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Abstract 
The 37th ESARDA symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation was held in Manchester, United Kingdom from 
19-21 May, 2015. The Symposium has been preceded by meetings of the ESARDA Working Groups on 18 May 2015. The 
event has once again been an opportunity for research organisations, safeguards authorities and nuclear plant operators 
to exchange information on new aspects of international safeguards and non-proliferation, as well as recent 
developments in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation related research activities and their implications for the 
safeguards community. 
The Proceedings contains the papers (118) submitted according to deadlines. 
Programme
Monday 18 May 
Working Group Meetings (and Friday 22 May)……… See agenda 
Building Capability in Safeguards R&D …………….. 09:30 – 16:00, Derby Room 
INMM International Safeguards Division……………. 17:00 – 19:00, Derby Room 
Reception at Midland Hotel………………………………. 19:00, Trafford Room 
Tuesday 19 May 
Plenary………………………………………………… 09:00 – 12:40, Alexandra Suite 
01 Implementation of Safeguards…………………….. 14:00 – 15:40, Alexandra Suite 
02 He-3 Alternatives for Neutron Detection………….. 14:00 – 15:40, Trafford Room 
03 International Collaboration………………………... 16:00 – 17:40, Alexandra Suite 
04 Uncertainties in NDA Measurements……………... 16:00 – 17:40, Trafford Room 
Wednesday 20 May 
05 Spent Fuel Verification……………………………. 08:40 – 10:40, Alexandra Suite 
06 Integrated Measurement and Monitoring………….. 08:40 – 10:40, Derby Room 
07 Safeguards Concepts………………………………. 08:40 – 10:40, Trafford Room 
08 Neutron Measurements……………………………. 11:00 – 12:40, Alexandra Suite 
09 Training and Knowledge Management……………. 11:00 – 12:40, Derby Room 
10 Quality Control in Destructive Analysis………….. 11:00 – 12:40, Trafford Room 
Poster Session………………………………………… 14:00 – 15:20, Alexandra Suite 
11 Gamma Measurements……………………………. 15:20 – 17:00, Alexandra Suite 
12 Export Control…………………………………….. 15:20 – 17:00, Derby Room 
13 Geospatial Information……………………………. 15:20 – 17:00, Trafford Room 
Conference Dinner………………………………………… 18:00 Transport from Midland  
Thursday 21 May 
14 Combined Analytical Techniques…………………. 08:40 – 10:40, Alexandra Suite 
15 Novel Technologies and Forensics………………... 08:40 – 10:40, Derby Room 
16 Containment and Surveillance…………………….. 08:40 – 10:40, Trafford Room 
17 Inhomogeneous Material Verification…………….. 11:00 – 12:40, Alexandra Suite 
18 Destructive Analysis Measurements………………. 11:00 – 12:40, Derby Room 
19 Geological Repositories…………………………… 11:00 – 12:40, Trafford Room 
20 Tomography for Spent Fuel Verification…………. 14:00 – 15:20, Alexandra Suite 
21 Non-Proliferation and Arms Control……………… 14:00 – 15:20, Derby Room 
22 Nuclear Material Accountancy……………………. 14:00 – 15:20, Trafford Room 
Closing Plenary……………………………………….. 15:20  Alexandra Suite 
Friday 22 May 
Working Group Meetings……………………………. See agenda 
Site Visit……………………………………………… Urenco Capenhurst 
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Tuesday Morning, 09:00-12:40
Plenary 1 – Alexandra Suite 
Chair – Jim Tushingham 
09:00 Welcome and opening remarks 
J. Tushingham, ESARDA President, and F. Sevini, ESARDA Secretary 
Keynotes: 
09:20 ONR Deputy Chief Nuclear Inspector and Programme Director, Mr G. Sallit 
09:40 EC ENER E Director, Dr P. Szymanski 
10:00 IAEA Dir SGCP, Ms T. Renis  
10:20 EC JRC DG, Professor V. Sucha 
10:40 Coffee break – Alexandra Suite 
Plenary 2 – Alexandra Suite 
Chair – Jim Tushingham 
11:00 INMM President, Dr L. Satkowiak 
11:20  Nuclear safeguards activities of the European Commission Joint Research Centre (80) 
S. Abousahl and Z. Palajova 
11:40 Recent Developments in IAEA Safeguards Guidance and Outreach (128) 
C. Mathews, A. Braunegger-Guelich, and I. Suseanu 
12:00 Overview of JAEA-ISCN’s NDA Development Programs (100) 
 M. Seya, M. Koizumi, H. Tomikawa, Y. Naoi, M. Kureta, H. Harada, R. Hajima and H. Nakamura 
12:20 Experience implementing the UK Additional Protocol (127) 
L. Johnson, M. Beaman and W. McCarthy 
12:40 Lunch – Alexandra Suite 
ii
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Tuesday Afternoon, 14:00-15:40
01 Implementation of Safeguards – Alexandra Suite 
Chair – Mike Beaman 
02 He-3 Alternatives for Neutron Detection – Trafford Room 
Chair – Anne-Laure Weber 
14:00 United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
Approach to Inspections and Quality Control of Data (2) 
D. Hanks and E. Freeman 
Workshop on He-3 alternatives for safeguards applications (17) 
P. Peerani, C. Carrapico, B. Pedersen, V. Forcina, F. Rosas, A. Rozite, H. Tagziria 
and A. Tomanin 
14:20 French Additional Protocol: technical implementation (51) 
G. Daniel 
Demonstration Result of Sample Assay System equipped Alternative He-3 
Detectors (101)  
H. Nakamura, Y. Mukai, H. Tobita, H. Nakamichi, A. Ohzu, M. Kureta, T. Kurita and 
M. Seya 
14:40 Safeguards-relevant information collection from small holders – 
experiences and challenges (49) 
E. Sundén, M. Dufva and J. Dahlberg 
Real-time, fast neutron detection for stimulated safeguards assay (106)  
M. Joyce, M. Aspinall, F. Cave and R. Plenteda 
15:00 Implementation of the SNRI concept in the FBFC Romans Fuel 
Fabrication Plant and the installation of unattended measurement 
stations for fuel assemblies (30) 
A. Terrasi, W. Koehne and P. Beuseling 
Experimental Assessment of a 6LiF:ZnS(Ag) Prototype Neutron Coincidence 
Counter for Safeguards (111) 
H. Tagziria, M. Foster, M. Schear, D. Ramsden, G. Dermody, B. Pedersen, P. 
Peerani and P. Schwalbach 
15:20 Safeguards Indexing Method for the Regulatory Assessment of 
Safeguards Culture at Nuclear Facilities (83) 
Z. Stefanka, É. Hedvig Nagy and Á. Vincze 
A prototype BF3 based neutron multiplicity counter for nuclear safeguards 
(114)  
B. Pedersen, J-M. Crochemore, M. Mosconi, V. Mayorov, H. Tagziria, A. 
Ocherashvili, E. Roesgen and P. Schwalbach 
15:40 Coffee break – Alexandra Suite 
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Tuesday Afternoon, 16:00-17:40
03  International Collaboration – Alexandra Suite 
Chair – Said Abousahl 
04 Uncertainties in NDA Measurements – Trafford Room 
Chair – Patrick Chard 
16:00 EU - ABACC Cooperation: Strengthening Safeguards Capabilities 
(63)  
J. Goncalves, F. Littmann, V. Sequeira, M. Sironi, O. Peixoto, S. de 
Almeida and S. Fernandez Moreno 
Emerging Applications of Bottom-Up Uncertainty Quantification in 
Nondestructive Assay (78)  
B. Weaver, A. Favalli, B. Williams, S. Croft, D. Dale and T. Burr 
16:20 Overview of Activities and Outcomes at Integrated Support Center 
for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security Related to 
Japanese Commitment at Nuclear Security Summit Process (99) 
Y. Naoi, N. Kobayashi, T. Mochiji and M. Senzaki 
TRIPOLI-4® and FREYA for Stochastic Analog Neutron Transport. 
Application to Neutron Multiplicity Counting (55) 
J. Verbeke and O. Petit 
16:40      JAEA − JRC Collaboration on the Development of  Active
Neutron NDA Techniques (109) 
M. Kureta, M. Koizumi, A. Ohzu, K. Furutaka, M. Seya and H. Harada 
Use of a Plutonium Piece Monitor and Improved Offline Plutonium Assay 
Algorithms in Support of a Residues Retrieval Programme (74) 
E. Waterhouse, J. Rackham, J. Sharpe, N. Clarke and M. Wilson 
17:00 Integrated NDA User Laboratories at the JRC in Ispra for Nuclear 
Safeguards and Nuclear Security (112) 
W. Janssens, K. Abbas, R. Berndt, V. Berthou, C. De Almeida Carrapico, J. 
Crochemore, G. Eklund, V. Forcina, M. Marin-Ferrer, V. Mayorov, P. 
Mortreau, M. Mosconi, B. Pedersen, P. Peerani, F. Rosas, A. Rozite, E. 
Roesgen, H. Tagziria and A. Tomanin 
Particle Swarm Imaging (PSIM) – A swarming algorithm for the reporting of 
robust, optimal measurement uncertainties (88) 
D. Parvin and S. Clarke 
17:20 Assessing ‘Gold Standard’ Status: Is the United Arab Emirates 
nuclear energy program suited to fit the bill? (61) 
M. Fisher 
Monte Carlo modelling of EURATOM neutron detectors for operational 
purposes (19) 
D. Ancius, P. De Baere and P. Schwalbach 
iv
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Wednesday Morning, 08:40-10:40
05 Spent Fuel Verification – Alexandra Suite 
Chair – Kåre Axell 
06 Integrated Measurement and Monitoring 
– Derby Room,  Chair – Joao Gonҫalves
07 Safeguards Concepts – Trafford Room 
Chair – Elina Martikka 
08:40 Extension of the SCK•CEN spent fuel 
inventory library (5) 
A. Borella, R. Rossa, K. van der Meer, M. Cometto 
and R. Remetti 
Progress and Status of Remote Data 
Transmission in EURATOM Safeguards (23) 
K. Schoop, J. Stronkhorst, J-F. Levert, C. Demartini, 
J. Pekkarinen, M. Garrisi, S. Kurek and K. Ruuska. 
Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and 
Security by Design to Address Real Time 
Threats in Nuclear Facilities (76) 
M. Schanfein and S. Mladineo 
09:00 Influence of fuel composition on the spent fuel 
verification by Self-Interrogation Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry (35)  
R. Rossa, A. Borella, P-E. Labeau, N. Pauly and K. 
van der Meer 
An update on the implementation of remote data 
transmission (RDT) in the dry interim storage 
facilities in Germany (28)  
A. Jussofie, K. van Bevern, W. Geißler, I. Niemeyer, 
A. Rezniczek, W. Trautwein and K. Schoop  
Safeguards by Design for Pyroprocessing 
Facilities in the ROK (6) 
H. Kim, E-H. Kwon and S-H. Park  
09:20 Development of Differential Die-Away 
Instrument for Characterization of Swedish 
Spent Nuclear Fuel (24) - T. Martinik, V. Henzl, 
M. Swinhoe, A. Goodsell, S. Grape, S. Jacobsson 
Svärd, P. Jansson and S. Tobin. 
Verification of Spent Fuel Transfers in Germany 
(129) 
I. Tsvetkov, G. Morris, D. Parise, B. Pudjanto, 
W. Kahnmeyer and W.Trautwein  
An Operators' Experience of Applying 
Safeguards by Design (113) 
A. Homer, V. Ferguson and C. Frears 
09:40 Improving the prediction model for Cherenkov 
light generation by irradiated nuclear fuel 
assemblies in wet storage for enhanced partial-
defect verification capability (31)  
E. Branger, S. Jacobsson Svärd and S. Grape 
Automated processing of safeguards data: 
Perspectives on software requirements for a 
future "All in One Review Platform" based on 
iRAP (27)  
A. Smejkal, P. Schwalbach and R. Linnebach 
Clandestine Proliferation: A Stochastic 
Process Model (65) 
N. Kyriakopoulos 
10:00 Underwater Testing of Detectors and 
Electronics Hardware for Spent Fuel 
Measurements (68)  
K. Ianakeiv, M. Swinhoe, M. Iliev, S. Tobin, A. 
Sjöland, H. Liljenfeldt and P. Jansson 
Use of a Plutonium Piece Monitor and 
Improved Offline Plutonium Assay Algorithms 
in Support of a Residues Retrieval Programme 
an Integrated Management System (IMS) at the 
EURATOM Safeguards Office (29) 
W. Koehne, P. Dossogne and J. Lupo 
Formalizing Acquisition Path Analysis for the 
IAEA's State-Level Concept (67) 
C. Listner, M. Canty, G. Stein, A. Rezniczek and I. 
Niemeyer 
10:20 In-field Performance Testing of the Fork 
Detector for Quantitative Spent Fuel 
Verification (90)  
I. Gauld, S. Vaccaro, P. Schwalbach, J. Hu, P. de 
Baere, H. Liljenfeldt and S. Tobin 
Applying the Data Analysis and 
Interpretation Software to Analyze Feed 
and Withdrawal Operations  (87) 
J. Garner and M. Whitaker 
Methodological aspects on the IAEA State 
Level Concept and related Acquisition Path 
Analysis (91)  
G. Renda, L-K. Kim and G. Cojazzi 
10:40 Coffee break – Alexandra Suite 
v
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Wednesday Morning, 11:00-12:40
08 Neutron Measurements - Alexandra Suite 
Chair – Alessandro Borella 
 09 Training and Knowledge Management 
– Derby Room,  Chair – Paolo Peerani
10 Quality Control in Destructive Analysis 
– Trafford Room,  Chair – Guy Granier
11:00 Comparison of Fresh Fuel Experimental 
Measurements to MCNPX Results using the 
Differential Die-Away Instrument for Nuclear 
Safeguards Applications (16)  
A. Goodsell, V. Henzl, M. Swinhoe, C. Rael, D. 
Desimone and W. Charlton 
Canada’s Standardized Program for Training 
Safeguards Inspection Staff (44) 
P. Creary and K. Owen-Whitred  
Quality control tools for age dating in nuclear 
safeguards and forensics (122)  
Y. Aregbe, C. Venchiarutti, A. Fankhauser, Z. 
Varga, R. Jakopic, S. Richter, K. Mayer, C. Rivier 
and D. Roudil  
11:20 Detection of fission signatures induced by a 
low-energy neutron source (104) 
A. Ocherashvili, V. Mayorov, A. Beck, E. Roesgen, 
G. Heger, J-M. Crochemore and B. Pedersen 
The Belgian approach in education and training 
in nuclear safeguards (81) 
K. van der Meer, A. Borella, R. Rossa, M. Coeck, R. 
Jakopic, Y. Aregbe, P. Schillebeeckx and B. Pedersen  
Experimental estimation of the uncertainties 
associated to low-background alpha-
spectrometry measurements (45) 
N. Cherubini, A. Dodaro, R. Iacovacci and G. 
Marzo 
11:40 Preliminary Results of the 2014 Field Trial of
the Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter 
(AEFC) for Verification of Research Reactor 
Spent Fuel at the Institute of Nuclear Physics 
(INP) (115)
K. Miller and H. Menlove 
The UK's Long Term Commitment to Training 
and Development in the International Safeguards 
Community (110) 
S. Francis 
Preparation of Uranium Micro-Particles as 
Reference Material for Nuclear Safeguards (66) 
R. Middendorp, A. Knott and M. Duerr 
12:00 A theoretical and experimental investigation of 
using Feynman-Y functions for the total and 
gamma detections in a nuclear and radioactive 
material assay (38) 
D. Chernikova, K. Axell and A. Nordlund 
Nuclear knowledge management in higher 
education. Case of Tomsk Polytechnic 
University (11) 
M. Perminova and D. Demyanyuk 
The Preparation of a Uranium-235 Solid 
Reference Material (107) 
S. Jerome, C. Larijani, S. Judge and S. Woods 
12:20 Improved Holdup Blender Assay System 
(IBAS) Slope Validation Measurements to 
Improve Nuclear Material Accountancy of 
High Alpha Holdup (72) 
A. Lafleur, H. Nakamura, H. Menlove, Y. Mukai, M. 
Swinhoe, J. Marlow and T. Kuroita 
Building a Strategy for ESARDA - Education, 
Training and Knowledge Management 
S. Grape, K. Persson and E. Andersson Sundén 
Stabilisation of uranium/plutonium dried spikes 
with a cellulose matrix (42) 
R. Buda, R. Carlos- Marquez, K. Lützenkirchen, P. 
van Belle 
12:40 Lunch – Alexandra Suite 
(139)
vi
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Wednesday Afternoon, 14:00-15:20
Poster  Session – Alexandra Suite 
Chair – Irmgard Niemeyer 
Each author will be invited to give a 2 minutes’ presentation of their poster, according to the 
order indicated below.  The short presentation may be just oral, or may be supported by one or 
two electronic slides, which should be provided before the start of the session.  Time keeping 
will be very strict.  After the short presentations, the session will continue in the poster area.  
Coffee will be served during the poster session. 
Chromatographic separation and on-line detection of long life alkali, alkaline earth and transition metal radionuclides by ICP-MS (73) 
A. Budreika, D. Plausinaitis, E. Naujalis, B. Knašienė, A. Prokopchik and A. Karaliūnas 
An efficient and sensitive optical sensor based on Furosemide as a new fluoroionophore for determination of uranyl ion (105) 
O. Elhefnawy and A. Elabd 
Image analysis methods for partial defect detection using tomographic images on nuclear fuel assemblies (48) 
A. Davour, S. Jacobsson Svärd and S. Grape 
Shielded Neutron Source Detection Option (22) A. Rozite
Conceptual Model of Security Threat Detection System of Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste at Banda Sea (9) 
D. Kurniawan, S. Putero and H. Santosa 
Nuclear Instrumentation & Control (1) 
M. Koshti and K. Modi 
Nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) (57) 
R. Vyas and K. Modi 
Software Development for Radionuclide Analysis Applications (121) 
M. Kaiser, S. Kim, V. Danilenko  and K. Eugene 
Method and validation for the preparation of a plutonium age dating reference material (123) 
Z. Varga, J. Zsigrai, A. Nicholl, M. Wallenius and K. Mayer 
Potential Causes of Inventory Differences at Bulk Handling Facilities and the Importance of Inventory Difference Action Levels (26) 
A. Homer and B. O'Hagan    
vii
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Wednesday Afternoon, 15:20-17:00
11 Gamma Measurements – Alexandra Suite 
Chair – to be confirmed  
 12 Export Control – Derby Room 
Chair – Christoph Treppmann 
13 Geospatial Information – Trafford Room 
Chair – Bhupendra Jasani 
15:20 Best practices for determining uranium 
isotopic composition by MGAU and FRAM 
(21) 
T. Ruther and J. Zsigrai 
Nuclear suppliers’ enhanced export control 
compliance and communication with authorities 
(82) 
F. Sevini, A. Viski, R. Chatelus, C. Charatsis, Q. 
Michel and S. Zero 
Nuclear Verification from Space - Satellite 
Imagery within Nuclear Non- proliferation and 
Arms Control Verification Regimes (56) 
I. Niemeyer 
15:40 Determination of Uranium enrichment with 
FRAM - Comparison of electrically cooled 
Germanium detector Detective200 and U-Pu 
detector (15) 
T. Köble, W. Berky, H. Friedrich, E. Lieder, M. 
Risse, O. Schumann, J. Glabian and W. Rosenstock 
SSM Research in Export Control (43) 
J. Peterson, H. Moberg, E. Koblet and L. Hildingsson 
Remote Sensing Technique in Support to 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Monitoring (59) 
M. Lafitte and J-P. Robin 
16:00 Analytical estimate of high energy gamma-ray 
emissions from neutron induced reactions in 
U-235, U-238, Pu-239 and Pu-240 (32) 
F. Postelt and G. Kirchner 
Comparison between Additional Protocol Annex 
II and current NSG trigger list through semantic 
representation (47) 
L. Falconi, G. Marzo, G. Giorgiantoni and M. 
Sepielli 
Monitoring uranium mining and milling using 
commercial observation satellites (94) 
L. Sundaresan, C. Srinivasan and B. Jasani 
16:20 An investigation of impurities and associated 
neutron signatures of strong orphan source of 
alpha (α) particles (40) 
D. Chernikova, K. Axell, A. Vesterlund and H. 
Ramebäck 
International Secure Platform for Export-
controlled Computing Tools (60) 
T. Valentine 
Integrated Analysis of Satellite Imagery for 
Nuclear Monitoring - G-SEXTANT Findings 
(117)  
I. Niemeyer, M. Canty, J-M. Lagrange, C. Listner, 
D. Schwartz, S. Uruñuela Hernández and E. Wolfart 
16:40 A rapid sample digestion procedure to aid 
initial nuclear forensics investigations for 
uranium-bearing ores and concentrates 
prior to gamma spectrometry (124) 
D. Reading, I. Croudace, P. Warwick and R. 
Britton 
3D Printing: Implications for Non-Proliferation 
(102) 
G. Christopher 
Mobile 3D Laser Scanning for Nuclear 
Safeguards (34) 
E. Wolfart, V. Sequeira, M. Murtezi, A. Zein, P. 
Turzak, S. Rocchi and L. Enkhjin 
18:00 Transport departs for Conference Dinner
viii
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Thursday Morning, 08:40-10:40
14 Combined Analytical Techniques – 
Alexandra Suite,  Chair – Jozsef Zsigrai 
15 Novel Technologies and Forensics  
– Derby Room,  Chair – Harri Toivonen
16 Containment and Surveillance 
– Trafford Room,  Chair – Pierre Funk
08:40 EURATOM experiences on NGSS field 
implementation preparation (25) 
J. Pekkarinen, K. Schoop and J-M. Mazur 
09:00 A user-friendly tool for easy and fast in-field 
Monte Carlo simulation of neutron collars (18) 
P. Peerani, H. Tagziria and M. Vescovi 
Nuclear Forensics Technologies in Japan (96) 
N. Shinohara, Y. Kimura, A. Okubo and H. 
Tomikawa 
New Ultrasonic Optical Sealing Bolts for Dry 
Storage Containers (13)  
F. Littmann, M. Sironi, V. Kravtchenko, B. Wishard, 
P. Schwalbach and L. Matloch 
09:20 Non-destructive measurement of the plutonium 
content of high-active liquid waste (33) 
J. Zsigrai, A. Leterrier, G. Duhamel, A. Maddison, 
J-G. Decaillon and A. Bosko 
Gamma spectrometric age dating of uranium 
samples (10) 
A. Kocsonya, Z. Kovacs, T. Nguyen and L. Lakosi 
Activities towards Ceramic Seal Operational 
Readiness (75) 
H. Smartt and D. Krementz 
09:40 Relative Actinide K-Shell Vacancy Production 
Rates in Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (120) 
R. McElroy, S. Cleveland, S. Croft, G. Mickum and 
A. Nicholson 
Standoff LIBS and Raman for security and 
safeguards applications (89) 
N. Smith, L. Li, D. Whitehead, C. Lennon, O. Horsfall 
and D. Trivedi  
Enhanced Containment and Surveillance 
System: Active Container Tracking System 
(SACTS) (85) –  
C. Britton, E. Farquhar, S. Frank, M. Kuhn, C. 
Pickett, B. Stinson, J. Younkin, D. Krementz, Y. Liu 
and J. Shuler 
10:00 Mass Attenuation Coefficient Data for Hybrid 
K-Edge Densitometry (119) 
S. Croft, R. McElroy, and A. Nicholson 
Determining the origins of Uranium Ore 
Concentrates using laboratory characterisation 
techniques (118) 
J. Caborn, C. Holmes and J. Edwards 
Enhancement of Safeguards Efficiency for 
Spent Fuel in Canada (46) 
H. Gao and K. Owen-Whitred 
10:20 Validation of the new software for in-field 
uranium concentration and enrichment 
measurements by "COMPUCEA" (39) 
H. Schorle, J. Zsigrai, M. Vargas-Zuniga, M. Toma 
and A. Berlizov 
A Safeguards Friendly Device for Monitoring 
Reactor Anti-Neutrinos (71) 
M. Murdoch 
Development of structural materials 
identification approach based on iris 
recognition algorithms (12) 
S. Sharavina and D. Sednev 
10:40 Coffee break – Alexandra Suite 
ix
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Thursday Morning, 11:00-12:40
17 Inhomogeneous Material Verification 
– Alexandra Suite,  Chair – to be confirmed
18 Destructive Analysis Measurements  
– Derby Room,  Chair – Eva Szeles
19 Geological Repositories – Trafford Room 
Chair – Joakim Dahlberg 
11:00 Utilizing Delayed Gamma Rays for 
Fissionable Material Measurement in NDA 
(92) 
D. Rodriguez, J. Takamine, M. Koizumi and M. 
Seya 
Semi-Automatic Separation Unit for 
Actinides at JRC-ITU and IAEA (41) 
R. Buda, L. Emblico, A. Schachinger, E. Zuleger 
“Cigéo” – The French Industrial Project of 
Deep Geological Repository Developed 
by Andra - Future Safeguards 
Considerations (50) 
F. Poidevin, P. Leverd and S. Farin  
11:20 R&D Status of Nondestructive Assay System 
Based on Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence 
(93)  T. Shizuma, R. Hajima, T. Hayakawa, C. 
Angell and M. Seya 
Implementation of Large Geometry SIMS for 
Safeguards: 4 Years Later (77) 
L. Sangely, J. Poths, T. Tanpraphan, O. Bildstein and 
H. Siegmund 
Encapsulation and final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel in Sweden (37) 
J-O. Stål 
11:40 Technique of Neutron Resonance 
Transmission Analysis for Active Neutron 
NDA (97)  
H. Tsuchiya, M. Koizumi, F. Kitatani, M. Kureta, 
H. Harada, M. Seya, J. Heyse, S. Kopecky, W. 
Mondelaers, C. Paradela and P. Schillebeeckx 
Validation of a Cameca 1280 High Resolution 
SIMS Instrument for Analysis of Nuclear 
Safeguards Environmental Swipes (126) 
A. Simons, N. Montgomery, T. Nicholls, A. Pidduck, 
S. Crooks and J. Collins 
Safeguards instrumentation to the final disposal 
facility in Finland (62) 
O. Okko 
12:00 Techniques of Neutron Resonance Capture 
Analysis and Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis for 
Active Neutron NDA (98)  
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United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
Approach to Inspections and Quality Control of Data 
David H. Hanks, Eric Freeman 





In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has benefited greatly from an 
increased number of data sources along with enhanced capabilities to assist safeguards inspectors 
who analyze this new data.  However, the quality and reliability of State declared information used by 
the IAEA to draw safeguards conclusions remains critically important. Each State or Regional 
Authority has the responsibility to ensure reports provided to the IAEA are accurate and complete.  
This paper describes the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (US NRC) approach to 
quality control of safeguards declarations provided to the IAEA and how this process supports 
fulfillment of the United States’ international obligations.  The US NRC’s audit-based approach to 
domestic inspections will be reviewed along with the advantages and challenges of such an approach 
to the quality control of information.  Furthermore, examples of quality control of safeguards-relevant 
information at facilities, the national nuclear materials database, and the NRC will be cited and used 
to show how each step helps build confidence in the final declaration provided to the IAEA. 
Introduction 
At the end of World War II and beginning of the world’s awareness of atomic weapons, the United 
States of America (U.S.) Congress established a system intended to protect the world from 
uncontrolled use of atomic energy for peaceful or non-peaceful uses. Congress passed the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 which resulted in creation of an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the 
transfer of ownership and responsibility of special nuclear material (SNM) in the U.S. from the 
Manhattan Project to the AEC. The Act authorized the AEC to produce nuclear materials and nuclear 
weapons, but only to the extent authorized by the U.S. President. It also authorized research and 
development activities, but only at AEC facilities or facilities under an AEC contract. As a direct result, 
nuclear material controls were first conceived and introduced by the Special and Fissionable Material 
Accountability Branch of the AEC in 19471 2.  
Slow progress was made between 1946 and 1954 in developing reliable accountancy measures for 
SNM because of the limited understanding of what was needed in this area and lack of appropriate 
verification technology. It became clear by 1954 that large scale peaceful uses of nuclear energy were 
possible, but could not be developed commercially under the strict rules of the original Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946. The U.S. Congress passed a completely revised Act in 1954 that included the ability for 
private individuals to possess (but not own) SNM for peaceful purposes. In addition, the AEC was 
authorized to issue licenses to qualified applicants requesting the possession/use of materials and 
performed inspections at all facilities working with special nuclear material. The philosophy of why 
there should be nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) changed markedly during the late 
1950’s. The former Special and Fissionable Accountability Branch was renamed the Division of 
Nuclear Materials Management at the AEC, eliminating a perceived stigma that accountability was a 
synonym for bookkeeping. By 1964, the U.S. Congress passed the Private Ownership Act which 
authorized individuals or corporations to own SNM requiring the AEC to grow its material control and 
accounting program to meet the new challenge. 
Evolving Safeguards in the United States 
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Nuclear material safeguards objectives and principles were introduced in the Atoms for Peace speech 
given in 1953 by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly, 
ending an era based solely on nuclear material management and beginning an era of international 
safeguards. A strong safeguards article was introduced into the newly established International 
Atomic Energy Agency charter in 1957. Some changes were made in the AEC beginning in 1963, 
which included its material control and accounting system employing an increased emphasis on 
safeguards. The U.S. offered to share much of its non-weapons nuclear materials and equipment with 
other nations that would agree to bilateral U.S. safeguards, including inspections, to ensure continued 
peaceful use of the materials furnished. Later, the Private Ownership Act of 1964 determined that the 
AEC had the ability to safeguard nuclear material as a function of who had physical possession, 
rather than who had legal title to the material.  
In 1967 and 1968 the AEC began to focus its efforts more on nuclear material safeguards instead of 
financially motivated nuclear material management. Where, in the case of precious metals monetary 
value was more important than strategic value of a material that might be used in an atomic bomb. Of 
particular importance was the addition of a series of license conditions designed to ensure SNM was 
safeguarded by its licensees. The AEC’s inspection responsibility of U.S. licensed nuclear facilities 
was moved into the Division of Nuclear Materials Safeguards under the Director of Regulation. 
Routine inspections were performed by the AEC at these facilities to ensure compliance with Federal 
Regulations.  
As part of the Atoms for Peace program, bilateral agreements for cooperation were concluded with a 
few Non-nuclear Weapons States. Assurances were given by the recipient governments that U.S. 
assistance would be used only for peaceful purposes. The State also agreed to maintain adequate 
records, submit periodic reports to the U.S., and allow U.S. inspections for safeguards purposes. 
Additionally, the U.S. began discussions with the IAEA on the potential for the U.S. to accept IAEA 
safeguards on US-supplied nuclear materials and facilities, while retaining a right to resume bilateral 
safeguards and inspections in the event of IAEA inability to carry out its safeguards responsibilities on 
US-origin SNM and facilities. It was a first step in providing safeguards declarations of nuclear 
material inventories to an autonomous international organization. 
The IAEA worked on safeguards approaches for facilities beginning in 1961, publishing IAEA 
information circular (INFCIRC) 26 which outlined a safeguard system for research reactors. To 
demonstrate a willingness to be safeguarded and to provide a proving ground for new concepts, the 
U.S. offered to place four research reactors under IAEA safeguards. INFCIRC/26 was extended in 
1964 to include power reactors. INFCIRC/26 was then replaced by INFCIRC/66 in 1965 which 
allowed for safeguards on specific principle nuclear facilities, nuclear material, and nonnuclear 
material to be safeguarded and prohibited their use for military purposes. A model comprehensive 
safeguards agreement was then described in INFCIRC/153 and in 1977 the U.S. signed the 
Agreement between the U.S. and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. (and Initial 
Protocol thereto) (INFCIRC/288). The United States brought its US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement into 
force in 1980.  
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 divided the AEC into two distinct organizations. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to license and regulate civilian uses of nuclear materials and facilities, 
along with the Energy Research and Development Administration (Department of Energy (DOE) 
precursor) to direct development and production of nuclear weapons, promotion of nuclear power and 
other energy-related work, and regulation of defense nuclear facilities. Acting as the U.S. National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) for its commercial nuclear industry, the NRC was charged with providing 
oversight for implementation of procedures and practices necessary to facilitate information gathering, 
timely reporting, and in-field verification of all commercial nuclear activities. 
Components of the NRC designed to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons or make them available 
to terrorists were exercised by the newly formed agency. By far the leading supplier of nuclear fuel 
and other materials for the production of nuclear power abroad, the U.S. had a responsibility to 
ensure exports did not encourage proliferation. Global increase in terrorist activities, transfers of 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies, as well as India’s nuclear explosion, which occurred 
during the decade of the 1970’s triggered U.S. policy makers to reevaluate domestic and international 
safeguards. The U.S. Congress passed legislation during that period, called the Export 
Reorganization Act of 1975, which gave the NRC responsibility for determining whether an importing 
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State’s imposed safeguards were “at least substantially comparable” to those required by the United 
States. Determining suitability of safeguards, including material accountability, in these States was an 
enormous task. The NRC lacked the resources and expertise to make these broad foreign policy 
assessments. It was ultimately determined that implementation of IAEA safeguards under a 
comprehensive safeguards agreement in those States fulfilled this obligation.3.  
In 1980, under the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288), “Voluntary Offer,” the U.S. 
allowed the IAEA to begin applying international safeguards on all special nuclear material (SNM) 
within the U.S., only excluding facilities associated with direct national security significance activities, 
with a view to enabling the IAEA to verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in 
the Agreement, from activities in facilities while such material is being safeguarded. The U.S. 
continues to periodically provide the IAEA with a list of facilities eligible for the application of 
safeguards; adding or removing facilities from that list as necessary. Revisions to this eligible facilities 
list (EFL) by the NRC and DOE are submitted for a 60-day Congressional review before they are 
submitted to the IAEA. As a result, the U.S. submits a completed IAEA Design Information 
Questionnaire (DIQ) and negotiates a Subsidiary Arrangement for those facilities formally selected by 
the IAEA from this list under the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement or its Initial Protocol. 
The US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and its associated EFL stems from discussions held between 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)1 and major industrial Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), who were 
concerned that acceptance of safeguards under the NPT would place them at a commercial and 
industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses. Interferences of IAEA 
safeguards inspections could affect the efficient operation of their commercial activities and possibly 
compromise their industrial secrets through IAEA personnel’s access to their facilities and records. In 
recognition of this concern, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated on December 2, 1967 that the United 
States would not ask any country to accept safeguards that the U.S. was unwilling to accept for its 
own nuclear activities—excluding those with direct national security significance4.  
The Initial Protocol to the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement was brought into force at the same time as 
the Agreement in 1980. The Initial Protocol allows for a secondary type of selection of facilities on the 
US EFL that only submit design information, permit IAEA inspectors to verify such information in the 
facility, maintain accounting records, and provide accounting reports to the IAEA without inspections. 
The technical provisions in the protocol follow closely the comparable provisions in the Agreement 
itself. Providing an initial protocol to the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement creates a succinct 
distinction between facilities selected for full safeguards and those required to only submit information 
and perform maintenance of records.  
In order to minimize costs to the IAEA, it was decided that safeguards would only be applied to a 
select number of facilities in the U.S., based on advanced designs or sensitivity in terms of 
international competition. Historically, the IAEA implemented and subsequently withdrew traditional 
safeguards at several NRC and DOE facilities under the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The list of 
NRC licensed facilities inspected by the IAEA intermittently between 1980 and 2005 includes: 6 
commercial power reactors, 5 LEU fuel fabrication facilities, and two HEU down-blending projects. 
Nuclear Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) 
Safeguarding licensed facilities, for domestic safeguards purposes, by the NRC continued to evolve 
from the routine inspections established by the AEC in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, 
becoming more comprehensive over time. Inspector practices were further enhanced in the 1960s-
1970s by the need to meet domestic legislative requirements. As in the early years, nuclear material 
accountancy was always the key element of ensuring that no diversion of SNM was taking place and 
the prevention of diversion by threat of early detection.  
In the commercial nuclear industry, quantitative control of SNM began as a philosophy that was first 
aimed at balancing cost of the nuclear material with effectiveness of its use to produce energy. 
However, in theory, as control and accounting of SNM became commensurate with the U.S. dollar, 
1 Article IX.3 of the NPT defines a nuclear-weapon State as one which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. Those States are: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
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SNM worth also became proportional to its strategic value for possible weapons production. The 
outdated philosophy for safeguarding purposes in the commercial industry was corrected by 1968, 
when the concept of a material balance area (MBA) and its importance to material control was 
introduced as a safeguards license condition by the AEC. Periodic physical inventories and 
adjustment of records accordingly helped to force licensees to prepare closed material balances at 
the end of each material balance period. Rules for how licensees were to construct, operate, 
decommission and report were codified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR). 
After 1974, nuclear material control and accounting procedures once performed under the AEC were 
improved by the U.S. Government through cooperation and financing of both the NRC and DOE. In 
time, a centralized national database for tracking and accounting for source and SNM in the U.S. was 
established using a computerized system under a DOE contract. The Nuclear Materials Management 
and Safeguards System (NMMSS) database now supports all the U.S. Government source and SNM 
accountancy programs. All facility identifier codes, nuclear material transactions, material balances 
and inventories are documented by NMMSS and used as a centralized reporting system that provides 
information to the IAEA under the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Additionally, some facilities use a 
facility-specific NMMSS software program called Safeguards Management Software (SAMS) which 
enables the user to resolve problems and make corrections prior to sending data to NMMSS. Quality 
assurance is incorporated into the software as described in DOE Order O 413.1b.  
Licensed facility operators in the U.S. are required to prepare nuclear material inventory and material 
flow report(s) and send them to the NRC for review. Normally, under domestic regulations (10CFR), 
data is transmitted electronically in the U.S. from the facility operator to the national accounting 
program managed by NMMSS utilizing proper domestic codes. When selected by the IAEA for 
safeguards, the facility operator generally performs the same procedure with the addition of key 
measurement points (KMPs), IAEA material description codes and measurement basis to their 
reports. Once this essential data is received by NMMSS, the information is structured into the proper 
IAEA reporting format outlined in the Facility Attachment (or Transitional Facility Attachment) and 
routed to the NRC, which then finalizes and submits the report(s) to the IAEA. Impact of this additional 
reporting to the IAEA is primarily absorbed by selected facilities from the U.S. EFL. However, the NRC 
and NMMSS bear the added responsibility of ensuring all reports from facilities under IAEA 
safeguards are accurate and complete. 
It is important to note that accurate and complete information recorded in facility records and reported 
to the IAEA be identifiable to inspectors and consistent with international standards. Information as it 
relates to certain items and batches of material should be recorded and referenced in the accounting 
records, inventory change documents and general ledger, so that data can be traced to its origin. 
Although the act of maintaining the accurate and complete information isn’t an additional impact, 
providing feedback to inquiries from the IAEA inspector could present some amount of burden to the 
NRC and facility operators.  
Performance-Based Domestic Safeguards 
US NRC inspectors have performed routine and unannounced inspections at licensed facilities 
constantly since the AEC was abolished. Techniques used by the NRC inspectors at reactors, spent 
fuel storage and nuclear fuel cycle facilities (fuel fabrication, enrichment and conversion) during the 
late 1970s included several methods of verification for inventory and nuclear material flow. 
Instrumentation for measuring unique items, scales for weighing, destructive analysis of bulk material 
and human surveillance were all part of the domestic safeguards approach.  
After the 1979 Three Mile Island event, the NRC focused more resources on nuclear safety and 
began to utilize an oversight program that included audit-based inspections for safeguards. The 
current material control and accounting process by the licensee is designed to use control and 
monitoring measures to prevent or detect loss when it occurs or soon thereafter. Additionally, 
statistical and accounting measures are used to maintain knowledge of the quantities of special 
nuclear material present in each area of a facility. Physical inventories and material balances are 
used to verify the presence of licensed material or to detect the loss of such material after it occurs, in 
particular, through theft by an insider.5 
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Oversight of the licensee’s MC&A recordkeeping system by NRC inspections ensures accountability 
of nuclear material and demonstrates that performance objectives and facility system capabilities are 
met. Facility records used to provide complete and accurate information to the IAEA can also be used 
to trace source material and SNM declared inventory and flow in monthly inventory change reports 
(ICRs), physical inventory listings (PILs) and material balance reports (MBRs). Inspectors also review 
facility MC&A procedures associated with the receipt and shipment of imports and exports as 
described in a facility import or export license. Quality control of the US Government reports to the 
IAEA begins with the assurance of proper MC&A recordkeeping accuracy and completeness by the 
facility as outlined in the 10CFR 50.9 and 70.5. Facility quality assurance programs provide for the 
adequate review, approval, and use of those material control and accounting procedures that are 
identified in the approved NRC Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan as being critical to the 
effectiveness of the described system. 
Fuel Cycle Facilities 
The framework for oversight includes gathering and processing performance information from a 
facility, evaluating risk by using a significance determination process based on results from risk 
assessments that licensees prepare under 10CFR Part 70. The NRC uses licensee provided 
performance indicator data to complement its core inspection, allowing the NRC to reduce the scope 
of these inspections, thereby enhancing efficiency for both the NRC and licensees.  
The fuel cycle facility oversight program employs a predictable, graded process to focus NRC 
oversight and is based on risk and acceptability of performance. The NRC inspection program carries 
out a base level oversight program for all licensed facilities, focusing on the most safety and 
safeguards significant plant activities being performed.  
Inspections at fuel cycle facilities occur several times a year and typically cover activities such as 
nuclear criticality control, chemical process, emergency preparedness, fire safety, and radiation 
safety. The facility Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan is required for each fuel cycle facility 
and is used as the framework for MC&A inspections. Resident inspectors are assigned to operating 
Category I Fuel Facilities and perform daily inspections at those sites. Periodic specialized inspections 
are conducted using personnel from NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland and the Region II 
office in Atlanta, Georgia. The NRC Inspection Manual provides guidance for inspectors on the 
objectives for each type of inspection and procedures to be used. 
The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) has overall responsibility for the NRC’s 
regulation of fuel cycle facilities. NMSS personnel review all ICR, PIL and MBR reports prior to their 
transmission to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Currently there are three NRC licensed low 
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication facilities and one gas centrifuge enrichment plant reporting to 
the IAEA under the U.S. Initial Protocol, utilizing a Transitional Facility Attachment (TFA) for guidance 
and a completed IAEA DIQ describing essential equipment and routine operations of the plant.  
U.S. Additional Protocol 
When the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force on January 6, 2009, the U.S. Government 
began providing data to the IAEA that differed from previous data sets and required a new approach 
to quality control. In particular, the AP does not focus on accountancy reports from nuclear facilities 
but instead requires the U.S. to provide information on fuel cycle research and development activities 
not involving nuclear material, uranium recovery, site layout and building descriptions, export 
information, and other Article 2 activities. In order to ensure the overall quality of the U.S. declaration 
to the IAEA, the NRC recognized that two different approaches were required. First, the industry 
needed to be educated about the U.S. AP and its associated requirements to help ensure quality data 
is reported to the U.S. Government. Second, the NRC needed to perform continuous quality control 
reviews of the data that was submitted in order to catch any mistakes or negative trends. 
The NRC began providing outreach on the U.S. AP and its associated requirements in 2008. It was 
recognized early in the process that one critical component of ensuring the quality of data provided to 
the IAEA was an adequate understanding of the U.S. AP by the domestic nuclear industry. Through 
tradeshows, conferences, and meetings, the NRC and Department of Commerce provided information 
to a variety of different licensees, and non-licensed advocacy groups (e.g., Nuclear Energy Institute). 
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The focus of this outreach effort was on the various reporting requirements under the U.S. AP and the 
U.S. Government process and deadlines for submitting data.  
Beginning with its initial declaration, the U.S. Government instituted a review process for the quality 
control of data. Multiple U.S. Government agencies reviewed the data to ensure it is consistent with 
requirements under the U.S. AP. While this was a fairly straightforward change, there is a 
fundamental difference between how data under the VOA and AP is treated within the U.S.  
The Department of Commerce is used as the central repository for the entire U.S. Government data 
submitted pursuant to the AP. This means that NMMSS is not involved in the processing of data for 
the annual declaration, or the quarterly import/export requirements. By removing the traditional role of 
NMMSS, one critical quality control step is also removed from the process. Therefore, over time, the 
NRC adopted an internal review process that helps to augment the U.S. Government-wide process. 
As an example, beginning between late 2012 and early 2013, the NRC incorporated a review of AP 
documentation and source data into the domestic inspection program at uranium recovery facilities. 
Approximately once a year while on-site for an inspection, NRC inspectors will ask for the facility to 
produce the declared AP reports and any source data used to produce the final report. This process 
helps to ensure that licensees reporting under articles 2.a.v and 2.a.vi are correctly interpreting the 
requirements in 10 CFR Part 75, and that there are no typographical errors in what is sent to the 
Department of Commerce. 
Summary 
Accurate and complete reports provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency by the U.S. 
Government from selected US NRC licensed facilities is ensured by a series of measures established 
over nearly 70 years of experience in nuclear material control and accounting. After the U.S. 
Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the Export Reorganization Act of 1975, 
the NRC was made responsible for ensuring importing States of U.S. supplied SNM and equipment 
were under suitable safeguards. States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in place fulfilled 
this obligation. Nuclear material accountancy has always been the key element to verify that no 
diversion of SNM has taken place and prevent diversion by threat of early detection. The U.S. 
Government utilizes a national database to track all source and SNM in the U.S., and provide reports 
to the IAEA. Quality control is incorporated into the nuclear material management and safeguards 
system software that provides reports for IAEA selected licensed facilities. The ICRs, PILs and MBRs 
are reviewed by the NRC prior to being sent to the IAEA. The Additional Protocol declaration review 
process is different than the nuclear material accountancy review process, in that it has an additional 
U.S. Government-wide review for initial declaration, annual updates and changes that takes place 
after the lead agencies review the declarations from those entities for which they are responsible.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 J.S. Walker and T.R. Wellock, A Short History of the Nuclear Regulation, 1949-2009, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, October 2010 
2 J.E. Lovett, Nuclear Materials Accountability Management Safeguards, American Nuclear Society, Nov. 1974 
3J.S. Walker, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974-1980  
4 http://www.State.gov/t/isn/5209.htm, 2012 
5 US NRC Regulatory Guide 5.29 (Rev 2) Special Nuclear material Control and Accounting Systems for 
Nuclear Power Plants, June 2013 
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Abstract:
This paper will describe the technical organization implemented since 2004 and the different steps
required to achieve an exhaustive and compliant Additional Protocol declaration (identification of
concerned entities, data collection, processing and cross-matching, analysis).
It will include appropriate information about content of the declaration. The feedback concerning the
challenges associated to the collection of information to ensure correctness and completeness will be
addressed. One of them is the understanding of the Additional Protocol by the industrials when
contacted about their activities, particularly when they are not focused on the nuclear sector and
therefore not used to its vocabulary. Analysis of the consistency of the gathered information is also a
big issue. Some examples will be given for a better understanding.
Additionally, the future of the French Additional Protocol data collection and compilation process will
be addressed, especially using the IT to improve the quality of the declaration thanks to a new web
portal. The aim of the recently developed software is to facilitate the work of entities submitted to
declarations on one hand and of IRSN analysts, in terms of data input and control on the other hand.
This tool will also take into account the feedback given by the Agency and the resulting evolution
requests to support its role within the international non-proliferation regime.
Keywords: Additional Protocol; France; Information technology; Safeguards
1. Introduction
On the 22nd of September 1998, in order to participate in the strengthening of IAEA safeguards,
France signed an additional protocol (INFCIRC/290/add.1) to its safeguards agreement
(INFCIRC/290). The protocol entered into force at the same time as those of the other Member States
of the European Union, on the 30th of April 2004. Under that protocol, France supplies additional
information to the IAEA on activities carried out in cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon States
(NNWS):
 Nuclear fuel cycle related public and private research and development activities,
 Manufacturing of Annex I equipment,
 Imports and exports from and to a NNWS outside of the Community of intermediate or high-
level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233,
 Exports out of France to a NNWS outside of the Community of Annex I and II equipment and
material,
 Planned co-operation activities with a NNWS for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to
the development of the nuclear fuel cycle.
The objective of the Additional Protocol is to provide relevant information to help the Secretariat to
detect clandestine activities conducted by NNWS, for example by the identification of mistakes or lack
in statements. It is important to note that the scope of relevant French stakeholders involved in the
declarations under the Additional Protocol is pretty wider than the holders of nuclear materials or
nuclear operators.
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As the purpose of this commitment by the French authorities is to facilitate the detection of undeclared
nuclear activities in a NNWS, IAEA may also request complementary accesses (CA) to declared
locations or anywhere upon the French territory.
2. Technical organization and feedback
The Euratom Technical Committee (CTE) is the French authority responsible for safeguards. The CTE
relies on the technical support provided by the IRSN’s (Radiation protection and Nuclear Safety
Institute) International Safeguards Implementation Unit. IRSN is the French national expert for nuclear
risk assessment including safety, security, safeguards.
As the AP covers activities which may not involve nuclear materials, the first challenge was to identify
the French entities potentially concerned, as they were not limited to those usually monitored either by
the French authorities, the European Commission or the IAEA. At the end of 2003, no specific data
base of these companies existed. For this reason, IRSN had to use different information sources to
define a list of entities potentially concerned. Almost 4000 entities were primarily preselected, but only
1741 were contacted for the initial statement after reviewing each one in depth. The list has been
rendered more selective with 202 entities in 2013.
An annual partial review of the entities is made, with, for example, the analysis of export licences
granted and European Framework Programs. In 2014, ten years after the submission of the French
AP initial declaration, a new global evaluation of all potentially concerned entities has been carried
carried out, to ensure that the list is up-to-date, using open source information and national firms
directories.
In parallel, CTE and IRSN organised several meetings with the main actors of the French nuclear
sector (EDF, AREVA…) and nuclear public research organisations (CEA, CNRS…). The aim of these
meetings was to introduce the French organisation for the implementation of the AP, to explain the
various types of declarations and to identify contact points inside these entities.
During the last 10 years, the interest of involving stakeholders was demonstrated in several occasions
as it ensures that they are able to provide the right elements. It implied to develop an appropriate
language, easily understandable but also sufficiently accurate to ensure the suitability of the answers.
Data collection and processing is divided in several steps:
(a) Contact the entire list of entities. In 2004, this preliminary step was completed at the
end of April with the sending of the declaration files containing a letter explaining the
aims of the AP, the national declaration forms and the French declaration handbook
(See figure 1 below). The following years, specific information for each entity,
extracted from previous declarations, was also sent. This habit proved to be very
useful to maximise the general consistency of the declaration.
To answer to entities questions. IRSN implemented dedicated hot line and email
address to assist the operators who needed help to analyse their situation regarding
the declaration criteria or to fill the declaration forms. These specifics means of
communication are commonly used by the operators. Especially the first time, a lot of
questions arose concerning the kind of cooperation that should be declared.
(b) Analyse the data collected. The collection of information from different entities has
many advantages:
(i) Cross matching when more than one French entity work on a subject is a
good way to ensure correctness of the declaration.
(ii) Contacted entities may as well give information on other companies working
in the same domain of activity and potentially cooperating in a relevant field of the
Additional Protocol.
In the French statement for 2013, 694 lines were declared in annual or quarterly declarations. From
the beginning of its AP, 205 declarations were realized, representing more than 5000 lines.
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Figure 1: National declaration handbook.
3. Future of the declaration
In 2012, French authorities expressed their willingness to improve the format and content of its
declarations to assist the IAEA in fulfilling its mandate. Thus, the Agency suggested some adjustments
in order to facilitate the review process and make it more efficient in assessing the correctness and
completeness of French and NNWS partners declarations.
Considering the possibilities given by the democratization of Internet, IRSN decided to implement a
web portal called PASTEL (Additional Protocol: Electronic Input and Processing). This evolution has
the following interests:
(a) Take into account some of the suggestions from the Agency in terms of format by
using more detailed forms.
(b) Facilitate the work done by the contacted entities by guiding them more accurately
and by allowing them to reuse previously registered information (e.g. lists of address).
(c) Reduce drastically the rewriting work done by IRSN analysts to focus on the content
assessment
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Figure 2: Article 2.a.i) declaration form in PASTEL.
This portal is now being tested internally. Access will be given to a small batch of entities during the
second semester of 2015 and full access next year.
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Abstract:
A number of universities, research institutions, hospitals, and other businesses are in possession of
relatively small amounts of nuclear material. In some cases the material is in activities related to the
nuclear fuel cycle, but there are also a wide variety of other applications. Regardless of application,
material accountancy must be reported to the European Commission (EC) and, in Sweden, to the
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM). However, checking the completeness and correctness of
the reports from operators with very small amounts of nuclear material can easily be forgotten or
viewed as being less important. In the beginning of 2013 SSM started to prioritize this area and began
working on more actively gathering information and checking its correctness. Informing the operators
in possession of nuclear material of the rules and regulations are a major part of this work, as we have
found that the knowledge level of safeguarding nuclear material in many locations is very low.
This paper will give a description of the work being performed by SSM to ensure that information
related to the possession of nuclear material are gathered and correctly declared. It will give an
overview of the different procedures that are applied to different categories of small holders in Sweden
(where the differences are mostly due to historical reasons). It will also entail some of the challenges
we have met along the way; such as explaining to radiographers that for nuclear non-proliferation
purposes we are interested in the shielding uranium container, not in the isotope emitting the radiation.
What we have experienced being the major differences between collecting information from small
holders as compared to larger nuclear facilities will also be outlined. We will end with some plans for
the future.
Keywords: small holders, information collection, LOF
1. Introduction
Sweden is a country with a long tradition of nuclear related activities. Already in the 1940s both a civil
and a military nuclear programme were developing. However, signing and ratifying the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 officially set an end to the military dimension of
the Swedish nuclear programme. In the 1970s and 80s the civil program grew and industry related to
the civil nuclear fuel cycle expanded. Currently Sweden has ten light water reactors in operation and
two permanently shut down. There is also a fuel fabrication factory and a research facility that up until
2005 contained a research reactor in operation. For the back-end of the fuel cycle a central interim
storage facility for spent nuclear fuel was built and started operation in 1985. A final geological
repository is planned and a first round of applications from the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste
Management Co (SKB) are currently under review by SSM and the Land and Environmental Court.
In addition to the large fuel cycle related facilities in Sweden there are also a number of small holders
of nuclear material. Some of the nuclear material, especially at schools and universities, was
purchased a long time ago and predates the Swedish signing of the NPT. The amounts of material
and applications vary and the holders can be anywhere from a small company with a handful of
employees to large research institutions with thousands of people within the organization. The number
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of small holders is not static over time, as a contrast to the very long-term operations of larger nuclear
fuel cycle facilities, and new holders can emerge quickly and others disappear by selling or
transferring their material elsewhere. These small holders are subjected to requirements for
safeguarding their material and should follow basically the same rules and regulations in this area as
the power plants and the other large facilities. This paper will describe the work being done by the
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) for ensuring the completeness and correctness of the
declarations submitted from this section of nuclear material holders.
2. Overview of holders of small amounts of nuclear material in Sweden
As of April 2015 there are in total 21 registered holders of small amounts of nuclear material in
Sweden. All together they are in possession of approximately 0.6 kg low enriched uranium, 1,000 kg
natural uranium, 1,300 kg depleted uranium and 11 kg of thorium. The bulk part of the depleted
uranium is in the form of radiation shielding devices. The sum of the holders combined amount of
highly enriched uranium and plutonium is of the order of 50 g in each category. Their approximate
locations can be viewed in figure 1. “WSWE” is the Material Balance Area (MBA)-code for the Swedish
national Location Outside Facility (LOF). “CAM” refers to the holders which are organized within the 
European “Catch-all” MBA. “Own MBA” refers to holders which have their own MBA-code. More on the
differences between these three categories of nuclear material holders will be explained in section 3.2.
Figure 1: A map of Sweden with the general location of registered holders of small amounts of nuclear material.
The labels refer to the three categories of holders. “WSWE” is the national LOF, “Own MBA” means holders which 
have separate MBA-codes, and “CAM” refers to the holders included in the European Catch-All MBA. The
categories are more thoroughly explained in section 3.2. The map reflects the situation as of April 2015 (map
adapted from WikiMedia Commons).
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The registered holders of small amounts of nuclear material include radiographers, scrap metal yards,
recycling facilities, universities, laboratories, research institutions and hospitals. They use different
types of nuclear material for different applications. We suspect that there are more installations in
possession of nuclear material than presently registered and work is on-going to investigate this. As of
yet, a structured approach to such an investigation have not been employed, but there have been
some activities to this end. One out-reach activity aimed at radiation experts at universities have been
conducted and plans exists for similar out-reach activities to other professional groups, such as
radiographers. Information about unregistered holders can come from the installation itself or through
an already registered holder, from open sources, or from other parts of SSM. When information about
unregistered holders reaches us we include the installation in WSWE and reports the material to the
EU Commission.
Every time we encounter an installation with nuclear material which has not yet been reported, the
reason given is lack of knowledge. Once information about the rules and regulations a holder of
nuclear material must abide by is provided, the holder tries to provide the correct information to the
Authority. This process is sometimes quite slow because there is often a need to search for
documentation and/or make measurements on the material to determine its properties.
The Authority keeps a national registry over all known nuclear material in Sweden. This registry
includes both the nuclear fuel cycle material as well as the nuclear material at each small installation.
When nuclear material is discovered and registered, the national registry is updated.
3. The legal framework for Swedish nuclear non-proliferation
Sweden is a party to the NPT and a member of the European Union (EU). Following that, Sweden has
accepted safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to control that all nuclear
material declared by the state is not misused. The control is based on a safeguards agreement
concluded with the state. Before entering the EU a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA,
INFCIRC/234) according to the model agreement INFCIRC/153 was in force in Sweden. By joining the
EU the agreement was replaced with INFCIRC/193 where the major difference lies in that the
European Commission (through Euratom) is the contact for all Swedish facilities. In 2000 Sweden
ratified the Additional Protocol (AP) and in 2004 the AP entered into force. Sweden decided to be a so
called ‘non-side-letter state’, i.e. Sweden is responsible for Articles 2a(i), 2a(iv), 2a(ix), 2a(x), and 2b(i),
which entails declaring nuclear fuel cycle-related research, the manufacturing of certain products, the
export of other products, and general plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the
development of the nuclear fuel cycle. For Articles 2a(iii) and 2a(viii), which entail providing the IAEA
with a general description of each site and information about processing of intermediate of high-level
waste, there is a shared responsibility between Sweden and the EU Commission. Sweden decided to
nominate its Competent Authority, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, as the site responsible for
each site in Sweden. For articles 2a(v), 2a(vi) and 2a(vii), which entail declaring information about
mines and source material, and quantities of material exempted from safeguards under article 36 or
37 under INFCIRC/193, the EU Commission is the responsible party.
As a member of the European Union, the Commission Regulation (Euratom) no 302/2005 has the
same legal standing as a national law in Sweden. To fulfil the articles in the Additional Protocol the
sentiment of the articles have been incorporated into Swedish national law. This was done by updating
the Act and Ordinance on Nuclear Activities (Lag (1984:3) och Förordning (1984:14) om kärnteknisk
verksamhet), the Act and Ordinance on Inspections according to International Agreements on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Lag (2000:140) och Förordning (2005:275) om inspektioner
enligt internationella avtal om förhindrande av spridning av kärnvapen), and in regulations prescribed
by the Authority (mainly SSMFS 2008:3; Strålsäkerhetsmyndighetens föreskrifter om kontroll av
kärnämne m.m.).
There are thus EU-regulations and national laws and regulations that implement the international
agreements on safeguards (such as the AP). In addition to this there are also national laws and
regulations. In the Act on Nuclear Activities it is specified that nuclear activities requires a licence,
either from the Government or from SSM. The Ordinance on Nuclear Activities specifies the limits of
the amount of nuclear material an entity can hold before it needs a licence from the Government or
from SSM, and what amounts only need to be reported but does not require licences. The Act on
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Nuclear Activities gives SSM the right to issue the regulations necessary to ensure compliance with
obligations in agreements aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and unauthorised
dealings with nuclear material and such nuclear waste that comprises spent nuclear fuel.
3.1. National rules and regulations for small holders
As mentioned in the introduction, the holders of small amounts of nuclear material must follow
basically the same rules and regulations for safeguarding their material as the large nuclear fuel cycle
related facilities. Of course, not all articles are applicable to all types of activities or businesses, but the
same basic rules apply. In particular, all holders must have control over their stock of nuclear material.
This entails keeping a current list over all nuclear material and up-date it as needed.
Most of the additional rules regarding nuclear non-proliferation for holders of nuclear material are
specified in regulations prescribed by the Authority, where the majority can be found in SSMFS 2008:3
(The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Material etc.). The
national rules on nuclear non-proliferation most applicable to the holders of small amounts of nuclear
material are summarized here:
All holders must have control over their stock of nuclear material. All changes to the inventory must be
reported to SSM within three business days. The nuclear material must be stored so identification and
verification can be made, and at an inspection there must be personnel with enough competence
present so that international inspectors can fulfil their inspection tasks. After a request by the
Authority, the holder must establish a site description over the buildings or parts of buildings where
nuclear material is used or stored. All holders must also appoint a person responsible for safeguards
within their organisation and report a point of contact for communications with the Authorities (the
State Authority, the EU Commission, and the IAEA). All holders must have a system and an
organization with enough financial and personnel resources to ensure these tasks are fulfilled.
In addition to the rules and regulations aimed at ensuring nuclear non-proliferation summarized above
there is also several other rules a holder of nuclear material must abide by. For example, they must
have a system for physical protection of the material, a waste management system, financial means to
take responsibility for the material until it is placed in a final repository, and handle the material
correctly to limit the radiation exposure to those coming in contact with the nuclear material. Some of
these additional rules derive from the Radiation Protection Act (Strålskyddslagen (1988:220)) which
aims at protecting humans, animals, and the environment from harmful exposure to radiation. An
amount of nuclear material can be exempted from license according to the Ordinance on Nuclear
Activities but require a license according to the Radiation Protection Act.
3.2. Different categories of small holders and international regulations
In Sweden the holders of small amounts of nuclear material are divided into three categories. With
different combinations of exemptions and derogations in these categories the set of international rules
they must abide by will vary between them, in addition to the national rules and regulations described
in the previous section. In this paper we label the three categories “Own MBA”, “National LOF”, and
“Catch-All MBA”.
“Own MBA” refers to the holders which have their own separate Material Balance Area (MBA) code. In
general, they report their inventory and changes to it directly to the EU Commission using the
reporting tool ENMAS. They are also obligated to provide annual activity reports, Basic Technical
Characteristics (BTC), and site descriptions, and keep them updated. However, several of these
holders hold nuclear material in amounts low enough to ask the EU Commission to apply for
exemption from safeguards under Article 37 in INFCIRC/193, or use nuclear material in such
applications that it can be exempted under Article 36 in INFCIRC/193. If granted, they will not have to
provide a site declaration or be subjected to inspections by the IAEA. By applying for derogations
under Article 19 in the Commission Regulation (Euratom) no 302/2005 the reporting format and
frequency can be simplified. If granted derogation the holder need only report when a change has
occurred, instead of monthly, and they can do so using a special form instead of using ENMAS. They
do however need to provide a report annually of their entire stock of nuclear material. Exemptions and
derogations are not connected, i.e. being granted one of them does not mean being granted the other
one. This means that there is in total four possible combinations here, where each combination comes
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with different rules and obligations (i.e. exemption + derogation, no exemption + derogation,
exemption + no derogation, and no exemption + no derogation). All four combinations are or have
been represented in the group “Own MBA” in Sweden. 
The “National LOF” in Sweden is a single Material Balance Area with the code WSWE. The members
within this MBA are located all over Sweden. When a business or research institution acquires nuclear
material (or as in most cases, discover that they already are in possession of nuclear material but had
not reported it to the Authority) the first step the SSM does is to include them in this MBA. Changes
within an MBA should not be reported to the EU Commission; however SSM keeps track of the
individual stock of nuclear material for all members of this MBA and records changes also within the
MBA. When a change in inventory in or out of WSWE is reported to SSM we report it to the EU
Commission using ENMAS. Exemptions and derogations can only be granted for an entire MBA, and
since the inventory quite frequently changes for some of the members within WSWE no exemptions or
derogations can be granted for any individual entity within this MBA. Therefore site descriptions are
needed for all members. The first site declaration for this MBA was created and submitted in 2014 and
the process leading up to this is described in section 5.
The “Catch-All MBA” is a common European Material Balance Area which gathers holders of small
amounts of nuclear material in the Non-Nuclear Weapons States in the EU. There is a strict limit of
how much material a member is allowed to have (specified in Annex I-G in the Commission regulation
(Euratom) no 302/2005), and the total amount of nuclear material in the whole MBA must not exceed
one effective kg (as stated in the Commission Recommendation of 15 December 2005, p. 35). The
holders in this group are automatically granted derogation according to the Commission Regulation
(Euratom) no 302/2005 and need only report to the EU Commission when there are changes in the
inventory. They are also exempted from IAEA safeguards and thus not subjected to inspections from
the IAEA or under the obligation of providing a site declaration4. 
Table 1 shows a summary of some of the tasks and reports the holders in the different categories
must do and submit.
Own MBA National LOF Catch-All MBA
Keep inventory list yes Yes yes
Report changes in NM
stock to SSM
yes Yes yes
Report changes in NM
stock to EU
Commission
yes no (SSM reports) yes
Report changes in NM
stock using ENMAS
yes1 no (SSM reports) no2 
Report NM stock
monthly




Programme of activities yes no (SSM reports) no4 
Table 1: The table shows a summary of some of the obligations holders of small amounts of nuclear material
have. For more information, see text in section 3.2.
1 If derogation has been granted by the EU Commission under Article 19 in the Commission
Regulation (Euratom) no 302/2005, the frequency and format of the inventory reports can be modified
from the standard way of reporting.
2 Members of the Catch all MBA are automatically granted derogation from the Commission
Regulation (Euratom) no 302/2005.
3 If exemption has been granted by the IAEA under Article 37 or 36 in INFCIRC/193, the NM is no
longer under IAEA Safeguards and therefor no site description is required.
4 The requirements for Catch-All MBA members are further specified in the Facility Attachment
”Safeguards agreement in connection with NPT, Subsidiary arrangements” from 1985.
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4. Inspections of small holders
To ensure that requirements set up by the international organisations and the national Authority is met
there is a need for communication, visits, and inspections. In the beginning of 2013 SSM started to put
more resources into the work with holders of small amounts of nuclear material. The EU Commission
had previously announced that they would start to prioritize inspections of small holders and during
2013 they carried out a round of inspections of most holders in the category “Own MBA” in Sweden.
The national work regarding small holders was further fuelled by a request from the IAEA to SSM to
provide site descriptions according to the AP for all the members within the National LOF WSWE.
4.2. National inspections
An inspection carried out at a holder of small amounts of nuclear material must be prepared well in
advance. Because of the vast differences between such companies and organizations that hold small
amounts of nuclear material, the approach to ensure compliance with national and international
regulations works best if it is tailor-made to fit the type of business. It has been a learning curve for the
national inspectors on how to best get the message across; on the one hand avoiding the use of too
many abbreviations or technical jargon that unnecessary complicated things and on the other hand not
simplifying too much or being too specific in instructing the installations.
Usually an inspection at a holder of small amounts of nuclear material that has not been visited in a
long time (or has not been visited at all) starts with a phone call where the purpose of the inspection is
explained. After that we send an email summarizing the call and giving explicit instructions on what
kind of preparations we expect from the holder before our visit. This can entail up-dating (or in some
cases, creating) an inventory list (we supply specifications on what information such a  list should
contain), prepare to show shipping- or transport-documentation, and to make sure all nuclear material
is available for id-checks and verification at the time of the visit. References to paragraphs in legal
documents are also enclosed in the letter.
During the inspection we discuss the inventory of nuclear material and frequently we find that it differs
from the inventory previously reported to SSM. Together we try to straighten out where material has
been moved if it no longer can be found on the site, and update the registry at SSM with material that
has either been found at the site or purchased without being reported. Often there is a need for a
longer discussion and explanation of what should be reported and what type of information should be
included. Then SSM verifies all material by number identification and sometimes by measurement by
the use of an identiFINDERTM (HM5-type detector of gamma and neutrons). Depending on the 
category of the installation (see section 3.2) we also discuss what other information the installation
need to provide or update, such as the basic technical characteristic (BTC) and/or a description of the
site.
After the inspection there are usually a number of follow-up activities that need to be carried out and
these are specified in a report written by SSM and distributed to the holder. The holders often need to
further up-date their list of inventory items (LII), sometimes work harder in trying to locate different
types of documents supporting transfers of materials, or perform additional measurements on certain
items to be able to declare them correctly. SSM often needs to update its registry of nuclear material
as well as the registry on types of activities carried out by the holder and their contact information. The
updated information is also reported to the EU Commission.
In summary, an inspection of an installation with very small amounts of nuclear material, as compared
to a larger fuel cycle related facility is much more time-consuming in large part due to the preparations
and the follow-up activities. To ensure the best result follow-up inspections should be made, but so far
only a few such inspections have been carried out.
4.3. Inspections with international organizations
The Swedish Government has appointed SSM to accompany IAEA inspectors during international
inspections in Sweden. (In the case of inspections initiated by the EU Commission and where the
IAEA chose not to participate, SSM makes a case by case decision to participate or not. The
inspections at small facilities are prioritized.) These inspections follow basically the same format as for
inspections in larger facilities. The books are audited and the internal book-keeping compared to the
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reported stock of nuclear material. The material is itemidentified and parts of it verified by non-
destructive analysis (NDA) measurements. Because of the inadequacies we have encountered in
many places we try to prepare the holders before the inspection as much as possible. If possible, we
make a separate visit before the international inspection is scheduled. At the international inspections
there is often less time to discuss matters of book-keeping, inventory lists, and reporting obligations.
This is why visits made without international inspectors are a very important complement in ensuring
compliance to regulations.
5. Site descriptions for the National LOF WSWE
The IAEA requested that Sweden (through the EU Commission) would either ask for an exemption or
provide a site description for the “National LOF” WSWE. The task sounds simple but was in reality not
so simple, especially when contacts with and inspections of the members within this MBA had been
few and far apart in time. Even finding out valid contact-information for some members proved difficult.
It was quite quickly determined that an exemption from IAEA Safeguards was not a suitable option.
The MBA fulfils the requirements on amounts of nuclear material (Article 37 of INFCIRC/193) but
because of frequent material movements in and out of the MBA an exemption would be very
impractical. Once this was determined discussions started with the EU Commission and to some
extent also with the IAEA on how such a site declaration should be made and what information it
should contain. As is shown in figure 1, the members of WSWE are scattered across the country.
There was also the question of how unified the declaration should be, because the nature of the
businesses for the members within WSWE can be quite different. It was decided that the level of
details provided for the different members did not have to be unified, but instead depends on the
activities within the specific installation. I.e. for metal scrap yards we included an overview map of the
area and a brief explanation of the major activities performed on the site. For research institutions the
site description need to be more detailed with floor-plans and description of rooms and activities
performed therein.
To simplify for the members of WSWE a template of a site declaration was made by SSM for each
installation where as much information as possible was already filled in. The members only had to
check and correct or in some instances provide us with some additional information. The ideal would
have been to visit all installations before submitting the site declaration, to ensure its correctness and
completeness, but unfortunately there was no time for that. It is instead an on-going task and we hope
to have visited most of the installations within a couple of years.
After all the templates were checked and completed the site declaration could finally be submitted to
the EU Commission in December 2014, and the first update to it was submitted in March 2015.
6. Experiences from working with small holders of nuclear material
In the past two years of working with holders of small amounts of nuclear material we have gained a
lot of experience and learned a lot about different applications of nuclear material. The challenges we
have encountered can be divided up into two main parts; communicating and explaining to the holders
what their responsibilities as owners of nuclear material are, and interpreting the national and
international regulations and determining where the bar should be set.
The first set of challenges relates to communication of the rules and regulations to the holders. One of
the surprises is that it is not always beneficial for the purpose of reporting if the holder has a great
knowledge of nuclear physics. Every gram of nuclear material should be reported, when used in
nuclear activities as well as for other purposes. A person with knowledge in the field might think that a
couple of grams (or kilograms) of depleted or natural uranium cannot be used for anything illegal, and
therefor does not need to be reported.
Other types of holders, such as radiographers, are used to contacts with other departments of the
Authority in applying for licenses to hold, use and transport radioactive isotopes. When we contact
them demanding information regarding the depleted uranium container in which the isotope is placed,
it can lead to many misunderstandings. Another common misconception is that natural or depleted
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uranium or thorium in the form of compounds such as nitrates or acetates are automatically exempted
from safeguards and safeguard reporting.
Even though the rules and regulations for all holders of nuclear material are basically the same, the
prerequisites for fulfilling the obligations can be very different. At e.g. a nuclear power plant there are
usually one or several people that have the dedicated task of keeping the inventory updated and
managing the reporting duties of the plant. For a smaller installation responsibilities are often not
formalized and the task of maintaining control of the nuclear material is not given enough time. When
communicating with these holders one must bear that in mind. One must also understand that some
words and abbreviations commonly used when communicating with larger facilities should be avoided
or at least thoroughly explained.
There is a need for a graded approach in applying regulations initially intended for facilities such as
nuclear power plants on installations with small amounts of nuclear material. Often, a graded
approach to requirements is not formalized, but employed nonetheless. SSM has the mandate to set
terms or grant exceptions from national regulations, but the Commission Regulation (Euratom) no
302/2005 must be followed by all holders and the organization with a mandate to determine
compliance is the EU Commission. Without guidance documents on how to interpret rules and
regulations from the viewpoint of a small holder makes it difficult for SSM to help the installations on
where to set the bar in trying to fulfil their obligations. Particular Safeguard Provisions (PSPs) or
Facility Attachments (FAs) are not in place for the individual small holders in Sweden (with the
exception of the ”Safeguards agreement in connection with NPT, Subsidiary arrangements” from 1985
which is valid for all members within the European “Catch All MBA”). When the holders ask questions
such as “Is the reply to this question in the BTC specific enough?” or “Can we collect information 
about our experiments for a year and only report a re-batch at one time?” we can give advice based
on previous experiences but we cannot give definitive answers.
6.1. On-going work
In order to ensure correctness and completeness of the reports provided by the small holders
themselves, or declarations that pass through the Authority such as site declarations, inspections are
needed. Since the start of 2013 the Authority has increased its presence at these locations, and so far
13 of the 21 registered holders of small amounts of nuclear material have been visited at least once.
Some have required several visits. We have increased our contact with all 21 of them in order to get
updated information for e.g. BTC:s and site descriptions.
After a visit to a location and a meeting face-to-face where both we at the Authority and the
representatives from the installations have the opportunity to ask questions, the rest of the
communication runs much more smoothly. This is one reason why, even if the amounts of nuclear
material is extremely small, a physical visit to such an installation is prioritized over some other tasks.
The ambition is thus to perform inspections of as many of the small holders as possible, and to do it as
soon as possible. But, since the follow-up tasks after an inspection in some cases is a lengthy
process, we try not to initiate more contacts at one time than can be properly followed up.
Prioritizing what installation to inspect is based on a number of factors; amount and type of nuclear
material, application of nuclear material, perceived control by the installation of the nuclear material,
and its physical location and closeness to other installations.
An inspection can be triggered by the holder itself. With new staff at positions such as radiation safety
experts we have sometimes been invited to talk about procedures for reporting and discussions on
how to apply the rules and regulations to their specific businesses. These visits are of course given
high priority.
6.2. Plans for future work
To maintain correct and updated information on nuclear material inventory and information provided in
BTC:s and site descriptions we believe there is a need for regular follow-up activities. After this initial
round of inspections has been completed we anticipate some sort of more scheduled plan of activities,
e.g. a rolling schedule of approximately 4-5 inspections annually and follow-up letters or phone calls
biannually to all installations. Even though the regulations states that changes should be reported
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without reminders we believe that to ensure complete and correct information some legwork is
required from the Authority’s side.
For most of the installations the nuclear material remains static for longer periods of time. However, a
couple of installations use their material for experiments where the material form changes and material
is relatively often sent and received, e.g. to and from collaborators. For these installations we plan to
focus our inspections on their system for ensuring that their declarations of both nuclear inventory and
technical capacity are complete and correct. This is especially important when there are several
people involved and where there is a large turnover of personnel, e.g. at universities.
We also plan to, in a more structured way, find installations which are in possession of nuclear
material but are unaware of their reporting duties. This can be achieved by better co-operation and
exchanging of information within the Authority, by various out-reach activities such as participating in
meetings at relevant trade associations, and by using the knowledge we have gained over the past
two years of what types of installations most likely to possess nuclear material.
To make it easy to understand and to follow the rules and regulations applicable to holders of nuclear
material we have plans to compose some sort of guide documents. These documents can either be
tailored to a specific type of installation, or be more general. Because of the three categories we have
in Sweden (described in section 3.2) there might be a need to compose at least differentiated
documents for these three.
As mentioned in section 3.1, installations which are in possession of nuclear material are also
subjected to rules and regulations outside the area of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards. To
reduce the number of inspections at a specific installation and make better use of both theirs and the
Authority’s time we are thinking about performing joint inspections, where e.g. nuclear non-
proliferation, physical protection, and radiation protection is combined. In that way we have expertise
from more areas and can provide the installations with a collected view on what works well and where
improvements can be made. The national inspectors can also learn from each other and after a couple
of joint inspections cover an area which is usually not covered by that inspector.
7. Conclusions
Working to ensure nuclear non-proliferation with holders of small amounts of nuclear material, often
not part of the nuclear fuel cycle business is both challenging and time-consuming work, but also
varying and fun. It demands a solid understanding of both national and international regulations, and
the ability to transfer and translate it so that parties not familiar with non-proliferation still can abide by
them. When we find installations not compliant with rules and regulations, the reason seems almost
always  to be a lack of knowledge. Keeping contact by telephone calls and emails and making regular
physical visits enables for easier communication and better compliance to rules.
A formalized graded approach to rules and regulations, made in collaboration with the international
organizations, would simplify working with small holders of nuclear material. This could be in the form
of PSP:s of FA:s, or perhaps as a guide document similar to the “Guidance for States Implementing
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols” in the IAEA Service Series 21. 
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Abstract:
Inspection schemes in large Fuel Fabrication Plants require - due to limited inspection resources -
concepts that allow for a flexible resource allocation but still ensure that all nuclear material under
Safeguards in the European Union has a probability to be selected for physical verifications.
Having started from regular, sometimes dense, inspection schemes to cover all relevant material
flows, EURATOM is moving towards more randomised inspections, which allow for a more flexible
inspection planning and execution. In this respect, EURATOM has implemented the SNRI (Short
Notice Random Inspection) concept at the FBFC LEU Fuel Fabrication Plant (FFP), located in
Romans, France, which is the FFP with the highest throughput in Europe.
The randomisation of the inspections gives the EURATOM inspectorate more flexibility in their
planning and allows the verification coverage of the complete flow of nuclear material going into and
out of the facility during a Material Balance Period (MBP), while consuming a reasonable level of
inspectorate resources. The operators are asked to inform the inspectorate about their operational
planning on a regular basis, to allow inspectors to plan and prepare their inspection activities in
advance.
However, with the given throughput of the plant, in order to avoid production delays and minimise dose
uptake for inspectors when performing measurements in the fuel assembly stores, it was decided to
combine the SNRI concept in the near future with an unattended measurement and surveillance
system to ensure that all fuel assemblies produced can be verified without any requirement on
inspectors to be present but still achieving the EURATOM verification goals.
The Remote Data Transmission (RDT) of instrument and camera signals via a VPN channel to the
EURATOM HQ in Luxembourg, together with the transmission of operating data by the operator in
electronic format, would be a further step to use the available inspection resources in the most efficient
way.
Keywords: Short Notice Random Inspection, Material Balance Period, unattended measurements,
Remote Data Transmission
1. Introduction
In large Fuel Fabrication Plants, the quantities of nuclear materials going into and out of the facilities
during a Material Balance Period (MBP) are much higher than the inventory and contribute
significantly to the MUF (Material Unaccounted For) and its uncertainty, the Sigma MUF (σMUF).
Therefore, information on the input and output flows and their verification are essential to draw a
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safeguards conclusion at the end of the MBP. In order to optimise inspection resources and ensure
that all the nuclear material under safeguards, going into and out of the facility during a MBP, is
eligible to be selected for physical safeguards verifications, concepts that allow a flexible resource
allocation are needed. A new approach based on the SNRI (Short Notice Random Inspection) concept
has been implemented by EURATOM at the biggest LEU FFP in Europe, FBFC Romans (France).
2. SNRI Objectives
The main objective of this new approach is to allow a random verification of the complete flow of
material going into and out of the facility during a Material Balance Period (MBP). Before the SNRI
concept was implemented at the LEU FFP of Romans, five scheduled bi-monthly interim inspections
were performed during a MBP and the verifications were limited to the population of items present at
the time of inspections. However, with the given plant throughput, a significant increase in the number
of interim inspections and resources, together with some retention time arrangements, would have
been required to achieve the verification coverage of the complete flow of nuclear material going in
and out of the facility over a MBP.
With the introduction of the randomisation factor, the SNRI concept makes the coverage of the
complete flow of nuclear material going into and out of the facility possible without increasing the
inspection frequencies and resources. The short notice aspect provides also additional assurance that
the facility is being operated as declared.
3. Plant operation forecast
In order to achieve the SNRI objective and allow the inspectorate to optimise the inspection planning,
the operator provides the inspectors on a monthly basis with a detailed forecast on the plant
operations for the next two months. The forecast includes weekly information about receipts and
shipments of nuclear material in the different forms (UF6, powder, scrap, rods, and assemblies), as
well as production information. However, the mandatory annual activity programme and advanced
notifications required by Commission Regulation 302/2005 for receipts and shipments of nuclear
material remain applicable.
The data to be provided in the forecast are:
For shipments and receipts
 The week number
 The type of activity (shipment/receipt)
 The type of items (UF6 cylinders, powder, scrap, rods, assemblies)
 The number of items
 The shipper/receiver
 The estimated quantities of Utotal and U235
 The date of unpacking / packing of material.
For the fuel production
 The week number
 The type and number of assemblies produced
 The country of delivery.
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4. SNRI inspection process
Three to five SNRI inspections will be normally performed during each MBP. The inspections are
performed by 2 inspectors and over 3 days. The timing of the inspections is random and unknown to
the operator. However, in order to allow the inspectorate to achieve the SNRI objective, the selection
of the date for SNRI inspections can also be driven by pragmatic factors such as the known
operational programme of the facility. Dedicated regular inspections might also be carried out as
appropriate in order to verify and seal exports of nuclear material to countries outside of European
Union. These inspections are scheduled according to the advance notifications received from the
operator.
The SNRI inspections are notified by e-mail between 9:00 am and 10:00 am to the State Authority and
the operator 48 hours in advance of the start of the inspection. Upon arrival of the inspectors on site,
an inspection opening meeting is held at which the operator provides the inspectors with information
on the latest operational status of the plant, the List of Inventory Items (LII) for the UF6 cylinders and
the fuel assembly stores and an update of the accountancy to 0:00 o'clock of the inspection start date.
Then the inspection team proceeds into the facility and starts with the verification activities. The scope
of the verification activities performed on-site during inspection is twofold: to confirm operator
declarations and to make sure that the operator’s physical follow-up system is working effectively and
is up-to-date. The verification activities performed include physical verifications and accountancy
verifications.
4.1  Accountancy verifications
The accountancy verifications include nuclear material declarations check and records verifications
and is performed covering the period from the starting date of the previous inspection to 0:00 o'clock
of the first day of the actual inspection.  To do so, the operator is asked to provide in electronic format
an update of the inventory change reports (ICR). These ICRs are then loaded into the EURATOM
VARO software (Validation of Accountancy Records of Operators) and checked for syntax,
consistency and errors. The ICRs are then merged with the HQ data to compute the books ending at
the start date of the inspection and to produce the Working Paper Accountancy (WPA).
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Based on the WPA produced with VARO, the inspectors perform a book audit consisting of:
 Comparison of accountancy records against operating records (source documents)
 Comparison of the book stocks calculated with VARO with the book stock values declared by
the operator
 Follow-up of accountancy remarks (if applicable)
 Comparison of all shipments and receipts declared since the last inspection with the weekly
flow information provided by operator in the operational forecast.
4.2  Physical verifications
During the SNRI inspections, the physical verifications activities are performed on items of the input
and output flows of the process, present in the facility at the time of performing the inspection. They
consist of quantitative testing including various methods of non-destructive assay (NDA), destructive
analysis (DA) and associated item counting and tag checking.
      Input/receipt  Output/shipment 
4.2.1 Non Destructive assay
The number of items to be verified by NDA for gross and partial defect detection is calculated for each
process flow using the Jaech and Russell sampling algorithm with the required detection probability
(e.g. medium for low enriched and low for natural and depleted Uranium), taking into account the
throughput since the last inspection. The table below gives an indication for the number of UF6
cylinders to be measured for gross and partial defect (GD/PD) at different throughputs to cover the
EURATOM detection goals.
The sum of items verified for each flow during the SNRI inspections must however be equal or
superior to the number of items which would be calculated to cover the complete annual input/output
flow of the facility with the appropriate detection probability. Due to the high throughput of the plant,
UF6 Cylinders
Minimum number of items to be measured during SNRI inspections with different
detection probability (DP)
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the number of fuel assemblies to be measured for gross and partial defect (GD/PD) to cover the
EURATOM detection goals at different throughputs can however result in a quite significant number of
items to be measured at each SNRI inspection. As an example, the table below gives an indication of
the number of fuel assemblies to be measured for gross and partial defect (GD/PD) at different
throughputs to cover the EURATOM detection goals.
Therefore, in order to avoid production delays while still achieving the EURATOM verification goals
and minimise the inspection’s effort, as well as dose uptake for inspectors when measuring in the fuel
assembly stores, it was decided to install an unattended Neutron Coincidence Counter (NCC) located
in the normal production flow in each of the two fuel assembly stores. All fuel assemblies transferred
into the stores will be measured and identified through a video surveillance system. After the
measurement, the fuel assemblies will remain under C&S until they are packed for shipment. The
signals of the instruments and cameras will be directly transmitted to the EURATOM office on-site for
central storage. During SNRI inspections, the inspectors will evaluate and review these data directly
transmitted to their office on site and compare the results with the operator’s declarations using the 
RADAR/iRAP software.
C&S system Fuel Assembly Stores
Moreover, to avoid inspectors' presence during the fuel assemblies export packing operations,
electronic seals placed by the operator under camera surveillance will be used to maintain continuity




Minimum number of items to be measured during SNRI inspections with different
detection probabilities (DP)
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unattended C&S system will reduce the inspection effort, minimise dose uptake by the inspectors, and
enable EURATOM to achieve the required level of assurance on the complete throughput while
offering more flexibility to the operator at the same time.
4.2.2 Destructive Analysis
A pellet sample is also taken at each SNRI inspection from the process line or the pellet store for the
detection of bias defects and it is left under seal at the facility. All samples collected during SNRI
inspections and at the PIV are sent to the EURATOM laboratory of ITU Karlsruhe to be analysed. The
results are compared with the operator's analysis results to evaluate the precision and accuracy of his
measurement system. In order to draw conclusions about the quality and effectiveness of the overall
operator’s NMAC system in relation to his statutory obligations according to EURATOM Regulation
302/2005, it might also be necessary for EURATOM to perform audits. These audits will be planned in
consultation with the operator and the State Authority.
5. Further development in the SNRI approach
Currently, operating data are handed over in electronic format to the inspectors during the monthly
interim inspection performed at CERCA Romans and loaded into inspectors' computer at the
EURATOM on-site office. The operator, the national Authorities and EURATOM are looking for ways
to improve this data transmission. The transfer of these data to EURATOM headquarter is under
examination.
Remote Data Transmission (RDT) of instrument and camera signals via a VPN channel to
EURATOM’s HQ in Luxembourg, together with the transmission of operating data by the operator in
electronic format, would be a further step towards using the available inspection resources in the most
efficient way.
6. Conclusion
The SNRI concept has become an effective method to perform the verification coverage of the
complete flow of nuclear materials into and out of the Romans facility without increasing the number of
inspections or personnel resources. The significant investment in the safeguards instrument
infrastructure in the fuel assembly store will pay off in terms of reduction of inspection effort on site and
intrusiveness of safeguards verifications.
The network transmission of safeguards data in electronic format directly to EURATOM’s Headquarter
will be a further step to maintain high detection probabilities and use the available inspection
resources in the most efficient way.
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Abstract
The Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for
evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method is
to provide a useful tool for the regulatory body to evaluate the safeguards culture at nuclear facilities.
The evaluated parameters are e.g. educational requirement for safeguards staff, quality of safeguards
report for IAEA and EC, results of safeguards inspections etc. Input of the method is for the one hand
the outcome of the comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular
comprehensive SSAC verifications of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification
system is: (i) to assess the facility’s safeguards system compliance with the relevant national 
legislation and recommendations, (ii) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and
further developing its safeguards system and (iii) to revise validity of data and information previously
provided by the facility subject to safeguards licensing procedures. On the other hand the annual
report of the nuclear facilities also supports the safeguards indexing method, which is a good indicator
of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of
safeguards culture.
Keywords: safeguards culture assessment, safeguards indexing method, national safeguards
system, comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system, SSAC
1. Introduction
The effectiveness and efficiency of an SSAC greatly depends on how the management in the nuclear
facilities is committed to the non-proliferation objectives of the country.
In Hungary safeguards licensing procedures are obligatory to possess nuclear material, launch any
activity related thereto, launch any modification important to safeguards, transport nuclear materials,
as well as to terminate safeguards requirements in case of terminating  nuclear activities. In addition to
it, facilities are obliged to maintain a facility level nuclear material accountancy system and create the
required conditions for international, regional and national verification activities. It is, however,
essential that the above obligations be integral parts of a coherent facility management policy.
Based on very promising experiences in the field of nuclear safety, the Hungarian SSAC has
introduced a comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular
comprehensive SSAC verifications in the whole lifetime of the facilities.
The structure, preparation, conduction, documentation and initial experiences of the comprehensive
safeguards verification system is introduced below.
Additionally, HAEA has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards
culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method and the evaluated
parameters are also shown in the paper.
2. The comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system (CDSVS)
The introduction of the comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system (CDSVS) by the
Hungarian SSAC started with laying down the procedure of the CDSVS in the Hungarian Atomic
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Energy Authority’s (HAEA) Quality Assurance System. The QA procedure for the CDSVS was 
approved by the General Deputy Director General of the HAEA. Carrying out CDSV falls into the
competence of the Department of Nuclear Security, Non-proliferation and Emergency Management of
the HAEA (hereinafter referred to as the Safeguards Department).
2.1. Goal of the CDSVS
The main goal for the CDSVS was defined as follows: to review whether the facility level safeguards
system of the organization is run in compliance with the relevant legal instruments and
recommendations in force. To reach this goal two tools are to be applied:
a.) to review all the safeguards relevant procedures of the organization. In this review the focus is
to check whether procedures for fulfilling the obligations are regulated by internal
documentations (e.g. instructions, procedures) and to find practical examples for the
procedures by the competent staff.
b.) to assess the activities of the organization in view whether it ensures sustainability and
improvement of the safeguards system in all levels of organisation, with special regards to the
commitment on management level.
During the last four years the Safeguards Department of the HAEA conducted comprehensive
verification inspection in every Hungarian nuclear facility on annual basis, e.g. in 2011 at the Modular
Vault Dry Storage (MVDS) of the Spent Fuel Assemblies, in 2012 at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, in
2013 at the Training Reactor at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics and in 2014 at
the Budapest Research Reactor. Verification of the management systems (highest management and
safeguards division management) as well as safeguards relevant areas as operation and
maintenance, accountancy and data provision were selected for verification.
2.2. Verification levels
2.2.1. ‘Level – A’ verification
As the primary goal of the verification is to assess the commitment of the highest management,
verification ‘Level A’ was assigned to the top management of the organisation. ‘Level – A’ verification 
was planned to assess the commitments of the managers in the field of safeguards and the
guarantees provided by the management to enable the organization to meet its safeguards
obligations.
A list of issues in 6 themes was provided in advance for the management to help preparation for the
on site inspection. Issues were grouped in 10 themes. Short description of the issues:
1) External influence (e.g. dependence of meeting their safeguards obligation on political
changes, TSOs; public acceptance of their mission, safeguards in their external
communication; possible responds of the organization in case of negative effects.)
2) Objectives and strategies (objectives of non-proliferation relevance, consultation process in
drafting strategies, possible future plans on any changes in this field)
3) Management functions and their review (selection criteria in the management, evaluation of
proper and improper safeguards related decisions, competences, etc.)
4) Allocation of resources (corporate procurement and/or restructuring with non-proliferation and
safeguards aspects)
5) Human resource management (reduction of staff - giving priority to safeguards staff; vacancy
and fluctuation in safeguards staff; promotion, reward system for safeguards staff, etc.)
6) Training (professional training possibilities for the safeguards staff, safeguards for the staff in
general, etc.)
7) Knowledge management (ensuring continuity of safeguards staff, communication channels for
safeguards knowledge, etc.)
8) Regulation (regulation work processes in view with safeguards obligations, inclusion of
safeguards aspects in revision of documents, etc.)
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9) Organization culture (evaluation of the performance safeguards related tasks on individuals’
appraisal or on organization’s level, who performs the appraisal of the individual in the
safeguards unit, etc.)
10) Communication (channels of information from external source to the safeguards staff and
vice-versa.)
2.2.2. ‘Level – B verification’
‘Level  - B’ was assigned to different safeguards related fields with the following subdivision: 
B1 –  Safeguards division (analyses of the safeguards division structure, its relation with the highest
managements, scope of competences; educational background and professional training of the
safeguards staff; adequate human resource for the related tasks, etc.)
B2 – Operation and maintenance (availability, authentication and maintenance of the measurement
equipment to support the accountancy, measures to ensure safe and secure operation of the
safeguards containment and surveillance systems, utilization of the organization’s own 
operational experience as well as safeguards experience and research and development
activities of other organizations; procedures established to enable national and international
inspections, e.g. ground pass systems,  safeguards duty system with telephone contact
availability, etc.
B3 – Accountancy and data provision (internal procedures regulating the nuclear material accountancy
and safeguards related data provision system, operation and reliability of the computer based
accountancy system, etc.)
2.3. Schedule of the verification
The CDSV is carried out along the following schedule:
1.) Preparatory phase (review and process of the related internal documents of the organization)
2.) On site inspection
3.) Assessment
2.3.1. The preparatory phase
The preparatory phase is very important part of the verification. The Safeguards Department held an
initial meeting to prepare the verification. On this meeting goals of the CDSVS and levels of
verification were explained to the representatives of the facilities. Participants of the meeting agreed
on collecting the internal documents regulating the tasks of the organization and allocating the
responsibilities within the units of the organization. It was agreed that these documents would be
provided for the HAEA well in advance of the meeting to enable the staff’s preparation for the 
verification. Potential participants on the on-site inspection both from the HAEA and the facilities were
discussed but not finalized.
In the preparatory phase representatives of HAEA on the on-site inspections will study the internal
documents of the facilities and finalize the list of issues on the areas assigned to them.
2.3.2. The on-site inspection phase
The on-site inspection is planned to be conducted according to the following agenda:
- Kick-off meeting – information on the goal and areas of inspection, and the methods to be
applied
- Inspections to be conducted
o with participants identified in advance
o based on list of issues for revision (While level – A list of issues were handed over
in advance, list of issues for the level – B areas will be used on the on-site
inspection only)
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o detailed records on answers and other observations will be prepared by the
inspectors
- Closing meeting – preliminary evaluation will be given. There will be possibility given for
the licensee to argue the preliminary evaluation results.
2.3.3. Assessment phase and corrective actions
After the on-site inspection, HAEA has finalized the report on the inspection and send it to the facilities
for comments. The report focused on identifying best practices and deficiencies, if any, and clearly
state the authority’s positions how to make corrective actions. The facilities shall comment on the main
findings and formulate its position on the HAEA’s conclusions and recommendations. Moreover,
facilities shall identify the means and timeframe of the corrective actions to be performed. Taking the
response and proposal from facilities full into account, the HAEA will issue a regulatory resolution on
the corrective actions to be taken and determine deadlines for each. In addition the HAEA will
establish the next review program of the CDSVS focusing on those areas where corrective actions
were identified.
3. The Safeguards Performance Assessment Index for evaluation the
safeguards culture
The Safeguards Performance Assessment Index (SPAI) for nuclear facilities has been developed by
the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority for the facilitation of the periodical comprehensive regulatory
review of the performance of the operators’ safeguards system. The parameters included into SPAI 
were selected on the basis of objectivity, availability and operability.
The SPAI is designed to be compatible with the system that was developed for the safety performance
assessment of the facilities, therefore the comprehensive assessment of the facilities including safety,
security and safeguards will be possible in the future.
Definitions:
• Safeguards Assessment Index (Index): a particular value determined by one or several
characteristics of the performance of the facility’s safeguards system. 
• Safeguards Characteristics (Characteristics): A classification value based on quantitative data
determined by the individual rule of assessment.
For the assessment of safeguards characteristic four rates are defined, as follows:
• acceptable: A safeguards characteristic is acceptable if the authority finds the level of performance
such that no corrective actions are required. A safeguards characteristic marked with green colour
indicates compliance with all of the relevant regulatory requirements. This rating may show a good
practice as well where the facility is proactive and shares a good practice leading to efficient
performance without any regulatory requirements.
• alarming: A safeguards characteristic is alarming if there is a slight deviation from the desired value
within the regulatory permissible set of values. Though only minor mistakes but no serious issues exist
yet, characteristics falling into the yellow zone may need improvement. The licensee shall be
instructed to set up a plan of actions to make the necessary improvements. As a respond to the plan
of actions the regulatory body sends a written notice to the licensee calling for the implementation of
the plan of actions. Execution of the required actions are to be checked in course of regulatory
inspections.
• not acceptable: It means that the safeguards characteristic is not acceptable. Rating in the red zone
refers to a non-compliance, however, only characteristics covered by regulations may be qualified as
red. If a safeguards characteristic has been assessed as red, an explanation is required on what
occurred, exact time and date when the non-compliance occurred, its consequences and measures
taken by the regulatory authority.  The licensee is obliged to set up a plan of actions which will be then
sent back by the regulatory body in the form of a regulatory notice, including additional measures
considered to be important by the regulatory body. Execution of the required actions shall be checked
in course of regulatory inspection.
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• not known: The system of safeguards index is the same for all nuclear facilities. It may occur,
however, that certain characteristics of the index are not relevant for every licensee. In this case
characteristics not relevant for the facility are marked white.
Margins for a four-grade zone will be individually determined for the different characteristics. In case of
several characteristics determined for a Safeguards assessment index, the index gets the same rating
as its characteristic with the worst assessment among all.
3.1. Areas of the assessment
The areas assessed by SPAI for nuclear facilities covers the three major parts of the facility
safeguards system, such as (i) safeguards organisation; (ii) operation of the safeguards system; (iii)
safeguards licensing procedures. In the following section the assessment indexes, characteristics and
evaluation criteria for the above mentioned three assessment areas are introduced.
3.1.1. Safeguards organisation
Assessment indexes
a) Number of staff
b) Training
Characteristics
a) Number of staff, Substitution
Quantitative characteristic of the safeguards organization (number of staff, order of
substitution within the safeguards organization, ensuring preparedness outside working hours)
b) Requirements for competence of safeguards officer
Qualitative characteristic of safeguards organization (Quality of training for the new staff and
to maintain the safeguards knowledge, its frequency, education background, etc.)
Evaluation
a) Quantitative characteristic of the safeguards organization
Rule of quantification: Ratio of the number of safeguards relevant tasks and the available number of
qualified staff. Quantitative assessment of the safeguards organization is made based on the number
of the tasks performed by the safeguards staff. Safeguards tasks performed within the given period of
time are summed and the number of safeguards relevant tasks (inspections, reports, licensing
procedures) incumbent for one person within the given period of time is checked.
Comments: The value is based on good practice. The preceding four years (2009-2012) were
evaluated for acceptable level of operation of safeguards organizations and the average results of the
four years were considered as appropriate. Classification values were defined accordingly.
b) Qualitative characteristic of the safeguards organisation
Rule of quantification: Relative percentage of compliance of the staff with the required trainings.
Comments: The required qualification and trainings should always be satisfied.
3.1.2. Operation of the safeguards system
Assessment indexes:
a) Nuclear material accountancy system (reports)
b) Information provision system (BTC, Additional Protocol)
c) Conclusions of the inspections
Characteristics
a) Nuclear material accountancy system
i. Correctness of reports sent (error lines, correction lines)
ii. On time delivery of reports (late lines)
b) Information provision system (R&D, site description, waste)
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i. Correctness and completeness of information submitted (requirements for
additional data, corrections, etc.)
ii. On time delivery of information, declaration
c) Experience of inspections
i. Conditions provided for inspections (ground pass, access to nuclear material,
clear spent fuel pond water, etc)
ii. Non-compliance discovered in course of inspections (discrepancies,
anomalies )
Evaluation:
a) Nuclear material accountancy system
i. Correctness of accountancy data transmitted
Rule of quantification: Relative percentage correct and inadequate reports
Comments:
ii. On time delivery of reports
Rule of quantification: Relative percentage of accountancy reports sent on time
and those sent beyond the time limit
Comments: The index is marked with the colour of the characteristic assessed
as the worst. If a report is not transmitted on time, time-limit of the accountancy
report is be marked as yellow, and in this case the indicator of the accountancy
system cannot be better than yellow.
b) Information provision system (R&D, site description, waste)
i. Correctness and completeness of information submitted (Provision of
information)
Rule of quantification: Relative percentage of information submitted in
compliance and those in non-compliance
Comment s: Provision of information subject to Additional Protocol are
analysed
ii. On time delivery of information, declaration
Rule of quantification: Relative percentage of declarations sent on time and
those sent beyond the time limit
Comments: Provision of information subject to Additional Protocol is checked.
The index is marked with the colour of the character assessed as the worst. If
any of the information is not transmitted on time, time-limit of the information
provision is be marked as yellow, and in this case the indicator of the
information provision system cannot be better than yellow.
c) Experience of inspections
i. Facilitating inspections
Rule of quantification: Relative percentage of inspections where all the
conditions necessary for an inspection were provided for and of those that
lacked one or some of the conditions.
Comment: Conclusions of the inspections are drawn based on the
evaluation of the inspection reports
ii. Non-compliance found in course of the inspections
Rule of quantification: Relative percentage of inspections where no anomaly
was found and inspections where anomalies were experienced by the inspector.
Comments: Conclusions of the inspections are drawn on the evaluation of
the inspection reports
3.3.3. Safeguards licensing procedures
Assessment indexes:
a) Regulatory measures/resolutions
b) Meeting regulatory deadlines




Execution of regulatory measures, requests for additional information by the regulatory
authority to make the licensing documentation complete, licensing applications refused by the
regulatory authority
b) Deadlines
Meeting the regulatory time-limits
Evaluation
a) Execution of measures requested by the regulatory body
Rule of quantification: Content and administrative compliance of safeguards relevant applications
with legal requirements. Ratio of applications in compliance and those in no-compliance with the
requirements.
Comments: The value is based on good practice. The preceding four years (2009-2012) were
evaluated for acceptable level of operation of safeguards organizations and the average results of the
four years were considered as appropriate. Classification values were defined accordingly.
b) Deadlines
Rule of quantification: Meeting the time limits defined by relevant regulations or the regulatory
authority for the safeguards licensing applications (e.g. first safeguards licence, requests to complete
licensing documentation, etc.) Ratio of documents submitted within and beyond the required time-
limits.
Comments: The value is based on good practice. The preceding four years (2009-2012) were
evaluated for acceptable level of operation of safeguards organizations and the average results of the
four years were considered as appropriate. Classification values were defined accordingly.
4. Conclusion
The new comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system has been introduced in 2011. Based
on the experiences collected during the 4 years period it can be concluded that the new program has
reached the following objectives:
• The management became more aware on its safeguards obligation. ‘Level – A’ list of issues 
helps the management to analyse the set of documents of the facility, from the organization’s strategy 
documents to the low level internal documents. Safeguards related scope of competence needs to be
assessed from the top management level to the safeguards officers’ level. 
• Review all the safeguards relevant procedures of the organization helps to disclose the
possible gaps in the regulation of the procedures or in the scope of competence.
• The need for sustainability of the safeguards system and improve in performance at all levels
within the organization will clearly be highlighted through the whole verification process.
The nuclear safeguards indexing method was designed using the experience collected from the
nuclear safety indexing method, therefore using both methods an integrated assessment can be
carried out. Moreover, the developed nuclear safeguards indexing method helps the authority to
assess the safeguards culture at the specific site. [1,2]
In this way improving the nuclear safeguards culture in the organization is expected to get the same
importance as nuclear safety and security culture.
5. REFERENCES
[1] E. SZÖLLÖSI, G. RÁCZ, Zs. STEFANKA, Á. VINCZE, K. HORVÁTH
Assessing and Promoting the Level of Safeguards Culture in Hungarian Nuclear Facilities, 2011 33rd
ESARDA Annual Meeting, Budapest
[2] Assessing and Promoting the Level of Safeguards Culture in Hungarian Nuclear Facilities
Zsolt Stefánka, Árpád Vincze. IAEA Safeguards Symposium 2014, Vienna
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
35
Session 2 
He-3 Alternatives for Neutron Detection 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
36
Workshop on He-3 alternatives for safeguards applications 
Carlos Carrapico, Bent Pedersen, Vittorio Forcina, Paolo Peerani, Francesca 
Rosas, Arturs Rozite, Hamid Tagziria, Georgios Takoudis, Alice Tomanin
European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Transuranium 
Elements (ITU), Nuclear Security Unit, Via Enrico Fermi 2749, 21027 Ispra (VA), Italy 
E-mail: paolo.peerani@jrc.ec.europa.eu  
Abstract: 
On 13-17 October 2014, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) hosted the second of two workshops on 
helium-3 (He-3) alternative materials and technologies for safeguards applications, under the U.S. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)-Euratom Action Sheet 
47, at the JRC Ispra Site.  
The recent Ispra workshop served as a direct follow-up to the Los Alamos workshop. Participants 
provided updates on several of the technologies discussed in 2013. In particular, workshop 
participants evaluated the applicability of the He-3 alternative technologies to a pre-established list of 
use cases and identify any capability gaps. In addition, the workshop included discussions of 
implementation strategies for advancing the prototype technologies to commercially deployable 
systems. The workshop included a demonstration of some of these technologies. Moreover, a field 
trial has been held on the margins of this workshop to provide a head-to-head comparison of various 
He-3 alternative prototypes for nuclear fuel verification.  
Keywords: NDA; neutron counting; He3 shortage; neutron detection 
1. Introduction
On 13-17 October 2014, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) hosted the second of two workshops on 
helium-3 (He-3) alternative materials and technologies for safeguards applications, under the U.S. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)-Euratom Action Sheet 
47, at the JRC Ispra Site.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regional safeguards inspectorates rely heavily on 
neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared 
nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. The reliability, safety, ease of use, 
gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic detection efficiency of He-3 based detectors made it an 
ideal detector material. However, an anticipated shortage of He-3 led to efforts to develop and field 
neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials.  
From 22-24 March 2011, the IAEA held an international meeting to address the question of possible 
replacement technologies for He-3 based neutron detectors. This was followed by a workshop at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory in June 2013, which provided an in-depth review of selected international 
efforts to develop and deploy technologies designed to serve as viable, near-term alternatives to He-3 
based systems for international safeguards applications. Participants included experts from U.S. 
national laboratories and Universities, Euratom, JRC, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), and the 
IAEA. 
The recent Ispra workshop served as a direct follow-up to the Los Alamos workshop. Participants 
provided updates on several of the technologies discussed in 2013. In particular, workshop 
participants evaluated the applicability of the He-3 alternative technologies to a pre-established list of 
use cases and identify any capability gaps. In addition, the workshop included discussions of 
implementation strategies for advancing the prototype technologies to commercially deployable 
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systems. The workshop included a demonstration of some of these technologies. Moreover, a field 
trial has been held on the margins of this workshop to provide a head-to-head comparison of various 
He-3 alternative prototypes for nuclear fuel verification. 
2. Inter-comparison benchmark
In the margins of the “Workshop on He-3 alternatives for Safeguards applications”, JRC hosted an 
inter-comparison benchmark that took place in the PERLA laboratory at the JRC facilities of Ispra on 
the two days before the workshop (October 13th-14th, 2014). 
The scope of the benchmark was to compare the performances of few prototypes of neutron counters 
based on alternative technologies among them and compared to those of ordinary He-3 devices 
ordinarily used by IAEA and Euratom for safeguards inspections. 
Six prototypes were tested and compared to three reference He-3 instruments corresponding to three 
different usage cases, as described in table 1. During the benchmark each developer operated his 
own instrument, whereas JRC staff operated the reference instruments. 




counting in Pu-bearing cans 
HLNCC ABUNCL with B-coated tubes GERS 
HLNCC with straw Boron tubes PTI 
Well counter with Li6-ZnS blades Symetrica 
Active coincidence counting 
for fresh fuel elements 
UNCL Liquid scintillator neutron coincidence 
collar 
IAEA 
Neutron monitors UNCL slab Parallel plate B slab counter LANL 
Stilbene scintillator UMICH 
Table 1: Prototypes tested in the benchmark 
2.1. Short description of the prototypes 
2.1.1. ABUNCL with B-coated tubes 
The ABUNCL was initially developed by General Electric Reuter Stokes as a collar for active 
measurement of fuel elements and as such had been demonstrated at the Los Alamos workshop in 
2013. The prototype tested in Ispra was a modification of the original collar that transformed the 
ABUNCL into a well counter by adding a fourth detecting side (see figure 1). The counter is equipped 
with 72 10B-lined proportional tubes. 
2.1.2. HLNCC with straw Boron tubes 
The straw HLNCC has been developed by PTI. It consists of 804 straws (narrow diameter 10B-lined 
proportional tubes) embedded in a structure have roughly the same dimensions (cavity, height and 
footprint) of a standard HLNCC (figure 2). 
2.1.3. Well counter with Li6-ZnS blades 
This prototype was developed by Symetrica in collaboration with JRC. It was only a partial prototype 
equipped with 8 blades out of the 32 foreseen in the final instrument (see figure 3). Each blade 
consists in a sandwich of PVT wavelength shifter coated with ZnS scintillator for charged particles 
doped with 6Li acting as neutron converter. 
2.1.4. Liquid scintillator neutron coincidence collar 
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This collar was developed by IAEA in collaboration with JRC and Hybrid Instruments and consists in 3 
slabs, each containing 4 cubic liquid scintillators; the fourth slab can host the interrogation AmLi 
source like in a common UNCL. 
2.1.5. Parallel plate slab counter 
This is a neutron slab based on boron-lined parallel plate technology; the same as in the HLNB 
prototype demonstrated in Los Alamos in 2013. This slab prototype has been particularly targeted for 
challenging conditions like high count rates and gamma fields. The demo was particularly intended to 
show the fast signal processing electronics. 
2.1.6. Stilbene scintillator 
The University of Michigan provided a couple of stilbene detectors with pulse shape discrimination 
capability. 
Figure 1: ABUNCL with B-coated tubes (picture 
and cross section) 
Figure 3: Well counter with Li6-ZnS blades 
(side and top views) 
Figure 5: Parallel plate slab (picture and cross 
section) 
Figure 2: Straw HLNCC 
Figure 4: Liquid Scintillator NCC 
Figure 6: Stilbene scintillator
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2.2. Testing procedures 
The purpose of the benchmark was to demonstrate the performance of alternative 3He systems 
against safeguards relevant parameters and perform benchmarking of these systems against 
available reference 3He-based systems. The key component of this activity involved side-by-side 
comparative measurements of a range of available SNM samples in the 3He-based systems and their 
proposed alternatives. The actual procedures have been slightly different for the three usage cases. 
2.2.1. HLNCC-types 
The main benchmarking parameters were: 
- HV plateau and gamma sensitivity: the plateau was measured in the presence of a 252Cf and 
gamma-ray sources (with dose rates of operational interest) to establish the optimum HV setting 
for benchmarking measurements and efficiency evaluation. 
- Efficiency: using available well-characterized 252Cf source and the optimum HV setting determined 
in step 1 the neutron detection efficiency was measured and compared with the reference 3He-
based system. 
- Figure of Merit: the die-away was measured and then the FOM was computed as FOM = ε / sqrt(τ) 
and compared to the reference 3He-based system. 
- Gamma sensitivity: the gamma influence was assessed by measuring a strong gamma source in 
absence and presence of a reference 252Cf source. 
- Statistical uncertainty: side-by-side measurements were performed using the available SNM 
samples in the alternative and reference 3He-based system and the statistical uncertainty was 
compared. 
2.2.2. UNCL-types 
The main benchmarking parameters were: 
- Efficiency: using available well-characterized 252Cf source the neutron detection efficiency was 
measured and compared with the reference 3He-based system. 
- GARR: the gamma rejection was estimated by adding a strong gamma source to the reference 
252Cf source. 
- Statistical uncertainty: side-by-side measurements were performed mimicking passive and active 
fuel measurements in the alternative and reference 3He-based system and the statistical 
uncertainty was compared. 
Due to the unavailability of a real fuel element the operating conditions were simulated by placing a 
252Cf source in the cavity providing a fission rate comparable to that expected in presence of a fuel 
element. Three types of measurements have been simulated: 
- Passive measurement (with weak 252Cf source in the cavity reproducing the spontaneous fission 
rate from U-238) 
- Active measurement in thermal mode (with AmLi in the lateral slab and a strong 252Cf source in the 
cavity reproducing the induced fission rate in U-235 in thermal mode: ratio AmLi/Cf = 10:1) 
- Active measurement in fast mode (with AmLi in the lateral slab and a weak 252Cf source in the 
cavity reproducing the induced fission rate in U-235 in fast mode: ratio AmLi/Cf = 100:1) 
2.2.3. Monitor-types 
The main benchmarking parameters were: 
- Efficiency: using available well-characterized 252Cf source the neutron detection efficiency was 
measured and compared with the reference 3He-based system. 
- Gamma sensitivity: the gamma influence was assessed by measuring a strong gamma source in 
absence and presence of a reference 252Cf source. 
In addition for the parallel plate using list-mode data acquisition, the performance of the parallel-plate 
detector with fast amplifier was demonstrated and compared with standard PDT amplifier. 
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2.3. Benchmark results 
We report hereby the main results obtained during the benchmark. 
2.3.1. HLNCC-types 
The major detection characteristics are reported in table 2, whereas table 3 gives the performance 
with respect to gamma sensitivity and table 4 the statistical uncertainty for measurements of MOX 
samples.  
The results can be quickly summarized as follows: 
- The PTI system has a slightly lower efficiency than the 3He HLNCC, but compensated by a much 
shorter die-away. As a combination of the two it gives a slightly better FOM, whose effect is 
confirmed by the lower statistical uncertainty in the Pu sample measurement. Moreover it has 
better gamma rejection. 
- The partial Symetrica system has half of the efficiency of the HLNCC and a longer die away, but 
we should recall that the prototype contains only one quarter of the expected blades (8 out of 32); 
Monte Carlo extrapolations have estimated that a full system would have and efficiency of 25%, a 
die away of 31 µs and a FOM of 4.6 (60% better than HLNCC). Gamma sensitivity is comparable 
with HLNCC. 
- The GERS system has inferior performances than HLNCC both in term of efficiency and die-away. 
Also in this case it has to be reminded that the demonstrator was a modification of the collar 





HLNCC B-straw HLNCC 
Efficiency [%] 16.50 10.20 8.90 13.56
Die-away time [µs] 43.30 65.40 55.90 26.00
FOM (ε/√τ) 2.51 1.26 1.19 2.66























137Cs (3.7 MBq) 40.3 0.008 11.4 0.013 0.7 0.000 4.9 0.003 
137Cs + 252Cf 1196.6 218.003 1888.6 178.779 - 93.830 - -
252Cf (7000 n/s) 1194.1 215.991 1893.9 183.927 - 92.610 - - 




HLNCC B-straw HLNCC 
MOX1 (168 g Pu) 
Measurement time [s] 600 600 600 600 
Doubles [s-1] 1088.95 315.81 165.33 770.76
σ 8.71 3.74 4.39 4.19
Relative precision [%] 0.80 1.18 2.66 0.54 
MOX2 (191 g Pu) 
Measurement time [s] 600 600 NA NA 
Doubles [s-1] 1242.54 357.43
σ 9.94 4.99
Relative precision [%] 0.80 1.40 
Table 4: Statistical uncertainty on Pu sample measurements of HLNCC prototypes 
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2.3.2. UNCL-types 
The results are reported in table 5. From the data we can conclude that the LS-NCC has the potential 
to provide better performances of UNCL, especially for measurements in fast mode (used mostly for 
Gd-loaded fuel elements). 
Safeguards parameters 3He-based 
HLNCC 
LS-NCC 
Efficiency - singles (S) [%] 10.01 9.54 
Efficiency - doubles (D) [%] 3.23 3.43 
GARR = S/(S+γ)  < 1.0e-8 8.4e-4 
D - passive mode 
(252Cf only) 61.55±0.87% 67.30±0.50% 
D – active thermal mode 
(AmLi+252Cf 10:1) 64.78±2.05% 68.98±0.49% 
D – active fast mode  
(AmLi+252Cf 100:1) 4.07±9.77% 4.77±1.87% 
Table 5: Comparison of results for UNCL and LS-NCC 
2.3.3. Monitor-types 
By nature slab monitors are scalable, so the efficiency has to be compared either as intrinsic efficiency 
(neutron detected per neutron hitting the surface of the detector) or the absolute efficiencies should be 
normalized per unit surface or covered solid angle. In the case of the systems demonstrated during 
the benchmark, the main purpose was not necessarily to provide a direct comparison of performance 
with He-3 detectors.  
For the University of Michigan the goal was to demonstrate the capabilities of novel plastic scintillators 
(in particular stilbene) as dual-particle detector with satisfactory gamma/neutron distinction by pulse 
shape discrimination. Figure 8 shows for instance the gamma sensitivity result: the neutron detection 
in presence of a strong gamma source was unaffected up to a dose rate of 30 μSv/h. 
For the parallel plate slab the main purpose was to demonstrate the high-count rate performances. 
Unfortunately the response of the Boron module was affected by noise on one of the amplifiers that 
has somehow degraded the performance of the detector during the benchmark. 
3. Conclusions from the workshop
The workshop was attended by 45 participants coming from several research centres in Europe, 
United States and Japan, industry and inspectorates (IAEA and Euratom). 25 presentations were 
delivered in the three technical sessions (general concepts / Li- and B-based alternatives / scintillation 
technologies), followed by a demonstration of the prototypes and concluded by a round table 
discussion table to which all participants contributed. The discussion was structured in four 
consecutive topics; for each topic an expert was invited to present a short statement that was 
supposed to trigger the discussion involving the entire audience. The four topics were: 
- Technical challenges 
- Standardized best practices for testing instruments 
- Use cases and technology gap 
- Implementation and path forward 
a) Technical challenges (facilitator S. Croft)
In the introductory statement the facilitator has evidenced three major areas for research: 
- the need to further develop the fundamental theory of coincidence and multiplicity counting,   
- simulation tools for the alternative technologies 
- availability of experimental facilities and round robin exercises 
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Concerning Monte Carlo simulation, the current tools work very well for He-3 counters, but require 
improvements to properly model the physics of the novel technologies. Modelling of boron or lithium 
based detectors would require a complete charged particle transport, whereas organic scintillators 
need modelling of a complex process including light emission/transport/collection and computation of 
pulse shape/height distributions. 
The use of spectroscopy could bring some advantages, but this needs to be first investigated and 
assessed. 
There would not probably be a fit-all-purposes solution, but we should seek for matching technologies 
to specific applications. 
In some cases a change from the classical way of working could be needed; the traditional way of 
measuring coincidences through the shift register logics could be replaced by other way of processing 
raw data, in particular for fast neutron detectors. In this view list mode data collection and analysis can 
open to a wider spectrum of possibilities in data processing. 
The use of fast neutron detectors (organic scintillators) would get a remarkable boost from 
developments in the data acquisition electronics: for instance, the capability to perform pulse shape 
analysis in real time and/or wave form digitalization. 
The lifetime of the new technologies has still to be demonstrated. 
Finally it was identified the need of bringing the appropriate competence from different disciplines to 
the NDA field. 
b) Standardized Best Practices for Testing (facilitator R. Kouzes)
The first fundamental question is: there are no standards for safeguards: do we need them? The 
safeguards “market” is relatively small and restricted and maybe do not justify the effort of developing 
standards. 
Then, as a consequence, the next question follows: can best practices replace standards and how? 
The answer is probably yes, but this would in any case require an intensive review of testing 
campaigns and the publication of agreed testing methods/protocols. 
The organization of benchmarks can be challenging, mostly from a logistic point of view. Benchmarks 
can be performed both as inter-comparisons (among different technologies) and versus real material 
and have to be targeted to end-user goals. 
The expected performance should be driven by the end-user needs; for instance the International 
Target Values (ITV) of IAEA are useful for some applications, but are not fully comprehensive and are 
in any case determined by experience on past performances. 
c) Use Cases and Technology Gaps (facilitator B. McElroy)
A provoking statement: since He-3 solves everything and it is not going to disappear totally in the short 
term, new technologies might find a place to only specific applications. Developers should aim to 
identify and target where their technology fits and where it can provide viable solution for replacement 
or even for improving the current situation. For instance attended/unattended applications might be 
tackled with different perspectives. 
Use cases where current equipment is not fully satisfactory and where R&D should be focused can 
include: 
- fresh fuel with poisons 
- fresh fuel with heterogeneity 
- partial defect in spent fuel 
- encapsulation/final repository safeguards 
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d) Implementation and path forward (facilitator T.H. Lee)
Here the facilitator has listed some of the issues considered of main relevance: 
- Optimize the use of He-3 (e.g. deploying hybrid B10+ tubes and modular detector assemblies) 
- Replacement of He-3 by B-10 or other alternatives for less challenging applications and where 
efficiency is not an issue (e.g. gross counting) 
- Still relying on He-3 for demanding applications (e.g. multiplicity counting) 
- active interrogation applications: fast neutron systems (organic or noble gas scintillators) 
- additional information from gamma/neutron detectors (multi-particle coincidences) 
Other properties of replacement technologies according to IAEA requirements are: 
- modeling possibility (required) 
- simple physical swap (desired) 
- compatibility with existing electronics (strongly desired) 
Finally the requirements for future systems should take into account: 
- field deployable (weight, cost, stability,…) 
- user friendliness 
- authorization process through evaluation vs existing systems 
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JAEA has been conducting an R&D project (for past 4 years) to develop a new type of neutron
detector using ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator (as an alternative neutron detector to He-3) with a
support of Japanese government. The design of the JAEA’s alternative system (ASAS: Alternative 
Sample Assay System using ceramic scintillator tubes) refers basically to the INVS (INVentory Sample
assay system) which is the passive type of neutron assay system equipped with total 18 He-3 tubes
and capable of measuring the small amount of Pu in MOX powder or Pu nitrate solution in a vial for
nuclear material accountancy and safeguards verification. In order to prove the alternative technology
and the performance instead of He-3 detector, and to establish Pu measurement capability, JAEA
developed and fabricated ASAS equipped with 24 alternative ceramic scintillator tubes and
demonstrated. The demonstration activity implemented the confirmation of reproducibility about
sample positioning, optimization of detector parameters, obtaining counting statistical uncertainty and
figure of merit (FOM) using Cf check source and actual MOX powder in PCDF (Plutonium Conversion
Development Facility). In addition, performance comparison between the current INVS and the ASAS
was also implemented.
In this paper, we present demonstration results with design information by Monte-Carlo simulation
code (MCNP). It is thought that these results give us the beneficial alternative technology with Pu
measurement capability and help to hedge risks of He-3 shortage.
Keywords: He-3 alternative, ceramic scintillator, neutron assay, figure of merit
1. Introduction
Existing neutron based NDA systems used for the detection of nuclear material in safeguards
application are typically based on He-3 proportional counters which require relatively large volume of
rare gas. Owing to the severe 3He shortage, an alternative technology for neutron detection is required.
In Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), the alternative technologies to detect neutrons for nuclear
security and safeguards systems are being developed. With the support of Japanese government
(MEXT; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports & Technology), the Integrated Support Centre for
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (“ISCN”, hereafter) of JAEA had started an R&D 
project of ZnS scintillation neutron detectors for non-destructive assay of Pu in clean MOX since 2011.
To solve the international issue about He-3 shortage, many types of potential alternative He-3 neutron
detectors such as BF3 gas detector, Li or B based inorganic solid state scintillator, plastic or liquid
scintillator, B-10 lined detector [1] and others were reported. In comparison with those detectors,
however all types of He-3 alternative detectors which are being developed could not achieved the He-
3 performance (efficiency) in a detection tube, we started to develop alternative He-3 detector using
ceramic scintillator to achieve the efficiency as well as He-3. JAEA has been developing an alternative
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neutron detection technology using ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator, since 2011 JFY [2] [3] [4]. On the
basis of the current specifications and performance characteristics of the ceramic scintillator detector,
one novel type of safeguards type of NDA detector equipped with the ceramic scintillator detectors
could have been designed and fabricated. It is a small size NDA system with references of HLNCC
type of detector called INVS (INVentory Sample verification system). In this report, we introduce a
development and demonstration result of a new Pu NDA system called ASAS (Alternative Sample
Assay System) which is equipped with ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator as an alternative He-3 system.
The demonstration activities including calibration by actual MOX powder was implemented at PCDF
(Plutonium Conversion Development Facility) in Japan.
2. Specification of Current INVS system (He-3 type)
The INVS was developed to quantify the Pu amount in a sample vial. The measurement target of the
INVS is pellets, Pu solution and MOX powder in a sample vial containing a few grams of plutonium.
The INVS is normally used for the inventory verification (attended mode) at the timing of Fixed-day RII
(Fixed-day Random Interim Inspection) in PCDF. Since DA (Destructive Analysis) takes a few days to
get Pu mass in the item, INVS system which can determine Pu mass in the item quickly is very useful
in order to get the result of inspection. With the HRGS (High resolution gamma spectroscopy)
measurement resulting in the Pu isotopic compositions, our results are verified quickly (during one
day). Since the total measurement uncertainty in the current INVS is expected about less than 6%, the
verification type by using INVS is categorized as a partial defect detection equipment (Method F).
As shown in the Figure 1, the INVS (HLNCC type of detector) in PCDF has 16 He-3 tubes that
surround sample chamber. The height of the detector is about 42cm, the external diameter of the
detector is about 28cm, and the weight of the detector is about 20kg. To make flatness response and
improve die-away time, cadmium liner is attached in the internal surface of sample chamber. Figure 1
also shows the image of sample vial. The vial can store maximum 50gMOX (about 20gPu). Since the
size of sample vial is small, the sample chamber is made small (55mm x 157mm) to set a vial to the
just center of sample chamber and it helps to increase relatively high counting efficiency (~31%).
Figure 1:  Axial sectional view of INVS and picture of a sample vial (24mm x 50mm (H))
It is estimated that the historical difference between measured (INVS) and declared in the current
INVS is about +/- 6%. And the recent measured doubles counting statistical uncertainty for 10-minutes
measurement is about +/-1.2% for MOX powder and about +/-1.2% for Pu nitrate solution. Since the
INVS is one of representative coincidence assay type of verification system, in order to prove and
present the ASAS performance, we would select it for the target of development and comparison.
3. Development of alternative He-3 system (ASAS)
To establish an alternative technique of He-3 neutron detector that is used for nuclear material
accountancy and safeguards, we developed a new type of neutron detector (Pu NDA system) using
ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator. The design of the alternative system (ASAS: Alternative Sample Assay
System) refers basically to the INVS, and the small amount of Pu in the MOX powder or Pu nitrate
solution in a vial can be measured. The basic design of ASAS is shown in the Figure 2.
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Overall view   Axial sectional view.
Figure 2: Schematic views of Alternative Sample Assay System (ASAS)
We developed the ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator detector module for safeguards and security use.
The photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) for scintillation light counting has been selected, and new electronic
circuitry has been developed. Figure 3 shows a photograph of the exterior view of the unit module built
on an experimental basis. The detector module is composed mainly of three components: an
aluminum regular square tube, a scintillator with a rectangular ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic sheet and two
PMTs. The sheet is fit on the diagonal inside the square tube, while the two PMTs are installed at both
ends of the tube. Nuclear reactions, between the neutrons that enter the scintillator from outside the
tube and the B-10 atoms in the scintillator, induce the emission of scintillation light from the surface of
the scintillator. The light photons are divided into two directions, towards both ends of the tube, and
are detected individually by the two PMTs as two pulse signals. Figure 4 shows the electronics circuit
that enables the alternative detector to detect neutron signals. The light signals detected with the
PMTs are amplified with pre-amplifiers. Then, the amplified signals are discriminated with certain
levels. The neutron signal is finally detected according to the coincidence of the two light signals from
the two PMTs, to eliminate the electrical noise signal which arises from various causes.
For the neutron detection efficiency of the ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator detector module of which
size is shown in Figure 3, we aimed at achievement of 70-80% of that of the conventional He-3 gas
(1in. diameter, 0.4MPa) detector with the same effective length (250 mm). For the gamma-ray
sensitivity of the ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator detector, we already achieved a sensitivity of less than
10-6.
Figure 3: Square-type neutron detector module Figure 4: Schematic view of mechanism of
(32mm x 32mm x 330mm) with alternative neutron detector
ceramic scintillator and 2 PMTs.
In order to prove the alternative system including alternative He-3 tubes, JAEA fabricated an ASAS
detector as a Pu measurement system. The system used ZnS/10B2O3 solid ceramic scintillator as
alternative He-3 tubes. Figure 5 shows cross-sectional views of ASAS detector design drawn by the
MCNP5. In the current design of ASAS, 24 neutron detection modules with PMT and sample chamber
(67mm x 158mm) for a sample vial are equipped. In the tube, 4mm thickness of glass plate and 2mm
thickness of ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator are placed diagonally, and the all plates are faced to the
sample chamber to detect neutrons effectively. As shown in the Figure 6, the ASAS is composed of a
detector unit using the ZnS/10B2O3 solid scintillator module, HV power supply and digital signal
processer box, AMSR (Advanced Multiplicity Shift Register) and data acquisition PC. Compatibility
with the current safeguards equipment is very important to use safeguards purposes. Therefore, the
ASAS detector transfers TTL pulse signals to the conventional shift register.
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(a)
Figure 5: (a) Cross-sectional view of ASAS detector (X-Z plane (Vertical))
(b) Cross-sectional view of each tube equipped ZnS/10B2O3 Ceramic Scintillator (X-Y plane).
(c) Cross-sectional view of ASAS detector (X-Y plane (horizontal))
Figure 6: System Configuration of ASAS system
4. Performance Demonstration
In order to prove progress of the technology and performance after the fabrication of the new detector,
fundamental performance check and calibration exercise for ASAS detector were conducted from the
end of February 2015 to March 2015 in PCDF in accordance with the demonstration plan [5]. To
evaluate the performance of alternative He-3 detector, side-by-side test by INVS was conducted to
compare the performance of ASAS. The fundamental performance check and the calibration for each
system were implemented using Cf check source and MOX powder in a sample vial in March 2015 at
PCDF. During the demonstration activity, JAEA showed their performances to relevant organizations
that are neutron based NDA specialists, safeguards regulation organizations and He-3 workshop
members on 17th and 18th March, 2015.
4.1 Fundamental Performance Check between INVS and ASAS
In order to confirm the possibility that ASAS can be used for the verification system as well as INVS,
JAEA conducted fundamental performance check which is focused on the detector performance of
itself. For the check, counting efficiency (), die-away time () and vertical response profile check in a
sample chamber were determined by using Cf-check source and a “figure of merit” that is one of index 
to compare the neutron detector performance was calculated for ASAS and INVS. Table 1 shows a
background measurement results. To minimize the counting statistical uncertainty, the 60min (30
seconds x 120 cycles) measurement was conducted. Table 2 shows Cf check source measurement
results to determine the counting efficiency for INVS and ASAS for 10 minutes measurement (30
seconds x 20 cycles). In the singles rate shown in the Table 2, the background measurement results
shown in the Table 1 were subtracted. As a result, 30.82% of counting efficiency for INVS and 15.97%
of counting efficiency for ASAS were calculated respectively.
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Table 1: Background Measurement Results for ASAS and INVS
Date Description Condition Singles (cps) s(S) Doubles (cps) s(D)
INVS Background 30s x 120c 19.143 0.082 0.008 0.004













INVS Efficiency Check 27127.673 8.729 30.82
ASAS Efficiency Check 14058.778 6.433 15.97




30s x 20c 88020
RSD: 0.032%
RSD: 0.046%
In case of die-away time (averaged neutron lifetime in the detector) determination, the comparison
method between 32s of gate width and 64s of gate width to change gate width setting in AMSR was
applied. The die-away time measurement results for ASAS and INVS are shown in the Table 3. The
measurement time was 5 minutes (30 seconds x 10 cycles). As a result, 45.4s of die-away time for
INVS and 77.7s of die-away time for ASAS was calculated by using formulas shown below Table 3.
In the demonstration, 4.5s of pre-delay which is default value of INVS was applied for both systems.
Table 4 shows the vertical response profile of ASAS in the sample chamber (see Figure 5). Since the
height of sample vial is about 5cm in PCDF, if we set the sample vial into the centre, the position bias
is expected about +/- 1% (see +/- 3cm of RSD (%) from centre). To apply known- method for the
calibration and sample setting reproducibility viewpoint, it is very important to establish flatness
response profile. It is thought that +/-1% deference in ASAS is very interesting and significant point by
comparing with the INVS detector (+/- 2%).
Table 3: Die-away Time Measurement Results of ASAS and INVS
Date Description Condition Doubles (cps) s(D) R+A A Die-away () s()
 INVS Die-away Time (GW:32s) 5542.088 13.485 28496 23137
INVS Die-away Time (GW:64s) 8279.149 17.700 54336 46330
ASAS Die-away Time (GW:32s) 1137.364 4.879 7008 6002






Detector Parameter: Pre-delay (4s), 
where, Rp is measured Reals.Rp1 is measured Reals of gate length 32. Rp2 is measured Reals of gate
length 64, s(Rp) is standard deviation of Rp.
Table 4: Vertical Response Profile Measurement Results for ASAS
Date Description Condition Singles (cps) s(S)
RSD (%)
from Center
Vertical Profile (+6cm) 20s x 5c 13404.277 7.453 -5.089
Vertical Profile (+3cm) 20s x 5c 13928.914 11.423 -1.374
Vertical Profile (Center) 20s x 5c 14122.927 9.678 0
Vertical Profile (-3cm) 20s x 5c 13977.829 15.763 -1.027




As a summary of fundamental performance check, the counting efficiency, die-away time and the
calculated figure or merit (FOM; 2 cases) are shown in the Table 5. Due to the lower counting
efficiency and higher die-away time, ASAS FOM (2/) was 1/7 of INVS one. So, it is concluded that
fundamental performance of ASAS detector could not achieved the conventional He-3 type of sample
assay system (INVS). In order to achieve the ASAS performance as well as INVS, it is thought that
following 3 improvement points are necessary based on our investigation result by MCNP simulation
and electronics viewpoint.
1) Improvement for structure of detector module (ZnS/10B2O3)
2) Optimization of detector module arrangement in the detector.
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3) Improvement of electronics (for instance, optimization of discrimination level and
Installation of de-randomizer board).
Table 5: Summary of Fundamental Performance Check for ASAS and INVS
4.2 Calibration
To prove the detector performance, the measurement uncertainty is the one of important evaluation
point. In the demonstration, the calibration exercise using MOX powder and blind sample
measurement by comparing PSMC (Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter) were conducted.
4.2.1 Sample Preparation
Table 6 shows the MOX standard list for ASAS and INVS calibration. In the periodical verification
activity by INVS (Method F), MOX and Pu solution containing 1gPu of sample are normally being sub-
sampled and used. Therefore, from 0.1gPu (0.24gMOX) to 10gPu (23.97gMOX) of MOX standards
were prepared in order to obtain appropriate calibration curve. In the sample preparation, well-
calibrated balance and analysis method (IDMS) were applied, and the uncertainty of Pu mass
determination of each standard is expected about less than 0.5%. To obtain the calibration slopes, Pu-
240 effective mass highlighted in red is used to compare with doubles count rate. Picture 1 shows the
picture of MOX standard which is wrapped by double plastic bags (0.3mm x 2) to maintain safety, and
the height of the vial is about 5cm.
Table 6: MOX standard list for the ASAS and INVS calibration
Picture 1: MOX Standard (10gPu)
4.2.2 Calibration
In the calibration exercise for ASAS and INVS using standard MOX powder, “passive calibration curve 
method” and “known- method” were applied. Prior to start the calibration measurement, detector
parameters shown in the Table 7 were determined and calculated. In the case of ASAS gate setting,
although 64s which is considered from die-away time is closer than 128s, since it was found that
minimum of RSD (%) in doubles was 128s, the 128s was selected. On the other hand, 0 factors to
correct multiplication for known- method were also calculated and applied as appropriate.
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Table 8 shows the ASAS measurement results for calibration to obtain passive calibration curve. The
measurement time for each standard was 30minutes (30 seconds x 60 cycles). Due to the low Pu
mass, less than 1.0gPu of sample could not achieve 1% of statistical uncertainty in Doubles. In the
range of standards, 3.16% of statistical uncertainty in Doubles was maximum. To obtain the
correlation between Pu-240 effective mass and Doubles count rate, as shown in Figure 7, we could
obtain a calibration curve as quadratic formula (Doubles=0.45x2+15.38x (X: Pu-240 eff. mass)). It was
confirmed that the quadratic formula was better correlation than liner formula. Table 8 also shows the
calibration check. To evaluate the actual difference from the formula, relative difference between Pu-
240 effective mass calculated by quadratic formula (slope) using measured double and actual Pu-240
effective mass was calculated. As a result, about -2% difference in 0.5gPu was observed.
Table 7:  Detector Parameter Setting for Calibration Exercise
Efficiency Predelay Die-away Time Gate Setting HV Setting Deadtime Doubles Gate
(%) (s) (s) (s) (V) (s) Fraction (-)
INVS 30.82 4.5 45.36 64 1780 1.2 0.6866 0.1518
ASAS 15.97 4.5 77.67 128* ** 8.9 0.5259 0.094
0
(known-)
* 128s was selected because minimum of RSD in doubles was 128s.
** Due to ceramic scintillator, individual HV is provided with each PMT


















1 0.1 0.033 9.355 0.109 0.538 0.017 3.16 0.033 0.550
2 0.25 0.083 26.172 0.171 1.374 0.030 2.18 0.084 -0.837
3 0.5 0.166 51.337 0.207 2.676 0.042 1.57 0.163 2.052
4 1 0.331 98.353 0.278 5.451 0.068 1.25 0.330 0.353
5 2.5 0.826 243.223 0.41 13.901 0.121 0.87 0.830 -0.463
6 5 1.651 484.245 0.523 28.236 0.204 0.72 1.649 0.104









Table 9 shows the ASAS measurement results for calibration to obtain known- calibration curve.
Though the measurement results from 0.25gPu to 5gPu were same as the result of Table 8, the other
2 standards were measured for a long time (2 hours) in order to reduce statistical uncertainty. To
obtain the correlation Pu-240 effective mass and multiplication corrected doubles count rate (MCD), as
shown in Figure 7, we could obtain a calibration curve as liner formula (MCD= 16.3x (X: Pu-240 eff.
Mass). Table 9 also shows the calibration check. To evaluate actual difference from the formula,
relative difference between standard Pu-240 effective mass and measured Pu mass using calibration
formula was calculated. As a result about -2.4% difference in 0.1gPu was observed.





















1 0.1* 0.033 11.264 0.073 0.538 0.007 1.30 0.525 0.032 -2.418
2 0.25 0.083 26.172 0.171 1.374 0.030 2.18 1.374 0.084 1.539
3 0.5 0.166 51.337 0.207 2.676 0.042 1.57 2.676 0.164 -1.121
4 1.0 0.331 98.353 0.278 5.451 0.068 1.25 5.451 0.334 1.012
5 2.5 0.826 243.223 0.410 13.901 0.121 0.87 13.586 0.833 0.888
6 5.0 1.651 484.245 0.523 28.236 0.204 0.72 26.93 1.652 0.050









* Longer measurements (2 hours) were conducted for 0.1gPu and 10gPu
In case of INVS, same calibration approaches were conducted, and we could obtain calibration curves
for passive calibration and known- method, respectively.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: ASAS Calibration Results for Passive Calibration Curve (a) and Known- Method (b)
Additionally, to prove the ASAS performance easily, blind MOX sample which is different Pu isotopic
composition and unknown Pu mass were measured for 20 minutes and compared between ASAS and
INVS. Once we determined Pu mass in the sample by PSMC measurement, the value was compared
with the Pu mass measured by INVS and ASAS in passive calibration curve and known- method. As
a result, those differences are very consistent within 1.5% of uncertainty. It is also concluded that
ASAS had almost same Pu measurement capability with INVS.
















Blind Sample by INVS 1.353 1.343 0.012 0.586 1.367 0.005 -1.156
Blind Sample by ASAS 1.353 1.331 0.016 1.48 1.354 0.017 -0.174
Through the series of measurements using Cf-check source and MOX powder, it was confirmed that
neutron measurement raw data including coincidence data could be acquired and processed in the
AMSR (safeguards shift-register) and INCC (IAEA Neutron Coincidence Counting software).
4.3 Uncertainty Evaluation
For a comprehensive evaluation for safeguards neutron detector, JAEA conducted an uncertainty
evaluation obtained from the calibration exercise that is shown in the Table 11. The total measurement
uncertainty of ASAS was 3.91% for passive calibration curve and 4.14% for known- method. On the
other hand, the total measurement uncertainty of INVS was 3.66% for passive calibration curve and
5.74% for known- method. Due to the different efficiency between ASAS and INVS, statistical
uncertainty of ASAS is about 1.5 times higher than the INVS. And the dominant reason against
relative big systematic and random uncertainties for each detector is the low mass (less than 1.0gPu)
measurement. In addition to the uncertainty evaluation, the low detection limits (LDL) were also
calculated. As a result, LDL for ASAS and INVS was 0.029gPu, 0.013gPu, respectively.
Table 11: Measurement Uncertainty Evaluation Table
* To reduce statistical uncertainty, 0.1gPu and 10gPu standards are not measured “30min”, but “120”min.
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The fundamental performance of ASAS, for instance, counting efficiency and die-away time, could not
achieve the INVS one, we could confirm that quantitative performance of ASAS in the total
measurement uncertainty was almost same as INVS. We think that these result of ASAS was satisfied
with the requirement of partial defect detection equipment of safeguards (less than 6% as total
measurement uncertainty). In normal, the detector performance should be compared with the
international target value (ITV2010 [6]) as HLNC detector (>10%MOX). The ITV shows the uncertainty
2.1% in 5 minutes measurement. Assuming that more than 2.5gPu of standards are used for the
ASAS calibration measurements and more than 1gPu of standards are used for the INVS calibration
measurements, it was confirmed that 2.1% of uncertainty shown in the ITV2010 can be achieved.
5. Summary and Conclusion
JAEA achieved in the 4th year the demonstration of ASAS using ZnS/10B2O3 instead of He-3 for small
sample as an alternative of INVS. Though the FOM of ASAS could not achieve the one of INVS due to
lower counting efficiency and higher die-away time, we could confirm that the measurement
uncertainty related to the Pu measurement capability was achieved to the same level. And it is thought
that ASAS can be applied to the partial verification system of uncertainty (~6%) as well as INVS
detector. It has a possibility to be applied as an alternative technology for future safeguards. It is also
confirmed that Pu mass by alternative He-3 detector can be measured quantitatively. This proves the
measurement capability for nuclear materials.
Since we think that ASAS is very innovative and interesting technology for assay plutonium although
fundamental performance of ASAS could not yet achieve the one of INVS, we would like to continue
improving the ASAS performance.
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Abstract: 
The advent of low-hazard organic liquid scintillation detectors and real-time pulse-shape discrimination 
(PSD) processing has suggested a variety of modalities by which fast neutrons, as opposed to 
neutrons moderated prior to detection, can be used directly to benefit safeguards needs.  In this paper 
we describe a development of a fast-neutron based safeguards assay system designed for the 
assessment of 235U content in fresh fuel.  The system benefits from real-time pulse-shape 
discrimination processing and auto-calibration of the detector system parameters to ensure a rapid 
and effective set-up protocol.  These requirements are essential in optimising the speed and limit of 
detection of the fast neutron technique, whilst minimising the intervention needed to perform the 
assay. 
Keywords: neutron; assay; scintillator; fast 
1. Introduction
Neutrons constitute the main route by which nuclear material might be assayed, non-destructively and 
remotely.  Generally they can be considered to exist in two groups in terms of their energy: fast and 
thermal, wherein the former can be considered for most purposes to be limited to a maximum of ~5 
MeV whilst the latter is usually defined by the ambient conditions at 0.0253 eV.  Thermal neutrons are 
often considered easier to detect because of the significant capture cross sections on materials 
containing 10B and 3He compared to higher energies.  Fission neutrons emitted by isotopes that might
provide useful signatures of nuclear materials are almost always emitted in the fast domain.  Hence, if 
a thermal neutron detection modality is to be used, this requires that the neutrons are thermalized by 
hydrogenous materials (usually polyethylene) prior to detection.  Such materials are bulky and can 
restrict the flexibility of such measurements.  Thermal detection media, such as boron trifluoride and 
3He gas, are often considered either hazardous in use or supply limited, respectively; although these 
limitations have not prevented many forms of apparatus based on them being developed and used  for 
nuclear materials assay over the last 50 years or so. 
However, as the world seeks alternative sources of energy (and especially electricity) in light of 
depleted oil stocks and the desire to decarbonise electricity supplies, the nuclear industry is under 
renewed focus in terms of novel reactor design i.e. small modular reactors, Generation IV systems and 
alternative fuels.  The latter includes revised thinking about such matters as fuel reuse, recycling, 
mixed-oxide variants and thorium.  Whilst nuclear fission remains the only proven technology for 
massive production of carbon-free electricity, it is also being considered as an energy source for 
desalination, hydrogen production and bulk chemical synthesis.  This multi-faceted nuclear 
renaissance heralds an era in which there is likely to be an escalation in international nuclear fuel 
trading and transportation, and all of these matters present challenges for the nuclear safeguards 
analyst.  Such challenges go beyond the need to ensure that new capabilities are grasped to ensure 
the continuous improvement of safeguards assay and to encompass the need to replace and seek 
alternatives to established methods, particularly those based on thermal neutron detection. 
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Neutron detection is often preferred for fissile materials assay because it enables those neutrons 
emitted simultaneously in fission to be detected providing, in some cases, an a priori measurement of 
quantity of nuclear material present.  The detection of neutrons in coincidence enables these neutrons 
to be discriminated from single neutrons that originate from a variety of other, competing contaminant 
sources and processes.  An important example in this context are the isotopes that are susceptible to 
fission, such as 235U, 238U, 239Pu, 240Pu etc. which constitute sources that emit neutrons that are 
emitted simultaneously, whilst neutrons that result from the interaction of α particles (usually arising 
from α decay in actinide species) on light isotopes are emitted independently of each other.  
To a thermal neutron detector, neutrons arising from α,n reactions or from fission are identical since 
the moderation process wipes out any information available associated with their initial energy.  The 
discrimination is done instead by the processing electronics using the time correlation information 
associated with the fission neutrons. To isolate the coincident signature of fission neutrons from those 
not correlated in time, a time window is usually applied, either electronically or in subsequent analysis; 
this time window is usually referred to as the coincidence gate.  The uncorrelated neutron fluence 
constitutes a random, accidental contribution to the total number of coincident neutron events that fall 
within this gate.  While the coincident events are distributed very close to the first event (depending on 
the detector characteristic) exhibiting the so-called “Rossi-Alpha distribution”, the accidental events 
have a constant probability at whatever distance in time they occur. Hence, the larger the gate, the 
larger the probability of a random accidental contribution.  In order to account for these random 
accidental events, a delayed gate with the same width as the coincident gate is opened far from the 
first event. This technique is usually carried out within hardware or firmware referred to as a shift 
register and is a well-established means for identifying the accidental contribution. In certain 
conditions in which the amount of real coincidences is very small in comparison to the accidental 
contribution, the statistical uncertainty in the mass estimate required will be too large for a practical 
acquisition time to be achieved. 
It is hence very clear that a significant factor that governs the uncertainty in coincidence 
measurements is the gate width.  In thermal neutron detection systems the average delay between 
two coincident detections is due mainly to the time necessary for the thermalisation prior to detection. 
In sharp contrast, in the case of fast neutron detection, the delay between two coincident events is not 
driven by the time needed for thermalisation but only by the difference in time of flight of the two 
fission neutrons.  This can be three orders of magnitude lower in comparison with a thermal detector.  
This can be depicted by comparing the Rossi-Alpha distributions for a thermal system that requires 
moderation prior to detection, and a fast system that does not.  These are shown in Figure 1, and 
illustrate the basis on which it is possible to move from an unavoidably wide time window for thermal 
systems to a much shorter, ~ 100 ns window for fast systems; the latter inferring significantly-reduced 
accidentals rates relative to the former. 
Figure 1: Rossi-alpha distribution for thermal systems (left) [1] and for fast systems (right). 
This paper concerns the use of fast neutrons for neutron coincidence assay in contrast to long-
established thermal neutron assays, the latter reliant predominantly on the use of 3He. It describes
measurements made in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  This paper 
is focussed on development of the electronics that has been necessary to promote the use of long-
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established liquid scintillator detectors into a field-deployable active interrogation assay of uranium 
materials.  
2. Concept outline and system architecture
Nuclear safeguards assay based on fast neutrons has been made possible by two developments: i) 
the availability of low-hazard, organic scintillation detectors and ii) electronic hardware and firmware 
that is sufficiently fast to enable real-time discrimination of neutrons from γ-ray contamination.   
A single neutron detector cannot detect two coincident neutrons due to the dead time (100-300 ns) in 
the detector and electronics.  Therefore a number of distinct, single detection cells is necessary for 
coincidence assays. On the other hand, it is proven that a large single liquid scintillator cell would 
distort the pulse too much to apply pulse shape discrimination between neutron and γ effectively [2]. 
Detector systems comprising a limited number of detectors i.e. a pair of detectors are, by definition, no 
use for multiplicity measurements but they serve as a useful basis with which to introduce the system 
architecture for fast-neutron safeguards assay.  A twin-detector arrangement is shown in Figure 2. 
This comprises two high-flashpoint, low-hazard EJ309 detectors (Scionix, Netherlands) connected 
through to two single-channel mixed-field analysers (Hybrid Instruments Ltd.).  The analyser 
comprises the high-voltage supply to drive the photomultiplier tube of a given detector and the 
firmware to discriminate the long-tailed neutron pulses from the shorter γ ray events; it is a single-unit 
alternative to laboratory-based rack modules.  The discriminated signals from these analysers are fed 
into a shift register configured on a field-programmable gate array on an embedded controller 
(National Instruments Ltd.).   
Figure 2: The fundamental system architecture for fast-neutron assay. 
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Figure 3: An exemplar scatter plot for one detector showing γ rays in red and neutrons in blue, with a threshold 
separation line in green. 
Neutrons and γ rays interact with the organic scintillant differently; the former lose their energy 
predominantly via proton recoil whilst the latter interact with the electron structure of the scintillant 
molecules.  This distinction in interaction processes results in a well-known albeit subtle difference in 
profile of the light pulse that results, with the neutron pulses exhibiting a longer falling edge than that 
of the γ-ray events.  When the data are plotted in terms of a long- and short integral of the area under 
the pulse the data separate into two clear loci which can then be used as a basis for separating the 
neutrons from the total field detected.  An exemplar depiction of the separation of events or scatter 
plot is given in Figure 3.   
The distinction of this arrangement from long-established, laboratory-based methods of pulse-shape 
discrimination (PSD) is that it enables real-time PSD i.e. radiation incident on the detector is 
processed immediately, without the need for post-processing but retaining the synchronisation with 
pulse arrival time to enable the essential coincidence function.  This is an important requirement for 
the application to be used autonomously in commercial fuel production facilities because post-
processing would introduce a delay, thus interfering with the manufacturing process which is highly 
undesirable. Also the availability of a digital signal corresponding to each neutron event synchronised 
in time with the detection of the incident event renders the system compatible with existing acquisition 
systems at the IAEA.   The mixed-field analyser also offers very high levels of throughput to enable the 
requisite levels of sensitivity to be reached with a practical number of detectors and within a 
reasonable period of acquisition.  A more comprehensive description of the approach is available in 
[3]. 
In support of the research reported here, three significant developments have been made to the 
electronics and firmware: 
• The high-voltage supply systems have been upgraded to provide for much greater
stabilisation in use, to optimise the consistency of the gains across a significant number of
detector cells, as necessary in this application.
• Very large events, that can become saturated in processing and thus in the past have
contributed to an extensive and erroneous source of high-amplitude noise in the scatter plot
data have been identified in firmware and removed.  This leaves behind much better localised
plumes that enables the better separation of neutrons and γ rays, and has the potential for
simpler PSD thresholding.
• The matching of gains across a significant number of detector cells i.e. >10 has been enabled
by the real-time acquisition of pulse-height spectra for each cell.  The auto-calibration of these
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spectra is enabled via the graphical user interface, providing a quick and effective approach to 
setting up arrays of detector systems of this type. 
3. System design for fuel assembly assay
3.1. Detector system design: the IAEA Liquid Scintillator Uranium Neutron Collar (LS-
UNCL) 
(a) (b)  (c) 
Figure 4: The detector system used in this research.  Schematic design (a), physical embodiment (b) and a 
single detector (c). 
The detector system used for this research is shown in Figure 4.  It comprises 12 individual VS-1105-
21 EJ309 detectors (Scionix, Netherlands). 
Each of these detectors is a cube of 
dimensions of 100 mm × 100 mm × 120 mm 
with a photomultiplier tube of type 9821 FLB 
(ADIT Electron Tubes, Sweetwater, TX). 
The detectors are positioned in three gangs 
of four, with the detector cells facing one 
another and the PMTs aligned vertically, 
opposite one another.  The pulse-shape 
discrimination is provided by three, 4-
channel mixed-field analysers (Hybrid 
Instruments, UK) and the acquisition system 
to perform the shift register processing is as 
described in Section 2.  The design of the 
system was influenced by simulations that 
were performed by the Joint Research 
Centre, Ispra, Italy. 
3.2. Multiple-channel real-time pulse-
shape discrimination 
An extended number of single-channel units 
is clearly not a satisfactory practical 
arrangement to process the pulses from a 
significant number of detectors.  Therefore 
for this application three 4-channel 
analysers from a bank of four were 
Figure 5: A bank of MFAX4.3 4-channel analysers 
used in this research. 
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configured, as shown in Figure 5. 
This unit provides processing capability for 16 detectors ensuring that there is redundancy for 4 extra 
detectors if they are needed.  As in the case of the system architecture discussed in Section 2, these 
analysers provide for 500 MHz processing per channel, 6 ns jitter between events and a processing 
period of 333 ns per event from detection through to output.  They output discriminated 50 ns TTL 
pulses for each neutron and γ ray, with the former being fed to the shift register firmware.  A 
comprehensive description of the analyser is available in [4,5]. 
3.3. System control 
The MFAX4.3 systems are controlled via a graphical user interface, and the system can operate in two 
modes.  The first of these is as a multi-channel analyser (MCA) in order to match the gain of all 
detection cells through the control of the high-voltage settings for each of the detectors; the user 
interface displays plots of counts versus channel for each of the channels in use and these are 
integrated in real time to enable quick and simple configuration on the fly.  Two examples of these 
plots are given in Figure 6 below; one for 137Cs (the usual choice of calibration source due to its single,
662 keV γ ray), and 252Cf, the latter a popular choice for configuring PSD thresholds.  The other mode
is as a PSD analyser, the unit’s main role, in which it provides scatter plots for diagnostic purposes 
which are once again updated in real-time, as depicted in Figure 3.  The user interface, as shown in 
Figure 7, allows high-voltage levels, trigger thresholds, pre-amplifier gains and pulse-shape 
discrimination thresholds to be adjusted.  Once configured, these settings are written to the FPGA on 
the MFAX4.3 analyser so that after powering off, the settings for each channel are set in firmware, 
allowing for autonomous operation independent of the user interface. 
Figure 6:  MCA plots for 137Cs (left) and 252Cf (right) provided in real-time by the MFAX4.3.
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Figure 7:  A screen shot from the control laptop of one of the control environments on the MFAX4.3. 
The FPGA-based shift register is configured via a separate user interface, and an example screen 
shot of this is shown in Figure 8.  This provides information for each pod (i.e. collection of four 
detectors), detection rates for each detector including GARRN estimates and doubles detection rates 
as a function of position in terms of time bins which is also displayed in terms of events versus bin 
number for each pod. 
Figure 8:  A screen shot from the control laptop of LabView ® environment configured to control the shift register. 
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3.4. Combatting cross-talk 
One consequence of using an array of fast neutron detectors is that to ensure satisfactory levels of 
detection efficiency the detectors are best positioned near to the sample under scrutiny.  However, this 
exacerbates the possibility that neutrons might scatter from one detector to another.  This is shown 
schematically in Figure 9. 
Figure 9:  A schematic depicting the cross-talk phenomena between four detectors arranged adjacent to one 
another. 
The significance of a cross-talk event is that it results in a single neutron stimulating two counts in 
neighbouring detectors and, in the case of a single scatter from one detector to another, a coincident 
event despite in reality there only being one neutron, not two.  If left uncorrected this contribution to 
the dataset would lead to an overestimate in the reals and a corresponding overestimate in the 
amount of material under assay.   
In the system used in this work a filter has been constructed to reduce this possibility, which comprises 
a 1 cm polyethylene layer separating the detectors from one another, and a software function which 
discounts coincident events in neighbouring detectors. 
4. Experimental details
4.1. Premise for the measurement 
We have previously reported the assay of plutonium with a real-time fast neutron system, comprising 4 
detectors and based on the detection of coincident events [5].  In this paper we describe an 
application for enriched uranium fresh fuel.  Nuclear fuel of this type that has yet to be irradiated is a 
challenge to safeguards because the 235U (for which the level of enrichment is of safeguards concern)
emits a very weak radiation signature that does not provide for a quick and accurate measurement of 
the quantity of material present.  Hence, for this aspect of the fuel cycle active methods are often 
employed in which a neutron source is used to stimulate 235U fission in the fuel.  The radiation that
arises as a result is measured to infer fuel quantity and, ideally, enrichment (usually the neutron 
component of the stimulated field is the focus of the measurement). In certain conditions, when the 
stimulating neutrons are above the absorption energy for gadolinium (to be independent of the 
presence of this component), the neutron fluence from stimulated fission is very small compared with 
the interrogating source (i.e. 1:1000) and design challenges can arise in the context of the use of 
thermal detectors.  The premise for this measurement is described in more detail in [6]. 
In this work we have adopted a similar rationale, with a 241Am-Li source as the stimulus but with the
combination of the liquid scintillator UNCL detector system, the MFAX4.3 analyser and the FPGA-
based shift register instead of a thermal neutron detection system.  This approach has two significant 
advantages in principle.  Firstly, the coincidence counting approach with a shorter coincidence gate 
allows for data corresponding to the true coincident neutrons detected with significantly-reduced 
accidentals rates.  Secondly, the system can also discriminate the stimulating source from the fission 
source on the basis of energy since it still preserves the original emission energy. In order to reduce 
the cross-talk contribution from the 241Am-Li to negligible levels, the low-energy cut-off of the organic
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liquid scintillation materials (EJ309) in neutron energy is raised to approximately 500 keV.  This 
ensures that the same neutron surviving the first detection is very unlikely to have enough have 
energy to be detected again. 
4.2. Experimental set-up 
The experiments central to the research described in 
this paper were carried out at the Atominstitut, TU-
Wien, Vienna, Austria.  The LS-UNCL was positioned 
near to the MFAX4.3 units and the associated HV, 
signal-input, and signal-output (neutron and γ-ray) 
cables were connected to the MFAX4.3.  The gains of 
the detectors were matched over Ethernet using a 
137Cs source and the signal output cables were 
connected to the National Instruments ® industrial 
controller for the multiplicity data collection.  The 
241Am-Li source (neutron emission rate 5×104 per
second) was placed in the vacant face of the LS-
UNCL detector system i.e. the face void of any 
detectors.  The source was removed to allow for 
passive measurements to be made of the material 
under test (predominantly of the 238U content present
in the sample) and then active measurements were 
made (stimulating neutrons from the 235U content).
The sample was a WWER-440 fuel assembly, of 3.6% 
enrichment as shown with the LS-UNCL system and 
MFAX4.3 in Figure 10.  Data were acquired for 15 
minutes, both passive and active, and the threshold 
was set to 400 keV neutron-equivalent energy. 




Neutron detection rates (totals) per second Uncertainty 
Passive reals Active reals Net reals 
15 minutes 1.28 5.57 4.28 2% 
Table 1: Data recorded for the passive and active measurement of a 3.6%-enriched WWER-440 fuel assembly. 
The results from a 15-minute measurement of the WWER-440 fuel assembly are given in Table 1. 
These include the passive-real neutron rates (without the source) and the active-reals neutron rates 
(with the source).  The net reals rate is obtained via subtraction, giving a 2% uncertainty in the 
measurement.  
5. Conclusions
The research described in this paper demonstrates that liquid organic scintillators can be used 
effectively for the analysis of enrichment levels in a nuclear fuel assembly, in this case a 3.6%-
enriched WWER-440 assembly.  In particular, three advancements made to the electronics in terms of 
high-voltage stabilisation, removal of saturated pulse profiles and auto-calibration of detector gains 
have yielded significant advantages in operation.  The use of liquid scintillators, coupled with real-time 
digital pulse-shape discrimination, results in extremely low accidentals rates offering the potential for 
the assay of a wider range of nuclear materials than previously considered possible.  The approach 
offers the benefits of faster assay of fresh fuel than was previously considered possible as a result of 
the very low accidentals rates or conversely, measurements with smaller stimulating sources where 
this presents benefits in terms of radiation protection and ease of use. 
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Abstract 
A prototype 3He-free neutron coincidence counter for safeguards applications has been developed
and built following comprehensive Monte Carlo modeling. It consists of eight compact 6LiF:ZnS(Ag)
thermal neutron absorbers (or blades) dispersed in  four moderating slabs surrounding the sample
chamber.
This paper describes the results of an extensive campaign of measurements carried out at the JRC in
Ispra to validate the Monte Carlo models, characterize and calibrate the counter in order to assess the
suitability of the technology as an alternative to 3He based ones. Its compliance with safeguards
requirements regarding a number of important parameters such as neutron efficiency, die-away time,
gamma rejection, dead-time amongst others is also evaluated.
The counter successfully took part in an inter-comparison measurement campaign at the JRC in Ispra
(Italy) within the International Safeguards Workshop on 3He alternatives in October 2014 attended by 
a number of laboratories and research institutes from Europe, IAEA and USA with Japan as observers
The performance of the counter is compared to that of a commonly deployed HLNCC-II-II counter
which makes use of now scarcely available 3He gas. 
Keywords: NDA; Nuclear Safeguards; Neutron Coincidence Counting
1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, non-destructive assay (NDA) in the field of nuclear safeguards has relied on the
neutron coincidence counter (NCC), using the time-correlation of fission neutrons to produce
measurements of fission rate from which plutonium mass can be calculated.  Such systems consist of a
sample cavity surrounded by He3 proportional counters embedded in high density polyethylene (HDPE), 
with attached electronics to carry out the time-delayed coincidence measurement.  The “classic” design is 
represented by the HLNCC-II in service around the world [1].
However, in recent years the supply of 3He has been outstripped by demand [2], leading to a perceived 
shortage in many fields, including nuclear safeguards.  To mitigate this problem extensive research has
been carried out worldwide into alternatives, focussing mostly on 10B and 6Li thermal neutron detectors or 
fast neutron detection using organic scintillators.
1Contact: hamid.tagziria@jrc.ec.europa.eu
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This paper describes research by JRC and Symetrica into a 6Li-based system, utilising the safeguards and 
NDA expertise of JRC and the detector development expertise of Symetrica.  The latter has demonstrated
excellent performance in terms of gamma-ray rejection and sensitivity when applying 6Li-loaded scintillators 
in systems ranging from roadside portals to handheld neutron detectors [3].  It was then a natural step to
apply Symetrica compact thermal neutron detectors to the neutron coincidence counting problem.
It was decided that the development effort would be staged.  The first stage consisted of two parts:
designing an NCC capable of outperforming the HLNCC-II using simulations in MCNPx; and developing
and testing the thermal neutron detectors that would populate it.  Since the thermal neutron detectors are a
new design, this stage only involved making a small number sufficient for testing the NCC in a partially
populated mode.  That testing was used to validate models and provide an improved estimate of the
performance of the fully populated NCC.
In order to judge the success of this effort, a detailed characterisation and calibration campaign of the partly
populated NCC was carried out at JRC, culminating in a comparison of plutonium mass estimates against a
benchmark set by an HLNCC-II.
The planned second stage will consist of using the results presented here to further develop the thermal
neutron detectors and to improve the design of the NCC.  A larger set of thermal neutron detectors
including improvements will be manufactured and used to test the full NCC, again against the HLNCC-II
benchmark.
2. Thermal Neutron Detector Design
2.1 Neutron Detector “Blade” Description
The neutron coincidence counter under test relies on a number of thin thermal neutron detectors utilising
6LiF/ZnS scintillators and silicon photomultiplier (SiPM) readout, dubbed “blades” for their form factor.
Figure 1 shows images and the physical parameters of the thermal neutron detector “blades” developed for 
this project.
Each blade consists of a sensitive element and processing electronics.  The sensitive element is made up
of two 6LiF/ZnS screens (EJ-426) sandwiching a wavelength shifting PVT plate of 500 x 60 x 3mm (EJ-280), 
both sourced from Eljen Technologies.  The screens cover the whole face area of the wavelength shifter
and have an average thickness of 0.75mm.  Scintillation light from the screens is transmitted by the
wavelength shifter to a row of silicon photomultipliers (S10931-050P) supplied by Hamamatsu Photonics
optically bonded to one end.
The processing electronics is a single-board solution that includes the following functions:
 Preamplifier to provide current to voltage conversion and signal conditioning.
 Temperature stabilized SiPM bias supply in the range 66V to 76V using a linear function of
56mV/°C.  A temperature sensor is placed near the SiPMs for this purpose.
 Neutron/gamma/SiPM noise pulse shape discrimination (PSD).  An internal 20MHz clock gives a
50ns time resolution.
 Simple internal fault detection and reporting via a “device ready line” that can be picked up by
attached electronics.
 Communication over SPI to set parameters such as SiPM bias and neutron/gamma discrimination
thresholds.  Internal memory holds these settings following calibration.
 A TTL output signal to indicate detection of neutrons.  The pulse is +5V and 120ns in duration.
The electronics are placed at the end of the sensitive element.  An aluminium enclosure fits over the
electronics and is electrically connected to a thin aluminum case over the sensitive element to provide RFI
and EMI shielding.  A layer of black heat-shrink plastic then shrouds the aluminum case to provide a
protective layer.
Discrimination between neutrons, gamma-rays and SiPM noise is based on the measured length of pulses
against a programmable threshold.  A paralysable dead time of 10μs follows each neutron detection TTL.
Each blade is self-contained and requires only a power line to operate.  In return it provides a ready line to
indicate that it is operating, and a TTL pulse for each neutron detected.
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 Mass = 430g
 Dimensions = 560 x 68 x 12 mm
 Power requirement = 9mA at 12V
 Temperature range = 10 to 30°C
 Neutron detection signal = +5V,
120ns TTL pulse
Figure 1: Clockwise from top left: An image of two blades, physical parameters of a blade, three blades showing
their processing electronics, the dimension of a blade.
2.2 Aggregation of Blade Detectors
To facilitate testing of systems containing multiple blades, an Aggregator Unit was developed.  It serves to
distribute power to up to 32 blades and contains a 32-input logical OR function with a single BNC output.
This BNC can then be connected to counting circuits or pulse train analyzers for data collection.  Blades are
connected to the Aggregator Unit by 32 cables of 1.5m length that carry 12V power, TTL signals and ready
lines.
Figure 2: The Aggregator Unit (left) connected to eight blades in a moderator slab (right).  Only eight
cables have been fitted to the Aggregator for convenience.
2.3 Neutron Detector Testing
For this project a total of eight blades were assembled and tested for their thermal neutron detection
efficiency and gamma-ray rejection.  One of the set was also subjected to thermal tests to measure its
variation in detection efficiency as a function of temperature.
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
66
2.3.1 Thermal Neutron Detection Efficiency and Gamma-Ray Rejection
The detectors used in the test module were calibrated to achieve the best thermal neutron detection
efficiency whilst still meeting a gamma-ray rejection limit of 10-7 or better, which means the probability of an 
incident gamma-ray being mistaken for a neutron was less than 10-7. 
The efficiency of each blade relative to the rest of the set was determined by irradiation with a 5.21ng 252Cf 
source moderated in a 5cm thick HDPE cylinder (10cm Ø x 10cm L), as shown in Figure 3.  Measurements
were taken indoors since environmental scatter was not relevant for relative measurements.
For gamma sensitivity measurements, a 17.7mCi 137Cs source was illuminating the largest face of the
detector at a dose rate of 100Sv/hr.  Results are shown in Table 1.  Since there exists a tradeoff between
these two measurements depending on pulse shape discrimination thresholds, the two measurements were
carried out simultaneously.
Figure 3: Left: a sketch of the detector in front of the gamma-ray source, with the neutron source in place, and
the detector sensitive element centred on the gamma beam.  Right: photographs of a blade in the test position.
Detector Serial
Number




140001 45.01 ± 0.39 101.3% 0.26 ± 0.11
140002 46.57 ± 0.40 104.8% 0.55 ± 0.12
140003 44.29 ± 0.39 99.7% 0.70 ± 0.14
140004 44.63 ± 0.39 100.5% 0.18 ± 0.10
140005 45.18 ± 0.39 101.7% 0.47 ± 0.11
140006 45.30 ± 0.39 102.0% 0.60 ± 0.13
140007 41.06 ± 0.37 92.4% 0.82 ± 0.14
140008 43.30 ±0.40 97.5% 0.50 ± 0.10
Table 1: Summarised results from the individual blade tests for relative thermal neutron detection efficiency and
gamma-ray rejection.
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The distribution of sensitivity is very tight, showing a standard deviation of only 3.7%.  During this work it
was found that the relative efficiency correlated strongly with the 6LiF/ZnS screen thickness indicating that 
this sets the limit on uniformity, since each blade was tuned for the best sensitivity.  If this distribution is
later found to be too broad, then the highest performing blades can then be de-tuned slightly to narrow it.
Gamma-ray rejection is very good in all blades, so gamma-ray rejection in the whole system is expected to
be good.
2.3.2 Temperature Tests
In this test, blade S/N 140002 was placed in an environmental chamber and cycled in the range 10°C to
30°C multiple times.  A neutron source in a 5cm HDPE moderator was also placed to provide a high count
rate.  During the cycle, the count rate was monitored.  Figure 4 shows the results indicating a high degree of
consistency over the range with no apparent hysteresis between cycles.
Figure 4: Data showing the consistency of neutron sensitivity as a function of temperature in the range 10°C to
30°C.
2.3.3 Readout Efficiency Measurement
The blades rely on a wavelength shifting process and pulse-shape discrimination to detect the capture of
thermal neutrons in the 6LiF/ZnS screens.  These processes are not simulated in Monte Carlo models and 
so must be accounted for as the “readout efficiency” of the thermal neutron detectors to prevent the model
overestimating the absolute efficiency of the NCC.  Readout efficiency represents the probability of a
neutron captured in the 6Li producing sufficient signal to pass the discrimination threshold and result in a 
TTL pulse being counted.
The simplest way to estimate readout efficiency in the absence of a well-characterised thermal neutron flux
is to place a detector in a low scatter environment and compare a measured absolute efficiency with a
simulated one.  That is,





Where 𝜀𝑎𝑏𝑠 is the absolute efficiency of the detector when exposed to a known neutron source. 
This technique was used to measure the readout efficiency of the blades by placing all eight into a HDPE
moderator that represented one quarter of the NCC (see Section 3).  A sketch of the moderator is shown in
Figure 5, along with a depiction of the model used.  The blades were connected to the Aggregator Unit and
the whole detector placed in an outdoor low-scatter environment.  A 252Cf neutron source of 5.21ng (± 0.9%) 
was placed at 8 cm from the centre of the largest face of the detector, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Left: A depiction of the modelled moderator with blades.  Right: A sketch of the 252Cf source placement, 
and a photograph of the measurement configuration.
Simulated Measured
Absolute efficiency, abs 6.07% ±.09% 5.17% ± 0.17%
Intrinsic efficiency, int 21.4%±.09% 18.5%
Readout Efficiency, RE 85.1%±2.9%
Table 2: Results of the readout efficiency measurement.
These results show a high readout efficiency of 85.1%, indicating a good optical path between the screens
and SiPMs and that the pulse-shape discrimination algorithm performs well at finding neutron events
amongst the SiPM noise.
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
69
3. Coincidence Counter Design
After having established the functionality of the blade detectors individually and within a slab module (see
Figure 5), the next stage in the development consisted of designing and optimizing a full-scale coincidence
counter build primarily consisting of four slab modules surrounding an assay chamber of square cross-
section, as shown in Figure 6 (left).  The modular design will also allow us to configure three modules as a
collar for active measurements.
Monte Carlo N-Particle extended (MCNPX) simulations were performed to estimate the detection efficiency
and the die-away time of the counter in order to compare to the HLNCC-II.  Figure 6 (center)  shows the
MCNPX model of the counter showing the distribution of up to 32 blades in the HDPE moderating wall of
the counter.
Figure 6: Full-scale NCC build illustration (L), MCNPX model (centre), and built with one slab removed (right)
Each slab module is enveloped in a cadmium sleeve to maintain a low die-away time by minimizing the
thermal neutron albedo to the sample chamber.  Top and bottom plugs were added comprising HDPE and
aluminium neutron reflectors to give a good vertical profile.  The design was completed by adding four
corner posts of HDPE to increase absolute efficiency, without unduly increasing the die-away time since
they are outside of the cadmium liners.  The top and bottom plugs as well as the corner posts are visible in
the right-hand panel of Figure 6.
The neutron source was simulated as a point isotropic 252Cf in the center of the chamber.  The simulated 6Li 
capture probabilities were multiplied by the measured 85.1% readout efficiency.  The die-away time of the
counter was obtained using the built-in coincidence capture feature of MCNPX and the sequential gate
width method, as well as fitting to the time distribution of the neutron population in the counter.  A Figure-of-





Where 𝜀 is the absolute efficiency and 𝜏 is the die-away time.
Figure 7 shows an iso-plot of FoM values for the blade counter design, normalized to the FoM of the
HLNCC-II.  The efficiency for a fully populated neutron blade coincidence counter (25.4%) is predicted to
exceed that of the HLNCC (16.5%), and yet have a lower die-away time of 31µs, resulting in a coincidence
counting figure-of-merit (FoM) of 4.56 compared to the 2.54 of the HLNCC-II.
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Figure 7: Simulated Figure-of-Merit for NCC compared to FOM of HNLCC-II
4. Experimental Verification
4.1 Counting and Analysis Electronics
During the measurement campaign, the blades were used with the Aggregator Unit which provided power
and a logical OR of their output TTLs.  As a consequence, the output of the system was a single BNC
connector with output pulses of 150ns.  The BNC output was connected to a PTR-32 from EK which was
used to perform coincidence analysis.  The PTR-32 provides the following functions using accompanying
software:
 Recording of time interval data for replay and reanalysis
 Plotting of time interval histograms
 Calculation of Rossi-Alpha distributions
 Measurement of coincidence rates using the two-gate R and R+A method
Figure 8 shows a block diagram of the blades, Aggregator Unit and PTR-32.
Figure 8: A block diagram showing the signal path used in this study.
4.2 Measurement of Basic Parameters
The NCC with eight blades was assembled in the PERLA laboratory at JRC in Ispra for testing.  A number
of HDPE “blanks” were manufactured that could be fitted into the spare blade slots to allow for 
reconfiguration of the NCC. Error! Reference source not found. shows the NCC in place with the
Aggregator Unit connected to the blades.  The blades were inserted with their electronics at the top of the
NCC.
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Figure 9:  The NCC installed at JRC with eight blades and Aggregator Unit showing.
The basic performance parameters of the partially-populated NCC were measured, namely absolute
efficiency and die-away time with 252Cf.  This was done with the blades and HDPE blanks in a number of 
different configurations.  Results with these configurations are shown below in Figure 10.
Config A Config B Config C
(Benchmark)
Config D
Die away = 62.6μs Die away = 50.3μs Die away = 56.9μs Die away = 39.3μs
εabs = 10.3% εabs = 9.1% εabs = 9.6% εabs = 8.5% 
FoM = 1.30 FoM = 1.29 FoM = 1.28 FoM = 1.36
Figure 10:  The basic parameters of the NCC as measured with the blades in various configurations.  Absolute
efficiency and die-away time were measured using 252Cf. 
The efficiency achieved here is about half of what is expected of a fully-populated NCC, and varies only
slightly with configuration.  Clearly with a partially populated system, it is possible to trade off efficiency
against die-away time using the HDPE blanks in the unpopulated slots.  The presence of blanks has a
greater effect on die-away time than on absolute efficiency and the best FoM is achieved by a configuration
with the lowest die-away (Configuration D).
The efficiency of the NCC was measured for different neutron sources to understand the effect of neutron
energy.  Measurements were taken with blades in Configuration D.
Neutron Source and mean energy Absolute Efficiency
Am-Li (alpha,n), 0.3 MeV 11.1%
Am-Be (alpha,n), 5.0 MeV 5.3%
Cf252 (fission), 1 MeV 8.5%
Pu240 (fission), 1MeV 9.9%
Table 3: Measured absolute efficiency for a range of neutron sources.
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Am-Li clearly gives a very good efficiency due to its low average neutron energy.  We can also see that Pu
has a significantly higher absolute efficiency than 252Cf.  Am-Be has a very low absolute efficiency due to its 
high energy and the under-moderated nature of the NCC design, intended to keep die-away times to a
minimum.
4.2.1 Comparison with Other He3 Free Systems 
The NCC was benchmarked alongside a number of other 3He free systems in October 2014 at JRC [4,5].  
Sample results as published are shown below.





GE Reuter Stokes 







Combined 10B and 3He 
proportional counter 
Abs. Eff (%) 16.5 13.6 9.6 25.4 10.2 
Die away 
time (s) 
43.3 26 56.9 31.6 65.4 
FoM 2.51 2.66 1.28 4.56 1.26 
Table 4: Comparative results of three 3He-free technologies and the HLNCC-II taken at JRC in October 2014 
The predicted FoM of the fully-populated NCC is very high, exceeding the HLNCC-II by ~80%, driven by a
very high absolute efficiency.  The results with the partially populated system are encouraging.  However,
FoM is a limited expression of the quality of a neutron coincidence counter, so further investigation is
required to obtain a complete picture of how useful the NCC will be.
5. Characterization of Safeguards Relevant Parameters
5.1 Bias and Timing Characteristics
Bias is a key property of a neutron coincidence counter which is quantifies any processes that produce false
coincidences amongst otherwise Poissonian neutron events.  For this study, bias was measured for each
blade individually and for the NCC as a whole.  Am-Li sources were used for their Poissonian neutron
output.  The individual blade tests were conducted with all eight blades in the NCC with only one connected
to the Aggregator Unit at a time.  Results were analysed by taking Rossi-Alpha distributions of the recorded





Bias measurements were also taken at two count rates separated by an order of magnitude to assess
variation with count rate.
5.1.1 Individual Blades
The measured bias differed considerably between blades, with six displaying an average negative bias of -
3.5%.  The remaining two had an average positive bias of 3.7%.  Sample Rossi-Alpha plots shown in Figure
11 and Table 5 shows the results.  Pre-delay was set to 15μs and gate width was set to 64μs.
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Figure 11: Sample Rossi-Alpha plots with two blades demonstrating the negative bias and positive bias cases.
Both are normalised to the average value they settle at beyond 300μs.
The plot above shows the dead time of a blade as being 10μs.  This is the processing time of a neutron
event, meaning that no two events closer than 10μs can be reported with TTL pulses.  Note that this is
internal to the blade, so another blade could detect a second neutron immediately after the first.
This sets a limit on pre-delay and therefore forces a lower gate fraction than for a system with a shorter
dead time.  For the following measurements, pre-delay is set to 15μs to exclude this region.
S/N 140001 140002 140003 140004 140005 140006 140007 140008
Bias
(1800cps) -4.2% 4.9% -3.4% -3.7% -4.8% 2.6% -2.5% -2.6%
Bias
(13000cps) -4.0% 1.9% -2.4% -3.3% -3.4% 2.1% -1.8% -2.2%
Table 5:  Measured bias for each blade using pre-delay = 15μs and gate width = 64μs.
A count rate of 13000cps in a single blade is equivalent to a 58.5ng 252Cf source in the sample chamber. 
The range of biases observed is due to two effects:  Undershoot in the analogue electronics within the
blade, and the long decay components present in ZnS(Ag).  The former induces a negative bias due to a
negative undershoot in the pre-amplified signal prior to processing.  This undershoot follows every neutron
event and lasts for up to 150μs, so any subsequent neutron event arriving during that time will appear to the
processing electronics to be weaker than it is.  This manifests as a temporary reduction in neutron
sensitivity following a neutron event, and a negative bias.   The extent of the overshoot depends on specific
component values in the analogue electronics and variations between blades are due to tolerances.
The effect of the long decay components of ZnS(Ag) is that each neutron event has a long tail that is visible
above SiPM noise up to ~100μs after the onset.  Subsequent neutron events occurring within that time will
be stood on a “pedestal” set by the tail of the first, which increases its signal strength when processed,
increasing its chance of passing the discrimination threshold.  This manifests as a temporary increase in
readout efficiency and thus a positive bias but this effect competes with the negative undershoot.  The
resultant bias in any given blade is therefore determined by one of these effects dominating the other.
The data appears to show a reduction in bias as count rate increases, whether positive or negative.  The
mechanism of this requires further study.
5.1.2 Partially Populated NCC
The bias of the NCC with all eight blades was measured with Am-Li sources again at multiple count rates.
Blades and HDPE blanks were arranged in Configuration A.  Two rates were tested with Am-Li sources to
determine whether the total bias changed with count rate.  Three different configurations were tested: all
blades connected, two positive-bias blades disconnected, two negative-bias blades disconnected.
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5,000 cps 0.00% -0.37% 0.00%
14,000 cps -0.33% -0.46% -0.31%
100,000 cps -0.19% -0.45% -0.19%
Table 6:  The measured bias of the whole system in three different blade configurations.
We can see that when the whole set of blades is present that the bias is slightly negative and that there is
no clear relationship with count rate.  Figure 12 shows the normalised Rossi-Alpha plots for the all blades
case at the three different count rates.  Note how in the region below 10μs the neutron response does not
fall to zero, instead falling to 7/8.  This is because during that time only the one blade that detected the first
neutron is in its dead state and subsequent neutrons can be detected by the other seven blades.
A bias of -0.3% is not considered to be a serious problem since it does not vary with count rate, so it will be
accounted for in any plutonium mass measurement calibration (see Section 6).
Figure 12: Rossi-Alpha plots taken using all eight blades at three different count rates.
Attempting to achieve zero bias will be a challenge, since whilst the analogue electronics can be changed to
remove the overshoot, that will leave a significant positive bias.  This is driven by the long decay time of the
ZnS(Ag) which presents a fundamental limit unless the scintillator is changed.  This is an area of active
research, with some focus on so-called “nickel” killed ZnS which suppresses the long pulses.  Other effort is 
focussed on changing the PSD algorithm to better reject the effect of neutron pile-up described above.
5.2 Selection of Operating Parameters
The pre-delay and gate width parameters are important coincidence settings since they determine the
measurement performance of the counter, such as the doubles rate counting efficiency, as well as the
relative uncertainty and measurement bias in the doubles rates.  Post-processing of stored timed interval
distributions was done for varying combinations of pre-delay (4.5, 8, 10, 15, 20, 30 µs) and gate width (16,
32, 64, 128µs) to determine the optimal combination that would minimize the measurement bias and the
relative uncertainty in doubles rates, while achieving a gate fraction (fraction of coincidence signal
measured) comparable to typical 3He systems.    For an uncorrelated source such as Am-Li the counting 
rates in the R+A gate should be equal to that in the A gate.  If they are not equal, then there is a
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Due to the 10µs processing time in each blade, there is a stronger negative bias in doubles for PD<10µs
due to the loss of a fraction of the coincidence signal from same-channel correlations.  Figure 13 shows the
negative bias as a function of pre-delay and gate width for an intense Am-Be source (singles rate of 81,877
cps).  Beyond the dead-time effect (i.e. for PD >10us), the observed bias reduces to and stabilizes to
negative 0.2%-0.3%, for all three gate width settings. A pre-delay of at least 10us is recommended in this
case to minimize bias effects.
The minimum uncertainty is a shallow, flat response between 64µs and 80µs.  This corroborates the
standard rule-of-thumb for optimal gate width of 1.257 times the , die-away time ( )(for an accidentals-
dominated thermal system), where, in our case, is =56.9µs for the 8-blade system, resulting in an optimal
gate width of 71.1µs. The fully-instrumented system is expected to have a shorter die-away time of 31.6µs,
so the gate width may be shortened, keeping in mind the effect of the gate width on the gate fraction of the
counter.  A typical HLNCC-II has a typical gate fraction of 0.696.
Figure 13: Bias vs pre-delay for fixed gate width values.  Am-Li was used in this case.
Figure 14 shows the relative uncertainty in the doubles rate from a 252Cf source vs. gate width for various 
pre-delay settings.
Figure 14: Relative uncertainty in doubles rate vs. gate width
The values in Table 7 show several choices highlighted in blue from our system that meet or exceed this
gate fraction for various pre-delay and gate width combinations. There is no optimum single pair of pre-
delay and gate width; rather the choice will ultimately depend on sample type and the precision required for
the sample type measurement.   For high-alpha samples, it is more important to limit the gate width so as to
the limit the accidental contributions at the expense of the gate factor.  For the purposes of this work, a 10
µs pre-delay and a gate width of 80µs may be used in the analysis, and results in a gate fraction of 0.633.
spite the larger pre-delay setting of the 6Li-based counter, gate fractions comparable to the HLNCC-II are 
achievable.
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
76
Table 7: Gate fractions for pre-delay and gate width combinations.  Values with 32 blades are predicted
based on the performance measured in Section 4).
5.3 Gamma-Ray Rejection
Gamma-ray rejection tests of the whole system were carried out using 137Cs and 241Am, two isotopes that 
the NCC will encounter in service.  The objective was to quantify whether the calibration of individual blades
to a GRR [6] of better than 10-7 was sufficient and whether the blades had a response to the low energy 
gamma-rays from 241Am. 
5.3.1 137Cs Response
The 137Cs response was tested by placing combinations of 137Cs sources and 252Cf sources into the sample 
chamber and measuring the total count rate and the doubles count rate.  The background-subtracted total
count rate when exposed to just 137Cs gives the gamma-ray rejection of the system.  Comparing the
measured total count rate and doubles rate with 252Cf with and without 137Cs exposure gives the practical 
effect of that GRR on coincidence measurements.




Where CR is the measured total rate with 137Cs, A is the source activity in Bq, BR is the branching ratio of 
the 662keV line (0.85) and Ω is the solid angle subtended by the detector.  In this case Ω = 4π.
We have also measured GARRn (gamma absolute rejection ration (neutrons)) which quantifies any change





In this system, it quantifies the effect of gamma-rays piling up with weaker neutron events in a blade to
increase the readout efficiency. In all cases, the sources were placed in the centre of the cavity and the
eight blades were distributed evenly about the counter in Configuration D.  Pre-delay was set to 15μs and 


















252Cf Not measured +0.28% 105.25 ± 1.25 cps 105.06 ± 1.25 cps(-0.2%)
137Cs
(7.4MBq)
252Cf 0.21 cpsGRR = 3.3 x 10-8 +0.48% 105.25 ± 1.25 cps




252Cf 0.37 cpsGRR = 2.1 x 10-9 +0.83% 125.52 ± 1.38 cps
129.07 ± 1.39 cps
(+2.8%)
Table 8: Results of measurements with 137Cs and 252Cf.  Quoted uncertainties are at the 1σ level. 
8-blades 32-blades
PD GW =58.9 =31.6
10 48 0.478 0.569
10 64 0.566 0.633
10 80 0.633 0.671
10 96 0.684 0.694
8 80 0.656 0.715
8 96 0.708 0.739
7 64 0.597 0.696
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We can see that the GRR of the whole system is very low over a broad range of 137Cs activities, never 
exceeding 10-7.  This implies that there is no significant pile-up of gamma-rays in the neutron detector 
blades.
We can also see that GARRn reaches up to 0.83% when 137Cs during high doses, which is still quite low.  It 
is believed that gamma-rays are adding to the signal of weaker neutron events, causing them to meet the
detection threshold.  Therefore, this GARRn would quantify an increase in readout efficiency due to
neutron-gamma pile-up.  More significantly to coincidence counting, we can see that the doubles count rate
increases by up to +2.8% against a 1σ uncertainty of ±1.7%.  This means that very strong gamma-ray
exposure can induce a positive bias in the NCC.  Further characterisation of the system is needed to
quantify this relationship so that a correction factor with dose can be calculated.  Otherwise, the gamma-ray
rejection can be improved further by adjusting the neutron detection threshold at the expense of absolute
efficiency.
5.3.2 241Am Response
The response to 241Am was measured using an Am-Li source and an Am-Be source.  In both cases, the 
source was placed at the centre of the cavity, and the total count rate, doubles rate and bias recorded.  This
was done both with and without a 3mm lead shield.  Comparing results gives the response of the system to
241Am gamma-rays. Pre-delay was set to 15μs and gate width was set to 128μs.
Am-Li (S/N 252) Am-Be (S/N 307)
Total count rate 
Shield
on 12343.1 ± 4.5 cps 81877.2  ± 11.7 cps 
Shield
off 12457.3 ± 8.0 cps 81843.4 ±  11.7 cps 
Change due to Am exposure = +1.65% -0.48%
Doubles rate
Shield
on -58.7 ± 7.9 cps -1794.7 ± 48.3 cps
Shield
off -59.7 ± 8.0 cps -1881.4 ±  48.0 cps






Table 9: Results of measurements with Am-Li and Am-Be
Table 9 show that ultimately the bias in the detector does not vary with 241Am gamma-ray exposure, even 
though there are variations in the measured total count rate and doubles rate.
In the case of Am-Li removing the shield causes a slight increase in totals rate, which is reflected in the
slight reduction in negative bias.  There is no statistically significant change in the doubles rate.  This
implies that the blades are sensitive to Am241 gamma-rays and that there is a need to either recalibrate the 
blades to improve gamma-ray rejection or to add a liner to the sample cavity.  The Am-Be case is different
in that the singles rate does not change much when 241Am gamma-rays are introduced.  We also observe a 
noticeable decrease in the negative doubles rate when the shield is introduced.  This is to be investigated
further.
5.4 Absolute Efficiency Profile
The absolute efficiency of the NCC was profiled in two sets of measurements.  The first was a vertical line
up the centre of the cavity, and the second was a grid of points in a horizontal plane at the mid-height of the
cavity.  In all positions a pre-delay of 15μs and a gate width of 64μs.  The blades and HDPE blanks were 
arranged in Configuration C.  In all cases, a bare 252Cf source of 25.5ng (59000 n/s) was used. 
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5.4.1 Vertical Profile
Figure 15: Plots of how the total count rate and doubles rate vary with vertical position.
The vertical profile plot shows that the absolute efficiency varies quite strongly with vertical position and that
the doubles rate drops to as much as 73% that at the centre.  This is consistent with the square of the drop
in absolute efficiency indicating that the absolute efficiency profile dominates the doubles rate profile and
there are no significant effects due to gate fraction.  This can be confirmed by Figure 16 which shows the
measured die-away time as a function of vertical position.  It is quite consistent and appears to be slightly
lower at the extremes, so the gate fraction would not reduce at those points.
Absolute efficiency is lower at the bottom of the chamber indicating that perhaps the blades have lower
sensitivity at their ends, warranting further investigation. Until this problem is resolved, testing will be limited
to the centre of the sample cavity, and as it stands, the NCC is unsuitable for measuring extended sources.
Figure 16: Die-away time as a function of vertical position.  20cm represents the centre of the sample cavity.
5.4.2 Horizontal Profile
Measurements of absolute efficiency, doubles rate and die-away time were taken over a horizontal plane at
the mid-height of the sample cavity.  Results are shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18, expressed as values
relative to the centre position.
It is clear that with the blades and HDPE blanks in Configuration C, the NCC exhibits poor horizontal
uniformity, with clear peaks at the sides and nadirs and the corners.  This is explained by the concentration
of blades and extra HDPE in the middle of the slabs, and away from the corners of the NCC.
The doubles rate shows a great non-uniformity that follows the same pattern as the total count rate, as
expected.  As in the vertical profile case, the measured non-uniformity of the doubles rate agrees well with
the square of the non-uniformity in totals count rate.  This implies that the gate fraction does not significantly
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Figure 18: A plot of how the measured doubles rate varied over the horizontal plane.  All values are given relative
to the central position. Pre-delay was set to 15μs and gate width was set to 64μs.
There appears to be a bias towards higher total count rate and doubles rate in the +X and +Y directions.
Such observations can be explained by the fact that the measurements were not taken in a low-scatter
environment.  In both the +X and +Y directions scattering material was present which would return partially
moderated neutrons above the cadmium cut-off energy which would then thermalise inside the NCC.
6. Assay of Pu samples - give comparative results with known samples
compared to HLNCC-II-II.
The final performance parameter of interest, and one that relies on those explored above, is the linearity of
the NCC plutonium mass calibration function.  To measure this, a number of plutonium-gallium (Pu-Ga)
samples were tested at JRC.  They were all taken from the same series and this have the same isotopic
composition, shown in Table 10.  The samples were thin disks and were placed at the centre of the sample
cavity on aluminium stands.








Pu-238 0.1336 0.04 567.57  (0.26) 87.74
Pu-239 75.6606 0.03 1.9288  (0.0003) 24119
Pu-240 21.4898 0.07 7.0824  (0.002 6564
Pu-241 1.9510 0.93 3.412    (0.002) 14.348
Pu-242 0.7651 0.38 0.1159  (0.0003) 376300
Am-241 1.86 0.02 114.2    (0.42) 433.6
Table 10: The isotopic composition of the Pu-Ga samples tested here.
Analysis was carried out using the PTR-32 and INCC software to extract the effective plutonium mass.  As
according to the analysis in Section 5.2, the pre-delay was set to 10µs and the gate width was set to 80µs.
Figure 19 shows the results in terms of doubles rate as a function of known plutonium mass.
The NCC was set up in Configuration C with two blades and two blanks per module.  For comparison, the
same plutonium samples were measure by an HLNCC-II also at JRC Ispra.
Figure 19: A plot of doubles rate as a function of Pu mass for the partially populated NCC and an HLNCC-II.
We can see a linear relationship between plutonium mass and measured doubles rate.  The linear fit shows
a negative intercept, which reflects the negative bias measured in this NCC.  The HLNCC-II shows a far
greater gradient due to its higher efficiency (16.5% vs 9%), and a much smaller negative intercept since it
has nearly zero bias.
y = 5.4496x - 0.1785 
R² = 0.9995 
y = 21.345x - 0.135 
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7. Conclusion
A prototype NCC was designed and tested in a partially populated configuration against a benchmark set by
a JCC-31.  The results of that testing were then used to predict the performance of a fully-populated NCC
with encouraging results.  In summary, our findings were:
 The readout efficiency of the blades is high at 85.1% and their gamma-ray rejection is excellent.
 The FoM of the partially-populated NCC is lower than the JCC-31 at ~1.3 depending on
configuration, but this is sufficient to obtain good data.
 The gamma-ray rejection of the whole NCC is good but it shows a slight sensitivity to very high
gamma-ray fluxes due to neutron-gamma pile-up
 The NCC shows a negative bias of -0.3% due to the analogue electronics in the blade.  This can be
developed further but achieving zero bias is limited by the length of the ZnS(Ag) scintillation pulse.
 The profile of the partially-populated NCC is poor.  Whilst this is expected in the horizontal plane, it
was not in the vertical plane.  This restricts plutonium mass measurements to point sources at the
centre f the cavity.
 Plutonium mass measurements show a very linear relationship.
This performance is deemed to be very good in a prototype though some work remains to solve the
problems that have been highlighted.
8. Future Work
Now that a reduced version of a neutron coincidence counter has been characterized and calibrated, further
work can be considered.
Firstly, the counter will be fully instrumented with 32 blades and then characterized and calibrated in the
same way.  Furthermore, recent improvements in SiPM technology will be incorporated in those blades to
improve dead time and thermal neutron detection efficiency further.  The optical design of the blades will be
investigated to quantify any loss of readout efficiency along their length.
Other coincidence counter geometries can be explored which are predicted to offer better absolute
efficiency profiles, especially in the vertical plane.  Another improvement to the coincidence counter will be
the addition of a low-Z liner to aid in rejection of low energy gamma-rays.
The positive bias induced by the long decay time of the ZnS(Ag) scintillator will be addressed by
investigating alternative scintillators such as ZnS(Ag,Ni) or “nickel killed” ZnS which shows suppression of 
the long components.  Another avenue of research is changing the PSD algorithm to better detect the
strength of the tail and remove it from the measurement of neutron event strength, to remove this effect.
A range of high-rate samples will be tested to provide empirical data of the systems dead time behavior.
This data will be used to compute a correction matrix.
On the broader scale, the modules developed for this counter can be used in an active system as an UNCL.
The blades are also suitable for development of a module for multiplicity counters such as the ENMC,
especially if their dead time can be reduced to exploit the low die-away times of such systems.  If not, then
any ENMC can be expected to contain a very high number of blades (~200) so the step due to dead time
will only introduce a bias of -0.5%.
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Abstract: 
Neutron coincidence counting and neutron multiplicity counting are standard techniques for mass 
determination of fissile materials in nuclear safeguards applications.  Traditionally the preferred 
neutron detector design incorporates 3He gas proportional counters in a cylindrical polyethylene 
moderator block with a central sample cavity.  The detector tubes are embedded in the polyethylene in 
a ring shape approximating a 4π geometry.  This standard layout has been adopted in several detector 
designs such as the High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC-II). 
The recent worldwide shortage of 3He gas has prompted research into alternative detection 
technologies for neutrons.  An obvious candidate from a physics point of view is 10B due to the high 
thermal neutron cross section and the inexpensive enrichment process of the 10B isotope.  An 
important advantage includes the fact that when in form of boron trifluoride gas this neutron detector 
the can replace 3He gas tubes while maintaining other standard counter materials, the well counter 
design, and even the detector electronics.  The toxicity of the BF3 gas however has been mentioned 
as a potential problem for using this neutron detector is large size neutron coincidence or multiplicity 
counters in nuclear facilities. 
The paper describes design elements the newly developed prototype well counter based on BF3 
detector tubes including a discussion of results of test bed experiments and Monte Carlo simulations 
carried out to reach the final design.  A prototype detector based on this design is currently under 
construction. This detector will have same cavity dimensions as the standard HLNCC but with neutron 
detection efficiency high enough to allow neutron multiplicity counting in practical applications.  The 
paper also discusses how the issue of the toxicity of the gas has been addressed in the design of the 
new counter. 
Keywords: nuclear safeguards, neutron multiplicity counter, alternative to 3He, boron trifluoride 
1 Introduction 
Neutron coincidence counting and neutron multiplicity counting are standard techniques for mass 
determination of fissile materials in nuclear safeguards applications.  The preferred neutron detector 
layout incorporates 3He gas proportional counters in a cylindrical polyethylene moderator block with a 
central sample cavity.  The detector tubes are embedded in the polyethylene approximating a 4π 
geometry.  This standard layout has been adopted in several detector designs such as the High Level 
Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC-II) [1]. 
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The recent worldwide shortage of 3He gas has prompted research into alternative detection 
technologies for neutrons.  An obvious candidate from a physics point of view is 10B due to the high 
thermal neutron cross section and the inexpensive enrichment process of the 10B isotope.  Gas 
proportional counters based on boron trifluoride gas (BF3) enriched in the 10B component have been 
used as over the last fifty years as thermal neutron detectors.  Applications are wide ranging from 
reactor instrumentation to survey meters.  In relation to well counters as used in nuclear safeguards, 
an important advantage includes the fact that boron trifluoride gas as a neutron detector the can 
replace 3He gas tubes while maintaining other standard counter materials, the well counter design, 
and even the detector electronics.   
The obvious advantages of BF3 gas proportional counters include the high capture cross section for 
10B, the high Q value for the (n, α) reaction in 10B, and consequently the good γ/n discrimination 
capabilities, the uniformity of detection efficiency in extended detectors .  Finally the relatively low 
price of BF3 gas, even when enrich in 10B to 99%, is an important factor.  Disadvantages include the 
loss of pulse linearity at higher gas pressures, and perhaps most importantly the toxicity of BF3 gas. 
The toxicity of the BF3 gas has been mentioned as a potential problem for using this neutron detector 
in large size neutron coincidence or multiplicity counters in nuclear facilities. 
2  Experimental comparison of boron based proportional counters 
Due to the potential advantages (mentioned above) of using boron based detectors as alternative to 
3He, we decided to investigate the feasibility of building a complete HLNCC type instrument based on 
such counters.  The premise was to design and build a prototype well type neutron counter with 
sample cavity of same size as the HLNCC-II, neutron detection efficiency sufficiently high to allow 
neutron multiplicity counting. The prototype detector was named Boron Based Neutron Correlation 
Counter (BBNCC). 
The design process included experimental comparison of single boron based detectors in 
polyethylene in our detector test bed, and comparison of measured and Monte Carlo calculated 
neutron efficiency and die-away parameters of the test bed detector configurations.  All Monte Carlo 
calculations were performed with MCNP [2]. 
Based on the simulations of the simple test bed configurations, the various detector configurations of 
the prototype BBNCC detector were compared in MCNP simulations.  The test bed experiments 
included both BF3 gas detectors and 10B lined proportional counters. The BF3 gas detectors were both 
one-inch and two-inch diameter types, and of various gas pressures.  The 10B lined detectors were of 
2 and 2½ inch diameter.  In principle the 10B lined detectors can achieve a higher neutron detection 
probability due to a potentially higher loading of boron when in solid form.   
The detector modules of the test bed can accommodate a single neutron detector in a central channel. 
The width of the modules is 300 mm which is sufficient for making the detector comparison 
independent of the module width.  The thickness of the modules was variable to allow for optimization 
of moderator thickness for the various detector diameters.  The thickness of the HDPE modules was 
variable in steps of 10 mm.  All module surfaces were covered in a cadmium liner.  When possible, 
same pre-amplifier and amplifier settings were applied. 
For comparison neutron detection efficiency of detectors, the distance from the 252Cf source to the 
centre of the detector was kept constant irrespective of the thickness of the moderator.  All 
measurements were compared to a module with a standard 4 bar, one-inch diameter 3He proportional 
counter. 
Parameters such as γ/n discrimination, die-away time, detection efficiency were compared for all 
detectors at certain moderator thicknesses.  A full report of these measurements is currently in 
elaboration [3].  Figure 1 shows the test bed including four vertical one-metre long moderator modules 
at same distance to the central source holder.   
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Figure 1. JRC test bed (side and top view) for gas proportional counters with variable poly thickness, 
 various detector diameters, 3He, BF3 of various pressures, 10B-lined detectors. 
The outcome of the test bed measurements favoured BF3 gas over the 10B lined detectors mainly due 
to the superior γ/n discrimination, and two-inch detectors rather than one-inch to achieve a sufficiently 
high neutron detection efficiency.  The gas pressure of the BF3 detectors was found to be not critical 
for the γ/n discrimination as along as the pressure remained below one bar.  The higher pressure 
however meant a high voltage well above 2 kV.  
One encouraging observation from the measurements of one-inch tubes of BF3 gas was that at 
optimal thickness (with respect to neutron detection efficiency) of the polyethylene moderator, the tube 
of 0.92 bar BF3 had detection efficiency of 0.42 relative to the 4 bar 3He tube.  This ratio is far better 
than expected when considering only the pressure ratios and the reaction cross section ratios of the 
two tubes.  The result indicates that the gas volume is better utilized for the “thinner” 10B gas 
compared the “denser” 3He gas for thermal neutrons.  
Figure 2 gives a summary of test bed measurements of die-away time and relative efficiency of some 
of the detectors at the moderator thickness of 80 mm and at the “efficiency optimized” thickness for 
the given detector. 
Detector 
3He, 1 inch 
4 bar (3He) 















35.8 ± 1.8 μs 
@ 80mm 
99.0 ± 6.8 μs 
@ 80mm 
74.1 ± 0.4 μs 
@ 80mm 
76.2 ± 2.9 μs 
@ 80mm 




85.7 ± 0.5 μs 
@ 120mm 
122.8 ± 2.2 μs 
@ 120mm 
76.0 ± 0.4 μs 
@ 120mm 
89.6 ± 2.8 μs 
@ 120mm 















Figure 2. Measurement of single detectors in the test bed using a small 252Cf neutron source,  
 “@ xx” indicates the thickness of the polyethylene module, Cd liner applied on all external surfaces. 
Changing to boron based gas detectors has an adverse effect on the die away time.  Compared to 3He 
the boron based detectors show longer die away time either because of the thinner absorber (one-inch 
tubes) or because of the larger detector volume (two-inch tubes).   
Generally speaking when using polyethylene moderated low pressure BF3 gas in two-inch tubes rather 
than high pressure 3He gas in one-inch tubes, the value of the die away time will increase both 
because of the lower absorption per gas volume and because of the larger detector volume.  This 
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means that a BF3 based system of comparable detection efficiency will always have a larger die away 
time compared to a 3He based system. 
Both experiments and Monte Carlo calculations confirmed that when using two-inch detectors the 
benefits in efficiency however outweigh the disadvantage in the increased die away time.  The BF3 gas 
detector of two-inch diameter in Figure 2 was selected in the final design of the BBNCC counter.  
2.1  BF3 Based Neutron Correlation Counter (BBNCC) 
The initial design calculations using MCNP included a variety of detector configurations of both one-
inch and two-inch configurations. For example a sandwich type of configuration where the 
polyethylene moderator was arranged inner and outer ring surrounding the dense array of detectors 
was tried in the attempt to bring down the die away time by means of reducing the volume of 
moderator.  This however had the consequence of low detection efficiency due to poor utilization of 
the detector volume. This kind of simulations confirmed that indeed the best usage of the detector 
volume is in a two-ring configuration with equal number of detectors in each ring (for the cases where 
the detector volume is so large that a single ring configuration cannot be achieved). Design 
parameters such as inner ring radius, outer ring radius, external radius, top/bottom plug design were 
optimized using the standard FOM (ε/√τ) in the Monte Carlo calculations. Figure 3 shows some of the 
calculated efficiencies as function of the inner and outer ring radius. 
Figure 3.  Example of data from the MCNP optimization of inner and  
outer ring positions, 12 BF3 two-inch tubes in each ring. 
2.2  Final design of BF3 Based Neutron Correlation Counter (BBNCC) 
The final configuration of the BBNCC counter based on the Monte Carlo calculations is shown in 
Figure 4 from the MCNP input file.  The active length of the detector tubes is 50% more than in the 
HLNCC-II.  The number of detectors is 24 compared to 18 in the HLNCC-II. The greater detector 
length combined with the top and bottom plug makes the axial efficiently profile slightly better than the 
HLNCC-II over the same sample volume.   
The MCNP calculations for a neutron source produced in a bulk Pu sample in a stainless steel 
containment resulted in the following values for the detection efficiency and die away time: about 
25.0 % and 73.70 μs, respectively. 
The BBNCC detector is both wider and taller than the standard HLNCC-II.  A sealed junction box is 
included, as well as a base plate with four wheels. The total height of the instrument is 1150 mm. 
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Figure 4. Final configuration of the BBNCC well counter based on MCNP calculations and measurements of 
single detectors in the test bed. 
3  Toxicity of BF3 gas 
Boron trifluoride, with the unique shipping identification number UN1008, has a Hazard Class Number 
of 2.3 indicating the substance to be a toxic gas.  In earlier yeas transportation of the gas by public 
means was prohibited. Since 1 January 2013 however the International Aviation Transport Association 
(IATA) has relaxed transportation regulations of BF3 gas.  The standing IATA Special Provision A190 
applies to BF3 neutron detectors containing less then 12.8 grams of BF3 and filled to a pressure of no 
more than 105 kPa at 20 degrees C. In addition, radiation detection systems, such as radiation portal 
monitors, containing up to 51.2 grams of BF3 may be shipped under the special provision. 
The BBNCC counter as in the design described above uses detectors containing approximately 2.1 
grams of BF3 gas at a pressure below one bar. The number of detectors is 24 bringing the total 
amount of gas to about 50.4 grams.  As such the BBNCC detection system falls within the scope of 
the IATA special provision allowing transportation by public means such as world-wide cargo aircrafts, 
but also by ocean vessels, rail and road shipment. 
In a recent reply to a report on alternatives to 3He for neutron detectors [4], the NNSA suggested that 
perhaps the boron trifluoride gas has not been accurately valuated as an alternative to 3He, 
considering, among other facts, that less than atmospheric pressure in the detectors has a mitigating 
effect of a leak. 
In the design of the BBNCC the issue of toxicity has been addressed by incorporating an additional air 
tight barrier towards the environment.  This is done by sealing the channels for the detectors tubes 
and the electronics junction box.  In this way the detector channels and the (sealed) junction box 
constitutes an intercommunicating secondary containment for the detector gas.  The concept includes 
implementing a reservoir inside the junction box for a chemical reactant such as soda lime (mainly 
calcium hydroxide and water) or activated alumina (Al2O3).  Both of theses substances are known as 
defluoridation agents due to their ability to neutralize fluoride gas.  If activated alumina is implemented 
in the ratio 6:1 all fluoride gas can be absorbed. E.g. if 12 grams is deposited in the junction box, all 
BF3 gas from one leaking detector will eventually be absorbed. 
Whether this approach will be acceptable to the plant management in a nuclear installation remains to 
be seen.  Certainly, the approach of isolating the BF3 gas from the environment by means of air tight 
barriers and implementing defluoridation agents inside the containment, as is the preferred safety 
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4  Conclusions 
We have designed a helium free prototype neutron multiplicity counter for safeguards verification 
measurements of bulk plutonium samples.  The counter named Boron Based Neutron Correlation 
Counter (BBNCC) is currently under construction in our laboratory.  The counter incorporates 24 
proportional detectors based on boron trifluoride gas enriched to above 99% in 10B.  The instrument 
will have a neutron detection efficiency above 25% which should make multiplicity measurement 
possible.  Using a thermal neutron absorber such as 10B in a polyethylene moderator means that the 
instrument can operate using standard safeguards assay parameters (pre-delay, gate width, die away 
time, updating dead-time parameters etc.).  This has the advantage that the safeguards inspector can 
directly apply the well-tested analysis algorithms, software packages, and signal analyzers, used in 
neutron measurements for safeguards purposes today.  
Although a high detection efficiency is achieved, a technical drawback of using BF3 detectors is the 
relatively long die away time which may call for longer measurement times in high count rate 
applications.  From an operational point of view the toxicity of the BF3 gas is an issue.  The BBNCC 
counter contains roughly 50 grams of BF3 gas.  The design includes the technical solution of an 
additional air tight barrier combined with a fluoride gas absorber against a possible release of the toxic 
BF3 gas to the environment.  Similar solutions are adopted for transportation of bulk quantities of 
fluoride gas. A recent review of transport regulations has let to a relaxation with respect to the 
quantities that can be transported without special precautions.  The simple (passive) technical solution 
to significantly reduce the risk of an accidental release of the toxic gas, and the recent easing of public 
transportation restrictions, should have a positive effect on the assessment of whether such counter 
systems can be permitted in nuclear installations.  
As soon as the prototype BBNCC becomes operational work will start to confirm the calculated assay 
parameters.  Also the performance in multiplicity mode and in high count rate applications will be 
investigated. 
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Abstract 
Following initial discussions in 2006 within the framework of the EURATOM – ABACC R&D 
Cooperation Agreement, in 2012 the European Union engaged into a cooperation project to 
strengthen Safeguards Capabilities at ABACC (the Brazilian-Argentinean Agency for Accountancy 
and Control). ABACC expressed interest in having access to two new Safeguards capabilities based 
on two JRC technologies approved for Safeguards use by both EURATOM and IAEA. This four-year 
cooperation project is funded by the European Commission Directorate General for Development 
and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO), under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
(INSC). The new capabilities to be created at ABACC are: (i) Verification of complex plant design 
and lay-out ("as-is") and (ii) Containment of Spent Fuel in a complex Storage Environment. This is 
to be achieved by transferring to ABACC two JRC-owned technologies: (a) 3D Laser Verification 
System and (b) Ultrasonic Seals. The development of the two technologies to be transferred were 
funded by JRC's internal work-programme and targeted to Safeguards under the framework of the 
European Commission Support Programme to the IAEA (tasks EC-E-1425 and EC-E-1559). The 
transfer of technologies includes a set of comprehensive training actions and field support 
activities. Close coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) takes place 
during the whole project’s lifetime. The European Commission Directorate General for Energy 
(EURATOM Safeguards) is also informed on the project progress and achievements. Given the 
technologies to be transferred have been approved and are used by the IAEA, it could be possible 
at the end of the project to have the Safeguards equipment being jointly used by ABACC and the 
IAEA. This paper details all aspects of this cooperation project. 
Keywords: Nuclear Safeguards, International Cooperation, ABACC, 3D Laser Verification System, 
Ultrasonic Seals 
1. Introduction
The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is a 
regional Safeguards organisation created by the Bilateral Agreement signed in December 
1991 between Argentina and Brazil1. ABACC is mandated to apply a full scope Nuclear 
Safeguards system in Brazil and Argentina. 
In March 1994, the Quadripartite Agreement between the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), ABACC, Argentina and Brazil entered into force [1].  For more than 20 years, 
the IAEA and ABACC jointly coordinate Safeguards activities avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of efforts, while maintaining the principle that both organisations shall be able to 
reach independent conclusions.  
1 Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively 
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. 
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 The selection of Safeguards tools to be used by ABACC is guided by the goal of implementing 
effective and efficient safeguards while reducing intrusiveness and protecting sensitive 
information, when so required. 
ABACC and EURATOM – the European Atomic Energy Community, signed in February 1999 a 
long standing cooperation agreement focussing on Safeguards related Research and 
Development and Training. Within the framework of this agreement, and as precursors of 
the current project, (a) a training course to ABACC staff on “3D Laser based Verification” was 
held at the JRC in Nov. 2007 (together with IAEA inspectors); (b) technology demonstrations 
took place at ABACC premises of 3D Laser based Verification (Nov. 2008) and Ultrasonic 
Sealing Bolt (Containment and Surveillance Workshop, Oct. 2010). 
The European Commission approved in 2012 the project "Strengthening the Safeguards 
Capabilities of ABACC". The project is implemented by the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) and aims at creating at ABACC new technical, human and know-how 
capabilities addressing two major safeguards challenges: 
A. Verification of Complex Plant Design and Layout 
B. Containment of Spent Fuel in Complex Storage Environments 
JRC will provide two specific Containment and Surveillance technologies: (a) 3D Laser 
Verification and (b) Ultrasonic Sealing. Both technologies were developed at the JRC’s 
Institute for Transuranium Elements, Ispra, Italy, and are approved for Safeguards use by the 
IAEA and EURATOM Safeguards.  
The following sections detail this cooperation project with ABACC, the technologies and the 
proposed implementation, including training and transfer of know-how. 
2. Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
The EURATOM Community’s Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) [2] promotes 
the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries. 
While pursuing a close cooperation with the IAEA, the Community finances measures 
supporting the application of effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries, 
building on its own safeguard activities within the European Union. 
In 2012, and following a specific request from ABACC, the project "Strengthening the 
Safeguards Capabilities of ABACC" was approved by the European Commission Directorate 
General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO). The project is funded by the European 
Commission Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). The four year project is 
implemented by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) in cooperation with 
ABACC. 
Following the appointment of the Commission of the ABACC2, the ABACC Secretariat became 
the Beneficiary of the project. 
2  The Commission of ABACC is ABACC’s policy planning organ and is constituted by diplomatic and technical 
representatives of Argentina and Brazil. The Commission is responsible for the approval of the decisions, 
resolutions and regulations applied to the performance of the ABACC’s Safeguards. Among other 
responsibilities, the Commission of ABACC approves the General Procedures and the Manuals for 
Application of nuclear safeguards in Brazil and Argentina.  
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 3. Project Structure
The project aims at creating new Safeguards capabilities, ie, technical, human and know-how, 
at ABACC. To achieve this objective the project includes the following actions: 
i) Transfer of two Safeguards technologies: (a) 3D Verification System and (b) Ultrasonic
Seals;
ii) Prototype and field demonstrations of the two above technologies at selected
facilities (to be agreed with national authorities and operators);
iii) Training courses for ABACC staff and inspectors, including:
(a) Train-the-Trainers: train a selected group of ABACC officers on how to teach 
the two new technological capabilities  
(b) Inspectors’ Training: train a first group of inspectors on the use of the above 
mentioned technologies for safeguards verification and inspection purposes. 
iv) Cooperation and technical support on the practical use of the two above
technologies
In terms of implementation, the project is divided in three tasks: 
Task A. Verification of Plant Design and Layout  
Task B. Containment of Spent Fuel in Complex Storage Environments 
Task C: Project Management 
4. Technologies
The technologies to be transferred to ABACC were selected and requested by ABACC as they 
fit ABACC's mandate to strengthen and implement nuclear safeguards in Brazil and 
Argentina. The project involves two technical tasks, each one addressing the use of a specific 
Containment and Surveillance technology as follows: 
A) 3D Laser Verification for detecting spatial changes in a nuclear site (indoor application)
B) Ultrasonic Sealing to safeguard irradiated fuel in interim or permanent storage (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Examples of JRC Ultrasonic Seals. 
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 Both technologies were initially developed at the JRC’s Institute for Transuranium Elements, 
Ispra site, Italy, as an internal research activity and then applied to EURATOM and IAEA 
safeguards. In what concerns the IAEA, the application of both technologies was done under 
the framework of the European Commission Support Programme (EC-SP) [3] to the IAEA, 
namely: 
i) EC-SP Task: EC-E-01425 – “3D Laser Range Finder for Design Verification at the
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)” and EC-E-01993 – “3DLR Support”
ii) EC-SP Task: EC-E-01559 – “Update of the Ultrasonic Sealing Bolt”
Both technologies are approved for safeguards use by both the IAEA (responsible for the 
implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – NPT) and by the European 
Commission’s DG-Energy (responsible for the implementation of the EURATOM Treaty). 
4.1 Task A: Verification of Plant Design and Layout 
The verification of minute details over large areas in complex environments represents a 
difficult task. Covering these scenarios, the application of safeguards has to verify if changes 
or new elements relevant to safeguards are introduced into the facility operating conditions 
and/or its layout.  
The application of laser technology for the verification of plant layout and configuration 
relies on the capability of the system to measure accurate distances of objects, and between 
objects, in a given scene [4, 5]. It is thus possible to detect minor changes in three 
dimensions (as opposed to normal video surveillance projecting the 3D world onto an image 
plane) – 3D scene change detection. Furthermore, 3D visualization tools help an inspector to 
interpret the spatial changes, their origins, safeguards relevance and impact (see Figure 2). 
The system is able to remount a 3D model independent from the capture point of the 
system. 
Characteristics of the 3DLR3 system such as self-illumination, independence of ambient 
lighting, high spatial resolution, high accuracy, fast speed acquisition, well defined 
measurement parameters (such as: distance, size, speed, motion orientation and easy 
interfacing) make this type of system suitable for the detection of changes in complex 
environments. 
4.2 Task A: Results to be achieved 
The specific objective to be achieved during this project is “to create within the regional 
authority ABACC a new Safeguards capability enabling the verification of complex plant 
design and lay-out (‘as-is’)”. The results to be achieved include:  
i) Provision of two 3DLR (Laser based Verification) systems.  Each system integrates
commercial equipment (3D laser scanner, associated computers and accessories,
e.g., tripod, carrying equipment, …) with JRC’s proprietary dedicated software, i.e.,
JRC 3D Reconstructor© and JRC 3D Verificator©;
3 3DLR is the code name for JRC’s laser based system for Design Information Verification – DIV - used by the 
IAEA. A similar system (code name: 3DLVS) is used by the European Commission’s DG-Energy for inventory 
verification purposes (in quasi-static storage areas). The 3DLR system (3DLVS also) includes two JRC’s 
proprietary software packages: JRC 3D Reconstructor© and JRC 3D Verificator©.  




Figure 2. (a) 3D model of a facility as shown by JRC’s 3DLVS software; (b) Map of changes 
derived from two 3D models acquired at different points of time. Changes are highlighted in 
red and green. 
ii) Field Test of a Laser based 3D Verification System, for Design Information
Verification purposes, at a nuclear facility in Brazil.
iii) Train-the-Trainers: train two ABACC officers on how to teach the new technological
capability – 3D Laser Verification, to ABACC inspectors.
iv) Inspectors’ Training: train a first group of 16-20 inspectors on the use of the 3D
Laser Verification technology for safeguards verification and inspection purposes.
v) Cooperation and technical support on the practical use of the 3D Laser Verification
System.
vi) Maintenance activities, including two further releases of the application specific
software and yearly calibration of the laser range finders.
vii) Delivery of support documentation (operation guide and maintenance manuals)
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 4.3 Task B. Containment of Spent Fuel in a Complex Storage Environment 
The second challenging goal is applying efficient and effective safeguards for on load 
reactors, based on the verification of the irradiated fuels that leave the core and keep the 
knowledge of such items during interim or permanent storage. For doing that, tools such 
Core Discharge Monitor and Fuel Bundle Counter are used together with containment and 
surveillance. Besides, the verification of the inventory of the spent fuel stored at the 
reactor’s pools is periodically performed. 
One way to maintain the knowledge on the nuclear material at a spent fuel pond is to apply 
containment measures at flasks or racks where these fuels are stored. It is important to 
guarantee that ABACC and IAEA maintain the knowledge over multiple layers of the spent 
fuel storage through the application of seals on fuel elements, racks or hangers. 
For this application, ultrasonic seals4 [6] have the necessary characteristics since they are 
designed to be attached underwater, are very resistant to harsh environments like storage 
pools, are easy to apply and can be regularly verified. The verification of ultrasonic seals 
does not involve the replacement of cables or substitution of the seal, nor does it require the 
movement of spent fuel. This improves inspectors’ productivity, takes due care of radiation 
safety considerations and decreases the disturbance to the plant operator. 
4.4 Task B: Results to be achieved 
The specific objective to be achieved during this project is “to create within the regional 
authority ABACC a new Safeguards capability based on JRC ultrasonic sealing technology, 
and have a demonstration prototype adapted to specific PHWR underwater storage deeper 
ponds and particular spent fuel storage configuration”. The results to be achieved include:  
i) Design of a complete and specific sealing system based on real conditions of an
underwater spent fuel storage pond;
ii) Field Test and demonstration of Ultrasonic Seals, for maintaining the continuity of
knowledge of verified irradiated fuel. For this test, It will be assumed that spent fuel
is stored in a closed packed way, in two layers at the storage pool (see Figure 3). For
verification of this particular configuration, the accessibility of nuclear
instrumentation to the lower layer of spent fuel is very complex and time
consuming. Ultrasonic seals should make verification much more easy and
straightforward. This test will be also useful to consider the technology for other
types of nuclear reactors with different spent fuel storage configurations.
iii) Improvement of the control software, including tele-operation assistance
requested by the high water depth;
iv) Equipment to be supplied: 150 ultrasonic seals and three reading systems. Handling
tool interfaces and specific sealing accessories will be also supplied.
v) Associated computers, accessories and JRC’s dedicated software for identifying
and reading the seals;
vi) Train-the-Trainers: train two ABACC officers on how to teach the new technological
capability – Ultrasonic Sealing, to ABACC inspectors.
4 Ultrasonic seals developed by the JRC are patented and currently used in Canada, France, Pakistan, Romania 
and UK by both EURATOM Safeguards and IAEA. 
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 vii) Inspectors’ Training: train a first group of 16-20 inspectors on the use of Ultrasonic
Sealing for safeguards verification and inspection purposes.
viii) Cooperation and technical support on the practical use of Ultrasonic Sealing.
ix) Delivery of support documentation (operation guide and maintenance manuals);
x) Preventive maintenance (2 years).
Figure 3. Proposed solution to seal a spent fuel pond 
5. Safeguards and Coordination with the IAEA
The project foresees close interaction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Indeed, the IAEA has been, and will be, invited for major project events, including: 
i) Kick-off meeting,
ii) Technical meetings,
iii) Demonstration of the technologies,
iv) Distribution of specific documentation issued during the project
v) Training sessions, both in Europe (Train-the-Trainers) and in South America
(inspectors’ training)
It should be noted that by creating new safeguards capabilities at ABACC, it will be possible 
(and desirable) that the instrumentation provided can be jointly used with the IAEA. To this 
effect, the IAEA will be contacted for relevant technical decisions. This will ensure that IAEA 
expectations in terms of the equipment to be supplied will be met in view of future joint-
use.   
More specifically, the IAEA met ABACC and EC/JRC representatives in the following 
occasions: 
- September 2013: the European Commission and ABACC organised a presentation of the 
project to the IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards (see Figure);  
- February 2014: JRC and ABACC met the IAEA to discuss in detail how EC funded 
equipment and systems, namely 3D laser scanners, can be made available later for Joint 
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 Safeguards Use by both ABACC and the IAEA. This led to the agreement on the technical 
specifications of the 3D laser scanners to be procured. 
- September 2014: short presentation of the status of the project was made by ABACC 
and JRC to IAEA staff. 
6. Status of the Project
The following activities have already taken place or are programmed shortly: 
- Technical specifications for the laser based equipment to be procured, 2014; 
- Technical specifications for the ultrasonic sealing equipment to be procured, 2014; 
- Specification of the demonstration and field test of the 3DLR system at a nuclear facility in 
Brazil, November 2014; 
- Train-the-Trainers course for the Ultrasonic Seals, May 2015; 
- Train-the-Trainers course for the 3DLR verification system, June 2015; 
- Technical proposals for sealing a multiple layer spent fuel storage pond, considering 
Atucha I spent fuel storage configuration, March 2015 
- Specification of the demonstration and field test of the Ultrasonic Seals at a storage 
configuration type of Atucha I, Argentina, June 2015 
7. Discussion and Conclusions
Looking for the best practices in the safeguards application, ABACC and EURATOM –  the 
European Atomic Energy Community – signed in February 1999 a cooperation agreement 
based on mutually agreed Research and Development topics and the training of nuclear 
safeguards inspectors in the field of nuclear safeguards. Cooperation between the parties to 
this Agreement shall be on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.   
ABACC and the European Commission engaged into a collaborative project on Strengthening 
the Safeguards Capabilities. This project involves two technologies – 3D Laser Verification 
and Ultrasonic Sealing, the benefits of which are to be evaluated for possible Safeguards 
application at facilities in Argentina and Brazil. 
3D laser-based techniques continue to improve and cover a large range of activities including 
Design Information Verification (DIV), containment verification and UF6 cylinders tracking. 
The ABACC expectation is that the use of 3D laser-based instrumentation will increase over 
the coming years and a direct benefit to the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards 
implementation can be provided in a near future.  
The main purpose of sealing using ultrasonic technique is to maintain the continuity of 
knowledge and avoid re-measurement of nuclear material inventories. This is particularly 
important when applied to spent fuel storages. The historical application of this technique 
has been analysed by ABACC since the development of the underwater seal based on 
ultrasound in conjunction with a randomly produced wire coil which create the seal 
signature. The new bolt for underwater sealing is derived from the design of the sealing 
bolts already used in the La Hague reprocessing plant. On-going developments of various 
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 Ultrasonic Sealing Systems for both underwater and dry spent fuel storages applications, in 
particular for dry storages using cask with concrete biological shielding have been tested. 
Within the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement [1], ABACC, together with national 
authorities and operators in Brazil and Argentina, is analysing the application of 3D laser 
and/or ultrasonic seals technologies. In particular, the analysis will focus on how the use of 
the new technologies improves safeguards without affecting operational tasks and turning 
activities less intrusive and more efficient.  
The use of new technologies is key to enhancing Safeguards effectiveness and efficiency. In 
this particular case, any future application of these technologies should be developed and 
implemented such that it allows Joint Use between ABACC and IAEA when the application on 
safeguards is discussed and approved. Results from the containment provided by the 
ultrasonic seals and verification of design by 3D laser-based techniques shall permit that 
ABACC and IAEA draw independent conclusions. 
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Abstract: 
In April 2010 at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., Japan made a commitment to 
establish a center of excellence on nuclear nonproliferation and security. This center would 
support capacity building for strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and security mainly in the 
Asian region and also would engage in development of technology related measurement and 
detection of nuclear material including nuclear forensics based on international cooperation. 
According to this statement, Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear 
Security (ISCN) was established under Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in December 2010. 
Since its establishment four and a half years ago, ISCN has developed its activities, having 
already conducted 79 training courses for the nuclear nonproliferation and security fields and 
having trained 2,217 participants from 49 countries (including Japan) and three international 
organizations. As for technical development on detection and measurement of nuclear material, 
ISCN has carried out substantial outcome with the international cooperation of U.S. and EU/JRC. 
It can be said that it is a significant achievement of the Nuclear Security Summit process. This 
paper will overview the outcome of ISCN’s activities over the past four years. 
1. Introduction
How the preparations were advanced toward the establishment of ISCN, with cooperation from 
domestic relevant organizations and how cooperation was promoted with the United States (US) 
and the European Union (EU) have been described in a previous paperi. This paper will present 
concrete results mainly in the ISCN’s capacity-building activities over the past four and a half 
years. 
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2. Overview and achievement of capacity-building assistance activities of
ISCN
For capacity-building assistance activities of ISCN ii , JAEA offers training courses in three 
categories: (1) International Nonproliferation Framework Courses, (2) Nuclear Security Courses, 
and (3) State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) and Safeguards 
(SG) Courses. Target countries for ISCN’s training activities are those that are part of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that participate in the Forum for Nuclear 
Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), that have the possibility of extended nuclear cooperation with 
Japan or that have requested cooperation at the government level. ISCN has conducted its 
support activities in close collaboration with the Japanese government and has determined 
target countries. As a general rule, those target countries are re-examined every year. Some 
training courses are hosted by ISCN in Tokai-mura, Japan, and other courses are organized by 
target countries with the lecturers dispatched from ISCN. International Nonproliferation 
Framework Courses are based on bilateral cooperation, and the courses are basically hosted by 
the target countries.  The achievements of each category of training courses since the 
establishment of ISCN are as described below. 
2.1 International Nonproliferation Framework Courses 
ISCN conducts seminars on “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Nonproliferation” to 
fulfill the purposes to convey to the target country the importance of nuclear nonproliferation and 
security activities, to broadly understand the target country’s current state of nuclear energy 
development and corresponding need for training in nuclear nonproliferation and security, and to 
lay a foundation of understanding for future cooperation between related organizations in Japan 
and in the target country. The duration of the seminar is usually one or two days. The participants 
come from a wide range of organizations related to nuclear nonproliferation and security in the 
partner country, such as the ministries of foreign affairs and energy, nuclear regulatory 
authorities, security authorities, operators, and research and development institutions. A typical 
seminar consists of presentations about the partner country’s plans for the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy and the measures that they have taken for nuclear nonproliferation and security, 
Japan’s experiences in these areas, and keynote speeches on the status and framework of 
international nuclear nonproliferation and security. As a result, while the seminar itself fosters a 
general awareness of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security, ISCN’s goal is that, after the 
seminar, the interaction with the partner country advances and shifts to specific support based 
on the partner country’s needs, such as the development of domestic legislation and SSAC, the 
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ratification and implementation of an Additional Protocol (AP), or the improvement of nuclear 
security. This kind of cooperation actually started in 2007, even before the creation of ISCN, so 
that JAEA/ISCN has already organized seminars in eleven countries, as shown in Table 1. Not 
only bilateral cooperation, but also cooperation with a multi-country framework such as the 
ASEAN Center for Energy (ACE) has been promoted, and ISCN and ACE have jointly organized 
a seminar. At the seminars, simultaneous interpretation service to and from the local language is 
sometimes arranged, in order to accommodate a wider range of participants. 
Table-1 Results of International Nonproliferation Framework Courses 
2.2 Nuclear Security Courses 
As shown in Table 2, in Japan fiscal year (JFY) 2011, ISCN started its capacity-building in 
nuclear security support activities with offering two training courses: a basic training course on 
physical protection of nuclear material (PP-RTC) and a workshop on the IAEA’s 
recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material (INFCIRC225/Rev.5). Since then, 
ISCN has extended the scope of its training courses as well as the total number of courses to 
meet increasing needs. 
In JFY 2014, besides the PP-RTC, which has been conducted yearly since JFY 2011, ISCN is 
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planning to organize many training courses including new ones, such as training courses on 
measures against insider threats and security of radioactive sources and a regional workshop on 
nuclear security culture. 
In addition to these international and regional training courses that are held in Japan, ISCN 
provides assistance based on bilateral cooperation and organizes seminars or workshops 
abroad in the field of nuclear security. A seminar on border security conducted in Lithuania and a 
basic seminar on physical protection of nuclear material conducted in Vietnam are examples. 
Recently, the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) of Indonesia requested ISCN 
cooperation in connection with the establishment of their training center. The areas of requested 
cooperation include training of trainers and development of training curriculums. 
Table-2 Provision of Nuclear Security Courses 
In regard to training the ISCN’s own lecture staff, ISCN has conducted the PP-RTC every year 
with cooperation from the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Sandia National Laboratories 
(SNL), striving for the goal of conducting international training courses all by itself. In JFY 2011, 
ISCN held a train-the-trainer course to train its own staff, with cooperation from SNL. Since then, 
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the proportion of ISCN training staff has increased and almost 80% of the training course 
lectures are now taught by the ISCN staff. Acquiring the knowledge and ability to deliver training 
courses by itself provides ISCN flexibility in scheduling training courses at the appropriate time. 
By doing so, ISCN will have a foundation of providing intensive courses. When developing a new 
training course, ISCN lecturers receive training at SNL and utilize the experience for the 
development of curriculum and training materials. Especially, ISCN developed and established 
the Virtual Reality Systemiii (Cave system), one of the virtual space experience system where 
the participants can walk in and around a virtual nuclear plant, and the Physical Protection (PP) 
Training Field where participants can learn and practice the performance and the features of 
nuclear protection equipment (protective fences, invasion detection sensor, surveillance camera, 
access management system and so on). These facilities are incorporated into the training 
curriculums and make the training original and unique. There is also increased demand from 
domestic government organizations. For example, ISCN organized a training course for 
inspectors of the regulatory authority (Nuclear Regulation Authority) in the field of regulation of 
physical protection. After that, ISCN has been making an effort to make courses more effective 
by improving the curriculums. This has been done through consultations with the regulatory 
authority. In JFY 2013, ISCN offered two basic courses and one specialized course. Upon 
request, ISCN continues to offer those courses in this JFY. This is evidence that ISCN’s training 
courses are highly regarded. ISCN’s training activities have extended not only to training courses 
for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Chemical School (started in JFY2012), for Japan Coast 
Guard (started in JFY2013) or National Police Agency (started in JFY 2014), but also training 
courses on performance testing of physical protection detection system or on cybersecurity. This 
is a great achievement of ISCN. 
2.3 State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) and 
Safeguards (SG) Courses 
JAEA has been providing an international training course on SSAC in Japan every year since 
1996, before the establishment of ISCN, and has contributed to the capacity building of key 
persons for safeguards activities in other countries. Some examples are noted below. A 
participant in JAEA’s SSAC course in 2006 has become the director of the nuclear safeguards 
division in the Vietnamese regulatory authority. She has been working to promote nuclear 
security and safeguards in Vietnam and contributing to strengthening safeguards systems in 
Asia at multilateral forums, such as the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) and FNCA. A 
Czech SSAC course participant in 2002 served as an IAEA lecturer in the SSAC course in 2013. 
A Korean participant in 2006 is now a vice-president of the safeguards and physical protection 
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regulatory authority in Korea. These clearly illustrate that participants in the JAEA’s 
capacity-building activities are playing an important role in their countries or in the IAEA. Also, a 
2012 SSAC course participant from Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission took initiative and 
explained in Arabic to other participants during exercise sessions at the ISCN’s workshop on 
safeguards in Jordan in 2013, to increase understanding. These show the good practice of 
ISCN’s capacity-building activities. 
The good practice shown above cannot be achieved in a short space of time, however, this is 
evidence that the knowledge and human network acquired through the ISCN’s capacity-building 
activities is instrumental in achieving these concrete results. It is also evidence that the ISCN’s 
activities contributed to fostering persons who work for the implementation of safeguards both at 
home and abroad. 
In addition, ISCN has conducted not only multilateral training courses but also training courses 
based on bilateral cooperation. These bilateral cooperation activities include training courses 
held in the partner countries, such as the ones conducted in Vietnam, Malaysia and Jordan to 
promote ratification of an Additional Protocol (AP) or to help participants learn basic safeguards. 
In Vietnam, ISCN has organized three training courses on SG, and Vietnam ratified an AP in 
September 2012. This is a good example of a visible result of ISCN’s capacity-building 
assistance activities. 
In response to a request from the IAEA, the SSAC course that is to be held in 2014 will be an 
international course. The invitation will not be limited to the Asian region, but participants will be 
invited from 88 countries in the world. This can be considered to be the result of the appreciation 
of trust that has been built over nearly 20 years of achievement and cooperation, even before the 
establishment of ISCN, through conducting SSAC training courses with cooperation from the 
IAEA. Table 3 presents the achievement of SSAC and SG courses after the establishment of 
ISCN. 
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Table-3 Progress in Provision of SSAC and SG Courses 
3. Technical development on detection and measurement of nuclear
material
ISCN/JAEA has been implementing development of basic technologies of the following 
advanced NDA (Non-Destructive Assay) of nuclear material that could be used as tools not only 
for safeguards (measurement of nuclear material) application but also for nuclear security one 
(detection of nuclear material). We have been involved in the following 5 programs with state of 
the art technologies of Japan, in collaboration with the international counterparts. The outcomes 
of the programs 2), 3), 4) and 5) will be reported in detail at “The ESARDA Symposium 2015”. In 
this paper we roughly introduce our development of each NDA technology. 
(1) Demonstration tests for a spent fuel Pu-NDA (Non-Destructive Assay) system 
(2) NRF (nuclear resonance fluorescence)-NDA using laser Compton scattered (LCS) 
gamma-rays (intense mono-energetic gamma-rays) 
(3) Alternative to He-3 neutron detection using ZnS/B O ceramic scintillator 
(4) NRD (Neutron Resonance Densitometry) using NRTA (Neutron Resonance Transmission 
Analysis) and NRCA (Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis) 
(5) Nuclear forensics technology development project 
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3.1 Demonstration tests for a spent fuel Pu-NDA (Non-Destructive Assay) 
system 
ISCN/JAEA and the United States Department of Energy (USDOE)/Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) have been collaborating on spent fuel measurements. We have conducted 
several important NRF and NRD experiments with a PNAR (Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity) 
and SINRD (Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry)  
NDA instrument (Figure 1 NDA apparatus) at Fugen nuclear power stationiv. 
Figure 1 NDA apparatus of PNAR and SINRD 
3.2 NRF (Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence)-NDA using Laser Compton 
Scattered (LCS) gamma-rays (intense mono-energetic gamma-rays)v 
ISCN/JAEA has developed a non-destructive detection system for measurement and detection 
of nuclear materials, such as measurement of nuclear material hidden in heavy shields in cargo 
containers, quantitative measurement of nuclear material in spent fuel, and non-destructive 
quantification of nuclear material in targets such as particle-like melted fuel debris. We have 
considered this technology difficult to be developed since long before. This system is able to 
detect and identify isotopes of nuclear material by employing Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence 
(NRF) with Laser Compton Scattering (LCS) gamma-rays, which are generated by the collision 
of laser quanta with high energy electrons. 
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Figure 2 Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) with Laser Compton Scattering (LCS) gamma-rays 
3.3 Alternative to He-3 neutron detection using ZnS/B2O3 ceramic scintillatorvi 
Against the background of the serious shortage of He-3 gas, the neutron-sensitive ZnS/10B2O3 
ceramic scintillator detectors have been developed by JAEA for a safeguards-specific alternative 
to He-3 for neutron detection. He-3 for neutron detection has been in critical short supply since 
the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001.  The US 
Department of Homeland Security used a great number of neutron detectors for detecting 
nuclear materials along the national borders and the port facilities in the United States. The 
United States, as a major supplier, established its policy to decrease their supply of He-3 gas in 
the area of safeguards which alternative to He-3 neutron detection can be applied.  In the end of 
March, 2011, the IAEA held a workshop for the experts of neutron and neutron detector 
development, and asked the States participated in the workshop to cooperate and develop the 
technology of alternative to He-3 neutron detection. While we have improved neutron detection 
units based on a neutron-sensitive ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic scintillator detector technology 
developed by JAEA (J-PARC Center) and digital processing circuits, we have involved in 
development and demonstration of NDA apparatus for nuclear safeguards with those neutron 
detector units.  
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Figure 3 Overview of a ZnS/10B2O3 Ceramic Scintillator Neutron Detector 
3.4 Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD)vii 
ISCN/JAEA has been undertaking to develop fundamental part of advanced Non-Destructive 
Assay (NDA) technologies for nuclear materials, under the collaboration with EC-JRC-IRMM. 
Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) has been proposed to quantify nuclear materials in 
particle-like debris of melted fuel (a molten mixture of nuclear fuel and structural material) by the 
types of isotopes formed in severe accidents of nuclear reactors. NRD is a method combining 
NRTA (Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis; quantification of nuclear fuel nuclei) and 
NRCA (Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis; quantification of mixed nuclei). It relies on neutron 
technique using a pulsed white neutron source. (Figure 4) 
3.5 Nuclear forensics technology developmentviii 
ISCN/JAEA has started a nuclear forensics technology development project since 2011. Nuclear 
forensics is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated 
material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution by determining origin, history, transit routes 
and purpose involving such material. This project includes the developments of analytical 
technologies such as isotope and impurity measurements, morphology analysis, age 
determination technique, and the prototype of National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL). 
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Figure 4 Neutron Resonance Densitometry 
i Yosuke Naoi, et al.,” Development of Centers of Excellence Play Major Role in International 
Capacity Building” INMM 54th Annual meeting, July 2013 
ii http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/index_en.html 
iii Tasuku Hanai, et al.,” Development of a Virtual Reality System for Training Use on 
the Nuclear Security” INMM 54th Annual meeting, July 2013 
iv J. Eigenbrodt, S. J. Tobin, W. S. Charlton, A. M. Bolind, H. O. Menlove, M. Seya and H. R. 
Trellue, “PNAR Measurement of Fugen Fuel, INMM 55th Annual meeting, July 2014  
v R. Nagai, R. Hajima, et al., “Overview of laser Compton-scattered photon source at the 
cERL, Proc. Of Nuclear Physics and Gamma-ray sources for nuclear secutity and 
nonproliferation, Tokai-mura, Japan, January 2014 
vi H. Nakamura, M. Kureta, A. Ohzu, K. Soyama, et al., “Demonstration plan of Pu 
NDA system using ZnS Ceramic scintillator”, 53rd INMM annual meeting, Orland 
U.S.A., July 2012 
vii H. Harada, P. Schillabeeckx, et al., “Development of Neutron Resonance 
Densitometry” 55th INMM annual meeting, Atlanta U.S.A., July 2014 
viii A. Okubo, Y. Kimura, N. Shinohara, et al., “Report on research and development of 
nuclear forensics technologies” JAEA-Technology 2015-001 (in Japanese) 
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Abstract: 
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency in collaboration with the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission started a program titled “Development of active neutron NDA techniques”. The program 
aims at developing an innovative non-destructive analysis (NDA) system for various applications in the 
field of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. 
A Non Destructive Analysis (NDA) system is proposed that is based on a combination of different 
active neutron interrogation techniques, i.e. DDA (Differential Die-Away Analysis), PGA (Prompt 
Gamma-ray Analysis) combined with NRCA (Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis), NRTA (Neutron 
Resonance Transmission Analysis) and DGS (Delayed Gamma Spectroscopy). The activities include 
the development of simulation tools and of improved data processing and analysis procedures. In 
addition, validation experiments will be carried out at the nuclear facilities of the JRC. The objective is 
to construct a prototype instrument at JAEA based on a 14 MeV pulsed neutron source for testing and 
demonstration experiments.  
At present no adequate NDA technique exists that can determine the amount of Special Nuclear 
Materials (SNM) and Minor Actinides (MA) in high radioactive nuclear materials, including fresh and 
spent fuel, debris of melted fuel, transuranic (TRU) waste and next generation nuclear fuel (e.g. fuel 
for nuclear transmutation). A system based on a combination of the above mentioned techniques is 
proposed to assess the quantity of SNM and MA for a wide variety of applications, i.e. nuclear 
safeguards and proliferation, decommissioning and waste management. In addition, the use of the 
system for the detection of explosives and nuclear forensics will be investigated. 
In this paper, the background and motivation of the program, the selected active neutron techniques 
and the master plan are described.  
Keywords: NDA; measurement; active neutron technique 
1. Introduction
In the field of nuclear material accountancy and safeguards, several material types are difficult to 
characterize for the content of SNM, i.e. the amount of 235U and Pu, and MA, especially in the 
presence of a high radioactive nuclides. Material composition and difficulties vary strongly according to 
the specific application. 
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The development of nuclear transmutation technology using a fast reactor or an accelerator-driven 
system is strongly promoted in Japan. By transmuting MA, the burden for conditioning and disposal of 
high-level radioactive waste will be significantly reduced. The fuel for a nuclear transmutation scheme 
results from reprocessing of LWR fuel. It contains large quantities of MA (Np, Am, Cm) mixed with Pu 
[1] and can be categorized as next generation fuel. Characterization of such material by conventional 
passive neutron techniques will be strongly hampered by the presence of 244Cm due to its high specific 
spontaneous fission rate. Hence, for conventional passive neutron techniques also the 244Cm/240Pu 
ratio is required. Unfortunately, due to high neutron emission rate γ-ray, spectroscopic measurements 
using HP-Ge detectors are excluded to determine this ratio. Hence, an alternative NDA technique is 
required for the nuclear material accountancy of this next generation fuel related to nuclear 
transmutation programmes. 
In the field of nuclear security and safeguards, there is a strong emphasis on the control of spent fuel 
assemblies. Therefore, the US-DOE has promoted the “Next generation safeguards initiative’s (NGSI) 
spent fuel non-destructive assay project” with national laboratories and universities since 2009 [2]. 
Within this project various R&D projects are carried out. They mainly concentrate on verification of 
spent fuel assemblies of the present fuel cycle. Techniques to verify spent fuel from reprocessing 
activities, which is obviously more complicated, are not considered.  
Decommissioning of nuclear power plants becomes an important activity. The characterisation of 
materials resulting from decommissioning activities in terms of the U and Pu content is required for 
material accountancy, classification of waste and clearance declarations. TRU waste is mostly 
contained in a 200 litter drum with a great variety in matrix material. In case of metal-based waste, 
resulting from fuel conversion and reprocessing facilities, conventional passive γ-ray techniques 
cannot be applied. In addition, results of passive neutron counting techniques might be biased due to 
the sensitivity of the results to the specific matrix materials.  
To prevent the risk of a “dirty bomb” or “Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)” as a radiological 
weapon, dedicated detection techniques are required. Since explosives always contain a substantial 
amount of nitrate, the presence of 14N can be used as a signature. Hence, the development of 
techniques for the detection of 14N is important for nuclear security. Such techniques can also be 
applied for the detection of plutonium-nitrate solutions.  
Characterisation of debris of melted fuel resulting from the damaged reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plants is extremely challenging. This is due to the high yield of fission neutrons from 
spontaneous fission of 244Cm and the high γ-ray dose from the decay of fission products. In addition, it 
is expected that the melted fuel will contain water, boron, concrete and structural materials. 
Unfortunately, the elemental (and isotopic) composition of such material cannot be predicted. Hence, 
conventional methods which rely on information about the elemental and isotopic composition cannot 
be applied. Although characterization of such debris for safeguards material accountancy will be 
required at the time of removal of the melted fuel, at the moment no official strategy exists for these 
materials. Possible scenarios have been investigated by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and 
U.S. Department of Energy [3,4,5]. A more concrete solution resulted from a collaboration between 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission 
(JRC) [6,7]. A method referred to as Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) was proposed. The 
method relies on Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) combined with Neutron 
Resonance Capture Analysis (NRCA) and Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis (PGA). The results of this 
collaboration are very promising [8]. It is expected that the amount of 235U and 239Pu present in particle 
like debris samples from melted fuel can be determined within 2% [9]. It should be noted that NRTA is 
an absolute method which does not require any calibration by representative samples.  
One can conclude that the development of innovative NDA techniques for nuclear material 
accountancy, safeguards, nuclear security and decommissioning is required. Based on the success of 
the JAEA/JRC NRD project [6,7,8] a new joint JAEA/JRC R&D project has been defined and its 
programme is discussed in this paper. 
2. R&D programme and activities
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The R&D programme is schematically summarised in Figure 1. The aim is to combine different active 
neutron interrogation techniques, i.e. DDA (Differential Die-Away Analysis), PGA (Prompt Gamma-ray 
Analysis) / NRCA (Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis), NRTA (Neutron Resonance Transmission 
Analysis) and DGS (Delayed Gamma Spectroscopy). Each of these techniques has its limitations and 
advantages. The main objective is to make optimum use of the complementarity between them. 
Figure 1: Schematic outline of the “Development of active neutron NDA techniques” programme 
The project consists of three phases: 
1. Development and experimental validation of simulation tools that are used to optimise the
design of the system. In addition, the quality of the nuclear data and models that are needed
for data processing and analysis, is verified.
2. Modelling, design and construction of a prototype system for measurements in a MA-Pu fuel
conversion facility as part of nuclear transmutation activities.
3. Development and construction of an industrial NDA system to be installed in a MA-Pu fuel
conversion facility.
In phase 1 Monte Carlo codes for neutron and γ-ray transport simulations, e.g. PHITS [10] and MVP 
[11] that have been developed by JAEA, will be validated together with the resonance analysis code 
REFIT [12]. The latter is used at JRC and JAEA for the analysis of cross section data. The prototype 
system will be used to demonstrate and optimize the performance of the techniques and the data 
processing and analysis procedures. In addition, dedicated measurements will be carried out at the 
nuclear facilities of the JRC, i.e. the neutron facilities at the Geel site and the PUNITA facility at the 
Ispra site. The results of these measurements are used to verify the nuclear data and will be part of 
the validation procedures. 
To develop a full NDA system that can be used for a variety of applications and that fulfils the 
requirements of different authorities, a more extended international programme is required. The 
activities within such a programme should concentrate on: 
• Standardization of methods for the performance assessment of active neutron interrogation
NDA techniques
• Exchange of information and experience and pooling of resources
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• Execution of common R&D projects
Instrument performances and measurement uncertainties are often evaluated based on experiments 
using working standards and procedures, which are both produced by the user of the instrument. 
Improved evaluation procedures could be part of a more international research framework. Such a 
framework should result in recommendations for the specifications, production and characterization of 
working reference materials which are traceable to primary standards or certified reference materials. 
Evidently, these requirements strongly depend on both the applied NDA technique and characteristics 
of the samples of interest. Ideally such a programme involves dissemination of good practice, 
exchange of staff and access to facilities. Experimental activities are foreseen at the following facilities: 
• JAEA-NUCEF(NUclear fuel Cycle safety Engineering research Facility)-BECKY(Back-End
Cycle Key element research facilitY) 
• JAEA-PCDF(Plutonium Conversion Development Facility)
− GELINA (Geel Electron LINear Accelerator) at the JRC Geel  site 
• PUNITA(Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly) at the JRC Ispra site
Such a pooling of resources and infrastructures will also result in a cost effective execution of R&D 
projects, e.g. the project will definitely benefit from combining JRC's experience in DDA 
measurements with JAEA's experience in Fast Neutron Direct Interrogation (FNDI) (see Appendix). 
3. Basic principles
The basic principles of the active neutron interrogation techniques that will be integrated in the NDA 
system are summarised in Table 1. A final industrial system for DDA, PGA and DGS applications will 
be based on a 14 MeV D-T pulsed neutron source with a neutron intensity of at least 108 n/s. For 
neutron resonance analysis applications, in particular NRTA, the focus is on a pulsed electron linear 
accelerator with a pulse-width < 500 ns and a neutron intensity of at least 1010 n/s. 
Table 1: Brief description of the studied active neutron interrogation techniques. 
Technique Principle Quantity of interest 
DDA − Interrogation by a moderated pulsed neutron beam 
− Detection of neutron induced prompt fission neutrons 
− Make use of die-away time difference 
Total fissile content 
DGS (DGSI*) − Interrogation by a moderated  pulsed neutron beam 
− Detection of neutron induced prompt fission neutrons 
− Make use of die-away time difference 
235U/239Pu and 241Pu/239Pu 
NRTA − Interrogation by (moderated) pulsed neutron beam 
− Detection of neutron transmission through a sample 
− Analysis of resonance transmission dips 
Quantity of U and Pu 
isotopes  
(absolute measurement) 
PGA/NRCA − Interrogation by a (moderated) pulsed neutron beam 
− Detection of prompt γ-rays after (n,γ) reactions 
− Make use of prompt γ-ray energy combined with 
neutron resonance energy 
Presence and quantity of 
specific nuclides 
* delayed gamma-ray spectroscopy combined with self-interrogation
3.1. DDA 
The DDA technique uses the detection of prompt fission neutrons, following neutron induced fission, 
as a means for quantifying the fissile mass. Normally small-sized D-T or D-D pulsed neutron 
generators are used as the interrogating external neutron source. The pulse width needs to be short 
(typically about 10 µs) compared to the interrogation time range and the neutron lifetime in the fission 
neutron detection system. The prompt fission neutrons are detected in thermal neutron detector 
modules, and can be separated from the interrogation neutrons and background signals. In this 
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context background signals include spontaneous neutrons, (α,n) neutrons, delayed neutrons, cosmic-
ray induced events, random neutrons from the D-T generator and finally electronic noise.  
The measured quantity in the DDA technique is the total fission rate of the sample. The key fissile 
nuclides are 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu. If the ratios 235U/239Pu and 241Pu/239Pu can be evaluated by other 
means, the fission rate can be expressed as the mass of 239Pueffective (=C1235U+239Pu+C2241Pu).  In this 
way the DDA can be classified as a direct measurement technique for the fissile mass which is 
important for nuclear safeguards purposes. 
The DDA technique has been investigated at many laboratories. For this reason several types of 
hardware and methodologies have been proposed. The method of thermal neutron interrogation is 
most common, the advantage being that fission cross-sections remain constant during the 
interrogation period. On the other hand, JAEA-DDA mainly uses fast and epi-thermal neutron 
interrogation (Fast Neutron Direct Interrogation method (FNDI)). FNDI has many difference points in 
methodology, hardware and software from thermal neutron DDA. An introduction to FNDI is given in 
the Appendix.  
In the joint JAEA – JRC programme regarding the DDA technique various activities will be undertaken. 
This includes exchange of information of DDA methodology and hardware implementations, as well as 
experimental investigations. The experimental work includes investigation of important quantities such 
as the time and spatial distribution of the interrogating neutron flux inside relevant passive matrix 
materials, together with methods for estimating these variations through instrumentation placed 
outside the containers. For this purpose some standard containers and matrices will be produced. The 
standard matrices will be prepared with re-entrant tubes to allow insertion of small sealed Pu and U 
standards, as well as sensors for neutron flux measurements. Measurements will be carried out both 
at JAEA and JRC in parallel with Monte Carlo simulations of the experiments. The results of this 
collaboration will demonstrate the sensitivity of the method applied to the standard matrices, and 
propose the best suited measurement procedures for unknown samples of this kind. 
3.2. NRTA 
NRTA is an absolute NDA technique to determine the elemental and isotopic composition of materials, 
which have a thickness of a few cm. NRTA is based on the analysis of characteristic dips in a 
transmission spectrum resulting from a measurement of the attenuation of a pulsed neutron beam by 
the sample under investigation [8]. It relies on the time-of-flight technique, which is a standard 
technique for neutron resonance spectroscopy [12]. It is an absolute method and can be considered 
as one of the most accurate NDA techniques to quantify the amount of SNM and MA. 
The experimental and analysis procedures for the analysis of homogeneous samples are well 
established [12]. The applicability of the technique for particle size debris samples of melted fuel 
resulting from severe nuclear accidents has been demonstrated by measurements at the GELINA 
facility of the JRC Geel  site [8,13], as part of a previous JAEA/JRC collaboration project [7]. This 
project will be continued to define the optimum conditions, e.g. container dimensions, of the samples 
and the impact of the sample temperature by measurements at a 10m flight path of GELINA using an 
oven.  
In this joint programme the applicability of NRTA for the characterization of fresh and spent nuclear 
fuel of the present and next generation fuel cycle and for nuclear decommissioning and waste 
management will be studied. This involves measurements with high radioactive material. Therefore, a 
radiation resistant neutron detector will be developed and tested.  
In addition, reference samples will be produced to evaluate the performance of NRTA for a wide 
variety of applications e.g. characterization of fuel for transmutation applications, including powder 
samples and fresh and spent fuel pellets containing SNM and MA. Constraints of a NRTA system for 
these applications, i.e. minimum flight path length, pulse width and neutron intensity, will be defined. 
A NRTA system will be designed and installed at the JAEA-NUCEF-BECKY facility. The system will be 
based on a D-T pulsed neutron source with a 10 µs pulse width. The implications of such a pulse 
width will be studied by predictions obtained from calculations with REFIT. These results will be 
validated by measurements at GELINA.  
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The REFIT code has been developed to determine resonance parameters from a resonance shape 
analysis of TOF cross section data. The code will be adapted and optimised for NRTA applications, i.e. 
for elemental and isotopic analysis starting from well-defined resonance parameters. A more user-
friendly and full documented version will be produced.   
3.3. PGA/NRCA 
The PGA technique is a γ-ray spectroscopic NDA technique which is extensively used for elemental 
analysis. The technique relies on characteristic properties of prompt γ-rays emitted after a (n,γ) 
reaction. The applicability of PGA combined with Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis (NRCA) for 
nuclear material accountancy and nuclear security will be investigated. In particular the use of 
PGA/NRCA to determine the elemental and isotopic composition of fuel containing MA will be verified.  
PGA can also be applied to detect the presence of SNM. For example, the detection of γ-rays 
following neutron capture in 14N is a signature for nitride fuel. The detection of high-energy γ-rays from 
neutron capture in light elements like H, C, N and O can also be used for the detection of explosives.  
For the majority of elements NRCA has a more favourable detection limit compared to NRTA. The 
difference is roughly one order of magnitude. For elements with resonances between 1 eV and 100 eV 
the detection limit is in the range of parts per million (ppm). Since NRCA is very sensitive when 
elements are present as impurities or trace elements, it can be a useful tool for nuclear forensics. 
Reference samples will be produced and a performance assessment will be carried out using a D-T 
pulsed neutron generator installed at the JAEA-NUCEF-BECKY facility. High energy prompt γ-rays will 
be detected with a large LaBr3 scintillator detector. The testing of such a detector and optimization of 
its shielding [17] were part of the previous JAEA/JRC collaboration project.  
3.4. DGS 
DGS has already been proposed as a NDA technique for the characterization of spent nuclear fuel 
[18]. The experimental observables are high energetic γ-rays which are emitted after the decay of 
fission products. Use is made of the difference in fission fragment yields of 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu. The 
amount of 235U and 241Pu relative to 239Pu is derived from the intensity of the emitted delayed γ-rays. 
Hence, these results combined with the total amount of fissile material resulting from DDA 
measurements are valuable input data for nuclear safeguards applications. It is intended to use the 
technique for the verification of Pu nitrate solutions in a MA-Pu conversion facility. It is planned to 
perform a pilot experiment at JAEA-PCDF. 
4. Prototype system
JAEA intends to build a multipurpose active neutron interrogation system based on a D-T pulsed 
neutron source with a maximum neutron intensity of 109 s-1, a 10 µs pulse width and a 100 Hz nominal 
frequency. A layout of the system, which combines DDA, NRTA and PGA/NRCA, is shown in Figure 2. 
The system will be optimised for measurements of low radioactive samples containing SNM. The 
design and construction of the device are scheduled for 2015 and 2016. The first measurements are 
planned in 2017.  
The DDA part consists of a neutron reflector and moderator placed close to the neutron generator, a 
sample holder on a rotating table and a neutron detector bank. The NRTA part includes a moderator, a 
sample changer, a vacuum tube with collimators and a neutron detector placed at 5 m distance from 
the neutron producing target. The PGA part consists of a sample holder and γ-ray detector.  
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Figure 2: Layout of an active neutron NDA prototype system combining DDA, PGA and NRTA. 
5. Summary
JAEA in collaboration with JRC launched a new R&D programme "Development of active neutron 
interrogation techniques". The programme concentrates on a method that combines complementary 
active neutron techniques, i.e. DDA, NRTA, PGA/NRCA and DGS. Such a combination of techniques 
should result in a more accurate determination of the amount of SNM and MA in low and high 
radioactive nuclear materials of the present and next generation fuel cycle. The method can be applied 
for nuclear safety, security and safeguards applications, e.g. characterization of nuclear fuel (including 
spent fuel, fuel for nuclear transmutation and melted fuel), nuclear decommissioning and detection of 
explosives. To demonstrate its potential a prototype facility using a high intensity D-T pulsed neutron 
generator will be constructed. The programme also includes a performance assessment of different 
NDA techniques using dedicated reference samples and procedures based on a more extended 
international collaborative effort. 
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7. Appendix
Fast Neutron Direct Interrogation (FNDI) is a DDA type of NDA technique [19]. The experimental 
observable is the total number of fission neutrons induced by interrogating the sample with a pulsed 
14 MeV neutron source. The method can be used to verify the content of 200 l waste drums for the 
amount of SNM.  
The interrogation with a non-thermalized neutron source has some fundamental difficulties such as 
variations in the source neutron spectrum as function of time, matrix materials, sample size, sample 
location etc. Some advantages however also exist which are worthwhile investigating.  
One of the differences between thermal neutron DDA and FNDI is the spatial distribution of neutron 
induced fission events in the sample, as illustrated in Figure 3 for an ideal case. Due to this difference 
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results obtained with FNDI may in some cases prove to be less sensitive to the spatial distribution of 
the nuclear material in the sample as those derived from the more conventional thermal DDA systems. 
Figure 3: Illustration of the spatial distribution of neutron induced fission events and the detection probability for a 
conventional thermal neutron DDA and FNDI.  
Typical die-away curves, i.e. counts as a function of time after the neutron pulse, are shown in Figure 
4. The component due to the detection of induced fission neutrons can be clearly distinguished from
the one caused by detection of interrogating neutrons. A least squares fit can be applied to derive the 
amplitude and die-away time of the two components. The total amount of fissile material present in the 
sample is estimated using quantities such as the amplitude and die-away time of the induced fission 
neutron component. The FNDI apparatus JAWAS-N installed at JAEA-Ningyo-toge is shown in Figure 
5.a. Results from measurements at this facility with waste drums containing uranium are shown in 
Figure 5.b.  
Figure 4: A typical die-away curve resulting from FNDI measurements at the JAWAS-N facility. The total number 
of detected neutrons is plotted as a function of time after the creation of the pulsed neutron beam. 
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(a) FNDI apparatus “JAWAS-N”              (b) verification result 
Figure 5: A photograph of the JAWAS-N facility (a) and the results of measurements with different uranium 
samples at this facility (b). In the latter the amplitude of the induced prompt fission neutrons is plotted as a 
function the total uranium mass.  
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Abstract
For many decades, the JRC’s Nuclear Security Unit in Ispra (Italy) has continued to play an important
role in international nuclear safeguards and nuclear security based on sound R&D programmes in non-
destructive analysis (NDA) methods and instrumentation, testing and benchmarking of detection
systems, user accessibility to laboratories and reference material, together with a comprehensive
training programme. Beneficiaries of these programmes have generally been the European
Commission DG’s (ENER, HOME, DEVCO, TAXUD, RTD), the IAEA, EU research institutions, EU
member states and many international partners.
The need for a modern and integrated infrastructure to promote synergy and efficient operation of all
activities has been recognised and a new laboratory named INS3L (Ispra Nuclear Safeguards, Security
and Standardization Laboratory) which will house all activities and facilities under one roof has indeed
been approved and is now in its planning phase with its completion expected within about three years.
This paper aims to describe the activities performed with reference to relevant publications and will
present the conceptual design of the new INS3L as a user laboratory within an integrated approach that
shall benefit all users and stakeholders, partners and EU member states in general.
Keywords: NDA, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, R&D, training, international co-operation, INS3L
1. Introduction
Three decades ago Walter Hage working at the JRC’s Nuclear Security Unit in Ispra (Italy) published 
his fundamental papers on the Point Model for neutron correlation counting. The legacy of Walter and
his co-workers is the foundation on which the unit still today reinforces its important role in international
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security built on a sound R&D programme in non-destructive analysis
(NDA) methods and instrumentation, user accessibility to laboratories and reference material, and the
various training programmes offered to end users and stakeholders.
In essence, the activities currently carried out within the unit can be subdivided as follows:
 R&D in NDA techniques for nuclear safeguards and nuclear security
 Scientific/Technical support to ENER, IAEA and EU member states
 Instrument testing, validation, benchmarking and standardization
 Monte Carlo simulation and modeling combined with measurements for validation
 Training of inspectors in nuclear safeguards
 Training of Front Line officers (FLO) and Train the Trainer of FLO in nuclear security and
detection of nuclear and radioactive materials.
Laboratories and facilities such as PERLA, PUNITA, ITRAP Dynamic, ITRAP Static and
EUSECTRA-Ispra combined with the availability of reference NDA samples of nuclear materials have
been instrumental for all the above-mentioned work areas. Recent collaborative projects such as
1
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 SCINTILLA, ITRAP+10, 3He alternatives R&D and METRODECOM (in support to decommissioning) 
fundamentally depend and thrive on them.
International projects of this kind are anticipated for the foreseeable future, and the need of a modern
and integrated infrastructure to promote synergy and efficient operation has been recognised. The
construction of a new laboratory named INS3L (Ispra Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Standardization
Laboratory), which will house all activities and facilities under one roof has indeed been approved and
has entered the planning phase with its completion expected within 3 years.
This paper aims to describe the activities performed giving some of the most important results and
publications as well as the conceptual design of the new INS3L as a user laboratory within an
integrated approach for the benefit of all users, stakeholders, international collaborators and EU
member states in general.
2. Facilities for R&D, Testing, Benchmarking and Standardization
2.1 PERLA Laboratory for R&D and Training in Nuclear Safeguards
A substantial part of the safeguards activities performed at ITU is carried out in the PERformance
LAboratory (PERLA) at the Ispra site of JRC where Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) methods are
applied for the determination of the isotopic composition of Uranium and Plutonium by gamma
spectrometry and their masses by passive and active neutron measurements or calorimetry, used
either individually or in integrated systems. The main activities performed therein are generally related
to the:
 Assessment and performance evaluation of non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques applied to
nuclear safeguards and security.
 R&D, Testing, Calibration of safeguards instrumentation and associated Data acquisition systems
and software
 Training of Inspectors (IAEA/Euratom)
 External user laboratories for partners, member states, DG-ENER and IAEA and universities etc.
for both nuclear safeguards and nuclear security
2.1.1 Gamma measurements
Changes in the fuel cycle or new facilities continuously require new solutions for safeguards. Currently
there a number being carried out in PERLA laboratory mostly on request from either DG-ENER or IAEA
[5-11].  For instance the digital MCA-527 was studied in view of its use as a gamma and neutron
spectrometry system thus replacing old electronics [5-6]. Important contributions were also made in
PERLA for  the development of a Prototype Tomographic Spent-Fuel Detector System [8, 9].
Support to customers represents an important part of PERLA activities whereby for instance the
EURATOM measurement stations in the plutonium storages (units UP2 and UP3) in La Hague (France)
[15] were replaced and an unattended monitoring system for plutonium storage in Magnox plant (United
Kingdom) was developed.
2.1.2 Neutron Measurements
PERLA has been systematically used to train inspectors for the classical applications of active and
passive neutron counting: HLNCC, AWCC, PSMC, UNCL. The availability of well characterized nuclear
material standards (U, Pu, MOX, etc.) has also allowed performing here the calibration of most Euratom
instrumentation prior to field deployment. In addition to the support activities described above an
extensive programme of R&D has been carried out.  A number of innovative neutron counters have
been designed and built within the unit in order to overcome some inspection issues not solved by the
commercial instruments. As examples one can mention the High Efficiency Passive Counter (HEPC) for
large LEU containers in fabrication plants [17], the Scrap Neutron Multiplicity Counter (SNMC) for MOX
fuel plants [18], the can monitor for Melox [19].
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 In recent years the neutron research has focused on finding suitable alternatives to He-3 and several
replacement candidates have been investigated and tested in Ispra: boron-based (like BF3 or boron
coated proportional tubes), lithium-based (like LiZnS blades [this symposium] and Li-coated Si pads
[20]) and organic scintillators (liquid and plastic, like the LS-NCC collar developed in collaboration with
IAEA [12, 21]).
The experimental work carried out within the laboratory is often extensively associated with numerical
simulation activities using Monte Carlo methods. The nuclear security unit in Ispra has in particular
developed the MCNP-PTA code specifically dedicated to modelling neutron coincidence and multiplicity
counters [22].  This has allowed to pioneer and demonstrate the possibility to replace empirical by
numerical calibration for applications where either standards are not readily available or detectors not
easily accessible [22] for instance.
Within the unit, the performance of the various NDA counters and detectors are indeed routinely
assessed and their models validated and optimised using Monte Carlo simulations codes such as
MCNP and its extensions (MCNP-PTA, MCNP-Polimi) and  GEANT in combination with good
measurements using reference nuclear materials. Examples of such projects are characterization of a
cubic EJ-309 liquid scintillator detector [12], the calibration and Monte Carlo Modelling (MCNP) of a
fast-UNCL for the IAEA [13], and development, characterisation and Monte Carlo modelling (MCNP-
Polimi) a liquid scintillator based neutron coincidence counter for the IAEA with the PhD thesis [28].
2.1.3 Calorimetry Measurements
Calorimetry remains one of the most accurate non-destructive assay (NDA) technique for materials
containing plutonium, when combined with accurate isotopic analysis using high resolution gamma-ray
spectrometry. This is mainly due to the fact that the technique is accurate, unbiased and unaffected by
geometry and sample matrix effects due to the fact that the magnitude of the heat flux leaving the
sample container at equilibrium is not affected by the matrix. Furthermore calorimetry requires no
physical standards to represent the samples of interest. In late 90’s the JRC’s Performance Laboratory 
(PERLA) in Ispra (Italy) purchased a compact and transportable small sample calorimeter (SSCAL
model 601C) shown in Figure 1, able to accurately measure samples of Pu bearing materials
corresponding to powers of less than 20 mW with a precision better than 0.2% at 10 mW  powers.
Calorimetry technique can be used as an NDA measurement tool in order to reduce the number of
samples subjected to costly destructive analysis.
Figure 1:  Photo of the SSCAL
The SSCAL has since been extensively upgraded and tested and its performance evaluated as the
first of a new generation of plutonium calorimeters based on thermopile technology. It was used for
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 instance at the Institute of Isotopes of the Hungarian Academy of Science in Budapest for the
characterisation [23], as dictated by IAEA safeguards requirements,  of about 250 Pu-Be and Am-
Be sources that came into the country during the soviet union era mainly.  More recently, seven Am
sources produced by ITU to be used cross section measurements by the JRC-IRMM have been
measured using calorimetry in conjunction to gamma and neutron spectrometry and these
measurements were compared to declared masses measured at ITU using various means [24]. In
conjunction with calorimetry measurements in stable and controllable humidity and temperature, the
SSCAL is often used within a large (4 by 4 m) climatic chamber in our laboratory.
2.2 PUNITA for R&D in nuclear safeguards and Security
The Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA) at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra is
designed for experimental studies in NDA methods and instrumentation for nuclear safeguards and
security applications.  The facility is composed of a large graphite liner surrounding the central
sample cavity.  The (D–T) pulsed neutron generator, the sample and the scintillation detector are
located inside the sample cavity.  Various permanently installed neutron detectors are located in
and around the instrument.  The dimensions of the sample cavity are 500 mm by 500 mm by 800
mm.  This design yields a relatively high neutron flux in the cavity and provides flexibility with
respect to detector configurations.  As such PUNITA is a versatile tool for studying detection
methods although not an instrument intended for practical applications [32].
The pulsing of the neutron generator (Model A-211 from Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.) at 100 Hz is
tailored to the exponential decay of the thermal neutron flux in the sample cavity with a decay time
of about 1.0 ms.  The interrogating thermal flux peaks at about 250 µs after the 14-MeV neutron
burst.  Due to the pulsing of both the Penning ion source and the acceleration voltage this
generator model is able to produce a sharp burst of 14-MeV neutrons with absolutely no neutron
emission between bursts.  This fact together with the very short duty cycle of 0.001 of the generator
allows separation of the neutron interrogation into a “fast period” (from zero to 100 s) and a
“thermal period” (from 250µs to 9 ms).  Figure 2 shows a vertical cross section of PUNITA with the 
permanently installed neutron detectors visible.
Figure 2: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA)
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 Various collaborative projects with external partners such as CEA of France and NRCN of Israel are
carried out in the areas of nuclear safeguards and security. An example is the feasibility study of using
a pulsed neutron generator in a graphite assembly together with liquid scintillation detectors for the
detection of special nuclear materials (SNM).  In this study epi-thermal and thermal source neutrons
induce fission in fissile material present in the sample.  By means of pulse shape discrimination (PSD)
the detector signals from fast fission neutrons are easily identified among the signals from gamma rays
and the interrogating thermal neutrons. The method was found to have potential in applications for
detection of SNM in shielded containers such as air cargo containers (ULD) [33].
2.2 ITRAP for testing, benchmarking and standardisation
The ITRAP laboratories have been built in the frame of the ITRAP+10 project funded by DG HOME [1].
The purpose was to test detection equipment used in nuclear security to intercept illicit trafficking of
nuclear and radiological material at borders and other nodal points. The laboratories have been
explicitly designed in order to execute radiological performance tests of detectors and verify their
compliance with international standards (IEC, ANSI, IAEA guidelines, etc.). They are constituted from
two halls: the static and dynamic laboratory.
The ITRAP laboratory for static tests has been designed to host irradiation tests for small equipment,
such as pagers, hand-held instruments and backpacks. Typical tests performed here cover the
response to gamma/neutron sources (including single/multiple sources, bare/shielded sources, mixed
photon/beta/neutron field, high over-range fields) and time-to-alarm measurement. The laboratory is
equipped with two irradiators specifically designed by JRC for this purpose: the Gamma and Neutron
Irradiators (GNIR and NNIR), see figure 3.
The ITRAP laboratory for dynamic tests has been designed to host irradiation tests with moving
sources in order to reproduce transit situations at fixed portals or search with moving detectors. The
laboratory is placed in a large hall hosting a conveyor system placed on 30-meter long rails, see
figure 4. The conveyor can be programmed to perform multiple passages at predefined speed: typical
testing speeds are 8 km/h (2.2 m/s) for vehicular portals and 1.2 m/s for pedestrian portals, and 0.2 m/s
for handhelds (to simulate a manual scanning). A number of instruments can be placed beside the rails
and exposed to sources mounted on the conveyor passing by the detectors. The conveyor has a
vertical bar on which the source holder can be raised to the required height. In addition to the
ITRAP+10 project (now extended to phase-II) where approximately 50 units of commercial detection
instruments have been intensively tested, the laboratories have served as a basis for preliminary
evaluation of innovative and prototypic solutions, like in the SCINTILLA and MODES (both FP7)
projects  and the FLASH project (collaboration with Arktis-AWE-US/DHS/DNDO).
Figure 3: ITRAP static laboratory with irradiators
(gamma and neutron)
Figure 4: ITRAP dynamic laboratory with
conveyor  rail
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 2.4 EUSECTRA-Ispra for training in Nuclear Security
Over the last two decades, increasing security concerns with respect to illicit trafficking of nuclear and
other radioactive materials were largely acknowledged by the international community. The Joint
Research Centre was consequently tasked by the European Commission (DG HOME) to set up a
dedicated European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) as recommended by the EU
CBRN Action plan adopted by the European Council in December 2009. The aim of such training
centre is to train front line officers and their trainer on the radiation detection techniques and procedures
at borders to detect and interdict illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials.
Based on the unique combination of scientific expertise, specific technical infrastructure and availability
of a wide range of nuclear materials, long standing experience in training, the JRC Ispra established the
first pilot training centre in 2009. It require the acquisition of various type of fixed and handheld
equipment, some of them were donated by the US Department of Energy, and the establishment of
dedicated classroom and Central Alarm Systems room. Further duplicated at the JRC Karlsruhe and
designated as EUSECTRA, the training centres complement national training efforts by providing
realistic scenarios with the availability of special nuclear material. The training program offers a unique
opportunity for trainees to see and experience actual materials and commodities. This is one of the few
places in the world where a wide range of samples of plutonium and uranium of different isotopic
compositions can be used for training in detection, categorization and characterization of nuclear
material. EUSECTRA-Ispra facility (Figures 5 and 6) provides different models and type of handheld
equipment an indoor training area to simulate airport conditions, equipped with pedestrian portal
monitors and outdoor facilities with different types of radiation portal monitors to simulate land border or
port infrastructure.
The facility is used to carry training courses for various types of customers, US DoE, IAEA, DG DEVCO
under the Instrument for Stability projects, DG TAXUD, and host participants from Europe, Africa, Asia,
etc. It hosts about 15 to 20 participants per session, in English or in the participants’ language with
interpretation and syllabus translation. The EUSECTRA Ispra is hosting about 10 sessions per year
since 2009.
In addition to providing training to many customers, the facility is also available to run R&D projects to
improve the capability and performance of detection of illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear
material. A scientific exploratory research on the effect of rainfall on the performance of radiation portal
monitors, as well as a PhD research on the improvement of NORMs discrimination on radiation portal
monitors have been conducted in this facility [27].
Figure 5: use of handheld device at EUSECTRA Figure 6: use of RPM at EUSECTRA
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 3. Training and Education
The Nuclear Security Unit of the Joint Research Centre based on the Ispra site has a long standing
experience in providing education and training (E&T) to a large variety of customers and audience in
the following fields of expertise:
- Nuclear Safeguards (non-destructive analysis, containment, surveillance, sealing and
advanced verification techniques, mass/volume measurements and innovative process
monitoring): both training and academically recognized courses
- Nuclear Security (detection of and response to radioactive and nuclear material out of
regulatory control)
- Non Proliferation and Strategic Trade Control
In recent years the unit started providing training in the field of Nuclear Decommissioning and Waste
Management. This strong portfolio of E&T activities has been gradually developed and established to
support the EU and international policies. It is based on long standing technical and scientific, unique
infrastructure, laboratories and materials, and clearly identified customers’ needs. This training support 
is complementary to the unit core’s activities in Research and Development. The development of
technical solutions and their deployment in field as well the development of new measurement
techniques and safeguards approaches/methodologies necessitates an adequate training program that
can only be performed by the experts.
The NDA safeguards training, the ESARDA education course, the nuclear security trainings and the
nuclear decommissioning school are all performed on site making use of the unique set of facilities,
infrastructures, instrumentations, nuclear materials and expertise presents at the nuclear security unit in
Ispra. It is foreseen that these shall be further strengthened in the new INS3L laboratory. As an
indication, the unit has trained 266 persons in 2013, and 201 persons in 2014, in the above mentioned
fields of NDA for nuclear safeguards and nuclear security.
3.1. Nuclear Safeguards
For over thirty years, the Nuclear Security Unit has provided training to nuclear safeguards inspectors
of DG ENER and the IAEA which is essential to the proper implementation of the international
safeguards and in line with the JRC mandate to support DG ENER under the EURATOM treaty. It
covers three of the four main categories of activities of nuclear safeguards: non-destructive analysis
(gamma spectrometry and neutron counting), process monitoring and containment and surveillance.
These activities belong to the core business of the unit, being driven by this R&D and its results, i.e. the
development of new technical solutions and methodologies for the nuclear inspectors on their requests.
These solutions and instrumentation are routinely used by the inspectorates and require continuous
training.  An average of 12 weeks of safeguards courses per year are held, mostly in the Ispra site and
laboratories, and on demand also in an operational facilities abroad. All the training performed for the
IAEA inspectors is done under the EC support programme to the IAEA.  A complete description of
these courses is given at: http://npns.jrc.ec.europa.eu/web_inspector_v2/01-courses.php
Figure 7: Training of nuclear inspectors
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 In addition to this broad spectrum of technical training courses, the Nuclear Security Unit has been for
the last ten years providing the ESARDA education course for nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation,
under the umbrella of ESARDA. This unique education course can complement nuclear engineering
and other universities studies and is recognized for 3 ECTS (European Credit Transfer System). A
syllabus was published and the course is yearly run with a panel of internationally recognized experts in
the field. The course is now being duplicated outside Europe with funding from the European
Commission, DG DEVCO, with two courses for South East Asian states hosted in Malaysia in 2013 and
in Thailand in 2014 [2-4]. A complete description of the ESARDA course is given at:
https://esarda.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
Figure 8 : ESARDA course syllabus Figure 9: participants at ESARDA course
3.2. Nuclear Security
The unit has more than 5 years experience in Nuclear Security training, with a focus on detection and
response to radioactive and nuclear material out of regulatory control. The EUSECTRA training centre
pilot site has been established and inaugurated in 2009 on the Ispra site, in line with the DG HOME
2009 CBRN Action Plan recommendations. Specific infrastructures, a dedicated set of detection
instruments and curriculum syllabus has been established and developed in order to provide
specialised training to border guards, customs, advanced operators and their trainers in the field of
radiation detection techniques and response procedures [31]. This one-week training course in Ispra is
fundamentally based on hands-on exercises using genuine nuclear materials and a variety of nuclear
detection tools. Occasionally those trainings are also held in the field in a relevant setting (e.g. border
crossing points in partner country) under outreach projects funded by DG DEVCO and its Instrument
contributing to Stability and Peace and implemented by JRC. The syllabus both for Front Line Officers
training and train the trainer training has been developed and approved by the Border Monitoring
Working Group in collaboration with the IAEA and the US DoE which are both customers of the training
centre. Around 10 training courses per year are held in EUSECTRA-Ispra with about 15 participants per
5 days long session.
4. User Laboratories and International Collaborations
Many projects embarked on by the Nuclear Security Unit in Ispra provide valuable access to the
laboratories, nuclear standards and expertise on site for the benefit of manufacturers of equipment,
research laboratories, universities  and  generally member states  in their developments and research
work.  We refer to this as user laboratory herein.
PERLA in particular has over the years offered to external users easy access to nuclear material and
NDA expertise for their development work, and has welcome several workshops per year, the most
recent of which are Scintilla [16] R&D, testing and benchmark campaigns described below, the testing
and benchmarking of alternatives to 3He based neutron coincidence counting (October 2014) within a 
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 DOE-Euratom/JRC action sheet with the participation of IAEA and JAEA and finally the JRC-IAEA-
EURATOM test campaigns for the development of MCA-527.
SCINTILLA  (EC FP7 project- www.scintilla-project.eu) mentioned above  is  an example of a wide
reaching project based on usage cases and customer demands and aims to a) build an innovative and
comprehensive toolbox of devices and best-of-breed technologies for the enhanced detection and
identification of difficult-to-detect radioactive and nuclear material and b) find a reliable alternative to
3He based neutron detection systems c) offer test bed and benchmarking services at JRC laboratories
in Ispra to its partners and beyond d)  Establish the Scintilla Partnership  Network to  encourage
collaborations and synergies in the related fields, bringing together manufacturers, scientists, other EC
funded projects and thus building a strong network around nuclear security. EU partners within the
consortium are: JRC, CEA, Symetrica, INFN, FraunhoferEuskirchen, SAPHYMO, ARTTIC, IKI,) Three
benchmarking exercises and about five testing campaigns each lasting 1 to 2 intensive weeks of
measurements have been carried out based on ITRAP+10 experience in Ispra. Another FP7 project
MODES also benefited from the facilities thus cross fertilisation and sharing of experience and
knowledge.
Below is a non-exhaustive list of partners, collaborators and institutions which have benefited from the
JRC facilities in Ispra, its nuclear material, knowledge transfer and competences resulting in a number
of publications.
 IAEA + EURATOM: Neutron counter tests (running, to grant IAEA Cat A license)
 IAEA + EURATOM: Gamma spectrometer test (to grant IAEA Cat A license)
 INFN, Italy: Security and Safeguards Instruments
 University of Michigan, regularly, also with a number of students
 Los Alamos National Laboratory – detector development, calibration and testing
 CEA (France) , security instrument testing
 SAPHYMO , Italy
 NRCN Israel: numerous lab campaigns in PUNITA and PERLA (scrap counter)
 Arktis-Detectors and Polytechnic of Zurich in collaboration with DOE and AWE
 Symetrica Ltd UK R&D detection systems in nuclear safeguards and security
 FraunhoferEuskirchen: detection devices, spectrometers
 GBS Elektronik / German support programme to IAEA: Spectrometer testing
 Swedish Defence Research Agency
 University of Hamburg
 Politecnico di Milano
 STUK  (Finland) …
5. The New Integrated User Laboratory  (INS3L)  in Ispra
International projects and activities of the kind described above are anticipated for the foreseeable
future, and the need of a modern and integrated infrastructure to promote synergy and efficient
operation has been recognised. The construction of a new laboratory named INS3L (Ispra Nuclear
Safeguards, Security and Standardization Laboratory; pronounced INSEL), which will house all
activities and facilities under one roof has indeed been approved and has entered the planning phase
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 with its completion expected within three years. This section of the paper will present the conceptual
design of the new INS3L as a user laboratory within an integrated approach that shall benefit all users
and stakeholders, international partners and collaborators and EU member states in general.
The INS3L laboratory shall group the different existing nuclear facilities of the nuclear Security Unit, i.e.:
• PERLA
• ITRAP Dynamic (with a rail track for dynamic testing)
• ITRAP Static
• EUSECTRA-Ispra  (with outdoor space for radiation portal monitors)
• PUNITA instrument room (with its sealed (D,T) neutron generator) adjacent  to a
control room
• Physics laboratory which includes a 4m by 4 m climatic chamber with temperature and
humidity controls
• Offices, meeting rooms, storage areas ..
5.1 Infrastructure and capabilities
The INS3L laboratory now in its design phase (figures 8 and 9 for first draft) shall group in one
experimental hall all the existing nuclear facilities, , on a footprint of 49 m by 20 m. Adjacent to it shall
be the building which will house offices, meeting rooms and utility areas  on two floors  with a footprint
of 20 m by 16 m . The total functional area shall be about 1300 m2. EUSECTRA-Ispra shall have an 
outdoor training area viewable from the inside room through large glass windows.
The laboratory shall continue the activities presently carried out in the different nuclear areas the
NUSEC unit, both for nuclear safeguards and nuclear security i.e.:
1. R&D in NDA techniques applied to nuclear safeguards and nuclear security
2. Scientific/Technical support to ENER/IAEA and member states
3. Instruments testing, validation and standardization
4. Monte Carlo simulation and modeling combined with measurements
5. Training of inspectors  in nuclear safeguards
6. Training of Front Line officers (FLO)  and Train the Trainer of FLO in nuclear security and
detection
The laboratory INS3L will not only house activities currently carried out but will also reinforce itself as a
“user laboratory” with easy access to nuclear material for guests and trainees, which in many way it has
been. This will be further facilitated and ensured by the fact that only sealed sources with a low level of
radiation emission and the low inventory of nuclear material, compared to other nuclear facilities which
in addition usually host open radioactive and nuclear materials as well.
It is also intended to integrate new tasks and activities such as addressing the important
standardization for detection instruments in nuclear security. The Integration of nuclear and non-nuclear
laboratories e.g. PERLA and AS3ML (Advanced safeguards Measurements, Monitoring and Modelling
Laboratory)  of  Figure 10  will be take an important place whilst the RADAR / iRAP/ iRAP evaluation
course for DG ENER will go ahead. Integration of methods will also be sought as the laboratories may
deliver integrated solutions e.g. for the supervision of the first final repository in the world at Onkalo in
Finland. Furthermore, the staff experience shall be used beyond the laboratory work e.g. in outreach
and training activities initiative and in addressing new policy requirements and needs.
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 Figure 8:   Perspective view of INS3L
Figure 9: General schematic layout of the INS3L
3: SS 
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 Figure 10: Schematic layout of the Advanced safeguards Measurements, Monitoring and Modelling
Laboratory
6. Summary
It was shown that a large array of R&D programmes in non-destructive analysis (NDA) methods and
instrumentation, testing and benchmarking of detection systems, user accessibility to laboratories and
reference material, together with a comprehensive training programme exist at JRC’s Nuclear Security 
Unit in Ispra (Italy) for the benefit European Commission DG’s, the IAEA, EU research institutions, EU 
member states and many international partners. The unit shall continue to play its important role in
international nuclear safeguards and nuclear security as demonstrated by the JRC’s plan to build a new
modern and integrated infrastructure on the Ispra Site, namely the INS3L laboratory building which will
house all activities and facilities under one roof thus promoting synergy and efficient operation of all
activities. The integration of INS3L with the newly setup AS3ML laboratory will be particularly beneficial.
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Abstract: 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is constructing four nuclear power reactors that are slated to become 
operational in 2017, expediting the first completely new nuclear energy program in over 25 years. Yet, 
before the reactors have even been connected to the grid, popular discourse already refers to the Emirati 
program as the ‘Gold Standard’ despite its checkered history on nonproliferation and export control issues. 
Indeed, construction of the UAE nuclear program may be outpacing its regulatory infrastructure in two 
regards:  
First, despite signing the 123 Agreement with the United States, among numerous other accords, the 
UAE’s continued reliance on an original Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) holds a number of Subsidiary 
Arrangements in abeyance and does not allow for IAEA inspections or oversight until it receives its first 
reactor fuel load or until a defined ‘significant quantity’ of nuclear material is imported.  
Second, there are still concerns stemming from disjointed export control authorities operating within the 
Emirates. Although some progress has been made since the UAE first implemented trade controls in 
2007, its ability to effectively regulate export controls is jeopardized by the lack of formalized coordination 
between its domestic regulatory authorities.  
Indeed, these considerations do not suggest a lack of commitment on behalf of the Emirates. Certainly, 
the UAE has signed onto every major international treaty dealing with nonproliferation issues and 
continues to receive assistance from multinational entities such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and members of the European Union, setting a high precedent for completeness and verification of its 
program. Further, the UAE also maintains strong ties on technical cooperation with countries such as the 
United States and South Korea.  
Above all, however, additional confidence-building measures could still be adopted to strengthen the 
Emirati legal and export control framework, therein bolstering international safeguards and ensuring that 
the UAE lives up to its ‘gold standard’ title before the 2017 deadline. In doing so, the Emirates would 
certainly serve as an example to other aspiring nuclear states and signal to the world that Abu Dhabi fits 
the bill of the model state. 
Keywords: safeguards; export controls; United Arab Emirates; nonproliferation; gold standard 
1. Introduction
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is on a fast track to acquiring four nuclear power reactors, expediting a 
robust nuclear energy program that is slated to go live in 2017. When the four planned reactors are 
connected to the grid in 2020, the UAE will become the second state in the region to maintain nuclear 
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 energy capabilities after Iran. It will also be the first new nuclear newcomer state in more than a quarter of 
a century. Though, years before the program has gone live, popular discourse already routinely refers to 
the Emirati nuclear energy program as a ‘Gold Standard’ or ‘model state’ for other aspiring newcomer 
nuclear energy states. In academic spheres, this special status is afforded to the UAE due to its strictly 
negotiated 123 Agreement, where the Emirates agreed to forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities (ENR) in exchange for technical assistance. Yet, this widely held and popular view ignores a 
number of historical factors that have previously hindered the UAE’s ability to effectively mitigate 
proliferation concerns within its own borders, a fear that is only furthered by an underdeveloped legal 
infrastructure and nascent export controls – these two concerns often remain underappreciated.  
In 2008, nonproliferation expert George Perkovich noted “the effects of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
‘nuclear program’ will be ambiguous and muddled, at least for the 10-15 years it would take to develop 
basic capabilities.” [1] In the same year, the Emirates declared its intentions to pursue its ambitious, yet 
peaceful nuclear energy program. Staying true to its word, the Emirates is pushing forward on its nuclear 
agenda with record speed and will achieve its program in just under a decade. To date, the Emirati 
program has remained on schedule and the international community remains assured that it will meet its 
2017 deadline. Indeed, nuclear material could be shipped to the Emirates as early as next year for reactor 
test runs, though its nuclear regulatory framework is currently incomplete. Be that as it may, there appears 
to be a critical lack of legislative, technical, and political infrastructure that impedes the UAE’s ability to 
effectively safeguard its nuclear program and could potentially open the door to proliferation if left 
unaddressed.  
As the UAE is slated to become the first wholly new nuclear program in more than 27 years, more must be 
done to ensure that the Emirates is readily equipped to manage its program safely before its reactors go 
live. In this paper, the Emirati framework is predominantly explored from two perspectives. First, the 
soundness and completeness of safeguards are carefully evaluated alongside its legal code. Second, the 
UAE export control regime and its commerce control mechanisms to thwart potential diversion are 
assessed. Also examined to a lesser extent is the federal regulatory framework that oversees 
development of the nuclear program. Fundamentally, it is imperative for the UAE to secure a solid 
programmatic and regulatory foundation before the first reactor goes live in 2017.  
In order to signal to the world that Abu Dhabi is ready to fit the bill of the ‘model state,’ additional 
confidence building measures could be adopted to strengthen its legal and export control framework, 
bolstering international safeguards in the process and ensuring that the UAE remains the ‘gold standard’: 
First, the UAE could rescind its current unmodified, original Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) in favor of a 
modified SQP. Generally, an SQP is administered by the IAEA to countries with minimal to no nuclear 
activity and is a required addendum under any signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, holding a 
significant number of safeguards measures in abeyance. As the Emirates looks to become a notable 
player in the nuclear energy field, rescinding its original SQP would force it to develop a robust state 
systems for accounting and control (SSACs), among other necessary measures. Indeed, few states still 
adhere an original SQP, and the exposure of loopholes within this accord has rattled the international 
community before. Of course, if the UAE were to move to the modified SQP, more strict measures would 
be implemented before introduction of nuclear material into the country, in addition to pushing the UAE to 
develop better reporting capabilities under the Additional Protocol (AP) and subsequent state system for 
accounting and control of nuclear materials.  
Second, the Emirates should formalize and nationally implement a comprehensive export controls list to 
expand its strategic trade controls systems. This move would inform responders and allow professionals 
working on these issues to accurately manage materials moving in and out of ports. Further, developing 
‘Measures of Success’ could be expanded to evaluate progress of its export controls measures, a system 
that would effectively monitor, protect, and report the movement of sensitive technologies. As of now, the 
country loosely adheres to the EU export control list, yet this has not been formally published nor uniformly 
implemented across the seven Emirates. 
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Third, there are a large number of non-indigenous experts currently working the UAE, though the Emirates 
intends to push its program to be fully indigenous in the future. The number of employees dedicated to the 
program is also expected to swell in coming years. Its latest internal International Advisory Board report 
suggested that the number of employees would double from its current levels to meet the gap. [2] 
However, until that goal is realized, the Emirates could improve its regulatory framework by training 
workers, more clearly defining roles of its numerous regulatory institutions, in addition to expanding its 
consultations with international experts and multinational export control regimes.  
Finally, the most recent Safeguards Implementation Report for 2013 produced by the IAEA goes to show 
that a broader conclusion for the country has not yet been drawn and integrated safeguards have not been 
implemented. [3] While the two-year deadline before its four reactors are slated to go live is not an official 
date put forth by the UAE to have all of these measures in place, it would be wise for Abu Dhabi to secure 
a robust legal and export controls framework before nuclear material is introduced to the country or its 
reactors are connected to the grid sometime between late 2016 and 2017. 
1.1 The Bid for Nuclear Power 
By most standards, the UAE is an energy rich country, though its resources stem largely from two primary 
sources – upwards of 98% of Emirati energy consumption draws from oil and gas sources alone. While 
these two assets have secured the UAE a sizeable wallet and steadfast seat as a major energy player, its 
recent wealth and population growth has led the country to become not only a major energy producer, but 
also a large energy consumer. Further, its energy requirements will continue to expand rapidly over the 
coming years; while the country is rich with natural gas and produced 90.6 billion kWh of power in 2009, 
there is very little energy diversity to accommodate future needs. Further, nearly all its domestic electrical 
generation currently stems from natural gas resources, an increasing amount of which must be imported 
from neighboring countries. As it turns out, “projected escalating electricity demand [in the UAE will grow] 
from 15.5GWe in 2008 to over 40GWe in 2020, with natural gas supplies sufficient for only half of this.” [4] 
While its current consumption rests at about 19GWe, UAE electrical demand is slated to grow by 9% 
annually. With needs rapidly growing, the move will shift the Emirates away from a baseload of fossil fuels 
and towards a more low-carbon future as nuclear and renewables are added in the fold. 
In 2008, the UAE decided to pursue an ambitious nuclear program to diversify its energy mix to combat 
these rising needs. Primarily, nuclear power would serve as a source of baseload power generation, or 
minimum power requirements, allowing the Emirates to rely less on imported gas and the use of its own 
reserves, which could be exported at a much higher price. In the region, burning conventional fossil fuels 
such as gas and oil is still the primary way to produce electricity. Yet, burning conventional fossil fuels is 
inefficient, expensive, and releases high amounts of CO2 emissions. On the other hand, nuclear power 
plants harness the power of the atom by converting heat into steam that then drives a turbine, which is 
also typically hooked up to a generator to create an output of electricity. Though, the UAE was not the only 
power in the region to openly declare the move towards nuclear in recent years – alongside the Emirati 
decision followed public calls for the pursuit of nuclear power by the following regional countries: Bahrain, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. [5] 
Initially, the Emirates had hoped to use nuclear power as a baseload electricity source, allowing the 
country to export more of its domestic resources and sell oil and gas commodities for a higher price to 
maximize potential profits of its natural resources. In short, the pursuit of nuclear power was initially done 
to fill the energy gap between the UAE’s rising levels of gas and oil consumption, while also increasing 
renewables investments alongside nuclear as its domestic demand continue to grow. As of now, the 
Emirates celebrate nuclear power as a reliable and clean source of energy with a long-term guaranteed 
supply of electricity in addition to much needed water desalination for its inhabitants.  
The UAE is looking to diversify its domestic energy supply and is the first country to break ground on a 
new nuclear energy program since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Though, the playing field between 
nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states has changed dramatically since that time. Surely, 
the UAE would have to secure support from the United States, and the initial push for the bilateral 123 
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Agreement was mired in Washington politics, though several public campaigns allowed the Emirates to 
leverage key stakeholders in the US. Some of the largest players in the US nonproliferation realm, 
including William Cohen, the former US Secretary of Defense, and Sam Nunn, former US Senator and Co-
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), pushed for the US to sign the 
deal through a piece titled ‘Nuclear cooperation with UAE in our interest,’ also showcasing support for the 
strict conditions of 123. [6] As such, the agreement looked to restrict the sensitive nature of the full nuclear 
fuel cycle from mining to reprocessing – several steps of which can be repurposed to produce potentially 
dangerous fissile materials used in nuclear weapons – and pushed the UAE to forfeit any right to domestic 
uranium enrichment and reprocessing through the hailed ‘123 Agreement’ or ‘Gold Standard’ nuclear 
cooperation agreement between the two countries. The agreement was signed in 2009.  
While the 123 Agreement set a high precedent for the US Congress and potential future agreements with 
other aspiring nuclear energy countries, other newcomer countries are not necessarily required to adhere 
to such hard-and-fast measures, rendering the Emirati accord inherently discriminatory. Yet, the UAE 
program is also distinguished for its negotiated ‘Agreed Minute,’ where conditions of the bilateral US-UAE 
123 agreement was set as a precedent for any future nuclear agreements in the Middle East region. 
Indeed, the UAE maintains the right to renegotiate the terms of its 123 Agreement should any regional 
power be granted the ability to engage in processes that handle or convert uranium to be used as a 
reactor fuel. To this end, the United States has negotiated other 123 agreements with a number of other 
countries including Vietnam and India that did not have to sign onto such stringent preconditions, but the 
US has yet to settle similar accords with others in the region. 
Through the 123 Agreement, the UAE agreed to a number of concessions on its program and remains a 
strong champion of nuclear power to meet its domestic energy needs. And while refocusing efforts to 
export its own gas resources for profit, the Emirates should ensure that its upcoming atomic energy 
program is able to meet international nuclear regulation standards before its first reactor goes live. It goes 
without saying that its emerging program should be regulated with the highest level of safeguards and 
export controls to mitigate any legal or verification challenges that may arise. All this rings especially true 
for a newcomer state, as other states aspire to join the nuclear energy ranks have typically built up 
programs over the course of several decades to establish an adequate framework in support of a nuclear 
energy program – in contrast, the entirety of the UAE program will likely be completed in the timeframe of 
a decade or less. 
Table 1: Timeline of the projected UAE nuclear program. 
In 2009, France, the United States, and Russia were all eager to sell nuclear technologies to the UAE 
following its initial nuclear bid, with France and the South Korea ascending to the final round for the 
tender. In January 2010, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) consortium was selected by the 
UAE to construct the first four commercial nuclear reactors and will provide construction, commissioning, 
and fuel security in addition to near full oversight of regulation of the program that will be located at 
Barakah. The site is situated on the coast of the Gulf, about 300 miles west of Abu Dhabi and near the 
border of Saudi Arabia. The reactor site would operate at a capacity of over 90% to provide baseload 
power to the UAE with a lifespan of a projected 60 years. [7] The initial bid for the four reactors was set at 
$20 billion, a move largely welcomed by the nuclear community and especially for the South Koreans, as 
KEPCO seeks to make an example of this site as the first export of Korean reactor technology abroad. 
The move will certainly leverage a foot in the door of the nuclear power industry, leading the Republic Of 
Korea (ROK) to become an exporter of nuclear technologies for the first time. [8] 
2008	  	  US-­‐UAE	  MOU	  on	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Cooperation	  Signed	   2009	  123	  Agreement	  Entry	  Into	  Force	   2012	  Construction	  on	  1st	  Reactor	  Starts	   DEADLINE:	  2017	  First	  Reactor	  Live	  (Expected)	  
2020	  Four	  Reactors	  Live	  &	  Connected	  to	  Grid	  (Expected)	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Similarly, in 2010, the US based Lightbridge Corporation entered the stage to assist aspiring nuclear 
newcomer countries by manufacturing programmatic roadmaps that would outline the steps to securing a 
peaceful nuclear energy future, primarily with aspirations to cater to members of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) market. In particular, the United Arab Emirates gladly moved forward with the deal, 
allowing Lightbridge Corporation to develop a comprehensive nuclear roadmap for the Emirati program. 
Lightbridge pulled together experts and consultants to aid these countries to develop strategies from 
planning to implementation stages of the Emirati framework. The company agreed to provide guidance on 
issues ranging from site assessment to fuel security, among other stipulations to help develop the 
emerging nuclear power to become the ‘Gold Standard.’ Lightbridge currently assists with capacity 
building and regulatory affairs. [9] 
It should be noted however, that selecting the bidders and signing deals is the first series of events that 
must take place before construction is even allowed to begin. Following any initial bid, there are a number 
of site selection processes that are necessary for new projects looking to build up nuclear power. 
Summarized, the process is as follows: 
Table 2: Necessary steps for nuclear power program. 
For any aspiring nuclear state, first, there is an economic feasibility study to gauge rough estimates of the 
cost of a reactor. Further, contractors often perform full economic and feasibility assessments at this time. 
This incudes a thorough breakdown of payback periods, internal rate of return, levelized cost of energy, 
debts, equity, among other calculations. Following this, the environmental impact assessment is 
characterized by two aspects, the first being financial which typically includes impact assessments over 
the complete lifecycle of the reactors and evaluates the payback period, emissions, energy expenditure, 
and more. Further, the Greenhouse Gas Emissions lifecycle, calculated in tonnes of CO2 equivalent per 
MW, is also factored. It is only after all this extensive, preliminary work that construction is able to 
commence. 
Construction on the first commercial reactor in the Emirates began in July 2012, with work beginning on 
the second reactor in May 2013. [10] The Emirati Federal Authority granted approval for construction of 
the third and fourth reactors under the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) in September 
2014. [11] The first reactor upon completion will, however, need to be tested at full power before it is 
connected to the grid. Generally speaking, these test runs include power levels and criticality trials, which 
are conducted a full four to six months before the reactor is live. First, completely fresh fuel is introduced 
to the core to ensure that the reactor is safe to run before the reactor is hooked to the power supply grid 
and to ensure that there are no malfunctions. The process includes running the reactors at different power 
levels and different criticalities, allowing potential poisons in the fuel such as Xe-135 to be bred out and set 
the baseline behavior for the reactor. Starting up the nuclear reactor for this type would typically take 
about two weeks, or potentially require more time in the case of initial startup. In essence, these pilot runs 
are done to test the power grid and ensure that the power generation is grid-compatible. Not conducting 
such tests would run huge risks that could have an enormous detrimental effect on the grid, resulting in a 
power surge that would likely lead to an outage or potential damage to the grid as a whole. [12] Tests of 
Phase	  I:	  Preconstruction	  Phase	  
1.	  Site	  Selection	  2.	  Feasibility	  Study	  3. Environmental	  ImpactAssessment	  
Phase	  II:	  Construction	  
Ongoing	  construction	   Phase	  III:	  Operation	  Phase	  1.	  Fuel	  introduced	  to	  facilty	  2. 6	  months	  of	  testing3.	  Reactor(s)	  connected	  to	  the	  grid	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this nature are carried out in order to evaluate the reactor stresses in terms of its ability to handle thermal 
and structural strains with the introduction of immense amounts of heat stemming from the reactors.  
Tying all this to the timeline of the UAE nuclear program, there are implications that nuclear material could 
be introduced to the Barakah facility as early as late 2016 before its first reactor is officially declared as 
‘live’ or connected to the grid in 2017. The tests are not exclusive to any particular nuclear reactor 
technology, but are applicable to the most common of reactors. In this case, it refers to Pressurized Water 
Reactors, including the APR1400 to be used in the Emirati program. While tests are inherently a time 
consuming process the time to import or transport these materials and prepare the reactors are likely 
already being factored into the Emirati timeline.  
The first 1400-MWe plant is expected to go live in 2017, with electricity being sold and distributed by the 
Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority. Additional reactors are expected to join the grid one-by-one 
annually in subsequent years, with all four reactors becoming operational by 2020 to provide electricity 
and meet domestic and regional needs. Furthermore, initial fuel and fuel reload commitments are 
supposedly guaranteed for a number of years through its prime contract negotiated with the South Korean 
contingency. Regulation authorities will largely be delegated to KEPCO in conjunction with the Emirates 
Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC).  
1.2 Potential for ‘Nuclear Diversion’ 
Since 2009, when the United Arab Emirates made the decision to pursue nuclear power, a great deal of 
effort has gone into developing the necessary regulatory bodies and export control authorities alongside 
construction of the reactors. And while the UAE has done much to counter proliferation risks to date, 
construction is moving along quickly. The program remains in relatively early stages, yet it appears 
construction may be outpacing regulation. In the past, Dubai, the largest trading port in the UAE has 
proliferated sensitive technologies as far reaching as Iran, Pakistan, and other states.   
The notorious A.Q. Khan (Abdul Qadeer Khan) – also known as the father of the Pakistani bomb – was 
one of the most prominent agents of proliferation in the late twentieth century. His personal network 
manipulated the export regimes network to pass along sensitive materials to a number of outside actors 
with ease. Khan serves as the most prominent example of both the UAE and international community’s 
failure to oversee and control a swelling transshipment network. In this particular case, Khan had used 
Free Trade Zones (FTZs) across the Emirates to transfer illicit materials, while all activities were 
conducted through a legitimate front company based in the Emirate of Dubai. For years, the company 
operated as a hub of illicit transactions and was a primary shipping point for a number of sensitive 
materials. In the wake of the Khan episode, the UAE was pressured by the international community to 
ramp up its export controls and create a comprehensive framework to regulate these issues. Yet even as 
recently as 2013, a US citizen “allegedly made a variety of false statements on shipper's export 
declaration forms” and used “his New York company to illegally export carbon fiber (which has nuclear 
applications in uranium enrichment as well as applications in missiles) from the United States” to other 
countries such as China, demonstrating that all transfers of sensitive materials are impossible to 
circumvent entirely, but additional steps could still be taken to thwart such activities. [13]  
The UAE’s checkered track record on export controls was brought up before congress during the 
negotiations of the 123 Agreement. And in order to push through the legislation, strict measures regulating 
the nuclear program were placed on the Emirates in order to win the favor and support of those in office 
involved on the matter. [14] Though, following the passing of the 123 in 2009, there has been little follow-
up in the adoption and implementation of the clear stipulations made in the agreement. Most of the 
pressure placed on Abu Dhabi simply disappeared after 2010. 
Meanwhile, South Korea’s KEPCO is slated to bear a large brunt of the responsibility for export controls 
under its negotiated exporter “conditions of supply,” yet these informal codes do not remove greater UAE 
responsibility to regulate sensitive technologies that move through its borders. Further, language within the 
123 document notes that the United Arab Emirates would be held solely responsible for any diversion of 
goods and technology moving through its borders and moreover, is expected to uphold due diligence of 
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any nuclear related programmatic endeavor. Also, according to the UAE’s negotiated INFCIRC//622 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, it is stipulated in Article 15 that “the United Arab Emirates and the 
Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this 
Agreement.” [15] Under its International Transfers Article 90, it quotes that “nuclear material subject or 
required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement which is transferred internationally shall, for 
purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of the United Arab Emirates.” At the 
very least, this agreement dictates that it is the responsibility of the “contractual nation” to safeguard 
technology and circumvent potential leakage of technical know-how. In this case, responsibility falls on the 
United Arab Emirates. [16] Yet, it is also the responsibility of the international community as well to thwart 
potential challenges and refocus resources to overcome challenges posed by shadow networks. 
With ongoing development on its nuclear energy program, the UAE is now afforded a full-fledged legal and 
legitimate capacity in which to operate with sensitive materials, granting the country certain privileges in 
the arenas of nuclear sales and transshipments. Certainly, Abu Dhabi will have to do everything in its 
power to thwart diversion. It must be clearly stated, however, that there is no insinuation that the United 
Arab Emirates is pursuing anything aside from a peaceful program. When dealing with proliferation risks in 
any new nuclear program, there are usually two types of perils to be aware of in the traditional school of 
non-proliferation thought. Yet, the UAE program presents a different type of proliferation that is discussed 
further below.  
In nonproliferation literature, the possibilities of vertical and horizontal proliferation are often examined. 
Yet, vertical proliferation refers to states that already possess nuclear weapons or delivery capacities and 
are actively looking to increase the domestic stockpile or improve existing technical capabilities, growing 
upwards and onwards internally. The UAE case deviates from this vertical proliferation definition insofar 
that the Emirates has no preexisting technical know-how or nuclear capability, but instead are looking to 
acquire an entirely new program for energy purposes only. Horizontal proliferation refers to governments 
that make an active decision to proliferate already developed nuclear capabilities to other states, 
expanding the greater nuclear regime whether for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes. The threat of 
diversion or illicit activities is worrisome for the United Arab Emirates, as it has historically served as a 
massive transit hub for regional nuclear ambitions in the past where dangerous materials were diverted to 
notorious programs in Syria, Iran, and more. [17] While the Emirates continue to make moves and hedge 
against proliferation or illicit transfers within its borders, much more must be done to mitigate this 
challenge. 
Ultimately, the UAE remains separated from these two schools of thought. Instead, it would be more 
useful to explore the uniqueness of the United Arab Emirates case, which departs from traditional 
discourse concerning vertical and horizontal proliferation, especially as the program is intended to be 
entirely peaceful by nature. Instead, the United Arab Emirates houses a third, arguably new type of risk in 
the nonproliferation community where a ‘nuclear cover’ could potentially support detrimental activities 
without the bidding of the government. In this case, the program is moving beyond the dichotomy of 
vertical and horizontal risks posed by states, whereas in the UAE, illegal transshipments can now take 
place without government involvement due to potential loopholes in regulation and infrastructure. While 
the UAE is more of a special case, where its government does not necessarily seek to proliferate, weak 
export controls could still facilitate the transfer of sensitive materials including dual-use components 
without the consent or knowledge of the Emirati government. This type of risk instead deals with the 
likelihood of diversion of materials and ongoing, transshipment issues that could aid external proliferation 
on an international level. Further, this type of proliferation addresses its domestic legal mechanisms that 
are currently insufficient to effectively deal with illicit diversion and could potentially serve as a cover for 
unintended proliferation activities. The greater fear lays in the fact that a legitimate UAE nuclear ‘cover’ 
may lead to other unexpected and illicit activities by nongovernmental actors that could undermine the 
effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime. In short, loopholes in the legal framework could serve as a 
cover for proliferation activities.  
Certainly, Emirati leaders have taken strides to deter proliferation within its borders over the last decade. 
However, ongoing loopholes in its legal codes and export controls can be leveraged to facilitate the 
transfer of sensitive materials or technical know-how, presenting a new type of proliferation that falls 
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outside the realms of vertical and horizontal proliferation. It instead poses a risk insofar as it is a 
newcomer program that could provide legitimate ‘nuclear cover’ under which diversion or proliferation may 
be leveraged, yet not necessarily by the will or consent of the state. This emerging hazard presents a 
fresh issue for the nonproliferation community, particularly those who still look to preserve the 
nonproliferation regime and combat nuclear mishandling. In order to hedge against these risks, the UAE 
will need to develop its ability to follow-up on potential abuses through rigid export controls and expansive 
safeguards in order to be hailed as a success story. This is especially so if it looks to serve as an example 
to other nuclear energy bids and upstarting programs.  
Indeed, its acquisition of nuclear capabilities and technical know-how is coupled with significant 
responsibility to hedge against potential avenues of vertical and horizontal proliferation that may arise 
within its program. It is important to note that while the UAE program does not appear to pose immediate 
threats, programs of this nature are inherently risky. The following points will examine if the current legal 
and export control framework is strong enough to mitigate these concerns. In the past, the UAE has failed 
to successfully combat sensitive materials transit through its borders – and so, can the international 
community accept UAE’s rhetoric to translate to commitment and this commitment to action in order to 
narrow any possibility of a ‘commitment-compliance gap,’ as first described by Dr. Bryan Early at the 
Harvard Belfer Center. [18] As of now, while the UAE has made strides to combat proliferation, its 
domestic legislation is still lacking and could be exploited to transfer or divert sensitive technologies. With 
that, before the nuclear program is set to go live, the UAE and broader international community must 
further develop its ability to thwart potential diversion of materials by bolstering legislation and training.  
Working against this type of diversion would be in the favor of the Emirates – there is nothing to gain by 
allowing these materials to find their way into the hands of actors that should not have them, as issues 
regarding non-state actors, terrorists, among other entities still present very real concerns. 
1.3. Overcoming Adversary 
The Emirates has numerous hurdles to overcome in order to quell safety and security concerns in order to 
push it to model state status. Controlling international trade and access to strategic items is certainly no 
easy feat. Proliferators are constantly working to get around official measures in order to carry out illicit 
activities. Such actors seek access to controlled items using alternative suppliers or shipping routes and 
multiple transshipment points, going as far as to falsify papers or use front companies to facilitate 
diversion of sensitive items. The UAE and international community must continue to be ahead of 
proliferators. Dual-use items are of particular concern, as production of these weapons is much harder to 
follow whether used legitimately or for indigenous production of weapons.  
According to the IAEA, the official definition of safeguards applied in the field is described as a mechanism 
to deter proliferation. The goal is to first help states build up assurances that the application of nuclear 
power programs is credible and honors international obligations. To take this a step further, states should 
be able to detect potential misuse of nuclear technologies, including the use of inspections, verifications, 
and other physical mechanisms to deter tampering. [19] Export controls (or commerce control), on the 
other hand, looks to constrain and manage sensitive materials through an efficient and streamlined 
service. Commonly, export controls refer to regulation of sensitive or dual-use technologies through 
extensive licensing procedures and limiting use of these technologies. The goals are to strengthen 
collective security, limit access to potentially dangerous materials, ensure compliance with international 
standards, and prevent such materials ending up in the hands of potentially harmful end-users. In the 
UAE, the challenge of both safeguards and export controls rest in the ability to effectively identify, follow, 
and subsequently prosecute violations of strategic trade controls. 
In the field, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (more commonly referred to as the 
Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT), is often championed as the ‘central or grand bargain’ where “non-nuclear-
weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange 
agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at 
the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” [20] On another note, the UAE became party to the NPT 
in 1995, the last country in the region to sign onto the accord just 25 years after its inception. While it had 
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 signed onto the non-aligned movement in 1970, it is not clear why there was such a disparity in signing 
onto the NPT. 
Internationally, all states party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are guaranteed the right to peaceful 
uses of nuclear technologies. In particular, aspiring nuclear energy states such as the Emirates is 
guaranteed the right to develop and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The specific language 
under the text of the NPT includes:  
Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes without discrimination.  
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy… 
According to the above text, the Emirates is guaranteed the right to develop a nuclear energy program for 
peaceful purposes. And yet, also stipulated by the NPT is the obligation of the Emirates to conclude and 
apply all relevant safeguards measures in order to ensure rightful operation of its nuclear energy 
framework. 
Article III: Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the 
application of its safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities 
and to prevent diversion of such material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
[21]  
And so, conversely, the UAE is required to adhere to all concluded agreements with the IAEA. In recent 
years, the Emirates is certainly on track to developing comprehensive safeguards and a framework to 
combat potential diversion. Through the 123 Agreement and other accords, the UAE has already signaled 
good faith to the international community by foregoing both front end and back end processing abilities 
that could be repurposed or diverted for obtaining weapons grade uranium and plutonium. These two 
sides of the fuel cycle pose significant dangers and proliferation challenges. Yet, even stronger 
countermeasures on strategic trade fronts will be necessary to secure the proper legal foundation and 
export controls processes that will be necessary to regulating materials of its emerging nuclear energy 
program before 2017. 
1.4. Current Regulatory Mechanisms in Place – Is it Enough? 
There is much ground to cover on the Emirati program, though an analysis of projected proliferation risks 
within the Emirati nuclear energy program would be incomplete without a thorough examination of the 
many institutions at play and greater legal framework. A closer look at the UAE’s current legal capabilities 
will be surveyed, in addition to examining the Emirates’ historical role as a procurement transit point for 
clandestine nuclear programs. 
International institutions that interact with Emirati regulators and key domestic players are the two groups 
that are building up the nuclear framework. Beyond this, a number of global institutions and several 
governments work in tandem with Abu Dhabi to tackle potential illicit trafficking, diversions of materials and 
other hindrances to the nonproliferation agenda. In the UAE specifically, the main players include the 
following: 
a. Relationships with International Institutions
Since the decision to pursue nuclear power, the United Arab Emirates continues to work with a number of 
countries and international organizations to build up its domestic capacity. Along these lines, it would be 
wise for the UAE to leverage its many bilateral and multilateral relationships to bolster domestic Emirati 
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regulatory mechanisms. Engagements with the United States government alone are plentiful. The 
Emirates holds partnerships with the Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) & International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), 
Department Of State (DOS) including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) & Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) & Export Control & Related Border Security (EXBS) & Partnership for Nuclear Security 
(PNS), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), among other organizations, all have a hand in engaging 
and training UAE personnel through a number of channels. [22] Yet, many of these engagements remain 
largely ceremonial in nature. 
Institution Description Status of Organization 
International Atomic 
Energy Agency 
Primary contact of engagement for developing 
safeguards, adopting comprehensive 
regulations, heading verification efforts and 
providing technical assistance 
Active, mostly after 
sufficient nuclear 
material is introduced 





Primary US contact as a basis institution of 
engagement, advancing safeguards, ensuring 
effective implementation of SSACs 
Active, intermittent 
annual updates 
United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC)  
International regulator, offers legal structure to 
track sensitive materials and implement 
effective export controls 
Active, largely removed 
from direct UAE 
engagement 
International Framework 
for Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation 
Partnership to expand nuclear energy “for 
peaceful purposes proceeds in a manner that 
is efficient, safe, secure, and supports non-
proliferation and safeguards” [23] 
Active, largely 
ceremonial 
Table 3: International engagements on UAE nuclear program, (not to be ignored are partnerships with EU and other 
countries). 
b. Domestic Regulators
Within the UAE, there are a number of domestic institutions that oversee law making, regulation and 
implementation of the Emirati nuclear program. In parallel with international standards, countries typically 
establish one law-making institution and one technical agency to oversee the program. In particular, there 
are two primary federal authorities working with these issues, FANR and ENEC. These two continue to be 
the major regulatory players in regards to building up and enforcing effective laws governing the nuclear 
energy program, though a number of other partnerships and implementation organizations remain in 
operation across the country and are more opaque in nature. Further, the absence of a clearly defined 
agenda or role for these numerous ‘secondary organizations’ housed in country may eventually become 
distractive and ultimately counterproductive to regulation of the program and the overall nonproliferation 
agenda. 
Following the release of Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development 
of Peaceful Nuclear Energy, the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) was established largely 
as a nuclear regulatory and lawmaking body. Its operations include departments dealing with Nuclear 
Safety, Security, Radiation Safety, Safeguards and Education & Training. By most milestones FANR is the 
most established institution working on nuclear issues in the Emirates, as it writes the legislation and 
clarifies rules on regulatory matters concerning the nuclear energy program. Its legislation is broken down 
into two facets: regulations and regulatory guides, regulations that govern safeguards and legal matters 
while regulatory guides are pertinent to operators or regulation of respective nuclear facilities.  Though, 
most all safeguards and relevant legal measures are currently encompassed in Regulation on the Export 
and Import Control of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Related Items and Nuclear Related Dual-Use Items 
(FANR-REG-09) and the Regulation for the System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material and 
Application of Additional Protocol (FANR-REG-10), both produced by FANR. [24] These two accords put 
forth the necessary steps for licensing and providing the scope for the proper paperwork to work with 
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sensitive materials – on the greater FANR website, there is an FAQ section that allows the public to 
access information on potentially hazardous nuclear materials, even those relating to medical or research 
purposes via a series of official, published Regulations and Regulatory Guides. In operation, FANR will 
require import permits at the initial phase through the executive office. Yet, because FANR serves 
primarily as a lawmaking institution, its counterpart, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, was 
created in tandem to implement the legal code into practice. 
In 2009, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) was also founded in Abu Dhabi after signing of 
the UAE Federal Law Regarding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (Federal Law by Decree No 6 of 
2009). ENEC oversees deployment and technical operation of the nuclear power plants in conjunction with 
the primary contractor, KEPCO. It operates on the federal level and works on strategic partnerships and 
engagements both domestically and abroad work to develop and ensure the civilian Emirati nuclear 
program aligns with the projected infrastructural scheme and nuclear framework of the UAE. The duties of 
ENEC ranges across many spectrums: communication with the public, developing the educational 
strategy and planning for the energy needs, decisions on investments related to the program, among other 
needs. [25] Its official and stated corporate values include; Safety, Integrity, Transparency and Efficiency, 
which, interestingly are also the same vision and core values that are reflected in FANR – yet, changes 
could be on the horizon as the UAE President recently reshuffled the board of directors. [26] Looking to 
exact safety and security standards in line with the IAEA and national authorities, ENEC is at the forefront 
of implementing the national vision of nuclear power, and deals directly with operational readiness, 
capacity development and delivery of the power plant projects. [27] 
Institution Description Status of 
Organization 
Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation (FANR) 
Primary head of safeguards, lawmaking, drafting 
federal regulations and ensuring effective 
implementation of legal codes, providing nuclear 
oversight writ large. Requires and issues permits on 
nuclear related items. 
Active 
Emirates Nuclear Energy 
Corporation (ENEC) 
Oversees implementation of law and codes set forth 
by FANR, heads efforts on the ground such as 
environmental radiological monitoring 
Active 
Export Control Executive 
Office (ECEO) 
In conjunction with FANR, ECEO has the ability to 
work across all seven Emirates. Any item that falls 
under international accords must obtain proper 
import permits. Facilitates commerce control from 
initial to final stages and at cabinet level  
Active 
Nuclear Energy Programme 
Implementing Organization 
(NEPIO) 
Status confidential with no open source trail, may 
have been brought under ENEC supervision 
Unknown 
International Advisory Board 
(IAB) 
Headed by Dr. Hans Blix, includes exclusive panel 
of experts that closely monitors status and progress 






Absorbed by Critical Infrastructure & Coastal 
Protection Authority (CICPA), handles internal 






Committee on Commodity 
Control Procedures 
Based within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this task 
force coordinates with FANR on export controls, 
licensing, and authorizations for the legal transit of 
sensitive or dual-use materials 
Active 
Gulf Nuclear Energy 
Infrastructure Institute 
(GNEII) 
Housed at Khalifa University, works with INSEP to 
facilitate specialized training, providing “educational 
and professional development capabilities on 
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Table 4: List of internal regulators and organizations involved in the nuclear program.1 
On the ground, the Committee for Goods and Materials Subject to Import and Export Controls was 
established under Emirati Decree Number 299/3 of 2009 in order to control strategic commodities. While 
based in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this committee coordinates with the UAE Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Economy, Federal Customs Authority, Preventive Security Department within the Ministry of 
Interior, and the Armed Forces including Chemical Defense, Civil Defense factions within Ministry of 
Interior. Under the international legal framework, the Emirati legal code is largely based on Law No. (40) of 
2006 regarding the Prohibition of Innovating, Producing, Storing, and Using Chemical Weapons Law No 
(13) of 2007 regarding commodities that are subject to import, in addition to export control Law No (6) of 
2009 regarding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. This committee permits goods and commodities, 
issuing Import, Export, Re-export, Transit, Transshipment and Brokering licenses to numerous federal 
agencies such as FANR, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Health, among others. This is, of course, 
before coordination is done with customs and port security. 
The Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC), established in 2006, also plays a role to govern industrial zones 
and regulate commercial ports. It oversees commercial, community, fishing, and private logistics ports 
across Abu Dhabi. Its Imports & Exports Controls Customs process includes: pre-arrival manifest, risk 
management system, scanning facilities, radiation facilities, and manual inspection. It coordinates with the 
Ministry of the Interior and the UAE Ministry of Environment and Water to “provide intelligence in 
cooperation with local and international security agencies” to oversee multiple clearance levels and ensure 
the integrity of commodities that are being moved. Its primary Khalifa Port, which was inaugurated in 2012, 
commands a very impressive and technologically complex means of operation with connections to road, 
rail, and air transportation hubs. 
1.4.1. Beware of Overlap of Regulatory Institutions 
The governance of the seven federations within the United Arab Emirates is unique and has historically 
been subject to political qualms of the United Kingdom alongside several other regional powers in the 
Gulf. After it gained its independence from a British protectorate in 1971, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, 
Fujairah, Sharjah and Umm al Qaiwain launched separate spheres of influence that were joined by Ras al 
1 Other Known Major Partnerships (with no particular ranking or order) 
Institutions/Memberships: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of International Programs; Department of State (DOS)/Partnership for Nuclear 
Security (PNS); DOE/Nuclear Energy International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC); DOE/National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA)/International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP)/International Nonproliferation 
Export Control Program (INECP); Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII); Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in 
Asia for Research, Development, and Training Related to Nuclear Sciences and Technology (ARASIA); World Association of Nuclear 
Operators (WANO); Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
Existing Bi-lateral Arrangements: [29] 
Republic of Korea (ROK), primary consortium contract (2009); United Kingdom (UK), Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy (2010); France (2008), Canada, Argentina, Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (2013); Russia, Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement (2012); Japan, bilateral Nuclear Cooperation/technical transfer agreements (2009); Australia Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement (2012), safeguards agreement; Canada, Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, safeguards agreement (2012). 
FANR itself, however, has signed agreements with the following international bodies: FANR-Republic of Korea Institute of Nuclear 
Safety, Implementing Arrangement (2010); FANR-US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Cooperation Arrangement (2010); FANR-
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Special Agreement (2011); FANR-Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control sign 
Implementing Arrangement (2011); FANR-Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, bilateral arrangement (2011); FANR-
French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), Cooperation Arrangement (2012); FANR-The French Institute for Radiological Protection and 
Nuclear Safety, Cooperation Arrangement (2013); FANR-The Norwegian Institute for Energy Technology, Associated Party 
Agreement (2013); FANR-Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Cooperation Arrangement (2013); . On the 
domestic side, the following has been done: FANR-Critical National Infrastructure Authority, Cooperation Agreement (2011); FANR-
Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research (2011); FANR-National Transport Authority, Memorandum of Understanding 
(2012); FANR-National Emergency, Crisis and Disasters Management Authority (NCEMA), Memorandum of Understanding (2012); 
FANR-Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), Memorandum of Understanding (2012); FANR –The Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority (TRA) sign Memorandum of Understanding (2013); FANR –The Environment Agency - Abu Dhabi (EAD), 
Memorandum of Understanding (2014); FANR –The Department of Civil of Aviation – Sharjah Emirates (DCA) sign Memorandum of 
Understanding (2014). [30]
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Khaimah only a year later. Each Emirate, therefore, has an Emir who is appointed to the Federal Supreme 
Council, which is tasked to designate members of the cabinet and the Prime Minister (who also serves as 
the Vice President). This political process in practice ensures harmony among the seven absolute 
monarchs presiding over each respective Emirate. Electoral processes for public office, however, only 
began after December 2006. [31] Abu Dhabi, which maintains about 86% of total UAE land, remains the 
primary governmental capital and is politically authoritarian. [32] Historically, Abu Dhabi takes lead of the 
Presidency while Dubai serves as the vice presidency. 
Aside from the few federal regulations in place, there is little overarching federal law that governs the 
seven Emirates generally. As it stands, each emirate offers its own independent export controls process 
and governance. This current Emirati structure implies that certain emirates may have stronger or weaker 
controls than others, leaving vulnerabilities open at the greater state-level. While interactions between 
FANR and ENEC head law-making and implementation of federal nuclear regulation, the realms of 
responsibility for other existing regulatory institutions are unclear, remain ceremonial, or are phasing out. 
As the regulatory framework matures, there should be caution of the numerous domestic institutions 
carrying out redundant activities by mirroring other organizations while federal institutions simultaneously 
assert more influence that harmonizes the Emirates. 
Additionally, United Arab Emirates continues to work extensively with the United States, closely 
collaborating on technical exchanges, programmatic monitoring and capacity-building assistance. Second 
to this is its extensive joint effort in collaboration with the South Korean consortium. Other contractors are 
involved in the project, including numerous domestic entities that provide construction and other aid in 
addition to carrying out provisions put forth by the numerous contracts and agreements that have been 
negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally. While the UAE should strengthen its growing number of protocols, 
agreements, and conventions that are signed, it should also be careful that redundancy may occur if not 
coordinated carefully. 
Further, some have argued there is an even larger issue of coordinating the training of the Emirati 
workforce by outsider partner or ‘donor countries’ that continue to offer a number of services and training 
for the UAE. [33] As the UAE remains on the fast track towards a robust nuclear energy program, it 
continues to accept enormous amounts of external assistance to bolster capacity building, leading to 
overlap in training modules and professional development. Further, numerous ‘Emirati’ delegations that 
are set to engage in training often send their non-indigenous colleagues, leading to further redundancy. 
Yet, it is without a doubt that such training modules are necessary, and it is important to note that 
redundancy or overlap in training is not an experience limited to the United Arab Emirates. 
1.4.2. Indigenous Capability Not Yet Fully Realized 
Prior to the signing of the 2008 US-UAE MOU on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, the United Arab Emirates 
had virtually no indigenous nuclear capacity or technical know-how on development or maintenance of a 
robust nuclear energy agenda. Typically, this implies that large amounts of support and reliance on the 
international community and foreign expertise would be required in order to move forward with such a 
program. As of now, there is a high reliance on foreign workers and expertise – the majority of workers at 
FANR alone are foreign nationals, drawing from more than 21 countries as of December 2010. [34] 
Certainly, that number has grown in the last five years. And while FANR is comprised of mostly foreigners, 
it is expected to make a full transition to an Emirati workforce over the next few decades when the reins of 
responsibility to fully govern the nuclear program are passed from South Korea to the UAE. Yet, the UAE 
goal for a fully indigenous program cannot be fully realized until much later when proper, effective 
legislation is adopted and a substantial, capable workforce is fully trained.  
The Emirates is currently attempting to tackle its lack of specialized workers in the field, and efforts to 
bolster effective training mechanisms include the inauguration of the Institute for Applied Technology (IAT) 
in Abu Dhabi and Simulator Training Center (STC) just a stone’s throw away from the Barakah site. [35] In 
October 2014, ENEC announced that forty Emirati students have graduated from the ENEC human capital 
development program, appropriately named Energy Pioneers, which divides about eighteen months of 
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time of its participants between specialized training sessions at the IAT in Abu Dhabi and in South Korean 
facilities. [36] 
Further, there are numerous countries currently involved in the enrichment and fabrication processes, 
handling the front of the fuel cycle of the program. Abu Dhabi is currently working with a number of 
international nuclear contractors that will be serving specific roles, including but not limited to involvement 
of; Canada’s Uranium One, Rio Tinto in the United Kingdom, France’s Areva, Tenex in Russia, URENCO 
based in the European Union, and the US’ Converdyn. [37] It appears these entities will coordinate with 
KEPCO on the front-end of the fuel cycle to convert, enrich and fabricate reactor fuel, which will then 
supply the UAE with the nuclear fuel assemblies and fuel to power the four reactors.  
Table 5: Projected supply chain of the UAE. 
Indeed, there are many players that have a hand in the fuel cycle and program of the UAE, as displayed in 
the chart above. This chart also evenly divides up the rights of the UAE to certain elements of the fuel 
cycle. It is made clear that the ‘front end’ of the cycle, meaning the processes between mining and milling 
to fuel fabrication will be completed outside of the UAE, and these are the capabilities that the UAE forfeit 
through the negotiated 123 agreement. The ‘front end’ cycle is often viewed as a proliferation concern due 
to the fact that enrichment can be diverted for non-peaceful purposes and used to enrich uranium for a 
bomb. However, the above chart goes to show that the Emirates really only deals with the operation of 
reactors and power generation (and to be determined, spent fuel storage may also potentially end up in 
the bill). Safeguards should be administered at every stage in which sensitive materials can be diverted for 
non-peaceful purposes. In the UAE, this is especially true for energy production and fuel storage stages. 
Yet, the UAE has also given up its reprocessing capabilities and so will not have the ability to filter out 
plutonium from its spent fuel stocks on the back end of the cycle, eliminating potential for the Emirates to 
ability to effectively weaponize a plutonium bomb. 
Mining/Milling	  France's	  Areva	  Russia's	  Techsnabexport	  (Tenex)	  Canada-­‐based	  Uranium	  One	  	  UK-­‐based	  Rio	  Tinto	  
Conversion	  France's	  Areva	  Russia's	  Techsnabexport	  (Tenex)	  USA's	  Converdyn	  
Enrichment	  (LEU)	  France's	  Areva	  Russia's	  Techsnabexport	  (Tenex)	  UK-­‐headquartered	  Urenco	  
Fuel	  Fabrication	  South	  Korea's	  KEPCO	  
Reactors	  South	  Korea's	  KEPCO	  UAE's	  ENEC	  
Spent	  Fuel	  Storage	  South	  Korea's	  KEPCO	  UAE's	  ENEC	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At the very least, the Emirati example demonstrates that states with little former indigenous nuclear 
fluency compels governments to ‘import’ the technical know-how and workers with the appropriate skill-set 
until its own citizens are trained properly. Though, in the case of the UAE, the number of players involved 
in the fuel cycle itself should not change dramatically so long as the UAE is obligated to forgo domestic 
enrichment and reprocessing. With that, the many international players in the UAE program will make it 
increasingly difficult to gauge the role of each state and its contributions – positive or detrimental – to the 
UAE’s peaceful nuclear energy program until much later. [38] 
Above, we see that there are numerous regulators and institutions both domestically and abroad that are 
hard at work to promote security, build out regulation, and grow the program exponentially in a short 
amount of time. With that, there is significant demand placed on the limited number of bureaucrats working 
on these issues in the Emirates. The Emirates should seek to strike the balance between international and 
domestic players to effectively govern its program and continue to develop its nuclear framework. 
2. Shortcoming One: Underdeveloped Legal Infrastructure
In October 2008, the “Federal Law Regarding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” was signed, putting 
the UAE on a path towards utilizing the power of the atom for peaceful purposes. At first glance, the UAE 
has set a high precedent for commitment and compliance to international accords and treaties that hedge 
against the threat of illicit activities related to nuclear programs and detrimental transshipments. Under 
closer examination, however, there are a number of ‘legal loopholes’ that exist and could be exploited or 
leveraged to facilitate illicit activities. The Emirates should close potential gaps in its legal infrastructure 
and ensure that its legal framework will effectively combat illicit smuggling before its program goes live in 
2017. 
The United Arab Emirates has ratified the historic Additional Protocol and a number of other accords to 
strengthen its safeguards framework, despite the fact that much of this rhetoric has been limited to 
measures of intent and not necessarily been translated into action or legislation on the ground. While the 
UAE has signed onto a number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and international 
safeguards that allow it a façade of a solid framework, each individually negotiated accord should be 
carefully scanned for potential shortcomings.  
Current IAEA Safeguards and other relevant international accords negotiated with the UAE include: 




The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 






Based on standardized model INFCIRC/153, an adapted version 
was negotiated to apply safeguards “on all sources of source and 
special fissionable material” in cooperation with the IAEA 
2003 
Original, Unmodified 
Small Quantities Protocol 
(SQP) 
In place for states without significant quantities of nuclear 
materials to bypass most requirements for detailed nuclear 
material accountancy reports and IAEA inspections 
2003 
UNSC Resolution 1540 Binding agreement, complementary to multilateral treaties that 
require states to prevent development, acquisition, transfer or 
2004 
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Table 6: List of current international regulatory treaties. 
It is important to note that this list is not exhaustive. The UAE has also signed onto the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2003), Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (2005), Convention on Nuclear Safety (2009), Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel and 
Radiological Waste (2009), among other agreements not listed here. 
On the international level, the UAE follows a number of protocols set forth by the IAEA and UN, including 
the hailed Additional Protocol that expands IAEA ability to provide reasonable assurance against the 
existence of undeclared nuclear activities. [40] To date, the 123 Agreement and AP provide the 
fundamental basis of safeguards and offer the most restrictive regulatory legal codes to date. As such, the 
AP alone requires one random IAEA headed inspection annually in addition to quarterly verification of 
each light water reactor. Another heavy hitting piece of legislation includes the Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/622) and the call to develop Systems of Accounting for and Control 
(SSAC) within the UAE. The basic obligations of any CSAs (whether under the model 153 agreement or 
negotiated 622 with the UAE) is to establish SSACs in order to facilitate cooperation, provide access, and 
declare information to the IAEA of its nuclear materials and facilities. With that, the need to develop 
bookkeeping, verification of nuclear material inventory, containment and surveillance, among other 
measures remains to be done in the case of the UAE. [41] On the domestic front, aside from the need to 
solidify SSAC regulations, the UAE’s Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) continues to take 
the lead in drafting nuclear regulatory code, yet much ground remains to be covered before 2017.  
2.1. Reliance on Original SQP 
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of the UAE legal code is its reliance on the original SQP I, granting the 
Emirates greater flexibility to handle sensitive nuclear materials without obligation to declare such 
materials to the IAEA until it receives its first reactor fuel load. Initially, this agreement was negotiated to 
reduce the burden on countries with little or no nuclear materials from inspections and other obligations 
such as to declare materials to the IAEA. According to Matthew Cottee of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, the original SQP is “designed to reduce pressure on resources, both at 
the IAEA and in SQP states, many of the reporting and access requirements under the CSA are held in 
abeyance.” [42] However, these protections have now reversed on the Emirates, as the IAEA now carries 
little to no authority over the Emirati program until the original SQP is rescinded, as called for under the 
123 Agreement negotiated in 2009.  
As a greater part of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements negotiated with states, certain countries are 
eligible for the original SQP if there is no significant amount of nuclear material statewide and there is no 
nuclear material in any given facility. The original 1974 SQP does not require these states to declare their 
activities and holds in abeyance most all safeguards measures in Part II of the model protocol 
INFCIRC/153. [43] The motivations of the IAEA to exempt certain states were prompted in efforts to 
reduce redundancy, as many states during the early nuclear age did not have any facilities or materials to 
use of CBRN-related materials and associated delivery systems 
to address threats posed by non-state actors [39] 
INFCIRC/254/Part1 & 
INFCIRC/254/Part2 
NSG Guidelines for conditions of transfer on the export or transit 
of sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related materials, equipment, 
and technology  
2007 
U.S.–UAE Section 123 
Agreement for Peaceful 
Civilian Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation (123 
Agreement) 
Agreement signed between the US and UAE for cooperation on 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, where UAE forgoes domestic 
uranium enrichment & reprocessing and signs AP – often 




Model Protocol Additional to CSAs between states and IAEA for 
application of Safeguards, requiring states to collect, declare and 
report to IAEA, complementary access to ensure verification and 
comprehensiveness and completeness of information provided. 
2010 
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declare. In order to remove the burden of declaratory or invasive activities by the IAEA in states where 
such measures carried little relevancy, the SQP also acted as an incentive for states to join onto otherwise 
cumbersome agreements. [44] This is due to the fact that under the original SQP I code, there is no 
requirement to provide the IAEA an inventory of nuclear materials, nor allow inspection of those materials, 
as long as the total quantity of nuclear materials in the state is small and no nuclear material yet has been 
introduced into a nuclear facility.   
Initial reporting and record keeping is also required for aspiring and established nuclear states, yet this first 
piece is missing. Without required declarations, there is no ability for the IAEA to conduct inspections, 
ensure that proper measures are being met, nor request additional data from the Emirates regarding the 
materials that may be imported or exported. It appears the most recent evaluation carried out by the IAEA 
in the UAE was done by its Site and External Events Design (SEED) Review Mission between 21-24 
November, 2011 or the Emergency Preparedness Review Service with the IAEA on March 31, 2015. This 
mission gauged site characterization and reviewed sections of the greater Emirati nuclear framework, but 
much has changed since 2011. On the other hand, the 2015 visit was a safety exercise that did not 
include verification of construction nor official inspections. [45] Moreover, the latest Safeguards 
Implementation Report for 2013 by the IAEA reports that the Emirates has offered numerous additional 
protocol declarations and declares one facility under safeguards, though zero declarations have been 
made in several other areas, including: number of inspections, number of design information verification, 
number of complementary accesses, among others. [46] 
The UAE signed onto the original SQP in 2003, and although the implementation of the US-UAE 123 
Agreement requires that the original SQP be rescinded before the US agrees to license any nuclear 
exports to the UAE, Abu Dhabi will not go back on its SQP I. That is, not until nuclear material is 
introduced into a nuclear reactor or a threshold amount of nuclear materials is present the country, which 
would nullify the original SQP anyway – so likely no earlier than late 2016 or 2017.  
While the SQP may be sufficient to ensure safeguards are being met in the meantime, there are numerous 
shortcomings to the original SQP as the program continues to develop. At the time of its signing (for 
original SQPs), many states were required to report the import or export of nuclear materials, design 
information questionnaires and plans to introduce nuclear material into a facility. Yet, for many countries, 
these reports are decades old and the IAEA has no mechanisms to follow-up on initial declarations. 
Further, the IAEA also no longer has the right to conduct inspections or formally request further 
information on these updates. In part, the original SQP left numerous gaps that were leveraged by 
numerous states for clandestine nuclear programs, such as the 1991 discovery of an illicit Iraqi program. 
Rising up to the challenge and realizing the need for a strengthened safeguards regime, the IAEA 
modified and updated the SQP in 2005, also formally known as the Modified Small Quantities Protocol 
(GOV/INF/276/Mod.1).  
The revamped Small Quantities Protocol II is much more comprehensive in the areas it covers. It requires 
initial nuclear materials declaration, annual reports, design information questionnaires and declaration to 
the IAEA upon the decision to build up a nuclear program. This last point is indispensible, as this 
notification happens as soon as a decision is made to build a nuclear facility, rendering the updated SQP 
null and void and all previous articles held in abeyance become required. Now, while the updated 2005 
SQP (SQP II) is much more comprehensive in terms of requiring declaration and verification of initial 
inventory of nuclear materials, many states have still not updated their original, negotiated small quantities 
protocol. The UAE falls into this category. 
Simply, the UAE explicitly opted to not make the transition to the modified, updated SQP II. All reporting to 
the IAEA (other than imports and exports) until the original SQP is rescinded remains voluntary, and 
without the obligation of inspections. Without inspections, the time between now and the 2017 deadline 
creates a phase where the program is suspended in the grey areas of legality of required declarations and 
what is actually moving through Emirati borders until the 2017 deadline is met. It is without a doubt that 
UAE adherence to the original SQP remains a large sore point for the IAEA and the nonproliferation 
regime. [47] It is important to note, however, this shortcoming will likely become irrelevant after 2017 after 
large quantities of ROK-supplied nuclear fuel arrives in country, well in excess of the limits for continued 
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SQP eligibility. The SQP will be automatically rescinded at that point, as specified in its original negotiated 
SQP text, subjecting the UAE to relevant IAEA protocols set forth in its comprehensive safeguards 
agreement. 
2.1.1. Subsidiary Arrangements Held in Abeyance 
When Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements are signed, as the UAE did in 2003, subsidiary 
arrangements are typically negotiated within 90 days of CSA entry into force. And while Article 39 of the 
negotiated CSA (INFCIRC622) calls for implementation of subsidiary arrangements that expand 
safeguards activities, this statute – along with a number of other commitments – is held in abeyance while 
the SQP remains in effect. In essence, this shortcoming allows the UAE to be exempt from implementing 
Subsidiary Arrangement Codes 1-9, legal codes which typically complement comprehensive safeguards 
agreements and strengthen safeguards until the original SQP is rescinded.  
2.1.2. Inability to Conduct Design Information Verification Before 2016 or 2017 
While the topic remains sensitive to the Abu Dhabi government, it is likely that the UAE has already 
submitted facility design information on the Barakah nuclear reactors in the form of design information 
questionnaires (DIQ), providing some early transparency to the program. Though, the CSA article 
(INFCIRC/622, Article 47) that allows for inspectors to conduct on-site verification of the submitted design 
information is also held in abeyance so long as the SQP is in effect. [48] Typically, declarations of this 
nature include “the facility description; the form, quantity, location and flow of nuclear material being used; 
facility layout and containment features; and procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control.” 
[49] 
Under current conditions of the original SQP, no IAEA inspector has the right to step foot in a UAE facility 
to conduct design information verifications or safeguards inspections until the SQP is rescinded or 
declared no longer in effect. Once a DIQ has been submitted (6 months before fuel is introduced to the 
facility, if not before then), Barakah officially becomes a nuclear “site,” only then subjecting it to a number 
safeguards and allowing the IAEA to act under AP Article 5.a(i) facilitating complementary access rights 
anywhere within the boundaries of the site to verify absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. 
Before that time (if an updated DIQ has not yet been submitted), the IAEA would in principle only be 
allowed to act under AP Article 5.c, allowing complementary access rights to conduct environmental 
sampling anywhere in the UAE to “resolve a question or inconsistency” about the correctness and 
completeness of the UAE’s AP declarations – in practice, IAEA follow-up of 5.c access is far more rare 
than 5.a(i) access. [50]  
More specifically, with the supply of APR-1400s, the design dictates that one third of the allotted fuel 
assemblies are switched out of the reactor core with each refueling, indicating that three fuel cycles take 
place before the entirety of the fuel cycle is completed. Characteristics of light water reactors poses 
several areas of interest for those who may be looking to divert or misuse nuclear materials, including 
materials found in fresh fuel or storage, core fuel in reactor vessel and spent fuel in ponds. There is also 
potential of diversion of fresh LEU or spent fuel or manipulation of shipments of spent fuel. [51] With that, 
fuel pins can also be inserted or removed causing a proliferation risk, but in theory these risks would be 
verified by IAEA safeguard routines after the program goes live. Though, the largest proliferation risk may 
fall under the switch-outs and verification of materials that are swapped out during the refueling process. 
Also, it may be important to note that no decisions have yet been made on accommodating future nuclear 
waste and spent reactor fuel, which could pose an additional layer of risk should the UAE not develop an 
effective nuclear waste strategy. While the APR-1400 reactor may accommodate mixed-oxide fuel (MOX), 
its use should be discouraged from a safeguards perspective, as there is a sizeable risk of reconversion of 
fresh MOX fuel to extract weapons usable plutonium. 
To the credit of the Emirates, Safeguards Plans (SP) and Design Information Questionnaires (DIQ) are 
carried out as required by the IAEA, at least internally, but it is not clear that this information is made 
public or shared. These practices include drafting definitions, information protection, designating roles and 
responsibility, reporting and recording, compliance and more. The Emirates also models its practices 
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directly off IAEA templates to cover data collections, nuclear material handling, nuclear material 
accountancy and control, general reactor data, and more. As of September 2014, the licensing process is 
as follows: Construction License Application Review, including a Preliminary Safety Analysis & Summary 
Report, Quality Assurance Manual, Management System Manual, Preliminary Safeguards Plan, Physical 
Protection Plan, Aircraft Impact Assessment Report, and Regulatory Commitments. And while the UAE 
claims DIQs were done for reactor sites 3 & 4, it was quoted that DIQs were “submitted as part of a routine 
annual safeguards update.” [52] Though, is not entirely clear who the Emirates provided this information to 
or whether or not there were any official containment or surveillance verification activities. Simply put, the 
IAEA may only conduct environmental sampling to gauge suspected inconsistency under the AP as of 
now, but would still need more valid reason or explicit invitation for such an inspection.  
With that, there are still two ways potential threats could arise: internal nonproliferation and external 
transshipment. Any interdictions at the front end would have to be foreign based, though any issues 
dealing with reactors or the back end of the fuel cycle is likely to fall under UAE authority insofar as 
storage and potential shipments of spent fuel to be processed could be manipulated on Emirati soil. In 
order to verify soundness and completeness of safeguards implementation and a robust framework to 
support the safety of the nuclear energy program, the IAEA will need complimentary access to facilities to 
gauge the integrity of safeguards implementation. Though, once fuel is introduced to the reactor, the SQP 
would automatically be rescinded and the IAEA would be able to begin the process to conduct ad hoc 
inspections as it saw fit.  
2.2. Potential Maintained Ability to Sell/Transfer Sensitive Technologies Under ‘123 Agreement’ 
The US-Emirati 123 Agreement and the Agreed Minute is now regularly hailed as a ‘gold standard’ for 
newcomer nuclear programs and mitigates a number of proliferation concerns, yet does not close all 
loopholes that may allow for internal or external proliferation. While the 123 Agreement has been required 
for nuclear cooperation with the US since the early nuclear age as a standard enabling agreement, the 
ENR clause in the agreed minute is more specifically what is referred to as the Gold Standard in the 
Emirati case. It goes without saying the UAE demonstrated huge nonproliferation commitments by signing 
onto the 123 Agreement, but there is still currently no language in the agreement that actively prevents the 
exchange of sensitive components that could be readily repurposed, exposing yet another proliferation 
concern.  
With that, the hailed 123 Agreement between the US and UAE contains one significant shortfall: the UAE 
retains the right to transfer sensitive components, technologies, and materials that could have dual-use or 
proliferation worthy applications even with its forgoing of ENR capabilities; a right that could be considered 
an inherent shortcoming of design of the 123 ‘Gold Standard.’ While Abu Dhabi has given up the right to 
enrich domestically, there is no detailed statute in the brokered agreement that would hinder its ability to 
become a nuclear supplier at some point in the future or transfer point of nuclear materials, which is 
increasingly a very real prospective with the bolstering of its own domestic technical capabilities and know-
how. 
This is not to say that there are no hurdles for the UAE to become a nuclear broker, indeed, there are 
several. There are numerous obstacles placed before the UAE through other safeguards agreements and 
negotiated bilateral contracts. In the language of Article VI of the 123 Agreement – Reprocessing, Other 
Alteration in Form or Content, and Enrichment – it is stipulated that the UAE is not restricted in its 
development or transfer of sensitive components or materials for purposes aside from official use. It goes 
onto to also state, however, that “material transferred pursuant to this agreement and material used in or 
produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred shall not be reprocessed unless the 
Parties agree.” Yet under this rhetoric, the 123 still does not address the development, sale, or transfer of 
related technologies so long as such materials are not being purposed for reprocessing and enrichment 
capabilities domestically on Emirati soil. In effect, it permits the transfers and sales of nuclear-related 
material and major components of other sensitive nuclear technologies, certainly undercutting the US’ and 
international community’s ability to hinder the ability of the UAE in moving these types of products in the 
future, should it make such moves in the future. 
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While this language may currently be considered an unaddressed loophole, the Emirates still has its 
hands tied due to clauses with a number of other states and would likely never pursue this option. It is, 
however, discussed here to go to show that improvements could be made in the language of negotiated 
123 Agreements in the future, particularly for other aspiring nuclear energy states. 
3. Shortcoming Two: Unsettled Export Control Concerns
Despite a spotty history with illicit trade and strategic trade control issues (STC), the United Arab Emirates 
works to effectively deal with the threat of illicit transfers taking place within its borders, though uniform or 
standardized export controls remain underdeveloped to date. Given the historical and ongoing role of the 
UAE as a major commercial establishment, proliferation risks remain due to large traffic moving through 
ports primarily based in the emirates of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah. Before 2007, the United Arab 
Emirates had virtually zero export controls in place – both in terms of relevant legal codes and the ability to 
follow up on abuses of transshipments through its borders. Due to this, its many free trade zones were 
previously exploited into serving illicit channels that provided sensitive technologies to nuclear programs in 
Iran, Syria, North Korea, among others. This issue, among developing effective STCs, remain to be a 
hurdle even today. Yet, it is imperative to effectively regulate authorizations, control dual-use items, and 
bolster other restrictive measures. [53] 
Following the A.Q. Khan episode, among other concerns to the export control regime, the UAE was 
pressured by the international community to comply with the stipulations of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 2004, a legally binding document that seeks to push member states 
to “have and enforce appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons (WMD), their delivery systems, including by establishing controls.” Further, in the 
case of potentially hazardous or dual-use materials, UNSCR 1540 “closes gaps in nonproliferation treaties 
and conventions to help prevent terrorists and criminal organizations from obtaining the world’s most 
dangerous weapons.” [54] And although 1540 outlines the stipulations states must make to achieve its 
basic obligations over controls, it does not put forth measures on how states will carry it out in practice. 
Without a doubt, the trade control regime within the Emirates is still largely in its infancy, yet looks to serve 
as an example for its neighbors in the GCC even in matters concerning safeguards and export controls 
infrastructure. Undoubtedly, measures of enforcement have improved and there have been huge efforts to 
crack down on general trading companies and money flow, especially to Iran. The UAE took steps to 
combat this beginning in 2007 by instituting new export control laws that shut down a number of money 
laundering and dual-use trafficking activities with Iran. [55] Undoubtedly, the UAE pursued these 
measures in step with joining the ranks of export control regimes. 
While entities such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Agreement, and the Australia 
group are in place to deal with dual-use issues, state level export controls are not under the purview of 
nuclear cooperation agreements in general nor are the Emirates party to these relevant institutions. In the 
UAE, it is only recently that legal and prosecutorial export controls mechanisms been implemented, but 
remain relatively new and untested. Often, the UAE tackles internal governances issues through 
multilateral efforts and by working with a number of international services or governments that ensure a 
baseline level of legal obligations. For the most part, the UAE acknowledges its former position as a transit 
hub and aims to change this reputation, though Abu Dhabi must endeavor to further enable its legal 
infrastructure to mitigate such concerns to ensure its export controls infrastructure does not facilitate 
smuggling or transit of sensitive materials. In March 2014, the Emirates hosted the International Export 
Controls Conference, bringing together experts from around the world to discuss effective trade control 
measures in addition to being an opportunity for the UAE to showcase its port security and beyond. 
At first glance, the export controls process in the United Arab Emirates is relatively simple. Initially, the 
Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation conjures law on the matter, requiring importers and exporters to 
apply for and obtain permits for sensitive items. [56] On the ground, however, the United Arab Emirates’ 
Export Control Executive Office (ECEO) takes over and ensures that all measures are being met. Carriers 
or shippers of radioactive material must first receive authorization from FANR, in addition to fulfilling 
compliance for all laws and regulations within the emirates, identifying the end user, and ensuring the 
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proper authorities also have the appropriate clearance. Typical movement of any sensitive cargo relating 
to the UAE nuclear program first requires KEPCO to notify the IAEA of upcoming shipments and 
verification of such items before the material is moved, as the Korean consortium heads management of 
the front-end of the fuel cycle. On the other hand, the UAE is required to notify the IAEA of any upcoming 
imports, and to verify the materials upon arrival in addition to when the materials are introduced to the 
fresh fuel storage site. All the while, the UAE, ROK, and IAEA must agree on effective safeguards 
approach, including cameras, seals, and other measures of safeguards verification. [57] Within the 
Emirates, The UAE Committee on Commodities Subject to Import and Export Controls, evidently now 
housed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remains to be another primary export and import control 
agency for the Emirati nuclear program. Typically, any company or agency dealing with sensitive materials 
for import or export purposes must acquire a license to handle controlled items. Only then does each 
import or export through Abu Dhabi subsequently receive a permit, differing from typical conventions and 
procedure elsewhere. [58]  
According to the US Bureau of Industry and Security, exporters should: 
“know whether foreign customers are obligated to obtain import or other authorizations prior to 
receiving controlled items. As a best practice, prior to shipment, BIS recommends U.S. exporters 
provide foreign customers with the Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) of items to be 
exported and request a copy of any required foreign authorizations. Failure of a foreign customer 
to honor a request to provide a copy of any required foreign import or export authorizations would 
present a ‘red flag’ that indicates an export may be destined for an inappropriate end use, end 
user or destination.” [59] 
These authorizations are universally applied within the EU to manage items from import countries to the 
end user, and an Emirati royal decree made in 2014 effectively set the EU Export controls list to be 
considered as national law to be carried out in the same fashion across the seven Emirates. Hence, an 
export controls list within the Emirates is to be modeled off of the EU Export controls list. Surely, there will 
be a greater effort by the international export control regime to push for such comprehensive rules that will 
guide importers and exporters to harmonize best practices in order to regulate control and dual-use items. 
[60] And while this is an applaudable effort on paper, there are still no clear stipulations on how the law 
was to be carried out. 
From the perspective of proper governance, the two major players appear for trade control to be the 
ECEO committee and FANR. First, FANR will establish the rule of law on export controls and the transit of 
dual-use items. ECEO is the secondary step to actually issue permits and follow up on abuses. 
3.1. No Formal Export Controls List 
A large number of sensitive nuclear technologies and material are slated for import to the UAE, yet no 
formal export controls list has been adopted to Emirati law. The Export Control Law No. 13 was enacted in 
2007, the first code to deal with commodities that are subject to import and export control through Emirati 
borders, but remains limited in its capacity to effectively head all export controls endeavors. [61] While the 
UAE currently follows the guidelines set forth by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, adopting 
INFCIRC/254/Part1 & INFCIRC/254/Part2 that sets guidelines for “nuclear transfers” and “guidelines for 
transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology” respectively, 
more could be done on this front in the form of a formalized export control list. [62] FANR and the UAE 
Committee on Commodities Subject to Import and Export Controls continue to loosely adhere to the EU 
dual-use list, NSG guidelines, and operative paragraphs of their 123 and safeguards agreements, but has 
yet to formalize adoption of any such lists to law. No formal list currently exists nor plans to develop a 
comprehensive export controls list. [63] 
Unlike the EU, which is included in numerous multilateral regimes and has adopted measures to 
strengthen international cooperation to counter threats posed by misuse or diversion of materials, the UAE 
still has much work to do. [64] Engagement of already present enforcement communities will be key to 
securing the Emirates’ ability to effectively enforce export controls. Leveraging numerous authorities and 
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agencies would help the Emirates bolster their exports control regime. This includes engagement of 
customs authorities, law enforcement, regulatory and licensing agencies, scientific and academic 
communities, among others to reach this goal. 
The UAE is not totally in the dark on the issue, however, as FANR proposed federal code to address 
export controls issues and combat proliferation in 2014, a move which was promptly adopted into law and 
neatly outlined in Code 9. This code looks to “establish licensing and reporting requirements for the 
Transfer of Regulated Items,” laying out the responsibilities of FANR and the UAE Imports Exports Control 
Committee to regulate licensing and authorizing movement of sensitive technologies that adhere to 
INFCIRC/254 and INFCIRC/622. [65] However, the division of labor between FANR and the Committee 
remains opaque, informal, and largely ad hoc. And still, none of the seven Emirates nor the federal 
government of the UAE currently sustains a formal exports list, going to show that effective and consistent 
export controls will be hard to achieve without one – Emirati rhetoric remains to be translated into action 
through a detailed list adopted into law. [66] While materials continue to move through numerous UAE 
ports, there is simply no ability to equally regulate all imports and exports moving through its borders with 
the status quo. 
3.2. Disjointed Emirati Law 
An additional layer of complication that may affect effective governance of export controls includes the 
relatively new federal government structure within the United Arab Emirates. Until recent years, the seven 
Emirates enjoyed a fair amount of independence and flexibility to draft their own laws with limited federal 
oversight. For the most part, each Emirate enjoyed a great degree of self-governance until larger, 
coordinated federal efforts were implemented in recent decades, such as with the Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company, FANR, and other entities. The nuclear energy program effort in particular, however, looks to 
force the hands of each independent Emirate to shift from an individual state mentality towards 
strengthening federal-level law and institutions (albeit in the nuclear case a large discretion is granted to 
Abu Dhabi, where the Barakah site is based). [67] 
The UAE is diligent in maintaining its status as the leading country in the region on nonproliferation issues. 
In 2010, it even went as far as to freeze 41 Iran-linked accounts and thwart other questionable activities. It 
was reported that the UAE has also cracked down on more than 40 firms engaged in dual-use materials or 
money laundering. However, when this took place and which businesses were involved have yet to be 
seen. [68] In many instances of this nature, the cooperation between the UAE and the international 
community has been mostly positive despite publicity of these successful interdictions being limited or 
hardly hailed. Indeed, it appears the international community is fast to respond to failures rather than 
successes. 
To ensure the rate of success in the Emirates to interdict potential hazards, there is a need for more 
coordinated investigations, improved efficiency of resources, easing public sector bureaucracy (including 
foreign customs regimes), improving information sharing and reducing potential overlaps. There must 
have a primary point of contact between the licensing FANR and enforcement on the ground. The Federal 
Authority for Nuclear Regulation already published a number of regulatory guides and licensing controls to 
regulate the nuclear program and build out the framework so that its nuclear ambitions may be realized, 
yet more remains to be done to bridge the gap between policymakers and federal institutions that are 
seeing these policies through. A number of unaddressed issues remain, including nuclear waste regulation 
and the development of state system for accounting and control of nuclear materials.  
A number of regulatory measures have been in place for years, namely, UNSCR 1540 that seeks to 
address Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which should have led to the development of a number of 
other domestic measures and obligations placed on stakeholders in the program. Further, regulations set 
forth by FANR and ENEC have been set to manage incoming exports to support and strengthen measures 
that would address with potential gaps in legislation. However, the implementation of these laws has taken 
much longer, and still there is not concrete means on how to follow-up on abuses. The big question 
remains on how the UAE intends to follow up on abuses. For the most part, the Emirates is an 
authoritarian state and by default is at liberty to shut down any suspect company or importers or exporters 
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without notice. Yet, there is a fine line to walk between dealing with official legalities and overstepping of 
power on related issues. The Emirates should ensure that it has sound mechanisms to keep its legislation 
up to date, with the principal purpose to change behavior of actors that may not be using the law as 
intended. 
3.3. Other Considerations 
The UAE has made strides to develop the most comprehensive nuclear energy program to date, but other 
concerns may hinder its ability to effectively regulate its borders and export concerns before the reactors 
start going live in 2017. To date, it has received wide praise from top international experts and 
governments alike, and is increasingly being considered a steward in the field as it goes onto aid other 
programs such as the one currently under development in Jordan. Certainly, the Emirates continues to 
rely on outside assistance, namely from the United States, who would be able to aid national stakeholders 
develop a detailed framework to operate, regulate and oversee protection of its materials. Further, the 
question of implementation remains to be the biggest question: how will the program look in practice once 
it goes live? There are a few other outstanding considerations that should be assessed. 
First, the Emirates should seek to maximize the potential of its citizens working on nuclear issues and 
minimize bureaucracy. Indeed, the Emirates has set up work programs and centers to train and equip its 
indigenous population with the necessary skills to run such a program, yet these institutes are still in their 
infancy and their activities should be expanded. Other facilities have been built near the site to train its 
modest numbers of students and employees, but many of these individuals have yet to accumulate the 
required experience necessary to take the lead on a nuclear program. Although the workforce issue is 
certainly not limited to the Emirates, the region and beyond deals with extreme bureaucratic issues and 
may not be fully equipped to deal with concerns that may arise in regards to legal shortcomings or 
implementing federal regulation in a timely manner. Indeed, the Emirates will be shuffling its top 
management in the future, forcing it to reassess the phase out foreign workers over time if they are to 
achieve the goal of a 100% Emirati workforce to head the nuclear power project. 
Second, while the UAE continues to work with its Korean and American counterparts to further develop 
the framework agenda, cultural factors that may affect the growth of the program must also be considered, 
as each party often bring divergent strengths and weaknesses to the table. Naturally, this all stems from 
the very diverse and robust network involved in the project. For instance, the constitution of the UAE under 
Article 14 speaks to “equality, social justice, and providing safety, security, and equal opportunities to all 
the citizens are pillars on which the community is grounded. Solidarity and shared sympathies are close 
links that tie the Emirates together.” In practice, while its citizens (which constitute the minority) routinely 
receive favorable treatment, the situation for others working on the program is much different. 
It would also be wise to take into consideration cultural aspects and potential misunderstandings that may 
arise between the many hired hands working on the project. Through conducted interviews on the ground 
in Abu Dhabi, it was clear that the Koreans and the Emiratis have had disagreements on ways forward in 
developing the program. To be sure, this is normal when cultures come together to tackle tough issues, 
yet the large number of different nationalities working on the program may actually create more 
uncertainty and distrust among the ranks rather than promote fraternalism. However, the many parties 
involved in the development and deployment of this program can conversely push for common 
understanding and encourage stronger controls. 
The primary contractor for the four reactors is South Korea, which runs about a third of its electricity from 
nuclear power, also has a spotty record of nonproliferation within its own borders. As recently as mid-
2013, the ROK suspended operation in two reactors and shutdown a third amid reports of falsified safety 
reports. [69] This scandal follows a similar incident in 2012 where operation of 23 reactors were stopped 
due to the use of industrial supplies that had been exchanged and implemented with fake certificates, a 
reported up to 10,000 components over the course of a decade were installed under the pretenses of false 
paperwork. [70] Another scandal of the firing of the vice president of KEPCO and chief executive at its 
subsidiary Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power certainly does not provide comfort to the Emiratis, particularly 
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as some of those directly involved in the scandal had worked with the UAE to develop its nuclear program. 
[71] 
Third, criticism of the government is near illegal and media within the Emirates is heavily restricted, which 
may hinder transparency and fair dialogue on development of the nuclear program. For example, Article 
30 of the UAE constitution stipulates: “Freedom of opinion and of expressing that opinion verbally, in 
writing, or by any other medium of expression is guaranteed as provided in law.” [72] In theory, this would 
guarantee freedom of speech and the right of the press. However, in practice, the UAE is still heavily 
reliant on perpetrating official news and government releases that go through heavy edits. Most Emirati 
media networks are subsidized by the government, and it is illegal to criticize the King, the Royal Family, 
or decisions of government. Hence, the system actively works against criticism of the government or of the 
ruling family. It is also sensitive to issues pertaining to radicalism or pornography. As of 2014, according to 
the World Press Freedom Index produced by Reporters Without Borders, places the United Arab Emirates 
at a ranking of 118. [73] All in all, such censorship and lack of freedom of press could be detrimental for 
the transparency of its program in the long run. 
Fourth, there are other political considerations to take into account. Numerous others wonder if its 
acquisition of nuclear power is a hedging strategy against the Iran nuclear deal and ongoing program. 
While much debate surrounds the question of prestige and the role of nuclear energy programs in the 
region to hedge against Iran, it does not, at least overtly, appear to be a hedging strategy. 
Undoubtedly, there are layers of concerns to take into consideration when assessing the UAE program, 
and while not all these presented considerations are dangerous or detrimental to a developing nuclear 
energy program, it is wise to keep these cultural and technical factors in mind.  
4. The UAE’s ‘Gold Opportunity’
As of now, it appears illicit transshipment or diversion of sensitive technologies and materials tied to the 
United Arab Emirates’ nuclear energy program is possible under the status quo. Surely, there is an 
immediate need to strengthen the legal infrastructure, export controls, and regulatory capacity before the 
program goes live in 2017 to effectively mitigate these challenges if it is to live up to its model state status. 
This is especially so if the UAE is looking to avoid a ‘commitment-compliance gap’ as it continues on a fast 
track towards acquiring nuclear power capabilities. [74] 
Although the Emirates has continued to work closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency, among 
numerous countries, further assistance will be required in order to help the UAE “graduate” from its 
newcomer status into a full-fledged and thriving nuclear program. Clarified and more rigorous criteria to 
develop the regulatory framework and export controls could help its endeavor to crack down on potential 
abuses. 
4.1. Policy Counsel I – Augment the Legal Infrastructure 
The Emirates must further develop its legal and federal codes to work against misuse and expand its 
ability to prosecute abuses – there must be a strong and robust legal code to support a framework 
combatting vertical proliferation or potential loopholes that may be exploited or leveraged for non-peaceful 
or non-official uses. Further, the UAE should work alongside other nations to increase outreach concurrent 
with development and provide training to inform companies and transshipment companies in the business 
community; this would also include bolstering exercises in the country and training of indigenous 
personnel. The Emirates should seek to:  
i. Integrate the legal systems of the seven emirates, at the very least between customs
administrations and export declaration systems. This would include furthering an effective 
federal agenda, and bolstering an effective and cooperative framework to ease the process 
for international and domestic players to coordinate on safety or prosecutory issues.  
ii. Rescind the unmodified, original SQP in favor of the modified SQP before nuclear materials
are introduced to the country or Barakah site. While this may not be a popular option for the 
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UAE, it is absolutely essential to securing the ability to develop and implement subsidiary 
arrangements as required under comprehensive safeguards agreements. Further, to conduct 
inspections and receive more information on the transiting nuclear materials and technology 
before 2017. 
iii. Develop a better reporting capability for requirements under the Additional Protocol and
mature SSACs upon finalization, including a means to gauge safeguards measurements.
Moreover, the Emirates should seek to initiate a national strategy to thoroughly implement
SSAC requirements.
4.2. Policy Counsel II – Expand Comprehensive Export Controls 
Currently, there is adequate opportunity for illicit materials to slip through the cracks of the current 
commerce controls system in the UAE, demonstrating the need for strengthening its exports control 
regime before 2017. Given its strategic geographical location, the many ports and Free Trade Zones 
housed by the UAE make it an attractive hub for illicit transshipments. One of the first steps the UAE 
should take would be to bolster its commitment to nonproliferation and ensure compliance through stricter 
export controls. The UAE is not currently part of a multinational export controls regime, though it intends to 
model its own guidelines after suggestions put forth by other multinational agendas. It should draft more 
guidelines and publish a formal control list, such as the EU list, in addition to tightening controls on 
strategic dual-use equipment and import licenses to optimize risk management capacity in order to 
establish a robust legal foundation that bolsters export controls and ability to respond to future incidents.  
Certainly, the UAE should actively work to fully develop and publish its export control list that is set to 
mirror the EU in order to meet international standards and obligations. This is particularly so as some 
private sectors working with sensitive materials are still not totally clear about what is controlled material, 
and the government should look to bridge the public-private gap to facilitate greater understanding of 
export controls. Also, definitions should be further refined while technical and scientific expertise is further 
developed. [75] 
As it turns out, there is a new shipping port being built at Barakah to accommodate transfers of sensitive 
materials into the UAE, and so will fall under Abu Dhabi governance. Whether or not the legal or illicit 
transfer of technologies through the UAE to third parties is deliberate by its leaders in the future, this new 
nuclear player should be able to clearly identify its end users. It would be wise for the Emirates to 
consider: 
i. Formalizing a comprehensive export controls list that tightens controls on strategic dual-use
equipment and import licenses, explicitly outlining sensitive technologies and regulations on
how to address noncompliance at the federal level – or, at least develop strict guidelines
within Abu Dhabi where most of the transfers concerning nuclear technology will take place.
ii. Adopting and publishing a formal export controls list that makes controlled items clear to
importers and exports. The UAE’s primary concern should be to coordinate this and promote
transparency of its requirements, as a number of industries are still not clear on what
constitutes a sensitive object and the proper channels to obtain licensing. This issue is
furthered by the free trade zones in operation that may facilitate loose exchange of goods and
materials within Emirati borders.
iii. Building measures of success to gauge effectiveness of institutions and regulations
administering export controls.
iv. Establish clear sentencing guidelines and fines, which would also bolster the legal
infrastructure to be more equipped to deal with potential abuses that may arise. As it currently
stands, the UAE is free to conduct raids and shut down companies without notice. While this
may be fine to do in the short-term in order to deal with abuses, a wider framework should be
established to strengthen both the rule of law and export control matters simultaneously.
v. Bolstering responsiveness, hence building levels of trust and confidence in the ability of the
UAE to effectively hedge against actors looking to proliferate and transit materials through
deepening partnerships with institutions, such as through the Security Freight Initiative and
Proliferation Security initiative.
vi. Clarifying roles of the different export control regimes, committees, and task forces at play,
which all appears to be operating in tandem towards the creation a single authority to head all
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work related to licensing and enforcement. Currently, this appears to be split between FANR 
and the ECNO, among others, yet it would be more effective to place responsibility in the 
hands of just one institution to ease the burden on importers and exporters of their obligations 
and to have a strengthened liaising department to work with regard export control related 
topics. 
4.3. Policy Counsel III – Bolster Regulatory Framework 
The UAE would have much to gain from more clearly defining the roles of FANR and ENEC, which 
continue to be the two largest regulatory institutions of the nuclear program. It could bolster these two 
firms and deepen its ability to leverage federal oversight and develop the regulatory framework of the 
Emirati nuclear power program. Further, the UAE could: 
i. Build the bridge between the federal level, Emirate level, and municipalities to further
synthesize regulation, in line with the National Programme launched in December 2005, which
would closely correlate with the unveiled 2007 UAE government strategy. Sheikh Mohammed
had noted, “creating synergy between the federal and the local governments is one of the
most important and vital elements of development underlined in this strategy.” [76]
ii. Join or further consult with multinational export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), Australia Group (AG), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), or coordinate with the
regional EU CBRN Centre of Excellence based in Amman to guide best practices in the UAE.
iii. Bolster its internal human capacity. Without former, formal expertise on nuclear matters, it
would be wise for the UAE to continue to build capacity of port security but also provide
training to inform companies and within the transshipment business communities. Capacity
building could include tabletop exercises, in addition to social assessments. Yet, it is important
to keep in mind to avoid redundancies and overlaps with training.
iv. Finally, the Emirates should look to establish metrics of success to gauge their progress and
conclude more agreements with other nations to receive technical assistance.
5. Conclusion
The United Arab Emirates already maintains a prestigious chair on the Board of Governors at the IAEA 
through 2015, affirming its position as a technologically advanced country on nuclear affairs within the 
Middle East. Yet, it is still a wholly newcomer nuclear energy state, and goes to show there is a certain 
degree of responsibility that falls on the international community to aid its efforts to hedge against 
clandestine, misuse or diversion of nuclear materials.  While the UAE has already signed onto a number of 
treaties and committees that demonstrate its commitment to nonproliferation ideals, the international 
community must ensure that Emirati rhetoric matches the reality on the ground. Furthermore, the Emirates 
should seek to avoid a potential disconnection between construction and operation that may arise before 
the import of nuclear materials before 2017 and general ‘commitment-compliance gap’ of its nuclear 
infrastructure by taking on additional layers of transparency and relevant legislation. [77] Plant 
construction of the first reactor was more than halfway completed by September 2014. [78]  
Acquisition of nuclear capabilities in the Emirates and subsequent expansion of technical know-how is 
coupled with significant responsibility to hedge against potential avenues of proliferation that may arise 
within its program. In the past, the UAE has failed to successfully mitigate sensitive materials transit 
through its borders – and so, can the international community accept Emirati rhetoric and aid the program 
to translate its commitment to action? Though the UAE has agreed to abstain from most all ‘sensitive 
processes’ of the fuel cycle in order to reaffirm its commitments to international nonproliferation efforts, 
Abu Dhabi must do more overcome its historical position as a major transshipment point for sensitive 
nuclear technologies. As it stands, near-term risks could become very real without sufficient safeguards 
and export control provisions. As of now, while the UAE has made strides to combat proliferation, 
domestic legislation is lacking and could be exploited to transfer or divert sensitive technologies. Further, 
transshipment remains to be a large challenge that has led to horizontal proliferation in the past. With that, 
before the nuclear program is set to go live, the UAE and broader international community must look to do 
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 more to secure its nuclear framework through avenues such as developing adequate legislation and 
training. 
In order to ensure success of the nuclear energy program in the United Arab Emirates, there is a strong 
need for foreign assistance and ample time to follow through on its pledges. Some steps that the UAE 
may take could include: first, further its legal infrastructure by rescinding the original SQP for the modified 
version and developing a better reporting capability, and second to expand export controls, all in addition 
to improving its internal regulatory framework. These notes of policy advice, among others, should be 
considered and adopted in order to facilitate additional transparency and build confidence of the 
international community in its program before the UAE model or its 123 agreement can serve as a 
normative standard for other aspiring nuclear powers in the future. Certainly, as other countries look to 
acquire nuclear technologies in the upcoming years, the UAE can serve as an example to these aspiring 
states, though there are still areas to improve. South Africa, Turkey and Vietnam are well on their way to 
developing respective nuclear energy programs, yet these countries will likely not do so at the speed of 
which the Emirates has expanded its program. This highlights the need for increased international 
collaboration with the Emiratis to aid them in their pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy, particularly as the 
UAE looks to collaborate with others in the regional and beyond. 
Fundamentally, the UAE does set a precedent for future 123 agreements negotiated with the United 
States government, but perhaps model state status cannot be applied to the Emirati framework until more 
is done on multiple fronts. The ‘gold standard’ status in particular refers to the Agreed Minute that forfeits 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Certainly, this move alone sends a huge signal for future 
agreements, yet other countries have not signed onto such hard-and-fast preconditions before breaking 
ground on equally ambitious nuclear programs. And so while it was intended by the US Congress to have 
the Emirati example set a precedent for future 123 agreements, the UAE agreement is much more 
restrictive in nature compared to other agreements. Nevertheless, more could still be done to meet 
international accords in order to promote transparency of the program and push it to global ‘model state’ 
status. 
Certainly, the UAE is hard at work to thwart potential abuses and build up its best practices in order to be 
considered the Gold Standard for both the region and indeed the world. Yet, much of this is still held at 
face value and it should go above and beyond what it has already done to demonstrate that the highest 
standards of reactor and nuclear safety are being upheld. While the Emirates continues to meet its 
milestones for completion and maintain a good track record, it should also demonstrate that it is meeting 
all its safeguards obligations as nuclear material is introduced to the facility in late 2016 or 2017. [79] 
The United Arab Emirates is only several years away from having its full nuclear program go live that will 
in turn supply nuclear power to the grid, eventually slated to provide the country with a quarter of its 
electricity, yet several obstacles remain. [80] The UAE should continue to bolster its internal measures so 
that the international community will not one day have to carry to burden of proof for presumed illicit or 
potentially detrimental activities that may arise in the future. If the Emirates truly seeks to set the ‘Gold 
Standard’ model for upcoming nuclear programs, the UAE must translate its intent to action before 2017. 
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Abstract 
The Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM) provides guidance on expressing 
measurement uncertainty for calibration, laboratory accreditation, and metrology services. 
Nondestructive assay (NDA) of items containing nuclear material uses calibration and modelling to 
infer item characteristics on the basis of detected radiation such as neutron and gamma emissions.  
Uncertainty quantification (UQ) can be approached from a bottom-up or top-down analysis.. Top-
down UQ compares measurements of the same item(s) from multiple assay techniques and/or 
laboratories. Bottom-up UQ quantifies sources of input uncertainty to a process and the resulting 
output uncertainty. Bottom up UQ is the focus of this paper. UQ for NDA has always been important, 
but there is a need for application of better statistical techniques and for UQ to play more of a role in 
assay development and assessment.  This paper describes NDA applications (the enrichment meter, 
distributed-source term analysis, Cf shuffler, Uranium neutron collar) that have emerging UQ topics 
that are not specifically addressed by the GUM, including: item-specific biases, errors in predictors, 
model error effects, and quantification of uncertainty in computer model errors and parameters. This 
paper also includes an initial UQ case study using the Uranium neutron collar assay method. 
Keywords: Bottom-up uncertainty quantification (UQ); emerging UQ topics; errors in predictors; item-
specific biases 
1. Introduction
Uncertainty quantification (UQ) for non-destructive assay (NDA) in nuclear safeguards
applications has always been important. But, currently it is recognized that greater rigor is 
needed and achievable using modern statistical methods and by letting UQ have a more 
prominent role in assay development and assessment [1-3]. UQ is often difficult, but if done 
well, can lead to improving the assay procedure itself. Therefore, we describe the extent to 
which the guideline for expression of uncertainty in measurements (GUM) [4] can be used for 
UQ in NDA [1-3]. This paper also takes steps toward better UQ for NDA by illustrating UQ 
challenges that are not addressed by the GUM. These challenges include item-specific biases, 
calibration with errors in predictors, and model error, especially when the model is a key step 
in the assay. We briefly describe a specific NDA application, the enrichment meter principle, 
for which a variation of the GUM approach can be applied, and other NDA applications for 
which the GUM approach must be extended. Then, a case study of the Uranium neutron collar 
is presented.  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives additional background on 
NDA and UQ for NDA. Section 3 describes the GUM and a few example NDA applications 
for which the GUM is applicable. Section 4 is the Uranium neutron collar (UNCL) case study. 
Section 5 is a discussion and summary. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
168
2. UQ for NDA
       The GUM [4] indirectly addresses top-down methods, but is most known for illustrating 
a bottom-up option that applies uncertainty propagation of uncertainty in each assay step to 
estimate the uncertainty in the assay. For bottom-up UQ, the GUM’s measurement equation is  
1 2( , ,..., )pY f X X X= (1), 
where Y is the estimate of the measurand, and the Xs are p inputs. The p inputs can be 
measurement or adjustment factors, and can be regarded as having a joint probability 
distribution that can include covariances among some or all of the inputs. For example, some 
of the inputs can be estimated calibration parameters, others can be measured values, and 
others can be adjustment factors. The GUM distinguishes two types of evaluations to describe 
how to estimate the probability distribution of one or more inputs.  “Type A” evaluations uses 
statistical methods applied to measured data. “Type B” evaluations use judgments, models, or 
other non-statistical methods. The inputs Xs in Eq. (1) can be obtained using Type A and/or 
Type B evaluations. 
     There is recent interest in revising and extending the GUM for reasons described in Bich 
[5]. However, there are many applications for which Eq. (1) is adequate for defensible UQ for 
Y. One  needs to know the functional form f(), and know how to quantify the error magnitudes 
in each of the Xs.  Because the GUM does not focus on top-down UQ, there is no attempt to 
describe sources of uncertainty such as omitted physical effects or model uncertainty. 
     In NDA applications, items emit neutrons and/or gamma-rays that provide information 
about the source material, such as isotopic content. However, item properties such as density, 
or the distribution of radiation-absorbing isotopes, which relate to neutron and/or gamma 
absorption behaviour of the item, can partially obscure the relation between detected radiation 
and the source material; this adds a source of uncertainty to the estimated amount of SNM in the 
item. One can express item-specific impacts on uncertainty using a model such as 
1 2, , ,( ... )pCR M g X X X= , (2) 
where CR is the item’s neutron or gamma count rate, M  is the item SNM mass, g is a known 
function, and  1 2, ,..., pX X X are p auxiliary predictor variables such as item density, source SNM 
heterogeneity within the item, and container thickness, which will generally be estimated or 
measured with error and so are regarded as random variables [6,7].  
     To map Eq. (2), to GUM’s Eq. (1), write 
1 2 1 2 1( ) ( )/ , ,..., , ,...,p pM CR g X X X h X X X += =             (3), 
where the measured CR is now among the p+1 inputs. Because p is generic notation for the 
number of inputs, and f, g, and h simply depict three distinct functional forms, we can rewrite 
Eq. (3) as Eq. (1), and interpret Y as the SNM mass M, so Eq. (1) is alternatively expressed as 
1 2( , ,..., )pM f X X X= .   (4). 
     Eq. (4) is intended for bottom-up UQ. But top-down UQ often suggests the need for a 
measurement error model that allows for both systematic and random errors, such as  
     M = T + S + R (5), 
where T is the true SNM mass, R is random error, and S is systematic error that accounts for all 
unmodeled or incorrectly modelled effects for each item. The systematic error could scale 
with the true value or not (that is, the error model could be multiplicative or additive or 
something else), and could vary across items or not, depending on the context [6-11]. If S 
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varies across items, then it is item-specific bias [9,10]. Item-specific bias is nearly always 
present to some extent, because test items differ to some extent from calibration items. Many 
NDA examples adjust test items (as do the three examples in Section 3 and example in 
Section 4) to calibration items using some type of modelling. Model uncertainty must 
therefore be addressed. 
      Top-down UQ estimates the R and S error magnitudes, typically quantified by their 
standard deviations Rσ and Sσ , which are estimated from data sets that have measurements of 
some or all items from each of two or more assay methods. We use the hat notation to denote 
estimated quantities; for example, ˆRσ  and ˆSσ  denote estimates of Rσ and Sσ , respectively. 
We use capital letters to denote random variables. The random error term R can include 
variation in background that cannot be perfectly adjusted for, Poisson counting statistics 
effects, and other random effects. In principle, the 1 2, ,..., pX X X could be estimated for each 
item as part of the assay protocol. However, there would still be modelling error because the 
function f must be chosen or somehow inferred, possibly using purely empirical data mining 
applied to calibration data [6,8,11], or physics-based radiation transport codes such as Monte-
Carlo-n-particle (MCNP, [12]). Typically, only some of 1 2, ,..., pX X X will be measured as 
part of the assay protocol, as we illustrate in the uranium neutron collar case study. 
3. The GUM and UQ for NDA
Recall that Eq. (4) is aimed primarily at bottom-up UQ, using either steps in the assay method 
and uncertainties in 1 2, ,..., pX X X , or using calibration data (see the UNCL case study in 
Section 4). However, supplements to the GUM describe analysis of variance in the context 
of top-down UQ using measurement results from multiple laboratories and/or assay 
methods to measure the same measurand. 
     The purpose of a measurement is to provide information about the measurand, such as the 
SNM mass. Both frequentist and Bayesian viewpoints are used in estimating the measurand 
and in characterizing the estimate’s uncertainty. Elster [13] and Willink [14] point out that the 
GUM invokes both Bayesian and frequentist approaches in a manner that is potentially 
confusing. To modify the GUM so that a consistent approach is taken for all types of 
uncertainty, [14] suggests an entirely frequentist approach while others suggest an entirely 
Bayesian approach.  Bich [5] also points out confusion between frequentist and Bayesian 
terminology and approaches in the GUM, which is one reason it would be useful to revise the 
GUM. No matter which approach is used, making it clear which quantities are viewed as 
random and which are viewed as unknown constants will avoid needless confusion. However, 
the real challenges involve choosing a likelihood for the data, a model to express how the 
measurand is estimated, and a model to describe the measurement process. These challenges 
are present in both frequentist and Bayesian approaches. 
     Ambiguities in the GUM arise for at least three reasons [3,14,16]: (1) The GUM divides the 
treatment of errors into those evaluated by type A evaluation (traditional data-based empirical 
assessment), and those addressed by type B evaluation (expert opinion, experience with other 
similar measurements). However, type B evaluations are primarily Bayesian (degree of belief) 
without explicitly stating so (and need not be), while type A evaluations are primarily 
frequentist (and need not be). The jargon used in describing type B evaluations implies that the 
true value T has a variance (a Bayesian view based on quantification of our state of 
knowledge). The jargon used in describing type A evaluations is frequentist, with 
statements such as    1 0.0) 5(P X T kσ− > = , with the interpretation that X varies randomly 
around the fitted quantity T , where σ is the known measurement error standard deviation. We 
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endorse either view, when clearly explained, but typically write 2 ˆ( 0) .05P X T k σ− > = where 
the hat notation conveys that the standard deviation is an unknown parameter that must be 
estimated, so 2 1k k> . (2) The GUM uses the same symbol X for a measurement result and for 
a true value, which also confuses the frequentist and Bayesian views. (3) There is vague use of 
the term “quantity.” And, although the GUM attempted to clarify confusion between “error” 
and “uncertainty,” it did not clearly use the term “error” when measurement error (which has a 
sign, positive or negative) was meant. Willink [14] aims to resolve these ambiguities by paying 
attention to notation and jargon, being careful to separate Bayesian from frequentist views, and 
pointing out a confusion of true values with measurements of true values.   Also, the GUM does 
not explicitly address calibration; however, because calibration is almost never a completely 
straight-forward application of ordinary regression, we agree with [13] that UQ for calibration 
deserves attention, as we illustrate with the UNCL example in Section 4. 
     Elster [13] points out that Eq. (4) is Bayesian because it implies a probability distribution 
for the SNM mass M, and [13] shows that for a particular form of noninformative (large 
variance) prior probability distribution for M, there is Bayesian approach that exactly agrees 
with that implied by placing a joint probability distribution on the inputs.  We point out here 
that historically, Bayesians have regarded the posterior probability distribution as the central 
feature of a Bayesian analysis. Frequentists interpret probability as the frequency of 
occurrence of an event. In metrology (for NDA or more generally), there is opportunity to 
merge some of the best Bayesian and frequentist practices.  Prior probabilities can encode 
constraints, such as true quantities being nonnegative; then, the actual frequency within which 
a 95% Bayesian probability interval actually includes the true value can be observed; thus, 
metrology provides a practical application for the notion of being a “calibrated Bayesian.”  A 
calibrated Bayesian borrows Bayesian and frequentist ideas.  
3.1 Example application of GUM to NDA 
     Nearly all assay methods, including all NDA methods rely on calibration. However, NDA 
methods are sometimes applied to test items that have different physical properties than 
calibration items. Elster [13] shows why GUM’s measurement Eq. (1) is not directly set up 
for calibration. However, with some creativity, one could map calibration problems to Eq. (1), 
which we now illustrate using a simple version of the enrichment meter principle (EMP). 
     Suppose we fit the known enrichment in each of several standards to observed counts in a few 
energy channels near the 185.7 keV energy as the “peak” region and to the counts in a few 
energy channels just below and just above the 185.7 keV energy to estimate background, 
expressed as 
1 1 2 2  ,Y X X Rβ β= + +  (6) 
where Y is the enrichment, X1 is the observed peak count rate, X2 is the observed 
background count rate, and R is random error. The calibration data is used to estimate β1, and 
β2. One could constrain the estimates 1ˆβ  of 1β and 2βˆ  of 2β  to be equal in magnitude in the 
case where the same number of energy channels is used for both the peak and background. That 
would correspond to assuming a constant (non-sloping) background throughout the peak region, 
which is sometimes, but not always, appropriate. Therefore, in practice, we do not force the 
constraint 1 2ˆ ˆβ β= − .  Also, note that the true enrichment is never known exactly, not even in
standards; however, the uncertainty in standards can be accounted for, and for convenience here 
will be assumed to be negligible.  
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     Because X1 and X2 are the measured count rates, they have measurement error. However, 
as we show numerically in the UNCL case study, there is no need to use the errors in 
predictors literature [7,17]. There is the need to estimate the 2-by-2 covariance matrix of 
( 1ˆβ , 2ˆ )β , which is best done by simulation unless one can safely assume that the errors in X1
and X2 can be neglected in this context. Some will argue that using simulation to estimate 
cov(( 1ˆβ , 2ˆ )β is beyond application of GUM’s Eq. (1). However, if we adopt a general
interpretation of Eq. (1), allowing type A and/or type B analyses to inform on the probability 
distribution of the inputs, then we can compute the estimated Y using test 1 1,test 2 2,testˆ ˆˆ  Y X Xβ β= + ,  
which can be thought of as being an example of 
1 2 3 4 1 2 1,test 2,tes 1 1,test 2 2,t tt es
ˆ ˆ( , ˆ ˆ  ,  , ) ( , , , )X X X X XY f f X XX ββ β β+== = , which has a probability
distribution that can be inferred from simulation applied to the calibration data. If the count times 
in training differ from the count times in testing, then modifications are necessary.  Also, see 
[13], who points out that there is not a unique functional form analogous to GUM’s Eq. (1), 
1 2( , ,..., )pY f X X X= . Instead, there is a collection of (Y, 1,train 2,train,X X ) triples from which 
( 1ˆβ , 2ˆ )β is estimated, using, for example, errors in predictors methods or not. So, even relatively
simple calibration applications such as the EMP without complications (next paragraph) are not 
fully treated by GUMs measurement Eq. (1). Nevertheless, one could defend regarding 
1 1,test 2 2,test
ˆ ˆ X Xβ β+ as a deterministic function of random quantities, and so it has a probability
distribution, paving the way for a Bayesian treatment if desired. 
     Several departures from calibration items can occur in test items; one common departure 
from calibration items is that test items could have meaningfully different container thicknesses, 
which must be measured and then the count rates X1 and X2 are adjusted accordingly, using 
the factor exp(µρx), where x is container thickness, µρ is the gamma linear absorption 
coefficient that adjusts for test items and calibration items having different container 
thicknesses. Reference [2] gives more detail about calibration and analyses of EMP data. If 
such departures occur, then a model is used to adjust to calibration conditions, which might 
still be amenable to a GUM-type UQ analysis, depending on the complexity of the model and 
the methods needed to validate the model for the NDA application. 
3.2 Example NDA applications that require extensions to the GUM 
     This subsection describes two NDA applications (the Cf shuffler, and the distributed 
source term analysis) that have emerging UQ topics that are not specifically addressed by the 
GUM, including: item-specific biases, errors in predictors, and quantification of uncertainty in 
computer models. Many NDA applications are like the extended version of the EMP where 
model-based adjustments are needed to adjust physical attributes of test items to those in the 
calibration items. 
3.2.1  Cf Shuffler 
     Shufflers measure fissile masses nondestructively by counting neutrons released as a result 
of fissions that are induced by successive irradiations from a source consisting of 252Cf 
neutrons.  As the hydrogen density from the non-SNM material increases, the shuffler 
accuracy can degrade because the detected count rate varies with the SNM positions within 
the item. In some cases, hardware additions to reduce the average energy of the irradiating 
neutrons reduces this problem, but increase item self-shielding, leading to other bias sources. 
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Alternate strategies, including imaging, have been pursued, but none have been completely 
acceptable. 
     Certified standards exist for only a few material categories (categories are defined on the 
basis of material type and packaging), while measurements are needed for a wide variety of 
categories. The standards are used in a calibration step to estimate the pseudo-source strength 
of the 252Cf neutrons. The procedure is to determine the source strength that minimizes the 
difference between the measured and MCNP-calculated count rates (CR) for the standards. 
The calculated count rate is the product of three numbers, F1 x F2 x F3, where F1 is a MCNP-
based estimate of the expected total number of counts (over all shuffle cycles) per source 
252Cf neutron per gram of SNM, F2 is a known constant that is determined by cycle time 
parameters such as count times with and without the 252Cf source neutrons, and F3 is a 
calibration parameter to be estimated [18]. The equation M = CR/(F1 x F2 x F3) + error can 
be fit to the measured data for calibration standards, leading to a least squares estimate of F3. 
Because of nonnegligible error in F1 due to MCNPX-based model uncertainty, this is another 
“errors in predictors” problem. However, in this case, there is no direct interest in the estimate 
of F1, F2,or F3. The main goal is to use the estimated F1 x F2 x F3 to convert CRs on test 
items to estimates of SNM mass. 
     If there were no model error (and all the relevant properties of the standards such as 
density and material form were known exactly), then F3 would estimate the actual 252Cf 
neutron source strength.   Following calibration on standards to estimate F3, we convert 
measured CR on a test item to estimated SNM mass using M = CR/(F1 x F2 x F3) + error.  
There will be errors in the predictor CR due to having a modest total count time, and there 
will be errors in the product F1 x F2 x F3 arising from errors in F1 x F3 due to modelling 
imperfections. 
     An unusual aspect of the calibration procedure is the partitioning into measurement 
categories. From the procedure described above, we recognize that if a new material category 
is to be assayed, using the F3 associated with calibration on the standards, then model errors 
arise from: (1) unmodeled effects that impact the new material category in a different manner 
than they impact the standards, and/or (2) improperly specified material properties in either 
the standards or the new category. Either of these effects leads to errors in F1 x F3 that could 
be different for the new category than for the standards and also different than errors in other 
measurement categories. 
     Examples of unmodeled or inaccurately modeled effects include some of the following:  
(1) the Cadmium liners on the detector banks have holes that are not currently modeled; (2) 
The detector is not technically modeled exactly as built. It would take a great deal of effort to 
include all the details, for examples there are certainly air gaps in the assembly of polyethlene 
blocks, yet the blocks are assumed to be one solid mass;(3) The 252Cf neutrons are inside of a 
small metal capsule, yet this capsule is not included in the model for cost/benefit reasons. (4) 
There is a motor below the rotating turntable in the floor of the shuffler; it was not put in the 
model for cost/benefit reasons.  This example list is current but subject to change; however, 
for any implementation there will be unmodeled effects, some of which could be important in 
UQ, although it is usually assumed that biases due to such modelling imperfections largely 
cancel out in relative calculations. 
     We regard the Cf shuffler with computational adjustments (F1 x F3 is estimated from 
imperfect application of MCNP) as having uncertainty that, while in principle, might be 
amenable to a type B evaluation, regulators will not yet accept the computational adjustments 
without further study. In short, the “propagate uncertainty in inputs to uncertainty in the 
output” guidance as implied by GUMs Eq. (1), is useful, but still leaves most of the work to 
understanding uncertainty in the inputs (which include computational adjustments) to those 
performing bottom-up UQ. Also, fundamental nuclear data, which is used, for example, by 
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MCNP in the Cf shuffler example, and in many other examples, has uncertainties whose 
impact depends on how calibration data and models are used.  
3.2.2 Distributed Source Term Analysis 
     The distributed source-term analysis (DSTA) is a measurement technique that has been 
applied to a variety of safeguards and verification situations where the amount of neutron-
producing material contained within a large area needs to be measured in a timely fashion. 
The technique was originally developed to assay material present in uranium enrichment 
cascade halls [19] using neutron counting. It has also been applied to the assay of low-activity 
waste storage areas, and static material storage areas. Current development of the DSTA 
technique is focused on material accountancy in plutonium glovebox process lines. In these 
cases, tools are being developed to assist the operator to localize materials to improve 
cleanout operations.   
     The DSTA is applied in situations where a neutron assay of a large area is required. In 
these cases, the sampled area is too large to be placed inside a counter as is done in a 
traditional neutron assay measurement. Instead, the detector is positioned at a variety of 
known positions within the sample volume and the neutron count rate is measured at each 
position. The sample area is then divided into a number of discrete source voxel locations. A 
room-response matrix is determined using MCNP to estimate the source-to-detector coupling 
for each voxel-measurement position pair. The MCNP-based estimate of the room response 
and measurement data are then used to estimate the neutron activity in each source voxel in 
the assay area. 
     The DSTA analysis consists of three basic activities: sampling, simulation, and fitting. 
During sampling, measurement positions are selected throughout the assay area to insure that 
the entire sample volume is adequately measured, where adequacy is determined by the 
particular application. The measured counts for positions 1, 2, …, P, are placed in a vector MP
([counts/sec]) and the location of each measurement position is recorded for use in the 
simulation phase. 
In the simulation phase, the sample itself (large storage area, process hall, etc.) is modeled 
using MCNP.  The sample can be divided into V discrete source voxels, the activity of which 
(AV [neutrons/sec]) can be estimated from the DSTA method, provided the number of 
measurement positions P >	  V. The MCNP code is used to determine the source-to-detector 
coupling between each of the V source voxels and each of the P measurement positions. The 
MCNP efficiency results are used to populate a response matrix, RVP ([counts/neutron]). The 
resulting system of linear equations is used to estimate the neutron production activity of each 
source voxel in units of neutrons/second. 
     The DSTA data model is then ~ Poisson( )p VP V
V
M t R A t∑ , and the main goal is to
estimate the total activity, VV A∑  (or total SNM mass).  This is another errors-in-predictors
problem, where the predictors RVP are estimated using MCNP and the estimates are partially 
validated using real (and corresponding MCNP-modeled) Cf sources at known source 
locations and recording their measured source strength at known detector locations. Because 
the error structure in the RVP matrix is currently not well known, [20] could only perform a 
“what if” sensitivity study, simply evaluating the error in the estimated total activity, VV A∑
under various assumptions about the error structure in the MCNP-based estimate of RVP , and 
using various options for dealing with errors in predictors. None of the errors in predictors 
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literature deals with the types of error structure that is possibly present in RVP, such as having 
both random and systematic components.  As in the EMP example, one could map the data 
model ~ Poisson( )p VP V
V
M t R A t∑  to one that expresses the estimate for total
activity, VV A∑ as a function of several inputs, including MCNP-based estimates of RVP.
However, this again still leaves most of the work to understanding uncertainty in the inputs 
(which include MCNP-based estimates of RVP) to those performing bottom-up UQ. 
4. UNCL case study
The UNCL uses an active neutron source (AmLi) to induce fission in the 235U in fresh fuel
assemblies [21-23]. Figure 1 is a simple overhead view produced by MCNP [12, 21-23]. 
Neutron coincidence counting is used to measure the “reals”, i.e. neutron coincident rate R 
attributable to fission events, which can then be used to determine the linear density of 235U in 
a fuel assembly (g-235U/cm) from calibration parameters, a1 and a2. The equation used to 







are calibration parameters, and k = k0k1k2k3k4k5 is a product of correction factors that adjust R 
(R = X in Eq. (7)) to  item-, detector-, and source-specific conditions in the calibration [21-
23]. Therefore, Eq. (7) is a special case of GUM’s Eq. (1), where the two calibration 
parameters a1 and a2 and the 6 correction factors k0 ,k1, k2, k3, k4 , and k5 are among the X’s in 
Eq. (1). We caution readers that GUM does not fully treat multi-parameter calibration 
uncertainties, so there are open issues in applying GUM’s Eq. (1) even to this relatively 
straightforward calibration problem. Also, there is much current research on options ot 
improve the UNCL method for new types of fuels, which will be reported elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, it provides a practical basis to support discussion of the current practice for 
NDA and to describe a roadmap for more comprehensive UQ for NDA.  
4.1 Description of UNCL Calibration and the 6 Correction Factors k0, k1, k2, k3, 
k4, and k5 
      Menlove et al. [22] introduced correction factors to adjust the measured reals count rate to 
the corresponding reals count rates observed in the calibration condition for a particular a1, a2 
coefficient pair.  Coefficient-pairs were defined for standard PWR and BWR fuel types by 
[16].  Since that original reporting coefficient pairs have been determined for WWER-440 and 
WWER-1000 fuel types [21-23]. 
     The term k0 accounts for uncertainty in the true Am/Li source strength (approximately 
historically 3.7% relative error standard deviation (RSD) if use recent IAEA estimates). The 
term k1 accounts for uncertainty due to electronic drift (considered negligible with modern 
electronics, so k1=1). The term k2 accounts for uncertainty due to differences in detector 
efficiencies (approximately 1.5% RSD). The term k3 accounts for the effects of burnable 
poison (burnable poison absorbs neutrons). The term k4 accounts for differences in the total 
uranium loading (U-total/cm) between the calibration case and the measurement case. The 
term k5 accounts for all other effects (eg spacers, bagged assemblies). 
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     The k-factors were introduced to allow for the use of the same 1a  and 2a values over a 
wide range of measurement cases and different UNCL detector systems.  In the present 
consideration the calibration factors, 1a  and 2a , and the  k-factors help to identify error 
sources in the UNCL measurement and calibration. 
Figure 1. Simple overhead view of an UNCL, produced from MCNP. The 6x6 fuel pins of 
the assembly are in the center of the detector cavity in white. The 16 blue circles forming a 
“collar” around the sample are the 3He neutron proportional counters. The green is the 
detector body; the red areas are air. The source is the large white circle towards the right. 
4.2 Example analyses 
     We reanalysed 9 pairs of (R, 235U) from Table VII for PWR from [22], fitting Eq. (7) with 
approximately 2% RSD. Figure 2 plots the 9 (R, 235U) pairs. We then applied a single noise 
factor and k = k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5  to introduce noise due to departure from calibration conditions 
as described in Section 4.1.  
     Figure 3 gives example RSD values for the 9 (R,235U) pairs in 105 simulations in R [24]. In 
each simulation, 6 of the 9 (R,235U) pairs were randomly selected to calibrate, and the other 3 
(R,235U) pairs were used to test.  Dividing into training and testing helps to account for model 
uncertainty in Eq. (7). Varying amount of random error in k was applied, ranging from 
approximately 1 to 5% RSD, which represents the aggregate effect of errors in each of k0-k5.  
The plot in Figure 3 assumed that the same RSD values in k were present in the 6 training 
pairs as in the 3 testing pairs. If there are different error magnitudes in testing than in training, 
then bias can be introduced in the estimated 235U [3,7]. Also, if there is an adjustment for 
errors in predictors [7,17], then the RSD is higher (option 2 in Figure 3) compared to not 
adjusting for errors in predictor (option 1 in Figure 3). And, there is a very large bias 
component contributing to the large RSD in the option 2 results in Figure 3. Interestingly, 
there is sometimes a large bias being observed in top-down evaluations of the UNCL [3].  The 
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equal to 1) using all 9 (R, 235U) pairs for 2
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σ . If there is no adjustment for errors in predictors, 
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∑ , which is the appropriate and familiar 
criterion if the goal is to predict y. 
     GUM’s key measurement equation (our Eq. (1) and (4)), 1 2( , ,..., )pM f X X X=  could be 
modified to allow for both “computational calibration” in which one uses modelling to adjust 
test items to calibration items (via the k factor in the UNCL example) and errors in predictors. 
However, one would need to allow for bias in the adjustment to calibration items by having 
different probability distributions for some of the inputs 1 2, ,..., pX X X in training and testing. 
This moves the analysis toward Monte Carlo simulation assessments, without concern for 
whether the probability distribution for the item SNM mass can be expressed as a known 
function, 1 2( , ,..., )pM f X X X= .  Because we do not yet have a defensible estimate of the 
probability distribution of the k factor, this example is for illustration only, not for a 
defensible bottom-up UQ for the UNCL. Also, choices in how to perform the calibration 
(with or without adjusting for errors in predictors for example) are best assessed using 
simulation, as we did in Figure 3. 
Figure 2.  The 235U mass per cm (linear density) versus the background-corrected reals 
coincidence rate R. The fit to Eq. (7) from the data is also shown. The 9 R values are 111.1, 
132.0, 149.7, 158.8, 164.1, 173.4, 176.0, 180.8, 186.5 [/s]. The corresponding 9 235U values 
are 16.20, 21.89, 27.59, 29.37, 31.15, 33.28, 34.71, 36.84, 38.98 [g/cm]. 
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Figure 3.  The RSD in UNCL prediction versus RSD in kR on the basis of 105 simulations. 
The data are the 9 data pairs from [22]. A large bias component is contributing to the large 
RSD in the option 2 results, due to adjusting for EIP by using the 1RSS criterion rather than 
the 2RSS criterion to estimate 1a , 2a . 
5. Discussion and Summary
This article has illustrated several challenges in UQ for NDA (EMP, Cf shuffler, DSTA,
and UNCL). As the need for better UQ for NDA is becoming recognized, the GUM [4] is 
being revised [5]. It is possible that the NDA community will need a modified GUM, or that 
NDA UQ needs can influence the in-progress GUM revision. For example, the UNCL case 
study illustrates that there is a need for attention to errors in predictors in the GUM 
supplement that deals with calibration. The UNCL case study is also an example of 
“computational calibration,” in which one uses modelling to adjust test items to calibration 
items. Other examples of computational calibration include the Cf shuffler [18], and possibly, 
in new applications of NDA to spent fuel assay [8]. In the case of spent fuel assay, it is 
currently unclear to what extent MCNP modelling will be used as part of the assay procedure 
once working standards become available.  
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Abstract: 
From nuclear safeguards to homeland security applications, the need for better modeling of nuclear 
interactions has grown over the past decades. Current Monte Carlo radiation transport codes compute 
average quantities with great accuracy and performance, but performance and averaging come at the 
price of limited interaction-by-interaction modeling. These codes often lack the capability of modeling 
interactions exactly: for a given collision, energy is not conserved, energies of emitted particles are 
uncorrelated, multiplicities of prompt fission neutrons and photons are uncorrelated. Many modern 
applications require more exclusive quantities than averages, such as the fluctuations in certain 
observables (e.g. the neutron multiplicity) and correlations between neutrons and photons. In an effort 
to meet this need, the radiation transport Monte Carlo code TRIPOLI-4® was modified to provide a 
specific mode modeling nuclear interactions in a full analog way, replicating as much as possible the 
underlying physical process. Furthermore, the computational model FREYA (Fission Reaction Event 
Yield Algorithm) was coupled with TRIPOLI-4® to model complete fission events. FREYA automatically 
includes fluctuations as well as correlations resulting from conservation of energy and momentum. 
Neutron Multiplicity Counting (NMC) exploits the correlated nature of fission chains, and thus requires 
analog neutron transport. With the latest analog neutron transport developments in TRIPOLI-4®, we 
will show that NMC can now be properly simulated, by reconstructing the mass and multiplication of an 
object by analyzing the measured signal from 3He tubes in a well counter. 
Keywords: Monte Carlo radiation transport code; Neutron Multiplicity Counting; TRIPOLI-4®; FREYA; 
analog transport 
1. Introduction
Methods based on time-correlated signals have been developed over many years to characterize 
fissile materials. For NMC, sequences of thermal neutron captures are recorded in 3He tubes. To 
determine features of the measured objects, the sequences are split into time windows, and the 
numbers of neutrons arriving in each window are recorded to build statistical count distributions. 
These distributions are in turn analyzed to authenticate or characterize fissile materials. Some 
materials such as 252Cf emit several neutrons simultaneously, whereas others such as uranium and 
plutonium multiply the number of neutrons to form bursts. This translates into unmistakable time-
correlated signatures. 
General Monte Carlo codes that are used for criticality safety evaluations are typically meant for 
calculation of an integral reactor parameter such as keff and for estimation of neutron fluxes and 
derived quantities of interest. They make use of well established variation reduction techniques 
leading to more efficient calculations. These techniques are meant to speed up calculations and are 
sufficient for the calculation of average quantities such as flux, energy deposition and multiplication. 
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However, they suffer from approximations of the underlying physical interactions, and are thus 
unsuitable for studying detailed correlations between neutrons and/or photons on an interaction-by-
interaction basis, and in particular for NMC which relies on the correlated nature of fission chains. 
The first part of this paper will focus on the latest TRIPOLI-4® [1][2] developments that were necessary 
to simulate NMC experiments: analog neutron transport, coupling with the LLNL Fission 
Library/FREYA [3]-[5] package for fission interactions, development of a spontaneous fission source, 
and new options to reduce memory footprint of ROOT [6] track files. The second part will focus on the 
use of these new capabilities for NMC. We will show that the mass and multiplication of a PuO2 ball in 
a well counter (see Fig. 1) can be determined from measurements of the neutron captures in the 3He 
tubes. 
Figure 1: (color online) Cutouts to show the inside of a well counter. Polyethylene (magenta), Cadmium (cyan), 
3He tubes (green), representation of a generic neutron source to be characterized (blue). 
Left: multiple 3He tubes removed for clarity. Right: upper polyethylene plug removed. 
2. Developments in TRIPOLI-4® for NMC
TRIPOLI-4® solves the linear Boltzmann equation for neutrons, photons, electrons and positrons with 
the Monte Carlo method, in any 3-D geometry. The code uses ENDF format continuous-energy cross 
sections from various international evaluations. It has advanced variance reduction methods to 
address deep penetration issues and can be run in parallel. TRIPOLI-4® is used as a reference code 
for industrial purposes (fission/fusion) for CEA1, EDF2 and branches of AREVA, as well as an R&D 
and teaching tool, for radiation protection and shielding, core physics, nuclear criticality safety and 
nuclear instrumentation. 
This section presents the list of the most important TRIPOLI-4® developments that were required for 
the NMC application, starting from version 9 of the code. These developments were made using a 
recent version of TRIPOLI-4® with analog mode capabilities [7]. While simulating the well counter was 
the objective of this study, these developments would also apply to multiplicity counting with liquid 
scintillators for fast neutrons and photons. 
2.1. Coupling of FREYA and TRIPOLI-4® for fission modeling 
To model fission, general-purpose Monte Carlo codes TRIPOLI-4®, MCNP6/X [8], TART [9], COG [10], 
Geant [11], etc.) employ the “average fission model” which is characterized by outgoing projectiles 
(fission neutrons and photons) that are uncorrelated, and sampled from the same probability density 
functions.  
During the past decade several code extensions have been developed that allow the modeling of 
correlations in fission. MCNP-DSP [12] and MCNPX-PoliMi [13] added limited angular correlations of 
1
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 Electricité de France 
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fission neutrons. The LLNL Fission Library [14], introduced in MCNPX2.7.0 [15], Geant 4.9 [11] and 
MCNP6 featured time-correlated sampling of photons from neutron-induced fission, photofission and 
spontaneous fission. The capabilities for correlations are, however, limited, as they sample outgoing 
particles from average fission distributions instead of sampling them from individual realizations of a 
fission process. 
In recent years, various simulation treatments addressed fluctuations of and correlations between 
fission observables. In particular, a Monte Carlo approach was developed [16] for the sequential 
emission of neutrons and photons from individual fission fragments in binary fission. The more recent 
event-by-event fission model, FREYA, has been specifically designed for producing large numbers of 
fission events in a fast simulation [17]. Employing nuclear data for fragment mass and kinetic energy 
distributions, using statistical evaporation models for neutron and photon emission, and conserving 
energy, momentum, and angular momentum throughout, FREYA is able to predict a host of correlation 
observables, including correlations in neutron multiplicity, energy, and angles, and the energy sharing 
between neutrons and photons. For modeling of fission on an interaction-by-interaction basis, the new 
LLNL Fission Library/FREYA package was coupled with TRIPOLI-4®. 
2.2. Development of a spontaneous fission source 
A spontaneous fission source was developed to sample time-correlated neutrons and photons from 
fission. This source emits bursts of time-correlated prompt neutrons and photons from individual 
fission events, whose multiplicities and energies are sampled from the LLNL Fission Library/FREYA 
package. TRIPOLI-4® accesses this source as an external source (see User Manual [1]). The times of 
spontaneous fissions are sampled randomly and uniformly within a given time interval ∆T 3. The rate of 
spontaneous fissions has to match the rate Fs of spontaneous fissions of the object to be measured 
experimentally. It is therefore essential to set the correct number of particles accordingly. 
2.3. Reduction in tracks memory footprint 
To model NMC for the well counter shown in Fig. 1, it is necessary to store the time tags of all the 
neutron capture reactions in the 3He tubes. It was quickly realized that the ROOT tracks stored by 
TRIPOLI-4® became bloated for large simulations, leading to files that were close to terabytes in size 
for seconds of experimental data. Most of the tracks did not result in 3He(n,p) reactions and were thus 
cluttering the disk. When filtering out tracks failing to traverse detector cells, we were able to 
substantially decrease the memory footprint, but not enough. Two new options were therefore 
introduced to further reduce the size of the track files. The first option enables us to store full tracks 
containing one or several events of interest, whereas the second option enables storage of only 
specific events with those tracks. With these two additional filters, we could keep the footprint of the 
ROOT track files in check. 
3. PuO2 ball
Let's consider a PuO2 object spherical in shape, of weight equal to 5.5366 kg, density 3 g/cc, and of 
outer radius 7.62 cm 4. Knowing the neutron yields of the different isotopes composing the object, we 
calculated the rate of spontaneous fissions to be 140170 spontaneous fissions/s. The spontaneous 
fission source is uniformly distributed across the sphere. A simulation of the PuO2 source in the well 
counter shown in Fig. 1 was performed. While the intensity of the (α,n) source could be calculated, we 
will neglect this contribution for the purpose of this study. 
3.1. Fitting count distributions to determine system parameters 
The arrival times of the neutrons in each of the 3He tubes were recorded in the simulation. Randomly 
splitting the sequence of time tags into N segments of width T (where T is of the order of 
microseconds to hundreds of microseconds) one can count how many neutrons arrive in the first 
3
 The time tags of the 3He(n,p) reactions in the 3He tubes are re-ordered chronologically in post-processing. 
4
 The isotopics of the plutonium are 0.014% 238Pu, 93.5% 239Pu, 6% 240Pu, 0.5% 241Pu, 0.03% 242Pu, and traces of 
other isotopes. 
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segment, how many in the second segment, in the third one, etc. to build a distribution )(TBn  of the 
number n of neutrons arriving in the segments of width T. The blue dots labelled “simulated data” in 
the left-hand graph of Fig. 4 show a typical count distribution. 
The probability distributions )(Tbn  (where )(Tbn  is the probability of recording n counts in a time gate 
T, which is equivalent to )(TBn  normalized by the number of segments of width T) can be 
reconstructed theoretically [18] using different sets of the three free parameters (M, ε, ssp Fν ), where 
M is the multiplication of the object, ε the efficiency of the detector array, spν the average number of 
neutrons emitted per spontaneous fission and Fs the intensity in units of spontaneous fissions per 
second of the spontaneous fission sources in the object. Using a likelihood function, one can 
determine which parameters (M, ε, ssp Fν ) generate the theoretical count distribution )(Tbtheoryn  closest 
to the measured data points )(Tbn . This method is best described in Ref. [19]. 
Each set of parameters (M, ε, ssp Fν ) has an associated likelihood that the reconstructed )(Tbtheoryn
will be a good match to the measured )(Tbn . Using Bayes' theorem, we calculate the posterior 
probability of each such set. To determine the region of the (M, ε, ssp Fν ) space that contains the 
solution with a credibility of 68.27%, we have to accumulate high posterior probability sets until the 
cumulative probability reaches 68.27%. Fig. 2 shows the credible regions in the (M, ε) and (M, ssp Fν ) 
parameter spaces for credibilities of 68.27% (red), 95.45% (yellow) and 99.73% (blue). The top two 
graphs are computed with FREYA. The bottom two graphs are computed without FREYA. Without 
FREYA, ν  is statistically rounded up or down at each fission site to get a number of neutrons. Fig. 3 
shows the same credible regions for 2530 seconds. 
Figure 2: (color online) Credible regions for theoretical reconstructions of PuO2 ball:  
68.27% (red), 95.45% (yellow), 99.73% (blue). 
Nuclear data for induced fission of 239Pu at 1 MeV. The measurement time is equivalent to 350 seconds. 
Top left: (M, ε) with FREYA. Top right: (M, ssp Fν ) with FREYA. 
Bottom left: (M, ε) without FREYA. Bottom right: (M, ssp Fν ) without FREYA. 
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Figure 3: (color online) Credible regions for theoretical reconstructions of PuO2 ball:  
68.27% (red), 95.45% (yellow), 99.73% (blue). 
Nuclear data for induced fission of 239Pu at 1 MeV. The measurement time equivalent to 2530 seconds. 
Top left: (M, ε) with FREYA. Top right: (M, ssp Fν ) with FREYA. 
Bottom left: (M, ε) without FREYA. Bottom right: (M, ssp Fν ) without FREYA. 
3.2. Discussions 
Table 1 shows the multiplication calculated by TRIPOLI-4® in different modes: either a criticality 
calculation including a convergence process of the fission source, or a fixed source criticality 
calculation where the same neutron source is kept during the whole simulation and fission neutrons 
are sampled but not used for the source convergence (see TRIPOLI-4® User Manual [1]). 
TRIPOLI-4® simulation mode LLNL Fission 
Library/FREYA 
M ± σ 
CRITICALITY no 1.3312 ± 0.0012 5 
FIXED_SOURCES_CRITICALITY no 1.3140 ± 0.0007 
FIXED_SOURCES_CRITICALITY yes 1.3124 ± 0.0008 
Table 1: Neutron multiplication for PuO2 ball in the well counter calculated with TRIPOLI-4®. 
With TRIPOLI-4® running in analog mode, the multiplication of the PuO2 ball within the well counter 
was calculated to be 1.3124 ± 0.0008 with FREYA, and 1.3140 ± 0.0007 without FREYA. These 
multiplications are very close and show that average quantities are not affected by the choice of the 
fission model, whether it statistically samples ν  rounded up or down, or a full neutron multiplicity 
distribution. 
5
 This multiplication was calculated using M = 1/(1-keff) and the k-eigenvalue method of TRIPOLI-4® for keff. Since 
this method does not solve the same problem as the FIXED_SOURCES_CRITICALITY method [20], it is not 
expected to produce the same multiplication. It is only shown for the sake of completeness. 
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For the reconstruction with FREYA, the best solution is (M, ε, ssp Fν ) = (1.35, 20.9%, 308368 n/s). 
One may wonder whether the credible regions shown in the top two graphs of Fig. 3 contain the true 
solution, which is the one with the source intensity used for the simulation and the multiplication 
computed by TRIPOLI-4®. The solution (1.33, 21.5%, 303041 n/s) in these two graphs is within the 
68.27% credible region and gives the correct source intensity of 302799 n/s. The small discrepancies 
are likely to be attributed to systematic errors, and to inadequacies in the theory to model the 
experiment. This is discussed at length in Ref. [19]. 
It is interesting to compare the count distributions reconstructed from the different solutions within the 
68.27% credible region. A set of three such distributions is shown in the left-hand graph of Fig. 4. All 
the solutions within the credible region are essentially indistinguishable, which explains the size of the 
uncertainty in that region, and illustrates the highly degenerate nature of the model. 
Figure 4: (color online) Comparison between theoretically reconstructed count distributions within the 68.27% 
credible region in Fig. 3. Random time gate count distribution. Time gate width = 1 ms. Simulation result in blue. 
Nuclear data for induced fission of 239Pu at 1 MeV. The measurement time is equivalent to 2530 seconds. 
Left: with FREYA. Right: without FREYA. 
Without FREYA, the best solution for the reconstruction is (M, ε, ssp Fν ) = (1.16, 27.9%, 257174 n/s). 
Within the 68.27% credible region, the solution that gives the closest source intensity is (M, ε, ssp Fν ) = 
(1.2, 26.0%, 269471 n/s). The model still gives very good count distribution reconstructions, as the 
right-hand graph of Fig. 4 illustrates, but unfortunately, these reconstructions are for the incorrect 
parameters. For correlated quantities and low multiplication, sampling the full distribution for the fission 
neutron multiplicity is important. The correct solution could be found with FREYA, whereas without 
FREYA the default neutron multiplicity sampling gave incorrect solutions. 
4. Conclusion
FREYA was coupled to TRIPOLI-4® for the purpose of using the latter for NMC. With the addition of a 
few modifications such as analog transport, spontaneous fission sources and improved tracking 
capabilities, we demonstrated by way of a PuO2 ball simulation that TRIPOLI-4® when coupled with 
FREYA can simulate physical correlations sufficiently well to reproduce predicted count distributions 
measured by a well counter.  
Average quantities like neutron flux, reaction rate, multiplication are not affected by the choice of the 
fission model. Whether the fission model statistically samples ν  rounded up or down, or a full fission 
neutron multiplicity distribution, to emit a number of secondary neutrons, has little to no impact on the 
result. 
For methods using correlated quantities, sampling the full distribution for the fission neutron multiplicity 
is paramount. The correct solution to the PuO2 ball problem could be found with the fission model 
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FREYA, whereas the default neutron multiplicity sampling gave incorrect solutions6. Thus, including 
such capabilities in Monte Carlo transport codes is important. 
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Abstract:
At Sellafield, a retrievals programme has recently been completed recovering a number of bottles
containing residues from a legacy store. The material in these bottles originated from the cleanout of a
range of different plutonium process gloveboxes, mixed-oxide (MOX) manufacturing processes and
from sweepings collected following various decommissioning activities. The bottles fell into two
categories; Residues (either plutonium or MOX) which were decanted into new containers,
consolidated and exported to a purpose built store, and low fissile content ‘Dross’ bottles, which were 
consigned as plutonium contaminated material (PCM) waste.
The Dross bottles, which mainly consisted of floor sweepings and dusts arising from decommissioning
operations, were assayed in a Plutonium Piece Assay Monitor (PPAM) and consigned as PCM waste
using the standard assay process: Passive Neutron Coincidence Counting (PNCC) combined with
High Resolution Gamma-ray Spectrometry (HRGS).
The PPAM was also used to assay consolidated Residue containers in order to provide Best
Estimates of the plutonium and uranium content for Safeguards purposes. The majority of these
residues contained high plutonium content and many also had a high proportion of plutonium fluoride
(PuF4) present, resulting in high neutron count rates leading to large statistical uncertainty on the
coincident neutron count rate and also significant elevation of this count rate due to high rates of
induced fission. The high statistical uncertainty meant the PNCC measurements could not meet the
required precision, and offline analysis was required to accurately determine the plutonium and
uranium content.
An innovative fluoride correction was successfully applied to the Residues with significant PuF4
content, utilising the HRGS data to determine the relative amount of PuF4 (with respect to total
plutonium) in addition to the isotopic composition, thereby allowing computation of the plutonium
content from the total neutron count rate. This analysis provided results that were broadly consistent
with estimates of the plutonium and uranium content produced previously from sampling and process
knowledge and significantly improved the accuracy and substantiation basis of the estimates that
would otherwise have been used for Safeguards purposes (for example, derived from the net weight
of the residue material).
Keywords: Non-Destructive Assay, Plutonium Fluoride, PPAM, MOX, Plutonium, Residues, HRGS,
PNCC, SNM.
1. Introduction
An innovative solution was required to support the Residues Retrieval Programme (RRP) by
characterising a large number of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) containers from several legacy SNM
stores on the Sellafield site, prior to their export to long-term engineered SNM storage facilities. The
SNM containers, which contained either “Dross” or “Residue” material, originated following the
cleanout of a range of different plutonium process gloveboxes, mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel manufacturing
processes and from sweepings collected following decommissioning activities. In order to comply with
ALARP practices, and to follow the waste hierarchy, the Dross bottles, which were expected to have
low masses of plutonium, were to be assayed for Nuclear Safety and Accountancy and consigned as
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Plutonium Contaminated Material (PCM) if possible, whilst the Residue containers were to be assayed
for accountancy (Safeguards) purposes only.
A desktop technical study had previously been carried out by Sellafield Ltd. in 2005 which used
process knowledge to estimate the nature and SNM content of the majority of the containers in the
stores for accountancy purposes. This study also assessed the feasibility of assaying such material
and highlighted that the complexity of the measurements would challenge both the hardware of the
existing assay system and the limitations of the Passive Neutron Coincidence Counting (PNCC)
technique currently used at Sellafield to assay such materials.  This complexity was compounded by
the short timescales required of the project, which necessitated close collaboration between
Cavendish Nuclear and Sellafield Ltd, together with prompt technical analysis of measurement data.
2. Technology
2.1. Decommissioning SNM Residue Containers
Prior to assay and export from the legacy stores, the Residue material, which had mainly been stored
within poly-vinyl chloride (PVC) bottles, was decanted and consolidated into new decommissioning
SNM residue containers (see Figure 1 below). Export limits constrained the net mass of the material in
each container to a maximum of 1400 g, and for the Residue containers, this net mass value was
used as a pessimistic (conservative) estimate of the Nuclear Safety fissile mass.
Figure 1: Pictures of Decommissioning SNM Residue Containers.
The Dross material was not decanted and was therefore measured in the original PVC bottles.
2.2. Plutonium Piece Assay Monitor
The consolidated Residue containers and Dross bottles were measured in a Plutonium Piece Assay
Monitor (PPAM) (see Figure 2), using the PNCC technique combined with High Resolution Gamma
ray Spectrometry (HRGS), in order to provide Best Estimate (Accountancy) and Nuclear Safety mass
values (calculated from the Best Estimate mass by the addition of three standard deviations of total
uncertainty). The PPAM was originally designed and commissioned for the measurement of PCM
waste packages, which typically contain low plutonium masses (i.e. less than a few hundreds of grams
total plutonium mass). In standard operation, it is used to ensure that a PCM package does not
exceed the 230 g Nuclear Safety limit for total plutonium mass.
The PPAM instrument consists of a measurement chamber surrounded by four banks of three 3He 
neutron detectors embedded in a moderating polyethene matrix (12 neutron detectors in total).  The
signal from each bank of detectors is fed into a separate amplifier and then to a rack of summing units
and a coincidence counting card, which determines the total (Totals) and coincident (or Reals) neutron
count rate. The system reports a plutonium mass determined from the Reals neutron count rate
combined with a HRGS measurement of the plutonium isotopic composition.
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Figure 2: (left) Picture of a Typical PPAM Prior to Installation. (right) Operator in Air Fed Suit Placing a PCM Piece in a
PPAM Measurement Chamber for Assay.
Given the challenging time constraints, only minor modifications to improve the functionality of the
system were considered possible. A Timestamper system was added in parallel to the PPAM’s 
coincidence counting card to provide an independent measure of the Totals and Reals neutron count
rates, providing a check of the correct function of the PPAM. Note that although the Timestamper card
has the capability to measure higher orders of neutron multiplicity, the neutron emissions were such
that the statistical precision on the Triples count rate was too poor to be used.
For the Dross bottles, which contained floor sweepings and dusts from decommissioning activities, the
plutonium mass content was expected to be low and assay using the standard PPAM measurement
was sufficient. Assuming the plutonium mass was below the 230 g Nuclear Safety limit, the Dross
bottles were consigned as PCM. However, the Residue containers were known to have a higher
plutonium content (of the order of one kilogram), with a more challenging chemical composition, such
that the neutron emission would lie outside of the calibrated and tested range of the PPAM, leading to
the requirement for additional testing and the use of alternative analysis techniques.
3. Technical Challenges
The measurement of Residue containers posed a challenge to the standard PNCC technique,
requiring the measurement of kilogram quantities of plutonium in challenging chemical form, and a
significant extension to the previously demonstrated working range of the instrument.
The plutonium composition of the majority of the Residue containers was expected to be in oxide form
(i.e. PuO2). However, the previous desktop technical study identified a number of the containers in
which plutonium fluoride (i.e. PuF4) was likely to be present in significant quantities. Measurement of
PuF4 is more challenging than other more typical plutonium compounds due to an (α, n) reaction in
fluorine, which leads to a neutron emission that can be 100 times higher than that of PuO2. This
contribution to the neutron emission potentially leads to excessive neutron count rates which could
exceed the capabilities of the PPAM hardware.
High neutron dose rates can lead to a loss of functionality of the PPAM; such as that due to system
dead time, pile up in the neutron counting chain, or potentially an overflow of the counter card which
ultimately could lead to an underestimation of the neutron coincidence count rate. High neutron
emissions originating from PuF4 also affect the magnitude of the uncertainty reported for standard
PNCC measurements, leading to imprecise values for the Accountancy mass and high values for the
Nuclear Safety mass. High count rate testing and additional testing of the PPAM hardware was carried
out to ensure that the system could operate with the high neutron emission rates expected from the
Residue containers. The correct performance of the neutron counting system was demonstrated up to
dead time corrected Totals neutron count rate of ~400,000 c.s-1 (contact neutron dose rate ~1.2 
mSv.hr-1) using the highest available neutron sources. Although the maximum Totals neutron count 
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rate and neutron dose rate from the Residues containers were significantly higher, at ~1,340,000 c.s-1 
and ~2.5 mSv.hr-1 respectively, offline trend analysis of the measurement data confirmed that the 
PPAM hardware was not underestimating the dead time corrected count rates across the measured
range.
The PPAM was designed to provide pessimistic measurement of low masses of plutonium. It does this
by using worst case values for parameters (e.g. detection efficiency) and making basic assumptions
(e.g. negligible self-multiplication), which produces safe but pessimistic results. However, these
intrinsic pessimisms will result in substantial overestimations when measuring Residue containers, as
they contain higher masses of plutonium for which the earlier assumptions made are no longer valid.
Alternative analysis techniques were required if precise Accountancy masses were to be obtained for
the Residue containers.
4. Method
Alongside the Timestamper, the PPAM was used to measure each Residue container and Dross
bottle in turn.  A phased offline assessment approach was then employed for the determination of the
Accountancy mass and for Dross bottles, the Nuclear Safety mass. In total, the following six methods
for plutonium mass measurement were compared:
(i) Result reported by the standard PPAM measurement
(ii) Offline recalculation of the PPAM result (see Section 4.1)
(iii) Offline recalculation of PPAM result with revised calibration (see Section 4.2)
(iv) Offline PuF4 correction using the Totals count rate and a measured PuF4 fraction (i.e.
measured Alpha value) (see Section 4.3)
(v) Offline Krick-Ensslin correction for self-multiplication (M), using both the Totals and Reals
count rates and using the Alpha value derived from the PuF4 technique (see Section 4.4)
(vi) Offline PuF4 correction using the Totals count rate and incorporating correction using Krick-
Ensslin derived M value (see Section 4.5)
A uranium accountancy mass was also calculated offline as described in Section 4.6.
4.1. Offline Recalculation of PPAM Result
The first phase of the analysis was to replicate the functionality of the PPAM by reproducing the
calculations as carried out by the instrument offline. This had the double advantage of independently
verifying the result from the PPAM and confirming that the correct raw measurement data has been
selected prior to applying the alternative analyses.
The PPAM uses a standard PNCC technique, calculating the Totals neutron count rate (singles, S)
and the Reals neutron count rate (doubles, D).  In PNCC, there are four unknown quantities:
 The 240Pu effective mass determined from the sample spontaneous fission rate (F)
 The enhancement of the neutron signal due to self-multiplication (M)
 The spatial and energy dependent neutron detection efficiency of the measurement chamber
(E)
 The effect on the total neutron emission of the chemical form and impurity content of the
plutonium material, alpha (α), where:
α=
𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (𝛼, 𝑛) 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
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These values can be equated to the measured singles (S) and doubles (D) rate using the equations
given below:

























Where vs1, vs2, vi1, vi1 are the nuclear data terms describing the spontaneous and induced fission first
and second order multiplicity coefficients and fd is the coincidence gate timing correction factor.
For a coincidence counting system measuring PCM waste items, it can be assumed that the plutonium
content will be low and therefore there will be little self-multiplication, and M =1. A conservative but
therefore pessimistic value for the efficiency is also applied.





Pu 240 Eq. 4.1.3 [1]
Where RSENS is the calibration factor accounting for the known efficiency, E, the timing gates and the
nuclear data constants.
The HRGS spectrum was then analysed by the Banham algorithm [2] to determine the isotopic
correction factor, FIsotopic, which is used to convert the 240PuEff mass into the plutonium Nuclear Safety 
and Accountancy masses. (Note that previous work has confirmed the accuracy of the Banham
isotopic analysis method for the Pu of Magnox origin known to be present in these containers).
isotopicEff FPumassPu 
240_ Eq. 4.1.4 [1]
4.2. Offline Recalculation of PPAM Result with Revised Calibration
To ensure the results were conservative, the Reals-to-Accidentals (R/A) Bias correction capability of
the PPAM has been disabled. R/A bias becomes significant at high total neutron signals and leads to
overestimation of the Reals rate. Hence to improve the accuracy of the results for the Residues, a R/A
bias correction was applied during offline analysis to account for this effect.
The systematic error term to account for the spatial dependence of the neutron detection efficiency of
the measurement chamber was also reduced in the Revised Calibration as the Residue container was
known to be in the centre of the measurement chamber, hence reducing this uncertainty and further
reducing the reported Nuclear Safety mass.
4.3. Offline PuF4 Correction using the Totals Count Rate and a Measured PuF4 Fraction
(i.e. Measured Alpha Value)
For Residue containers with PuF4 present, it was necessary to calculate an appropriate alpha value
(α) because as detailed earlier, the standard PNCC technique is not suitable since the measured
Doubles rate is highly influenced by the enhanced induced fission rate and by poor statistics.  Hence,
a PuF4 technique which was previously developed by Cavendish Nuclear [3] was applied which used
HRGS to determine the fraction of PuF4 within a container.
An example HRGS gamma ray spectrum from a PuF4 waste item is shown in Figure 3.
.
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Figure 3: Example Gamma Ray Spectrum from a PuF4 Waste Item. [3]
Figure 3 shows the prominent 414 keV gamma peak directly from 239Pu and the 583, 891 and 1274 
keV gamma ray peaks emitted from the decay chain associated with the (,n) reaction on fluorine (see
Figure 4).
Figure 4: The (,n) Reaction with Fluorine (* nucleus is formed in an excited state). [3]
The basic principle of the correction technique is to determine the fraction of the Pu in the sample
which exists as PuF4, RPuF4, using the ratio of the 239Pu 414 keV peak to the PuF4 583 keV peak count 








4 Eq. 4.3.1 [3]
Where:
 NuclearData is a term to correct for the different emission probabilities of the gamma rays.
 DetectionEfficiencyRatios is a term to allow for the fact that gamma rays of different energies
are detected by the gamma ray detector with different efficiencies and will be attenuated by
different degrees when passing through the Residue container to the detector.
Several different gamma rays associated with PuF4 were selected and used to calculate different
measures of the fluoride content (e.g. using 891 keV or 1274 keV instead of 583 keV). Each measure
accounts for the effect of attenuation within the plutonium residue material by using the observed
effect on the ratios of the 345 keV and 414 keV 239Pu peaks to adjust the detection efficiency ratios.  
The most suitable assumed attenuating matrix material of either CaF2, PuO2, or Fe, was determined
by analysis of the relative gamma peaks and alignment of the different fluoride fractions calculated
using different characteristic gamma peaks. Assuming a consistent set of results could be obtained
with a realistic assumption of the attenuating material, the most precise PuF4 fraction was then
selected and used to determine the total neutron emission per gram of the material, and hence the
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alpha value, by combining the PuF4 fraction with the isotopic composition determined from the
standard gamma ray measurement analysis. Using this calculated alpha value, the Pu mass can be
determined from the measured Totals neutron count rate using Eq. 4.1.1.
A further adaptation of this technique is to use the self-multiplication value in order to correct the totals
rate for self-multiplication (M) as described in section 4.5.
4.4. Offline Krick-Ensslin Correction for Self-Multiplication (M) using both the Totals
and Reals count rates and using the α value Derived from the PuF4 Technique
For higher plutonium mass Residue containers, where the assumption of a low self-multiplication (M)
value was unrealistic, the Krick-Ensslin technique was applied using the alpha value determined using
the PuF4 correction (see section 4.3). The correction for self-multiplication is important for the Residue
containers, as typically for PuO2 at these levels a self-multiplication of up to 1.06 might be expected
which would lead to an approximately 40% overestimation of the plutonium mass [4]. The magnitude
of the overestimate can become substantially larger than this (as can be seen from Eq. 4.1.2) if the
sample also contains plutonium fluoride and therefore has a high (α,n) emission and hence a high α
value.
With the Krick-Ensslin technique, M can be obtained by evaluating the roots of the quadratic formula:
r -  M1-)(1 
1)-(






























































4.5. Offline PuF4 Correction using the Totals Count Rate and also Incorporating
Correction using the Krick-Ensslin Derived M Value
As the standard fluoride correction technique (described in Section 4.3) did not correct for self-
multiplication the result was slightly overestimated for high Pu mass samples.  An additional
calculation was therefore added, which corrected the fluoride technique for the effect of self-
multiplication using an estimate determined from the calculations performed in the Krick-Ensslin
technique. As the fluoride assay result is based on the total neutron count rate, the degree of
correction was small (<~10%).  This result was produced for comparison with the results from the
standard fluoride correction and the Krick-Ensslin correction techniques.
4.6. Offline Determination of the Uranium Mass
For the residue measurements there was a requirement to report the total uranium mass for
accountancy purposes in addition to the 235U mass content. The PPAM system has a simplified ability 
to report an indicative 235U mass value if a significant 185.7 keV peak is measured. However, this 
technique takes no account of gamma ray attenuation and is therefore not considered to be accurate.
As such a technique based on the PuF4 correction method was developed.
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This technique used the magnitude of the 1001 keV peak characteristic of 238U decay and compared it 
to the 414 keV 239Pu peak to determine the 238U/239Pu ratio. As in the fluoride correction techniques, 
correction was applied for the effect of attenuation in the residue material (using the 345 keV to
414 keV peak ratio). The 239Pu mass of the sample was obtained from the calculated plutonium mass 


















If a 185.7 keV peak was measured, the 235U mass was determined directly using the same
methodology as for 238U, again accounting for the effect of attenuation in the matrix. If no 185.7 keV 
peak was measured, natural uranium enrichment of 0.7% was assumed.
5. Results
5.1 Example Residue Container Measurement Result
For each container, the results from each measurement technique described above were compared.
The example shown below in Table 1 was a high mass PuF4 Residue container.  In this example, the
necessity of the application of the PuF4 correction is evident as the results obtained using the PPAM
(calculated offline) and the Revised Calibration are unphysically high.
In the case of high PuF4 residues, the effect of the PuF4 correction technique can be very significant.
For example, in the case shown in Table 1, when using the α value of 63 calculated by the PuF4 
technique, the Krick-Ensslin technique calculates an M value of 1.036 and hence using the equations
presented in section 4.4, calculates a Doubles rate correction factor (Cf) of approximately 0.15,
indicating that 85% of the measured Doubles signal came from induced rather than spontaneous
fission. This clearly highlights the fact that the standard PNCC technique used by the PPAM (and the
Revised Calibration) which assumes negligible self-multiplication was not suitable for assay of these
high PuF4 containers.
For this particular container, the assay result from the PuF4 technique with no correction for self-
multiplication (i.e. making the assumption that M=1) was assigned as the Accountancy Pu mass of the
item. This slightly more pessimistic result was chosen in this case because the total neutron count rate
was on the limit of the tested range.
Table 1: Example Results Table Reported following Offline Analysis for a Residue Container.
1 The PPAM system will not quote a measurement result over 999 g as this is outside the certified







PPAM System Outside certified range1 Outside certified range Outside certified range
Offline Recalculation 44,788.5 19,141.8 102,213.8
Revised Calibration 3,273.1 6,220.1 21,933.5
PuF4 Technique with
no correction for M 588.6 84.7 842.7
Krick-Ensslin with α
from PuF4
581.4 95.8 Method not used forNuclear Safety Mass
PuF4 correction with
Krick-Ensslin derived M 568.4 81.8
Method not used for
Nuclear Safety Mass
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The selection of the attenuating matrix for the PuF4 correction was determined by the comparison of
the different PuF4 calculation methods and by establishing an estimate of the thickness of attenuating
material required to yield the observed peak intensity ratios. The relationship between the PuF4
fraction reported for the different methods will vary with the selection of attenuating matrix material as
they depend on different peak energies (Methods 1-3 use the 583 keV peak, whereas Method 4 uses
the 891 keV peak and Method 6 uses 1274 keV peak).  The effect of the selection of the different
matrices is evident from Figure 5 where Fe has been used as the attenuating matrix and Figure 6,
where PuO2 was the matrix material.  Figure 6 shows that the PuF4 ratios vary widely and reports a
PuF4 fraction of 94.25 %, suggesting a poorly suited matrix. This is in contrast to Figure 5 where the
ratios are more closely aligned and reports a PuF4 fraction of 62.22%, demonstrating the importance
of assigning an appropriate attenuating matrix material. 
Figure 5:  Comparison of PuF4 Ratios for an Attenuating Matrix Material of Fe.  PuF4 fraction calculated as 67.6%.
Figure 6:  Comparison of PuF4 Ratios for an Attenuating Matrix of PuO2.  PuF4 fraction calculated as 94.25%.
5.2 Overall Summary of Results
The offline analysis was successfully applied to determine an Accountancy mass for each Residue
container and both Nuclear Safety and Accountancy masses for each Dross bottle.
Four main techniques were found to be applicable for the containers (see Figure 7). The main method
of analysis for the Dross bottles and the MOX Residue containers was the Revised Calibration, whilst
for the Fluoride containing Residues, either the PuF4 correction technique, or the PuF4 correction
technique with correction for M derived from the Krick-Ensslin method was applied.
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Figure 7: Chosen Analysis Method for the Dross and Residue Containers (Number of Containers or Bottles Measured
Indicated).
The effectiveness of the measurement techniques is demonstrated in Figure 8 below. For the PuF4
and MOX residues, it can be seen that the assay reported Accountancy Pu masses are significantly
lower than both the net mass of the Residue and the expected Pu content of the Residues based on
previous theoretical studies. For the PuF4 Residues, the total Accountancy Pu mass from assay was
only 58% of the expected value, and 77% for the MOX residues. Likewise for the Dross bottles, the
Accountancy Pu mass is only a fraction of the net Residue mass.
Figure 8: Showing Estimated and Measured Plutonium Mass as a Percentage of the Net Residue Mass.
6. Conclusions
The measurement of the Residue containers was technically challenging, requiring the development of
multiple analysis techniques in order to account for high neutron emissions in challenging matrices.  A
toolbox of measurement techniques was developed such that the measurement of each container
could be customised for its own properties, accounting for induced neutron emissions, or self-
multiplication.
The PuF4 technique facilitated measurement of containers with significant PuF4 content. Had only the





Chosen analysis method 
PPAM
Revised Calibration
PuF4 technique (no M
correction)
PuF4 technique (with M
from Krick-Ensslin)
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technique reported on average only 6% of the Pu Accountancy value determined using the PPAM
technique). The same technique was also then extended to give accurate values for the 235U and 238U 
masses, which were required for Safeguards purposes.
The RRP saw each Residue container and Dross bottle successfully assigned an Accountancy mass
and each Dross container assigned a Nuclear Safety mass. This enabled the export of the Residue
containers to a long-term engineered store, reducing the radiological hazard.  Furthermore, all Dross
bottles measured were consigned as PCM waste, with a number of residue containers also identified
as actually containing Dross material and consigned as PCM waste, which was a substantial cost-
saving to Sellafield Ltd in terms of future waste processing cost. This project was achieved by
modifying existing equipment in order to extend its calibrated measurement range and applying an
innovative technique to allow accurate assay of large plutonium masses and high neutron emissions.
The benefits of providing accurate Accountancy masses are two-fold, both in terms of providing
accurate data for Safeguards purposes and in enabling future decommissioning projects to make
educated decisions on the basis of the true Pu masses present, rather than on the basis of Pu masses
from conservative desktop technical studies.
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Abstract:
Particle Swarm Imaging (PSIM) is an innovative technique developed by Cavendish Nuclear used to
enhance quantitative gamma-ray assay1. The innovation overcomes some of the challenges 
associated with the accurate declaration of measurement uncertainties of radionuclide inventories
within waste items when the distribution of activity is unknown. Implementation requires minimal
equipment, making use of gamma-ray measurements taken from different locations around the waste
item, using only a single electrically cooled HRGS gamma-ray detector for objects up to a UK ISO
freight container in size.
The PSIM technique iteratively ‘homes-in’ on the true location of activity concentrations in waste items.
PSIM differs from conventional assay techniques by allowing only viable solutions - that is those that
could actually give rise to the measured data - to be considered. Thus PSIM avoids the major
drawback of conventional analyses, namely, the adoption of unrealistic assumptions about the activity
distribution that inevitably leads to the declaration of pessimistic (and in some cases optimistic) activity
estimates and uncertainties.
PSIM applies an optimisation technique based upon ‘particle swarming’ methods to determine a set of
candidate solutions within a ‘search space’ defined by the interior volume of a waste item.
The positions and activities of the swarm are used in conjunction with a mathematical model to
simulate the measurement response for the current swarm location. The swarm is iteratively updated
(with modified positions and activities) until a match with sufficient quality is obtained between the
simulated and actual measurement data. This process is repeated to build up a distribution of
candidate solutions, which is subsequently analysed to calculate a measurement result and
uncertainty along with a visual image of the activity distribution.
This paper provides examples of PSIM’s ability to significantly reduce the levels of pessimism inherent 
in reported uncertainties.
Keywords: PSIM, Imaging, Non-destructive assay
1. Introduction
Cavendish Nuclear has over 50 years of experience in the development, delivery and operation of
non-destructive assay systems both in the UK and internationally. As part of the on-going
development and innovation strategy, a review of the existing technologies was performed with the
aim of developing new and novel measurement techniques.
The concept of Particle Swarm Imaging (PSIM) was developed as part of this process, being driven by
the increasing demand for novel techniques with improved levels of accuracy and performance whilst
keeping the cost and complexity of measurement systems to a minimum.
1 In 2014 PSIM was the winner of the Sellafield Ltd. Supply Chain Awards for “Supply Chain Innovation – Large Supplier”
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2. Particle Swarm Imaging (PSIM)
To illustrate the concept of PSIM consider a measurement geometry comprising of an arbitrary volume
(referred to as the ‘search space’) containing n point sources of activity, with each point source
possessing an activity An. Consider the deployment of M detectors around the waste item (or 
alternatively M measurements using the same detector at M different positions) and let each individual
point source have a detection efficiency with respect to each detector. The goal of the measurement is
to determine the total activity within the search space. A schematic of the measurement arrangement
is shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Measurement geometry containing point sources of activity which are constrained to lie within a
3-dimensional ‘search space’ such as the interior volume of a drum or box, the surfaces of a wall, interior of a
glovebox etc.
Unlike many conventional assay techniques PSIM makes use of the information contained within each
of the individual measurements taken around the search space shown in Fig. 1. The count rates
measured at each of the M measurement positions must be dependent upon the position and activity
of each source within the search space. Representing the source distribution as a sequence of source


















iC  = count rate measured at position i  = 1 to M 
jA = activity of source j
ji , (x, y, z) = detection efficiency of point source j at measurement position i
Although the number of point sources, activities and positions required to solve (Eq. 1) explicitly are
not known, it is possible nevertheless to evaluate the ‘quality’ of the agreement between the count
rates produced from any ‘potential’ distribution of activity within the search space and the actual count
rates measured.
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The PSIM approach initialises a ‘swarm’ of solutions within the search space. Representing the










pˆ Eq. (2) 
where: 
iC(p)
ˆ  = count rates due to the activity within the search space at measurement position i
The positions and activities of the swarm are used in conjunction with a mathematical model
describing the measurement geometry to simulate the measurement response for the current swarm
location. The swarm is iteratively updated (with modified
positions and activities) until a match with sufficient quality is
obtained between the simulated and actual measurement
data i.e. until a solution to Eq. (2) is found. This process is
repeated to build up a distribution of candidate solutions,
which is subsequently analysed to calculate a measurement
result and uncertainty along with a visual image of the activity
distribution, a typical example of which is shown in Fig. 2.
The benefit of this approach is that only viable solutions - that
is those that could actually give rise to the measured data -
are considered. And this, in turn, facilitates accurate
quantification of total activity and activity distribution.
PSIM avoids the major drawback of conventional analyses,
namely, the adoption of unrealistic assumptions about the
activity distribution that can lead to the declaration of
pessimistic, or in many cases optimistic, activity estimates
and uncertainties.
2.1. Swarming Concept
Particle Swarming is a computational method that optimizes a problem by iteratively trying to improve
a candidate solution with regard to a given measure of quality, see Eq. (2). The particle swarming
approach used by PSIM is a hybrid of the ‘Particle Swarm Optimisation’ or PSO approach originally
attributed to Kennedy, Eberhart, Ref. [1] and ‘Artificial Bee Colony Optimisation’ or ABC attributed to 
D. Karaboga, B. Basturk, Ref. [2].
The PSIM algorithm works by having a population (called a swarm) of candidate solutions (called
particles). Each particle is assigned an activity value and position within the search space (for example
the volume of a waste drum). The particles are moved around in the search space according to a few
simple formulae. The movements of the particles are guided by their own best known position in the
search space as well as the entire swarm’s best known position. When improved positions are 
discovered these will then guide the movements of the swarm. The process is repeated until a match
of sufficient quality is obtained with the measurement data.
Having established a good ‘match’ to the measurement data the swarm is allowed to evolve (either 
explore, expand or contract) seeking other candidate solutions that also produce a good ‘match’ to the 
measured data. Over time the swarm effectively searches the entire search space (exploration)
producing a distribution of solutions from which the final activity result and associated uncertainties are
derived.
The swarming pseudo - algorithm is shown in Fig. 3.
It is important to note that no assumption as to the physical size (number of particles) within the swarm
is made as the swarm is able to adjust its size as necessary throughout its lifetime.
Figure 2: Example of PSIM image of the
activity distribution within a 200 litre drum
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
202
Furthermore the approach does not seek a ‘global’ minimum (i.e. a single ‘best’ solution) as it not
possible to find a unique solution to most measurement scenarios. In reality there are many solutions
that will match the measurement data, all of which will be equally valid.
However over the lifetime of the swarm, regions of ‘preferred’ space result, leading to regions where 
the solution density is higher. Regions of high solution density therefore correspond to the most likely
position of the activity within the search space.
Figure 3: PSIM algorithm
2.2. Mathematical Model and Calibration
The distribution of activity within the search space can be represented as a sequence of point sources
at discrete locations, producing count rates described by (Eq. 1). To calculate the count rates at the
measurement positions we require a model that calculates the efficiencies for each point source of
activity within the swarm. If the efficiencies are known then the count rates at the detector positions
can be evaluated.
The PSIM model is defined firstly by a series of quadric surfaces which define the measurement
geometry. A quadric surface is represented by the following expression:
0222  JIzHyGxFyzExzDxyCzByAx       Eq. (3)
where A, . . . , J are constants.
This notation allows the user to specify complex geometries
including shapes that can be constructed from multiple planes,
spheres, cylinders, cones etc. In addition to the surfaces that
make up the measurement geometry it is necessary to define the
cells within the geometry. Each cell is defined by a series of
‘senses’ with respect to each surface which uniquely defines the
spatial extent of the cell volume within the measurement
geometry. Each cell must be assigned a material density and
mass attenuation coefficient appropriate to the gamma-ray of
interest.
The PSIM model does not use pre-defined ‘template’ geometries 
instead specifying the geometry by a series of quadric surfaces
providing the user with greater flexibility to specify more
representative and complex geometries.
Figure 4: Complex
geometries can be
modelled by PSIM 
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‘Source’ cells are identified within the PSIM model. Only these cells are permitted to contain sources
of activity (an example of a ‘source’ cell would be the matrix within a drum or a vessel within a 
glovebox). This definition ensures that the swarm does not explore regions of the geometry within
which no activity can exist. There is no restriction on the number of source cells allowing complex
geometries to be considered (an example may be the measurement of multiple waste items within a
room, a scenario which may be difficult to interpret using only pre-defined geometries due to the
measurement cross-talk between individual objects and the measurement positions).
The PSIM model is completed by defining the locations at which the measurements were performed
as well as the detector response. The measurement positions are simply defined by the central
co-ordinates of the front face of the detector within the measurement geometry. The orientation of the
detector with respect to the search space is defined by the normal vector perpendicular to the front
surface of the detector. The detector response is pre-calibrated as a function of the incident gamma-
ray energy.  This detector calibration is the only model parameter that requires any pre-calibration
prior to performing a measurement.
2.3. Percentile Uncertainty Reporting
The PSIM model is used to calculate the count rates at each measurement position for the current
swarm position, and the fit ‘quality’ of the count rates is compared to the measured data. If the quality
of the solution is ‘acceptable’ then the solution is archived (this then becomes a ‘candidate’ solution). 
Before continuing with the PSIM analysis, the model can be perturbed (i.e. the cell densities, material
types, efficiency of the detector, detector positions and measured count rates are all sampled) before
the analysis resumes. Thus PSIM is able to incorporate the effects of uncertainty components
associated with the model and measurement data into the final result.
Having established a good ‘match’ to the measurement data the swarm is allowed to evolve (either by
exploration or exploitation) seeking other candidate solutions that also produce a good ‘match’ to the 
measured data. Over time the swarm effectively searches the entire search space producing many
candidate solutions. The PSIM analysis is terminated once the required number of candidate solutions
has been exceeded (a typical PSIM analysis will be configured for a total of 2000 - 3000 candidate
solutions before a result is generated).
On completion of the analysis a frequency histogram is produced showing the distribution of the total
activity (i.e. the sum of the activities of each point source or particle) for each candidate solution.  It is
from this histogram that the final activity result and associated uncertainties are derived – see Fig. 5.
The activity results and uncertainties calculated by PSIM are based on a ‘percentile’ methodology. 
This method of confidence level reporting is ideally suited to PSIM because the set of activity solutions
stored by PSIM are rarely normally distributed. In most cases the PSIM frequency histogram of
solutions is skewed and contains important information that should be included when reporting robust
measurement uncertainties.
To illustrate the percentile method employed by PSIM, consider Fig. 5, which shows a typical
normalised frequency histogram constructed from a set of candidate solutions. A percentile is a
measure used in statistics indicating the value below which a given percentage of observations in a
group of observations (or PSIM solutions) fall. For example, the 20th percentile is the value below
which 20% of the PSIM solutions may be found and the 90th percentile is the value above which 10%
of the PSIM solutions would be found.
Suppose the histogram comprises 1000 different candidate solutions. After ranking the total activities
from smallest to largest, let the values be denoted by (If we choose to report 
uncertainties at the 95% confidence interval, then the minimum and maximum activity values would
therefore be [corresponding to the upper and lower 2.5% of solutions taken from each end 
of the distribution. Here represents the lower activity value at 95% confidence and  the upper 
activity value at 95% confidence (see both vertical lines shown in Fig. 5).
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Figure 5: PSIM Imaged (total) activity frequency histogram
The PSIM ‘best estimate’ activity is usually reported as the modal value of the histogram, but other
alternatives include the median or average value.
2.4. ‘Hotspot’ Imaging
This section presents examples of PSIM’s ability to image the location of activity within a defined 3D
search space; other examples are provided in Ref. [3]. This simulated example considers a 200 litre
drum containing 2 x 1 MBq ‘hotspots’ of Cs-137 activity (the search space is defined as the interior
volume of the drum consisting of concrete at a density of 1.2 g/cc). Two measurement scenarios are
considered as shown in Fig. 6. The first considers 8 discrete measurements performed at the drum
mid-height as shown in the left figure and the second a total of 8 discrete measurements taken at two
different heights as shown in the right figure.
Figure 6: Detector deployments for PSIM imaging examples. Scenario #1 consists of 8 measurements at the
drum mid-height (left) and Scenario #2 a total of 8 discrete measurements taken at two heights (right)
Fig. 7 shows a visual representation of the evolution of the swarm for Scenario #1. The bottom figure
shows the final PSIM solution and the actual locations of the two hotspots of activity.
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Figure 7: PSIM images for Scenario #1. The top figure shows the initial random swarm configuration. The middle
figure shows the swarm after approximately 500 iterations. The bottom figure shows the final PSIM solution along
with the actual location (red markers) of the two hotspots of activity within the drum. The data shown in blue
represents locations within the drum contributing most to the overall ‘quality’ of the PSIM solution and represents 
therefore the most probable location of any activity within the drum.
The lack of height information associated with Scenario #1 (i.e. all the measurement positions are at
the same height) is reflected in the image shown in Figure 7, showing solutions extending along the
full height of the drum.
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This should be compared to the PSIM image result for Scenario #2 shown in Fig. 8. The addition of
height information into the PSIM solution allows the two hotspot positions to be correctly resolved into
the top and bottom regions of the drum.
Figure 8: Final PSIM images for Scenario #2.
Fig. 9 shows the activity results returned by PSIM compared with those determined using more
conventional analysis methods. In the conventional analysis method the calibration assumes the
activity is ‘uniformly’ distributed throughout the drum volume, uses the sum of the count rates at each
of the eight measurement positions, and the uncertainties are expressed at the 95% confidence
intervals based on the assumption that any activity present has the potential to exist as a single point
source located anywhere within the drum.
Figure 9: Comparison of PSIM and conventional analysis results for measurement Scenario #1 and Scenario #2
(note that the true activity within the drum is indicated by the solid red line and the uncertainties shown are at the
95% level of confidence generated using the percentile method described in Section 2.3)
In terms of accuracy, the best estimate PSIM value is closer to the true value because it has imaged
the actual location of the activity. In terms of uncertainty, PSIM only considers those solutions that
could have given rise to the count rates at the measurement positions and therefore avoids the major
drawback of conventional analyses, namely, the adoption of unrealistic assumptions about the activity
distribution that can lead to the declaration of pessimistic, or in some cases optimistic, uncertainty
estimates. Both these facilitate accurate quantification of total activity and robust uncertainty
declarations. The PSIM uncertainties are significantly smaller and the additional height information in
Scenario #2 leads to a smaller uncertainty component than Scenario #1.
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2.5. Dispersed Source Imaging
Waste items will not always contain discrete hotspots of activity, but rather multiple sources distributed
in a random fashion throughout the waste volume.  To compare the performance of PSIM in these
circumstances against more conventional analysis methods a simulated trial was performed
comparing the PSIM measurement uncertainties against those obtained using a conventional analysis
approach.
The trial randomly located between 1 and 10 point sources within a 200 litre drum containing concrete
having a bulk density of 1.2 g/cc. The measurement geometry used was that shown in Fig.6 (left). A
total of 1,700 random trials were performed.
The conventional analysis is calibrated to assume the activity is ‘uniformly’ distributed throughout the 
drum volume, uses the sum of the count rates at each of the eight measurement positions, and the
uncertainties are expressed at the 95% confidence intervals based on the assumption that any activity
present has the potential to exist as a single point source located anywhere within the drum.
In contrast, the PSIM analysis makes no prior assumption as to the distribution of activity within the
drum (i.e. no calibration is assumed prior to the measurement) and only required the generation of a
model to reflect the measurement geometry.
Fig. 10 shows the results of the trial, comparing the uncertainties output by PSIM against those
obtained from the conventional analysis approach described above. The uncertainty ratio shown
equals the 95% upper uncertainty on the activity divided by the true activity within the drum. Thus ratio
values greater than one would be expected in all cases. The PSIM uncertainty ratios have been sorted
in order of increasing value and then plotted against the corresponding conventional value.
Figure 10: Comparison of PSIM and Conventional analysis methods. The uncertainty ratio shown
equals the 95% upper uncertainty calculated using both analysis methods divided by the true activity
within the drum.
The result of the trial clearly demonstrates that the uncertainty ratios generated by PSIM are in every
case less than those generated using the conventional analysis. For only a few cases is the
uncertainty ratio less than unity and these represent 2.5% of the total trials performed and therefore
entirely consistent with the confidence level of 95% chosen.
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The PSIM uncertainties are on average approximately three times smaller (the average uncertainty
ratio for the PSIM data being 2.6 compared to a value of 8.2 for the conventional analysis results).
Because PSIM only considers those solutions that could have given rise to the count rates actually
measured it avoids the overly pessimistic uncertainty estimates seen in the conventional results.
3. PSIM Projects (United Kingdom)
PSIM has been used by Cavendish Nuclear to perform measurements at nuclear facilities across the
United Kingdom to confirm the suitability of waste to be consigned to LLWR and ILW and VLLW waste
disposal and treatment facilities to support waste hierarchy re-categorisation. The PSIM technique has
been used successfully for both characterisation and verification monitoring, including in-situ HRGS
assay of a wide range of waste streams, waste item types and radionuclide species.
Recent projects include:
- VLLW bagged combustible wastes, for Sellafield / Environment Agency
- Legacy waste vault characterisation, for Sellafield
- Over 70 VLLW and LLW Isofreight containers, for LLWR / Sellafield / Environment Agency
- Drummed waste arising from low active drain operations, Sellafield
- Drummed wastes at other UK-wide nuclear sites such as Magnox Trawsfynydd, EDF
Hunterston and EDF Heysham (ILW – containing concrete-shielding legacy wastes, VLLW
and LA-LLW – containing asbestos and PPE, LLW – containing pond reactor and laundry
waste, LLW – containing redundant plant and PPE)
- Multi-element bottles (MEBs) and other large metallic items prior to recycling at Studsvik.
Figure 11: PSIM measurements performed at various sites in the UK
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4. Future Developments – Neutron Swarm Imaging (NSIM)
PSIM is equally applicable to the assay of neutron emitting material such as plutonium (stored in
waste drums, crates etc.) as well as monitoring and verification of material in process plant such as
gloveboxes.
Whilst the modelling required to determine the response of the swarm is more complex, the algorithm
shown in Fig. 3 is readily adapted to neutron based measurements. In fact neutron based
measurements benefit from producing both totals and reals (coincidence) count rates, therefore
providing the swarm with more information for use in the optimisation process.
Fig. 12 shows the module mapping between PSIM and NSIM.
Figure 12: Module mapping between current PSIM algorithm and NSIM (Neutron Swarm Imaging)
As well as imaging the location of neutron emitting material, Cavendish Nuclear is currently developing
methods for including both alpha (the ratio of (, n) to spontaneous fission neutrons) and neutron
multiplication as additional swarming variables in the solution eliminating the requirement to know or
make assumptions for their values.
MCNP modelling is being used to test and validate the development of the NSIM algorithms. Fig. 13
(left) shows a 3D visual of a glovebox surrounded by 18 polythene moderated He-3 neutron detectors
containing three process vessels as shown in the right hand figure.
Figure 13: Example of an MCNP model used to validate the development of NSIM
The 3D schematic shown in Fig.14 is an example of NSIM imaging the neutron emitting material in the
three process vessels as well as material located on the floor of the glovebox.
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Figure 14: Example of NSIM imaging in process vessels and glovebox floor
5. Summary
Particle Swarm Imaging (PSIM) is an innovative approach developed by Cavendish Nuclear to perform
gamma-ray assay.
PSIM has been successfully used to perform verification and characterisation measurements at
nuclear facilities across the United Kingdom to confirm the suitability of waste to be consigned to
LLWR and ILW and VLLW waste disposal and treatment facilities
The innovation overcomes some of the challenges associated with the accurate declaration of
measurement uncertainties of radionuclide inventories within waste items when the distribution of
activity is unknown. Implementation requires minimal equipment, making use of gamma-ray
measurements taken from different locations around the waste item.
PSIM avoids the major drawback of conventional analyses, namely, the adoption of unrealistic
assumptions about the activity distribution that inevitably lead to the declaration of pessimistic (and in
some cases optimistic) activity estimates and uncertainties.
PSIM is being developed for the assay of neutron emitting material such as plutonium (stored in waste
drums, crates etc.) as well as monitoring and verification of material in process plant such as
gloveboxes.
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Abstract: 
EURATOM operates around 90 neutron coincidence and multiplicity detectors which are portable or 
permanently installed in nuclear installations across the EU. They are used to verify operators' 
declarations – to carry out quantitative evaluation of the amount of nuclear material in certain items. 
Installed equipment is often used to verify flow and contents of items moving to/from Material Balance 
Areas (MBA). To assure their sound performance the detectors are regularly maintained and tested. 
Monte Carlo techniques allow modelling of failure scenarios as well as simulation of variation of their 
parameters such as the efficiency, Rho-0, die-away time, and more. 
This paper presents MCNPTM modelling of two EURATOM coincidence detectors permanently 
installed in two MOX fuel fabrication plants. It is demonstrated that changing the boundary conditions 
of a detector may significantly modify its performance and certain parameters, e.g. after its installation 
where the detector is surrounded by shielding such as concrete or JABROC. Such effects are also 
confirmed by tests performed with a 252Cf source. The paper investigates how the Monte Carlo 
technique may be applied for numerical calibration of the neutron detectors in the cases where the 
measured items containing nuclear material change their shape or physical features such as the 
density, cans' void ratio, etc.  
Uncertainties due to the model's geometry and material composition, as well as uncertainties due to 
the nuclear data are estimated. As a matter of validation of the MCNPTM model, the use of a well 
characterized spontaneous fission source is very important. For operational purposes this raises the 
demand for source longevity and for precision of its neutron yield estimation. 
Keywords: Monte Carlo; MCNP; neutron detectors; measurement system; uncertainty estimation. 
1. Introduction
Implementation of EURATOM Safeguards requires quantitative verification of operators' declarations 
of nuclear materials. Plutonium containing materials represent high strategic value and thus 
EURATOM inspectors are frequently present in MOX fuel fabrication and spent fuel reprocessing 
plants. Quantitative verification of materials involves the use of NDA tools such as mobile or 
permanently installed (unattended) gamma and passive neutron coincidence and multiplicity detectors. 
EURATOM owns and operates around 90 units (including active neutron coincidence detectors used 
for Uranium mass determination, mainly in LEU fuel assemblies). To assure reliability of the results, 
periodic preventive maintenance and calibration checks are executed. Repairs are carried out in case 
of malfunction or failure and extensive upgrades might be required after a couple of decades of 
continuous operation, an example was reported by Ancius [1]. Differently from mobile detectors the 
unattended detectors are frequently located in difficult-to-access locations - often in radiation 
controlled or high security zones. Data is acquired automatically and transmitted via the autonomous 
EURATOM data network to unattended data acquisition systems such as RADAR and operated in 
combination with the data evaluation programs CRISP or iRAP [2].  
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The remote location of EURATOM detectors in European nuclear installations and their limited 
accessibility during plant's active operation set some restrains on preventive maintenance and repairs 
in terms of the duration of intervention. This implies very rigorous planning, availability of proper tools 
as well as good knowledge of the detectors. In addition to the above given number of the neutron 
detectors it is important to highlight that their incorporation in plant's industrial line often requires 
custom-designed rather than the commercially available detectors [3, 4]. This is why their variety is 
very large. In some cases where the operator of the facility has its own installed NDA assay system, 
EURATOM Safeguards is based on branching of an authenticated detector's signal(s) [5, 6]. 
Operators' systems do not require EURATOM maintenance, but good knowledge of the system is 
necessary to assure an independence of the measurement analysis. 
Use of numerical modelling methods for design of neutron counting systems is not new and witnesses 
a history of several decades. A good practice guide for numerical modelling in Safeguards was 
prepared by the ESARDA NDA Working Group [7]. With the increasing availability of powerful 
computational systems the use of Monte Carlo techniques became more and more popular.  
This paper shows applications of the Monte Carlo computational code MCNPTM (Briesmeister' [8]) for 
operational purposes such as maintenance, failure analysis or estimation of alteration of detector's 
calibration characteristics in various circumstances. An alternative way to calibrate detectors using 
Monte Carlo modelling is investigated. The modelling uncertainties are estimated and discussed. 
2. Motivation for Monte Carlo modelling
What else may be expected from numerical modelling once neutron detector is designed, calibrated 
and tested? The answer to this question is closely related to specificities of operation of EURATOM 
detectors and some aspects unique to this matter that normally are not seen in scientific laboratories 
operating such detectors.  
2.1. Alteration of detector's parameters 
One of such specificities is that we are often limited in the possibility to collect enough knowledge 
about detector's operational characteristics after installation. In some cases, especially when the 
detector is installed in an already operational plant, the time to test and to perform maintenance may 
be very short as in case of the D0 detector in Melox [4]. The D0’s operational parameters, such as the 
Rho-0, the die-away time, and the dead-time correction coefficients were obtained from the Factory 
Acceptance Tests (FAT). Then it was calibrated with reference sources. We discuss below how, after 
installation in the facility, some of the characteristics were influenced by surrounding materials like 
concrete and significantly altered. By performing normalization measurements with a certified source 
and finding such altered characteristics one may reach wrong conclusions about good performance of 
the detector. Monte Carlo based estimation of neutron albedo from surrounding construction materials 
is relatively simple and may substantiate or not such conclusions. Moreover, when supported by the 
tests with certified spontaneous fission source this modelling may re-establish the realistic detector's 
in-situ characteristics. 
2.2. Failure scenarios 
EURATOM Safeguards are based on multi-layer verifications from accountancy to physical 
quantitative and qualitative checks of items at different points of interest inside a facility. This is why 
the failure of an individual detector may not lead to a failure of overall material balance verification in 
the facility. Thus, in case of a "bad measurement" involving significant discrepancy between the mass 
of nuclear material declared by an operator and that measured by an inspector, questions may arise 
whether the declaration or the measurement itself is wrong.  Detector’s performance showing repeated 
"bad measurements" involving similar items may become seriously questionable. Usual procedure for 
this case is that the inspector would request the measurement of the reference item or ask the test 
source. However, a validated Monte Carlo model may support the estimation of the detector's 
response function for a given item and allow making the definite conclusions. In case of a failure an 
accurate Monte Carlo model in combination with the tests source may assist in the failure diagnostics 
and save intervention time and costs.  
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2.3. Calibration of the detectors 
Calibration of detectors requires significant experimental effort and suitable reference standards. 
Monte Carlo technique allows modelling of a large variety of masses, obtaining of detectors response 
functions, as well as establishment of calibration curves. Furthermore, the Monte Carlo techniques 
allows for "real-time calibration" described by Peerani [9]. Last mentioned technique may be especially 
very useful in the cases of "non-standard" items for which the application of point model (used in an 
absolute majority of cases) has some particularities. 
2. Modelling of two MOX fabrication plants' detectors
Two EURATOM neutron coincidence detectors installed in two MOX plants – SMP in U.K. and Melox 
in France – were modelled with MCNPX and MCNP6 codes (there are multiple versions of original 
MCNPTM, the MCNP6 being the last version). The general computational scheme and validation of 
built Monte Carlo model is presented in Fig. 1.  
Fig. 1. Computational scheme and validation of the Monte Carlo model 
All neutron detectors' components like 3He tubes, polyethylene moderator, cadmium and stainless 
steel liners, as well as the constructions surrounding the detectors (concrete slabs, JABROC shielding 
and their material compositions etc.) were input and modelled to our best knowledge. The measured 
items, i.e. the cans and MOX assemblies were modelled accurately taking into account the real 
structure of the item, as for example the annular hole of the pellet and the cladding or the internal, 
intermediate and outer cans in case of PuO2 items.  
MCNPTM uses the nuclear data like nuclear reactions cross-sections, multiplicity of spontaneous and 
induced fissions, etc. All that nuclear data is organized in nuclear data libraries and constitutes an 
integral part of the computational code. However, the users may select the version(s) of nuclear data 
libraries. In this case we have employed the ENDF/B-VII.0 [10] libraries for continuous neutron energy 
cross-sections: ENDF70 with the identifiers ZAID.70c and its previous version ENDF66 with the 
identifiers ZAID.66c. As concerns the fission multiplicity data, the default multiplicity data (available for 
18 isotopes) were used at this stage of calculations.  
For the source definition the SDEF card with the particle identifier sf – for spontaneous fission 
neutrons and n – for the neutrons from (α;n) reactions in PuO2 or MOX was used. The Watt spectrum 
and its default values were fixed for spontaneous fission spectrum. To establish a realistic (α;n) 
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input file was run twice for a given problem: once to sample the tallies from the spontaneous fission 
and once more for the tallies from (α;n) reactions.  
As a result of the Monte Carlo simulation and the neutron's track length (F4:N tally) estimation, the 
probabilities of the neutron's capture in a cell (cells) representing the 3He tube may be calculated. For 
the detector's efficiency estimation the item's leakage multiplication has to be known as well. This is 
why the net multiplication calculated by MCNPTM is very important (also for calibration purposes - to 
be explained later). The net multiplication well approximates the leakage multiplication (used in the 
plutonium mass calculation algorithms) if its numeric value is smaller than 1.5 [11].  
MCNPTM pulse-height tally F8:N in conjunction with the CAP, also known as the coincidence capture 
tally, and the GATE card permits simulation of the shift register's logics and evaluation of the factorial 
moments. Setting of different pre-delay and gate widths for processing of simulated pulse trains from 
the neutron captures in 3He tubes allows estimation of detector's characteristics like the die-away time 
τ and the Rho-0.
For the evaluations of the Singles (Totals), the Doubles (Reals), the Triples and so on, the MCNPTM 
results need to be normalized against the source strength. In this case the source strength of the 
particles sf (spontaneous neutrons) and n (neutrons from (α;n) reactions) may be calculated from the 
isotopic composition of Uranium, Plutonium and Americium in the simulated item. It is important to 
underline that the dead-time effects taking place in the real detectors are not simulated by MCNPTM, 
except its specific versions like MCNP-PTA [12]. In this work the measured count rates of the Singles 
and the Doubles are corrected for dead-time effects using the reported dead-time correction 
coefficients of the detector. Then the dead-time corrected Singles and Doubles are compared with the 
values obtained from Monte Carlo modelling. 
For the modelling of 252Cf spontaneous fission source the small geometrical cell (equivalent to the 
point source comparing to detector’s dimensions) containing the low density of the isotope (to exclude 
the self-multiplication effects) has been introduced. To model the Americium-Beryllium (Am-Be) non-
coincidence neutron source the probability function corresponding to the neutron spectrum from (α;n) 
reaction in Am-Be source was used [13]. Obtained MCNPTM results were normalized with the decay-
corrected source’s strength from its characterisation certificate.  
The leakage multiplication mentioned earlier or its MCNPTM approximation the net multiplication 
becomes very important at the stage of validation of Monte Carlo models built for calibration purposes. 
Contrary to the Rho-0 (the ratio of the Doubles to Singles for a non-multiplying sample of 240Pu) whose 
incorrect value - technically speaking - may be compensated by the calibration parameters, the 
leakage multiplication shall not be lower than 1. However, an arbitrary or wrong Rho-0 value may lead 
to such situations (in some cases of the automated plutonium mass calculation algorithms the leakage 
multiplication may be forced to 1). This is exactly why in the detectors’ modelling we want to achieve 
realistic values of the net multiplication and of the Rho-0. 
2.1. Case of D5 SMP neutron coincidence detector 
EURATOM's neutron coincidence detector D5 in the Sellafield MOX plant (SMP) was integrated into 
the Fuel Assembly Handler and used to measure the MOX fuel assemblies when placed into the fuel 
assembly store. The design is described in [14]. D5 has 24 3He tubes imbedded in the polyethylene 
moderator and surrounded by a thick layer of JABROC (material used in neutron radiation shielding). 
The detector has an internal and external 0.5 mm cadmium liner protected by a stainless steel sheet. 
D5 has not been in use for several years but will be re-activated as the SMP fuel store takes over a 
new function [15]. 
The MCNPX model of D5 detector is presented in Fig. 2. The JABROC (in grey) surrounds the 
polyethylene moderator (in blue) and the 3He tubes (red). The MOX PWR fuel assembly (shown only 
partially – the model takes into account its total length) is positioned in the centre of D5 and is 
protected against accidental damage by the stainless steel sheath. The shown assembly's vertical 
position corresponds to the EURATOM verification measurement position. The lower part of the 
assembly remains in the concrete well. The stainless steel plate (in green) supports D5 from beneath.  
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For simulation of the detector's response to 252Cf and Americium-Beryllium sources a small cylindrical 
source was modelled in the centre of D5's cavity.  
horizontal cross-section vertical cross-section 
Fig. 2. MCNPX model of D5 MOX assembly coincidence detector 
2.1. Case of D0 Melox neutron coincidence detector 
EURATOM D0 neutron coincidence detector was custom–designed [4] for a specific location in Melox. 
It was installed into a concrete ceiling and is used to measure the PuO2 cans moving to the store one 
level higher. The PuO2 cans are packaged in a transport container which is lifted through D0 where 
actual measurements are done in 3 different vertical positions. D0 has 40 3He tubes imbedded in the 
polyethylene moderator and surrounded by the ceiling’s concrete. The detector has an internal and 
external 0.5 mm cadmium liner protected by a stainless steel sheet. The MCNPX model of D0 detector 
is presented in Fig. 3. 
horizontal cross-section vertical cross-section 
Fig. 3. MCNPX model of D0 PuO2 coincidence detector 
The concrete (in pink) surrounds the polyethylene moderator (in green) and the 3He tubes (red). PuO2 
cans in their transport container (shown only partially – the model takes into account all length and all 
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cans) are inserted to the D0. The shown vertical cross-section corresponds to one of the three 
EURATOM verification measurement positions.  
For simulation of the detector's response to 252Cf source a small cylindrical source was modelled in the 
centre of D0's cavity. 
3. Modelling results
3.1. Validation of Monte Carlo models 
Both D0 and D5 models were built based on information about their construction materials and 
dimensions available in technical documents. Some information has been re-verified in place. In order 
to validate the models recent preventive maintenance measurements with 252Cf and the Americium-
Beryllium neutron sources were taken into account. Table 1 presents a comparison of Monte Carlo 
and measurement results.  
DETECTOR'S 
CHARACTERISTIC 




D0 MELOX DETECTOR 
Singles, cps 6929.7 ± 1.4 7039 ± 145 +1.55% 
Doubles, cps 1761.3 ± 1.1 1776 ± 60 +0.84% 
Efficiency, % 25.27 ± 0.005 25.66 ± 0.53 +1.52% 
Rho-0 0.1445 ± 0.0001 0.1434 ± 0.019 -0.77% 
Die-away time, µS 40.52 ± 0.16 41.8 +3.06% 
* 
252Cf source's neutron yield = 27427 ± 521 n/s (1.90%) for the measurement day of 6-March-2014 
D5 SMP DETECTOR 
Singles, cps 27438 ± 8 22846 ± 216 -20.09% 
Doubles, cps 2203 ± 3 1551 ± 44 -42.04% 
Efficiency, % 8.56 ± 0.00003 7.13 ± 0.07 -20.06% 
Rho-0 0.046 ± 0.0001 0.039 ± 0.009 -16.92% 
Die-away time, µS 61.48 ± 0.39 57.96 ± 9.39 -6.09% 
* 
252Cf source's neutron yield = 320575 ± 2853 n/s (0.89%) for the measurement day of 12-November-2014 
Table 1. Comparison of MCNPX and measurement results for validation of the detectors’ models 
For D0 the modelled and measured discrepancies of Singles, Doubles, Rho-0, and Efficiency are 
small and within their statistical uncertainties. Whenever such discrepancies are within 10%, it is 
recommended to introduce the fixed correction factors [7]. However, in our case the main uncertainties 
stem from the test measurements (measurement statistics and the uncertainty of neutron yield of the 
test source). This is why at this stage we consider our model valid.  
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Test measurements on D5 showed larger discrepancies, not in line with the model. An effort to 
improve the D5 model did not give considerably better results. Additional test measurements with 
Americium-Beryllium neutron source (nominal yield 2.2E+5 n/s) have been made. The neutron energy 
spectrum of an Americium-Beryllium source, which differs significantly from that of Californium 
(fission), has been used for Monte Carlo modelling. Once more the measured and calculated 
efficiencies were significantly different: 5.56 ± 0.84% (measured) and 7.16 ± 0.002% (calculated). The 
discrepancy was -22.35%. This points towards a loss of efficiency during this long non-operation 
period. One of the possible verifications of this assumption is to validate the model using the pre-
operational measurements, e.g. Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT). To test the FAT conditions the 
above model of D5 was modified by “removing” the JABROC, the stainless steel plate, and the 
concrete slab. The results of this altered model, compared with FAT measurements are presented in 
Table 2.  
DETECTOR'S 
CHARACTERISTIC 
Monte Carlo estimation Measured during FAT 
with 252Cf source* 
ۻ܍܉ܛܝܚ܍܌ −ۻܗܖܜ܍	۱܉ܚܔܗ
ۻ܍܉ܛܝܚ܍܌
D0 MELOX DETECTOR 
Singles, cps 926.8 ± 0.2 945 +1.89% 
Doubles, cps 211.5 ± 0.2 - - 
Efficiency, % 22.66 ± 0.005 23.10 +1.89% 
Rho-0 0.130 ± 0.0001 - -
Die-away time, µS 40.30 ± 0.17 40.6 +0.74% 
* 
252Cf source's neutron yield = 4090 ± (n.d.) n/s for the measurement day of 20-December-2007. 
D5 SMP DETECTOR 
Singles, cps 461.2 ± 0.18 463.1 ± 2.2 +0.40% 
Doubles, cps 30.18 ± 0.05 30.80 ± 0.32 +2.01% 
Efficiency, % 6.778 ± 0.0003 6.805 ± 0.033 +0.40% 
Rho-0 0.0372 ± 0.00006 0.038 ± 0.005 +2.11% 
Die-away time, µS 59.32 ± 0.46 57.18 -3.74% 
* 
252Cf source's neutron yield = 6804 ± 31 n/s (0.46%) for the measurement day of 28-May-1997. 
Table 2. Comparison of MCNPX and Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) results 
Monte Carlo simulation of the FAT test shows good agreement of calculated and measured values 
and excludes significant modelling errors. During preventive maintenance test on D5 the instability of 
the count rates was observed. This, together with the results of Monte Carlo calculations led us to 
decide to dismantle the detector from the Fuel Handling Machine for in-depth maintenance. This 
operation is not easy and requires prior preparations and justifications convincing the operator of the 
facility about the need for such intervention. In the meantime, it has been done. 
Our experience with D5 motivated us to make the same verification for D0. And this is why the 
identical approach of modelling of the FAT conditions has been used. The MCNPX results of the 
simplified model of D0 were compared with the FAT results. The comparison is presented in Table 2. 
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Existing FAT records do not contain uncertainty estimations and this is why the modelled and 
measured discrepancies could not be verified properly. Some other quantities like the Doubles or the 
Rho-0 were not measured and could not be compared. However, in general, the discrepancies are not 
large and this proves once more that our Monte Carlo model is trustworthy.  
3.2. Estimation of alteration of detectors' characteristics after their installation 
The validation of the Monte Carlo models for FAT of D0 and D5 has highlighted significant alterations 
of detectors' characteristics, such as the Efficiency, the Rho-0 and the Die-away time after the 
detectors' installation in the plant. The summary of such altered characteristics of D0 and D5 detectors 
is shown in the Table 3.  
DETECTOR'S 
CHARACTERISTIC 
Monte Carlo estimation Measured with 252Cf 
source in 2014 
D0 MELOX DETECTOR 
Efficiency +11.52% +11.08%
Rho-0 +11.15% -
Die-away time +0.55% +2.96% 
D5 SMP DETECTOR 
Efficiency +26.28% +4.78%
Rho-0 +22.58% +2.56%
Die-away time +3.64% +1.36% 
Table 3. Alteration of FAT characteristics of D0 and D5 after their installation in the plant 
Comparison of Monte Carlo calculated alteration of detector's characteristics to the measurements 
with a certified 252Cf source is in good agreement for D0. As concerns the D5 there is no agreement, 
but we have to bear in our mind that the 252Cf measurements were performed at the moment where 
the detector had probably already lost some efficiency. 
This alteration of characteristics as calculated by MCNPX is very different for D0 and D5, but there is a 
principal difference which explains this: the concrete (D0 case) is a less good reflector of the neutrons 
leaving the detector than the JABROC (D5 case). In fact, the JABROC with its density of 1.3 g/cm3 
contains ~50% of carbon and even 6% of hydrogen (by mass), which makes it a very efficient neutron 
shielding material but also an excellent neutron reflecting medium [16]. In this specific case the 
neutron backscattering in D5 due to JABROC and the related increase of detector's efficiency 
(+26.28%) is even higher than it would have been if the detector was shielded with high density 
polyethylene (+23.47%) and is comparable to the graphite's case (+40.27%). In both cases these 
magnitudes were obtained by MCNPX modelling. Of course, this estimated change will be once again 
verified with the 252Cf source as soon as the good functioning of D5 is confirmed after its maintenance. 
However, the alteration of D5 efficiency by JABROC as evaluated by MCNPX above is not lacking for 
explanations. 
3.3. Investigation of possibility to use Monte Carlo for calibration of detectors 
Detector's calibration using physical reference materials for the items such as measured by D0 and D5 
is almost hypothetic. First of all, the items are of high complexity and contain significant plutonium 
masses: the canisters contain several cans with potentially different isotope composition (D0 case), 
the MOX assemblies may have different matrixes - 14x14, 16x16 grids and even more complex 
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hexagonal shape like fast breeder's sub-assemblies (D5 case). Secondly, the fact that the measured 
item is only partially inserted into the detector makes that both D0 and D5 operate beyond the point 
model's mode. Thus the assumptions like the constant neutron emission and invariable multiplication 
(as in case of a typical reference material) are not valid anymore. This is why the "physical calibration" 
procedure is based on the use of the "reference items" which known isotopic composition and the 
plutonium mass may be confirmed and verified by other safeguards means (as destructive analysis 
upstream in the process). On the other hand it is very convenient to have such reference item(s) for 
re-verification of the detector's response at any time. However this is not always possible because in 
the high throughput facilities they end up into the industrial process and are not available anymore. 
Another aspect which is also important to mention here is that any calibration process involves 
significant preparatory work, selection of representative items, verifications and sometimes repeated 
measurements which require additional operators' and inspectors' efforts. 
At this point the use of Monte Carlo modelling may become very attractive because of its simplicity 
(providing that the model has been already validated), flexibility, and relatively low computational time 
resources. With the following example we want to demonstrate our attempts to model one item 
measurement in D0 detector and to discuss the uncertainties of such modelling. 
The container has several PuO2 cans and is measured in three different insertion positions. Table 4 
compares measured (dead-time corrected) and our calculated Singles and Doubles. Both MCNPX and 









Position 3 Average 
ۻ۱ۼ۾܆ −ۻ܍܉ܛܝܚ܍܌۲܂ି۱۽܀܀
ۻ۱ۼ۾܆
Singles -7.6% -5.5% -2.5% -5.5% 
Doubles +18.4% +20.3% +20.7% +19.7% 
ۻ۱ۼ۾૟ −ۻ܍܉ܛܝܚ܍܌۲܂ି۱۽܀܀
ۻ۱ۼ۾૟
Singles -7.3% -5.0% -2.0% -5.0% 
Doubles +16.9% +18.5% +19.7% +18.2% 
Table 4. Comparison of MCNPX and MCNP6 calculated and measured Singles and Doubles, D0 
Following the good practice recommendations [7], the <20% difference can still be compensated by 
benchmarking of our model and then used for calibration of D0. However the achievement of the 
minimum differences is not in the objectives of this paper.  We want to reveal the types of uncertainties 
one may encounter in Monte Carlo model built for calibration of detectors for complex items and to 
point out how better results may be achieved.  
3.4. Uncertainties of Monte Carlo modelling of the D0 detector 
3.4.1. Geometrical position and physical form of an item 
The uncertainties of D0 calculation results due to geometrical inaccuracy of D0 components may be 
evaluated from model validation involving the 252Cf source. The geometrical reality of the item 
(container with several cans, not always filled to the same degree) is more challenging to model with 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
220
high certainty, because the operator does not always declare all the details. The position of the cans 
inside the long container (in particularly the distance of the bottom can from container's foot – due to 
for example the use of a shock-absorber or any other material) is not well known. Fortuitously, it does 
not matter for the establishment of measurement based calibration curves unless these characteristics 
change from campaign to campaign. Three measurement positions are fixed by the step motor cams 
and this mechanism assures the invariance of conditions established during the calibration exercises. 
But for Monte Carlo simulation such uncertainty of the "active column" of cans may introduce 
noteworthy uncertainties, especially for top and bottom measurement positions, 1 and 2.  
The void factor of the cans or the density of PuO2 is another aspect which when unknown makes the 
Monte Carlo estimations indefinite due to neutron multiplication assessment. Accurate density of PuO2 
is not declared by the operator, but by taking its variation from 2.0 to 3.0 g/cm3 we assume that the 
true density is situated in between. Therefore, we have chosen an arbitrary value of 2.5 g/cm3 for our 
calculations. They show that the variation of the density of 20%, between 2.0 and 3.0 g/cm3 changes 
the multiplication of the neutrons in the item correspondingly from 1.14 to 1.19 in the measurement 
position 2 and from 1.13 to 1.19 in the measurement positions 1 and 3. In the uncertainty terms of our 
measurables this would translate to ± 3% for the Singles and to +10 and -11% for the Doubles (from 
the arbitrary density of 2.5 g/cm3).  
3.4.2. Dead-time correction 
The dead-time correction of D0 as recommended in the FAT report is based on a single dead-time 
constant a (0.312 µS) for the Doubles and it was determined by the method of one correlated and one 
non-correlated neutron source. The uncertainty ∆a was not assessed during FAT, but using the 
reported FAT measurement raw data and through uncertainty estimations using partial derivatives we 
have established that its conservative value is 0.052 µS. This results to a relative uncertainty of 6.20% 
for the dead-time corrected Doubles and 1.55% for the dead-time corrected Singles (a/4 was used for 
the correction of the Singles).  
3.4.3. Nuclear data 
The user of MCNPTM may define himself the nuclear data he is going to apply. It starts with the 
definition of the cross-section libraries for the materials used in the problem. To evaluate the influence 
of different libraries to calculation results we have compared two sets of libraries represented as 





(not DT corrected) 
Doubles 




(ENDF66):    ࢃࢇ࢚࢚ିሺࢻ;࢔ሻ
∗
ࢃࢇ࢚࢚ +2.0% -1.0%
(ENDF70):    ࢃࢇ࢚࢚ିሺࢻ;࢔ሻ
∗
ࢃࢇ࢚࢚ +2.0% -0.7%
* the probability distribution of (α;n) neutron spectrum is reproduced taking into account the neutron production
probabilities in ref. [7] and the isotopic composition of Plutonium and Americium of the measured cans. 
Table 5. Uncertainties of D0 detector simulation due to nuclear data: selection of cross-section libraries and use 
of Watt vs. (α;n) neutron spectra for (α;n) neutrons simulation 
The differences of the Singles and the Doubles derive from slightly different results of induced fission 
estimations in MCNPX (ENDF66) and in MCNP6 (ENDF70). Renewed cross-section library ENDF70 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
221
differs from previous ENDF66 version by several new features, which permitted better treatment of 
unresolved resonances and processing of the delayed neutrons (not taken into account in ENDF66).  
The definition of the source of fissionable material and the neutron spectrum in MCNPTM especially for 
(α;n) reactions is complex. However, the average energy of spontaneous and (α;n) neutrons in oxides 
(in the point model there is only one value of efficiency for both) is close [17]. Thus, the source 
definition in modelling may be significantly simplified by using the Watt fission spectrum for both 
spontaneous fission and (α;n) neutrons. We have estimated what would be the uncertainties due to 
such choice. These estimations are also shown in the Table 5. In this case of the D0 detector the 
α=0.74 (the ratio of neutrons from (α;n) and spontaneous fission) and the contribution of spontaneous 
fission neutrons is more important. But for the items with higher α, e.g. the scrap material, the 
contribution from (α;n) becomes significant and thus the differences of the results due to the use of 
Watt and (α;n) neutron spectra for (α;n) neutrons simulation would increase.  
4. Conclusions
Modelling of EURATOM neutron detectors with MCNPTM permits verification of characteristics like the 
efficiency, the Rho-0, and the die-away time. These may change after the detector's installation in the 
plant due to changed boundary conditions and surrounding materials such as concrete or JABROC.  
Validations of MCNPX models for D5 and D0 were performed on the basis of the records of the 
Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) executed with the 252Cf spontaneous fission neutron sources. Recent 
test measurements of D0 were in good agreement with Monte Carlo predicted values. Such prediction 
for D5 detector differed significantly and raised doubts about the good functioning of the detector after 
its long inactivity period. The detector is being prepared for an in-depth maintenance. In particularly 
the example of D5 shows how the Monte Carlo simulation may be efficiently used in the failure 
analysis of EURATOM detectors. Given the usual remote location of EURATOM detectors and 
complexity of the access to the detectors in an operating plant, the Monte Carlo modelling may 
significantly complement failure diagnostics and shorten repair-after-failure times.  
Uncertainties of Monte Carlo simulation depend first of all on good knowledge of the detector's 
construction components and also on the knowledge of its surroundings, after installation. Test 
measurements involving 252Cf source may reduce these uncertainties to 1-2% both for the Singles and 
the Doubles. As the analysis above shows, the magnitude of these uncertainties is largely caused by 
the uncertainties of the neutron yield from 252Cf source. This raises the demand for the availability of 
well characterised spontaneous fission sources permitting to achieve lower measurement 
uncertainties. The short longevity of 252Cf source is an essential motivation for investigations on 
spontaneous fission sources with longer half-lives. 
As concerns the modelling of PuO2 items, characteristics such as the density and the internal position 
of cans in the transport container may become the primary source of uncertainties. These may be 
ignored during the "physical calibration" exercises unless they change between different measurement 
campaigns. The dead time effects of the electronics of the detector may not be modelled with the 
classic version of MCNPTM. This is why the good knowledge of the dead-time correction constants and 
their uncertainties (FAT or established during post-tests) is important for the reduction of Monte Carlo 
simulation uncertainties.  
Selection of nuclear data libraries may slightly vary the Monte Carlo calculation results. In particularly 
for the prediction of the Doubles this difference is smaller than 2%. Monte Carlo calculation results 
depending on the way the neutron spectrum from (α;n) reactions is modelled (Watt vs. (α;n) reaction 
data [7]) differ by 1-2% for the Singles and the Doubles. For the items with an increased α (the ratio of 
neutrons from (α;n) and spontaneous fission) the selection of Watt or (α;n) spectra may further 
increase above estimated difference. 
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SCK•CEN is performing R&D work related to the development of Non Destructive Assay on spent fuel
elements. Due to difficulty in accessing spent fuel, having an accurate and validated model of the
measurement equipment and a characterization of the source term is important for this type of studies.
To better understand and develop methods based on neutron counting and gamma spectroscopy, a
significant effort was done to determine the source terms associated to spent fuel with depletion and
evolution code calculations.
This paper reports about the extension of the SCK•CEN spent fuel inventory library with the ORIGEN-
ARP code. The cases considered a Low Enriched Uranium 17×17 PWR fuel with an initial enrichment
of 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0 %. This set of enrichments complements the data published previously for
enrichments between 3.5 % and 5 %. In addition, results obtained with Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel are
presented and discussed. The impact of the initial enrichment, for LEU fuel, and the Pu mass, for
MOX fuel, on the neutron emission and production of the main neutron emitters, are also studied.
Keywords: Evolution and depletion calculation; Spent Fuel Inventory; Neutron emission; Gamma
emission; Spent Fuel; Non Destructive Assay;
1. Introduction
In the last decade, a significant research and development effort on Non-Destructive Assay (NDA)
measurements methods used for spent fuel verification has received world-wide attention [1,2].
Several measurements technologies have been and are being investigated [3] with the aim of
reducing the uncertainties associated with spent fuel verification. While some of the technologies rely
on novel approaches [4], others rely on measurements concepts either already used in spent fuel
verification [5] or more technologically mature [6].
Despite the large inventory of spent fuel, this material is often stored under water in difficult-to-access
areas. Access to spent fuel is granted in agreement with the nuclear operators and authorities in
charge of the spent fuel management, and stringent safety regulations must be respected when
manipulating spent fuel and carrying out the measurements. These limitations and the non-existence
of adequate reference material, result in a difficulty on the possibility to verify the performances of the
measurement methods being developed or investigated. Therefore, studies of the considered
techniques are carried out by means of numerical calculations, often based on Monte Carlo methods
[7].
Studies with Monte Carlo methods are based on models of the measurement environment. Such
model typically includes the geometry and composition of the measurements equipment, the
measurement environment and the characteristics of the radiation source. Moreover, other modelling
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and physics options can be adjusted or enabled in the model. In case of spent fuel modelling, its
geometry and composition are specified. In addition, in order to estimate the absolute detector
response, a description of the source term associated to the spent fuel is needed. For example, the
source term can be the neutron or gamma energy differential distribution.
The determination of the spent fuel composition and the characteristics of the emitted radiation can be
achieved by means of evolution and depletion codes such as Origen-ARP [8,9,10] and ALEPH2 [11].
These codes are validated against experimental data on the composition of spent nuclear fuel
[12,13,14]. Previous work [15,16], indicated how the interpretation of Fork detector spent fuel
measurement data benefits from the combined use of the detector responses, obtained with Monte
Carlo simulations, and spent fuel composition and emitted radiation, obtained with evolution and
depletion codes.
In this framework, SCK•CEN started to develop a spent fuel library and investigate the impact of
different factors on spent fuel composition and emitted radiation. The characteristics of spent fuel
depend on quantities such as fuel type, irradiation history and initial composition of the fuel. We
focussed on 17x17 PWR fuel element and studied the change of the neutron emission by varying
parameters such as initial uranium enrichment (IE), average power level (AP), duration of the
irradiation cycle (DIC) and cooling time between two complete irradiation cycles (CTIC), burnup (BU
and cooling time (CT) after discharge [17,18].
The spent fuel library consists of entries, each corresponding to a specific irradiation case. In one
entry the total neutron emission, total gamma emission, and the corresponding energy spectra are
given. In addition, the abundances of 50 selected nuclides are present. All the data are available in a
format which is compatible with the one of an MCNP [19] input file. To process the large amount of
data generated by the codes and extract only the indicated entry data an ad-hoc tool was developed.
It is envisaged that the library content will be made available to the scientific community.
In this work, we first describe the current status of the library. We then describe how the results of the
output of the used evolution and depletion codes are processed. In addition, we report about the
results of calculations that were carried out for Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel for with an initial
enrichment of 2.0%, 2.5% and 3.0%. In addition results with Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel are also
presented.
Conclusions and outlook on future work are also presented.
2. Spent Fuel Library – current status
The SCK•CEN spent fuel library is based on the results obtained with Origen-ARP code. The cases
refer to LEU 17×17 PWR fuel with an initial enrichment between 2.0% and 5.0%. All the quoted
percentages are weight percent. The burnup ranged between 5 and 70 GWd/tHM and 30 values of
cooling time, from 0 up to 3 million years, were considered. An average power of 40 MW/tHM was
used; this value was obtained from the irradiation histories of the spent fuel data in [20].
In addition to LEU fuel also MOX fuel was considered. Four different percentages of plutonium on the
total fuel mass (i.e. 4, 6, 8 and 10%) were studied. The range of burnup was limited to 60 GWd/tHM
due to limitations in the cross sections libraries of ORIGEN-ARP. The following Pu/U isotopic vector











With this choice of the isotopic vector, a MOX fuel with 6 % of Pu has approximately the same amount
of fissile material as a LEU fuel with 4.0% initial enrichment.
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In previous works [17,18], we reported on the results obtained with LEU 17x17 PWR with an initial
enrichment between 3.5% and 5%. In addition, the impact of several parameters such as the Average
Power, the Duration of the Irradiation Cycle and Cooling Time between two complete Irradiation
Cycles, affecting the irradiation history, was also studied for a reference case with IE=4.5%.
The content of the library is given in Table 1. The new contributions to the spent fuel library are
highlighted. For each group of entries, the quantities that are varied with respect to the reference case
(IE=4.5%, AP=40 MW/tHM, DIC=360 days, CTIC=30 days) are shown in bold.
IE / % AP / MW/tHM DIC / days CTIC / days IE / % AP / MW/tHM DIC / days CTIC / days 
2.0 40 360 30 4.5 30 360 30
2.5 40 360 30 4.5 35 360 30
3.0 40 360 30 4.5 40 360 30
3.5 40 360 30 4.5 45 360 30
4.0 40 360 30 4.5 50 360 30
4.5 40 360 30 4.5 40 270 30
5.0 40 360 30 4.5 40 360 30
4.5 40 420 30
4.5 40 360 15
4.5 40 360 30
4.5 40 360 45
4.5 40 360 60
4.5 40 360 90
Pu mass / % AP / MW/tHM DIC / days CTIC / days 
4.0 40 360 30
6.0 40 360 30
8.0 40 360 30
10.0 40 360 30
Table 1: Overview of the SCK•CEN spent fuel library. The new additions are shown in yellow background.
3. Data processing
For each simulated case, the output file of Origen-ARP contains the composition of the fuel during the
irradiation history. In addition, the characteristics of the neutron and gamma sources are given after
each irradiation period. Since we have decided to track information on all the available nuclides
throughout the irradiation, the corresponding output file size is several Mbytes. In order to handle
efficiently the extraction of the relevant information, several scripts working under the Cygwin bash
shell environment were developed. With these scripts, it is possible to extract the following information
associated to a given entry of the spent fuel library:
 Total neutron emission
 Total neutron emission components (spontaneous fission, (n,), delayed neutrons)
 Neutron emission due to a given nuclide and its components (spontaneous fission, (n,),
delayed neutrons)
 Abundance of a given nuclide or a set of nuclides
The user needs to specify the irradiation or decay case and cooling time(s) for which the information is
requested and the scripts generate the requested information in text files.
In addition, a dedicated script was written to determine the 50 most important nuclides for the neutron
transport and generate an MCNP input file for the composition of the spent fuel. This script determines
this information based on the abundance of all nuclides at a given time and a weight factor associated
to each nuclide. A ranking is then determined based on the product of the nuclide abundance and the
weight factor; the first 50 nuclides of the ranking are selected and included, in addition to oxygen
isotopes, in a material entry in MCNP format where their abundance is given in g/tHM.
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The weight factor was determined with ad-hoc MCNP calculations, from the nuclide neutron
absorption cross section averaged on an isolethargic flux from 10-9 to 100 MeV. The average 
absorption cross section normalized to the maximum obtained value is shown in Fig. 1. An example of
the material entry in MCNP format obtained with the processing scripts is given here:
008016 -1.341270E+05 & 
008017 -5.426640E+01 & 
008018 -3.085850E+02 & 
092238 -9.353740E+05 & 
092235 -1.851200E+04 & 
094239 -5.859370E+03 & 
094240 -1.753320E+03 & 
095241 -6.989090E+02 & 
094241 -4.187120E+02 & 
092236 -4.930160E+03 & 
060143 -8.552370E+02 & 
062151 -1.540490E+01 & 
064155 -3.731280E+00 & 
062149 -4.620770E+00 & 
054131 -4.159840E+02 & 
062152 -1.154340E+02 & 
093237 -4.190830E+02 & 
045103 -4.449080E+02 & 
055133 -1.084190E+03 & 
060145 -6.561470E+02 & 
060144 -1.153380E+03 & 
092234 -2.842850E+02 & 
062147 -2.689780E+02 & 
058142 -1.048250E+03 & 
062150 -2.675470E+02 & 
094238 -8.899680E+01 & 
043099 -7.469910E+02 & 
063153 -9.141050E+01 & 
094242 -2.629840E+02 & 
059141 -1.047370E+03 & 
042095 -7.329210E+02 & 
054136 -2.039950E+03 & 
057139 -1.137010E+03 & 
063151 -2.594210E+00 & 
060148 -3.358500E+02 & 
044101 -7.127980E+02 & 
060146 -6.245410E+02 & 
064157 -1.037900E-01 & 
054134 -1.401980E+03 & 
042097 -7.529560E+02 & 
040091 -5.904900E+02 & 
040093 -6.864520E+02 & 
040094 -7.329250E+02 & 
042100 -8.551440E+02 & 
054132 -9.467280E+02 & 
044102 -6.874880E+02 & 
046105 -2.988980E+02 & 
047109 -5.272200E+01 & 
095243 -4.368760E+01 & 
056138 -1.204980E+03 & 
042098 -7.525010E+02 & 
055135 -3.762380E+02 & 
058140 -1.174420E+03 
For the future, the development of additional scripts allowing to generate the neutron and gamma
energy spectra associated to entries of the spent fuel library, is foreseen.






























Relative absorption cross section
Figure 1: Relative average absorption cross section as a function of the atomic number (Z) and the neutron
number N. The maximum value is set to 100. Nmin is the minimum number of neutron for a given element for
which nuclear data are available.
4. Neutron emission study for LEU and MOX 17x17 PWR fuel
4.1. LEU fuel
The total neutron emission and the nuclides contributions were determined as a function of BU and CT
for LEU of different IE. The results for the total neutron emissions are compared with the one obtained
for an IE=5.0%, which is taken as reference case in this work, in Fig. 2.
To correctly interpret the obtained results, we studied how the nuclide contribution to the total neutron
emission varies with BU and CT. The nuclides contribution for the most important nuclides is given in
Table 1 for a LEU with IE=2.5% and in Table 2 for a LEU with IE=4.0% for different BU and CT values.
The data reveal that at low BU and CT less than 1 year, 242Cm is the main neutron emitter. For
intermediate and high burnup, 244Cm contributes the most to the neutron emission until 102 y. Between 
102 and 104 y, 240Pu and 246Cm are the main neutron emitters. Above 104 y, 242Pu dominates, while the 
importance of 241Am is limited to specific values of Bu and CT. By comparing the data in Table 1 and 
Table 2; one can conclude that the roles of the main neutron emitters do not vary strongly with IE.
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The data in Table 1, allow an interpretation of the structures present in the data of Fig. 2, as a function
of CT. The fact that different nuclides account for the neutron emission for different CT and BU values,
explains why such structures can be present. By varying the IE, the production/depletion of the
dominant nuclides is enhanced, compared to the reference case, due to the increased neutron flux.
Therefore, different structures can be observed.
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Figure 2: Total neutron emission for LEU fuel as a function of BU, CT and IE. The data are relative to the one for
LEU with IE=5.0% at each BU value.
BU 10 GWd/tHM 35 GWd/tHM 60 GWd/tHM
CT 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 
1 d 73 15 8 1 35 64 12 82 1
10 d 73 16 8 1 34 65 12 83 1
100 d 65 20 10 1 26 73 9 86 1
1 y 37 35 18 1 1 10 88 3 92 1
3 y 3 51 29 2 4 1 98 0 96 1
10 y 43 31 2 13 98 1 1 97 2
30 y 23 36 3 28 94 1 1 1 1 95 4
102 y 2 44 3 40 55 10 12 5 13 58 32 3 2 3
103 y 66 5 16 31 38 17 11 84 7 5 2
104 y 62 13 19 34 40 71 8 16
105 y 66 96 81
106 y 36 90 80
Table 1: Percentage share of different nuclides to the total neutron emission as a function of CT and BU for LEU
fuel of IE=2.5%.
BU 10 GWd/tHM 35 GWd/tHM 60 GWd/tHM
CT 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 
1 d 73 9 12 49 50 21 77
10 d 72 10 12 48 51 20 78
100 d 64 12 16 39 60 15 83
1 y 36 21 28 1 1 17 80 5 92
3 y 3 29 42 2 6 1 96 1 98
10 y 23 42 2 15 96 1 98 1
30 y 10 41 2 30 90 3 3 95 3
102 y 44 2 37 40 4 18 5 22 60 23 4 3 5
103 y 64 3 14 12 50 17 16 71 14 9 4
104 y 59 7 7 45 38 55 16 25
105 y 43 95 91
106 y 18 84 88
Table 2: Percentage share of different nuclides to the total neutron emission as a function of CT and BU for LEU
fuel of IE=4.0%.
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Burnup / GWd/tHM 10 35 60
IE / % 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Nuclide Mass at discharge
240Pu 2.12 1.56 1.22 1.38 1.25 1.11 1.08 1.07 1.04
242Pu 5.79 2.82 1.60 2.66 1.89 1.36 1.76 1.49 1.23
242Cm 4.87 2.54 1.52 1.91 1.56 1.25 1.10 1.10 1.07
244Cm 12.62 4.34 1.92 5.94 3.06 1.69 3.27 2.23 1.49
246Cm 41.24 8.61 2.60 16.28 5.79 2.27 6.89 3.70 1.92
Table 3: Nuclides abundances as a function of IE and burnup. The data of each nuclide are relative to the ones
for an IE of 5% at the indicated burnup value.
The data in Fig. 2 reveal also that the neutron emission increases when decreasing the initial
enrichment, given the BU and CT. To obtain the same BU levels in the same DIC, i.e. keeping the
same AP, LEU fuels with lower IE are irradiated with a neutron flux that is higher compared to the one
for LEU fuel with higher IE values. Under higher flux the production of transuranic, and the one of
neutron emitters such as 242Cm and 244Cm, happens at a faster rate and this explains why a higher 
neutron emission is obtained for LEU fuel with lower enrichment.
This interpretation is confirmed by looking at the production of specific neutrons emitters during
irradiation for different IE. The concentrations of the main neutron emitters, relative to the one for a
5.0% IE, are given in Table 3, for different values of IE and BU. At all BU values, the nuclides
concentrations decrease with IE. The neutron emission, consequently, follows the same pattern. As
shown in Fig. 2, at low BU, the fuel has been exposed to relatively low neutron fluence and the
nuclides are mainly generated as a consequence of irradiation and their depletion is limited, especially
for the Cm isotopes due to their higher mass number. At higher BU, the neutron fluence is higher and
also the depletion of the nuclides plays a role in addition to their production. This explains the
decreasing sensitivity to IE as BU increases.
4.2. MOX fuel
4.2.1. Comparison with LEU fuel
The total neutron emission and the nuclides contributions to the neutron emission were determined as
a function of BU and CT for MOX with different amounts of Pu. The results for the total neutron
emissions are compared with the ones obtained for a LEU IE=4.0%, which has approximately the
same fissile content, in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3: Total neutron emission as function of BU and CT (left) and mass at discharge (right) for the main
neutron emitters for different BU values. All the data are for a 6% MOX fuel relative to a 4% LEU fuel.
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Due to the presence of Pu isotopes already at the beginning of irradiation, and the consequent earlier
production of Cm isotopes, the neutron emission is always higher for MOX fuel. The relative difference
decreases as BU increases, as shown in Fig. 3.
Also the nuclides contribution to the total neutron emission strongly differs between LEU and MOX
fuel, as indicated in Table 5 and Table 2, at low and intermediate BU values.
BU 10 GWd/tHM 35 GWd/tHM 60 GWd/tHM
CT 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 242Cm 244Cm 246Cm 240Pu 242Pu 241Am 
1 d 30 66 1 23 76 15 81 1
10 d 29 67 1 23 76 15 81 1
100 d 22 74 2 17 82 11 85 1
1 y 9 86 2 6 93 4 92 1
3 y 93 2 98 96 2
10 y 91 3 1 1 98 97 2
30 y 82 6 2 4 96 2 94 4
102 y 25 25 10 23 63 15 7 3 8 56 36 2 2 3
103 y 56 26 14 52 25 14 8 87 6 4 2
104 y 43 50 36 25 36 75 7 14
105 y 98 97 80
106 y 96 96 81
Table 5: Percentage share of different nuclides to the total neutron emission as a function of CT and BU for MOX
fuel with 6% of Pu.
4.2.2. Impact of Pu mass
Both the variation of total neutron emission and the nuclides contributions were studied for MOX fuel
with different Pu mass, as function of BU and CT. We refer to the data of Table 5, for the nuclide
contribution to the total neutron emission vs BU and CT for a MOX with 6% Pu mass. For all BU
values, 244Cm is the main neutron emitter until 102 y. Between 102 and 104 y, 240,242Pu and 246Cm are 
the main neutron emitters depending on the BU. Above 104 y, 242Pu dominates, while the importance 
of 241Am is limited to specific values of BU and CT. This pattern is present also at other values of Pu 
mass.
The results for the total neutron emissions are compared with the one obtained for a Pu mass of
10.0%, which is taken as reference case for MOX fuel, in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Total neutron emission for MOX fuel as a function of BU, CT and Pu mass. The data are relative to the
one for MOX with 10.0% Pu mass at each BU value.
The interpretation of the data in Fig. 4 is not straightforward as for the corresponding data for LEU,
given in Fig. 2. In the case of MOX fuel, by varying the Pu mass, we do not change only the amount of
fissile material initially present in the fuel, but also overall the mass of Pu (fissile and not fissile
isotopes). Therefore two competing phenomena, from the neutron emission point of view, take place
during the irradiation: on one hand, at low Pu masses, to achieve the same BU levels in the same
DIC, i.e. keeping the same AP, a higher flux is needed; therefore, a higher production of transuranic
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and transplutonium nuclides take place; on the other hand, at higher Pu masses, a higher presence of
transplutonium nuclides is due to the higher initial mass of Pu isotopes.
Burnup / GWd/tHM 10 35 60
Pu mass / % 4.0 6.0 8.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Nuclide Mass at discharge
240Pu 0.41 0.60 0.80 0.37 0.57 0.79 0.32 0.53 0.76
242Pu 0.42 0.61 0.80 0.53 0.68 0.84 0.60 0.74 0.87
242Cm 0.78 0.88 0.95 0.71 0.86 0.94 0.53 0.76 0.91
244Cm 1.06 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.03
246Cm 2.99 1.93 1.37 2.74 1.85 1.34 2.41 1.75 1.31
248Cm 6.61 3.09 1.71 6.35 3.03 1.68 5.81 2.94 1.65
Table 2: Nuclides abundances as a function of Pu mass and burnup. The data of each nuclide are relative to the
ones for a Pu mass of 10% at the indicated burnup value.
The interpretation of the data in Fig. 4 and the explanation given above, are supported by the data
about the change in the production of specific neutrons emitters during irradiation as a function of Pu
mass. The concentrations of several nuclides, relative to the one for a 10% Pu mass, are given in
Table 2, for different values of CT, BU and Pu mass. The data reveal a different pattern compared with
the data for LEU shown in Table 3. Only for the nuclides with the highest mass numbers (246Cm and 
248Cm), the nuclides concentrations decrease with Pu mass at all BU values. For nuclides with lower
mass number (240Pu, 242Pu and 242Cm) the nuclides concentrations increase with the Pu mass, while 
244Cm shows little sensitivity with Pu mass and BU values.
Figure 5: Production of transuranic nuclides during irradiation.
By changing the Pu mass, the initial amount of Pu isotopes changes. The amount of 240Pu and 242Pu, 
relative to the 10% Pu mass case, almost does not change with BU, indicating the production of
nuclides is balanced by their depletion. A similar interpretation is valid for the 242Cm and 244Cm, which, 
however, are not present initially in the fuel. The 242Cm is produced by beta decay of 242Am and
242mAm, following neutron capture on 241Am, produced from decay of 241Pu, as shown in Fig. 5. This 
explains why its abundance follows a similar trend as the one observed for Pu isotopes. The
production of 244Cm requires more neutron captures from 242Pu, so the variation of its abundance with 
Pu mass is influenced both by the initial Pu amount and, in the opposite direction, by the higher
neutron fluence associated with lower Pu masses. These phenomena explain the obtained data for
244Cm in Table 4.
The neutron emission, consequently, follows a similar pattern. Up to 102 y, 244Cm dominates the
neutron emission and its production is almost insensitive to Pu mass. Above 102 y and at low burnup, 
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240Pu and 242Pu dominate the neutron emission and their impact scales with the Pu mass. For
intermediate and high burnup, 246Cm is the main neutron emitter and the trend of its production with 
Pu mass explains the structure in the data in Fig. 4, in a similar way to as already seen for LEU fuel.
5. Conclusions and outlook
To better understand and develop methods based on neutron counting and gamma spectroscopy, a
significant effort was done at SCK•CEN to determine the source terms associated to spent fuel with
depletion and evolution code calculations. The extension of the SCK•CEN spent fuel inventory library 
with the ORIGEN-ARP code was presented in this paper. The results obtained for a Low Enriched
Uranium 17×17 PWR fuel with an initial enrichment of 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0 % were presented and
compared with previous work. In addition, results obtained with Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel with a
reference isotopic vector were presented and discussed.
For LEU fuel the impact of the initial enrichment on the neutron emission and production of the main
neutron emitters was discussed. To achieve the same burnup value, a higher neutron flux is needed at
lower values of the initial enrichment. This has direct impact on the total neutron emission and the
production of neutron emitters. In the case of MOX fuel, the impact of the Pu mass on the neutron
emission and the production of neutron emitting nuclides was also studied. Both the initial mass of Pu
and the neutron fluence required to obtain a given burnup value play an important role in the
productions of different neutron emitters. Moreover, specific dynamics, depending on cooling time and
burnup values, need to be accounted for to explain the obtained results.
Future work will focus on extending the LEU data up to an initial enrichment of 6.0%, investigate the
impact of the isotopic vector on the neutron emission associated to MOX fuel, develop scripts to
generate gamma ray and neutron spectra and make available the obtained results to the scientific
community.
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The Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) is a passive Non-Destructive Assay
(NDA) that is developed for the safeguards verification of spent nuclear fuel. The main goal of SINRD
is the direct quantification of 239Pu by estimating the SINRD signature, which is the ratio between the 
neutron flux in the fast energy region and in the region close to the 0.3 eV resonance of 239Pu. The 
resonance region was chosen because the reduction of the neutron flux within 0.2-0.4 eV is due
mainly to neutron absorption from 239Pu, and therefore the SINRD signature can be correlated to the 
239Pu mass in the fuel assembly.
This work provides an estimate of the influence of 239Pu and other nuclides on the SINRD signature. 
This assessment is performed by Monte Carlo simulations by introducing several nuclides in the fuel
material composition and by calculating the SINRD signature for each case. The reference spent fuel
library developed by SCK•CEN was used for the detailed fuel compositions of PWR 17x17 fuel
assemblies with different initial enrichments, burnup, and cooling times.
The results from the simulations show that the SINRD signature is mainly correlated to the 239Pu mass, 
with significant influence by 235U. Moreover, the SINRD technique is largely insensitive to the cooling 
time of the assembly, while it is affected by the burnup and initial enrichment of the fuel. Apart from
239Pu and 235U, many other nuclides give minor contributions to the SINRD signature, especially at 
burnup higher than 20 GWd/tHM.
Keywords: SINRD, neutron resonance densitometry, reference spent fuel library, Non-Destructive
Assay, spent fuel verification
1. Introduction
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the task to ensure that all nuclear activities in the
Member States are devoted exclusively to peaceful applications. In order to achieve this objective, the
Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) is the primary verification tool, and it is supported by
Containment and Surveillance (C/S) measures [1].
As part of the NMA for spent nuclear fuel, the non-destructive assays (NDA) are playing an important
role for the verification of operator data. Moreover, they can be used for the characterization of spent
fuel both for safeguards verification and for other applications such as the disposal of spent fuel in a
geological repository [2]. Many NDA methods are currently under investigation to improve the
capabilities of current NDA techniques [3], and the Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance
Densitometry (SINRD) is proposed to directly quantify the 239Pu mass in a fuel assembly [4]. 
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However, in addition to 239Pu, spent fuel contains a wide variety of radioactive elements that are
resulting from the irradiation in the reactor core. In order to evaluate the influence of several nuclides
on the results of the SINRD technique, a set of simulations were carried out considering fuel with
different fuel compositions. The impact of single nuclides included in the fuel composition was
evaluated following a multi-step procedure. Starting from fuel containing only 238U and 16O other
nuclides were added sequentially to estimate the effects of each isotope on the SINRD signature and
on the neutron energy distribution. Moreover, the SINRD signature was calculated for fuel with
different initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time, to evaluate the sensitivity of SINRD to the fuel
irradiation history.
This paper first describes the approach chosen to investigate the SINRD technique, together with a
description of the Monte Carlo model developed for the simulations and the details of the fuel
compositions used in the study. Then the influence of single nuclides on the SINRD signature is
evaluated in Section 4, whereas the impact of the fuel irradiation history is analyzed in Section 5.
2. Background on the SINRD technique
The SINRD technique is a passive NDA method that has the unique feature to directly quantify the
239Pu content in a spent fuel assembly, and this goal is achieved by measuring the attenuation of the
neutron flux in the 0.2-0.4 eV energy region. This energy region is close to the significant resonance of
239Pu, and therefore the reduction of the neutron flux is expected to be correlated to the 239Pu
concentration in the fuel [5], [6], [7], [8].
The 239Pu content is estimated using the SINRD signature, which is defined in Formula (a) as the ratio 






A 238U fission chamber and a 239Pu fission chamber are envisaged to measure the fast neutron flux 
and the flux around the 0.3 eV resonance region, respectively. The term "self-indication" can also be
used in the acronym of SINRD instead of “self-interrogation” because the isotope quantified with the
technique is also used as active material in the detector to increase the detection of neutrons in the
resonance region. Apart from the SINRD technique, self-indication measurements are a well-
established method for cross-section measurements [9], [10], [11]. In the approach proposed for
SINRD the 239Pu resonance region is selected by wrapping a foil of Gd or Cd around the 239Pu fission 
chamber. These elements are also called filters because they exhibit a cut-off energy for neutron
absorption slightly below and above 0.3 eV. Therefore by taking the difference between the neutron
fluxes transmitted through each filter, the estimation of the neutron flux around 0.3 eV is possible.
3. Description of the model
3.1 Monte Carlo model of the fuel assembly and detector
The PWR 17x17 fuel assembly geometry was taken as reference for the development of the Monte
Carlo model. The MCNPX code [12] was used to create the model of the fuel assembly and of the 12
cm thick layer of polyethylene surrounding it. By simulating this configuration the neutron moderation
occurred mainly outside the fuel assembly and this leads to a clearer reduction of the neutron flux at
0.3 eV due to 239Pu absorption. In fact, the neutron moderation within the fuel pins occurring when the 
fuel assembly is stored under water is detrimental for the SINRD technique, because it reduces the
indication of the neutron absorption due to 239Pu as mentioned in [13], [14]. 
The neutron flux was calculated in the central guide tube of the assembly in a void cavity that can host
the neutron detector and filter. No model of detector or filter was placed at this stage in the simulation,
and the flux transmitted through the filter (tr) used for the calculation of RES was estimated as:
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𝜑𝑡𝑟 = 𝜑𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑑 ∙ 𝑙 ∙ 𝜎𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐷 )  (𝑏)
where d is the atom density, l is the thickness, and 𝜎𝑡𝑜𝑡𝐷  is the Doppler broadened total cross-section of 
the filter. Therefore, the transmitted flux is directly related to the total cross section and the area
density of the elements present in a sample [15]. Considering the results in [16], a 0.1 mm Gd filter
and a 1.0 mm Cd filter were used in the calculations to achieve a good balance between significant
sensitivity to 239Pu and large total neutron counts. 
For the estimation of FAST, Formula (b) was modified by neglecting the exponential term since a bare
238U fission chamber is used for the measurement.
3.2 Characteristics of the spent fuel compositions
Fuel compositions containing the 50 main neutron absorbers were selected for this study in order to
account for the influence of single nuclides on the SINRD signature. The reference spent fuel library
was developed for more than 1600 case studies according to several variables such as initial
enrichment, fuel burnup, and cooling time after discharge [17], [18].
In this paper the fuel compositions calculated for 4 values of initial enrichment (i.e. 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, 5.0%),
6 values of burnup (i.e. 5, 10, 15, 20, 40, 60 GWd/tHM), and 5 values of cooling time (i.e. direct
discharge, 30 days, 5, 10, 50 years) were included in the Monte Carlo simulations.
The simulations in Section 4 evaluated the influence of single nuclides on the SINRD signature, and
the 239Pu concentration was selected first as additional nuclide apart from 238U and 16O. Then several 
nuclides were added sequentially and the SINRD signature was calculated for each case. The
concentration of each nuclide added in the fuel composition was taken from the reference fuel library,
and the quantity of 238U was adjusted to keep a constant total fuel mass. The study in Section 5
compared the SINRD signature calculated for fuel with different irradiation histories. The fuel
composition for these simulations contained the 50 main neutron absorbers as calculated in the
reference spent fuel library.
4. Influence of single nuclides on the SINRD technique
4.1 SINRD signature
One of the objectives of this paper is to investigate the influence that single nuclides have on the
SINRD signature. To reach this goal, several simulations were performed starting from fuel containing
only 238U and 16O, and then adding one nuclide sequentially as described in Section 3.2. The nuclides 
chosen in this section represent the nuclides that have the highest macroscopic cross-section in the
energy region around 0.3 eV and therefore are expected to give the major contributions to the SINRD
signature [14].
Figure 1 shows the normalized SINRD signature as a function of the 239Pu content for the cases
selected in this study. The simulations considered fuel with 3.5% initial enrichment, 10 years of cooling
time, and burnup up to 60 GWd/tHM as indicated in the plot. The values of the SINRD signature were
normalized to the case obtained for fuel containing only 238U and 16O. Several groups of data points 
can be identified on the plot as a function of the 239Pu content, and they reflect the different fuel burnup 
considered in this study.
At low burnup fuel the SINRD signature obtained with a detailed fuel composition is almost the same
as the signature obtained with only 239Pu and 235U as additional nuclides. Moreover, the 235U gives the 
major contribution up to 20 GWd/tHM. By increasing the burnup the contribution from other nuclides
becomes more relevant, and Table 1 shows the share of SINRD signature due to the single nuclides
added in the fuel composition for fuel with 3.5% initial enrichment, 10 years cooling time, and 60
GWd/tHM burnup. For the cases reported in Table 1 the two main fissile isotopes in spent fuel, namely
239Pu and 235U, account only for about 60% of the SINRD signature. 
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Figure 1: Normalized SINRD signature as a function of the 239Pu content. The legend shows the additional 





239Pu [1] 4.3 57 %
[1] + 235U [2] 4.7 62 %
[2] + 241Pu  [3] 5.2 68 %
[3] + 240Pu  [4] 5.9 78 %
[4] + 241Am    [5] 6.4 83 %
Full card 7.6 100 %
Table 1: Normalized SINRD signature and share compared to the full material card. The values refer to fuel with
burnup of 60 GWd/tHM and the uncertainty associated to the SINRD signature was always lower than 0.1%.
Figure 2: Normalized SINRD signature as a function of the fuel burnup for different fuel compositions.
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Additional simulations were performed to evaluate the influence of both 239Pu and 235U on the SINRD 
signature. Figure 2 shows the normalized SINRD signature as a function of the fuel burnup for several
fuel compositions. The plot contains the results obtained for full material cards and for fuel with only
239Pu, 238U, and 16O. In addition, the SINRD signature was calculated for fuel where 239Pu, 235U, or both 
239Pu and 235U were removed from the material composition. All cases reported in the figure show 
almost constant SINRD signatures for fuel with burnup higher than 40 GWd/tHM, because the 239Pu 
content in the fuel is not varying at high burnup. Moreover, the figure shows that by excluding the 239Pu 
from the fuel composition the SINRD signature is almost independent from the fuel burnup, and this
supports the concept that the SINRD signature is mainly affected by the 239Pu fuel content. 
4.2 Energy distributions of the neutron flux
As shown in Figure 1 the SINRD signature is influenced by several nuclides, and the mass of each
nuclide in the fuel composition depends on the fuel burnup. To investigate the results included in the
previous section, Figures 3 and 4 show the energy distributions of the neutron fluxes in the resonance
and in the fast energy regions for fuel with burnup of 15 GWd/tHM and 60 GWd/tHM respectively. The
color scheme used in the figures to indicate the fuel composition is the same of Figure 1.
Figure 3: Energy distributions of the neutron fluxes in the resonance (left) and fast (right) energy regions. The
color scheme used to indicate the fuel composition is the same as Figure 1 and the compositions refer to fuel with
burnup of 15 GWd/tHM.
Figure 4: Energy distributions of the neutron fluxes in the resonance (left) and fast (right) energy regions. The
color scheme used to indicate the fuel composition is the same as Figure 1 and the compositions refer to fuel with
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The energy distribution in the resonance region was calculated as the difference between the
transmitted fluxes through Gd and Cd filters, and by considering 239Pu as active material in the
detector, while for the fast energy region the response of a bare 238U fission chamber was calculated. 
The plots of the resonance region show a decrease when nuclides are added to fuel containing only
238U and 16O (MOX00), while an opposite trend is shown in the graphs of the fast energy region. The 
reduction of the neutron flux in the resonance region is due to the neutron absorptions from different
nuclides, while the increase in the fast energy region is linked to the increase of the total fissile
material in the fuel. For both burnup values there is a significant decrease of the neutron flux in the
resonance region due to 239Pu absorption, while significant effect is due to 235U only for fuel with
burnup of 15 GWd/tHM. Moreover, for fuel with burnup of 60 GWd/tHM several nuclides are responsible
for the reduction of the neutron flux in the resonance region, while the curves for fuel with burnup of 15
GWd/tHM and containing only 239Pu and 235U are rather similar to the results obtained with full material 
composition.
Focusing on the fast energy region, this region is less influenced by the fuel composition compared to
the resonance region. However, still significant contributions can be seen from 239Pu and 235U for fuel 
with burnup of 15 GWd/tHM, while 239Pu alone gives the main influence for fuel with higher burnup. 
5. Impact of the fuel composition on the SINRD signature
The nuclides included in the fuel composition have an influence on the energy distribution of the
neutron flux and therefore result also in a variation of the SINRD signature.
Figure 5 shows the SINRD signature calculated for the fuel compositions mentioned in the previous
section starting from data obtained in the reference spent fuel library. The values are normalized to the
SINRD signature calculated for fuel containing only 238U and 16O. 
Figure 5: Normalized SINRD signature as a function of the 239Pu content for several fuel compositions. The 
burnup values corresponding to different data groups are reported in the figure.
A significant trend can be observed with the initial enrichment and burnup of the fuel; the increase of
the SINRD signature with the initial enrichment is due to the increasing 235U content, while the
increase with the fuel burnup is due to the increasing 239Pu concentration. Only the results from
simulations with burnup of 40 and 60 GWd/tHM give similar SINRD signatures because the 239Pu
content in these cases is similar.
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The SINRD signature is reported in Figure 5 for several cooling times only for the fuel with 3.5% initial
enrichment. As shown in the figure, the cooling time of the fuel assembly does not influence
significantly the SINRD signature, and this is because both 235U and 239Pu concentrations are not
affected by this parameter. Therefore, the SINRD signature shown in Figure 5 for other initial
enrichments refers only to the cooling time of 10 years.
The results from these simulations agree with previous results [14] that concluded that the SINRD
signature was mainly influenced by the 239Pu and 235U concentrations and minor effects were due to 
other nuclides.
6. Conclusions
The SINRD technique aims at the direct quantification of 239Pu in a fuel assembly by measuring the 
attenuation of the neutron flux close to 0.3 eV due to the neutron absorptions of this nuclide. However,
since all isotopes present in the fuel assembly determine a variation in the energy distribution of the
neutron flux, this paper estimated the influence that single nuclides have on the SINRD technique.
By using the results of the reference spent fuel library developed by SCK•CEN, 239Pu and 235U were 
the isotopes that influenced mostly this parameter, but for burnup higher than 20 GWd/tHM significant
contributions from other nuclides such as 240Pu, 241Pu, and 241Am were observed. Finally, the
correlation between the SINRD signature and the 239Pu fuel content was confirmed because the
simulations of fuel without 239Pu did not show any significant trend for the SINRD signature. 
The energy distribution of the neutron flux calculated with different fuel composition confirmed the
major role of 239Pu and 235U on the SINRD signature, and highlighted the balance between the neutron 
absorptions in the resonance region due to multiple nuclides and the increase of the fast neutron flux
due to the presence of fissile material.
Considering the 50 main neutron absorbers present in the spent fuel, the SIRND signature was
calculated for fuel compositions reflecting several combinations of initial enrichment, burnup, and
cooling time. It was found that the SINRD signature increases with initial enrichment and burnup
because of the increase of the 235U and 239Pu concentrations respectively. On the other hand, the 
cooling time did not influence significantly the results because the 235U and 239Pu contents are not 
affected by this parameter.
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Abstract:
An active non-destructive assay technique - differential die-away (DDA) - is being investigated within
the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent Fuel project as one of several promising alternatives
to currently available instruments used for spent nuclear fuel assemblies (SFAs) characterization.
An external neutron generator produces interrogating neutrons which thermalize while penetrating the
SFA to induce fission primarily on the fissile content, typically 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu. The strength of 
the signal and the time distribution of detected neutrons depend on a balance between the amount of
fissile isotopes and neutron absorbers, and reflect the overall SFA isotopic composition and irradiation
history. Taking advantage of differences in dynamic evolution of the detected signal, the DDA
instrument can determine various characteristics of SFAs, be it multiplication, total Pu content, fissile
content, initial enrichment, burn-up and presence of certain types of partial defects.
Given the demand from the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company for an
instrument for spent fuel characterization, the DDA instrument is being developed to independently
verify both boiling water and pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies. The first prototype of DDA
instrument is customized for deployment in the central interim storage facility (Clab) in order to perform
test measurements on 50 SFAs with different characteristic parameters. A future DDA instrument is
considered to reliably characterize more than 40 000 SFAs at the encapsulation facility (Clink) before
the fuel is deposited into the geological repository.
Within the scope of this paper, the selection and design of individual components as well as
operational aspects of the DDA instrument developed for its specific use in Clab will be described.
Additionally we provide justification for individual decisions made accompanied by a discussion of
potential changes in the DDA instrument performance should the individual components be chosen
differently.
Keywords: differential die-away, spent nuclear fuel, non-destructive assay, prompt fission neutron
detection, Clab
1. Introduction
In 2009, The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent Fuel project (NGSI-SF) of the United States
Department of Energy [1] began the effort of researching new alternatives to existing non-destructive
assay (NDA) techniques for nuclear safeguards with a particular emphasis on the capability of an
integrated NDA system. The primary goals of the project are to (1) detect the diversion or replacement
of pins, (2) determine Pu mass in spent fuel, (3) verify initial enrichment (IE), burn-up (BU) and cooling
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time (CT) of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) declared by the facility’s operators, and (4) estimate the heat
content.
The NGSI-SF project initially suggested the use of 14 different techniques, each of which was
evaluated in terms of their possible application to SNF characterization. One of these techniques,
differential die-away (DDA), has been chosen for further research because initial simulation results
indicated the potential for independent verification of various fuel parameters. Following the simulation
results from the earlier stage of this project, the DDA method revealed the potential for this technique
to be comprehensive. The DDA based instrument is expected to be able to measure spent fuel
assembly (SFA) multiplication [2] determine total Pu content [3], and measure total fissile content [4],
IE, and BU [5].
An SFA, after being irradiated inside the reactor core during several operational cycles, contains a
considerable amount of nuclear material, which can be used for illicit purposes. To prevent the illegal
proliferation of nuclear material, SFAs are required to be characterized and verified in accordance with
international safeguards agreements. After the irradiation, the SFAs are placed and kept inside a
temporary storage facility, before a final decision is made on how to deal with the nuclear waste. In
principle, the three main options are to (1) reprocess the SFA, (2) deposit the fuel in a repository, or
(3) postpone the final decision. In Sweden, the current plan is to encapsulate the SFAs in dedicated
copper containers, which are inserted in a long-term geological repository. The process of
encapsulation is expected to start in 2023 in a newly built facility named Clink, which will be located in
close proximity to the current interim storage facility Clab in Oskarshamn. The estimated operational
time of Clink is until approximately 2070, when all the SFAs are expected to be encapsulated and
transported by ship to the long-term geological repository in Forsmark. There the canisters will be
placed 500 meters below the surface in the granite rock.
Given the objective to accurately characterize the SFAs before the final encapsulation, the Swedish
Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) has joined the NGSI-SF in a collaborative
effort to develop instrument(s) for SFA characterization in a future Swedish encapsulation facility. The
participation of Sweden in the collaboration has created an opportunity for the project to test the
performance of instruments researched within the NGSI-SF on commercially used SFAs. The DDA
instrument was designed to be deployed and tested in Clab. If the expected performance of the DDA
instrument is successfully confirmed, the same or an improved version may be used at Clink. The
DDA prototype, as described in more detail in [6], has been designed and will soon be under
construction at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Following the completion of the prototype
construction, the performance of the DDA instrument is planned to be first tested on fresh fuel
assemblies (FFAs) at LANL, and then on a set of 25 pressurized water reactor (PWR) and 25 boiling
water reactor (BWR) SFAs at Clab.
As the DDA instrument is expected to share certain structural components with other instruments
designed for Clab, e.g. the differential die-away self-interrogation instrument (DDSI), some
construction modifications have been made to the design proposed in [6]. Within the scope of this
paper, we summarize the individual components of DDA design as described together with the
simulation results in [6], and we list major modifications that are based on practical considerations of a
real-life industrial type of deployment. In addition, the consequences of such changes on the DDA
performance and operation are discussed.
2. The Differential Die-Away Technique
The DDA is an NDA technique based on the active interrogation of fissile isotopes of an item that
contains nuclear material, e.g. SFAs, by neutrons from an external source. A neutron generator (NG),
which is commonly used as a source of these neutrons, injects short and intense pulses of fast
neutrons to the SFA. The highly energetic neutrons penetrate deep into the SFA, thermalize, and
induce fission primarily in fissile isotopes (i.e., 239Pu, 241Pu, and 235U). The induced fission leads to the 
emission of prompt fission neutrons, which are either detected by detectors surrounding the SFA, are
absorbed in the material, or induce another fission reaction. While the NG neutrons that hit the
detector directly without any previous fission reaction (so-called “burst neutrons”) die away on the
order of tens of µs, the induced fission neutrons remain inside the SFA for longer time, and are
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absorbed with die-away time approximately in the range of 80 – 180 µs. The name of the DDA method
is derived from the difference in die-away times of these two different groups of neutrons.
The DDA instrument provides the information primarily from two measurable quantities: (1) the integral
sum of the DDA signal detected in a certain time domain following the end of the interrogation neutron
pulse; and (2) the die-away time, which can be determined in various time domains by least square
exponential fit of the DDA signal distribution. Both of these quantities are driven by SFA composition
and are dependent on the balance between the amount of fissile material and the amount of neutron
absorbers in the fuel. The DDA signal is typically stronger for FFAs that usually have higher fissile
content than the irradiated fuel assemblies, which also contain a significant amount of neutron
absorbers. The die-away time in the early time domain reflects the amount of present neutron
absorbers but in the later time domain reflects the SFA multiplication. The die-away time tends to
decrease with higher BU as the amount of neutron absorbers also increases. The DDA signal and die-
away time may be used to characterize the SFAs (i.e., to determine the IE, BU, CT, and Pu mass and
total fissile content) [3,4,5].
3. Differential Die-Away Instrument Proposed for Clab
The design of the first DDA deployment-ready prototype as introduced in [6] and illustrated in Fig. 1
has been developed with special consideration for deployment in Sweden. The DDA design initially
introduced by [7] has been subject to extensive research and underwent significant evolution before
the design of the first prototype was released [6]. The first modification of the DDA instrument with the
objective of practical operation and deployment in Sweden was done by Lundkvist et al. [8], and was
later further developed in [6]. The first DDA design simplifications were made in [8] investigating also a
light weight version of the DDA instrument, which is designed to be more easily transportable.
However, this concept was later abandoned as not perspective for the Swedish application given the
operators requirement not to use fission chambers in the instrument design. As a result, the
conceptual design by Blanc et al. [9] using 3He detectors was taken to be a starting point for a new 
research path of the Clab design. The latest design proposed for use in Clab as described in [6]
features many components similar to the Blanc conceptual design. A significant difference is the
choice of commercial off-the-shelf components that, once combined together, provide a fully
functioning instrument able to operate in the high radiation environment and handle the high neutron
detection rates expected on individual 3He detectors. Several of the components that are critical for 
the proper functionality and that essentially dictate the final layout [6] are summarized below:
 Neutron generator - The selected NG is a ThermoScientificTM model P 385 [10]. It provides a
nominally highest achievable neutron yield of ~3·108 n/s that should be sustainable over long
(months to years) periods of operation.  It is anticipated to be operated at a minimum yield of
1·108 n/s with a 5% duty cycle and 2500 Hz pulse frequency.
 Detectors + polyethylene moderator – In total, twelve 3He detectors were placed around the
SFA. The detectors are 5 cm in active length, have a 1.25 cm diameter, and have a gas
pressure of 7.5 atm. Small detectors were chosen to limit the count rate and to assay only a
limited region of the SFA in the vertical direction as the BU distribution of the SFAs can vary
significantly along the vertical axis, i.e. edges of PWR SFAs and the entire length of BWR
SFAs. The decreased efficiency due to limited length is compensated by an increased inner
pressure which improves the detection efficiency. All detectors are enclosed in a 1.4 cm thick
polyethylene sleeve which is covered by a 0.1 cm thick cadmium (Cd) liner to make the
detector exclusively sensitive to the prompt fission neutrons.
 Cd liner around SFA – Previous research [8] suggests that a Cd liner around SFA should be
used to prevent the return of thermalized neutrons from the water back to the SFA. This
component is essential especially if the SFA is surrounded by a relatively thick (> 1 cm) layer
of water.
 Lead shielding of detectors – The preamplifiers of 3He detectors and detector themselves
must be shielded from gamma rays emitted by SFA; therefore, a 5 cm thick and 50 cm high
lead collar was placed between the SFA and detectors to minimize the exposure of 3He
detectors.
 Tailoring material between the NG and SFA – Based on the simulation study by Goodsell et
al. [11], the tailoring material between SFA and NG, be it tungsten, lead, stainless steel, water,
or even in an extreme case, 238U, does not indicate a significantly improved or worsened
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active signal on the detectors. Therefore, the function of the tailoring material, the primary
purpose of which was to slow down the neutrons and produce additional neutrons by (n,2n)
reaction, was omitted here in favour of placing the NG closer to the SFA which leads to
additional improvement of the expected signal-to-background ratio (S/B).
 Shielding of NG – The inner components of the NG (e.g., the NG target, tube, and
electronics) are also sensitive to gamma rays. Consequently, extreme gamma exposure of the
NG may lead to the overall paralysis of the NG. In [6] the position of the NG was chosen as a
compromise between keeping the NG close enough to have relatively high (S/B) ratio, and a
sufficient distance that ensures a low gamma ray exposure from the SFA. As a result, it was
suggested that a 3 cm thick, 50 cm high rectangular tungsten block be placed between the NG
and SFA to minimize the gamma dose rate on the NG target while still keeping the satisfactory
S/B ratio. This block may be alternatively replaced with a 5 cm thick lead block.
 Neutron flux monitor – In addition to the 3He detectors, an independent flux monitor is
required to monitor the neutron output from the NG during every single measurement
campaign, as well as over the entire lifetime of the NG tube. In [6], several options (3He, 4He, 
and various types of fission chambers) were presented as potential candidates for this
purpose.
Figure 1: Horizontal (left panel) and vertical (right panel) cross-sectional view of the DDA design as simulated
and proposed for the deployment in Clab [6].
4. Impact of various design modifications on the DDA instrument performance
The conceptual design of the DDA instrument for Clab, as summarized in Section 3 and thoroughly
described in [6], is still expected to be modified due to various fabrications constraints and in order to
benefit from mechanical design features of other instruments (e.g., DDSI). The initial idea of sharing
the majority of the components and building one integrated instrument for DDA and DDSI has been
abandoned because of too large number of compromises it entailed that were threatening the very
performance of individual instruments. However, the external basket of DDSI [12], which
accommodates the entire instrument, will be used to house DDA instrument as it is preferred by SKB
and provides enough space to house all necessary instrument components. However, several
components as suggested in Section 3 and depicted in Fig. 1 have been modified or replaced. This
section of the paper describes the main alterations that have been implemented into the most recent
design to be fabricated at LANL. Some of the modifications may have an impact on the performance
of the DDA instrument, and within this paper we discuss the potential magnitude of such effects in
terms of longer measurement times and different levels of accuracy from those described in [6].
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4.1. Shielding of the NG
The NG, if operated in vicinity of another SFA, must be effectively protected to ensure optimum
operation. The most sensitive part of the NG is the high voltage section, which accelerates the ions to
the target. In [6], several different materials of various thicknesses were simulated using Monte Carlo
Neutron Particle transport code (MCNP) [13]. Given the compromise between the position of the NG
and the gamma dose rate on the NG’s target, a 3 cm thick tungsten block was preferred over lead
because given the same thickness the more dense tungsten blocks gamma rays more effectively than
lead. However, the high cost of tungsten alloys made this option generally less desirable. Therefore,
the decision was made to limit the use of tungsten to only the space between the NG and SFA. More
recently, that decision was reversed and the originally suggested 3 cm of tungsten between the NG
and SFA was replaced with 5 cm of lead shielding. Thorough MCNP simulations have shown that the
5 cm of lead is about as efficient in shielding gammas as 3 cm of tungsten. The consequences of
shifting the NG 2 cm farther from the SFA on the active signal yield are discussed in Section 4.2.
In addition to the gamma-ray shielding between the NG and SFA, the NG has to be shielded from
gamma rays originating from other external sources (e.g., the SFAs stored nearby). However, since
the exact layout of the encapsulation facility and thus the measurement conditions has not yet been
decided, it is difficult to predict the exact thickness of this additional shielding that needs to be placed
around the NG. In anticipation of need to provide at least some additional shielding of the NG the
initial idea was to use a simple 1 to 3 cm thick lead collar covering the external side of the NG as
shown in the figures of [6], the final decision was made to house the entire NG into a compact 2.5 cm
thick lead enclosure, which effectively protects the NG from exposure to external gamma sources.
4.2. Shift of the NG Position
Figure 2: Schematic drawing of the DDA detector layout and position of NG dictated by the use of different
shielding material and other design modifications. The left panel illustrates the situation for initially modelled
position in [6], the right panel displays the current configuration.
The results in [6] suggest placing the NG as close as possible to the SFA without compromising the
gamma shielding of the NG. But as described in Section 4.1, the 3 cm thick tungsten shield of NG [6]
has been replaced by a 5 cm thick lead brick, which requires altering the position of the NG from that
projected in [6]. In addition to this 2 cm shift, the NG will be also need to be shifted by another 2.5 cm
to accommodate the insert and the upper funnel of the assembly. In total the NG will be shifted by 4.5
cm farther from the SFA (relative to the position suggested in Fig. 1). The effect of the gap necessary
for the insertion of the funnel may significantly influence the performance of the instrument For
example, if water is used to fill this gap, many fewer neutrons from the NG would actually reach the
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SFA because many will thermalize and then will be captured by the Cd liner. Therefore, it has been
suggested that this space should be filled with aluminum, which is expected to be nearly transparent
to fast neutrons. The new layout (right panel) is compared to the original (left panel) in schematic
drawing in Fig. 2. Reference [6] shows how shifting the NG by 3 cm impacts the active neutron count
rates on detectors and consequently also the S/B ratio in comparison with the position without any
shielding material between the NG and SFA. Following the same approach as that applied in [6] for
the estimation of the change of the S/B ratio, the active signal is expected to decrease by a factor of
approximately 0.7 ± 0.1 if the NG is shifted by the additional 4.5 cm discussed above. In total, the
simulated S/B ratio for the summed signal from all detectors is expected to be approximately 1.5 ± 0.2
for the worst case SFA (i.e., 5% IE, 60 GWd/tU, 5y CT, and a 300 s measurement time). For the SFA
with the highest active signal (i.e., 5% IE, 15 GWd/tU, 5y CT, and a 300 s measurement time), the
resulting S/B ratio is approximately 6.0·102 ± 0.8·102. The S/B ratio for all other PWR SFAs is 
expected to stay within this range.
4.3. Use of Cd Liner around the SFA Insert
Lundkvist et al. [8] studied an important issue arising from neutron return to SFA after its
thermalization in water. This neutron return impacted the distribution of the neutron population
considerably if the SFA without a Cd liner was placed in water as it induces more fission in the front
region of the SFA, resulting in an oversampling of this region relative to the rest of the assembly and
eventually distorting the entire DDA signal. Thus, using a Cd liner was suggested to reduce such
thermal neutron return. A similar use of the Cd liner was also studied in [6]. For the case of the “full 
scale” DDA instruments such as designed by Blanc and Menlove [9] or the proposed Clab design [6],
the Cd liner was observed to be unnecessary if the water gap between the SFA and lead shielding
remained below 1 cm. The primary reason for this conclusion is that the detectors and various
shielding material surrounding the SFA provides enough neutron absorption that the effects of thermal
neutron return are significantly suppressed and become negligible. As a result, the decision was made
to use a 60 cm tall, removable Cd liner around the PWR SFA insert for situations where the water gap
exceeds 1 cm. The Cd liner is vertically centered at the level of the target plane extending 30 cm up
and down.
4.4. The Effect of Different Polyethylene Thickness around the Detector
The twelve 3He detectors with a 1.4 cm thick polyethylene sleeve moderator, which were simulated in 
[6] and suggested for use in the Clab instrument, are expected to be slightly altered. Following the
recent measurements of the fresh fuel with a laboratory DDA setup at LANL [14], the detectors located
closest to the NG (also referred as front detectors) experienced difficulties in handling the high count
rates which are also expected during real-life measurement at Clab. The fast neutron flux is the
highest at the position of the front detectors because a significantly higher fraction of neutrons come
directly from the NG. Despite the dedicated studies of front and back detector count rates in [6] which
resulted in adjusting the 3He tube and moderator dimensions, the preliminary experimental results
from the LANL indicate potential issues with too high dead time. A conservative estimate to ensure the
data from all detectors are valid and not compromised by high count rates, forces us to reduce the
efficiency of the individual 3He detectors. The most practical way to do that is reducing the
polyethylene moderator thickness around the detectors preventing thus a more costly replacement of
current detectors by smaller models. At this stage, the decision has not yet been made regarding how
much to reduce the polyethylene thickness and whether to do it on all the detectors - a conservative
response - or to only modify the front set of the detectors, since the back detectors experience
approximately an order of magnitude lower peak detection rate.
The change of the polyethylene thickness would alter the absolute levels of both active, as well as
passive signal count rates, as simulated in [6]. This in turn means the S/B would remain the same and
therefore general performance of the instrument is also expected to remain unchanged. But as the
active signal is overall decreased, the projected measurement times in the range of 5 to 10 minutes [6]
may be prolonged in order to achieve same statistical accuracy.
4.5. Independent Monitoring of NG Output
One of the last few unresolved questions that need to be addressed is the selection and design of the
independent neutron flux monitor. It is however expected to be decided based on the experience with
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the fresh fuel measurement campaign that is currently ongoing at LANL. The independent flux monitor
is expected to provide information proportional to the immediate neutron flux emitted from the NG over
the span of the individual measurement and for the duration of the entire NG operation. The system of
independent monitoring is required to verify the actual NG’s output, which is known to be slowly
decreasing during routine use that exceeds several hours as well as the gradual decrease of the
maximum achievable intensity as the tritium inside the NG target is depleted. For this purpose, a
dedicated cavity behind the NG has been suggested to accommodate the independent flux monitor. At
the time of writing this paper, the approximately 18 cm, active length fission chamber with 2 grams of
depleted uranium is suggested and considered to be adequate for this purpose.
4.6. BWR Insert and Position of SFA in the Instrument
The majority of the study dedicated to finalization of the Clab design was performed only with PWR
SFAs. However, the majority of spent fuel in Sweden consists of BWR SFAs, which are dimensionally
(but also by shape of the BU distribution) different from PWR SFAs. BWR SFAs have not been
simulated with the Clab design primarily because of associated high computational demand compared
with PWR SFAs. However, the DDA performance with BWR SFAs has been tested on the conceptual
DDA design in [4], where the design by Blanc and Menlove [9] was modified to enclose the BWR SFA.
In [4], the lead shielding dimensions and detector positions were changed to enclose the SFA similarly
as for the PWR in [9]. The comprehensive set of 216 SFAs was simulated and analyzed. The results
did not indicate a significant change in the DDA instrument performance when benchmarked with
results obtained from PWR SFAs. Therefore, the Clab design, which is similar to the conceptual
design by Blanc and Menlove is anticipated to work with BWR SFAs as well.
In case of the Clab design, the BWR assemblies are expected to be assayed by the same DDA
instrument as the PWR SFAs which can be modified to accommodate both dimensionally different
PWR (~ 21 x 21 cm) and BWR (~ 14 x 14 cm) SFAs. While the volume of BWR assemblies is
significantly lower, the space between the SFA and the DDA instrument needs to be filled with material
that does not significantly alter the neutron transport. If water is not prevented from occupying this
place, the majority of fast fission neutrons from SFA would thermalize and get captured on Cd liner of
the individual detectors. Thus, the DDA instrument performance could be significantly degraded.
Figure 3: The comparison of the DDA instrument with the inserted PWR SFA (left) [6] and BWR SFA together
with aluminum insert (right).
In general, the gap around the SFA when the BWR is assayed has been recommended in [6] to be
filled by material such as air, aluminum, iron or stainless steel to minimize the neutron interactions with
this material. The position of the BWR assembly during the assay is also suggested to be as close to
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the NG as reasonably possible (right panel of Fig. 3) because the solid angle of the injected neutrons
that target the SFA is larger improving thus the S/B ratio. However, at this point we are unsure about
the details of operations with the BWR assemblies and whether off center position inside the DDA
instrument can be permitted by the facility operator. The alternative is that the BWR is centered inside
the DDA cavity resulting in a uniform gap of app. 3 cm around the SFA. Fig. 3 (right panel)
schematically illustrates the preferred position of BWR SFAs and filling of the gap with aluminum, as
proposed to the Swedish operators.
5. Planned Measurement and Operational Scenarios
The test measurements are planned to use the interrogation scenario with a 5% duty cycle and the
interrogation pulse length of 50 µs resulting in the pulse frequency of 1000 Hz. This interrogation
scenario was suggested in [6] as the best compromise to improve S/B ratio without compromising
DDA signal quality by mixing neutrons from various time domains. In [6], the statistical uncertainties
were investigated for measurement times of 5 and 10 minutes, which both indicated a satisfactory
relative statistical uncertainty below 1%. This time is dedicated only to a measurement of a single SFA
orientation, which in many cases is expected to be sufficient. However, some of the SFAs may require
assay of all four SFA orientations [15]. In such case, the data acquisition time would be prolonged by
factor of 4 to be approximately 20 to 40 minutes per SFA. But, that time does not account for
additional time necessary to maneuver (i.e. to insert, to extract, and to rotate) the SFA. The time
required for maneuvering the SFA is expected to be 5 to 10 minutes for single-sided assay, and 20 to
40 minutes for multi-sided assay, respectively. The estimated total handling time of SFA including both
measurement and maneuvering is approximately 10 to 20 minutes for single-sided assay, and 40 to 80
minutes for a multi-sided assay, respectively. Whether this anticipated time is compatible with future
Clink operation, which is anticipated to encapsulate one canister per 8 hour working day (i.e., 12 BWR
or 4 PWR SFAs), is beyond the scope of this paper and will need to be evaluated in the future.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The DDA instrument that was designed and proposed for Clab deployment has undergone several
modifications because of various limitations in construction, expected deployment conditions, and
financial or other technical reasons. The most significant changes in the design that may impact the
instrument performance are: (1) different shielding for the NG, (2) increased separation of the NG from
the SFA, (3) use of a Cd liner around the SFA, (4) monitoring of the NG output, and (5) positioning of
the BWR SFA in the instrument. The effect of these changes has been evaluated leading to a
conclusion that despite remaining uncertainty in actual operational conditions the DDA instrument
design proposed for Clab deployment is still expected to provide statistically significant results in
practical measurement times.
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Abstract:
The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) is one of the tools available to an inspector performing
verification of the irradiated nuclear fuel inventory in wet storages at a nuclear facility. For gross defect
verification, the presence of Cherenkov light and its qualitative properties are sufficient to verify the
presence of an irradiated fuel assembly. For partial defect verification, the measured Cherenkov light
intensity is quantitatively related to the intensity that is expected from the assembly under
investigation, given the operator declarations for that assembly.
While the currently used method for predicting the Cherenkov light emission intensity has performed
well, data have also shown that enhanced methods incorporating more details may improve the
prediction capabilities even further, in particular for short-cooled fuel assemblies. Fuel parameters
such as initial enrichment, burnup, cooling time, as well as the fuel irradiation history and fuel type
affect the total emitted Cherenkov light intensity, and should be taken into account in the prediction
process. Furthermore, a larger number of fuel types and geometries need to be incorporated into the
methods to take geometric effects into account.
This paper describes a new and fast method to predict the Cherenkov light intensity of an irradiated
fuel assembly, taking the fuel irradiation history and fuel geometry into account. The proposed method
takes advantage of pre-computed Monte Carlo simulations of the Cherenkov light generated by a fuel,
and is fast enough to be used in the field. The improved prediction method will also allow for more
stringent detection limits, which may improve the partial defect detection capabilities of the DCVD.
Keywords: DCVD; partial defect verification; Cherenkov light
Introduction1.
One of many safeguards tasks undertaken by authority inspectors is the verification of irradiated
nuclear fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies are often stored in water for decay heat removal and for
radiation protection. The electromagnetic radiation emitted from the fuel assemblies will interact with
the water and gives rise to Cherenkov light in the water, which can be measured. A commonly used
method for verifying irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies is to detect and quantify the Cherenkov light
emission from spent fuel assemblies, and compare the quality and/or intensity of the detected light to
what is expected from a fuel assembly.
To do quantitative measurements with the DCVD, the measured Cherenkov light intensity of a set of
fuel assemblies are compared to predicted intensities. The currently used prediction method (referred
to as CPM in this text) works by first simulating the Cherenkov light intensity in a fuel assembly for a
range of burnups and cooling times of the fuel. Based on the operator declared values for burnup and
cooling time, the relative intensity of a fuel assembly is then interpolated from the previously simulated
data. This paper presents a next generation prediction method (referred to as NGM in this text) for the
Cherenkov light intensity, which also takes fuel geometry and irradiation history into account when
predicting the intensity.
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1.1. Measurements with the DCVD
One of the instruments available to an inspector for measuring the Cherenkov light emitted from a fuel
assembly is the Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) [1]. The DCVD has for a long time been
used for gross defect verification, where the inspector verifies that an object is an irradiated fuel
assembly as opposed to a non-fuel object. The DCVD can also be used to perform partial defect
verification, with the purpose of detecting missing and/or substituted fuel rods according to the IAEA’s 
definition of a partial defect, currently at a level of 50%.
In a measurement situation, the DCVD is mounted on the railing of a bridge above the fuel, looking
down into the water, as shown in Figure 1. This allows for quick, non-destructive measurements of fuel
inventories.
Figure 1 Left: the typical measurement situation when measuring irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies with a DCVD.
Right: an example of a gray-scale DCVD image of a PWR fuel assembly.
Depending on whether an inspector wants to perform a gross or a partial defect verification campaign,
the measurement scenario looks slightly different. For gross defect verification, the inspector studies
the detected Cherenkov light intensity and light characteristics from each fuel item separately, in order
to determine whether the object under study is a fuel item or a non-fuel item. For partial defect
verification a collection of spent fuel assemblies of the same type is measured, and the measured
(quantified) intensities are compared to expected intensities, which have been estimated from the fuel
burnups and cooling times. Conclusions on whether the fuels are intact or suffer from partial defects
are drawn after measurements have been performed. Currently, an inspector enters information about
the fuels to be measured into a program that estimates the Cherenkov light intensity by interpolating
pre-computed data for fuels with varying burnup and cooling time. Entering the fuel data into the
program doing the interpolation is often done manually, but can be done automatically if there are
scripts available to read the data in the format provided by the operator.
As can be understood, the prediction method for the Cherenkov light intensity needs to be both fast
and accurate in order to be useable in the field. The CPM, which takes only the final burnup and the
cooling time since end-of-irradiation into account, has performed well in most measurement
campaigns. However, it has not been able to accurately predict the Cherenkov light intensity from
short-cooled fuel, with a cooling time shorter than a few years. For such short-cooled fuels, the
irradiation history influences the Cherenkov light intensity to a relatively large extent. Furthermore,
implementing a more detailed method will improve the capability of the DCVD to detect partial defects,
by putting more stringent limitations on both the expected intensity value and its uncertainties. For
these reasons, the method presented here was developed.
1.2. Next-generation prediction tools
To model the Cherenkov light generation in a fuel assembly, a Geant4 [2] based simulation toolkit has
previously been developed [3]. This toolkit has now been updated to work with the latest version of
Geant4, and scripts have been developed to launch the simulations and collect the data with limited
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efforts from the user of the toolkit. This work is a continuation of the work in [4], further developing the
models and procedures used for the simulations of predicted Cherenkov-light intensities.
The updated toolkit uses a Geant4 standard physics list, with optical physics added separately. The
gamma source in the simulations can be chosen to be one of the following: 1) a monoenergetic
source, 2) an arbitrary spectrum provided in a format the program can read, or 3) an output file from
the fuel depletion calculation program ORIGEN [5]. The geometry of the fuel assembly, including rods
with cladding and a fuel box surrounding the fuel is specified in an input file. The standard simulation
settings are applicable to most cases, but via input files the user may alter settings such as cut-off
energies of gammas and electrons, and what data to save during a simulation run.
Current prediction method (CPM) for predicting the Cherenkov light intensity2.
The CPM used to predict the Cherenkov light intensity from an irradiated nuclear fuel assembly is
based on a method developed by Rolandson [6]. In this method, the Cherenkov light intensities for a
selection of boiling water reactor (BWR) fuels with varying burnups and cooling times were obtained
through Geant3 simulations. In the analysis, these results are used to interpolate the expected
Cherenkov light emission intensity for a fuel assembly, given its burnup and cooling time. The method
was later extended by others to work for a larger range of burnups and cooling times, as well as to
give predictions for short-cooled fuel, with cooling time shorter than one year.
2.1. Description of the CPM
The simulations of the data that form the basis of the CPM were performed in two steps. The first step
was to calculate the concentration of fission product isotopes in a fuel assembly using a fuel burnup
calculation program, and create a gamma spectrum as emitted by the fuel. The second step was to
transport the gamma rays from their place of emission inside the irradiated nuclear fuel, which
includes tracking them through their interaction with e.g. electrons in water and in the Cherenkov light
generation process in the surrounding water. The last step also included the transport of the
Cherenkov photons to the place of detection.
The first step was done using the ORIGEN fuel depletion code, and as a result the gamma spectra
emitted from the selected BWR assemblies with different burnups were calculated. In the original
studies the fuels were irradiated during four to six irradiation cycles, with each cycle having an
irradiation period of 330 days followed by 35 days of cooling. The length of the final cycle was
adjusted so that the fuels had the desired total burnup. The power level was chosen to be equal at all
times of irradiation. However, for high-burnup fuels, more irradiation cycles were added, while for low-
burnup fuels, four irradiations cycles were used with a lower power level. After irradiation, the gamma
spectrum was saved for several cooling times in the range of 1 to 50 years. To simplify the
calculations, the original investigations concerned only the contributions from the six isotopes Y-90,
Rh-106, Cs-134, Cs-137, Pr-144 and Eu-154, which together contributed to more than 96% of the total
gamma ray intensity at energies which may result in Cherenkov light being produced for the burnups
under consideration. All these nuclides are gamma emitters, except for Y-90. This isotope emits high-
energy electrons that cause Bremsstrahlung in the fuel, which contributes to the total gamma
spectrum. All recent updates of these simulations, including results presented here, include not only
these six isotopes, but the full inventory of gamma emitters. This is especially important when
extending the simulations to more short-cooled fuel, where many short-lived isotopes are present and
contribute to the total Cherenkov light intensity.
The second step was to simulate the transport and interaction of the gamma rays in the fuel geometry.
This was done in the Monte Carlo code Geant3. The code simulated the gamma ray interactions with
surrounding matter (fuel, cladding and the water), the creation of electrons and the generation of
Cherenkov light. The propagation of the Cherenkov photons to a detector position 5 m above the fuel
was also simulated. A “shadow factor” was also introduced, to take into account the effect of spacers
and top structures in the fuel. This factor was multiplied with the simulated intensity to get an estimate
of the measured intensity.  Later simulations used a simplified geometry, and the total emitted
Cherenkov light intensity was used as an estimate rather than a simulated intensity at a detector
position.
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2.2. Limitations of the CPM
The CPM has worked well so far. However, since it does not take into account the irradiation history, it
has proven to be less accurate in predicting the Cherenkov light intensities from short-cooled fuel.
Furthermore, a simplified geometry is used and the results from the simulations of a specific BWR fuel
type are taken to approximately describe all types of fuels. The impact of these two factors is
described in the following two sections.
2.2.1. Irradiation history
The CPM works very well when the decays of Cs-137 are the dominating contribution to the emitted
Cherenkov light. Since Cs-137 is long-lived with a half-life of 30.2 years and since it is proportional to
burnup, the knowledge of the burnup and cooling time of a set of fuel assemblies is sufficient to
estimate their relative Cherenkov light intensities. However, for fuels with a cooling time on the order of
or less than two years, the irradiation history of each fuel assembly and its location inside the reactor
core becomes more important. A typical fuel in a power producing reactor is placed near the center of
the reactor core for the first cycles, where it has a relatively high power level, and spends the last
cycles near the edge of the core, with a lower power level. For short-cooled fuels, the short-lived
gamma-emitting isotopes which were generated in the last irradiation cycle are still present. This
means that the assumption of an equal power level in all irradiation cycles is not fully valid, especially
if the burnup of the last cycle deviated significantly from the average of the previous ones.
While the “typical” fuel has a high burnup in the first cycles and low burnup in the last ones, it is also
common that fuels may have an irradiation history which differs from this. If a fuel spends a cycle
outside the reactor before being irradiated again, or if the final cycle is high-power, this can greatly
affect the gamma spectrum of the fuel at discharge. Thus, for short-cooled fuel, the fuel irradiation
history must be taken into account to accurately predict the Cherenkov light intensity.
2.2.2. Geometry
The foundation for the CPM is based on simulations of 8x8 BWR fuel. It is currently being investigated
to what extent, and with which accuracy, the results can be applied to predict the Cherenkov light
intensity from other types of spent nuclear fuels. In addition, it is being investigated whether the
simulations can be simplified by simulating and extrapolating the Cherenkov light emitted by one
single fuel rod, rather than a full assembly, in order to speed up the process. Work is ongoing in both
areas, but it is worth mentioning that by using simplified geometries there is a risk of neglecting
differences between different fuel types. This may e.g. impact the Cherenkov light generation process
and the transport of the Cherenkov photons from their place of emission to the DCVD, and hence
increase the errors in the predicted intensity for other fuel types. Thus, there is a need for a prediction
method which also takes the fuel geometry into account.
Proposed next generation method (NGM) for predicting the Cherenkov light3.
intensity
In this paper, it is argued that more accurate predictions of the Cherenkov light emission from a fuel
assembly can be obtained through simulation of its actual fuel irradiation history and detailed Monte
Carlo modelling of the Cherenkov light generation in the entire fuel assembly, and for this reason the
NGM has been developed. As in the case of the CPM, the fuel depletion step is done in ORIGEN, and
the particle transport is done in Geant4. The modelling of the particle transport takes into account the
full fuel geometry including all rods, the cladding and the fuel box. The process of repeating the
generation of the source term (i.e. the gamma spectrum) for different fuel geometries also allows for
an investigation of possible differences between different fuel types. To speed up the prediction
process, the Cherenkov light production due to gamma rays of a given energy in an assembly can be
pre-computed, and given a gamma spectrum from e.g. ORIGEN, the Cherenkov light intensity can be
estimated quickly based on the pre-computed values.
3.1. Simulating Cherenkov light from BWR and PWR fuel geometries
To investigate the difference between the CPM and the proposed NGM, and to study if the gamma
spectrum and Cherenkov light production depends on fuel type, simulations have here been
performed for an 8x8 BWR and a 17x17 PWR fuel design. The fuel history simulated in ORIGEN was
chosen to be rather similar to the one used in [6] so that the results may be compared. However in this
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work all the cycles were of equal length, while the previous work adapted the length of the final cycle
in order to meet the desired total burnup.
For all simulations, an initial enrichment of 2% was assumed, to allow comparison with the earlier
results. Fuels with 10, 20 and 30 MWd/kgU burnup were irradiated for four cycles, where each cycle
had 312.5 days of irradiation and 46 days of cooling. The power levels for the three burnups were 8,
16 and 24 kW/kgU, respectively. For the 40 MWd/kgU case, the power level remained at 24 kW/kgU,
and the fuel was irradiated for 5 cycles. For all burnup levels, separate gamma spectra were saved at
0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60 years of cooling time after discharge. The same
irradiation histories, initial enrichment and power levels were used for both the BWR and the PWR
studies.
The gammas rays from the fission products inside the fuel were generated in the vertical center of the
full fuel rod length, and at randomly distributed positions in the horizontal fuel rod plane. The
momentum directions of the gamma rays were isotropic. To save computer time, gamma rays with
energy below 300 keV were not simulated, since simulations show that for gammas just below 300
keV only one or two Cherenkov photons are generated per 10 million gammas, which is negligible.
Further, electrons with energy less than 257 keV were discarded in the simulations, since these have
too low energy to produce Cherenkov light. Once a gamma ray had energy lower than 257 keV it was
also discarded, since it cannot produce electrons with sufficient energy to produce Cherenkov light.
Geometrically, the 8x8 BWR fuel geometry was matched to the one used in [6], with the same fuel and
cladding diameters and rod pitch (center distance between rods). The chosen PWR geometry was a
17x17 Westinghouse type with water filled guide tubes for control rods and a central instrumentation
tube. The geometrical fuel information for the BWR and PWR fuels is given in Table 1. The inner
radius of the cladding is chosen to be the same as the fuel pellet radius, corresponding to a closed
gap in between the fuel and the cladding. Since the fuel types simulated are rotationally symmetric, it
was sufficient to simulate one octant of the fuel, and the information could be used to predict the
Cherenkov light contribution from the rods that were not simulated.
Property BWR 8x8 PWR 17x17
Fuel size [mm] 130 * 130 * 3985 214*214*3852
Pellet radius [mm] 5.22 4.09
Cladding outer radius [mm] 6.13 4.75
Pitch [mm] 16.3 12.6
Table 1 Geometry details of the implemented BWR and PWR geometries.
The Monte Carlo simulations were run on the UPPMAX computer cluster at Uppsala University, with
each fuel rod submitted as a separate job, enabling all rods to be simulated in parallel. For each rod,
10 million fission product gamma rays were simulated, with the energy distribution given by the
gamma spectrum from ORIGEN. The results of all the separate jobs were merged, to give a total
emitted Cherenkov light intensity for the given gamma spectrum of the fuel. The statistical uncertainty
in the total emitted Cherenkov light intensity of an assembly with a given gamma spectrum, due to the
Monte Carlo nature of the simulation, was estimated to be less than 0.4% for all BWR simulations, and
less than 0.1% for all PWR simulations.
3.2. Pre-computing the Cherenkov light intensity of a fuel assembly
While a simulation of a complete assembly is expected to give accurate results, such simulations are
too comprehensive to be executed during a measurement campaign. One way to speed up the
process of predicting the light intensity is by pre-computing the Cherenkov light intensity for each rod
at a number of different gamma energies. These pre-computed intensities can then be combined with
the assembly gamma spectrum to quickly obtain an estimate of the Cherenkov light intensity in the
fuel.
The first step in predicting the Cherenkov light intensity is to use a program such as ORIGEN to
simulate the fuel irradiation history, to obtain a gamma spectrum of the assembly. The gamma ray
spectrum is then combined with pre-computed values of how much Cherenkov light is generated in an
assembly by gammas of various energies. Since the gamma spectrum is typically binned, the pre-
computed values can be the number of Cherenkov photons generated in a fuel assembly per gamma
quantum in each bin which occurs in the gamma ray spectrum. This makes it very easy to estimate the
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Cherenkov light intensity from an assembly, since there is information about the gamma ray intensity
per bin, as well as the Cherenkov light production per gamma for each energy bin.
To test this method and to compare it with the simulations done in section 3.1, simulations were run for
both a BWR and for a PWR fuel assembly. The simulations were run for one octant of the fuel
assembly, using the symmetry of the fuel to obtain the intensity values for the other rods. For each rod
and for each gamma ray energy bin, a simulation of 10 million gamma rays was run. This corresponds
to about 4000 CPU-hours to simulate both the BWR and the PWR fuels. This work is extensive, but
only needs to be done once for every fuel geometry.
Due to the large amount of simulated particles, the statistical uncertainties in the resulting Cherenkov
light emission are very low, typically around 0.03% per gamma ray energy bin. Although the statistic
uncertainty in the gamma ray spectra from ORIGEN is low [7], larger systematic uncertainties arise
due to not modelling e.g. the complete fuel history including every control rod movement during
irradiation, and one may thus relax the statistical precision somewhat in the Cherenkov emission
simulations without affecting the overall uncertainties significantly. Accordingly, simulating a complete
assembly may be done in a few hundred CPU-hours while still having a statistical uncertainty much
lower than the systematic uncertainty of the gamma ray spectrum.
Results4.
This section presents the results of the simulations. The first subsection compares the results of BWR
simulations using the CPM in [6], with the complete assembly simulations done using the NGM here.
In the next subsection, a comparison is made between the Cherenkov light intensity from BWR and
PWR fuel assemblies with identical irradiation history.
4.1. Comparison of the current and next generation methods
The results of the CPM and the NGM are shown in Figure 2, where the results have been scaled to be
equal at 10 years. As can be seen, the new simulations stretch into shorter cooling times than the
results from the CPM.
Figure 2 Comparison of a full BWR assembly simulation with the currently used method (CPM) [6] and the next
generation method (NGM), normalized to 10 years cooling time. Statistical uncertainties of simulated values are
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Comparison of currently used method (CPM) 
with next generation method (NGM) 
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The results from the CPM and the NGM are quite similar for fuel with a cooling time of more than 10
years, but for short-cooled fuels the results deviate. The simulations done here suggest a higher
relative intensity compared to the CPM. This can be expected since the new simulations include the
contribution of all isotopes in the fuel, while the older results only considered six long-lived isotopes.
The difference may also depend on small differences in the fuel irradiation history used. Investigating
how the irradiation history affects the Cherenkov light intensity is the subject of future work. Further,
the differences may also be due to updates in nuclear cross sections in ORIGEN and updates in
physics models used in Geant4 compared to the older versions of the code.
The results also differ from those found in [4], where a somewhat lower intensity was found. The
cause of this is under investigation, but possible reasons are improved methods to introduce ORIGEN
spectra into Geant4 and updates in the physics models used in Geant4.
Done in an automated way, the ORIGEN burnup calculations and the estimation of the Cherenkov
light intensity using pre-computed simulations can be performed in a few seconds per fuel, which is
fast enough to be practically useable during measurements.
4.2. Cherenkov light emission from different fuel types
The CPM is based on simulations of a BWR fuel respectively on simulations of a single rod. If the
results of such simulations are applied to other types of fuels, the predictions become more uncertain
since the effect of fuel geometry on Cherenkov light production is not taken into account. To
investigate what effect the fuel geometry has on the Cherenkov light production, simulations were run
for a BWR and a PWR fuel assembly with identical irradiation history.
Comparing the simulated emission of Cherenkov light from a PWR fuel to that of a BWR fuel reveals
that the intensity profiles as a function of time differ, as shown in Figure 3. With a normalization of data
to 10 years’ cooling time and the same uranium mass, the Cherenkov light emission appears to be
higher for PWR fuels as compared to BWR fuels for short cooling times. This is most noticeable for the
simulated fuel assemblies with low burnup, where the difference is largest at 2-8 years, depending on
the burnup. For very short cooling times of less than one year, the intensity is instead lower for PWR
fuels, which may be explained by the difference in how short-lived isotopes are built up in BWR and
PWR reactors. For a cooling time longer than 10 years, the Cherenkov light intensity for the PWR fuel
appears to be lower compared to a BWR fuel.
Figure 3 Deviation of the simulated emitted PWR Cherenkov light intensity compared to the BWR intensity,
normalized to 10 years cooling time and the same uranium mass content. The uncertainties of the values are
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These effects are on one hand due to differences related to the reactor core design of BWR and PWR
reactors, such as the presence of void in the BWR reactor and on the other hand due to differences in
the fuel geometry such as fuel and cladding size, pitch, and guide tubes which affect the amount of
water inside the fuel assembly. The statistical uncertainty of the total Cherenkov light intensity in the
BWR simulations were typically between 0.2% and 0.4%, while for the PWR case it was smaller than
0.1%, which means that the difference between the two are significant.
As a consequence,  if Cherenkov light emission intensities based on BWR simulations are used to
predict corresponding intensities for PWR assemblies or vice versa, a noticeable error is introduced.
For accurate estimations of the Cherenkov light intensity, one may conclude that each fuel type should
have its own set of intensity estimates.
Conclusions5.
This paper describes the currently used method for predicting the Cherenkov light intensity emitted
from irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage. It also presents results from the new proposed
method for predicting the Cherenkov light intensity generated in an assembly for both BWR and PWR
fuels, and suggests a new, quick and accurate way to obtain the same information. The new method
makes use of pre-calculations to estimate the contribution to the total Cherenkov light intensity in the
assembly for gamma-rays of various energies from each rod. It takes into account both the fuel history
and fuel geometry, while still being fast enough to allow for use during field measurements or when
only limited computational resources or time is available. The increase in prediction accuracy can aid
in setting more stringent limits on how much a measured intensity may deviate from a predicted value,
which, in turn, may be used to improve the partial defect detection capability of the DCVD. The
simulations performed also show that the new method gives very similar results to the currently used
method for fuels with a cooling time longer than 10 years, but shows a different behavior for short-
cooled fuel.
The new method requires computationally expensive pre-calculations, done separately once for each
fuel type, preferably on a computer cluster. For long-cooled fuel, or for fuel where a detailed irradiation
history is unavailable, a standard irradiation history may be applied. Using such a standard fuel
history, the intensity estimates can be obtained with the same amount of work as the currently used
prediction method. However, for short-cooled fuels, with a cooling time on the order of one or two
years, the irradiation history must be taken into account, which is possible using the methodology
suggested here. It is also possible to automate the input of the fuel history into ORIGEN, running it,
and extracting the resulting gamma ray spectra. A modern laptop is capable of producing around 2000
such estimates per hour, which includes the ORIGEN simulations of the fuel history. This will allow for
predictions taking into account the fuel history, while still not adding to the workload of converting the
operator declaration to a Cherenkov light intensity estimate.
Outlook6.
One possible extension to the suggested method is to not only pre-calculate the total emitted
Cherenkov light intensity, but to also handle the transport of the Cherenkov light to a detector position.
This will further increase the accuracy of the method, since it predicts what the DCVD can actually
detect. This will however require additional information on the geometrical details of the fuel assembly
such as spacers and top structure to be taken into account, as well as the axial burnup distribution and
the absorption of light in water. A related question is to what extent this information is available to an
inspector on site. Furthermore, material deposits on fuel rod surfaces (CRUD) may alter the optical
properties and thus change the absorption and reflectivity of UV light, which must also be taken into
account. Also, if the prediction takes into account the light intensity which the DCVD can measure, it
may also be possible to directly compare the Cherenkov light intensity of fuel assemblies of different
types.
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Abstract 
Underwater gamma and neutron spent fuel measurement techniques are being researched to meet the 
combined needs of the international safeguards community and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company (SKB), which is responsible for fuel encapsulation and repository operation in 
Sweden. Both SKB and the involved regulators anticipate measuring each spent fuel assembly 
individually before encapsulation; such a measurement plan presents a real challenge for the performance 
and long-term behavior of detectors and electronics hardware. The reliability and radiation hardness of the 
electronics and detectors are a big challenge for users of this technology. For instance, the gamma 
detectors and electronics may have to operate at count rates up to few million counts per second while 
maintaining good spectral resolution to detect lines from 137Cs, 134Cs, and 152Eu. If the 10B proportional 
counters are to replace the difficult-to-transport 235U fission chambers, they must tolerate a gamma dose 
rate of many thousand R/h (many tens of Sv/h) without gain changes due to space charge effects or long-
term degradation of the gas mixture. To address these challenges, a special underwater enclosure was 
developed for testing these detectors and electronics in parallel with the design and deployment of 
nondestructive assay options for characterization of the spent fuel. In this paper we describe the hardware 
and modeling components of the testing setup.   
Keywords: spent fuel, underwater measurements, passive gamma spectroscopy, high counting rate, 235U 
fission chambers, 10B detectors, scintillation detectors, radiation resistance, front-end electronics, 
collimator modeling 
1. Introduction
In-situ spent fuel measurements for safeguards are needed, which creates particular requirements for 
underwater radiation detection instrumentation. This paper will inform the safeguards community about 
(1) the challenges encountered by the current detector/electronic technologies for underwater gamma 
spectroscopy and total neutron flux measurements; (2) new detector electronics and modeming that have 
been developed to resolve these challenges.  
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Passive gamma emission from fission products in the spent fuel contains important information about a 
range of characteristics (e.g., the level of burnup, cooling time, initial enrichment, Pu mass, reactivity, and 
heat) of spent fuel assemblies [1]. Using high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors and scintillation 
detectors outside of a spent fuel pool [2] is a mature measurement approach. Recent measurements 
substituting the HPGe detector with moderate-resolution, but much faster light response LaBr scintillation 
detectors demonstrate the promising potential of this technology to eliminate the need for long air 
collimators [3].  
The deployment of scintillation detectors in-pool enables the acquisition of high-quality spectral 
information more readily, thus enabling practical safeguards deployment, as well as enabling the 
development of advanced techniques such as gamma tomography [4]. This technique requires a low dead 
time and very good pileup rejection to mitigate the interference between the 1274-keV line of 154Eu and 
the 1324-keV sum peak created by the pileup of 662-keV lines of 137Cs. The following limiting factors 
hinder the fulfillment of the above requirements:  
1. A fundamental count rate limitation is caused by the duration of the scintillation process. The use
of LaBr as a scintillator reduces this limitation because it has an exceptionally fast light response
(95% of scintillator light is collected in the first 60 ns). This fast response does not present a
practical count rate limitation for most envisioned deployments as much as the electronics does. In
contrast, the widely used and much more inexpensive NaI(Tl) scintillator has a slower light
response. In particular, the slow components of the scintillation are many times longer than the
decay time of the Tl activation center [5], which is the main limiting factor for deterioration of the
pulse height spectrum at high count rates.
2. The gain in a photomultiplier tube (PMT) is unstable at high count rates. It is well known that
PMT operation at both a high gain and a high count rate causes fluctuation of the voltage on the
dynodes (and thus fluctuation in the PMT gain), resulting in spectrum degradation. Typically, the
light response of a LaBr detector with a Hamamatsu R6232 PMT to a 662-keV gamma would
provide an anode current pulse with an ~20-mA amplitude and therefore about a 750-mV
amplitude at the output of a 75-ohm terminated cable. Transporting small-amplitude, very short
(tens of nanoseconds) pulses is not very practical; therefore, a preferred option is amplifying and
transforming the detector’s current pulses into voltage pulses with longer exponential decay in a
charge-sensitive amplifier before transmitting through the cable.
3. All industry standard multichannel analyzers (MCAs) require a preamplifier signal with an
exponential decay of a minimum 40 μs and maximum amplitude of a few volts. Because of the
extensive pileup of preamplifier pulses, the amplitude of preamp pulses should be in the range of a
few hundred mV; thus, there is a voltage mismatch. To preserve the highly desired resolution of a
LaBr detector (about 3% FWHM for the 662-keV line), the contribution of high count rate and
electromagnetic interference (EMI) noise in a long cable should be less than 1% or 10–20 mV. A
classical charge-sensitive preamp cannot fulfill the conflicting requirements of (2) and (3).
Replacement of the 235U fission chamber faces many challenges. The 235U fission chamber has been the 
main choice for the fork detector measurements of spent fuel because of its exceptional tolerance to 
gamma doses. Special designs of 235U fission chambers and fast electronics have been used for reactor 
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core measurements at gamma dose rates up to 106 R/h (104 Sv/h); however, that exceptional gamma 
resistance comes with  heavy penalties: 
• Increasing the scrutiny for shipping and handling detectors containing special nuclear material
makes them very difficult to use in safeguards applications.
• Lower sensitivity (about 20–50 times lower that of a 10B proportional counter with the same
size) requires longer measurement times for assemblies with low activity;
• It is a few times more expensive than a 10B proportional counter of the same size.
• Despite the higher energy of 235U fission fragments, the signal is on the order of the lower
range of the 3He tube signal (a few fC at a 6-MeV threshold), which aggravates the problem of
operating with long cables.
The 10B proportional counters have gamma resistance and neutron detection efficiency somewhere 
between 235U fission chambers and 3He tubes [8] and therefore could be an attractive alternative for 
replacing the radioactive 235U fission chamber in fork detector measurements [9]. However, the 
experimental results in both of these publications encountered severe space charge effects, leading to a 
change of tube gain, and thus of detection efficiency. In addition to that limitation, the organic gas admix 
used for the improvement of charge collection time and count rate capabilities, is known to cause long-
term instability problems due to the decomposition of organic gas molecules and photo-polymerization of 
the gas on the anode wire.  
2. Measurement Setup
This section describes the proposed setup testing the detectors at Clab. The underwater testing is planned 
to take place in the upper pool. The side and top views of the proposed measurement arrangement are 
shown in Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b.  
The cylindrical underwater enclosure will be immersed in the pool at a fixed position along the concrete 
wall; a structural support extending down from the edge of the pool will hold the detector at a fixed 
location above the floor of the pool. The detector enclosure is built with 0.25-in.-thick aluminum tubing 
having a length of 24 in., and an internal diameter of 7.5 in. Two 12-in. square flanges are welded onto 
both sides. The enclosure is sealed via a third flange with an outlet for ¾-in.-thick flexible watertight 
electrical conduit. The LaBr gamma detector and front-end electronics are placed in a cylindrical hole 
behind the Pb shielding, whereas the 10B detector and small ionization chamber are placed in front of the 
shielding. A diagonally placed, 2-mm-diameter cylindrical hole serves as a collimator for the LaBr. The 
diagonal arrangement of the collimator geometry was chosen to maximize the shielding effect for the fixed 
thickness of Pb. Since the Pb collimator is designed to be inserted into the enclosure, a separate coaxial 
shielding geometry with the front collimator is possible. The signal cables connecting the data acquisition 
electronics outside the pool with the front-end electronics inside the underwater enclosure are placed in a 
watertight electrical conduit.  
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Fig. 1a. Side view of the 
measurement arrangement. 
Fig. 1b. Top view of the measurement arrangement. A cross 
section of the testing enclosure shows the arrangement of its 
components. 
3. New Detection Technology for Passive Gamma Measurements
3.1. Scintillation Detector 
The need to improve the count rate capabilities of NaI detectors to be used for the Spent Fuel Attribute 
Test [7] led to the development of a novel electronics approach that overcomes the fundamental limitation 
of NaI detectors by cancelling the slow decay component in the preamplifier signal [8]. That approach was 
refined [9] and successfully implemented in the detectors used for transmission-based, online enrichment 
monitoring technology [10]. The off-the-shelf PMT dividers and decoupling circuitry are not optimized 
for high count rate applications. The problem is aggravated additionally for PMTs with positive high 
voltage (which most commercial PMTs for scintillation counting are), where all decoupling capacitors 
have values that are getting impractically high.  
3.2. Electronics 
Fulfilling the conflicting requirements for a high amplitude preamplifier signal needed for improved 
immunity from ground looping and EMI encountered during the previous measurements and, small 
(hundreds of mV) amplitude at the MCA input is not possible with the off-the-shelf instrumentation. 
Therefore, we propose a novel approach based on our prior experience with industrial noises encountered 
in UF6 Blend Down Monitoring Systems [10] and our current United States Department of Energy, Next 
Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) work for noise immunity of front-end electronics for unattended 
monitoring [11, 12]. A simplified block diagram explaining that approach is shown in Fig. 2. The +/-12-V 
power supply cables and interconnections, as well as the more complex-charge sensitive feedback 
described in [10], are omitted for simplicity.  
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The charge sensitive preamplifier (simple RC feedback configuration is shown) has a short-time constant, 
on the order of a few μs, thus enabling the generation of pulses with a few volts of amplitude without 
reaching the voltage rails of the preamplifier. 
The Time Constant and Gain Conditioning Module (TCGCM) converts the high-amplitude, but short-time 
constant pulses into signals with lower amplitude but with the 50-μs long-time constant necessary for 
proper operation of the MCAs (just the opposite function of classical pole/zero cancellation).  
Fig. 2. A simplified block diagram of the scintillation detector and electronics for passive gamma measurements. The 
charge-sensitive amplifier and detector are installed in the underwater enclosure, whereas the TCGCM is installed 
outside the spent fuel pond next to the Data Acquisition (DAQ) electronics. The facility ground loop noise is 
presented as a voltage source connected between the enclosures.  
3.3. Modeling 
A set of Monte Carlo calculations has been performed using MCNP 5 [15] to estimate the effects of 
shielding against gamma radiation when measuring close to a used nuclear fuel assembly using a LaBr 
detector. A worst-case scenario with no shielding was simulated as a base case with which simulations 
incorporating various shielding thicknesses could then be compared. The geometry for the calculations 
was simplified, as compared with the geometry shown in Section 2 on the measurement setup, while still 
providing useful information regarding necessary shielding for future applications of the technologies 
presented in this work [e.g., as a spectral resolved gamma detector used in combination with a differential 
die-away (DDA) instrument]. The detector was placed just outside the corner of the fuel assembly, where 
it is planned to be used in the DDA instrument. 
3.4.1 No shielding A calculation with the detector in its enclosure without any shielding was performed to 
get a base line with which to compare cases with added shielding. For this case, the average flux of 
gamma radiation in the detector was tallied for the following combinations of sources: (1) for each of the 
gamma energies 605, 662, 796 and 1274 keV, emitted homogenously and isotropically from each fuel rod; 
and (2) from each individual fuel rod in the 17-x-17 fuel assembly. 
As can be seen in Fig. 3, the contribution to the average flux in the LaBr detector is dominated by the fuel 
rods closest to the detector. It is also evident that contributions from fuel rods in the upper right part of the 
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assembly that is further away from the detector are negligible. Fig. 3 shows that the flux contributions are 
symmetric around the (8,8)-(-8,-8) diagonal of the fuel assembly. 
Fig. 3. Contribution to the average flux in the LaBr detector without shielding for different gamma-ray 
source energies. 
3.4.2 With shielding As can be seen in Fig. 3, the calculations for the no-shielding case showed that the 
contribution to the flux from fuel rods in the upper right part of the assembly was negligible compared 
with the contribution from the bottom left part that is closer to the detector. Therefore, for calculations 
incorporating shielding, the source was considered to be originating only from the contributing part of the 
assembly (primarily towards the bottom left as shown in Fig. 3). Also, the calculations for the no-shielding 
case showed that the geometry has a large degree of symmetry. Therefore, when shielding was included in 
the geometry, we performed calculations only for a quarter of the fuel assembly that is closer to the 
detector, with the results corrected for the missing source. 
We present results for calculations with shielding using a 1274-keV (Eu-154) gamma source in Fig. 4. 
Increasing the thickness of the Pb shielding from 1 to 4 cm will decrease the photon flux by a factor of 
about 6 for the 1274-keV gamma radiation. 
Planned experiments at Clab will be informed by these calculations regarding how much shielding must be 
added to a LaBr detector when the DDA instrument is equipped with it. 
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Fig. 4. Contribution to the average flux in the LaBr detector for different thicknesses of Pb shielding for a 
1274-keV gamma source. The figure shows the total flux, per source particle, as a function of Pb thickness 
(where the statistical uncertainty in the calculated values is too small to be visible in the plot). 
4. New 10B Detector and Electronics for Total Neutron Flux Measurements
Despite encouraging results, current off-the-shelf 10B proportional counters are not suitable for direct 
replacement of 235U fission chambers for fork measurements because, as discussed in the introduction, 
problems exist with the short- and long-term degradation of detection sensitivity. Because the gamma 
signal in gaseous detectors originates from a pileup of Compton electrons generated in a tube wall, the 
gamma sensitivity depends in a very complex way on energy deposition in the gas, signal formation on 
anodes, and shaping time of the front-end electronics. These effects need to be taken into consideration in 
the system design.   
4.1 Detector 
To assess the status of current technology and address its limitations, we present the analysis of the 
available experimental results from [9] obtained with an RS-P7-0405-201 10B proportional counter (tube 
diameter of 0.5 in., anode wire diameter of 0.001 in., active length of 5 in., and sensitivity of 1.3 cps/nv) 
and a PDT-210 preamplifier based on an Amptek-A111 chip. The plots in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b show the 
plateau of counting characteristics at different gamma dose rates taken with and without 2-cm-thick 
tungsten shielding (an attenuation factor of about 55 for the 662-keV line).  
The currently used 10B detector and PDT-210 electronics in a fork cannot accurately measure the entire 
range of spent fuel assemblies, and still requires two types of neutron detectors for assay. Using an organic 
gas admix will cause additional long-term degradation of gain stability and the requirement for tedious and 
labor-intensive periodic recalibration.  
Based on our experience with high count rates in 3He proportional counters developed under the NGSI 
program [15], we believe that the main reason for a space charge gain shift is the very high nonuniformity 
of the electrical field due to the use of a thin (0.001-in.-thick) anode wire.  
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Fig. 5a. Shielded detector counting characteristics 
(detector dose rates 100 to 1000 R/h). The gain loss 
due to space charge effects is noticeable at 520 V, 
which is far below the 620-V normalization voltage. 
Fig. 5b. Unshielded detector counting characteristics 
(detector dose rates (6500 to 61,000 R/h). Severe 
gain loss can be seen across the entire range of the 
dose rate.  
To address these two major limitations of 10B detectors, a special radiation-hardened design of 10B 
detectors has been specified and built by GE Reuter-Stokes (GE-RS). The detector has a 5-in. active 
length, a 3/4-in. tube diameter, and a 0.004-in.-thick anode wire that provides a space-charge-free 
geometry electrical field. Because of the larger tube diameter, this detector has about 60% higher 
sensitivity than the RS-P7-0405-201 used in the fork measurements. The GE-RS proprietary inorganic gas 
admix does not decompose by radiation effects, and thus, the detector does not require periodic 
recalibration. This gas admix has very low stopping power for Compton electrons generated in the wall, 
resulting in a lower amplitude of gamma pulses, but also will be prone to double pulsing due to a slower 
charge collection time. The front-end electronics needed to resolve that problem are described in the next 
section.  
4.2 Electronics 
The lack of a real plateau in the 10B counting characteristic and the possibility for infiltration of gamma 
pulses above the detection threshold reduces the possible range of measured spent fuel. Based on the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)-designed for Amptek A-111 replacement basic KM-200 electronics 
that may be commercialized by Ludlum Measurements, an experimental proof of principle dual-channel 
architecture prototype has been built  to expand the measurement capabilities of 10B detectors over the 
entire range of measured fuel. The prototype and the block diagram depicting the principles of operation 
are shown in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b respectively. 
The simultaneous measurement at two points (on the slope far below the gamma pileup and at the quasi 
plateau) will be used to expand the measured range of spent fuel assemblies with only one instrument. The 
ratio of the two count rates is very sensitive to gamma pileup but not to neutron flux and therefore will be 
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used as an indicator for excessive gamma pileup. If gamma pileup is detected, the count rate of the fast 
channel, corrected by the initially calibrated ratio in a pure neutron flux, can be used.  
Fig. 6a. An assembled KM-200 dual-channel 
prototype: preamplifier, signal distribution, 
fast and slow shapers, fast and slow 
discriminators, power regulators, and 
connector boards. 
Fig. 6b. KM-200 dual-channel functional diagram and 
10B counter characteristics showing the position of fast 
and slow detection thresholds. 
5. Future Work
Measurements in the spent fuel pool are expected to take place in August 2015 and during the next year. 
6. Conclusions
In situ spent fuel measurements are needed, which creates particular requirements for underwater radiation 
detection instrumentation (neutron and gamma). It is hard to meet these requirements with current off-the-
shelf technology. For neutrons, recent advances in detectors and electronics may help to address this 
problem. Electronics for spent fuel passive gamma measurements with scintillation detectors  that may 
lead to significant improvements in performance have being developed. The research is guided by 
modeling at many different points in the development process. An important point is that we must 
consider the complete measurement system  (detector, signal  processing and data acquisition electronics 
as well as the data analysis software)  to obtain optimum performance, rather than simply plugging 
together available components.  
We are taking advantage of an excellent opportunity to benefit from real-world testing provided at the 
Clab facility, which will benefit many of the stakeholders in the spent fuel community. It should be noted 
that regardless of the results of these tests, long-term testing of the equipment will be needed.  
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Abstract: 
Expanding spent fuel dry storage activities worldwide are increasing demands on safeguards 
authorities that perform inspections. The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) require measurements to verify declarations when spent 
fuel is transferred to difficult-to-access locations, such as dry storage casks and the repositories 
planned in Finland and Sweden. EURATOM makes routine use of the Fork detector to obtain gross 
gamma and total neutron measurements during spent fuel inspections. Data analysis is performed by 
modules in the integrated Review and Analysis Program (iRAP) software, developed jointly by 
EURATOM and the IAEA. Under the framework of the US Department of Energy–EURATOM 
cooperation agreement, a module for automated Fork detector data analysis has been developed by 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) using the ORIGEN code from the SCALE code system and 
implemented in iRAP. EURATOM and ORNL recently performed measurements on 30 spent fuel 
assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab), operated by 
the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). The measured assemblies 
represent a broad range of fuel characteristics. Neutron count rates for 15 measured pressurized 
water reactor assemblies are predicted with an average relative standard deviation of 4.6%, and 
gamma signals are predicted on average within 2.6% of the measurement. The 15 measured boiling 
water reactor assemblies exhibit slightly larger deviations of 5.2% for the gamma signals and 5.7% for 
the neutron count rates, compared to measurements. These findings suggest that with improved 
analysis of the measurement data, existing instruments can provide increased verification of operator 
declarations of the spent fuel and thereby also provide greater ability to confirm integrity of an 
assembly. These results support the application of the Fork detector as a fully quantitative spent fuel 
verification technique. 
Keywords: Fork detector; iRAP; spent fuel verification; ORIGEN; spent fuel safeguards 
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world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for 
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federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan (http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-
public-access-plan). 
1. Introduction
Spent fuel safeguards rely primarily on material containment and surveillance with item counting and 
non-destructive assay (NDA) verification measurements. Such measurements are required for spent 
fuel assemblies before they are transferred to long-term dry storage, final disposal at a repository or, 
in general, to other facilities where assemblies are not easily accessible. Verification measurements 
may also be required to re-establish continuity of knowledge. The instruments currently accepted by 
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the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for spent fuel measurements are the Fork detector and 
the Cerenkov Viewing Device (CVD) [1].  
Activities related to spent fuel storage and disposal are increasing in Europe and worldwide as spent 
fuel pools reach their storage capacities and many countries are expanding dry storage operations 
and some are seeking extended interim storage options. In Europe, the increasing use of dry cask 
storage has increased the demands on safeguards authorities to perform inspections during cask 
loading. Measurements are routinely performed using the Fork detector during joint inspections by the 
IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The Fork instrument relies on 
passive gross gamma-ray and total neutron counting as a means to indirectly verify the operator 
declarations of the fuel. The Fork detector has been used for safeguards since the 1980s; the 
underlying technology has remained largely unchanged over 30 years, owing to its simplicity, 
durability, transportability, and the fast and relatively low-intrusive nature of the measurements. 
To address increasing demands on inspection resources and to improve the efficiency of data 
collection, EURATOM developed the Remote Acquisition of Data and Review (RADAR) unattended 
data acquisition software application, which can operate without the presence of an inspector [2]. Data 
analysis, review, and reporting are performed by the Integrated Review and Analysis Program (iRAP), 
developed jointly by EURATOM and the IAEA. To enable analysing the Fork measurement data 
quantitatively and identifying potential discrepancies between operator declarations and 
measurements, an automated spent fuel data analysis module has been implemented in iRAP. This 
module is based on the ORIGEN code [3], developed and maintained at the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. Software development, integration, and testing have been done under a collaboration 
agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and EURATOM. Unlike some research 
initiatives   focusing mainly on new and advanced detector technologies, the current research focuses 
rather on improving the accuracy and efficiency of the data analysis for a proven technology (the Fork 
detector), thereby minimizing the impact on existing inspector requirements or facility operations. 
Benchmarking and validation of the spent fuel analysis module in iRAP have been performed using 
measurement data acquired through cask loading campaigns in Europe during joint inspections using 
both EURATOM and IAEA Fork instruments and electronics. In the past two years, data from more 
than 15 loading campaigns and more than 200 assemblies have been evaluated [4, 5]. However, cask 
loading data are inherently limited by low assembly diversity. Frequently, the assemblies have the 
same or similar enrichments, burnup, and cooling times. Consequently, the limited assembly 
properties do not provide sufficient challenges to test the analysis capabilities. Additionally, finding 
patterns or trends within such limited data set has proven to be difficult.  
The research presented in this paper includes an analysis of recent Fork measurements performed on 
assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab), in 
Oskarshamn, Sweden. These assemblies have been selected for measurements under the US DOE 
Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent 
Fuel (NGSI-SF) Project, in collaboration with the EURATOM Directorate for Nuclear Safeguards, and 
the Swedish Nuclear Waste Management Company, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (SKB). The 
assemblies selected under this experimental program cover a very wide range of spent fuel 
characteristics that are representative of commercial fuels. Extensive fuel design and detailed 
operating history data are also available for all assemblies included under this program. Such a 
diverse data set provides a valuable opportunity to quantify the performance of the Fork detector and 
data analysis methods. Furthermore, the results discussed in this paper, which are representative of 
current technology capabilities, can be used to benchmark results obtained with the more advanced 
instruments and techniques. 
2. Facility and experimental program
Under the DOE NGSI-SF project, several advanced NDA instruments have been developed for 
assembly measurements to advance the state-of-the-art in NDA techniques for spent fuel verification 
[6]. Under the US International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) and in the 
framework of the EURATOM-DOE Technical Cooperation Agreement on nuclear safeguards and 
security, an Action Sheet has been agreed between SKB, EURATOM, and DOE. Several instruments 
are being deployed for testing and performance evaluation at the Clab facility in Sweden.  Operated by 
SKB, Clab is the central interim storage facility for all spent nuclear fuel from 12 commercial reactors 
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in Sweden. More than 30,000 spent fuel assemblies are currently stored in the pools at Clab, with 
plans for a final repository in Forsmark to become operational after 2030. 
Within the experimental program, 50 spent fuel assemblies were selected for measurements that span 
the wide range and diversity of fuels that are intended to go in the Swedish repository. The fuel design 
and operating characteristics of 25 assemblies from pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and 25 from 
boiling water reactors (BWRs) are listed in Table 1. The PWR assembly designs include 15×15 and 
17×17 lattice types, while the BWR assembly designs include 8×8 (with and without water rods), 
10×10 SVEA and 10×10 ATRIUM lattice designs.  
The 25 PWR assemblies have an enrichment range from 2.1% to 4.1% and a burnup range from 19.6 
to 52.6 GWd/tU. The cooling times span from 4.2 to 29.2 years. The 25 BWR assemblies have 
enrichments from 1.3% to 4.0%, burnups from 9.1 to 46.4 GWd/tU, and cooling times between 7.2 and 
29.2 years.  
In addition, several assemblies had complex irradiation histories, where the assembly was unloaded 
from the reactor for several cycles between its initial loading and final discharge. The irradiation history 
is indicated approximately in Table 1 by the percent effective full-power days (%EFPD). This 
parameter represents the percentage of time that a particular assembly is irradiated at full power rate 
between its initial loading and final discharge. Assemblies with low %EFPD values generally 
experienced either significant outages (within cycle and/or between cycles) or long periods of low 
power operation while irradiated in the core.  For example, assembly PWR24 was out of core for about 
10 years before it was re-loaded in the core, resulting in a low %EFPD of 11%. BWR25 was loaded in 
the first cycle of the reactor and it experienced long periods of low power operation, resulting in a 
%EFPD of 31%. 





















Pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies 
PWR1 15x15 AFA3GAA 4.10 52.630 4.2 5/4/2005 5/28/2009 89 
PWR2 15x15 AFA3GAA 3.93 49.555 4.2 5/4/2005 5/29/2009 83 
PWR3 17x17 Fra 3.69 48.175 13.1 7/6/1996 6/21/2000 83 
PWR4 17x17 HTP 3.93 46.873 5.2 9/26/2004 6/4/2008 87 
PWR5 17x17 HTP 3.94 46.866 5.2 9/26/2004 6/2/2008 87 
PWR6 17x17 AA 3.60 45.658 14.1 7/8/1993 6/23/1999 52 
PWR7 17x17 Siemens 3.94 44.483 6.1 9/5/2003 6/27/2007 80 
PWR8 17x17 W 3.30 44.375 24.9 8/20/1984 9/11/1988 75 
PWR9 15x15 W 3.71 45.846 6.0 6/15/2003 8/1/2007 76 
PWR10 17x17 Fra 3.70 43.474 15.1 7/1/1994 6/17/1998 75 
PWR11 17x17 Fra 3.51 43.225 13.1 7/1/1994 6/21/2000 50 
PWR12 17x17 W 3.30 42.969 24.9 8/20/1984 9/11/1988 72 
PWR13 15x15 KWU 3.20 40.920 26.3 7/25/1982 4/25/1987 59 
PWR14 17x17 Fra 3.51 40.745 16.1 7/8/1993 6/24/1997 70 
PWR15 17x17 W 2.80 40.473 26.0 4/17/1982 8/27/1987 52 
PWR16 17x17 Fra 3.60 40.410 17.1 6/23/1993 6/21/1996 92 
PWR17 17x17 Fra 3.70 40.294 13.9 9/22/1994 9/1/1999 56 
PWR18 17x17 Fra 3.52 39.756 18.2 7/9/1989 6/9/1995 46 
PWR19 15x15 KWU 3.20 35.027 28.3 5/17/1980 5/1/1985 48 
PWR20 17x17 W 3.10 34.032 27.1 7/4/1980 6/18/1986 39 
PWR21 17x17 W 3.10 34.019 27.1 7/4/1980 6/18/1986 39 
PWR22 17x17 W 2.80 31.165 27.0 4/18/1982 8/10/1986 50 
PWR23 17x17 Fra 3.60 28.499 17.1 7/7/1993 6/21/1996 66 
PWR24 17x17 W 2.10 23.151 18.2 7/2/1980 6/9/1995 11 
PWR25 17x17 W 2.10 19.607 29.2 7/3/1980 5/24/1984 35 
Boiling water reactor fuel assemblies 
BWR1 SVEA-96S 4.01 46.41 8.3 10/28/1999 8/29/2006 62 
BWR2 SVEA-100 3.2 43.76 10.3 6/9/1999 8/17/2004 77 
BWR3 SVEA-100 3.4 44.36 12.3 10/13/1993 8/3/2001 51 
BWR4 SVEA-100 3.4 41.89 12.3 10/28/1999 8/29/2006 57 
BWR5 SVEA-96S 3.14 42.02 8.3 10/28/1999 8/29/2006 56 
BWR6 8x8 2.65 38.15 29.2 10/11/1993 8/3/2001 48 
BWR7 SVEA-100 3.15 41.24 10.3 6/9/1999 8/17/2004 73 
BWR8 ATRIUM 10B 3.15 39.75 9.5 8/29/2001 5/19/2005 97 
BWR9 SVEA-96S 4.01 40.44 7.2 8/29/2001 9/7/2007 61 
BWR10 SVEA-96S 3.14 39.50 8.3 8/29/2001 8/29/2006 72 
BWR11 8X8-1 2.09 31.53 22.3 9/15/1995 7/25/2003 45 
BWR12 SVEA-96 2.96 33.51 9.5 6/24/1997 6/10/2005 38 
BWR13 SVEA-96 2.96 36.83 9.5 6/24/1997 6/10/2005 42 
BWR14 8x8 2.65 30.49 29.2 9/3/1987 8/12/1992 67 
BWR15 8x8-1 2.09 29.42 25.3 8/26/1988 5/21/1996 42 
BWR16 8x8-1 2.09 26.82 27.5 8/29/1988 10/14/1993 64 
BWR17 8x8 2.31 32.71 28.4 3/1/1975 7/15/1986 26 
BWR18 8x8-1 2.09 21.52 22.3 7/23/1994 8/30/2000 48 
BWR19 8x8 1.27 30.80 25.5 10/17/1984 6/10/1989 60 
BWR20 SVEA-96 2.96 26.43 9.5 8/2/1998 6/10/2005 35 
BWR21 8x8 2.31 27.67 27.4 3/1/1975 7/1/1987 20 
BWR22 SVEA-96 2.96 20.41 9.5 7/14/2001 6/10/2005 48 
BWR23 SVEA-96 2.96 15.99 9.5 5/24/1999 6/10/2005 24 
BWR24 8x8 1.27 13.32 27.4 10/17/1984 7/10/1987 45 
BWR25 8X8 1.27 9.13 27.4 10/17/1984 7/10/1987 31 
Table 1: Fuel characteristics for the measured PWR and BWR assemblies 
3. Fork detector design
Measurements were performed with PWR and BWR Fork detector instruments provided by 
EURATOM. Each arm of these instruments contains a gamma ionization chamber operated in current 
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mode and two neutron fission chambers. One fission chamber is bare to measure primarily thermal 
neutrons; the other is embedded in a polyethylene region covered by cadmium to measure epithermal 
and fast neutrons. The gamma detectors are LND model 52110, filled with Xe gas at 10 bars, with a 
16 mm diameter and an active length of 86 mm. The neutron fission chambers, CENTRONIC model 
FC167, contain approximately 160 mg 235U (93% enriched) and are filled with Ar and N at 4.5 bars; 
they have a diameter of 25.4 mm and an active length of 127 mm. 
The PWR Fork detector assembly used in the measurement is shown in Fig. 1. A cross-sectional view 
of one detector arm containing the three chambers and their arrangement is shown in Fig. 2. The 
neutron signals from the two fission chambers of the same kind (bare or cadmium-covered) in each 
arm of the detector are integrated to compensate for potential radial burnup gradients in the fuel 
assembly. The signals from the bare fission chambers are registered in Channel A, and the signals 
from the cadmium-covered chambers are registered in Channel B.  
4. Spent fuel data analysis module
The iRAP review and analysis software includes a spent fuel analysis module that performs 
automated analysis of Fork detector measurements based on operator-declared information on each 
assembly. This verification approach does not try to estimate enrichment, burnup, or cooling time 
independently of the operator information; rather, it uses the declared data to predict the neutron and 
gamma signals, compares the predictions to the measurements and thus identifies potential 
discrepancies in operator declarations. 
The spent fuel analysis module uses the ORIGEN code [7] to perform the burnup and decay 
calculations. This module can use all information available on the irradiation history of an assembly to 
calculate the neutron and gamma ray emission rates and energy distribution in the fuel. The ORIGEN 
calculations use cross-section libraries that have been developed for most classes of fuel assembly 
designs. For each assembly design, cross-section data are tabulated in libraries as a function of initial 
enrichment, burnup, and moderator density (for BWR designs). The Fork detector signal is determined 
by combining the emission rates in the fuel predicted by ORIGEN with energy-dependent detector 
response functions that have been pre-calculated for the fuel assembly–detector configurations using 
MCNP. This procedure allows neutron and gamma ray signals to be calculated from assembly 
declarations in typically less than 5 seconds. The information returned to iRAP by the calculation 
includes (1) irradiated uranium isotopic contents, (2) plutonium isotopic contents, (3) the gamma ion 
chamber response, and (4) the neutron fission chamber response for both the bare and cadmium-
covered detectors. This system has been described previously [3-5]. 
Fig. 2 Cross section of Fork detector arm showing 
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A limitation of the spent fuel analysis software identified in previous research [5] is that subcritical 
neutron multiplication in an assembly was not considered. The methods described above for the 
neutron response include only the primary emission neutrons without neutron multiplication. The 
neutron source calculated by ORIGEN includes the delayed neutron emission from spontaneous 
fission (242Cm and 244Cm are usually dominant) and from (α, n) reactions from 17O, 18O, and any other 
light element in the fuel. Subcritical neutron multiplication in the assembly is dependent on the 
composition of the fuel (the amount of residual fissile material and neutron absorber nuclides); the 
geometry (leakage); and absorption in water, which may contain soluble boron. Most discharged fuel 
generally has a similar effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) and therefore similar induced 
neutron source multiplication. However, for the fuel assemblies measured at Clab with diverse 
characteristics, the neutron multiplication varies significantly from one assembly to another. For 
assemblies that were irradiated beyond typical burnup, neutron multiplication will be reduced, leading 
to lower neutron counts. For assemblies with low burnup, the higher residual fissile content will 
increase multiplication and will increase the Fork detector count rate. 
A correction for neutron multiplication was added to the spent fuel module for the analysis of the Clab 
measurements in this work. Neutron multiplication is given approximately as M = 1/(1 – keff).To avoid 
time-consuming criticality calculations to determine keff for each assembly, neutron multiplication is 
approximated using the infinite neutron generation factor k∞ calculated directly by ORIGEN as the 











where n  is the number density of a given nuclide, fσ  is the fission cross-section, ν  is the average 
neutrons per fission, and absσ  is the total absorption cross-section. The summation is carried over all 
nuclides in the system. This expression does not consider neutron absorption in assembly structures 
or water, or leakage. A non-leakage probability factor (PNL) for a single assembly in water is applied, 
so that keff = k∞PNL, where PNL is determined for each assembly design class using a detailed neutron 
transport calculation. A value PNL = 0.7 was applied for analysis of the Clab measurements. This value 
depends on the soluble boron level in the storage pool. The storage pool at the Clab facility does not 
contain boron. In pools that contain boron, provided the boron level remains constant at the facility, the 
effect of boron can be captured in the neutron calibration factor for the instrument.  
5. Measurement campaigns
Fork detector measurements were performed by EURATOM in two campaigns at Clab. Fifteen of the 
25 PWR assemblies (as shown in Table 1) were measured during October 14-15, 2014. The 
remaining assemblies are scheduled to be measured later in 2015. The 25 BWR assemblies (Table 1) 
were measured on March 22, 2015. Separate Fork detectors were used for the PWR and BWR 
measurements due to the different sizes of the assemblies. At the time of the present analysis, 
detailed operating history data were not available for 10 of the 25 BWR assemblies. Therefore, only 
results for the 15 BWR assemblies with detailed data are included in the present analysis. 
The data acquisition time was approximately 3 minutes per assembly. The relative standard deviation 
of the measurements was approximately 1% to 3%. Channel A count rate exhibited some erratic 
behaviour during the BWR measurement campaign, as identified by anomalies in the ratio of the 
Channel A and B count rates. Consequently, only the results from channel B were used in the analysis 
presented here. The measurement results for the PWR and BWR assemblies are listed in Table 2. 
This table shows the calculated neutron and gamma ray signals, both uncorrected and corrected, 
based on detailed information of the fuel provided by SKB. This detailed information may not always 
be provided by a reactor operator. The comparisons between measurement (M) and calculation (C) 
are also included in the table. For the neutron count rates, the correction was made to account for the 
subcritical neutron multiplication as described in Section 4. For the gamma ray signals, the correction 
was made to account for the nonlinearity of the ion chamber response (more detailed explanations are 
included in the next section). Discussions about the comparisons are provided in the next section. 
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Assembly 












(units) Neutron Gamma Neutron Gamma
Pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies 
PWR1 2162.1 1223182 2321.1 1441610 2263.1 1253397 7.4 17.9 4.7 2.5 
PWR2 1837.9 1126913 1795.3 1259584 1828.6 1125102 -2.3 11.8 -0.5 -0.2 
PWR3 1246.4 612000 1312.1 588625 1216.1 612183 5.3 -3.8 -2.4 0.0 
PWR4 1522.0 934477 1404.3 1020117 1468.0 950452 -7.7 9.2 -3.6 1.7 
PWR6 1049.3 562908 1105.8 525230 1034.0 558843 5.4 -6.7 -1.5 -0.7 
PWR7 1169.3 802432 1091.0 852702 1167.6 823471 -6.7 6.3 -0.1 2.6 
PWR9 1395.5 859405 1408.2 890628 1432.4 852644 0.9 3.6 2.6 -0.8 
PWR10 798.5 531171 798.2 488502 785.7 527356 0.0 -8.0 -1.6 -0.7 
PWR11 817.4 517900 829.8 489221 818.8 527976 1.5 -5.5 0.2 1.9 
PWR14 666.2 486164 622.0 439165 625.8 484298 -6.6 -9.7 -6.1 -0.4 
PWR16 590.0 480941 570.5 420549 577.0 467804 -3.3 -12.6 -2.2 -2.7 
PWR19 245.8 338518 258.2 257907 256.5 316360 5.0 -23.8 4.3 -6.5 
PWR22 205.5 319391 209.9 243437 209.3 302078 2.1 -23.8 1.9 -5.4 
PWR23 163.1 359146 130.3 298237 165.8 355353 -20.1 -17.0 1.7 -1.1 
PWR24 149.9 263198 162.2 202231 170.0 260428 8.2 -23.2 13.4 -1.1 
Boiling water reactor fuel assemblies 
BWR1 1034.7 501985 1140.3 567202 1050.4 531017 10.2 13.0 1.5 5.8 
BWR2 843.2 477075 883.5 506707 839.4 485204 4.8 6.2 -0.4 1.7 
BWR5 738.4 494300 768.2 518009 750.1 493842 4.0 4.8 1.6 -0.1 
BWR7 756.7 451088 744.3 475366 731.9 461043 -1.6 5.4 -3.3 2.2 
BWR8 679.0 463648 646.7 498980 658.4 479275 -4.8 7.6 -3.0 3.4 
BWR9 641.0 520513 664.8 549400 675.2 517642 3.7 5.5 5.3 -0.6 
BWR10 629.8 505537 617.8 519270 635.1 494804 -1.9 2.7 0.8 -2.1 
BWR12 375.0 397132 343.4 377655 374.5 383526 -8.4 -4.9 -0.1 -3.4 
BWR13 525.3 427656 490.5 415504 503.3 413979 -6.6 -2.8 -4.2 -3.2 
BWR19 193.3 234132 182.5 215353 180.3 244702 -5.6 -8.0 -6.7 4.5 
BWR20 164.8 341681 134.9 308797 175.3 326480 -18.1 -9.6 6.4 -4.4 
BWR22 52.9 268423 32.6 223775 57.7 252329 -38.3 -16.6 9.0 -6.0 
BWR23 23.6 220091 9.6 169824 22.7 202357 -59.5 -22.8 -3.9 -8.1 
BWR24 21.4 109311 21.8 88574 24.6 120216 2.0 -19.0 14.9 10.0 
BWR25 7.1 81625 5.1 59782 7.1 87776 -28.4 -26.8 0.7 7.5 
Table 2: Comparison of measured neutron (channel B) and gamma detector signals with calculations. Neutron 
calculations are shown with and without correction for subcritical multiplication. Gamma calculations are shown 
with and without correction for nonlinearity of the ion chamber response  
6. Analysis
6.1 Gamma signals 
An initial review of the gamma data (uncorrected) in Table 2 showed significant deviations of up to 
+18% and -27% compared to measured signals. The discrepancies exhibit clear trends with the 
gamma signal intensity, indicating a nonlinear detector response. This behaviour does not exhibit 
saturation at high gamma ray intensities, but rather, exhibits a strong power relationship over the 
range of the predicted signals. 
Detector response of the LND model 52110 gamma ion chambers used in the measurements has 
previously been measured using a calibrated Keithly ionization chamber and a 60Co source in water. 
Nonlinear behaviour is also evident in the calibrated response data, yielding a well-defined power 
relationship of y = x p, where p = 0.575 with an R2 fit coefficient of 0.9995 over more than 5 orders of 
magnitude of gamma ray dose rate.  
The gamma ion chamber response for both the PWR and BWR measurement campaigns at Clab also 
indicates a nonlinear power relationship, as was observed in the 60Co calibration data. However, a 
power coefficient of p = 0.8 with an R2 value of 0.996 was found over the range of the Clab data, 
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representing a factor of more than 30 in ion chamber response. The cause of the differences in ion 
chamber response may be due to the detectors, electronics, sources, or detector performance in a 
mixed neutron and gamma environment. Assuming a power relationship for the gamma detector 
response, the predicted gamma ray signals were corrected for the nonlinear behaviour. The results, 
shown in Table 2 as corrected gamma data, show that the discrepancies observed before correction 
are largely eliminated and that most results are within ± 5%. The gamma results, plotted in Fig. 3, 
show the predicted gamma signal as a function of the measured signal before and after correction. 
The BWR assemblies have lower signals, caused primarily by the smaller assembly size and lower 



























Fig. 3. Comparison of measured and calculated (uncorrected and corrected for ion chamber response) gamma 
ion chamber signals for PWR and BWR assemblies. 
6.2 Neutron count rates 
The measured and calculated neutron count rates in Table 2 are illustrated in Fig. 4. Results with and 
without the correction for subcritical neutron multiplication are given. Good agreement is generally 
observed between calculations (corrected) and measurements for most assemblies, with only one 
PWR and one BWR assembly exhibiting a difference greater than 10%. The range of neutron data 
spans more than a factor of 100 in fission chamber response. The largest deviations are observed for 
both the lowest burnup PWR and BWR assemblies. Assembly BWR #24 had a count rate of 21 cps 
compared to more than 1000 cps for BWR #1, and also had a very low burnup of 13 GWd/tU and an 
enrichment of only 1.27 wt% 235U. 
The impact of the neutron multiplication correction for the SKB assembly analysis is seen to be 
significant. Excluding the correction resulted in larger deviations for almost all assemblies. For 
example, assembly PWR #23 experienced a burnup that was less than most assemblies with similar 
enrichments, resulting in relatively more residual fissile material in the assembly that increases 
neutron multiplication. Including the neutron multiplication correction decreased the discrepancy with 
measurements from 20% to less than 2%. The effect of the multiplication correction was not as 
evident in previously evaluated loading campaign data due to the similarity of many of the assemblies. 

























Measured neutron count rate channel B (cps)
PWR (corrected)
BWR (corrected)
PWR (no multiplication correction)
BWR (no multiplication correction)
Fig. 4. Comparison of measured and calculated (uncorrected and corrected for subcritical neutron multiplication) 
neutron fission chamber count rates for PWR and BWR assemblies. 
The relative standard deviation of the percent differences between calculated (after correction) and 
measured gamma signals, shown in Table 2 and plotted in Fig. 5, is 2.4% for the 15 PWR assemblies 
and 5.2% for the 15 BWR assemblies. The largest deviations occur for the BWR assemblies #23, #24, 
and #25. These assemblies experienced very low burnup and had the lowest gamma signals of all 
measured assemblies. Using a 95/95 two-sided tolerance interval and 15 measurements, and 
assuming a normal distribution, 95% of measured PWR assemblies are expected in an interval of ± 
7% of the predicted values based on declarations with a 95% probability. For the BWR 
measurements, the 95% tolerance interval is ± 15%. 
The relative standard deviation of the percent differences between calculated and measured neutron 
signals (Fig. 5) is 4.6% for the 15 PWR assemblies and 5.7% for the 15 BWR assemblies. Similar to 
the gamma results, the largest deviations occur for the low-burnup assemblies that had the smallest 
neutron signals. Using a 95/95 two-sided tolerance interval and 15 measurements, a 95% tolerance 
range of ± 14% is expected for the PWR measurements. For the BWR measurements, the 95% 
tolerance interval is ± 17%. All assemblies measured at SKB are within these tolerance ranges. 
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Uncorrected Correction for non-linear response
































Neutron fission chamber (nB)
Uncorrected Corrected for neutron multiplication
Fig. 5. Percent deviation between calculated and measured gamma ion chamber results (left) and neutron fission 
chamber (Channel B) results (right) for the SKB assemblies. 
7. Uncertainties
Uncertainties are attributed to the measurements (counting and assembly positioning uncertainties), 
the declarations, and the analysis. These uncertainties define the ability to identify discrepancies in 
declarations and verify the integrity of the nuclear material. The main contributors to uncertainty in the 
spent fuel analysis method are described in this section. 
7.1 Accuracy of the records 
The assembly burnup declaration is obtained from reactor simulation codes and is generally accurate 
to 2% to 3% [8]. For typically discharged fuel, this burnup uncertainty results in an uncertainty in the 
gamma signal of similar magnitude (2% to 3%) and an uncertainty in the activity of the major neutron-
emitting actinides of up to 6% for 242Cm and 13% for 244Cm. Therefore, achieving accuracy in the 
neutron count rate verification of less than ~10% will be limited by the uncertainty in the reactor 
records.  
7.2 Operating history 
Information on the operational details of an assembly may not be available to the inspector, including 
dates when the assembly resided in the reactor and the accumulated burnup by operating cycles that 
can be used (if available) to derive the specific power of the assembly during its irradiation history. 
Information on non-continuous assembly irradiation in the reactor (if removed for some cycles and 
then re-loaded in the core) can have a significant effect on both neutron and gamma signals due to the 
half-lives of the dominant nuclides: 154Eu (8.6 yrs), 134Cs (2.07 yrs), 137Cs (30 yrs), 242Cm (163 days), 
and 244Cm (18.1 yrs). Other operational variables include the exposure to control absorbers, discrete 
burnable absorber rods, or control blades. 
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Detailed operating histories for the assemblies measured at Clab were provided by SKB and they 
were used in this analysis. To further quantify the uncertainties introduced by the lack of detailed data, 
additional analysis using only standard safeguards data (e.g., just fuel burnup without cycle history 
information) on these measurements are being performed and the results will be reported in the future. 
7.3 Fuel and assembly design 
Assembly designs are modelled using representative design information that approximates the range 
of design variations in use, and these approximations contribute to uncertainty. Although the class of 
assembly design(s) in a facility is usually known, other variables, such as presence of integral 
burnable absorber rods (e.g., gadolinium) and enrichment zoning (variation of rod enrichments in the 
assembly), are typically unknown to the inspector.  
7.4 Axial burnup distribution 
The assembly average burnup is reported by the operator; however, Fork detector measurements are 
typically performed at the mid-section of the assembly. The assembly burnup is adjusted in this 
analysis using a factor of 1.06 for PWR assemblies and 1.16 for BWR assemblies. This factor is 
estimated as the ratio of assembly centreline burnup to the assembly average burnup.. An analysis 
using the actual centreline burnup of each measured SKB assembly indicates that the variability in the 
axial burnup profile introduces an uncertainty of less than 1.5% in the centreline burnup, with 
variations of up to 5% observed for several low-burnup assemblies that have larger axial peaking 
factors.  
7.5 Repeatability of the measurements 
Uncertainty attributed to positioning of the assembly in the Fork detector was evaluated and the 
variability was found to be generally less than 1% in the gamma signal. The neutron channel B results 
showed differences of 1% to 2% and the neutron channel A showed differences of 3% to 5% when the 
same assembly was measured multiple times. The larger sensitivity observed in channel A may be 
due to the fact that the bare neutron fission chambers measure primarily thermal neutrons that are 
sensitive to any changes in moderation. 
7.6 Assembly rotational uncertainty 
The two Fork arms, each containing separate detectors, are designed to compensate for potential 
burnup gradients in the assembly that may lead to non-uniform neutron and gamma emission rates. 
The Fork measurements were repeated on three PWR assemblies with small and large radial burnup 
gradients after the assemblies were rotated in 90° steps. The gamma signal was found to have a small 
dependency on rotation (~1% variation). The neutron channel B also exhibited low dependence (about 
1% to 2%); the neutron channel A had the largest dependence (about 2% to 4%). 
7.7 Nonlinear gamma detector response 
Corrections to the LND gamma ion chamber signals were required to compensate for apparent 
nonlinear response. The correction factor between the minimum and maximum gamma signal was 
larger than 40% over the range of the PWR assemblies. The gamma response was different from 
responses observed in earlier LND detector calibration measurements performed using a 60Co source. 
It has not yet been determined whether the response is associated with the source energy spectrum, 
the ion chamber design, detector performance in mixed gamma and neutron fields, the detector 
operating regime, and/or the associated electronics. Linear response behaviour, or the ability to 
reliably correct for nonlinear response, will be a critical requirement to apply the Fork detector for 
quantitative spent fuel verification applications. 
8. Conclusions
Safeguards agencies are facing increasing near-term spent fuel verification challenges from the 
expanding use of dry cask storage and with the planned repositories in Sweden and Finland. 
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EURATOM has identified data quality (better instruments and improved data evaluation to reduce 
false alarms) and resources (better efficiency and reduced costs) as key near-term support needs. 
The research described in this paper addresses both improved data evaluation efficiency and 
improved accuracy by using rigorous modelling and simulation software and nuclear data. The 
analysis methods implemented in iRAP have been upgraded based on initial instrument testing and 
applied to measure a very diverse set of assemblies at the SKB Clab facility. These developments 
enable advancement of the Fork detector from a qualitative measurement instrument used frequently 
as an attribute test, or with limited semi-empirical analysis, to a fully quantitative instrument capable of 
verifying operator declarations with improved accuracy.  
This research also points to a need for instrument improvements. The ion chamber response was 
found to be nonlinear with the gamma ray signal, which represents a potential roadblock for wider 
quantitative application of the Fork detector. Alternative gamma instruments, such as the Cadmium-
Zinc-Telluride (CdZnTe) detector, that have been previously investigated for application to the Fork [9, 
10] may provide a practical and cost-effective near-term solution.
Finally, while verification of operator declarations of spent fuel is one of the goals of the IAEA, 
safeguards inspections must also verify the integrity of a fuel assembly to determine that nuclear 
contents have not been diverted from intended use. Quantitative application of the Fork detector will 
enable improved partial defect detection by identifying statistically significant discrepancies between 
the predicted and measured signals. The level of partial defect detection (fraction of fuel being 
removed from the assembly) will be dependent on the detector performance, as is quantified in this 
paper. With improved quantitative analysis and review of the measurement data, the ability to detect 
partial defects is likely to be significantly better than the current 50% partial defect level, as is 
frequently cited for the Fork detector.  
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Based on some successful achievements and several years of experience the authors want to 
compare the advantages of Remote Data Transmission (RDT) against the costs and effort for secure 
implementation. An overview of the current and planned RDT implementation in the EU will be given.  
Furthermore the generic 'Security Plan' describing the principles and details of data transfer, 
distribution and storage, the results of risk analyses of data transfer with and without RDT, the security 
aspects and approaches, as well as the Incident Handling Plan will be presented. Last but not least we 
will discuss how EURATOM safeguards are monitoring the continuous functioning of the remote 
installed equipment. Details of the practical cooperation with the IAEA, including handling of remote 
maintenance, will be described. In addition, we will present the different challenges for the acquisition, 
evaluation and transfer of safeguards data within large facilities, focussing on large reprocessing and 
fuel fabrication plants. Recently, a successful network, equipment and software upgrade in a French 
fuel fabrication plant gave us important feedbacks that have been applied to upgrade the networks in 




The European Commission (EC) and the IAEA have installed optical surveillance systems, electronic 
sealing and data acquisition systems in most of the European nuclear facilities based on their 
obligations stipulated in international safeguards treaties and agreements. These systems operate 
completely isolated from all other systems in the nuclear facility. The data from these systems are 
stored on removable storage devices, and where no remote data transmission (RDT) is installed, they 
are transported by the inspectors to Luxembourg and Vienna headquarters for review. In case of 
installed RDT the data is transferred automatically to the EC Headquarters (HQ).    
 
In order to separate data from different sources, three isolated systems are in operation in the HQ 
(details see chapter 4)  
- the UK RDT system, operational between Sellafield site and EC HQ since 2007 [1], will soon be 
extended to also cover Dounreay and Sizewell sites, 
- the France RDT system, currently under negotiation, preparation and construction and  
- the EU Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) RDT system [2,3], operated jointly with the IAEA since 
2009 and being extended step by step to connect nearly all nuclear sites in the EU. 
 
After the introduction of IAEA Integrated Safeguards with Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI) in 
the EU NNWS, the EC guarantees a permanent optical surveillance in the nuclear facilities in order to 
cover the time period following the SNRI announcement until presence of inspectors. To do this the 
EC is installing RDT in concerned facilities, while the systems on-site remain in principle unchanged. 
Only if necessary, few components in the existing housings are changed by EC technicians. If Member 
States or nuclear operators require specific individual measures for IT security reasons, they might be 
implemented. For example the British Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and the German 
Bundesamt (BSI) have required the use of specific VPN devices approved by them and the German 
operators have required an additional time delay of 24 h. 
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2. Description of the RDT implementation 
2.1. The basic principles 
The basic principle of the RDT link is the creation of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel between 
the fully isolated data acquisition system (i.e. optical surveillance or sealing system) inside the nuclear 
plant and the isolated collecting server at EC HQ in Luxembourg over an internet broadband 
connection. The VPN is created often over a DSL line by Netscreen VPN routers with firewall and 
encryption/decryption functionalities. In most cases, the daily files of the previous day will be pulled 
once a day by the collect server in Luxembourg from the remote facilities and the data from the NNWS 
is simultaneously forwarded to IAEA HQ in Vienna using a second VPN tunnel (see Fig.1). In the 
secured review rooms at the Luxembourg EURATOM HQ dedicated systems are available to review 
the acquired inspection data on the Storage Server. 
 
Fig. 1: Concept of Remote Data Transmission for EU NNWS  
2.2. Routine data transmission 
The implementation of RDT is based on a bidirectional VPN tunnel, but the data flow for routine 
transmission is unidirectional from the facility to the HQs and occurs often only once a day with data 
from the previous day. So the transferred images are typically between 2 and 30 hours old and there is 
no real time image transmission. 
The collect server in the secured area in Luxembourg pulls routinely the data of the previous day from 
the remote site over the secured VPN tunnels at pre-defined times. This data set is a copy of the data 
stored on the removable storage media of the remote (surveillance) system. Then the data is copied 
simultaneously to isolated data servers in Luxembourg and Vienna (via an additional VPN) using a 
push routine. The pull routine by the collect server was chosen for security reasons because if the 
traffic is initiated from inner (trusted) side to the untrusted outside the firewall rules can be greatly 
simplified. All traffic request from outside will be blocked; only a creation of a VPN tunnel where 
certificates will be checked and ping requests are allowed to pass the firewall for testing the 
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connection from the remote site. All download jobs are automated and run unattended. The data flow 
for routine data transmission is shown in figure 2.  
The hardware used for the VPN has several security certifications including FIPS 140-2 and NATO-
Restricted. These devices are already being used by the EC and the IAEA at several nuclear sites. 
The integrated site-to-site IPsec and VPN features allow a secure link to be established between the 
plant and EC premises. The data packages are encrypted by a state of the art AES process while non-
authorised requests or packages are blocked by the firewall. The hardware both in nuclear plants and 
at EC headquarters is placed in cabinets with common IAEA/Euratom seals. The access to the VPN 
device setup is password protected and the remote management function is only possible via the VPN 
tunnel. Thus the configuration changes are only possible by authorised personnel in the presence of 
both inspectorates.  
2.3 The EC HQ Infrastructure 
 
Fig. 2: The data flow in the RDT systems HQ infrastructure (incl. safeguards review and archive) 
The data generated by remote safeguard systems are pulled from remote sites and copied in batches 
routinely on both Luxembourg and Vienna data servers. For most of the new EU member states 
installations the IAEA had already RDT installed before INFCIRC 193 came into force. For this historic 
reason data from these facilities are often still collected by the IAEA in Vienna and then automatically 
transferred to Luxemburg using the second VPN channel. For better upgrades of these old systems it 
was agreed with the IAEA in 2009 to transfer them step by step to the common system. For historical 
reasons the file naming and structure are different on both servers. To allow a single centralized 
repository in EC HQ with a common file structure, a centralized server named RMS-SERVER has 
been put in place. 
The RMS server in Luxembourg receives and stores all safeguards data (including those manually 
transported by inspectors or received remotely from Vienna) and makes it available to the 5 NNWS 
review stations. This very small "review net" is fully isolated from any other networks. Intermediate 
servers, firewalls and data diodes are in place between external systems (remote sites and IAEA in 
Vienna) and the RMS-SERVER, so there is no direct contact from outside to the RMS-SERVER itself 
and therefore no possibility to enter RMS-SERVER from outside or to use it as a bridge between 
different external sites. This and the firewall rules on the VPN router ensure that the systems at the 
nuclear sites have no contact to any other systems.  
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The whole RDT system performance is evaluated daily by the Review Officer to check for missing 
files, anomalies and breakdowns. Automatic procedures (log file parser) have been put in place on 
RMS-SERVER to check all incoming daily files against their presence and appropriate length and 
some abnormal values in the log files (power, temperature, UPS battery status, etc.). If files are not 
present or abnormal conditions are detected, an alarm is raised and the Review Officer can verify the 
alarm condition and perform the necessary actions. Reviews will be performed usually in the review 
room using the five review stations directly connected to the RMS-SERVER on the dedicated review 
network.  
If needed, data may be manually copied across an air-gap to the DG ENER secure network where it 
can be further evaluated by the inspectors. This secure network is fully separated from the normal 
Commission office network and is highly secured against access from outside. After evaluation the 
data are deleted from the secure network. The data on the RMS-SERVER are backed-up and 
archived for 5 years and deleted after that period. 
In case of problems in the routine data transmission, the EC technical services will be active to solve 
the issue. If no problem is found on the data transmission equipment in Luxembourg, the operator of 
the nuclear facility might be asked for help to verify the presence of main power to the surveillance 
equipment and the functionality of the internet connection. If the remote connection cannot be restored 
then the EC will send a technician to repair the surveillance or transmission system. These activities 
are not time critical, because the on-site systems are storing the data for more than half a year. 
2.4 Joint-Use Remote Maintenance System  
Besides the automated routine data transmission it is intended to use the VPN connection also for 
remote administration of the installed data acquisition systems to further increase the efficiency. 
Examples of such interventions are remote diagnostics, rebooting of a system, control and change of 
camera settings without modification of the field of view on-site (because camera position and lenses 
are fixed) or adding new sites or remove certificates in the HQ configurations. In 2009 the EC and the 
IAEA agreed on the joint-use remote maintenance (JURM) system for NNWS. It has been installed in 
Luxembourg allowing a shared joint access to remote transmission systems and the corresponding 
data in nuclear facilities (see Fig.3).  
 
Fig. 3:  The JURM system overview  
The maintenance or check of a camera set-up requires the EC, the IAEA and, if necessary, the 
operator to agree upon a date for turning on the Joint-Access-PC in the EC premises. After 
synchronisation of the PC in Vienna with the Joint-Access-PC via a second VPN the IAEA can open 
the access to the Collect-Server using IP tracking. Then a bidirectional connection to the site can be 
established via the Collect-Server and the necessary maintenance or checks can be done. Each party 
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has the right to "pull the plug", meaning that there must always be a consensus for changes and near 
real time image transmissions. 
3. Advantages of RDT vs. Effort 
The RDT implementation is not available for zero effort. Therefore the advantages of RDT have to be 
compared with the effort for implementation – for the inspectorates as well as for the operators. 
Highest priorities are efficiency and effectiveness of inspections and very high IT security. 
3.1. The Advantages of RDT implementation 
 RDT has obvious advantages if manpower can be saved, for the inspectors as well as for the 
operator. In installations where safeguards procedures require more than 1 to 2 inspections per year - 
the obligatory PIV (Physical Inventory Verification) and possibly their preparation - the RDT has the 
potential to be more effective, as verification and maintenance activities can be carried out in the HQ. 
That includes mostly installations with HEU and fresh PU, bulk handling facilities and stores with 
material difficult to access. Examples are special research and MOX power reactors, fuel fabrication, 
reprocessing and encapsulation plants. The inspectors are saving manpower and travelling costs and 
the operators save the administrative workload for preparing and accompanying inspections. 
Since 2007 the EC is operating RDT from the EURATOM network in Sellafield (more details in 4.2.) 
[1]. The UK data server and review terminals are connected via a bidirectional VPN channel to the 
isolated EURATOM network in Sellafield allowing full access to all network connected EC systems on-
site. The savings in manpower are considerable;   
- for inspectors, having only to walk 100m to access all data from Sellafield at any time. Much of the 
safeguards data evaluation work can be carried out in HQ instead of the on-site office or on local 
machines, 
- for the technicians, being able to daily check and intervene on the system performance. Many of the 
detected issues can be corrected by remote adjustments, reboots or software updates or with the help 
of inspectors present on site. 
- for operators, because the request for inspectors document preparation and escorts are reduced and 
sensitive information will not be transported outside the secured environments. 
Since the implementation of IAEA Integrated Safeguards it seems that RDT does not save effort in the 
LEU power reactors and spent fuel storages, but the RDT allows the EC to check daily the status of 
health of the systems and to react quickly in case of technical problems. This also serves the purpose 
to reduce consequences and effort for the operator in case of e.g. loss of continuity of knowledge. 
For NNWS, a certain savings potential is expected for RDT linked to the spent fuel cask loading with 
Ion-fork measurements. Ideas already exist in EURATOM, but they have to be agreed with IAEA and 
operators first. 
Another important advantage of RDT is the possibility to transport the image data in a more secure 
and timely manner compared to hand delivery made by the inspectors. This notably increases the data 
and IT security and allows safeguards inspectors to carry out certain inspection tasks even before their 
arrival at the nuclear facility. Therefore, this approach has advantages for both, the operators and the 
inspectors. 
3.2. The effort for RDT implementation 
The effort for implementation of RDT includes the administrative effort for agreements between 
stakeholders concerning IT security and modalities, the HQ infrastructure preparation, hard and 
software purchase and the remote site infrastructure preparation and hardware implementation as well 
as communication and maintenance expenses. 
The time for administrative negotiations and agreements is very difficult to quantify. This is a process 
That may last over several years, especially for countries with a large nuclear infrastructure. For 
example, during the negotiation with France it was required to make a detailed risk analysis and 
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establish a security plan in line with the ISO 27000 series on IT Security and the related Commission 
regulations C(2006) 3602, 2015/443 and 2015/444. For this task the EC has hired an external IT 
security expert for several years who has not only performed the risk analyses but is also updating 
existing agreements with other stakeholders. Due to the existence of a Security Plan, agreements in 
principle could be achieved with Sweden and Spain in a very short period, shorter than 1 year.  
However, the implementation of RDT depends also from specific installation in the country. Very often, 
the surveillance systems have to be upgraded before because the old single camera system is not 
100% RDT compatible. The quickest installations have been done in Krsko and, thanks to the support 
from STUK and the operator FORTUM, in Loviisa 
In the HQ the IT infrastructure for pulling, checking and pushing the data to other servers had to be 
prepared and maintained. The initial effort for the NNWS system can be roughly estimated to about 2 
person-years and about 80 k€, of which about a half person-year was spent for the software 
development for the State of Health evaluation system and about 40 k€ was used to purchase the 
data diode from German collect PC to the (joint) Collect PC. The maintenance and follow up of the 
system requires about 80 persons-days per year, each adding of a new installation about 2 person-
days (EC HQ effort only).   
On the remote site usually installation costs occurs on cable placing from the safeguard system to the 
switchboard and for reimbursement of the DSL line costs. A good average is about 7000€ per MBA 
plus about four times 700 € for 4 year DSL line reimbursement. Several installations, mostly German 
and Eastern European, are charging much less because they only request reimbursement for external 
costs and don't take into account their internal cost. 
The installation effort for a new site is much larger for the EC technical and financial service and can 
be estimated to 12 person-days per new site, where more than half of it is used for the administrative 
procedures in our HQ (writing of specifications, request for cost estimation, evaluating of cost and 
preparation of reimbursement agreement). 
3.3. Comparison  
Having in mind that the HQ infrastructure had to be built up only once and that an addition of a new 
installation is a reasonable effort, especially when combined with other activities onsite such as 
surveillance system upgrade etc. [6], it can be stated that RDT always makes sense in installation 
where more than 1 to 2 inspections per year are necessary. The costs and effort are still moderate but 
the savings can be enormous. Even for LEU reactor with cask loading and no static spent fuel 
storages it is useful to have RDT to transport the data in a secured and timely manner to prevent that 
data get lost or disclosed and to react quickly on malfunctions. In cases of shut down LEU reactors 
where the remaining fuel will be loaded into cask after the complete pond verification by DCVD it has 
to be decided if a redundancy of permanent surveillance is the best approach. 
A real story of success is the RDT from Sellafield which allow the EC to have the same inspection 
performance with reduced staff available. We try to repeat this story also with the large reprocessing 
and fuel fabrication plants in France, but during the ongoing pilot phase in La Hague some restrictions 
have to be accepted and common trust has to be built first. 
4. Progress in the last years and status of RDT 
In the last few years [2, 3] a lot of effort has been spent mainly by the authors themselves to  
- improve the EC HQ infrastructure and documentation set (risk analysis, security plan), 
- develop and implement State of Health (SoH) data evaluation software,  
- get principal agreements with all EU Member states having nuclear installation where RDT is useful 
and  connect further installation to the NNWS RDT system, 
- refurbish the onsite network systems to have reliable and secured connections to all data acquisition 
systems and  
- upgrade the data acquisition and evaluation software and hardware [4] to newer operating systems 
like Win7 or higher. This action is not only important for higher IT security; it is a precondition for 
reliable unattended systems and for saving of human resources with RDT [5]. 
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 4.1 The RDT system with France 
The RDT with France is still under development but the road map has been agreed and has to be 
implemented gradually. As a pilot project the data transfer from La Hague was chosen. The detailed 
risk analysis based on the EBIOS approach was agreed by the common working group of French 
authorities (CET, ANSI,…), operator (AREVA) and EC (ENER E2 and E1) and the security plan in line 
with ISO norms and EC regulations was established. The security plan describes the scope and 
principles of RDT, the hardware and software, the detailed risk analysis of the existing approach, the 
counter measurements and the remaining residual risk, the internal laws to be followed and the 
physical access, training and indoctrination of staff. The result of this very systematic work was also 
adapted to all other RDT applications so that today we have templates for all different RDT systems. 
The risk analysis has shown that the manual transport of data is the biggest risk concerning data 
disclosure and data loss. From the IT security point of view it is a necessity to implement state of art 
RDT as soon as possible. 
The French authorities require for this pilot project a delay of 2 days for transmission of certain data. 
This delay is not an issue for the safeguards data evaluation, but has consequences for the structure 
of the network. The UP2 and UP3 network should be interconnected and only the near real-time 
network will be accessible from the inspector's offices on-site. The data will be mirrored with 2 days 
delay over a data diode to an additional server which is accessible from EC HQ. The use of a data 
diode guarantees that the data transfer can go only in one direction from real-time to the delayed 
network or server, but never back. The data on the delayed network are accessible via VPN from the 
EC HQ and can be remotely evaluated and maybe corrected. If these evaluated data have to be 
transferred back to the real-time network than it can be done only onsite with dedicated USB stick 
which should never leave the inspector offices there. The SoH data can be transferred immediately so 
that we have near real-time information about the functioning of our systems available in our HQ but 
the remote maintenance is very limited. Nevertheless, ideas and experience exist to solve this issue in 
the future. 
Today the network refurbishment in La Hague is ongoing, aiming to be in line with the security plan. 
The network will be documented in detail (UP3 is already finished), the new switches and server 
hardware will be installed soon and the local SoH system will be fine-tuned to be use it immediately if 
RDT is in place. Furthermore, the hardware and software replacement and network restructuring in the 
inspector office is ongoing so that an audit of the system against the security plan can be performed in 
the second half of the year. We hope to have the RDT with La Hague in place around the end of this 
year already.  
In the Melox plant we are at a final stage. In 2013 the network refurbishment was performed to have a 
network ring topology with modern routers which redirect the traffic over to the other side if one side is 
interrupted. Also most of the Data Acquisition (DA) cupboards with in total 60 sensors (gamma or 
neutron detectors with their dedicated electronic, door monitors, ID readers, balances …) connected to 
16 DA-PCs were modernised. In 2014, after testing and qualifying our new release or data acquisition 
and evaluation software RADAR and iRAP [5] for Win7 operating systems we have first upgraded the 
historical databases to a newer Oracle version, then we migrated to the new RADAR and iRAP 
versions and finally we replaced the inspector office hardware by a complete virtual system comprising 
two hot redundant servers sharing a common NAS and hosting a part of the IT infrastructure. All these 
activities were done on running 24/7 systems without any data loss and very low interference with the 
inspection schedules. 
4.2. The Sellafield RDT system 
The Sellafield network has historically grown over the last 20 years [4] starting from small local 
surveillance, sealing and DA systems in Thorp, SMP, Magnox and SPRS. They have been gradually 
connected to each other by different technologies (Fibre optic, ATM, TCP/IP,…) and connected via 
VPN to a server located the EC HQ secured data room in 2007 so that a full access to the entire judge 
network in Sellafield is possible. A network and hardware refurbishment was really necessary [3] to 
achieve reliability and redundancy in future using state of art hardware and routers. 
In 2013 the existing network status was well documented in detail and a plan for restructuring and 
additional lines was established. Fig. 4 gives an overview about the logical fibre optic network only. In 
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total 134 sensors are connected to 37 DA-PCs. In this figure the surveillance system PCs and the data 
evaluation PCs in the inspector office are not included. In 2014 gradually the network was upgraded 
during full operation of the entire systems without any data loss. Now the activities as in Melox above 
will be repeated, first the databases will be upgraded, then the RADAR/iRAP software and office 
hardware – this time under consideration to perform it together to save time and human resources.  
 
Fig.4: Sellafield Network Fibre Optic infrastructure 
Concerning RDT documents the "Accreditation Document Set" [1] upgrade is ongoing to a "Code of 
Connection" which establishes together with the Sellafield Security Plan the legal framework for the 
data transmission between the Sellafield operator and EC. Until now an unsolved issue is the limited 
band width of DSL connection from Sellafield site to the next DSLAM but here the operator and EC are 
depending from the British Telecom. A better connection is envisaged for the next years, which will 
then allow us also to transmit several images regularly. 
4.3 The NNWS RDT system 
In the recent years, principle agreements for RDT could be achieved with Germany, Finland, Sweden 
and Spain. There is only one country in the EU still missing, mainly due to lack of sufficient human 
resource in the EC. One reason for the quick results in few countries is the existence of the security 
plan template. It gives the security experts of national authorities and installations an easy way to 
quickly find answers to their questions. The discussion with Finland was very helpful in this process 
because a chapter about protection of privacy was included in the security plan and a penetration test 
of the VPN connections was carried out on the initiative of FORTUM. 
Gradually more and more installations will be connected to the system described in chapter 2. The 
connection to RDT, however, often requires an upgrade of the connected system, i.e. the single optical 
surveillance systems. The successor system NGSS is well tested and ready for deployment since 
October 2014 [6]. First installations were already done in Loviisa, Sellafield and Spain; Sweden, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Germany will follow soon.  
The HQ infrastructure has been improved and restructured as mentioned in chapter 2.3. and a 
software for automated check of the system's performance was developed. The so-called log file 
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parser is running on the RMS server every day in the morning or on request and is checking if all 
expected files from previous day of all listed systems are available, if the file size is in the adjustable 
range (i.e. +/- 10 % of the average of the last 10 days) or if in the RADAR log file some parameters 
have strange values. Based on the checking result the errors will be shown on an alarm page where 
the review officer can flag them according to actions he has taken. The history page is showing the 
alarm history of the last 30 days over all listed systems with different colours. A wizard allows 
managing the different systems to be included in the parser. This parser can also been used in local 
systems in La Hague and Melox where historically the Nagios software was used to record the SNMP 
traps (predefined alarm messages from operating systems).   
By upgrading the HQ data room internet connections we no longer have bandwidth issues with the 
downloads, but the limited upload speeds of asymmetric connections used to forward the data to the 
IAEA can still be a bottleneck at times. However, it seems that this issue can be solved later this year. 
From the about 80 installations (with 143 MBAs) in the EU NNWS where we get regularly data, one 
third (27) is connected to the RDT system. That includes installations from Slovenia, Italy, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Finland and soon Sweden and Spain. Additional 15 installations could be connected in the next 
months because all the administrative issues are solved, the reimbursement agreements are in 
progress and the necessary hardware and software is available on stock. The biggest issue is the 
limited human resources but by sharing installation work with the surveillance team and getting help 
from the IAEA SGTS and EC inspectors we hope to solve this issue too.  
5. Summary 
In the past few years a lot of effort has been spent to prepare the necessary network documentation, 
to adapt the HQ infrastructure, to automate the SoH checks and modernise and upgrade the infield 
infrastructure and networks for remote data transmission and maintenance. Milestones were the 
creation of the security plans, implementation of local and central automated SoH data evaluation, the 
review net installation (Fig. 2) as core part of HQ RDT infrastructure, and the successful complete 
upgrade of the Melox safeguards infrastructure.   
We hope that by the end of this year certain other milestones can be achieved, like the first RDT from 
France, the nearly completed modernisation of the Sellafield data acquisition and evaluation 
infrastructure, and the connection of more than 50 % of installations to the NNWS RDT system. But 
there are also plenty of other tasks and projects on the horizon, so that the available human resources 
will play a deciding role. 
6. References 
1. M. Beaman, P. Chare, P. Schwalbach, W. Stanley, J. Vigo, Scope for Remote Monitoring in 
Large Scale Plutonium Facilities, Proceedings of 27th ESARDA Annual Meeting, London, 2005 
2. K. Schoop et.al., Developments in Implementation of Remote Data Transmission, IAEA 
Symposium 2010 (CN-184/239) 
3. K. Schoop, et.al., Reference Configuration for reliable and secured Data Acquisition and 
Remote Data Transfer, Proceedings of 33rd ESARDA Annual Meeting, Budapest 2011. 
4. P. Schwalbach et.al., RADAR and CRISP – Standard Tools of the EC for remote and 
unattended data acquisition and analysis for nuclear safeguards, IAEA Symposium 2006 (CN-
148/195) 
5. A. Smejkal et.al., Automated Processing of safeguards data: Perspective on software 
requirements for a future "All in One Review Platform" based on iRAP, Proceedings of 37th 
ESARDA Annual Meeting, Manchester, 2015 
6. J. Pekkarinen et al., EURATOM experiences on NGSS infield implementation preparation,  
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Annual Meeting, Manchester, 2015 
 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
295
An update on the implementation of remote data transmission 
(RDT) in the dry interim storage facilities in Germany  
 
 
A. Jussofie1, W. Graf1, K. van Bevern2, W. Geißler3 I. Niemeyer4, A. Rezniczek5,  
W. Trautwein6, K. Schoop7 
 
1Gesellschaft für Nuklear-Service mbH, Frohnhauser Str. 67, 45127 Essen, Germany 
2VGB PowerTech e. V., Deilbachtal 173, 45257 Essen, Germany  
3RWE Power AG, Kraftwerk Biblis, 68647 Biblis, Germany 
4Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, IEK-6: Nuclear Waste Management and Reactor Safety, 52425 
Jülich, Germany 
5UBA Unternehmensberatung GmbH, An Gut Forensberg 40, 52134 Herzogenrath, Germany 
6Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, Villemombler Str. 76, 53107 Bonn, Germany 
7European Commission, DG ENER E1, L-2920 Luxembourg 
 
E-mail: astrid.jussofie@gns.de, katrin.vanbevern@vgb.org, Wolfram.Geissler@kkw.rwe.com, 






The importance of dry interim storage for SF management is emphasized by the enactment of the Law 
on Site Selection from 23rd July 2013 for a repository to store heat generating radioactive waste, which 
requires the definite repository site to be selected until 2031. As long as no operating repository is 
available, the intermediate storage of spent fuel and heat-generating waste, which storage licence is 
currently limited to 40 years, is the only legal possibility in Germany. The remote transmission of 
Safeguards data from the dry interim spent fuel storage facilities (SFSFs) to EURATOM and IAEA 
HQs is not only important in the light of maintaining the continuity of knowledge (CoK) during 
announcement of short notice random inspections, since it allows to detect a failure of the systems on 
a daily basis by monitoring the Safeguards equipment. Furthermore, RDT improves substantially the 
security of data transport.  
 
Since in Germany the interim dry SFSFs underlie different license and supervising authorities, a fully 
functional RDT solution was developed by EURATOM and IAEA by implementing also the 
recommendations by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and established by means of a 
field trial in the dry SFSF at Ahaus under the German Support Programme to the IAEA. The promising 
results of the field test from September 2012 to January 2013 needed to be confirmed by a longer 
follow up operation in order to demonstrate the long-term reliability of the unattended RDT system. 
 
The paper will summarize the progress made over the last two years in achieving a RDT 
implementation approach top-down from the federal level to the individual operators of nuclear 
facilities. An update of the experiences gained and the current status of RDT implementation in the 
German interim dry SFSFs will be given. 
 






The political decision in 2011 to shut down 
immediately eight of a total of 17 German 
reactors that started in or before 1980 and the 
remaining nine reactors stepwise by 2022 [1, 
2] as well as the enactment of the Law on Site 
Selection from 23rd July 2013 for a repository 
to store heat generating radioactive waste 
provide a unique situation in Germany 
regarding spent fuel management [3]. The new 
act determines no preference for a specific 
host rock type and foresees the restart of the 
search for high level radioactive heat 
generating waste with participation of the 
public in all process steps as a necessary 
precondition for a site selection supported by a 
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broad consensus; major decisions are finally 
made by law. Based on the three legally fixed 
temporal milestones of the current site 
selection act, operation of the repository is 
foreseen after completing the site selection 
process until 2031 as well as after completion 
the following licence and construction phases.  
 
Germany’s accelerated exit from nuclear 
energy that is associated with the need for 
defueling of nuclear power plants as soon as 
possible by temporarily increasing the loading 
of SF into casks on one hand, the timeline 
deriving from the current site selection act on 
the other hand – both emphasize the 
importance of dry interim storage for SF 
management and the need for long-term 
reliable unattended Safeguards (SG) 
measures in order to preserve the continuity of 
knowledge (CoK). With regard to a sustainable 
SG concept for long-term interim SF storages 
the importance of the failure-free operation of 
optical surveillance and, hence, the importance 
of remote image transmission will grow in 
consequence of a decreasing diversity of 
suitable seal types. It can be assumed that 
maintenance-free passive seal types will be 
preferred to battery containing electronic seals 
as EOSS. Through the increasing application 
of the passive Cobra seal, the optical 
surveillance in conjunction with RDT may 
contribute to the preservation of the “dual 
principle of Safeguards instrumentation” since 
the application of different technology types 
increases failure resistance. 
 
The implementation of RDT in the German 
SFSF was mainly motivated by the concern 
that the failure-free operation of the 
unattended Safeguards instruments is to be 
ensured under the Integrated SG-regime, 
where the camera function has to be 
guaranteed within the short notice random 
inspection (SNRI) notification period of 48 h. 
Since without RDT, malfunctions or a 
functional loss of the SG cameras are not 
automatically returned to the inspectorates, 
EURATOM used to check the functional state 
of the camera / video system and to exchange 
the hard disk with the stored image files on-site 
once a year in the absence of IAEA in addition 
to the inspections performed by both 
inspectorates as a joint team.  
 
Hence, the implementation of RDT in 15 dry 
SFSF in Germany (12 on-site dry SFSF, the 
two centralized SFSF at Ahaus and Gorleben 
and the SFSF at Lubmin) is for EURATOM 
also under the aspect of budgetary constraints 
of major interest, since RDT enables 
EURATOM to reduce their inspection efforts by 
increasing the efficiency of routine Safeguards. 
In Germany without a national Safeguards 
authority, EURATOM is in charge of 
establishing and maintaining the state’s 
system of accounting for and control of nuclear 
material subject to Safeguards under the 
agreement INFCIR/193. In compliance with 
this obligation, EURATOM can only reduce 
their inspection frequency with the application 
of compensating measures in order to keep 
the quality of their control function.  
 
A further reason for the implementation of RDT 
is the confidentiality of the collected images 
what the main concern is for the operators. 
The SG data have been stored compressed 
but unencrypted on removable hard disks so 
far so that the risk of an unauthorized data 
disclosure through a theft during their physical 
transport to Luxembourg and Vienna is higher 
than during their remote transmission. 
 
  
2. Security arrangements for 
sensitive data  
 
The protection against unauthorized data 
access through unauthorized users that could 
gain access to the RDT system to make 
unauthorized changes to the IT-system or to 
the transmitted and stored data is the major 
requirement of the operator. The particular 
situation in Germany is a result of the 
decades-long anti-nuclear movement that 
opposes the use of nuclear power. Images 
from a SFSF in publicity would demonstrate 
that the issue of information security has not 
been dealt properly with. This is just what 
nuclear opponents are waiting for in order to 
jeopardize the reputation of the whole nuclear 
industry.  
 
Because of the fundamental importance of 
confidentiality of SG data for German 
operators the BSI, the ultimate Federal Office 
for IT-security in Germany, was involved to 
check the concept of RDT developed by 
EURATOM and IAEA with respect to the 
operators’ main concern of a risk of an 
unauthorized access to Safeguards data. A 
technical solution approved by BSI is of 
additional advantage for the German 
operators, since thereby the suitability of the 
security level for RDT is agreed on a federal 
level. Hence, this approach ensures a pilot 
solution that is applicable in principle to all 
SFSF regardless of the different license and 
supervising authorities the operators underlie 
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in consequence of the federal structure of 
Germany.   
 
Basically, the original RDT concept of 
EURATOM and IAEA differentiates between 
state of health (SoH)-data and sensitive 
Safeguards data, which deserve special 
protection. In compliance with the German 
security requirements for sensitive data, the 
BSI recommended a modification of the basic 
RDT system developed by EURATOM and 
IAEA by installing two German developed 
devices in the RDT-system: 
 
I. The SINA Box LE from Fa. Secunet 
AG, which has been approved by BSI 
for use at the national level VS-nfD 
(Germany) as well as at the 
international level EU restricted and 
NATO restricted, ensured a secure 
handling of image data. 
II. The Data diode (SINA OWG2 
Gateway with input and output server) 
in order to ensure a unidirectional data 
transfer. It was installed between the 
PC that collects the Safeguards data 
from Germany and the PC that collects 
the data from other non-weapon states 
of the EU. The data diode decouples 
the German RDT-network from other 
RDT networks so that a potential 
access from installations outside 
Germany to EURATOM IT systems or 
installations in Germany could be 
excluded.     
 
The increasing concern for security in data 
transmission over the networks has resulted in 
virtual private network (VPN) solutions being 
the most preferred technology for secure 
networking. Accordingly, the technical solution 
of EURATOM and IAEA for RDT is based on a 
virtual private network (VPN) tunnel between 
the data acquisition system in the respective 
dry SFSF and the data collecting server in the 
EURATOM headquarter at Luxembourg using 
a broadband internet connection which is 
separated from the operator’s IT network. 
Following the transfer of data to Luxembourg 
the data are immediately transmitted to Vienna 
via a further VPN tunnel. The SINA box at the 
respective SFSF encrypt the SG data to be 
transmitted and the SINA-box at EURATOM 
headquarter decrypt the encrypted data 
transmitted. The Safeguards data are 
encrypted according to the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES)-algorithm by a 256 
bit key which is only known by the two SINA-
boxes.  
 
The Point-to-Point Protocol Over Ethernet 
(PPPoE)-protocol is ensuring that during the 
transmission over the internet all data 
packages from the sender will arrive at the 
receiver without loss. All images are signed 
with an authentication signature, calculated 
already during the image capturing process in 
the DCM14 camera module. This signature is 
automatically verified during the review in the 
inspector's headquarter to ensure the genuine 
of the image.  Further details of the technical 
solution adapted to German security 
requirements are given in the security plan for 
RDT connections with Germany [4]. 
 
3. The field trial - An essential step 
in implementation of RDT  
 
In the next step the practicability of the RDT-
system, which had been modified according to 
the recommendations of the BSI / adapted to 
the German security requirements was 
demonstrated under daily use conditions 
during a field test as part of the German 
support programme for the IAEA. The field test 
had been carried out at the central dry SFSF at 
Ahaus between 6/9/2012 and 31/01/2013 in 
two test phases. The first test phase was 
limited to the transmission of SoH data, which 
consist of SDIS-log-files and data from an 
EOSS which had been opened and closed for 
test purposes outside the storage hall by the 
operator at Ahaus. The times of seal openings 
and closings were recorded for comparison 
with the signals received at Luxembourg. The 
second test phase was extended to the 
transmission of sensitive data in the form of 
original images from the four surveillance 
cameras installed in the dry SFSF at Ahaus. 
The image transmission with a delay of 24 h is 
a crucial precondition for the German 
operators who have thus the opportunity to be 
on the same level of information as EURATOM 
and IAEA. The data flow for routine 
transmission occurs once a day with the data 
from the previous day so that the time required 
by the collect server Germany to acquire the 
transmitted data varies between 3 and 30 
hours. Since the timeliness goals of IAEA and 
EURATOM do not require an image 
transmission in real time, the image data were 
delayed by additional 24 hours.    
 
In summary, the RDT field trial in the SFSF at 
Ahaus has been evaluated as successful by all 
parties involved BMWi (Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Energy),  BSI (Federal 
Agency for Security in Information 
Technology), FZJ (Forschungszentrum Jülich), 
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WKK (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Association) and 
VGB (Association for Power and Heat 
Generators). The RDT system ensured a 
complete and reliable data transmission 
applicable under daily use conditions. It could 
be demonstrated that all the images were 
genuine, recorded and transmitted with the 
valid (authentic) signature and the correct 
recording interval. Interruptions of the RDT-
operation for several days remained without 
consequences due to the local storage 
capacity of the RDT system and its 
subsequent automatic synchronization. The 
field trial proved that the RDT-system based 
on the concept of EURATOM and IAEA in 
consideration of the German security 
requirements offers a technically fully 
functional solution applicable as a prototype to 




4. Further basic arrangements for 
RDT implementation in German 
dry SFSF 
 
Apart from the German security requirements 
to be considered for the remote transmission 
of images, further basic arrangements were 
agreed on for implementing RDT in German 
SFSF: 
 
 No connection to the operator’s own 
data network: RDT transmission 
occurs via a separate communication 
line, which is the easiest and most 
effective measure to protect the 
network on-site from the introduction 
of malicious software when 
implementing RDT. In addition, RDT 
via a separate communication line also 
excludes the transmission of operating 
data.   
 No impact on the plant operation: It is 
a general concern across the whole 
nuclear industry that SG measures 
may not impede the operational 
processes.   
 No increase of the operators’ effort by 
RDT: 
The daily transmission of images may 
not lead to increased inquiries by 
EURATOM with the potential 
consequence of an increasing 
inspection frequency, a higher control 
density or other operators’ efforts.  
 
Specific considerations were made regarding 
the compliance of RDT with the operator‘s 
Privacy Policy. For this purpose the operator’s 
data protection officer was consulted on the 
remote data transmission of images since it 
can not be excluded that the transmitted 
images, which are taken inside the dry storage 
facility in order to follow the path of SF -
currently only into and within the material 
balance area (MBA)-  coincidentally may also 
show facility staff. However, the view angle of 
the camera is chosen such that movements of 
the big-sized transport and storage casks can 
be monitored within a large area of the MBA. 
The review of the transmitted images by the 
inspectorates is limited to images that indicate 
movements of big objects such as casks. As 
long as no movement is registered by the 
review software program, the review of images 
is carried out automatically by comparing 
consecutive images and triggering a human 
review in case of differences between images. 
Since no personal data is collected, nor any 
records are kept that can be linked to an 
individual, the inspection data collection will 
not be in conflict with the operator’s Privacy 
Policy  
This applies equally to the physical protection 
of the dry SF storage facilities. In case of the 
SF storage facility at Ahaus print outs of 
images were handed over to the data 
protection officer on request in order to 
demonstrate the respect of privacy. 
Under the aspect of data protection, it was 
necessary to assure that the recommendations 
of BSI have been implemented and that the 
storage of the transmitted data is only 
temporary. Accordingly, after the review, the 
images will be archived for 5 years, after that 
period the storage media (HDD and/ or DVDs) 
will be physically destroyed. It was concluded 
that from a data protection perspective, no 
objection against the remote transmission of 
SG-related images exists. 
 
In addition, the works council was informed on 
the field trial of remote transmission of 
Safeguards data. It was emphasized that the 
operators are legally obliged to tolerate and 
support the control of nuclear material by the 
relevant supervising organizations EURATOM 
and IAEA. According to the body of 
Safeguards rules and Safeguards regulations, 
EURATOM and IAEA have the right to record 
images and to review them. It was pointed out 
that the information content of the transmitted 
images remains unchanged by RDT and only 
the path for transmitting SG data from the 
storage site to EURATOM’s headquarter has 
changed. It was assured that EURATOM is the 
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owner of all collected data and that the 
operator has no access to the image data. 





5. Considerable progress in the 
administrative field 
 
The legal situation in Germany concerning the 
RDT to EURATOM and IAEA is incomplete, 
since the Implementation Act that is mandatory 
for the operators, does not cover Article 14 of 
the Additional Protocol especially regarding 
RDT. Therefore an approach top-down from 
the federal level to the single operator was 
necessary in order to pave the way for an 
implementation of RDT in all German dry 
storage facilities, which underlie different 
competent Federal Land authorities.  The 
approach includes the following steps: 
 
 Consultation of the relevant Federal 
Agencies via the Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 
to ensure an approval of RDT 
implementation on the federal level 
 Instructing the German Federal Land 
authorities to support the 
implementation of RDT in German 
SFSF 
 Official Informing of the operators of 
the German dry SFSF about 
Implementation of RDT by BMWi 
 
In consideration of the extensive preparatory 
work, the adherence to the basic 
arrangements agreed on and the successful 
field trial, the BMWi endorsed the RDT 
implementation in German interim dry storage 
facilities. After the approval of RDT 
implementation by the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation, Building 
and Nuclear Safety and that of BSI in 2014, 
BMWi instructed the competent German 
Federal Land authorities by letter dated 28 
May 2014 to support the implementation of 
RDT in the dry interim SF storage facilities. 
Finally, BMWi informed the operators of the 
German SF storage facilities by a letter dated 





6. Status quo of RDT 
implementation   
 
The implementation of RDT has been 
completed in three dry interim SF storage 
facilities in Germany including the SFSF at 
Ahaus. The two are the “Zwischenlager Nord” 
(ZLN) close to Lubmin, which was connected  
in 10/2014, and the storage at Biblis  as the 
first on-site dry SFSF, which was connected in 
03/2015.  
 
The connection of the SFSF Krümmel, Lingen 
and Gundremmingen is coming soon, since 
the contract has been concluded. Start of RDT 
operation is expected for 06/07 2015. 
 
In the SFSF Brunsbüttel, Philippsburg, 
Neckarwestheim and Gorleben the preparatory 
works are ongoing; the necessary 
infrastructure adaptations have been identified 







After completion of the field trial the period of 
observation was extended for reliability 
estimations. Since the start of operation on 
06.09.2012 an interruption of RDT from SFSF 
Ahaus to the headquarter of EURATOM 
occurred three times, namely in 09/2012, 
11/2014 and 03/2015. It can be stated that 
until today virtually no additional effort of the 
operator is required for routine RDT operation.  
 
In the storage ZLN an initial faulty cable 
connector caused RDT interruptions, which 
had no effect due to automatic synchronisation 
and data transmission later on. 
 
Overall, based on the current experience an 
effort reduction should be achieved on the part 
of the operators as well as on the part of 
EURATOM and IAEA by implementing RDT, 
since the RDT system works reliably under 
daily use conditions and the Safeguards data 
are transmitted completely. 
 
 
7.2 RDT-setup  
 
Due to the experience from the Ahaus field 
trial, no technical problems occurred in the 
other two SF storage facilities, neither during 
installation of the RDT components on-site nor 
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their start-up. A stable VPN tunnel was created 
at the first attempt.  
 
7.3 Lessons learnt 
 
It can be stated that technically no significant 
problems emerged during the installation of the 
RDT-systems. However there is a potential for 
improvements in the administrative area field. 
For instance the execution of the 
reimbursement agreement in English would be 
easier in the official language of RDT 
implementing MS. Likewise, the availability of 
EURATOM’s IT security plan in the official 
languages of the EU would facilitate the 
preparatory works for RDT. One of the major 
issues is the responsibility that has to be 
clarified between operator and EURATOM in 
the legal sense.  
The approach of performing a pilot project with 
the involvement of all parties concerned 
(EURATOM, BMWi, BSI, Federal Land 
authorities and operators) and administrative 
provisions for implementing RDT in in the dry 
interim SF storage facilities could be 





Completion of RDT-implementation in all 
German dry SFSF is foreseen in 2015/2016. 
Meanwhile EURATOM already aims at 
performing a pilot field trial for RDT from a 
German reactor. The implementation of RDT in 
nuclear reactors is only worthwhile if their 
operation time still lasts at least for 5 years. 
From the operators‘ point of view, however, the 
experience gained with RDT from dry SFSF 
has to be evaluated in the first step before 
starting a field test in a reactor thereby 
enabling a final evaluation of the experience 
gained with RDT from SFSF. However, 
arrangements and the concept made for SFSF 
are not fully applicable to reactors, since not all 
reactors are equipped with a communication 
line that is separated from the operator’s IT 
network. In addition, the higher protection 
requirements to data and IT-systems in 
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Following the decision of the German Federal Government to completely phase out nuclear energy by 
2022, safeguards inspectorates are facing an increasing number of spent fuel (SF) transfers from 
nuclear power plants (NPP) to dry SF storage facilities. Verification of these transfers in the period 
2014-2017 using standard approaches would have required about 1500 additional calendar-days in 
the field by inspectors. To meet the verification requirements with the available resources, the Agency 
together with the European Commission (EC) designed an innovative approach. The approach is 
making full use of safeguards cooperation with the EC and Germany’s NPP operators to reduce the 
inspector’s efforts, while fully adhering to the Agency’s safeguards policy and requirements.  
 
The approach includes verification for partial defect test using digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD) 
of SF inventories in a reactor pond(s) before and after a SF loading campaign; during the SF loading 
campaign all SF in pond(s) is kept under continuous surveillance, while the containment measures on 
SF casks, i.e. fibre-optic and electronic seals, and corresponding fibre-optic cables, are applied by the 
NPP operator in accordance with the agreed procedure. While the above approach allows for a 
substantial reduction of the Agency inspector presence during the SF cask loading campaign, it can 
only be implemented when good cooperation exists between the Agency, the facility operator, and, as 
in the case of Germany, the regional safeguards authority.  
 
 






The German Government’s decision to permanently shut down eight NPPs in 2011 and to completely 
phase out nuclear energy by the end of 2022 by gradually shutting down the remaining nine NPPs 
was taken in the wake of Fukushima nuclear accident on 11 March 2011. The decision became part of 
the German Atomic Law on 31 July 2011 and is continuing to be implemented. As a result, the number 
of SF transfers from reactors to SF dry storages in Germany has increased substantially. The IAEA 
and the EC are facing an increased workload related to verification of these transfers, which for the 
period 2014 -- 2017 would require about 1500 additional calendar days in the field (CDFs) of the 
inspector’s efforts, if current practice for verification was to be continued. 
 
 
2. Development of the Safeguards Approach and relevant State-specific 
Factors 
 
To meet the verification requirements with the available resources, the IAEA together with the EC 
designed an innovative safeguards approach. The approach is making full use of safeguards 
cooperation with the EC and Germany’s NPP operators to reduce the inspectors’ efforts, while fully 
adhering to IAEA safeguards policy and requirements. The following State-specific factors are 
essential for full utilisation of this approach: 
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a) A Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with an Additional Protocol (AP) should be in 
force in the State, and broader safeguards conclusion on the absence of undeclared material 
and activities should be drawn for this State by the IAEA 
b) Appropriate State-level Safeguards Approach, e.g. integrated safeguards approach, should be 
developed and implemented in the State 
c) Permanent surveillance measures should be applied to the spent fuel pond areas at relevant 
NPPs in the State 
d) Facility operator and the State/Regional authorities should agree to apply IAEA containment 
measures without presence of IAEA inspectors, in accordance with agreed procedure.  
 
The factors a) and b) allow for application of optimized safeguards measures, while factors c) and d) 
provide for substantial increase in efficiency gain of the approach.  
 
For Germany, the broader safeguards conclusion was drawn for the first time in 2008 and was 
reaffirmed every year since; integrated safeguards has been implemented since January 2010; 
permanent surveillance measures are applied to the spent fuel pond areas at all NPPs; and the facility 
operators of German NPPs and the EC are willing to support the IAEA by applying containment 
measures without presence of IAEA inspectors. Thus, in Germany, all relevant State-specific factors 
for implementation of safeguards measures outlined below are present, and the safeguards approach 
for verification of SF transfers is expected to meet the required verification activities without substantial 
increase in utilized resources. 
 
 
3. Safeguards Measures applied to SF Cask Loading Campaigns at NPPs in 
Germany 
 
After SF has been discharged from a reactor to a SF pond, it is jointly verified by IAEA and EC 
inspectors by item counting (100%) and for gross defect test with PIV0F1-level detection probability, 
normally by Cerenkov Viewing Device (ICVD). The SF is then cooled in the SF pond for at least 5 
years prior to its transfer to the dry storage. As the fuel assemblies at German NPPs are of the types 
that can be easily dismantled, a partial defect test is required to verify SF loading to SF cask, using the 
best available method approved for inspection use with random high (RH) detection probability. 
Currently, Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) and, if DCVD is not available or feasible, Fork 
Detector Irradiated Fuel Measuring System (FDET) are the best available NDA methods.  
 
Traditionally, verification of SF for partial defect is carried out for each SF cask separately. Between 
the time of SF verification and until placement of the SF cask in the dry storage, continuity of 
knowledge (CoK) is maintained on each SF cask by surveillance and later by containment measures, 
e.g. seals, applied by the inspectors after loading of every SF cask. This approach requires 
approximately 7 CDFs of IAEA inspectors’ efforts for each SF cask loading; therefore, it is not very 
efficient.  
 
For States with broader conclusion, where a State-level safeguards approach has been implemented, 
e.g. Germany, the IAEA policy is to allow for certain relaxation of timeliness requirements for 
verification of SF transfers, i.e. when SF has been previously verified to the required level and has 
remained under successful Containment/Surveillance (C/S) measures, verification of SF prior to its 
transfer to SF cask is not required.  
 
Based on this policy, the Agency and the EC have considered various conditions in the facilities in 
question in Germany and determined the optimal verification strategy for verification of SF transfers. 
Particularly for the shut-down NPPs where no incoming flow of SF is expected, the safeguards 
approach for verification of SF transfers to dry storage has been worked out as follows:  
 
a. Before the beginning of SF loading campaign the SF inventory in the reactor pond(s) is 
verified with the required detection probability for partial defect test by DCVD 
1 Physical Inventory Verification 
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b. During the SF loading campaign all SF in the reactor pond(s) is kept  under continuous 
surveillance, while the containment measures on SF casks, i.e. fibre-optic and electronic 
seals, and corresponding fibre-optic cables, are applied by the NPP operator in accordance 
with the agreed procedure 
c. After the SF loading campaign the SF left in the reactor pond(s) is again verified to the same 
requirements as before the campaign 
d. The containment measures applied by the operator on SF casks will be finally verified by both 
the Agency and EC inspectorates upon SF casks arrival at the receiving interim dry storage 
facility (verification for a group of casks). 
 
This approach allows for substantial efficiency gains during SF cask loading campaigns, as it requires 
only limited IAEA and EC inspector presence for verification of SF assemblies and sealing of casks; 
however, substantial efforts are expected for verification of SF pond(s) inventory by DCVD before and 
after the campaign. Training of the facility operator for application of containment measures should 
also be taken into account. Thus, application of the above safeguards measures during SF cask 
loading campaigns should be carried out on a case-by-case basis, considering the operational status 
of the reactor, number of SF casks involved in the campaigns, operator’s readiness to provide 
required information and apply containment measures. It is a further advantage of this approach that 
verification using DCVD and cask loading are decoupled in time, i.e. there is a certain flexibility 
regarding the timing of verification by DCVD. Sealing by operators also considerably reduces the need 
for coordination between the operator activities and inspection needs if compared with sealing by the 
inspectors. The approach thus results in added benefits for both inspectorates and the operator. 
 
 
4. Provision of Information by the NPP Operator 
 
For proper evaluation of surveillance measures, the NPP operator should provide the IAEA and EC 
with detailed information on the schedule of the entire SF cask loading campaign in advance, normally 
as soon as it is available. The information will include, inter alia: 
 
• the start and end date of the SF cask loading campaign(s) 
• the number of SF casks planned to be loaded during each campaign 
• the number of SF assemblies and pins to be loaded (total and cask by cask amounts) 
• the schedule of the loading of individual SF cask 
• cask/container ID and IDs of all SF assemblies to be loaded in the cask 
• presence and planned movement during the campaign of any other casks suitable for storing 
or transporting SF assemblies and pins in the area covered by surveillance 
• number of pins to be loaded in SF casks (this activity would take place after the loading of all 
fuel assemblies or when loading the last SF cask) 
• planned pin removal activities before and during the campaign. 
 
It is expected that the spent fuel assemblies will be loaded and shipped ahead of any fuel pins. Any 
change in the schedule should be communicated to the IAEA and EC as soon as information becomes 
known to the operator. 
 
 
5. Verification of Spent Fuel for Partial Defect using DCVD 
 
The DCVD is a tool for Cerenkov Light examination of spent nuclear fuel, with partial defect test 
capability, to the visual pin level. A quantitative measurement of the light emission by SF assembly is 
possible and can be linked to the operator declarations of initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time 
[1]. This quantitative measurement is a relative measurement; the evaluating software performs a 
consistency check on the Cerenkov light emission computing a normalization factor. For this reason it 
is mandatory that items that are compared to one another must have the same emission profile. 
Hence, it is necessary to receive detailed information from the NPP operator on the irradiation history, 
removed pins, fuel inserts, etc. for the whole SF inventory of a pond prior to verification. The 
verification with DCVD has three components: 
 
1. Qualitative verification for consistency with declaration on item type, fuel map position and 
for missing pins 
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2. Qualitative verification of Cerenkov light emission profile, to distinguish between irradiated 
fuel and non-irradiated items (dummies or fresh fuel) 
3. Quantitative verification of total Cerenkov light emitted against predictions. 
 
Two thresholds are applied for the quantitative verification for partial defect: 
 
1. A threshold of 30% represents a low intensity warning level and a threshold of - 30% 
represents a high intensity warning level 
2. A threshold of +/-50% represents a potential inconsistency with regards to the Partial Defect 
Test objective. 
 




Fig. 1. Evaluation of SF verification for partial defect using DCVD 
 
 
6. Application of Containment Measures by Facility Operator 
 
Containment measures (optical COBRA and electronic EOSS seals) on SF casks are applied by the 
NPP operator when both the IAEA and EC inspectors are not present. The attachment (or 
detachment) of seals as well as the recording of the containment application activities will be carried 
out by the Operator, without the presence of inspectors, using specially adapted standard IAEA/EC 
equipment while the continuity of knowledge will be maintained on the seals and the sealed nuclear 
material.  
 
Application of containment measures by operator requires special arrangements, equipment, and 
training for operator. In Germany, NPP operators require assurance on the correct application of 
COBRA and EOSS seals, for which purpose a special interface tool was developed by the EC for NPP 
operators to have assurance on successful EOSS attachment. The sealing reader system on Fig. 2 
was developed by Dr. Neumann Elektronik GmbH under a contract with the EC to allow the NPP 
operators to read, save and generate a printout with the status of EOSS closure. This tool facilitates 
the sealing by the German NPP operators by providing documentary evidence of the successful 
handling of the sealing operation. 
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The safeguards approach utilizing DCVD for verification of SF transfers and sealing by operators in 
Germany allows for substantial efficiency gains during SF cask loading campaigns, as it requires only 
limited IAEA and EC inspector presence for verification of SF assemblies and sealing of SF casks. 
 
However, the approach should be implemented at each reactor on a case-by-case basis, after taking 
into due account the operational status of the reactor, number of SF casks involved, and the 
operator’s readiness to provide required information and apply containment measures. Operators may 





The authors wish to acknowledge great contribution to DCVD verification of SF for partial defect test 




[1] CSSP Report 123, SKI Report 02:25, Development of a High Sensitivity Digital Cerenkov Viewing 
Device, 15 May 2002. 
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Abstract:  
Acquiring, processing and analysing information to confirm and verify declarations on mass or flow of 
nuclear material is an essential part of EURATOM safeguards. Unattended measurement systems 
and automated review platforms are installed at all larger nuclear facilities in Europe and at the 
EURATOM headquarters in Luxemburg. 
The information to be processed and analysed originates from a variety of sources and sensors 
acquiring data autonomously by EURATOM's standard data acquisition system RADAR (Remote 
Acquisition of Data and Review). Large amounts of data need to be analysed and compared with 
operator declarations by safeguards inspectors. To cope with this challenge, the use of adequate 
automated review tools is inevitable.  
The integrated Review and Analysis Package iRAP, the successor of CRISP (Central RADAR 
Inspection Support Package), is a modular software package developed by EURATOM. It has been 
used for years successfully by EURATOM inspectors and has been recently adopted by the IAEA as a 
future review tool. Under a licence agreement with the IAEA, iRAP will be developed jointly towards an 
"All-in-one review platform". 
Whilst the software package meets current requirements, it is essential to enhance the effectiveness 
of safeguards measures and the efficient use of existing resources. In addition, the construction of 
new facility types (geological repositories and encapsulation plants) in Sweden and Finland requires a 
careful adjustment of the existing solutions in order to prepare for future challenges and requirements. 
This paper describes ongoing projects, like the integration of operators’ branched and authenticated 
data into iRAP via EDAS, the Enhanced Data Authentication System developed by Sandia National 
Laboratory, and ongoing developments to automatize the verification of spent fuel measurements 
using a specifically packaged version of ORNLs ORIGEN code. A major challenge is the incorporation 
of video information into iRAP. A concurrent analysis of correlated video, seal and NDA data would be 
a significant improvement of the current review process. 
All modifications and enhancements of this complex software system are managed under a legal 
agreement with the IAEA. A framework based on inter-institutional relationships between research 
centres and safeguards authorities has been established. It prioritizes and assesses software 
requirements coming from multiple stakeholders with various perspectives. 
Keywords: unattended data acquisition; automated review; software development 
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1. Introduction
Unattended data acquisition and automated review have become an important part of modern nuclear 
safeguards. As a matter of fact, requirements on safeguards software have changed significantly in 
the last 10 years. Today nuclear material verifications at larger nuclear plants are highly dependent on 
automated measurements controlled and triggered by software modules without any human 
intervention.  
Whilst unattended data acquisition systems as deployed by EURATOM are more or less invisible to 
inspectors, completely different requirements are applied to review and analysis tools.  
The increasing number of unattended systems providing a great amount of information to inspectors 
and the need to optimize human resources in operational units have made it necessary to develop an 
automated data review platform which supports inspectors in their daily work. 
Even if safeguards software is developed for a very small, but technically skilled, user group 
(EURATOM employs 163 nuclear inspectors [1]), non-functional requirements are getting more and 
more important. Standards and expectations on software have changed along the years. In order to 
get a software package accepted by the end user, it is very important not only to focus on what the 
software does, but as well on how the software will do it. Complex mathematical operations and 
nuclear analysis methods need to be provided to the inspectors by intuitive and easy to use user-
interfaces.   
Another major aspect when developing safeguards applications is data security. Data security does 
not only involve the confidentiality of data. It must also include data authentication. It has to be 
guaranteed that data has not been modified during transmission or storage, and it needs to be 
assured to the receiver that data come from a valid sender.  
All new and ongoing developments need to take those additional specific requirements into account. 
Support in the field of new safeguards techniques and on the growing requirements on data security is 
provided by European and US research centres and consultants. Therefore, the number of 
contributing parties has increased significantly. This requires a careful project management in order to 
coordinate successfully contributions from various stakeholders. 
2. RADAR and iRAP, two software platforms developed by EURATOM
2.1.  Unattended Data Acquisition by RADAR 
The software package RADAR (Remote Acquisition of Data and Review) is a modular and 
standardized software platform for data acquisition from different sensors. The development of 
RADAR started in 1997 and it has been financed by the European Commission (EC) [2], [3]. 
RADAR is EURATOM's standard software for unattended measurements and has been successfully 
deployed in all large facilities in Europe. RADAR has replaced all other acquisition tools, like NEGUS, 
BUD and NOVIS [4] which had been tailored for facility specific needs. 
RADAR was originally developed as a resident system for large facilities [2]. In facilities like Sellafield 
RADAR operates more than 100 sensors. In total, RADAR controls several hundred sensors which 
continuously monitor nuclear operations in European facilities. 
Furthermore, a portable system was developed which indicates visually state of health information of 
system components (Fig. 1). This system was designed to support spent fuel (Castor) loading 
campaigns. The data acquisition hardware (SMC2100 [5] and the PC are in a sealable, portable box 
with a transparent front panel.  In order to visualize state of health information of certain system 
components, a special data acquisition module was developed and integrated into the RADAR 
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system, the so called Alarm-Agent. This module checks the system permanently and turns on red or 
green status lights indicating operability of all relevant system components. In combination with other 
sensors ensuring continuity of knowledge, the permanent presence of an inspector during a spent fuel 
loading campaign is no longer required. 
Fig 1: A portable Fork measurement system 
indicating State of Health information: Two 
modules are active under RADAR. One module 
controls the Fork measurement electronics; the 
other indicates status of system components. 
2.2. Data evaluation by iRAP 
The development of iRAP, the successor of CRISP (Central RADAR Inspection Support Package), 
started in 2001 and was based on principles of modularity and standardization openness to 3rd party 
suppliers [3]. 
iRAP was designed to be a software package with several tools to configure or to access a database 
system for a full data analysis. The database contains all the necessary information to perform an 
automated data analysis. It accepts plant information and operator declarations on material moves 
and item contents including the timing. Furthermore, the database contains a number of algorithms to 
extract information (events) out of RADAR produced raw data files and process these events. A 
considerable number of evaluation algorithms are already integrated into the iRAP system. They are 
the core of iRAP and can be either in-house developed (e.g. Pu Mass Calculation, Flow verification 
[6]) or integrated as a third party development into the system (MGA [7], INCC [8], ORELLA/ORIGEN 
[9], [10]). 
Once iRAP is configured it can perform an automated analysis for each selected system. This process 
can be described as a sequence of predefined tasks in separated evaluation layers (Fig. 2). Each 
layer uses special algorithms to perform the requested operation. In the first step iRAP reads data 
from a number of selected sensors; these sensors are combined to a measurement system.  A typical 
system could be a combined measurement station for Gamma, Neutron and ID reading in order to 
perform an automated Pu mass calculation. Measured data originate from corresponding RADAR 
modules. These modules control all necessary electronics like multichannel analysers, shift registers 
and ID readers. 
Subsequently corresponding events at a selected measurement system are correlated and evaluated 
by using preconfigured algorithms like MGA or PuCalc Mass to calculate the isotopic composition and 
the mass of Pu. In a final step the result is compared to the operator’s declaration. 
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Fig. 2: The iRAP data flow outline for a Pu 
mass calculation 
In Evaluation Level 1 "Event Detection” iRAP 
accesses the raw data. Adjustable event 
detection algorithms extract the relevant 
information out of the data. A typical event 
can be for instance the mean value of a 
neutron measurement plateau, an ID or 
balance reading. 
Evaluation Level 2 "Event Correlation" will 
correlate corresponding events (e.g. neutron 
plateau, gamma spectrum and ID reading) to 
a single correlated event and will then 
evaluate this newly created event by using 
algorithms to calculate for instance mass 
and isotopic composition.  
Verification of the results is done in 
Evaluation Level 3 "Event Verification" by 
comparing the result with imported 
operator‘s declarations 
3. What are the requirements for future iRAP and RADAR developments?
Even if both software packages meet current requirements, it will be inevitable to consider major 
changes or a complete re-engineering of certain modules in the near future. The RADAR framework is 
based on principles defined in 1997. The development of CRISP, the predecessor of iRAP, started in 
2001. A sustainable software management requires at a certain time a complete status review in order 
to identify potential deficits and to react in due time. 
Safeguards software is used by a small number of users, nuclear inspectors and safeguards 
technicians working either in field or at the HQ. A nuclear measurement is a highly complex process. A 
measurement system contains many different components and needs to be installed, configured and 
maintained, often under harsh conditions and time constraints, in a nuclear facility. 
The analysis of nuclear data acquired by those systems requires a broad understanding of safeguards 
principles and nuclear physics.   
In order to use human resources efficiently, safeguards inspectors need to be trained quickly on tools 
and techniques provided to them; this includes of course training on software tools as well. For this 
reason new developments in the field of safeguards software need to focus much more on: 
• Usability of software: For the time being RADAR controls about 20 different sensor types, all
with characteristic configuration parameters. iRAP uses a number of sophisticated algorithms
in order to detect and evaluate measurement events automatically. Even if configuration
interfaces are standardized, look and feel principles are applied to the design, it requires a
sound knowledge of measurement electronics, detectors and evaluation algorithms to
configure a reliable and stable data acquisition system and a corresponding review platform.
In order to enhance the usability of a system, simple dialogues are required. The majority of
the users should be able to complete typical tasks without requiring assistance. The use of
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installation and configuration wizards may support the user. Interactive user interfaces with 
precise and constructive on-screen help and documentation would help to achieve the aim.  
• Maintainability of the software: As a matter of fact, data acquisition systems and review
platforms are usually installed at nuclear facilities at remote places. In order to minimize travel
of technical support teams and/or to optimize a planned technical intervention, a software
system needs to be maintainable to a high degree via remote connections (if available). Back-
up procedures after catastrophic failures need to be achievable remotely.
• Data protection is a major challenge for all stakeholders, i.e. the safeguards authorities, the
nuclear operator and national authorities, especially when using remote data transmission.
Data is provided either by independent safeguards measurement systems or by branched
sensors provided by the facility operator. In both scenarios it needs to be assured that data is
protected. Data encryption provides only authorized parties with the possibility to read, whilst
data authentication reduces the risk that data has been tampered with during a transfer, and it
also verifies that data comes from an expected sender.
In order to meet these requirements, EURATOM has started a number of initiatives to address 
upcoming needs. 
4. Joint development of iRAP by the IAEA and EURATOM
The IAEA was seeking an IT tool for an automated analysis of safeguards inspection data. After 
closely evaluating the CRISP code, they concluded that CRISP provided a good basis and already 
had a good part of the features which the IAEA had identified as needs. Consequently, the IAEA 
offered EURATOM the possibility to jointly develop the software for common use by safeguards 
inspectors of both organisations. The joint development of the Central RADAR Inspection Support 
Package (CRISP), later re-named to iRAP, by EURATOM and the IAEA can be described as a typical 
model for sharing development effort, resources and the resulting source code. Nevertheless, two 
main questions had to be answered in advance: "Who owns what?" and "Who does what?" 
The first question addresses the ownership of intellectual property (IP) rights.  If this is not examined in 
advance, there may be a potential problem for an organisation not obtaining all necessary intellectual 
property rights for modifying or further developing a product. If a nuclear safeguards authority like 
IAEA or EURATOM does not obtain the necessary intellectual property rights to adapt a certain 
product to specific needs, the results can be disastrous and range from loss of certain functionalities to 
a complete uselessness of the product. This led to the conclusion that a licence agreement was 
needed to assess licensing issues. 
CRISP/iRAP has been solely owned by the European Commission (EC). Therefore, it was possible to 
allocate development and IP rights to the IAEA. The IAEA, as a new end-user, is now an active 
participant in the software development process of iRAP and will share ownership of newly created 
intellectual property. IAEA specific tasks are carried out by contractors selected and financed by the 
IAEA. 
Finally, a licence agreement, negotiated between the EC department for intellectual property and 
technology transfer and the IAEA office of legal affairs (OLA) was signed in October 2013 [11]. This 
legally binding agreement was necessary as all stakeholders needed to understand who owns the IP 
for a jointly developed safeguards software package and whether the packages can be shared with 
3rd parties. 
The second question ("Who does what") addresses the use of financial and human resources and was 
described in the "All-in-One Software Configuration Plan" agreed by both parties. It clearly defines the 
processes by which the software tool is modified, enhanced and maintained by the two organisations 
and any third-party developers and how a new product should be developed by one party or jointly by 
both parties. Nevertheless, this plan describes the general framework of the partnership. Specific 
projects, jointly or individually developed, need to be decided on a case by case basis. 
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For this reason the joint development of iRAP is coordinated and supervised by a Change Control 
Board (CCB) of IAEA and DG ENER experts. The CCB meets regularly in order to bring developers, 
users and technicians together in the very early phase of a development cycle, to define the scope 
and requirements of projects, to avoid potential conflicts among different user groups and to review 
new releases. This enhances communication and relations between inspectors and technical 
personnel of both organisations. 
The modularity of the iRAP software package offered quickly and with minimal financial effort the 
possibility to easily modify and adapt the existing package to IAEA data formats. iRAP is now able to 
read and display all kind of data types from various IAEA specific data sources. In addition, a 
configuration wizard was developed which supports users in the set-up of simple analysis scenarios.  
Further developments cover the integration of analysis algorithms for the VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor 
(VIFM) for Bundle Counters and Core Discharge Monitors (CDMs) [12]. Those systems are widely 
deployed by the IAEA and are used at CANDU reactor sites to detect and automate the accounting of 
spent fuel transfers. VIFM is jointly used by both organisations in Romania (NPPs at Cernavoda). 
Projects of common interest have been identified and will be launched soon. First activities will cover 
enhancements of the iRAP core and the enhancements of the user interface, which needs to be 
adapted to current user expectations. A new user interface needs to be highly interactive; it should 
allow for manual marking of events and on-screen writing of notes and remarks. 
The integration of the widely used INCC [8] software into iRAP as an external algorithm will allow 
users to apply all INCC core functionalities within the iRAP framework. For this reason the existing 
version of INCC needs to be upgraded in order to be compliant to iRAP requirements on external 
algorithms. Necessary changes will be done by LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) staff. This 
work is coordinated by the IAEA.  
A milestone of upcoming joint developments will be the integration of video information into iRAP and 
correlation of images with NDA events. A careful preparation of this step towards an All-in-One 
Review Platform is inevitable as this will extend the range of functions significantly. A concurrent 
analysis of NDA, seal and image data is envisaged; correlation of events either coming from sensors 
or cameras should be possible. Both organisations are drafting their user requirements and 
development work is planned to start before the end of 2015.      
5. US-DOE/EURATOM cooperation:
Under the US-DOE EURATOM Agreements on nuclear safeguards and security, first concluded in 
1995 and revised 2010 [13], a number of Action Sheets have been launched which directly address 
certain needs, for instance in the field of usability improvements or data protection.  
5.1.  Automated burn-up calculation - iRAP meets SCALE 
iRAP has been developed in a way that it is easily adaptable to facility specific needs without any 
major effort or development necessary. In a recent development, functionalities of the SCALE [9, 10] 
package can be called by iRAP using the newly-developed ORELLA module to allow automated 
evaluation of Fork measurement campaigns. ORELLA takes basic information on the assembly design 
and declared operating history from operator declarations imported into iRAP, creates input files for 
the ORIGEN code, executes that code, and returns the expected Fork detector signals.  
This is a significant improvement of the usability of the ORIGEN code and the iRAP package, as 
inspectors are not required anymore to transfer measurement data into spreadsheets or perform 
consistency checks manually.  
In the next development step it is planned to automate the complete evaluation process and transfer 
the result to the operator. This new method to be developed and integrated into iRAP would allow 
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performing loading campaigns in absence of safeguards inspectors but with the assurance that spent 
fuel is verified.  
Final storage projects envisage conditioning of spent fuel in an encapsulation plant - the fuel will be 
encapsulated in copper canisters to be disposed in a final repository. Most advanced are Finland [14] 
and Sweden which target start of operations for the 2020s. In other EU countries packaging of spent 
fuel in casks for interim storage is continuing at growing rates. Both situations present a considerable 
challenge to the safeguards authorities. 
Implementation of EURATOM and IAEA safeguards are expected to require all assemblies to be 
verified [15]. Inconsistencies will need to be communicated to the operator instantly to interrupt the 
loading process before a container is closed and moved to the repository. Consequently, the 
measurements and their evaluation need to be fully unattended and automated. This automation can 
now be implemented by a combination of ORNL's ORIGEN code (Oak Ridge Isotope GENeration) [9] 
and the IAEA/EURATOM package iRAP. 
In combination with the EURATOM system for unattended Fork measurements, this approach will 
allow the design of a completely autonomous spent fuel verification station [16]. The system could be 
an integral part of a comprehensive IAEA/EURATOM safeguards verification scheme; it could be 
linked to the safeguards HQs and indicate any inconsistencies to the operator autonomously. Before 
the operation of the encapsulation facilities, important parts of the system can be applied immediately 
to current spent fuel cask loading operations for intermediate storages. 
5.2. Data security - EURATOM coordinates field test for EDAS 
The Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS) is a technical concept to securely “branch” 
measurement data from operator-owned equipment while assuring the integrity of the operator’s 
communication link. While safeguards normally depend on measurements that are completely 
independent from operator measurements, certain situations may call for the sharing of information 
from facility systems for both operations and verification purposes. Nevertheless, the inspector must 
be confident that this branched information is a secure, true and complete duplication of the operator’s 
device. At the same time, an operator must have the assurance that the branching does not modify or 
interrupt his measurements.   
The EDAS project is a joint collaboration between the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy (EURATOM), the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), the U.S. Department of 
Energy, and Sandia National Laboratories.  
An EDAS field test was launched at the Westinghouse fuel-fabrication plant at Springfields in the 
United Kingdom early 2015 [17].  Two EDAS units were installed at the entry point of the Oxide Fuel 
Complex. Those units are connected to the operator’s weighing and identification system. Information 
on weight and ID of incoming and outgoing UF6 cylinders is branched, encrypted, signed and 
transferred to a data acquisition station either via USB or Ethernet.  
Once connected, EDAS is capturing the complete data stream. All data packages, either sent to the 
device or transmitted from the device, are stored in a single file. Therefore, EURATOM developed a 
RADAR component based on existing modules to filter those data packages, write them to individual 
files compatible to iRAP and indicate their encryption and authentication status. 
The result of the field test will prove if EDAS is able to meet inspector and operator requirements.  
EDAS may also have additional valuable applications, not for branching but for inspector's equipment. 
Successful laboratory tests have already shown that the concept of encrypting and signing data in real 
time by attaching an EDAS system, as close as possible to the signal output of the measurement 
electronics, has a lot of potential for further use in the field of safeguards measurements and 
instrumentation. Fig.3 shows a system set-up as it could be used for spent fuel verification. The Fork 
electronics, a SMC 2100 [5] is directly connected to EDAS and provides by that way two separated 
outputs, an original data stream and a branched stream, encrypted and authenticated. 
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This set-up allows even remote configuration of the electronics as EDAS does not interrupt or modify 
the communication between control software and electronics.  
Fig. 3: EDAS connected to measurement electronics for spent fuel measurements. 
6. Summary
Nuclear safeguards organisations, regardless if international or regional, depend on the provision of 
specific IT tools and software tailored to the needs of nuclear inspectors allowing them to analyse and 
review nuclear data in a reliable and efficient manner. As a matter of fact, commercial off-the-shelf 
software for nuclear safeguards purposes hardly exists. Analysis and evaluation tools are mostly 
provided by some manufacturers of measurement electronics or research centres. Most of these 
products are not developed for operating conditions in nuclear facilities. Furthermore, maintenance of 
such products is either problematic or time consuming due to missing IP rights.  
EURATOM decided already in the late 1990's to avoid these problems by starting an in-house 
development for a data acquisition system (RADAR) and some years later a corresponding review 
platform (CRISP/iRAP). In recent years, EURATOM started a number of initiatives to improve 
cooperation between stakeholders. EURATOM shares all IP rights on iRAP with the IAEA.  A joint 
licence agreement allows now both organisations to develop new features and tools with individual 
software developers according to each organisation’s specific needs, but as well to share resources 
for common needs. The benefits for both organisations are obvious; as the IAEA now holds all 
necessary IP rights, they can start developments on the basis of an approved and recognised 
software package. In addition, EURATOM has gained a lot of experience in the use of iRAP in 
automated Pu handling facilities. The IAEA will boost the development with new ideas and 
approaches. Common needs like the integration of INCC or video review are expected to become less 
expensive as costs will be shared. 
In addition, a number of Action Sheets with the US DOE have provided valuable scientific input to the 
software. A combined use of software packages iRAP and SCALE, provided by Oak Ridge National 
laboratory, allows user friendly automated consistency checks of declarations on spent fuel. A 
possible use at the future encapsulation plants in Sweden and Finland and CASTOR loading 
campaigns is envisaged. 
The important aspect of data encryption and authentication as close as possible at the signal source is 
taken into account in the EDAS project of SANDIA National Laboratories. 
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Abstract:
With the implementation of an Integrated Management System (IMS) within EURATOM issues like
coherence of inspection approaches, data quality, traceability, and the evaluation of inspection data
become more essential than ever. In combination with ever shrinking resources and the increased
complexity of plants in the nuclear fuel cycle there is no other way than to rely on software to help
inspectors carrying out their verifications in a comprehensive, harmonised and least time consuming
but still fully documented way.
Some years ago EURATOM started to develop the VARO software package (Verification of
Accountancy Records of Operators) to support their inspectors with the evaluation of accountancy
declarations received from the nuclear operators at HQ against on-site accountancy records,
operational data and verification results. The VARO application aims to make safeguards conformity
assessment activities coherent without limiting inspectors in their inspection scope. A generic
application, centrally managed at HQ, reduces the resources needed for development, maintenance
and training, thus leading together with the central data storage to a more consistent evaluation of
safeguards data.
The application is part of the standard inspection software package used by EURATOM inspectors,
which is available in a so called Mobile Kit, thus allowing inspectors to work almost seamlessly while
being on site and allowing them to synchronise their inspection results upon return to HQ. The
centralisation of inspection data allows for a direct comparison of their performance regarding
safeguards between installations and helps focussing inspection resources.
With the IMS aiming for an ISO 17020 compliant inspection management system based on inspection
documentation, preparation, execution and recording, VARO is the choice that ensures EURATOM
management and inspectors to have the necessary tools at hand for their inspection co-ordination and
work, like central criteria setting, seamless workflow between HQ and installation. The central
inspection data management and documentation at HQ allows for direct comparison of safeguards
activities and detailed statistical evaluations of their results as required by the IMS.
Keywords: software; inspection; standardisation; management; quality
1. Introduction
The EURATOM Treaty is law in the European Union (EU) and implemented by the European
Commission (EC). One of the major challenges for the EC over the next years will be to find the right
balance between available resources, in particular personnel, on the one hand and credible
safeguards verification schemes on the other. A number of industrial operations will generate extra
workload, such as the defueling of nuclear power reactors because of the decision in some Member
States (MS) to phase out nuclear power, the production and export of large numbers of nuclear fuel
elements for overseas markets, the consolidation of strategic material in the UK, as well as the
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construction of encapsulation plants and final repositories in Finland, Sweden, France, Spain and
elsewhere.
Despite the increasing workload and the challenging staff reduction targets of the EC, EURATOM
Safeguards is aiming to maintain and where possible increase its effectiveness. The introduction of an
Integrated Management System (IMS) supplementing the procedures of the Directorate-General and
the Internal Control Standards (ICS) of the European Commission is a way to cope with the additional
challenges. The IMS is based on ISO standards for quality management and conformity assessment
and compliance of the directorate's internal processes with the ICS of the European Commission.
In this context it is essential to ensure that the right safeguards tools are available to support the IMS
concept and to cope with reducing resources at a time when the complexity of the safeguarded
facilities, the amount of nuclear material under control, and verification activities continue to grow
steadily.
2. Development of standardised software tools
The use of standardised software tools is one way to save resources in several aspects, such as
development, harmonisation, training, documentation, etc., to apply coherent verification standards at
all installations under EURATOM Safeguards, to evaluate data provided by the operators in a
consistent way, to have fully documented and recorded inspection results, and to support the
EURATOM Safeguards Directorate in drawing its safeguards conclusions.
All nuclear operators in the European Union are required to maintain a system of accountancy and
control for nuclear materials in their possession. According to EURATOM Regulation 302/2005, these
systems shall include accounting and operating records with information on quantities, category, form,
composition and location of these materials, together with information on recipients or shippers, when
nuclear materials are transferred. Accounting and operating records shall be made available to the
inspectors in electronic form if they are kept in this form by the installation. The amount of these data
might be limited for small installations and by consequence the related safeguards verifications could
be done manually. However, this has proven to be very resource demanding or even impossible in
bigger or more complex installations. It is therefore essential to provide inspectors with efficient
software tools to allow them to carry out their verifications in an efficient and coherent manner.
Almost immediately when computing power became more widely available, nuclear safeguards
inspectors started to use it. The new technology was deployed to evaluate nuclear accountancy
declarations and related operational records. From simple spreadsheet type evaluations these
developments evolved in a number of cases into very specific and complex applications that became
essential for the successful execution of inspections. However, the constant development of the
hardware and software platforms, combined with staff mobility and the constant evolution of nuclear
installations, have made it very difficult to maintain a large number of individual installation-specific
applications, to keep them in working order and adapted to the inspection needs. Apart from the
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difficult maintenance and long-term development, these different applications created a constant need
for inspectors training. When being on inspection, inspectors are facing all sorts of different tasks and
the use of different software applications at the installations for similar tasks is a further complicating
factor that needs to be avoided whenever possible.
In addition to these issues, the statutory reporting format was changed from 80 character lines to XML
records with EURATOM Regulation 302/2005 coming into force, thus making most of the existing
installation specific applications obsolete due to the incompatibility of the input format of at least parts
of the data.
The EURATOM VARO software project addresses these aspects. It provides a common verification
tool for safeguards data that the inspectors can use at a broad range of installation types. During
inspections as well as at headquarters it helps inspectors to verify that declarations and accountancy
records correspond, and whether these are supported by operational records. The evaluation of
conformity assessment activity results falls also under the scope of VARO.
3. EURATOM Safeguards IT concept for inspection data
EURATOM Safeguards uses database systems at their Luxembourg headquarters to process, store
and evaluate the declarations that nuclear operators are required to send according to Regulation
302/2005 for most of the installations on a monthly basis. These declarations are first checked for
compatibility with the required reporting format, checked for internal consistency, and then loaded into
the accountancy database. The declarations are then checked against the reporting rules of the
Regulation and facility specific criteria stored in a database called Rulebook. For installations under
IAEA safeguards, these declarations are also translated into the IAEA format and subsequently
forwarded to the IAEA.
Nuclear safeguards inspectors carry out onsite inspection activities to verify the completeness and
correctness of these declarations by comparing them with the physical reality at the installations.
Nuclear operators transmit on a monthly basis declarations about the flows of nuclear material in and
out of Material Balance Areas (MBA). This declaration is called the Inventory Change Report (ICR).
The deadline for the transmission of the ICR of a given month to EURATOM is the fifteenth of the
following month, thus creating a gap of at least two weeks between the accountancy data available on
site and the accountancy declaration available in the EURATOM HQ. This gap has to be updated by
the inspectors onsite.
When preparing for their onsite inspection activities, the inspectors download the relevant declarations
sent by the operators, from the HQ accountancy database system (CMF) for the relevant Material
Balance Areas (MBA) together with other relevant data like the seals applied in the installation,
installation related documentation, procedures etc. into a so called "Mobile Kit" for their onsite
inspection activities.
On arrival at the installations the HQ data are complemented with accountancy records kept by the
operator to update the declarations to the day before the start of the inspection. This accountancy
update is straightforward if the operator is prepared to provide the required inventory change data in
the XML format of the EURATOM Regulation 302/2005. In some installations the accountancy
systems do not allow interim ICRs without creating the monthly file for EURATOM, thus creating a new
report number. To avoid any issues with the report numbering all operators are asked to implement a
functionality to produce an interim report without an increment of the report number. However, many
operators at reactors and smaller facilities, who only declare a few lines per month, do not have their
own accountancy system and use the ENMAS (EURATOM Nuclear Material Accountancy System)
application to prepare their monthly declarations. Since the accountancy systems in these installations
are often paper based or use incompatible data systems, there is no other way for the inspectors than
to transcribe these data into the required XML format using the ENMAS application. During onsite
inspection activities this can be relatively time-consuming and some inspectors prefer to do this upon
return in HQ. When loaded, these local accountancy records are checked for consistency and
compliance with the reporting requirements to allow the inspectors to establish an updated book stock.
Then, they are compared with operating records for consistency.
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Depending on the size and variation of the inventory, physical verifications are carried out based on
stratification by splitting the inventory into the different material categories, e.g. Plutonium, high and
low enriched, natural and depleted Uranium and further sub-strata depending on the verification
methods used. Established sampling plans are used to calculate sample sizes and to select items out
of the different strata to be chosen for physical verification activities.
The data loading routines use mapping files to translate the operating records and verification data
into the standardised internal database format. A powerful, easy to use, query engine has been
developed to display and compare the different data sources in a coherent and common, but also user
defined way. Several output functions allow the inspectors to view and export data in different formats
for reporting and further evaluation.
The "Mobile Kit" concept enables the inspectors to work seamlessly while being on site. The uploading
of data into the HQ database on their return allows for a full data trail from nuclear materials
declarations through accountancy and operating records to verification measurement results.
These functionalities described above are an important step forward regarding the requirements of
ISO 17020 for standardisation of sampling and inspection techniques, including the traceability and
recording of inspection results, thus an important element of the IMS of EURATOM.
To be compatible with other EURATOM software projects, the VARO application is designed using
web technology with an underlying Oracle database system, which is running either on a HQ server or
as a mobile version using a so called Mobile Management System (MMS) on the inspector's PC. The
MMS is used to create so called Mobile Kits containing the required safeguards applications and the
relevant data for the specific on site activities. These "Mobile Kits" are either copied onto encrypted
storage devices for transfer to and use on onsite PCs or directly deployed on the inspectors'
notebooks with encrypted hard drives. Inspectors therefore always leave HQ with the latest software
versions and data, which are synchronised with HQ, in a secured way as required for sensitive
safeguards data.
The look and feel of the mobile version of VARO is exactly the same as with the HQ version. With the
development of the MMS it is now possible to control the software development centrally, thus
ensuring that the infield version is fully compatible with HQ, that there are no conflicts with software
versions and that data are handled in a coherent way both in HQ and on inspections. This is resulting
in a significant reduction of necessary, resource demanding software maintenance at the sites.
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4. VARO Project Phases
Phase 1 of the project was focused on the accountancy declaration checks. This part of the
application is needed at all installations and addresses the most urgent requirements of the
inspectors. Phase 2 of the project is focused on the loading and evaluation of operating records and
their comparison with the accountancy. Phase 3 addresses the stratification, sampling and
comparison of verification activities with the operating records and is in development. Additional
phases are foreseen for the material balance evaluation, batch operation of commands, automatic
routines to interface with instruments, and the creation of a HQ data repository allowing data
warehouse functionalities together with the other HQ applications.
Similar to other large and complex software projects running over a longer period of time, it is difficult
to define all functionalities in sufficient detail at the conception phase to allow for a writing of the full
specification. Since the VARO development team is relatively small in relation to the size of the
project, this stepwise approach was chosen, splitting the project in different phases. The definition of
these phases was mainly based on the functionalities in question. Since the loading and verification of
accountancy data is the most generic of the functions required, the project was started with a tool for
the loading and checking of these data. This function is used in all facility types and was after the
change of the reporting format the one in most urgent need. Subsequent project phases incorporate
the treatment of operating and measurement data, statistical evaluations and the central storage of
inspection related data for reference. However, since some of the functionalities needed in these
phases are common, the start-up development effort was significant. The development of the Mobile
Management System (MMS) was a significant step to allow the inspectors using safeguards
applications while being away from HQ. This also required a relatively high upfront investment. Also
the storage and sharing of user defined queries were brought forward to avoid a repeated loss of
definition work done by the users, which could have caused an acceptance problem.
The development is done in iterations, with four versions managed in parallel. The developers are
working on version N, while version N-1 is being tested by professional software engineers, while
version N-2 is in user acceptance testing (UAT) and version N-3 is operational. At the moment
iteration 33 is operational. This sequence is ensuring a close feedback cycle for the development team
and allows the analyst to define the way forward in close cooperation with the project committee,
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
320
which consists of representatives of all units of the safeguards directorate. Whereas the project
committee meets at different intervals to discuss strategic issues and to review functionalities, a
smaller team meets at shorter intervals for status meetings to review user comments and more
imminent development issues.
A user feedback function "Problems? Questions? Remarks?" at the bottom of the application interface
allows users to send messages to the applications helpdesk at any time by e-mail. Attachments can
be used to explain the issue using screenshots or other documents and with the e-mail a list of the last
commands used is sent to allow the development team to establish the operational background for the
comments. All user comments and bug reports are followed up in a database, thus allowing the project
team to prioritise and monitor progress. This development environment is ensuring a short iteration
cycle and clear guidance for the development team.
5. Mobile Kit
All new EURATOM safeguards applications are now based on web interfaces, using Oracle
databases. With the start of the development of VARO it was decided to develop a mobile working
environment for essential safeguards applications to run on, called "Mobile Kit". Besides VARO,
applications for seal management (ESAM) and reporting (IMIS) have or will have mobile versions, thus
allowing the inspectors to use their HQ tools when being out of the office. This system ensures that
the actual software versions are only kept and maintained at HQ, thus reducing drastically the need for
onsite software maintenance.
Since the sensitivity of safeguards data does not allow to use fully web based applications, these
mobile versions work within an inspection context and are run either on the inspectors' notebooks,
which have encrypted hard drives and are security cleared to be used for the storage, treatment and
transfer of sensitive data or on local PCs in the on-site safeguards offices.
Before leaving HQ for an inspection the inspectors define the content of their specific Mobile Kits by
selecting the required applications, the inspections to be covered, and the data to be copied from the
HQ systems. Once the selections are made, the Mobile Kit is prepared as a self-extracting jar-file
serving as a data container. These files are password protected and are either copied to the encrypted
hard drives of the inspectors' notebooks or any other approved storage medium for sensitive
safeguards data, like encrypted USB sticks with biometric (fingerprint) user identification. These jar-
files can be deployed directly on the inspectors' notebooks or at big installations, with safeguards IT
infrastructure, on a server, thus allowing multi user access. In this respect the web based applications
are versatile as they are multi-user capable by design, thus allowing inspectors to work in teams with
them in a networked environment.
At the end of the inspection activities the preparation of inspection outcome kits is necessary for the
return of safeguards and verification data to HQ. The inspectors have the option to delete some of the
data fields in the outcome kit, like the location in inventory listings, to address security concerns in
some Member States. This outcome kit is used to upload the inspection data to the HQ database. It is
to be noted that there is no backward synchronisation of accountancy data with HQ, but all data are
stored in the inspection context of VARO for later reference.
6. Accountancy data
One of the first activities at the start of an inspection is to check whether inventory changes have
happened since the last declaration was sent to HQ in order to establish the book inventory at the start
of the onsite inspection activities. To do so, the operator is asked to provide an update of the inventory
change reports (ICR) to the day before the inspection starts. These ICRs are loaded into VARO,
checked for syntax, consistency and errors, and can be merged with the HQ data to establish the
running totals of the declarations received.
It is essential that inspectors use coherent verification rules when loading accountancy data. VARO
uses the same rules as the HQ application (CMF). So there is only one reference used for verifications
and the inspectors are sure that they are using the correct, up to date syntax for these checks as used
in HQ and by the accountancy unit in charge of the nuclear materials declaration checks at HQ.
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After loading of the accountancy declarations, errors and warnings can be checked and the inspectors
have the option to compare and combine HQ and onsite declarations. Different browse and filter
options allow adapting the views on the data and help the inspectors with consistency and coherence
checks. Since the application is based on a query editor, predefined queries can be created at HQ by
experienced inspectors being in charge of the installation, thus sharing the knowledge and allowing for
specific checks that are adapted to the plants. All queries can be saved and selected to be shared
amongst the inspectors.
7. Operating records
The consistency of accountancy and operating records is one of the essential checks that inspectors
carry out during the onsite inspection activities. Operating records are very plant specific and their
detail and structure depends on the plant type, operational concept and size, but also on the
inspection activities to be performed and reporting requirements for the operators as laid down for
example in the Particular Safeguards Provisions (PSP) foreseen in the EURATOM Regulation and the
Facility Attachments (FA) foreseen in the safeguards agreements, e.g. INFCIRC 193, for installations
under IAEA safeguards.
Whereas in small installations the nuclear material tracking by the operator's is done mainly manually
using paper documentation, more complex installations with higher throughputs use IT systems that
allow for online tracking of material flows and quantities in the different areas. This serves many
purposes, like process and criticality control, quality assurance, product documentation and is also
important for nuclear material accountancy and control. Plants using fully integrated material tracking
systems normally have a very good documentation of their operations and are able to provide this
information in electronic format. However, also smaller installations use mostly electronic tools to keep
their records up to date and these data are often in the form of spreadsheets or databases, which can
relatively easily be converted into a format suitable for evaluation by software tools. Mapping files are
used to relate the different formats of operating data to the internal data structure of VARO. This is
another area where the use of common software tools is of help to get to more coherent data
structures. New installations providing operational data in electronic formats can use already existing
data formats for which mapping files already exist.
Operating records are needed for flow and inventory verifications. Depending on the inspection
context the required data are different. For inventory verifications the operating records consist of
inventory listings and related documentation. Flow verifications are normally based on documentation
related to material movements, like shipments in automated plants, where containers or fuel
assemblies pass through unattended measurement stations, solvent flows in reprocessing plants,
weighing data in bulk handling facilities etc. and these results are compared with the flow information.
8. Measurement data
Physical verifications are the essential part of inspection activities. After the accountancy records have
been verified against operating records, these are used to divide the nuclear material into different
more homogeneous strata depending on the material type, category, quantity, location and available
instrumentation for safeguards verifications. Depending on the inspection type, the List of Inventory
Items (LII), store inventory listings or movements at strategic points of the plant are used to select
items for measurements.
The number of items to be selected for verifications is calculated either by using the Jaech sampling
algorithm, depending on the required detection probability, the number of items, the goal quantity and
the average nuclear material quantity of the strata or using predefined percentages / fixed numbers,
like 10% or 5 items out of a stratum. These requirements are part of a Material Balance Area (MBA)
specific set up, which is pre-defined by the facility officer at HQ, thus ensuring that all inspectors use
the same criteria when carrying out their physical verifications. These requirements are stored in
installation specific operational setup data and queries, which are part of the mobile version of VARO
that travels with the inspectors in the Mobile Kits.
In the stratum setup the facility officer also defines the verification methods, instruments to be used
and the data to be recorded, if manual measurements are carried out by the inspectors.
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Once the item selection is done, the inspectors prepare their paper print-outs of working papers for
use in the plant. These working papers provide information specific to the verifications to be done, like
area listings for tag checks sorted by location or measurement data sheets for specific instruments.
There is also the option to use electronic spreadsheets as an output for the working papers that can
be filled in by the different inspection teams whilst carrying out their verifications.
After having carried out the physical verifications the inspectors have to enter the measurement data
into the application. This can be done either by manual transcription from the working papers, by re-
importing the electronic spreadsheets, or by importing instrument specific data files. The measurement
data are linked with the operating data using item IDs or time related information.
Some of the mobile instruments in use have an internal memory for measurement results that can be
exported as instrument data files. Specific mapping files will be used to import these data and feed
them into the VARO application for evaluation and comparison. The use of these routines is essential
to avoid transcription errors, gain traceability, archiving of data and to save inspection resources.
For unattended measurement systems EURATOM uses its own Remote Acquisition of Data and
Review (RADAR) software, which allows for remote control of and data gathering from unattended
instruments. So called DAMs (Data Acquisition Modules) are used as interfaces for the different
instruments, like ID readers, Neutron Coincident Counters (NCC), High Resolution Gamma Systems
(HRGS), transducers etc. The recorded data of the DAMs are collected on local PCs and at bigger
installations are automatically copied to central servers in the inspectors' offices. EURATOM’s 
evaluation software CRISP is moving to its next generation under the name of  integrated Review &
Analysis Package (iRAP). iRAP is now a common software project with the IAEA, evaluates the
recorded data and detects safeguards relevant events based on triggering devices like limit switches,
ID readers or signal patterns, like weighing processes or level readings of vessels being filled or
emptied. If more than one signal is used for the event definition, like neutron and gamma
measurements with an ID reader or level and density measurements for tank transfers, these are
combined to establish safeguards relevant information, like element or isotopic data or material
quantities.
If operating data are needed to evaluate the measurement data, like isotopic data for a NCC without a
HRGS, or tare weights of containers for weighing, VARO will provide these data to iRAP using
inspector defined queries and iRAP specific protocols. After iRAP has evaluated the data and formed
the measurement events, these are exported to VARO for comparison with the operating data.
The sequence above allows for a comparison of safeguards verifications with accountancy
declarations through operating records and related statistical analysis. With related measurement
uncertainties the inspectors get immediate feedback if and when measurement results are outside of
predefined acceptance criteria. They can trigger follow-up actions, e.g. re-check or re-measure and/or
seek for background information. This avoids late surprises and ensures that re-verifications are done
as early as possible to avoid unnecessary interference with plant operations later. At the end of the
physical verifications specific routines and listings will allow the inspectors to calculate overall statistics
on measurement uncertainties related to their measurements. Related operator / inspector differences
and their uncertainties will support the inspectors in their judgement on the acceptability of their
verifications and related declarations of the operators.
9. Query engine
One of the main challenges of the project is to be generic enough to cover all installation types under
EURATOM Safeguards and being at the same time specific enough to allow inspectors to carry out
their verifications. In this respect one of the main features of the application is the query engine,
allowing inspectors to filter, organise and display the available information in a very flexible, but
specific way to support the detection of inconsistencies and errors. These queries are using a SQL
type syntax, which is relatively easy to use with pull-down menus for the available commands and
data fields. Since the queries are displayed in a window at the top of the result list, immediate
feedback is given to the user when defining the criteria. Complemented by sorting and display options
the user has the full flexibility to display and check the data available. This query engine is used for all
data sets, accountancy, operating data (moves, inventory listings) and measurement data. The
queries, sorting and display settings can be saved by each user under his/her preferences and can
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also be made available to others by sharing them. This allows the management and facility officers to
define standard verification routines without limiting the inspectors in any way to carry out the
verifications under their responsibility.
10. Document checks and versioning
During the course of an inspection it is sometimes necessary for the operator to update the
documentation provided. Since inspectors often immediately process information made available,
each updated set of data causes a problem for the inspectors to know which data were changed and if
these changes have an impact on the verifications already performed or the conclusions already
drawn. A typical example is the List of Inventory Items (LII), which as an operational document is
sometimes updated by the operator during a Physical Inventory Verification. It is therefore essential to
have a routine to check updated data files against the original and to highlight changes found. This
also allows for a statistical evaluation on the quality of original documents, e.g. how precise they were,
the number of errors corrected etc. However, verifications already carried out and their established
relation to operating records should not be compromised. Therefore, the application has to be able to
detect changes in updated data sets, whilst at the same time maintaining record relations between
operating and measurement data based on the item ID.
11. Legal restrictions on data transfers to HQ
Normally the inspectors enter all relevant data into the VARO application for data transfer to HQ to be
able to continue working with them and for documentation and archiving. However, some Member
States have very specific legal restrictions on the transfer of data related to nuclear material quantities
and locations. To address these restrictions it is possible to limit the data travelling back with the
inspectors to HQ by taking only pre-defined data back, i.e. without location information, in order to
respect these local requirements.
12. Data storage
On return to HQ the inspectors are required to upload their inspection data by using a created
outcome kit for uploading to the HQ database. After this upload, it is possible to continue working with
the data and their evaluation seamlessly. The use of the mobile version allows for the inspectors'
independence from on-site data and takes away from them the time pressure to finish evaluations on-
site. Dedicated data output formats and print-outs allow the inspectors to record their inspection
activities and verification results. These documents are used as annexes to the inspection reports,
which are the overall record of the inspection activities.
After the evaluations are finished it is the responsibility of the head of the inspection to close the
inspection. This is the moment when the inspection data are fixed, cannot be modified anymore and
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considered as reference. In the IMS context the increased traceability and seamless data transfer
between HQ, site and vice versa is to be seen as an asset in striving for improved quality of inspection
results.
Whereas the HQ database for accountancy data is to be seen as reference, similar central
repositories for operational and measurement data do not exist yet. These data are normally stored at
the installations and taken, if possible, back to HQ as separate files. These files have different
structures, depending on their origin and are not stored in a single, compatible data format. With the
start of the VARO project it was decided to normalise operating and measurement data using an
internal data structure that allows for a central storage. So far all inspection related data are stored in
the inspection context.
However, depending on the installation type, it might be necessary for the inspectors to reference
back to data received at earlier inspections or to have older measurement data available for
comparison and to complement data. This is for example necessary at storage locations used at
fabrication and reprocessing facilities, where isotopic composition details are needed for later in-
process measurements or re-verifications. Other aspects are that along the fuel cycle data from
enrichment plants are used for input verifications at fuel fabrication plants or that nuclear data from
fabrication plants are also useful for spent fuel verifications at reactors. Since the VARO concept is
relying on HQ data as reference, it is essential that inspectors are able to take relevant operating and
measurement data for predefined areas and periods with them when leaving for an inspection. Central
data repositories are planned to allow for referencing and cross comparison outside the inspection
context, across different installations and over time.
13. Material Balance Evaluation
The centralised HQ storage of relevant inspection data allows not only for evaluation in the inspection
context, but also for data analysis over several inspections and years. It is foreseen to have routines
allowing for periodical evaluations on MBA and installation level. This will help the inspectorate to
better focus the inspection effort and to adapt it regularly to requirements.
At bulk handling facilities, the evaluation of the difference between the book stock and the physical
inventory, called Material Unaccounted For (MUF), is an important indicator for the quality of the
Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control (NMAC) system of the operator. MUF can be an essential
indicator for a possible protracted diversion. Since all the data required for a MUF evaluation are
available in VARO, MUF is calculated automatically by VARO. An essential element of the MUF
evaluation is to know the related operator's measurement uncertainties, which are needed to establish
acceptance limits for verifications and for the sigma MUF calculation.
The operators are required pursuant to EURATOM Regulation 302/2005 to describe in the Basic
Technical Characteristics (BTC) of their installation the methods for measurements, sampling and
analysis and are also required to provide derived estimates of random and systematic errors with the
operating records. If these uncertainties are not available, the International Target Values for
Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials are used in a top down approach as an
estimate. It is foreseen to implement a MUF and sigma MUF calculation using these uncertainties to
support the Material Balance Evaluation (MBE) at the end of the Material Balance Period (MBP) after
the Physical Inventory Taking (PIT) of the operator and its verification at the Physical Inventory
Verification (PIV) by the inspectorates. Long-term trending of the MUF and the Cumulative MUF
(CUMUF) helps to detect possible bias effects, operational changes, measurement deficiencies,
protracted diversion of nuclear material etc. With the storage and evaluation of related data it is
foreseen to automate this process, as far as possible, allowing for a direct comparison of the different
installations and a better focusing of inspection resources.
14. Co-operation with the IAEA
The functionalities of VARO are tailored to the needs of the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate.
However, all of its functions are needed by IAEA inspectors as well. The IAEA is aware of the
development and with the common development of the iRAP instrument interface software the use,
exchange and comparison of operating data is an essential VARO feature to encompass the different
operating data formats. The exchange of inspection data is an obligation stemming from the
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safeguards agreements of EURATOM with the IAEA. The exchange of EURATOM’s inspection 
results, as foreseen in the safeguards agreements, could be done in the future by making the relevant
"Mobile Kit" for an inspection available through the existing VPN channel used for the transmission of
surveillance data. This could significantly improve the exchange of data with and the use of them by
the IAEA.
15. Difficulties encountered
Due to the complexity of the project and the required start-up time until the first version came into
common use, it proved to be difficult to keep stability in the IT project team. Because of termed
contracts and existing mobility of staff within the organisation, the project management changed
several times. However, resilience on the user side has ensured that the project did not lose track.
Due to the differences between the installations, ranging from small laboratories handling milligram
quantities to complex reprocessing plants handling tons of sensitive nuclear material, the use of data
tools varies strongly between the different inspection groups. The harmonisation and centralisation of
inspection concepts and documentation is still a matter of continued discussion with all stakeholders.
16. Co-operation of all stakeholders required
The aim of the VARO application is, besides other elements, to increase the efficiency of the limited
inspection resources available and to help with the implementation of IMS. It is in the interest of all
stakeholders to carry out inspections as smooth, efficient and effective as possible, without any
unnecessary delays. A fundamental requirement is a coherent and seamless data processing.
Whereas in almost all installations the use of computerised material tracking systems is an established
practice, the data exchange with the safeguards authorities is often done in a patchwork fashion. To
avoid cumbersome and time consuming manual data treatment during on-site inspection activities, it is
essential that inspectors receive predefined datasets, which can be loaded and evaluated
automatically. To support the use of VARO, inspectors are required to agree common data interfaces
with the operators. This will save time and effort at all sides, but requires an initial investment and co-
operation to get these arrangements into routine operation. The operators of nuclear installations have
a crucial role in this context and their co-operation is an essential element for the standardisation of
operating data and the related implementation of VARO. On the other hand, VARO will be an essential
building block for a coherent safeguards implementation in the different installation types and Member
States of the European Union as foreseen in the IMS.
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Applying the Data Analysis and Interpretation Software to Analyze 
Feed and Withdrawal Operations 
Jim Garner, Michael Whitaker 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P. O. Box 2008, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831 
Abstract: 
The number of facilities and quantities of nuclear material and other items under International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards are continuing to increase, but the Agency’s financial 
resources have not risen commensurately. In recognition of this emerging challenge, the IAEA and its 
Member States are investigating new safeguards measures to enhance inspection efficiency without 
sacrificing effectiveness. One new concept being investigated for safeguards at gas centrifuge 
enrichment plants (GCEPs) – one of the more labor-intensive types of nuclear facilities to safeguard – 
is to leverage operators’ load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations to monitor the flow of 
material transferred to or from the enrichment process. This would help the IAEA achieve one of its 
primary safeguards objectives at declared GCEPs: the detection of undeclared feed which could 
lead to excess low enriched uranium (LEU) production.∗ The detection of excess undeclared LEU 
production at an existing enrichment facility is important because the excess material could be 
shipped to a small clandestine facility where it could be further enriched to a level suitable for 
nuclear weapons.  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has assembled a small-scale F/W system [1,2] and platform-
scale testing center [3] to generate load cell data representative of that produced during GCEP F/W 
operations. A major benefit of the simulated data produced by these systems is that the information is 
neither sensitive nor propriety and thus can be shared and discussed with all stakeholders. The ORNL 
F/W system has also been used to generate data that cannot be easily produced in operating facilities, 
namely, data resulting from a variety of facility misuse scenarios (e.g., diversion, undeclared feed, 
etc.). The authors installed the OSIsoft PI data historian to store F/W cycle data, which was then 
analyzed using the Data Analysis and Interpretation (DAI) software package developed by the 
European Commission – Joint Research Center – ITU Ispra. The DAI software has been used 
extensively at reprocessing plants like THORP and La Hague [4], and the IAEA has used a related 
software system called the Solution Monitoring Software at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Japan 
[5]. However, the IAEA has not yet approved this type of software for use at GCEPs. This paper 
explores how DAI might be used by the IAEA to strengthen the efficiency of safeguards at large-scale 
GCEPs and demonstrates a proof-of-concept application of this approach by analyzing data generated 
using ORNL’s F/W system for both normal cycles and potential misuse scenarios.  
Keywords: Gas centrifuge enrichment plant safeguards, load cell monitoring 
Applicability for IAEA safeguards 
The primary objectives for applying international safeguards at declared nuclear facilities are to verify 
that declared nuclear material is not being diverted and that the facilities are not being misused for 
undeclared production or processing of nuclear material. ORNL and other researchers have been 
evaluating the potential application of process monitoring techniques to strengthen the application of 
IAEA safeguards at GCEPs and other facilities that process Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders – 
UF6 conversion and fuel fabrication plants. 
∗ The primary safeguards objectives for GCEP are (1) the detection of diversion of declared material, (2) the 
detection of enrichment levels that exceed declared levels (especially highly enriched uranium (HEU)), and (3) the 
detection of excess LEU product using undeclared feed material. 
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Gas centrifuge enrichment plants are of particular nonproliferation concern because they can 
potentially be misused to directly produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapons program. 
Currently, the IAEA safeguards GCEPs in five non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS): Brazil, Germany, 
Iran, Japan, and the Netherlands. 
The IAEA has three main safeguards objectives for declared GCEPs: 
1) the timely detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material;
2) the timely detection of the enrichment of uranium above the declared level (particularly HEU); and
3) the timely detection of excess production of LEU via undeclared feed.
The IAEA uses nuclear material accountancy, containment and surveillance (C&S), and Design 
Information Verification (DIV) to detect diversion of declared nuclear material. The IAEA uses limited- 
frequency, unannounced access (LFUA) to the cascade area with nondestructive assay, material 
sampling, containment and surveillance, environmental sampling and DIV to detect enrichment of 
uranium above the declared level. The IAEA is currently exploring new process monitoring techniques 
to assist in achieving these safeguards objectives (i.e., on-line enrichment monitoring systems [6] and 
unattended cylinder verification stations [7]). Detecting excess production of LEU, however, continues 
to be a challenge because the IAEA has fewer proven “tools in its tool box” to achieve this safeguards 
objective. Previous IAEA publications have suggested that continuous unattended monitoring of load 
cell data may provide an option to address this challenge: “Load-cell monitoring supports the detection 
and deterrence of excess production scenarios in a way that other unattended instrumentation cannot” 
[8]. One promising tool to help inspectors harness the value of load cell data is automated analysis 
using software tools like the Data Analysis and Interpretation (DAI) software package. 
Currently, there are limited safeguards measures for monitoring the transfer of UF6 between the 
enrichment process and the cylinders. Typically, feed cylinders are not continuously monitored by the 
IAEA after they have been initially verified, so material could potentially be removed prior to feeding 
the cylinder contents to the process. Empty product and tails cylinders are not all verified by the IAEA 
prior to being filled, so the calculated net UF6 content (gross weight – empty weight) is based on an 
unverified empty weight value (i.e., the cylinder tare weight). Finally, there is no continuous monitoring 
(or camera surveillance) of the F/W stations using current safeguards approaches, so possibilities 
exist to process undeclared cylinders in between inspections.  
Monitoring cylinder weight data from load cells in F/W stations offers a capability that could 
significantly strengthen the IAEA’s ability to meet its safeguards objectives of detecting the diversion of 
declared materials and undeclared production scenarios within declared facilities by providing the 
following safeguards capabilities: 
• confirmation that weights of declared cylinders (full and empty) do not change between the F/W
stations and the accountability scales;
• a capability to confirm the number of cylinders processed (e.g., no undeclared feed, product, or
tails cylinders were processed in the declared F/W stations);
• a capability to more quickly resolve discrepancies or anomalies that would normally have to wait
until the annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV); and
• the ability to calculate a more timely, approximated material balance (e.g., a rough snapshot in
time).
Load cell data collection, analysis, and comparison 
One of the IAEA’s current tools to detect excess production relies upon short-notice access to the F/W 
areas; this is referred to as Extended Limited Frequency Unannounced Access (ELFUA∗). At facilities 
where ELFUAs are performed, the operator submits a feed occupancy list information daily to an in-
∗ An EFLUA provides for short notice access to the F/W area in addition to the cascade areas once an LFUA has 
been announced. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
328
situ mailbox.∗ When the inspectors arrive for ELFUA inspections, they retrieve the feed occupancy list 
and verify that only the F/W stations declared to be in use are occupied. 
New informal operator declarations to the in-situ mailbox would be used as the baseline for 
comparison against the process load cell data. Official declarations often take a longer path through 
the state system for accountancy and control and so may be given to the IAEA months after actual 
inventory changes occur. For timely detection and anomaly resolution, the operator will need to 
declare all cylinder movements into or out of feed or withdrawal stations to the in-situ mailbox. 
Modern F/W stations typically have integrated weighing systems that operators use for process 
control. Monitoring the existing load cells in F/W stations is one of the most promising options to detect 
excess production [9]; however, there are serious challenges to its use as a safeguards measure. For 
example, the operators are required to protect proliferation-sensitive data, and the IAEA wishes to 
receive authentic data. ORNL researchers are testing a variety of systems for collecting and analyzing 
load cell data for safeguards purposes including methods to improve the IAEA’s confidence in the 
authenticity of the shared weight data.  
If data is collected very frequently (e.g., once a second), operators have expressed concerns that 
sensitive details about the centrifuges, cascade design, or efficient plant operations can be revealed. 
However, our investigations are showing that very frequent data collection is not needed for the IAEA 
to reach safeguards conclusions. Studies are under way to identify an optimal data frequency 
collection range that is both short enough to meet safeguards objectives and long enough to protect 
the operator’s proprietary information [10, 11]. 
To meet the IAEA’s objective for detecting excess production of LEU, load cell data would need to be 
collected to confirm that it is consistent with continuous feed operations by identifying key markers 
such as the date† and the gross weight of the full cylinder when it is first put into the station and the 
date and gross weight when the emptied cylinder (containing residual UF6 after the UF6 transfer 
process had been completed) is removed from the station. Only minimal periodic data is required 
between these points to support the conclusion that the station was continually occupied by a declared 
cylinder. Additionally, continual monitoring with only minimum data would be required to support the 
conclusion that undeclared cylinders were not processed in stations reported to be empty.  
Algorithms can be written to identify the key cycle markers and time periods where manual evaluation 
is required to enable the inspectors to quickly verify the number of cylinders processed between 
inspections. Additionally, the cylinder weight data could be compared with the operator’s cylinder 
change reports. Currently the IAEA inspectors verify a statistically significant subset of declared 
cylinder full and empty weights, but in the future, the process-scale full and empty weights from load 
cell data could be compared against the accountability values reported by the operator to provide 
greater confidence that declared material isn’t diverted between the declared F/W stations and 
accountancy scale. The net amount of material transferred to and from the process through all the F/W 
stations can be calculated to provide an estimate of the process inventory changes to compare with 
operator declarations for a more timely, approximated material balance. 
A number of options exist to identify these key markers to count cylinders or perform advanced 
analysis. A key consideration is whether the method is local to each feed or withdrawal station or if the 
method employs a centralized data collection and analysis architecture. 
John Howell (formerly a Reader at the University of Glasgow) developed a concept and reference 
implementation for a basic cylinder counting algorithm on a data logger to log local load cell data and 
analyze it in real time. This technique leverages a simple programmable logic device to provide 
minimal output information to the inspector at each station. ORNL researchers assembled a system 
∗ The IAEA has deployed in-situ mailboxes at several Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. The IAEA defines 
mailbox declarations as “Declarations of operational activities at facilities that are submitted electronically, time-
stamped and irretrievable, which can be randomly validated by the Agency [IAEA].” State Level Concept 
Supplementary Document (footnote 53).  
† The precision required will depend on the feed/withdrawal cycle period. For example if a cylinder can be fed in 
less than a day then the software would need to identify these key markers with more than day precision (e.g. 
hour precision). 
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based on the reference implementation and tested it using data from the small-scale F/W system.∗ 
More details will be discussed in a forthcoming paper. A local logging and analysis technique may be 
appropriate at facilities with a limited number of stations; however, larger facilities would likely require 
a centralized logging and analysis technique because it requires less inspector time to review the data 
and reduces the maintenance burden on the inspectorate. 
Application of DAI to ORNL cycle data 
The DAI software was developed for process monitoring in reprocessing facilities [4]. Researchers at 
the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy, have managed the development of DAI and a closely 
related spin-off called the Solution Monitoring Software, which is used by the IAEA at the Rokkasho 
Reprocessing Plant [5]. Researchers at the JRC have also proposed using DAI for GCEPs [12]. 
DAI analyzes process data by evaluating time series data against rules. DAI organizes sets of rules as 
a “comportment” that relates to what is physically happening in the process that is being monitored. 
These comportments are strung together to form cycles, but DAI requires a starting or reset 
comportment be configured. The starting comportment for ORNL’s feed cycles was configured to 
require the data match two rules—first, that the slope before the evaluation time was less than -0.2 
and, second, that after the evaluation time the slope was between 0.05 and -0.05. This is displayed 
graphically in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: To find the starting point of the ORNL cycle, DAI is trying to find a time period where the slope of the 
load cell data is less than -0.2, followed by a time period where the slope of the load cell data is between 0.05 and 
-0.05. 
DAI has a useful test feature that shows in real time how the algorithms are interpreting and matching 
the rules to the data. An example of the test feature is shown in Figure 2 with an arrow drawn to point 
out where the rule previously described first matched the data. 
∗In 2008, ORNL established a small-scale F/W system that uses water as a surrogate for UF6. This system has 
been leveraged by several researchers to evaluate different load cell monitoring techniques including both local 
and central logging and analysis techniques. In 2010 and 2011, David Hooper and James Henkel, while working 
at ORNL under a contract with Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), used a central collection approach to 
obtain load cell data sets that simulated both normal F/W operations as well as abnormal operations that included 
several plausible diversion scenarios. 
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Figure 2: An example feed cycle with arrow showing where DAI found the starting point for the cycle. 
DAI allows for comportments to be dragged onto the control surface and linked together, as shown in 
Figure 3. This set of comportments, each with its own set of rules, was used to analyze ORNL load cell 
data. 
Figure 3: Comportments can be dragged from the left pane to the control surface and linked together. 
Henkel and Hooper stored their data into a general-purpose relational database called PostgreSQL. 
However, DAI was built to use the OSIsoft PI data archive. OSIsoft’s PI is purpose built for time series 
data. In order to get the Henkel and Hooper data into OSIsoftPI, the raw data was extracted from the 
PostreSQL database as comma separated values (CSV), manipulated in Excel to eliminate the time 
between independent runs, exported as a CSV file, and then imported into OSIsoft’s PI data archive 
using OSIsoft’s Universal File Loader. When data is imported into OSIsoft PI, exception and 
compression algorithms are typically run on the incoming data to minimize the data that is actually 
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stored. This feature maintains enough details from the time series data to fully describe trends or 
disturbances, while helping to reduce the storage required when a sensor reports the same value for 
consecutive periods and helping to expedite the retrieval and analysis of the data. If the operator and 
the IAEA could agree, the exception and compression settings built into OSIsoft PI may be a sufficient 
information filter to ensure that the IAEA has a safeguards significant set of data that satisfactorily 
limits the data frequency to protect the operator’s sensitive or proprietary interests. 
The configuration in Figure 3 was able to identify both expected transition events and abnormal weight 
profiles when it was used to analyze the ORNL small-scale F/W system load cell data. Figure 4 
demonstrates the analysis on this load cell data. The round markers in this figure indicate normal 
transition events, while the red triangles indicate that DAI recognized an abnormal event. 
Figure 4: The configuration shown above correctly identified normal cycles and alerted when abnormal events 
were encountered. 
Installation and use at a GCEP 
OSIsoft PI offers flexible options to import data. Standard industrial protocols like ModbusTCP or OPC 
could be used to import data into the OSIsoft PI data archive. An installation could also leverage the 
IAEA’s emerging data transmission standard (RAINSTORM∗) to import data.  
Figure 5 shows a hypothetical GCEP load cell data transmission architecture using RAINSTORM to 
transmit the load cell data. In this environment, weighing systems at each F/W station could collect raw 
data into simple text-based files. The IAEA’s GetRainstorm† application could then be used to retrieve 
the most recent data and move it to the input folder for OSIsoft PI’s Universal File Loader (UFL). The 
UFL is a configurable software application that can parse incoming file data into the OSIsoft PI data 
archive. Optionally, exception and compression algorithms could filter data and permanently store only 
time series significant events in the OSIsoftPI data archive. This would discard consecutive data points 
if they have the same value so that only data points that vary significantly from the norm would be 
stored. 
∗The IAEA is developing and adopting the RAINSTORM (Real-time And INtegrated STream-Oriented Remote 
Monitoring) protocol as a standard way to retrieve data from remotely monitored instruments. The RAINSTORM 
protocol leverages the same underlying communication protocol (HTTP) that delivers web pages to deliver data 
files from sensors to centralized collection computers or IAEA headquarters. The IAEA has developed some 
reference implementations of RAINSTORM for Windows and Linux computers. 
†The IAEA has also developed the GetRainstorm application to retrieve files from IAEA instruments using the 
RAINSTORM protocol. 
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Figure 5: Weighing systems at each F/W station could provide a Rainstorm interface. A central system could use 
GetRainstorm to pull text files from each of the systems. The OSIsoft PI Universal File Loader can be easily 
configured to parse text files and import data into the OSIsoft PI data archive. DAI pulls raw data from the OSIsoft 
data archive, automatically analyzes the data, and can save the analysis results into Access or SQL server 
databases. Initially, IAEA inspectors would configure the analysis algorithms using the DAI software. IAEA 
inspectors would then routinely use an extension to the existing DAI software or a stand-alone graphical user 
interface to compare the analysis results with operator declarations. 
Once the raw data is in the OSIsoft PI data archive, the DAI analysis algorithms can be run 
automatically to identify the significant F/W events and complete cycles. These results could then be 
saved into a SQL server or Access database. While the IAEA inspectors would need access to the 
load cell data to configure DAI, they may not need routine access to the raw periodic process load cell 
data.  
If the algorithms correctly identified all key cycle markers and did not identify any time periods that 
needed additional review, the IAEA inspectors would only need to use an extension to DAI or a 
separate application to display the analysis results in order to compare them to the operator’s 
declarations. A sample screenshot is provided in Figure 6 showing the comparison of mock operator 
declarations corresponding to the feed cycles in Figure 4 as an example of how an inspector might be 
able to view the data. If, on the other hand, DAI identified a weight difference that differs significantly 
from the declared mass transfer or a time period that was abnormal, then the corresponding cell or row 
would be highlighted to indicate this time period needs additional evaluation.  
Drill down functionality to click the highlighted cell to display the raw periodic cycle data in DAI would 
likely be the most useful for inspectors if they were investigating analogous events. In order to protect 
this more sensitive data, access controls could be applied in order to limit access to the raw data to a 
subset of inspectors from approved states. Another way to control this sensitive information while 
allowing inspectors to investigate the region of interest would be to use a mutually agreed upon data 
release mechanism that requires operator involvement for a small subset of data near the time period 
of interest.  










5980 2011-02-01 07:XX 2011-02-01 11:XX           106.21           106.10 
61789 2011-02-01 12:XX 2011-02-01 15:XX              56.40 105.20         
52338 2011-02-01 18:XX 2011-02-01 21:XX           104.79 104.90         
37174 2011-02-01 22:XX 2011-02-02 01:XX           107.00 106.20         
DAI
Figure 6: An extension to DAI or a stand-alone graphical user interface could display DAI analysis results and the 
operator declaration. A simple table could show the first level of detail and highlight cycles that require additional 
investigation. 
Using OSIsoft PI and DAI with a graphical user interface to compare the key markers (full and empty 
weights with times) against declared values could greatly improve the IAEA’s effectiveness to detect 
excess production; however, these gains do not come without costs. Localized data analysis solutions 
installed at each station may be appropriate at smaller facilities but will require more inspector time to 
use and will be more difficult to maintain (making configuration changes on one centralized system 
would be significantly easier than making changes at multiple stations all under seal). Larger facilities 
with more stations and higher cylinder throughput are probably better suited for centralized analysis 
solutions, but data sharing policies need to be negotiated between the operator and inspectorates. 
Remaining questions 
A key question that needs to be addressed for the IAEA to utilize DAI is how to perform the initial 
configuration of the software in a large-scale GCEP plant. Other topics that need further discussion 
and resolution include what data (and at what frequency) can be shared, how can sensitive data be 
adequately protected, how shared process data can be used to support IAEA safeguards conclusions, 
and what level of authentication is necessary for the data to be useful to the IAEA. The specific needs 
and requirements resulting from these discussions can then be tested and evaluated at mock F/W 
stations and then demonstrated in operating facilities. 
Conclusions 
Strengthening the application of IAEA safeguards at GCEPs is a priority for the United States and the 
IAEA. While the IAEA currently has relatively effective safeguards measures at GCEPs to detect (1) 
the diversion of declared material (e.g., nuclear material accountancy), and (2) the production of UF6 
with higher-than-declared enrichment (e.g., environmental sampling and NDA measurements during 
LFUA to cascade halls), it does not have many proven tools to detect excess production.  
To improve the IAEA’s ability to efficiently detect excess production, the IAEA needs to be able to 
continuously monitor the transfer of material between the cylinders and the process. A potential cost-
effective solution would be to share data from the operator’s already installed load cells; however, 
operators must protect proliferation-sensitive information and the IAEA needs to be confident about the 
authenticity of the data.  
ORNL, sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), has been investigating 
solutions. These projects include the development of a small-scale F/W system, in addition to the more 
recent development of a larger platform-scale testing center, to evaluate innovative ways to improve 
the IAEA’s confidence in the authenticity of data. These systems provide ORNL researchers and our 
collaborators with representative data free from the sensitivities associated with data from a real 
facility. Another NGSI-funded project at ORNL involves using Monte Carlo analysis to identify a 
frequency of data transmissions which may protect the operator yet satisfy IAEA safeguards needs. 
ORNL is also evaluating how minor enhancements to how existing information that is already reported 
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to the in situ mailbox is used and how additional information could further strengthen the value of this 
tool.  
This study furthers ORNL’s work to strengthen the IAEA’s tools by examining how the DAI software 
might be used in a large-scale GCEP plant to detect excess production. For this study, the authors 
installed the OSIsoft PI data archive and universal file loader to leverage data sets previously collected 
on the small-scale water-based F/W system. Centralized analysis software, such as DAI, is the 
only cost-effective and efficiently maintainable choice for collecting and analyzing large data 
sets. Currently, in cooperation with JRC, the DAI software is being used to analyze this data and to 
investigate how a similar architecture could be deployed for IAEA safeguards. DAI or other centralized 
analysis applications could be used to automatically analyze load cell data for better detection of 
excess feed at large GCEPs.  
Preliminary feed, product, and withdrawal configurations were developed and tested for this study. 
During the configuration process, the authors had full access to the raw data from the small scale F/W 
system. During the configuration process at a GCEP, inspectors or technicians would likely need full 
access to the raw weight data. An automated tool, once properly configured with allowances for the 
IAEA to access the weight data upon request to resolve discrepancies, may provide an effective 
information filter to provide the IAEA with sufficient data to draw safeguards conclusions while also 
protecting the raw data in order to satisfy operators’ concerns. 
The findings from this study continue to emphasize the point that monitoring weight data from load 
cells in F/W stations could provide confirmation that weights of declared UF6 cylinders (full and empty) 
do not change between the time they are weighed at F/W stations and the time they are weighed by 
accountability scales, which in turn could enhance existing methods to detect excess LEU production. 
This new capability could also confirm that the number of cylinders processed matches the number 
declared (e.g., no undeclared feed, product, or tails cylinders were processed in the F/W stations). In 
addition, monitoring load cell data could provide the IAEA with a capability to more quickly resolve 
discrepancies or anomalies that would normally have to wait until the annual PIV. Load cell monitoring 
could also provide the IAEA with ability to calculate a more timely, approximated material balance 
(e.g., a rough snapshot in time). 
Further dialog is needed with stakeholders to address the remaining questions. Past consultancies 
among technology holders have been useful for promoting valuable dialogs between operators, 
inspectorates, and researchers, and a follow-up consultancy would help to clarify some of the 
remaining questions. 
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Abstract 
Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and 
international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3  However, once a facility is 
operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations.  This 
separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality. 
Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility.  Will they notify security so 
they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering?  Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider 
who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building.   
If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through 
segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors 
can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be 
unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility. 
This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for 
domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, 
to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats. 
Introduction 
The impetus for safeguards by design started in 2010 with the recognition that, with few exceptions, International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards systems were installed in facilities after completion of construction.4 
This resulted in a safeguards system that was costly, less efficient, and less effective than if it had been incorporated 
during facility design.  To mitigate this problem, guidance for all nuclear fuel cycle facility types, with the outreach 
focused on architect/engineers, vendors, builders, State Regulatory Authorities, and facility operators is now being 
issued by the IAEA.3  The goal for this guidance is to raise awareness and effect a positive change to the project 
management process so that safeguards is considered during the earliest conceptual design phases.  Ideally, 
safeguards would be accorded attention similar to safety, a discipline that went through an evolutionary process so 
that it is always included in designing a facility, and is considered as part of any initial concept for any type of 
nuclear facility. 
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Nuclear facility designers have long considered the importance of safety by design.  More recently initiatives have 
focused on safeguards by design and security by design.  With the incipient expansion of nuclear technology to 
newcomer countries, the IAEA has developed a milestone approach to building a nuclear infrastructure.5  The 
process of building this infrastructure suggests consideration of the potential synergies from addressing all three 
disciplines of safety, safeguards, and security (3S) holistically.   
Since its introduction by Japan in 2008, and acceptance as a concept by the Group of Eight (G8) at their Hokkaido 
summit, there have been a number of papers and presentations on the history and possible synergies of 3S, including 
some by one of the present authors.6 For example, at the Hokkaido summit some of the shared principles include: 7 
“…peaceful use of nuclear energy accompanied by commitments to implement 3S is a sound 
basis for international transparency and confidence in the sustainable development of nuclear 
energy.” 
“Implementation of 3S constitutes an indispensable objective for the development of the 
infrastructure necessary for the introduction of nuclear power generation.” 
“…international cooperation can greatly contribute to the development of such 
infrastructure.” 
At the Workshop on Effective Management of Safety, Security, and Nonproliferation Issues at Operating Nuclear 
Facilities held at Oak Ridge National Laboratory the Chairperson suggested that among the challenges for 
organizations and facilities:8 
“There is a general understanding of the potential benefits of the 3S concept. However, there 
is a lack of fundamental understanding of what are the interfaces and synergies between safety, 
security and safeguards and how they can be practically implemented.” 
Several papers by experts trying to address the challenge of applying the 3S concept can be found in archive 
proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and 
Development Association.  In this paper, the authors seek to demonstrate the importance of close coordination 
among the three disciplines in emergency situations and propose a mechanism that would enhance nuclear security, 
while taking advantage of the capabilities of the other disciplines. 
Discussion 
The disciplines of safety,9,10 safeguards,11 and security12 have been refined over many decades in nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities.  A number of risk assessment approaches have been used for each one.  The boundaries for each discipline 
with respect to each other have areas of complete independence as well as areas of overlap, and can be represented 
as in Figure 1.  This paper will emphasize the common area among these three disciplines as indicated in the shaded 
region where all three intersect. 
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Figure 1  
To illustrate  an area in which these disciplines overlap, consider the following example:  a requirement for a second 
door in a nuclear material vault.  Safeguards and security would prefer that there not be a second door to reduce the 
risk of loss or theft of material by limiting egress points.  Safety, on the other hand, requires the second exit to 
ensure personnel on staff have a second egress point should the primary door not be accessible in an emergency.  
One possible set of solutions to this dilemma is for safeguards to install a collimated radiation portal monitor to 
detect the removal of nuclear material through the door, and for security to install a balanced magnetic switch and 
alarm on the door to detect when it opens and to announce the opening to local staff members.  In this way, solutions 
to the requirements and needs of all three disciplines can be optimized. 
Focusing on the overlap of safeguards, security, and safety even further, we consider emergency response, including 
insider and outsider threats.  This is where real-time cooperation has the potential for the greatest positive impact on 
a facility’s response to threats.  Planning, implementation, and training for a coordinated approach are critical to 
realize the most effective application of the limited resources available to counter various threats.  Table 1 shows 
some example events to illustrate how a joint response operation could perform in a coordinated and supportive 
manner. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
340
Safeguards by Design for Pyroprocessing Facilities in the ROK 
Ho-Dong Kim, Eun-Ha Kwon and Se-Hwan Park 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon 
Nonproliferation System Research Division 
Daedeok-daero 989-111, Yuseng-gu, Daejeon, 305-353 Republic of Korea 
E-mail: khd@kaeri.re.kr, kwoneh@kaeri.re.kr, ex-spark@kaeri.re.kr 
Abstract: 
Safeguards by Design (SBD) is expected to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguarding 
new nuclear facilities. Application of the SBD to the design of new nuclear facility will minimize the 
proliferation risks and facility retrofit for safeguards equipment. The KAERI has been developing 
pyroprocessing technology for the recycling of the useful resources from the spent fuel, and the SBD 
is incorporated into the conceptual design and system development phase of the pyroprocessing 
facilities. Safeguards approach of the Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF), 
which is an engineering-scale model facility, was developed through the IAEA Member State Support 
Program (MSSP) and its performance was evaluated by analysing the MUF uncertainty. As a result of 
the review by the safeguards experts for the REPF safeguards approach, it was recommended to the 
technology development in the field of input accountancy, viability of the Cm ratio method, NDA and 
DA measurements of U and U/TRU ingots, and process monitoring in argon hot cell. The close 
collaboration on the SBD of the pyroprocessing facilities is continued through the IAEA MSSP.  
Keywords: SBD; Safeguards Approach; Safeguards Measures; Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Pyroprocessing 
1. Introduction
KAERI has been developing pyroprocess since 1997 to resolve the issue of spent fuel accumulation 
and produce metal-based fuel for future fast reactors. Figure 1 shows a flow diagram of the process: 
(1) pretreatment (decladding, voloxidation, and sintering), (2) electroreduction, (3) electrorefining 
(including uranium recovery), (4) electrowinning, and (5) waste salt treatment [1]. The nuclear fuel 
cycle facilities related to the pyroprocess such as DFDF(DUPIC Fuel Development Facility), 
ACPF(Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility), and PRIDE(PyRoprocess Integrated 
inactive DEmonstration facility) have been constructed in ROK, and the safeguards system for each 
facility was designed from the beginning of the facility design [2]. 
Figure 1. Flow Diagram of Pyroprocessing 
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Safeguards-By-Design (SBD) is an approach in which international safeguards requirements and 
objectives are fully integrated from the design stage of a nuclear facility. By integrating all regulatory 
issues, including safeguards requirements, the project risks can be minimized. The ROK has the 
experience of developing safeguards systems for nuclear fuel cycle facilities and is actively developing 
safeguards technologies for the pyroprocessing facility, using the SBD approach [3]. In this paper, the 
main features of SBD for pyroprocess by the KAERI, which include the nuclear fuel cycle facilities and 
its implemented safeguards system, the development of NDA instruments, and the study of reference 
pyroprocessing facility concept, are introduced and discussed. 
2. Development of Safeguards System for Pyro-related Facilities
KAERI has been developing a head-end processing step for spent oxide fuel that applied to 
pyroprocessing technology. This processing step employs the feed material fabrication activity to 
produce granules and pellets from the voloxidized powder using spent PWR fuel at DFDF. The 
granules and pellets could be used for the hot test of electrolytic reduction process in pyroprocess. 
The main objectives of the feed material fabrication activity at DFDF are to demonstrate technology for 
developing optimal process conditions to produce granule and low density pellet from the spent PWR 
fuel by only utilizing the thermal and mechanical processes, and to supply the feed material to the 
electrolytic reduction process of ACPF. 
DFDF consists of one concrete hot cell used for the technology development of the DUPIC (Direct Use 
of Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel in CANDU) fuel fabrication as well as for vol-oxidation of irradiated 
PWR fuel rod cuts. During the vol-oxidation process, volatile fission products are removed and trapped, 
e.g. Cs-137 is significantly reduced. The safeguards system development of the DUPIC fuel cycle has 
been considered from the beginning of the R&D process. Two aspects of its safeguards R&D 
technology have been developed and demonstrated. The first involves nuclear material accountancy 
in a hot-cell with the DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter (DSNC), and the second involves 
containment and surveillance with an unattended image and radiation monitoring system. Fugure 2 
shows an overview of DFDF. 
Figure 2. DFDF Overview 
KAERI is currently developing an electrolytic reduction process to demonstrate the laboratory scale 
operation in ACPF, in which spent fuel materials will be used. ACPF is an R&D facility consisting of 
two concrete hot cells, one of which contains an argon compartment, for research into the electrolytic 
reduction process. The ACPF process involves only one step of the full pyroprocess for the electrolytic 
reduction of oxide into metal form in the argon compartment. The demonstration test is divided into 
two phases, in which the cold test with natural and depleted uranium and hot test with up to 10 kg-U of 
feed material from DFDF (PWR irradiated fuel rod cuts after vol-oxidation process in the form of low 
density pellets or granules) will be performed. Figure 3 shows an overview of ACPF. 
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Figure 3. ACPF Overview 
KAERI has been developing a passive-mode neutron coincidence counter for material accounting of 
the ACP. This well-type neutron counter, so-called ACP Safeguards Neutron Counter (ASNC), is for 
conducting NDA of the materials that exist during the ACP process. The basic concept of the ASNC is 
the Pu to Cm ratio method which uses the Cm mass determined by measuring the coincidence 
neutrons from Cm-244 and the pre-determined Pu-to-Cm ratio to calculate the Pu mass.  The ASNC 
contains 24 3He tubes, which are symmetrically located in high density polyethylene moderator. Each 
3He tube is connected to an individual pre-amplifier. The 24 signals from the tubes are divided into 4 
groups, and each group is combined into 1 signal. The signal cable was designed to be replaced by 
remote manipulators. There is lead shield inside the sample cavity to protect the 3He tubes and 
electronics from the intense gamma rays of the process materials. Lead and HDPE shields outside the 
ASNC reduce the background gamma rays and neutrons from the hot cell environment. The ASNC 
was installed inside the hot cell of the ACPF in 2005, and the performance tests were conducted with 
252Cf sources. A verification test using spent fuel rod-cuts was performed with experts from the IAEA 
and LANL in 2007. The results were satisfactory, and the ASNC could measure spent fuels with Triplet 
counts [4]. The ASNC also has remote operation capabilities, and maintenance can be performed 
while the ASNC is in a hot cell. It is currently under the minor modification of modularization into 
several components to meet the load limit requirement of the in-cell crane. 
Figure 4. Structure of ASNC 
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The ASNC is a key NDA device for nuclear material accounting. The accounting data of the ASNC are 
provided to the IAEA periodically. The IAEA's slab detector is used for independent verification of the 
nuclear material accountancy for the ACPF. Three IAEA cameras and three IAEA neutron monitors 
were installed at the rear and side doors of the ACPF hot cells to monitor any activities related to the 
nuclear material movement through the doors. The cameras and neutron monitors are connected to 
the IAEA safeguards server located in the working area of the ACPF. 
Since 1997, the laboratory-scale unit process of pyroprocessing has been carried out, and the design 
and construction of an engineering-scale integrated system was developed by KAERI. PRIDE is the 
integrated engineering-scale mock-up pyroprocessing facility, and it was constructed in 2013. The 
PRIDE consists of a large scale argon-atmospheric cell (40.3 m length, 4.8 m width and 6.4 m height), 
an argon system, in-cell equipment (transfer lock, in-cell crane, feed through, etc.) and remote 
operation devices. The purpose of the PRIDE is to test the unit process performance, the remote-
equipment operability, the integrity of the unit process, the system operation under argon conditions 
and the safeguards technology. Only uranium and depleted uranium will be treated in the PRIDE. The 
processes in the PRIDE consist of a voloxidation, oxide reduction, electrorefining, electrowinning, and 
waste treatment processes. Air-atmosphere processes such as fabrication of UCl3, ingot production 
and voloxidation are carried out on the first floor and large argon cell is positioned on the second floor. 
The throughput of the facility is 10 tonU/yr.  
The construction and installation works for the facility have been completed and the cold operations of 
unit process are now by using DU, while the integrated works of full spectrum will be started soon. The 
key pyroprocessing technology will be tested and demonstrated using natural and/or depleted uranium 
with surrogate materials, and the system engineering studies including the design study for facility and 
equipment, remote operation and maintenance, advanced safeguards and radioactive materials 
transportation etc. will be performed. The PRIDE will also support the near-term mission to evaluate 
and produce reliable data in order to resolve scale-up issues of full-spectrum pyroprocessing 
technology [5]. Figure 5 and 6 show the overview and equipment of PRIDE facility. 
Figure 5. Facility Overview of PRIDE 
Figure 6. Exterior and Equipment of PRIDE Facility 
A safeguards system of the PRIDE has been designed and is being developed. Because natural and 
depleted uranium are the process materials in the PRIDE, the mass measured at the Key 
Measurement Point (KMP) is the most important parameters in the accounting system. The 235U 
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amounts will also be accounted for with a unified NDA system. This instrument is an integrated device 
with three independent techniques of neutron counting, gamma-ray spectroscopy, and weighing and 
called the ‘Unified NDA’ of PRIDE facility. The figure 7 shows an MCNPX model of the Unified NDA 
instrument. The Unified NDA instrument was designed to be flexible for several containers, which are 
largely different in their size. Thus the inner cylindrical neutron counter can be removed for larger 
containers to be accommodated. The basic principles of each technique will remain intact but some 
improvement in measurement error is expected by the synergy of the combined techniques. Although 
there will be only natural or depleted uranium materials to be used in the PRIDE facility, the Unified 
NDA concept could be applied to the nuclear material measurement for future pyroprocessing facilities. 
Gamma detectors are installed inside the argon cell to evaluate the possibility of tracking the uranium 
process flow. Key measurement parameters such as current, voltage, temperature, and humidity will 
be monitored from process equipment. Cameras are installed to survey the movement of nuclear 
material. An integrated safeguards system, which combines the on-line NDA signals and process 
monitoring signals, is being developed to implement Near Real Time Accountancy (NRTA) at PRIDE. 
Figure 7. The Unified NDA Instrument 
3. Safeguards by Design for REPF
A Member State Supporting Program for Agency Safeguards (MSSP) for the ‘Support for 
Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant’ was contracted between the IAEA 
and the ROK in 2008. Six pyroprocessing facility concepts suggested by the US, Japan, and the ROK 
were analyzed, and the Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) concept was 
developed. The input material for the REPF is PWR spent fuel, and the output materials are U ingot 
and U/TRU ingot. The size of the process batch is 50 kgHM, the throughput per campaign is 500 
kgHM, and the throughput per year is 10 MTHM.  
The main processes performed in the REPF consist of receipt and storage of spent fuels, the head-
end process, the electrolytic reduction process, the electro-refining process, the electro-winning 
process, and waste salt regeneration and solidification. The head-end process has five steps: 
disassembling and rod extraction, chopping, decladding, homogenization, and pretreatment of the 
oxide fuel. In the electrolytic reduction process, the oxide fuel is converted to a metallic form. The 
electro-refining system, which is composed of an electro-refiner, a salt distiller, and a melting furnace, 
recovers pure uranium from the electrolytically reduced fuel. The electro-winning system is able to 
recover actinides from salt after the electro-refining operation. The waste salts are fabricated into 
durable waste forms in the waste salt regeneration and solidification process. 
Three Material Balance Area (MBA)s were identified for the REPF, which consists of the spent fuel 
receiving area, the storage and head-end process area (MBA-1), the main pyroprocessing area (MBA-
2), and the product and waste storage area (MBA-3). Key Measurement Point (KMP)s should be 
identified in which the nuclear materials are present to make it possible to measure them and 
determine the material flow or inventory [6].  
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Since the main nuclear materials that should be accounted for are uranium and plutonium in the REPF, 
and the most important KMPs for accounting these materials are the point before the main 
pyroprocessing, and two points where the final U ingot and U/TRU ingot products of the 
pyroprocessing are placed. A unified NDA equipment, a PNAR detector and a fission chamber were 
suggested as material accounting instruments at three KMPs [7].  
Figure 8. Key measurement points in MBAs of the REPF 
Near-real time accountancy (NRTA) system will be established to timely detect a diversion during 
pyroprocessing. NRTA system could be based on NDA equipment and a Destructive Assay (DA) 
would also be applied to the three important KMPs to increase the accuracy of material accounting. 
Considering the time required for a DA, a three-level method was suggested. In the first level, the DA 
samples are obtained at the three important KMPs, and the samples are analyzed by the DA method. 
In the second level, the NRTA equipment in NRTA system are continuously performed at three 
important KMPs while the DA samples are analyzed. In the third level, the NRTA results from the 
NRTA system are updated and corrected by comparing with the DA results. 
A simulation program called Pyroprocessing Material flow and Material unaccounted for Uncertainty 
Simulation (PYMUS), has been developed to analyze the nuclear material flow in the REPF and to 
calculate the MUF uncertainty. DA-based material accounting in the REPF can give accurate 
information for the necessary accountability, and the NDA-based accounting can also yield useful 
accounting information in a timely manner. 
Although the REPF concept was mainly based on safeguards concerns and the analysis under these 
conditions may give limited results, the efforts to design a reference facility and to develop a 
safeguards approach for pyroprocessing will be helpful in implementing the safeguards-by-design 
concept [8].  
4. Conclusions
Pyroprocessing is a new and advanced proliferation-resistant technology that could help reduce the 
volume and the radioactivity of spent fuels, and potentially allow the spent fuel to be recycled.  The 
safeguards approach for pyroprocessing should be established to determine the Pu inventory 
accurately, track the nuclear material flow, and ensure that there is no diversion. 
The ROK has successfully developed and implemented NDA instruments and safeguards systems for 
pyroprocess-related facilities. Currently, the R&D efforts to develop NDA measurement equipment, 
advanced C/S and process monitoring systems, and modeling and simulation for the safeguards of the 
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pyroprocessing facilities continue. The SBD approach is based on these efforts. From the beginning of 
the design phase, these projects have proceeded in cooperation with facility designer. The REPF 
concept was established to develop the safeguards approach, and to analyze the safeguardability. 
While incorporating the SBD concept early in the design phase is being emphasized for 
commercialization of next-generation nuclear systems, KAERI has dedicated itself to developing 
technologies that are required to implement an international safeguards system for pyroprocess, which 
is a promising and/or advanced nuclear fuel cycle technology in Korea. KAERI is expanding its R&D 
scope to integrate safeguards with other safety and security objectives in the overall design process of 
pyroprocessing. The ultimate goal is to achieve an optimum design technology for pyroprocessing that 
incorporates the enhanced 3S features. By addressing the concepts of 3S at an initial stage of 
development, the credibility of the state will be enhanced, which will lead to a pyroprocessing-based 
fuel cycle being realized in Korea.  
The application of SBD to these efforts will contribute to improving nuclear transparency and 
safeguards technology so that pyroprocessing technology can be realized in the future.  
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Abstract:
Under the State-level concept for safeguards embodied the objective is to develop a safeguards
protocol that covers activities, items and locations in the entire State. Although these additional
elements have legitimate uses, they could contribute to or be part of a clandestine nuclear program.
The challenge is how to develop and implement a safeguards approach that does not rely on detailed
nuclear material accountancy, or a mechanistic verification, yet, it is objective transparent and non-
discriminatory.
The decision of a State to develop a nuclear weapons program at any given time may depend on the
existence of conditions that are conducive to proliferation. However, these conditions by themselves
do not necessarily imply proliferation and may change over time. Although there is a relationship
between proliferation and certain conditions such as presence of conflicts, that relationship is neither
deterministic nor causal. It is more appropriate to treat these conditions as random variables.
Similarly, the data collected under the Additional Protocol do not have a specified direct causal
relationship to proliferation, although they could be related to some yet to be determined degree.
Thus, at best they can be characterized in terms of their statistical properties which can form the basis
of calculating the probability of detecting deviations from legitimate activities.
This paper addresses the problem of detecting the state of development of clandestine processes
along diversion paths such as those enumerated in the Critical Path Analysis approach. The
undeclared activities of a State are modeled as a stochastic system, because of the uncertainties
inherent in the clandestine development of nuclear weapons. The state of the system is represented
as a state vector. Similarly, the evaluation of the State as a whole, under the Additional Protocol is
also stochastic, because of the uncertainty in the connection between the data collected by the IAEA
and the existence of a clandestine process. A modified form of the Kalman filter equations has been
developed that makes it possible to estimate the state of clandestine development as long as the
clandestine process remains stable. Examples illustrating the uses of the approach are presented.
Keywords: clandestine proliferation; stochastic model; detection; safeguards concepts
1. Introduction
The integrated safeguards approach envisions the evaluation of a State as a whole to determine
whether the State is engaging in any clandestine activities in violation of its obligations under the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The IAEA in its effort to strengthen the effectiveness and improve
the efficiency of the safeguards through the application of the Additional Protocol is facing the
challenge of developing an “objective” mechanism for verifying the declarations under this protocol 
without employing a “mechanistic” approach. While the safeguards applied to the declared nuclear
facilities under INFCIRC/153 are based on the materials balance approach to detect diversion, the
Additional Protocol explicitly excludes “detailed nuclear material accountancy”. In addition, the IAEA 
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may not “systematically seek to verify” the information collected under the Protocol [1]. At the same
time, the evaluation of a State needs to be objective, transparent and non-discriminatory. An even
bigger challenge is to develop a methodology for detecting undeclared activities in the absence of
empirical data about the characteristics of clandestine nuclear development programs.
Acquisition path analysis is being investigated as a potential approach to State-level evaluation [2]. It
provides an exhaustive list of possible paths to develop nuclear weapons. Each path consists of a
sequence of steps that could eventually lead to a nuclear weapon. Each potential clandestine path
originates at some declared activity. Thus, for States for multiple declared activities in the nuclear fuel
cycle, there are multiple starting points for clandestine activities. For a given State, some of the paths
might not be feasible or desirable, because one or more processes in the path do not exist in the
State.
Using game theory, acquisition path analysis seeks to identify which path a State might choose to
follow in order to develop a nuclear weapon on the basis of the least cost to the State. Estimation of
the cost includes the cost associated with detection by the IAEA. In calculating optimal strategies, the
model assumes that implementation of the Additional Protocol by the IAEA has a high probability of
detecting clandestine activities, while the application of INRCIRC/153 safeguards provides a low
probability of detection. These probabilities are assumed probabilities and, to our knowledge, are not
based on any detailed analysis of processes taking place in clandestine development paths and the
detection mechanisms for each of the possible paths.
In order to make the approach more robust, one needs to develop a methodology for evaluating
probabilities of detection of clandestine activities under all possible acquisition paths. It is not an easy
task. To assign realistic probabilities of detection one needs to needs to have a fairly good description
of the activities involved in a clandestine path. Also, for each such set of activities a corresponding set
of measurements are needed for detecting them. When a State initiates a clandestine program it is
not clear whether it has a well-developed plan, it experiments with different approaches or both. As a
starting point and in the absence of any specific information, it would be reasonable to treat the
parameters of the clandestine process random variables. Similarly, the measurement system, i.e., the
types of information collected by the IAEA under the Additional Protocol may also possess some
degree of randomness, because it may not necessarily be associated with a particular stage of the
clandestine process
In this paper we describe clandestine proliferation as a process with the variables being the state of
development of a nuclear weapon and the parameters of the process being random variables. We
also treat as random variables the measured parameters and the measurement data in order to
denote the inherent uncertainties in both. In the first part of the paper we have a process model for a
clandestine weapons program followed by the development of stochastic models for the clandestine
process and the measurement system under the Additional Protocol. To estimate the state of the
clandestine proliferation process, we have derived a modified form of the Kalman filter equations that
takes into account the uncertainties in the state and measurement system matrices. In the third
section of the paper, absent any empirical data, we have used two hypothetical scenarios to
demonstrate the applicability of the model.
2. Clandestine proliferation as a process
As identified in the paper by Lister et al [2], there are multiple starting points for a clandestine nuclear
weapons program depending on the state of the legitimate nuclear industry in a given State. Any
given clandestine weapons development scenario, comprises more than one paths existing in parallel
and secretly. For example, one path would lead to the acquisition of highly enriched uranium, another
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
359
to the acquisition of highly accurate timing circuitry, yet another to the acquisition of capabilities for
precision tooling. In the present context, the term acquisition denotes capability either developed
indigenously or imported. The starting points of a clandestine weapons program are unique to each
State. For example, in a State with indigenous advanced electronics manufacturing, the capability to
acquire the trigger mechanism would already be present in the form of advanced circuitry and
engineering personnel. On the other hand, the same path for a State with non-existent or minimal
electronics manufacturing capabilities would consist of many steps until the attainment of the
capability to manufacture a working trigger mechanism. Similar reasoning applies to the paths for the
clandestine acquisition of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Thus, although the various
acquisition paths have been well documented, their internal structure, namely, how many steps each
of those paths contain, is not well-defined and it is correlated with the technological capabilities of
each State.
As with any product development, each acquisition path is a multi-step process. One can classify the
clandestine acquisition paths into two categories an ab initio clandestine and spin-off from existing
processes. An example of the first category is the case of a State without legitimate and declared
nuclear activities that starts the entire process of acquiring highly enriched uranium clandestinely. The
second category may involve starting a clandestine enrichment process at some point of a declared
nuclear fuel cycle, or the development of weapon-related technology as a spin-off from legitimate
production processes. These two categories apply to all possible weapons development paths that
lead and converge to a nuclear explosive device.
The starting point of a clandestine nuclear weapons program is the decision by a State to embark on
one. In a previous paper [3] we have identified some conditions such as regional conflicts,
militarization, etc., that could become the trigger mechanism for a State to embark on such a program.
Once such a decision has been taken, the development process, typically, consists of multiple parallel
paths for the complementary technologies that are essential for the assembly of the final device.
Regardless how each of the paths starts, the development of the relevant technologies is a discrete
step process. Each step involves, inter alia, planning, design, experimentation, testing, and
verification of design prior to the next step of development. A first order approximation is that for the
case of a spin-off path, the clandestine process once started remains completely separate from the
legitimate one. Figure 1 illustrates these two categories; part (a) indicates an ab initio development
path where cpi(k) is the kth step of the ith clandestine acquisition path with cpi(0) the initial step 
consisting of the decision to start the program; part (b) indicates an acquisition path as a spin-off of a
legitimate path pi where the decision to embark on a clandestine program is taken at some stage pi(n)
of the legitimate path. For example, a State with a declared enrichment program at 5% makes a
decision to start a clandestine program to obtain highly enriched uranium. In such a case the starting
point of the clandestine path would be the expertise and technology associated with the enrichment
level of 5%. Similar analogies apply to the complementary technologies needed to assemble a
nuclear device.
The two types of clandestine paths are similar in form, but differ on the initial conditions and possibly
on the transition parameters between successive steps. For example, initial conditions in terms of
technology and expertise for a spin-off path can be assumed to be stronger than those of an ab initio
one. For either path, the transition between sequential development steps can be expressed as
( 1) ( ( ))                                                         (1)i i icp k f cp k 
The function ( ( ))i if cp k relates the (k+1)
th stage of the development process to the preceding one. 
We will use the uranium enrichment process to illustrate this relationship. The process to obtain HEU
from NU or LEU is sequential consisting of multiple steps. Each step involves varying degrees of effort
measured in terms of kilogram Separative Work Unit commonly abbreviated as SWU. At each step,
the effort is a function of the concentration of uranium in the feed material, the enriched output and
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Figure 1. Two general categories of clandestine acquisition paths, ab initio (a) and spin-off (b).
the depleted stream. For example, the number of SWU required to attain a given level of enrichment
varies inversely with the amount of uranium left in the depleted stream and vice versa. Similarly, for a
given level of enrichment, the number of SWU decreases as the concentration of uranium in the feed
material increases [4],[5].
A number of factors affect the transition from one level of enrichment to the next, such as the
arrangement of centrifuges into cascades which consist of groups of centrifuges connected in parallel
to form stages that are connected in series. There are different categories of cascades depending on
the number of centrifuges per stage and the handling of the waste per stage. There are simple and
recycle cascades, symmetric and asymmetric cascades, tapered and square cascades to name some
of the most common configurations. Regardless of the configuration, factors affecting the efficient
operation of the enrichment process include, in addition to the optimization of performance of each
centrifuge, the flow rate and the material passes from one stage to the next. In addition to the
complexity of the enrichment process, the centrifuges are constructed from special alloys of high
quality steel and aluminum. Furthermore, although gas centrifuge is the most widely used method of
enrichment, there are additional methods of enrichment, some less efficient such as the older gas
diffusion method as well as experimental ones. They fall into the broad categories of laser separation,
chemical and ion exchange, thermal diffusion aerodynamic separation and electromagnetic isotope
separation [6], [7].
Another factor entering into the equation for the transition from one step of the process to the next
may be the potential asymmetry of the effort involved in the transitions between steps. For example,
one tonne of uranium feed requires approximately 800 SWU-900 SWU to achieve an enrichment level
of 4% - 5% for power reactors, 1100 SWU for an enrichment level of 20% for research reactors power
reactors and 1300 SWU for an enrichment level of 90% for nuclear weapons [8].
The foregoing example illustrates the complexity of the processes involved in the development of a
nuclear weapons program. Similar examples of complex processes can be developed for the
technologies required to transform an explosive nuclear device into a usable nuclear weapon. Thus,
the function ( )if  has obviously many parameters with unknown interrelations. However, if one bears 
in mind that technological improvements generally take place incrementally, one can refine the
successive steps in a given product development line to consist of small increments. Under such
assumption, within each development step, the transition function can be assumed to be linear and
expressed as
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( ) ( ) ( 1)             (2)k k k x P x
where ( )kx is the state of development at the thk stage of the thi clandestine path and ( )kP a matrix 
of the parameters that determine the transition from the ( 1)stk  to the thk stage of development. 
There is no known model in the open literature for the development of a clandestine product related to
nuclear weapons. There is, however, a wealth of literature on product development and technological
innovation [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. Some of those models describing the process of innovation
are rather simplistic in that they describe a sequence of steps basic research, applied research, and
development. Such a broad definition has come into existence primarily as a mechanism for achieving
public policy objectives through the allocation of funding rather than as a tool for predicting innovation
[15]. More substantive and promising work has been on processes for the development of commercial
products. Models describing the development of products fall into four general categories. There are
models that describe actual product development processes, theoretical models for ideal processes,
didactic models that are used as tools to visualize and simplify actual development activities, and
management tools used in specific companies to visualize and organize their internal development
activities. Some of the theoretical models for product development are partitioned into new product
development models and incremental development models, which refer to products that are based on
but are substantially different from existing product lines. A substantial amount of research is devoted
to the so called “fuzzy front end” in product development that comprises all activities before the formal 
product design stage. Fuzzy front end is the first stage in a new product development process. It is a
set of activities that take place from the moment an idea is generated until it is either discarded or
approved for the development of the product. The extensive research in the area of commercial new
product development has not resulted in the development of predictive models for technological
innovation, because the processes involved in technological progress are neither orderly nor
understood. Some have described the process as chaotic with non-predictable steps involving
learning through feedback [16].
3. A stochastic model
The foregoing cursory review of models of commercial product development illustrates the challenges
inherent in the efforts to develop objective procedures for detecting clandestine nuclear programs
when no predictive process models are available even for commercial products. For a given State
there is uncertainty first on how the effort to develop a particular technology critical to the
development of a clandestine weapon is organized and second whether or not the effort would be
successful. In other words, for practical purposes there is total lack of measurable information
concerning any clandestine activity.
3.1. A clandestine proliferation model
In the absence of a deterministic predictive model for the evolution of technology and the high degree
of uncertainty surrounding the existence of a clandestine program or the lack there off, it would be
reasonable to consider the parameters of the matrix ( )kP to be random variables as a starting point 
for the development of a process model. As an example, if the process at each step consists of two
variables, the transition between successive stages is given by equation (3).
1 11 12 1
2 21 22 2
( ) ( 1)
  =  (3)
( ) ( 1)
x k p p x k
x k p p x k
     
          
 
Each of the elements of the matrix P denotes the strength of the transition of each process variable in
the development path and has a range [ 1, 1] . For example, 12 21 0p p   and 11 22 1p p  
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indicate that process variable 1( )x k depends only on process variable 1( 1)x k  and is not affected by 
process variable
2 ( 1)x k  , in other words, the two variables are completely decoupled. On the other 
hand, if the two variables a fully coupled, 11 12 21 22 1.p p p p      
In general, a clandestine development process at the thk state of development may be described by 
equation (4).
 ( ) ( 1) ( 1) (k)                                               (4)k k k   x P x Gw  
where P is an xn nmatrix relating the transition of the n states within each development step and 
(k)w a vector denoting the process noise at each transition. 
3.2. Measurements under the Additional Protocol
Although the Additional Protocol requires the collection of a broad range of data, it explicitly excludes
material accountancy and a “mechanistic” approach as tools for verification. At the same time, the
IAEA is charged with developing an “objective” approach for detecting clandestine activities. Under
such constraints, the challenging task for the IAEA is to devise a measurement system that seeks to
identify the unknown ( )kx  of development. Since the IAEA has no direct access to the clandestine 
development paths, if such paths exist, it cannot have in place a specified measurement system for
an unknown clandestine development stage. Thus, the information obtained under the Additional
Protocol, since it is provided by the State, may or may not have some relationship to the state of
development of the clandestine stage that is not clearly specified. This relationship is given by
equation (5).
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )          (5)k k k k y C x v
where ( )ky denotes the measurements (data) obtained by the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, 
( )kC is a matrix relating the unknown states at the thk measurement instant to the state of 
clandestine development and ( )kv is the measurement noise. In the absence of an a priori known 
relationship between the data collected by the IAEA and the clandestine state of development, the
elements of the matrix ( )kC may also be characterized, at first, as random variables until more 
experience is gained in the collection of relevant data.
4. Estimating the state of clandestine development
The problem of estimating the state ( )kx of a process corrupted by noise on the basis of periodic 
noisy measurements has been solved through the design of Kalman filters [17], [18], [19]. These are
linear, recursive filters that minimize the variance of the error between the actual state ( )kx and the 
estimate of the state ˆ( )kx . The basic operation involves two steps. First, the best estimate at the 
measurement instant ( 1)k  , ˆ( 1 1),k k x is projected to next measurement instant ( ),k i.e.,
ˆ( 1).k k x The projected estimate is given by equation (6), where ( 1)kP is the process at ( 1)k
.
ˆ ˆ( | 1) ( 1) ( 1| 1)              (6)k k k k kx P x
Also, projected from ( 1)k to ( )k is the error covariance matrix given by equation (7), where 
( | 1) ( 1) ( 1| 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1| 1) ( 1)                 (7)T Tk k k k k k k k k k          Q P Q P G W G  
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Subsequently, the projected estimate is corrected on the basis of the new information obtained from
the measurements ( )ky to yield the updated best estimate ˆ( )k kx given by equation (8). 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( 1) ( 1 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( 1 1)               (8)k k k k k k k k k k k           x P x Γ y C P x  
The filter gain ( )kΓ is calculated from the projected error covariance ( | 1)k k Q , and the 
measurements ( )ky and is given by equation (9) where ( )kR is the covariance matrix of the 
measurement noise.
1
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( )                        (9)T Tk k k k k k k k k

     Γ Q C C Q C R  
Using the filter gain ( )kΓ  the updated error covariance becomes (eq.10) 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  (10)
T Tk k k k k k k k k k k    Q I Γ C Q I Γ C Γ R Γ
In contrast to conventional state estimation problems where the processes and the measurement
systems are known and deterministic, the clandestine processes being unknown by their nature, can
be viewed as stochastic and the elements of the state transition matrix ( )kP be independent random 
variables. The measurement system ( )kC can either be described either as deterministic or 
stochastic. In the case of the safeguards under INFCIRC 153, where the relationship between the
nuclear fuel cycle and the measurements is well defined, the elements of ( )kC are deterministic. This 
is not the case where a clandestine process is not well defined. Under these conditions, the closest
one can come to describing the elements of the measurement system is to consider them as
independent random variables.
In this paper we have developed a modified set of Kalman filter equations by taking into account the
stochastic nature of both the state transition matrix ( )kP and the measurement matrix ( )kC , in other 
words, the state transition matrix is given by { ( )} { }ijE k E pP where ijp  are independent random 
variables, and the measurement matrix { ( )} { }ijE k E c   C . The projected state estimate is given 
by equation (6a) where { ( 1)}E kP denotes the expected value of the state transition matrix. 
ˆ ˆ( | 1) { ( 1)} ( 1| 1)                    (6a)k k E k k kx P x  
The projected error covariance given by equation (6a) takes into account the statistical properties of
the state transition matrix where iiq is the 
thi diagonal element of the error covariance matrix, 2
jip
 is 
the variance of the ( )thji  parameter of the state transition matrix, iiw is the 
thi diagonal element of the 
system noise covariance matrix and 2
jig
 is the variance of the ( )thji element of the measurement 
noise matrix.
   
   
2
1
( | 1) ( 1) ( 1 | 1) ( 1)
diag ( 1 | 1) ( 1), 1, , (7a)







k k E k k k E k
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

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  
      
  
    










w k k k j n

  
      
  

The updated state estimate is given by equation (8a) where the state transition matrix and the
measurement matrix are expressed in terms of their statistical properties.
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 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) { ( 1)} ( 1 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) { ( 1)} ( 1 1)       (8a)k k E k k k k k E k E k k k           x P x Γ y C P x  
The Kalman filter gain is given by equation (9a), where
iiq is the ( )
thii element of the error covariance 
matrix and 2
jic
 is the variance of the ( )thji element of the measurement matrix. 
 
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C Q C R
Finally, the updated error covariance is given by equation (10a) where 
ji is the ( )
thji element of the 
filter gain ( )kΓ . 
   
2
1
( ) ( ) { ( )} ( 1) ( ) { ( )} ( ) ( ) ( )






k k k E k k k k E k k k k
k q k k j n 

    
  
    
  

Q I Γ C Q I Γ C Γ R Γ
5. Some illustrative examples
Let (0)x denote the starting point of the diversion process that can be considered as the state of 
development at the breakout instant. Successful achievement of a desirable objective for the
particular development path is indicated by the equilibrium state e x 0 . On the other hand, if the 
clandestine process is not successful in achieving the desirable goal, the equilibrium state will not be
reached and the norm of the state vector will be greater than the norm of (0)x , i.e. ( ) (0)k x x . 
The information collected by the IAEA from the State is indicated by ( )ky and is updated annually. 
Thus, the interval between successive measurements is one year. During any such interval, the
clandestine process transition matrix ( )kP remains constant, but it may change between successive 
measurement instances, i.e. ( 1) ( ) ( 1)k k k   P P P . In evaluating the State as a whole, 
the objective of the IAEA would be to estimate the state of development of the particular clandestine
process on the basis of the information obtained from the annual measurements regardless whether
the process has been successful and reached equilibrium or unsuccessful. The noises corrupting the
process and the measurement system are considered Gaussian with zero mean and specified
variances, i.e., { (k)}= { (k-1)}=0E Ew w , E{ (k) (j)}= ( ),T kw w W for j k  and 
   ( ) ( 1) 0E k E k  v v ,  ( ) ( ) ( )TE k j kv v R  for  j k . For the purposes of this analysis 
we limit the number of state variables for the particular process to five, i.e.,
1 2 3 4 5( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
T k x k x k x k x k x kx . If the particular effort is based on trial and error, it might 
or might not be successful. In such a case, the elements of the state transition matrix can be
considered random with values ( ) [ 1,1]ijp k   with +1 and -1 indicating strong positive and negative 
feedback, respectively, for a particular state. In assigning values to the elements of the measurement
matrix (k)C  we have considered the combination of the total lack of information available to the IAEA 
about the particular clandestine process and the accumulated experience by the IAEA in safeguards
implementation. The accumulated experience can be represented as positive elements in the
measurement matrix modified by the uncertainties concerning the connection between the actual
state of the clandestine process and the information given to the IAEA by the State. For the purpose
of these illustrative examples we have used the following values:
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0.1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0.3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
( ) ; ( )0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 1
k kW G  
1 1 0 0 0 0.4 0 0
(k)= 0 0 1 1 0 ; ( ) 0 0.5 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.4
kC R  
5.1. Case I – Clandestine process completely chaotic
In an extreme case, consider a State without any substantive experience with technological
development that initiates a clandestine process. In this case, the elements ( )ijp k   are uniformly 
distributed in the range [ 1,1]  with { ( )} 0ijE p k  . Normally, one would perform a Monte Carlo 
simulation. For this paper, we use only some sample calculations to illustrate the applicability of the
proposed approach. To illustrate a completely chaotic development process, we used a (5 x 5) state
transition matrix with each of the elements generated randomly with uniform distribution in the range [-
1,1].
0.6276 0.2131 0.8928 0.2499 0.5500
0.6694 0.8244 0.3616 0.3404 0.5915
( ) 0.5344 0.8601 0.9001 0.6836 0.4271
0.3743 0.7177 0.0242 0.4427 0.8577
0.4642 0.4996 0.1854 0.5210 0.0417
kP
The following cases were investigated. In Case Ia, the elements of the state transition matrix
remained constant for every iteration, i.e., (0) (1) (2) ( )k   P P P P denoting the same 
level of chaos at each stage of the process. In Case Ib, the elements of the state matrix were modified
randomly in the range [0.9,1.1] ijp , and the elements of the measurement matrix were modified 
randomly in the range [0.75,1.25] ijc where ijp and ijc are the values of the initial matrices. In Case 
Ic, the elements of the state and measurement matrices were assigned values at random in the
ranges [0.5,1.5] ijp and [0.75,1.25] ijc , respectively. 
For each of the three cases, the initial state (0)x of the diversion path is assumed to be known, 
because it the state of the declared process from which the particular clandestine path diverged. As
expected, the clandestine process did not converge to an equilibrium state, because the eigenvalues
of the state matrix were outside the region of stability of the process, which is the interior of the unit
circle. Figure 2 shows the norm of the state vector as a function of the iterations. As the uncertainty
about the value of each parameter of the state transition matrix increased, the divergence became
more rapid, which of course, was not unexpected. In other words, a completely chaotic development
process would be unlikely to converge.
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Figure 2. State trajectories for Case I; the elements of the state transition and measurement matrices are
random variables.
The interest, however, was to determine whether the estimator would be able to track the state vector.
As shown in Figure 3, that plots the norm of the error vector ˆ( ) ( )k kx x , the estimator was able to 
track the state trajectory only in the case where the values of the elements of the state transition
matrix and the measurement matrix remained constant for each iteration. In other words, although the
parameters of both matrices were selected arbitrarily, and the process diverged, the estimator was
able to follow the state trajectory and converge to a steady state estimation error within a few
iterations.
Figure 3. Trajectories of the norm of the estimation error vector for Case I.
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5.2. Case II – Clandestine process achieves desirable objective.
At the other extreme, a State with substantial technological expertise could organize a clandestine
process with high level of confidence that the process will result in the desirable outcome, i.e., the
equilibrium state will be reached starting from some initial state. For this case, the elements of the
state transition matrix are not completely random, because they represent parameters of a well-
organized process. In such cases, for the system to converge to an equilibrium state, the eigenvalues
of the state transition matrix must be located inside the unit circle. The stochastic nature of the
process is reflected in randomness of the elements of the state transition matrix subject to the
constraint that the eigenvalues remain in the interior of the unit circle. For this case, the elements of
( )kP were arbitrarily selected such that ( ) [ 1,1]ijp k   subject to the preceding constraint and are 
given by
0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0.1
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
( ) 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2
0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5
kP
The eigenvalues of ( )kP are { 0.3641,   0.8149,  0.7060,   0.3716 0.0252} j
As in the preceding case, three cases were examined. For case IIa, the elements of the state matrix
remain constant for every iteration, i.e., (0) (1) (2) ( )k   P P P P  indicating the 
clandestine process is equally well coordinated at every step of the given diversion path. For case IIb,
the elements of the state matrix were modified randomly in the range [0.9,1.1] ijp , and the elements 
of the measurement matrix were modified randomly in the range [0.75,1.25] ijc where ijp and ijc are 
the values of the initial matrices. In Case IIc, the elements of the state and measurement matrices
were assigned values at random in the ranges [0.5,1.5] ijp and [0.75,1.25] ijc , respectively. For the 
last two cases, the random variations in the parameters of the state transition matrix and the
measurement matrix have been introduced to indicate the uncertainties in both the process and the
measurements inherent at each stage of the clandestine path.
For each of these cases, the state converges to an equilibrium state, i.e., the objective of the
clandestine operation is achieved as shown in Figure 4 even with uncertainties as large as 50% in the
values of the elements of the state transition matrix. Thus, the estimator would be able to track the
state trajectory as shown in Figure 5. In other words, a clandestine diversion path would ultimately
lead to a successful outcome under a reasonably planned effort. Similarly, the application of the
safeguards under the Additional Protocol should be able to detect such a diversion path after a
number of iterations. It should be noted, however, that, for the present measurement schedule at one-
year intervals, it would take a number of years for the estimator to converge to some equilibrium value
where the estimation error reaches a steady state. Furthermore, the estimation error will never
converge to zero, due to the uncertainties in the values of the process and measurement parameters.
In other words, no definitive conclusion can be reached about the existence of a clandestine diversion
path.
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Figure 4.  State trajectories for Case II; the elements of the state transition matrix and the measurement matrix
are random variables subject to the constraint that the process is stable.
Figure 5.  Trajectories of the norm of the estimation error vectors for Case II indicating that the estimation error
has reached a non-zero equilibrium.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have addressed the problem of applying an objective criterion to the evaluation of a
State as a whole in the absence of a monitoring system designed to detect clandestine operations
using some optimality criterion. In typical state estimation problems, the processes are generally
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known both in terms of their variables and their structure. For such problems recursive estimation of
the values of the internal variables is a well-developed field even for processes that are characterized
by some variability in their parameters. However, the problem of detecting clandestine nuclear
weapons development programs presents unique challenges for two main reasons. There is no
reliable model for a typical clandestine development process.  Also, the Additional Protocol restricts
the ability of the IAEA to verify all information supplied by the State and collect any other data that
might be needed for detection. Under those constraints, the development of techniques for evaluating
sparse information to characterize an unspecified process is a very difficult task. In such cases one
option available is to use statistical techniques that rely on incomplete specification of a clandestine
process and uncertainties about the values of the available information. In this paper we have shown
that, even under great uncertainty, it is possible to converge to a solution in cases where a
clandestine process achieves its objective. However, to achieve detection, multiple measurement
steps are needed. This process can be improved, by pursuing two parallel paths. One avenue of
research would be to build upon the foundation of Critical Path Analysis. For each of the possible
critical paths, one could develop one or more corresponding process models that a clandestine
development program could follow. The data collected under the Additional Protocol would be used to
evaluate the performance of such process models and, also, to determine the sufficiency of the
information for detecting the state of a given clandestine process. Such an iterative process would be
used as a learning mechanism for improving the measurement system. In other words, the type of
information collected by the IAEA on an annual basis would be modified and augmented on the basis
of the results of the evaluation of the preceding year.
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Formalizing Acquisition Path Analysis for the IAEA’s
State-Level Concept
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Abstract
The IAEA’s Department of Safeguards has embarked on an evolutionary process
to more fully develop and apply the State-level concept for safeguards implementation.
In an attempt to direct safeguards to areas of greatest proliferation risk, this concept
makes use of all safeguards-relevant information available in order to focus and prior-
itize its safeguards activities for a State.
A key component is the development of a State-level Approach which consists of ana-
lyzing acquisition paths, establishing and prioritizing technical objectives, and identi-
fying applicable safeguards measures. The methodology to accomplish this is based on
a three-step-approach: network modeling, network analysis, and strategic assessment.
The network modeling step assesses and formalizes the State’s nuclear capabilities as
well as other state-specific factors concerning relevant proliferation scenarios. The
network analysis step gives a ranking of all plausible acquisition paths including a
visualization of the paths. Finally, the strategic assessment evaluates the State’s pro-
liferation and compliance options as well as the IAEA’s set of technical objectives and
subsequent safeguards measures.
In this paper, a hypothetical State model was developed in order to test the method-
ology’s performance. Therefore, an Excel spreadsheet with all necessary state-level
factors has been created. Afterwards, a Python software module based on graph the-
oretical algorithms was applied to produce a comprehensive list of ranked acquisition
paths including their visualization. The following step of the strategic evaluation is
mainly based on the concept of the Nash equilibrium resulting in a stable combination
of the State’s and the IAEA’s strategies. This formal and automatic procedure offers
the advantage of gaining results in a comprehensive and non-discriminative manner.
1 Introduction
Since the first ideas for supervising nuclear material, the verification system has evolved
constantly. After gaining first experiences with item-specific safeguards according to the
commitments in INFCIRC/66, the system of international safeguards was established by
the signature and ratification of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. The treaty
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implementation has mainly been governed by comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA)
and later the additional protocol (AP) with Integrated Safeguards.
In order to verify the State’s compliance to these provisions, the IAEA has been carrying
out a mechanistic, check-list approach to safeguards with limited success. This method has
been superseded over the past years by a holistic approach called the State-level concept
(SLC). The SLC’s main idea is to move away from material centric approaches to a system
analysis view of nuclear proliferation which clearly identifies the actors, their possibilities
and their risks. Due to its general and comprehensive nature, the SLC has great potential
to replace voluntary offer agreements (VOA) in nuclear weapon States (NWS) and to be
used in other fields of treaty verification.
Underneath the new paradigmatic view to nuclear verification, the State-level concept es-
sentially consists of three processes which help to develop State-level safeguards approaches
(SLA) [1]:
1. Identification of plausible acquisition paths.
2. Specification and prioritization of State-specific technical objectives (TO).
3. Identification of safeguards measures to address the technical objectives.
This paper concentrates on the first step of this process which is also known as acquisition
path analysis (APA). APA is defined as the analysis of all plausible sequences of activities
which a State could consider to acquire weapons usable material [2]. The purpose of the
APA is to determine whether a proposed set of safeguards measures is sufficient. Therefore,
some overlap to the second step, the definition of technical objectives, is obvious.
The approach to acquisition path analysis used in this paper has advanced over the past
years [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Motivated from the fact that the SLC tries to come up with adaptive
safeguards approaches, the main idea of this approach to APA is to account for differentia-
tion without discrimination. In order to accomplish this, the available safeguards-relevant
information is processed in an objective, transparent, reproducible, standardized and well-
documented way in contrast to classical reasoning-with-words or black-box-approaches.
Besides the methodology and its progress, the new verification paradigm has to be compati-
ble with the existing approach to nuclear material accounting, a major element of traditional
safeguards. Therefore, it will be shown how performance targets can be derived from a risk
assessment of the State’s as well as the inspectorate’s strategic options.
In the following, the methodology and its recent enhancements will be presented. Then, a
discussion on the relationship between game theory and performance targets will be carried
out. Afterwards, a case study focusing on the strategic assessment part of the method will
be shown. Finally, conclusions of the paper and an outlook on future work will be presented.
2 Materials and Methods
The given approach to acquisition path analysis consists of three general steps: First, the
potential acquisition network is modeled based on the IAEA’s physical model and experts’
evaluations. Second, using this model all plausible acquisition paths are extracted auto-
matically. Third, the State’s and the inspectorate’s options are assessed strategically. The
workflow is depicted in Figure 1. In the following, a description of the three stages will be
given. A more in depth discussion can be found in Listner et al. [8].
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Figure 1. Three step approach to acuisition path analysis.
Figure 2. Generic Phyiscal Model.
During the first step of the process, also known as network modeling, a State-specific ac-
quisition model is set up. Mathematically, such a network can be seen as a directed graph
with material forms represented by nodes and processes represented by edges. The IAEA’s
physical model [9] serves as a starting point, where all proliferation relevant materials and
processes are formally described in a general acquisition model for nuclear weapons usable
material.1 Based on the IAEA’s physical model, a mathematical model has been derived
that encodes all the potential materials and activities in a single directed graph (see Figure
2).
There are four categories of processes in this model: diversion from existing facilities (div),
undeclared import (imp), misuse of existing facilities (mis), processing in clandestine facili-
ties (cland). When assessing a State’s options for acquiring nuclear weapons usable material,
1In principle, also the weaponization step itself could be modeled using a graph theoretic approach.
However, due to the definition of acquisition path analysis given in International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) [2], this paper’s approach ends at weapons usable material.
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specific processes of these four types are included in or excluded from the model. E.g. if a
State does not have an enrichment facility on its ground, all edges of type misuse in con-
nection with enrichment will be removed from the model. On the other hand, there will be
always the option for enriching in clandestine facilities and hence these processes will remain
in every State’s case.
Besides the mere presence of edges in the model, these edges will be assessed in terms of
attractiveness for the particular State. Three dimensions of attractiveness are used which
originate in the GIF methodology [10]: Technical Difficulty (TD), Proliferation Time (PT)
and Proliferation Cost (PC).2 For each process, the three dimensions are graded based on
expert judgment. The grades range from 0 meaning a very attractive option to 3 being
very unattractive. Using the arithmetic mean for each edge e, a single edge weight we is
calculated from these figures.
After having specified the edge weights, it is necessary to model the inspectorate’s side i.e.
the possible technical objectives t with their respective non-detection probability β(t)e on a
specific edge e. Also the inspectorate costs ct generated by technical objective t have to be
quantified. Although no specific safeguards measures have been determined at this point,
an expert can estimate the costs for attaining a given detection probability based on expe-
rience and knowledge about the State’s capabilities, fuel cycle as well as existing safeguards
approaches. While these figures can be specified for the edges related to the declared fuel
cycle, i.e. misuse and diversion, deriving this information for the undeclared processes, i.e.
undeclared import and clandestine processing, is yet an unsolved task. However, the given
approach assumes that such a quantification can in principle be done for all types of pro-
cesses, no matter whether they take place in declared facilities or elsewhere in the State.
As a result of the first step, a directed multi-graph is produced that represents the State’s
options for acquiring weapons usable material including their attractiveness in terms of
time, cost and technical difficulty. Furthermore, also the inspectorate’s options to control
the activities are given, including the costs and non-detection probabilities in specific areas
of the State’s acquisition network.
This directed multi-graph is now analyzed in terms of all technically plausible acquisition
paths. In order to accomplish this, a fully automated software extracts all paths from node
’Origin’ to any node representing weapons usable material by applying the Depth-First
Search (DFS) algorithm [11, pp. 540-549]. For each path pi, the overall attractiveness is





The list of paths is then reordered by attractiveness and all paths are visualized. It has
to be emphasized that not only the shortest path but all technically plausible paths are
considered. Therefore, this approach is comprehensive and avoids to ignore technically less
attractive paths which could be strategically interesting.
Using the results of the first and second step, especially the list of paths with their respective
attractiveness as well as the non-detection probabilities of technical objectives, the third step
assesses the strategies of both parties, i.e. the State and the inspectorate. On the one hand,
all acquisition paths and the option of compliant behavior are considered to be the State’s
strategy set. On the other hand, the strategies of the IAEA are all combinations of technical
2These dimensions only represent technical aspects of proliferation as if no inspectorate was present. The
interplay of State and inspectorate will be considered separately in the third stage of the process.
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No Alarm Alarm
Compliant Behavior (0, 0) (−f,−e)
Non-compliant Behavior along path i (di,−c) (−b,−a)
Table 1. Game Theoretic Payoffs.
objectives (TOC) that have been defined in the first part of the process. The overall non-






For each strategy combination a pair of payoff values for State and Inspectorate (H1, H2)
can be defined (see Table 1). For the IAEA, the strategic outcomes in increasing order of
preference are undetected non-compliance (−c), detected non-compliance (−a), false alarm
(−e) and compliance without alarm (0). These parameters can be selected freely as long as
the ordering is kept.
Regarding the State, the strategic outcomes ordered increasingly by preference are detected
non-compliance (−b), false alarm (−f), compliance without alarm (0) and successful ac-
quisition along path i (di). The path length li calculated in step two is used to obtain the





The decision whether an alarm is raised by the inspectorate depends on the non-detection
probabilities. Hence, for each strategy combination an expected outcome for both players
can be calculated. In case the State decides to follow an acquisition path i and the IAEA has
TOC j in place, this payoff for the State is given by the expected benefit from a successful
acquisition plus the risk of getting caught red-handed, i.e.
H
(i)
1 = diβij − b(1− βij). (4)
For the IAEA, the expected payoff can be derived from the sum of the risks of detected and
undetected non-compliance , i.e.
H
(i)
2 = −cβij − a(1− βij). (5)
In case the State behaves in compliance with its given commitments, the outcome for both
sides is only determined by the false alarm risk with false alarm probability α, i.e.
H
(compliant)
1 = −fα (6)
for the State and
H
(compliant)
2 = −eα (7)
for the IAEA.
Based on these considerations, a stable strategy combination (H∗1 , H
∗
2 ) known as the Nash
equilibrium can be calculated using the Lemke-Howson-algorithm [12]. The Nash equilib-
rium is characterized by the fact that its impossible for either of the two actors to deviate
unilaterally from the equilibrium strategy and increase its expected payoff. Hence, it seems
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rational for both players not to deviate and pursue the equilibrium strategy. This very
limited definition of rationality only means that the actors care for the risks and benefits
they are facing.
Using the equilibrium payoff value for the IAEA and scaling the IAEA’s payoff parameters
to c = 1, it is possible to define effectiveness as
E = 100% +H∗2 . (8)
In case of 0% effectiveness, the equilibrium ends in non-compliance with no possibility of
detection. For 100% effectiveness, compliance with no false alarm is achieved almost surely.
As the ultimate goal of acquisition path analysis is the selection of a TOC inducing compliant
behavior (expressed by the term sufficient in the APA definition), this paper proposes to
use a TOC leading to a high effectiveness value in the Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, in cases where compliant behavior can be induced in the Nash equilibrium, it
is also possible and reasonable to gain an increase in efficiency. By iterating over a cost
threshold W and calculating the Nash equilibrium for this range of values, a strategy with
a given level of effectiveness at minimum costs can be selected.
3 Strategic Assessment using Performance Targets and
Game Theory
In the previous section, it has been shown how a game theoretic, highly quantitative ap-
proach to technical objectives determination could look like. Alternatively, a more qual-
itative approach based on the idea of performance targets [13] can be used, which gives
more flexibility to the analyst. This section will show that the philosophy behind these two
different approaches to APA can be considered to be equivalent.
A performance target on the path level can be defined as the minimum detection probability
that is needed in order to deter a State from pursuing this path. This means that if perfor-
mance targets are properly defined for a given set of acquisition paths, these paths can be
considered to be adequately covered by safeguards measures. Hence, the State is likely to
act in compliance with its given commitments.
More formally, one can say that for given acquisition path i and technical objectives combi-
nation j, path coverage is achieved if the risk for the State to get caught along the path is
higher than the benefit of a successful acquisition3, i.e.
diβij − b(1− βij) ≤ 0. (9)
In the past, the IAEA has considered it to be sufficient to obtain a detection probability
of 90% in nuclear facilities with high potential to be used in nuclear weapons programmes.
Transferring this to the idea of acquisition path analysis, for the most attractive path a
performance target of 90% should be reached. As it has been shown in Avenhaus and Canty
[14], this directly influences the choice of the payoff values in Equation 9, i.e.
0 ≥ d1 · 0.1− b · 0.9,
9 ≥ d1/b.
3For reasons of simplicity, false alarm risks are ignored in this paper. A similar argument can be made,
if false alarm risks are included in the model.
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Because the payoff values are ranging from 0 to 1 (see Equation 3) with d1 = 1, dethe State’s
payoff for a successful acquisition is b = 1/9.
Using these parameter values derived for the most attractive path, one can reinsert them









This gives a rationale to define the path performance targets for the detection probability
based on its attractiveness as
PTi = DP
(min)




This calculation of performance targets can be used within the methodology of Budlong
Sylvester et al. [15] in order to specify the appropriate technical objectives. If all performance
targets are fulfilled, it is guaranteed under the assumptions of the model that the State will
chose to behave in compliance with its commitments.
While the methodology in Budlong Sylvester et al. [15] leaves the decision up to the analyst
which technical objectives to choose, the methodology in Section 2 uses an optimization
technique to determine them. From the standpoint of the underlying philosophy however,
both methods are equivalent.
4 Example Case Study
In order to prove the feasibility of the concept described in the previous sections, a case
study was carried out. Therefore, a hypothetical State with a complex civil nuclear fuel
cycle and comprehensive capabilities was modeled. Attractiveness values as well as costs
and detection probabilities for technical objectives were determined using expert judgement.
Following that, a set of 2060 plausible acquisition paths was calculated and sorted according
to their attractiveness. Furthermore, a visualization was generated (see Figure 3).
In order to allow for a manual determination of technical objectives according to Section
3, 21 paths out of the 2060 paths were selected for further analysis. At this stage of the
process, performance targets were calculated for the selected paths using Equation 11. The
selected paths with their associated attractiveness, payoff values and performance targets
are displayed in Table 2.
Finally, the strategic assessment, restricted on the 21 paths, was carried out using an ap-
proach which iterated over the cost limit W as it was described in Section 2. As previous
studies have shown, the results are highly dependent on the detection probability for clan-
destine activities, DPcland, the algorithm ran for different values of this parameter. The
results are displayed in Figure 4. The alternative approach to technical objectives selection
as described in Budlong Sylvester et al. [15] was beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusions and Outlook
This paper shows how acquisition path analysis can be carried out using a comprehensive
methodology which is yet compatible with the principles defined in Cooley [1]. Furthermore,
two possibilities for determining technical objectives were proposed and evaluated. The first
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Figure 3. Visualization of the 5th most attractive path. The path highlighted in magenta
represents the diversion of low enriched UF6 from the declared enrichment facility and


























Figure 4. Effectiveness chart retrieved from game theoretic analysis.
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i Description li PTi di
1 Origin -imp- Direct Use Enrichment Product 2.33 90% 1.0
5 Origin -div- Indirect Use Enrichment Product -mis- Direct Use En-
richment Product
3.0 88% 0.78
8 Origin -div- Irradiated Fuel -mis- Direct Use Reprocessed Material 3.67 85% 0.64
14 Origin -div- Enrichment Feed -cla- Direct Use Enrichment Product 4.33 83% 0.54
22 Origin -div- Indirect Use Fuel -mis- Irradiated Fuel -mis- Direct Use
Reprocessed Material
4.33 83% 0.54
27 Origin -imp- Indirect Use Reprocessed Material -mis- Enrichment
Feed -mis- Direct Use Enrichment Product
4.67 82% 0.5
39 Origin -div- Source Material -mis- Enrichment Feed -cla- Direct Use
Enrichment Product
5.0 81% 0.47
40 Origin -imp- Source Material -cla- Enrichment Feed -mis- Direct Use
Enrichment Product
5.0 81% 0.47
44 Origin -imp- Natural Uranium Fuel -mis- Irradiated Fuel -cla- Direct
Use Reprocessed Material
5.0 81% 0.47
58 Origin -div- Indirect Use Fuel -cla- Irradiated Fuel -cla- Direct Use
Reprocessed Material
5.33 80% 0.44
65 Origin -imp- Natural Uranium Fuel -mis- Natural Uranium Fuel Feed
-mis- Enrichment Feed -mis- Direct Use Enrichment Product
5.33 80% 0.44
67 Origin -imp- Indirect Use Fuel -mis- Indirect Use Fuel Feed -mis- In-
direct Use Enrichment Product -mis- Direct Use Enrichment Product
5.33 80% 0.44
68 Origin -div- Source Material Resources -cla- Source Material -cla-
Enrichment Feed -mis- Direct Use Enrichment Product
5.33 80% 0.44
73 Origin -div- Enrichment Feed -mis- Indirect Use Enrichment Product
-cla- Direct Use Enrichment Product
5.67 79% 0.41
88 Origin -imp- Source Material -mis- Enrichment Feed -mis- Indirect
Use Enrichment Product -mis- Direct Use Enrichment Product
5.67 79% 0.41
95 Origin -imp- Natural Uranium Fuel -mis- Natural Uranium Fuel Feed
-cla- Enrichment Feed -mis- Direct Use Enrichment Product
5.67 79% 0.41
125 Origin -div- Source Material Resources -cla- Source Material -cla-
Enrichment Feed -cla- Direct Use Enrichment Product
6.0 78% 0.39
164 Origin -div- Source Material Resources -mis- Source Material -mis-
Natural Uranium Fuel Feed -mis- Natural Uranium Fuel -mis- Irra-
diated Fuel -mis- Direct Use Reprocessed Material
6.33 77% 0.37
262 Origin -imp- Indirect Use Reprocessed Material -mis- Natural Ura-
nium Fuel Feed -mis- Natural Uranium Fuel -mis- Irradiated Fuel
-cla- Direct Use Reprocessed Material
7.33 74% 0.32
538 Origin -div- Source Material Resources -mis- Source Material -mis-
Enrichment Feed -mis- Indirect Use Enrichment Product -mis- Indi-
rect Use Fuel Feed -mis- Indirect Use Fuel -mis- Irradiated Fuel -mis-
Direct Use Reprocessed Material
9.0 70% 0.26
1509 Origin -div- Source Material Resources -cla- Source Material -cla-
Enrichment Feed -cla- Indirect Use Enrichment Product -mis- Indi-
rect Use Fuel Feed -cla- Indirect Use Fuel -mis- Irradiated Fuel -mis-
Direct Use Reprocessed Material
12.0 64% 0.19
Table 2. List of paths selected for strategic assessment along with path index i, description
of the path, overall path attractiveness li, performance target PTi and payoff value di.
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more quantitative approach delivers a set of technical objectives with optimal effectiveness
under the assumptions of a game theoretic model. Besides the high degree of automation,
this approach also allows for an inherent randomization of technical objectives. However, the
analyst has to specify a set of parameters in this approach. Therefore a good understanding
of the model is necessary, as the influence of the parameters on the model’s outcome is very
complex.
The alternative approach overcomes these drawbacks by a higher degree of interaction with
the analyst. Moreover, it allows for re-prioritization of paths based on possible indications.
On the other hand, this flexibility leads to less reproducibility of the results when transfer-
ring the task to a different analyst.
In summary, while the underlying philosophy is the same, both methodologies have their
advantages and disadvantages. However, it also has been shown that the underlying philos-
ophy is the same.
In the future, further case studies need to be carried out. Also, the outcomes sensitivity on
the selected parameters in both approaches will be investigated. Furthermore, the applica-
bility of the presented ideas to other applications in the area arms control and disarmament
will be investigated. Finally, the methodology will be iteratively improved with the help of
experts at the IAEA.
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Abstract:
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards designed to deter nuclear proliferation
continue to evolve to respond to new challenges. Within its State Level Concept, the IAEA envisions a
State Level Approach for safeguards implementation that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-
related activities and capabilities as a whole within the scope of the State’s safeguards agreement to 
meet generic safeguards objectives. For a State with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, these
generic safeguards objectives are to detect diversion of declared nuclear material in declared facilities
or LOFs, to detect undeclared production or processing of nuclear materials in declared facilities or
locations outside facilities (LOFs), and to detect undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State.
Under the SLA, States will be differentiated based upon State-Specific Factors (SSF) that influence
the design, planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities. Proposed categories of factors
include both technical and legal aspects, spanning from the deployed fuel cycle and the related state’s 
technical capability to the type of safeguards agreements in force and the IAEA experience in
implementing safeguards in that State. SSFs related to a State’s technical capabilities are captured 
through an Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) that identifies plausible routes for acquiring weapons-
usable material. In order to achieve this goal, the APA will have to identify possible acquisition paths,
characterize them and eventually prioritise them. A key issue affecting the SLC’s ability to satisfy 
effectiveness, efficiency, and nondiscrimination principles is the objectivity of technical SSFs captured
through the APA. A review of proposed APA methods and historical evidence indicates that
assessments of a State’s technical capabilities and pathway completion times may not be as objective 
as has been suggested. Process modifications are proposed to improve pathways characterization
supporting the SLC, such as developing a sounder basis for technical plausibility, formalizing
considerations of intrinsic technical difficulty, assessing uncertainties in collected information and
issuing guidance on omitted SSFs that may influence pathway completion times.
Keywords: Safeguards, State Level Concept, Acquisition Pathways Analysis
1. Introduction: The IAEA State-Level Concept for Improving the Effectiveness
and Efficiency of International Safeguards Implementation
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards designed to deter nuclear proliferation
continue to evolve to respond to new challenges. With the introduction of the Additional Protocol (AP),
approaches for detecting the diversion of material and the misuse of declared facilities have been
complemented by additional measures to strengthen the detection of possible undeclared activities
within the State. The IAEA’s State-Level Concept (SLC) envisions a holistic approach to nuclear
safeguards considering the State as a whole with safeguards implementation tailored to the State.
Within the SLC, the IAEA envisions a State Level Approach (SLA) for safeguards implementation that
considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole within the scope
of the State’s safeguards agreement to meet generic safeguards objectives – the detection of
diversion, misuse, and undeclared material or activities.[1]–[3]
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Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation are among the key goals of
the SLC.[3] While these aspirations are uncontroversial, demonstrably achieving them are empirical
questions. While the IAEA envisions reductions of safeguards intensity informed by the Broader
Conclusion (BC) [3], assuring the absence of undeclared activities may be costly to achieve.[4]
Perceived over-spending in States with substantial nuclear infrastructure thought to present low
proliferation risk [5] may reflect non-technical factors (e.g. security environment, form of government,
etc.) rather than technical State Specific Factors (SSF) – potentially engendering accusations of
discrimination and requiring a level of transparency that some consider generally lacking.[6] While
these scenarios are deliberately provocative, they underscore the importance of an evidence-based
approach to safeguards effectiveness and efficiency.
1.1. Program Theory
Towards an evidence-based approach, a program theory or logic model [7] assesses the mechanisms
by which the SLC might achieve effectiveness and efficiency goals. Figure 1 outlines the processes
supporting the implementation of safeguards at the State-level as envisioned by the IAEA.[3] The SLC
program theory in Figure 2 developed from the IAEA’s diagram (excluding feedbacks), reflects the
premise that differentiating States on the basis of SSFs will lead to improvements in safeguards
effectiveness and efficiency.

















































Figure 2: Notional sketch of SLC program theory linking State Specific Factors to Acquisition Pathways Analysis
and effectiveness and efficiency measures
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A key issue affecting the ability to improve effectiveness and efficiency in a non-discriminatory manner
is the extent to which information on the SSF related to “the nuclear fuel cycle and related capabilities
of the State” can be utilized objectively within Acquisition Pathways Analysis (APA). Though an
exposition of the program theory diagram is beyond the scope of this paper, the “tail” of the program 
theory diagram is discussed first to identify measures of safeguards effectiveness and efficiency
(Section 2). The “head” is then discussed (Section 3), summarizing the impact of SSFs upon
effectiveness and efficiency. The focus then turns to features of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle captured 
by the APA to identify methodological improvements that enhance analytical rigor and address
uncertainties (Section 4). Processes supporting the SLA closely linked to the APA, including the
prioritization of technical objectives and developing an annual implementation plan, are also discussed
(Section 5).
This paper is a snapshot of on-going APA development in support of the State Level Concept for
safeguards implementation. This paper captures concepts derived primarily from open sources of
information, including publications, presentations, and workshops on the APA by the IAEA, various
Member States Support Programs (MSSPs), and relevant work found in the open literature. It also
builds upon previous JRC contributions in the area of methodological considerations for the APA
process and the potential of open sources of information for supporting the APA.[8], [9] As the APA
and the SLC are continuing to evolve, the topics covered here should be considered a snapshot in
time, does not reflect finished products, and does not necessarily reflect official views.
2. The Tail: Evaluating Effectiveness and Efficiency
Defining goals is an important step to the design of any system. When evaluating whether or not a
program has had the desired outcomes, evaluations of effectiveness and efficiency generally focus on
improving processes or proving causal relationships.[7] Towards the latter, the impact of the
nonproliferation regime on the behavior of States has been studied extensively. Some have suggested
anecdotally that the nonproliferation regime is an overwhelming success as early fears of the number
of nuclear-armed States have not yet materialized.[10],[11] But proving causality is more elusive as
“States might simply join the NPT because they do not plan to acquire nuclear weapons”.[12]
Quantitative analysis suggests that the “presence of traditional IAEA safeguards” was not among
“proliferation inhibitors” but was a “proliferation promoter”, finding statistically significant correlations
between safeguards and decisions to “explore” and “pursue” (but not to “acquire”) nuclear
weapons.[13],[14] Others have suggested that the safeguards system is, paradoxically, a victim of its
own success as the rarity of safeguards events hampers assessment.[15] Looking forward, while
widespread adoption of the AP is expected to inhibit proliferation, data is not yet available to assess its
impact.[14]
Lacking the “gold standard” of a program evaluation – a randomized controlled study [7] – evaluations
of safeguards effectiveness are inherently subjective. A report written in 1995 by the U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment notes that, “Despite the objective, systematic way in which the IAEA nuclear 
safeguards system has been codified and implemented…the underlying judgment as to what the
safeguards system needs to be able to do and how well it needs to do it is inherently a subjective
one.”[16] The IAEA’s effectiveness measures reflect this reality. Effectiveness indicators essentially
come in two categories: “the scope of achievement resulting from safeguards implementation” and 
“the level of assurance attained”.[15] Whereas the former is quantifiable (e.g. the percentage of
nuclear material/facilities under safeguards for which inspection goals have been fully attained), the
level of assurance is more difficult to ascertain.[1], [15], [17]
The generic State-level safeguards objectives proposed by the IAEA [18] and other proposals for
performance-based measures [19], [20] contribute to the scope of achievement and level of
assurance. For example, the three State-level objectives are:
 “to detect any diversion of declared nuclear material at declared facilities or LOFs
 to detect any undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities or
LOFs; and
 to detect any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole.”[3], [18]
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
385
Though efficiency is not formally defined in the IAEA safeguards glossary, [1] it is commonly
understood as the ratio of effectiveness and cost - presenting obvious difficulties when assessing
levels of assurance. Ceteris paribus, alternative safeguards measures could be evaluated based on
the effort, cost, and impact to the Agency and State.[21]
3. The Head: Differentiating States with State-Specific Factors
Turning to the head of the program theory diagram, the IAEA has stated that States are to be
differentiated based upon objective State-Specific Factors (SSFs) that influence the design, planning,
conduct, and evaluation of safeguards activities and has identified six categories of SSFs as listed in
Table 1.[3] Though the IAEA has stated that no other factors would be considered, [18] others have
suggested that these SSFs may be incomplete (e.g. democratic government, multinational nuclear
companies, etc.) – potentially missing effectiveness and efficiency gains.[22], [23] Some have
characterized these SSFs as being based on “indisputable facts” or “more open to disagreement”, but 
still based on shared implementation experience, and without “inherently subjective” factors such as 
the State’s political situation, intentions, etc.[24] Others appear more skeptical, with one commenter
characterizing four of the six SSFs as “hardly quantifiable” or “discretionary”.[23] In contrast, the SSF
related to “the nuclear fuel cycle and related capabilities” is considered to be “well quantifiable” [23]
and based on “…indisputable facts and thus not open to misinterpretation or ambiguity.”[24] (Table 1)
State Specific Factors [3] Medici, 2014 [23] Burton, 2014 [24]
The type of safeguards agreement in
force for the State and the nature of the
safeguards conclusion drawn by the
Agency
“well quantifiable” “…indisputable facts and thus not open to
misinterpretation or ambiguity.”
The nuclear fuel cycle and related
capabilities of the State
“well quantifiable” “…indisputable facts and thus not open to 
misinterpretation or ambiguity.”
The technical capabilities of the State or
regional system of accounting for and
control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC)
“hardly 
quantifiable”
“…more open to disagreement between the
IAEA and the State, but are still based on the
shared experience in implementing safeguards
in the State.”
The ability of the Agency to implement
certain safeguards measures in the State
(e.g. remote monitoring,
unannounced/short notice inspections)
“discretionary” “…indisputable facts and thus not open to 
misinterpretation or ambiguity.”
The nature and scope of the cooperation
between the State and the Agency in the
implementation of safeguards
“discretionary” “…more open to disagreement between the
IAEA and the State, but are still based on the
shared experience in implementing safeguards
in the State.”
The Agency’s experience in 
implementing safeguards in the State 
“discretionary” “…more open to disagreement between the
IAEA and the State, but are still based on the
shared experience in implementing safeguards
in the State.” 
Table 1: Summary of the quantifiability and objectivity of State-Specific Factors, examples, and impacts on
safeguards implementation, derived from [3], [23], [24]
4. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities and the APA
To begin to address how quantifiable is “well quantifiable”, this section explores how information about
a State’s nuclear fuel cycle capabilities is used by Acquisition Pathways Analysis (APA). As the
technical backbone of the SLA process, APA is utilized to estimate the speed by which a State might
acquire weapons-usable material and used to allocate limited safeguards resources. The APA
consists of a four stage process:
 Information Collection: “Consolidating information about the State's past, present, and planned
nuclear fuel cycle-related capabilities and infrastructure”
 Path Identification: “Identifying and visually presenting technically plausible acquisition paths
for the State”
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 Path Characterization: “Assessing acquisition path steps (State's technical capabilities and
possible actions) along the identified acquisition paths”
 Path Prioritization: “Assessing the time needed to complete a technically plausible acquisition
path” [25]
4.1. Information Collection
As depicted in the program theory diagram, what can be known about a State’s nuclear fuel cycle 
capabilities is influenced by the safeguards regime in place. Considerably more information is
available about a State with an Additional Protocol (CSA+AP) than one with only a Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement (CSA-only). Much as verification of a State’s declarations has been the basis 
of safeguards conclusions for decades, analysts must confront the possibility that the evidence in
hand may be incomplete, unreliable, ambiguous, and even deceptive.[9] As the pendulum of relative
advantage swings from competition between hiders and seekers, the probability of detection may be
difficult to characterize at any particular moment. As will be discussed further below, these information
asymmetries between the State and the IAEA contribute to misestimates of a State’s capabilities and 
to the potential for unpleasant surprises.
4.2. Path Identification
Overall, the process of path identification appears to be based on solid foundations, leveraging the
IAEA’s Physical Model [26] to identify safeguards-relevant flows of materials. Two features are notable
about the IAEA’s process: the process of addition (vs. subtraction) and the definition of technically
plausible paths.
4.2.1. Path Identification: Additive vs. Subtractive Processes
Enhancing the robustness of pathway identification will be important to avoid inadvertently excluding
plausible paths. The process of addition defined by the IAEA adds technically plausible path segments
to declared facilities, excluding pathways deemed to be technically implausible.[27] A suggestion
engine augmenting an analyst-driven process promotes completeness by suggesting potentially
overlooked pathways and warning of inconsistencies. The engine might also consider other factors,
such as reducing reliance upon importation with increasing economic development.[28] Alternatively, a
process of elimination that systematically “prunes” implausible pathways may also promote
completeness. Computational tools may accelerate this process as well, identifying implausible
pathways based on logical (e.g. utilizing “if-then” relationships [29]) or physical relationships (e.g. the
IAEA physical model [26]). Differences in workload between a process of addition and elimination may
depend upon the complexity of a State’s infrastructure and capabilities, but may not be substantial if
all path segments are assessed for plausibility.
4.2.2. Technical Plausibility as a Screening Criterion
The IAEA employs technical plausibility essentially as a screening criterion to “prune” technically 
implausible pathways. A pathway is considered technically plausible if “…a State could, from a
technical point of view, acquire at least one significant quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material
within five years…”.[25] Presumably, implausible pathways that are deemed too far off into the future
to warrant further consideration are pruned to reduce analytical burdens. However, as currently
defined, this concept has procedural, definitional, and conceptual issues. As technical plausibility is
essentially a preliminary estimate of completion time, the associated definitional and conceptual
issues associated with estimating completion time are addressed later in this paper.
On procedural grounds, a determination of technical plausibility appears premature at this stage of
process. As the technical capability of a State is assessed later in the process, analysts will depend
upon previous assessments, theoretically leading to a vicious cycle of declining safeguards attention.
For this reason, analysts should err on the side of caution by excluding only the most implausible path
segments and implausible pathways should be reassessed periodically so that all pathways face the
possibility of detection. The IAEA has recognized this possibility, noting that the “… State evaluation 
process will continue to look for indications that a State may be developing related capabilities and
their technical plausibility will be reassessed periodically.”[25]
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Despite this precaution, a sounder criterion for technical plausibility is desirable as the five year
criterion appears arbitrary. A plausibility threshold based on detection by semper vigilans safeguards
measures (such as those associated with the State evaluation processes including the monitoring of
open source information, third-party sources of information, etc.) may be a more defensible basis for
pruning pathways while maintaining complete coverage. For a given measure with an annual detection
probability, Pannual, the probability of detection after t years is, assuming independence of events, P(t) =
1-(1-Pannual)t. A safeguards measure assessed to have a 37% annual probability of detection results in 
a 90% probability of detection within five years. By doing so, the threshold for plausibility establishes
detection goals for implausible pathways without sacrificing full coverage. These goals, however, may
be largely aspirational as they may elude quantification.
4.3 Path Characterization
Drawing upon the consolidated information about a State, characterizing paths is largely descriptive in
nature – a structured collection of facts about a State’s technical capabilities – and appears to be well
developed. Relevant details of a State’s capabilities depend on the type of acquisition path step e.g.
indigenous production, diversion, misuse, clandestine, import. In the case of a path step involving e.g.
the diversion of spent fuel from a declared Light Water Reactor (LWR), relevant technical details
include inventories of material and their characteristics. In the case of potential undeclared activities,
factual information include assessments of the State’s knowledge, R&D, current capabilities to 
manufacture or purchase equipment, and experience with operating related processes. State actions
(i.e. proliferation scenarios) are then identified and assessed for each plausible acquisition path step.
In the case of diversion, State actions include the diversion of spent fuel assemblies with replacement
by dummies and the diversion of spent fuel rods through the disassembly of fuel assemblies. Misuse
includes such actions as using excess capacity and concealed modifications or upgrades. Clandestine
paths are assessed with respect to the actions necessary to acquire the missing capability through
indigenous development and/or importation.[25]
4.4. Path Prioritization by Estimating Completion Time
Following the identification and characterization of paths, the “…ease (technical capabilities) and
speed by which a State could acquire one significant quantity of nuclear material using that path” are 
then estimated.[25] Path completion time is a concept useful for establishing timeliness goals for
safeguards planning and should not be mistaken for path likelihood as “…the most likely path is not
necessarily the quickest path”.[30] That being said, estimating ease and speed are perhaps the most
analytically challenging element of the APA process. As noted by the developers of the Program
Evaluation Research Task (PERT) process, analysts must consider several factors including,
“…resources, in the form of dollars, or what ‘dollars’ represent – manpower, materials, and methods of
production, technical performance of systems, subsystems, and components, and time.”[31] As
discussed below, estimating how fast or how slow must also contend with sources of informational and
analytical uncertainties.
4.4.1. Assessing Ease: Intrinsic Technical Difficulty and State Capabilities
The IAEA appears to emphasize the technical capabilities of the State when assessing the “ease” of a 
path. The ease of the task itself is also important, without which, completion time cannot be estimated.
Analytical models demonstrate that path priorities are sensitive to the ratio between the intrinsic
technical difficulty and a State’s capabilities.[32] As defined in the Generation IV International Forum’s 
Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) evaluation methodology, the intrinsic
technical difficulty of a path step (defined as “technical difficulty” by PR&PP) is, “The inherent difficulty 
arising from the need for technical sophistication, including material-handling capabilities, required to
overcome the multiple barriers to proliferation.”[33]
Caution is necessary when evaluating intrinsic technical difficulty as qualitative statements can be
misleading. For example, as reported in a recent review study, some analysts have claimed that “…all
enrichment techniques demand sophisticated technology in large and expensive facilities”, suggesting 
that enrichment is out of reach of all but the most capable States. In contrast, others suggest that a
small centrifuge plant is “…feasible for countries with no prior experience, ‘that possess relatively little 
technical skills and which have relatively little industrial activity’”.[34] Quantitative descriptions may
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help narrow these discrepancies by specifying costs and labor requirements in addition to necessary
materials and physical processes.[30], [35]–[39]
Provided that a path is well-specified in terms of its intrinsic technical difficulty, the IAEA’s process 
appears well-suited for collecting information about a State’s nuclear-specific and related
capabilities.[25] Broader consideration of a State’s economic status may also be necessary to reflect
generalizable capabilities that can be redeployed to nuclear programs. These linkages are evidenced
by the correlation between proliferation decisions and, inter alia, general economic development in
addition to nuclear specific capabilities.[14], [40] General capabilities also impact technology choices
and reliance on imports – more sophisticated States may choose to be less reliant upon importation to
maintain secrecy.[28] Furthermore, even non-nuclear industrialized States may have plausible
pathways. After all, over half a century ago, only seven years elapsed between the discovery of fission
and the first use of a nuclear weapon. States that exploded or deployed nuclear weapons had an
average GDP per capita of $8000 (in 2015 U.S. dollars) and many States were below that
average.[40] Though the use of economic status may be contrary to IAEA guidance against the use of
SSFs to “rate or grade States”,[3] the rationale for this prohibition is unclear as SSFs could also be
misused to rank States and economic status may be rationally related to assessing a State’s technical 
capabilities.
4.4.2. Assessing Speed: Sources of Informational and Analytical Uncertainty
Once a task has been defined in sufficient detail, engineering management methods can estimate
completion times in light of a State’s capabilities and resources. Approaches such as the Program
Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) that capture “The effects of resources and technical
performance changes” on time, [31] have been used to plan complex projects, including the Hanford
Engineer Works during the Manhattan Project.[41] The importance of uncertainties, particularly for
research and development activities, was recognized early on. The PERT method itself quantifies
uncertainties with a combination of optimistic, likely, and pessimistic task times.[31]
Evidence suggests that these uncertainties might be sufficiently large to warrant consideration. A
retrospective study of U.S. intelligence estimates concluded a State’s nuclear capabilities have tended 
to be overestimated i.e. States have tended to acquire capabilities later than expected.[42] However,
our review of the cited cases indicates that foreign nuclear fuel cycle capabilities (excluding estimates
involving weapons development and testing) tend to be underestimated i.e. States have acquired
capabilities sooner than expected. Of these 35 cases, 13 were underestimated, 13 were correct, and
nine were overestimated. Quantitative time estimates were available for nine of these 35 cases with
an average underestimate of approximately five years along with a number of unexpected surprises
(Table 2).[42] While it is difficult to know if these cases are a representative sample, this evidence
suggests that the potential for underestimation may be large enough such that capabilities judged to




Underestimated 13 5 4.8
Correct 13 1 -
Overestimated 9 3 1.8
Table 2: Estimates of foreign nuclear fuel cycle capabilities from a recent study of US intelligence estimates,
derived from [42]
This history of misestimation suggests that even a well-structured collaborative process emphasizing
early warning may lead to significant underestimates of a State’s capabilities. Political, cultural,
bureaucratic, and organizational distortions contributed to these misestimates (Table 3). Cultural
biases may be particularly concerning (Table 4). Not only might these “…cultural or racial biases…”
engender accusations of discrimination, these biases also include “…failure[s] to understand an
economic system” that can distort assessments.[42]
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Type Distortion Hypothesis
Political  The ideology of the executive may encourage or promote those estimates that
conform to the desired view
 Policy initiatives, past, present, and future, can affect estimates (e.g. existing
policy makes difficult or precludes objective analysis, whether logistically or
psychologically, not enough importance attached to an area of geography or
analysis, likelihood of major action resulting from estimate)
 Likelihood of disclosure / politicization of estimate
Cultural  Cultural biases create mistaken assumptions of capabilities
 Misestimating intent / motives / resolve of subject State
 Analysts misinterpret the involvement of outside sources
Bureaucratic  Multiple advocacy among agencies causes compromise and/or domination
 A fragmented bureaucracy stalls the dissemination and aggregation of useful
data
Organizational  Data overwhelms the analytic system, signals not separated from noise
 Preference for secret over open sources [and vice versa?]
 Recent experience with intelligence failures
 Mistaken induction / conceptual rigidity: assumptions derived from historical
experiences may not apply






Germany 1941-1945 Overestimation “Culturally, beliefs about the abilities of the German 
scientists and a motivated misinterpretation of the slightly
delayed publications where absence of evidence was
considered evidence also contributed to distortion.” 
France 1954- Overestimated “… it is likely that cultural biases were positive in the 
French case, causing analysts to downplay the probability
of inevitable problems and pushing estimates forward.” 
Israel 1955- Underestimated “… underestimated Israeli technical capabilities, as it was
believed that Dimona could not be completed without US
or French assistance” 
China 1956- Underestimated “… underestimation of native Chinese production
capabilities was a major factor in skewing earlier
estimates, which expected reliance on Soviet assistance.” 
Iraq 1973-1991 Underestimated “The program’s underestimation was driven by a prior 
underestimation of Iraqi manufacturing capabilities, as
evidenced by the expected reliance on foreign sources.” 
Libya 1970-2003 Underestimated “Prior views of Libya’s incompetence (although justified) 
may have contributed to the six-year gap between Libya’s 
decision to seek a nuclear program through assistance
from the A.Q. Khan network and the CIA reports of Libyan
attempts to acquire materials from abroad.” 
Table 4: Examples of cultural biases impacting assessments of a State’s technological capability, table based on
text extracted from [42]
Technical process issues may also contribute to misestimation. In the context of the APA, two principal
sources of uncertainty are important to recognize: informational and analytical.[9] Analytically, even
assuming certain input data, the certainty of path completion times estimates will likely vary by the
type of pathway under consideration and depend upon the degree to which factors of production are
fixed or variable. In the parlance of production economics, factors of production (e.g. land, labor,
capital equipment) are fixed if they are not readily altered over the short-run. In the long-run, all factors
of production are variable.[43] Along this continuum, diversion scenarios can assume largely fixed
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factors of production and well understood means of moving nuclear material. Misuse paths are more
complicated as production factors are more variable and a State’s capabilities are more salient, 
leading to greater analytical uncertainties. Clandestine paths have considerably more degrees of
freedom that include the possibility of indigenously produced material, imported material, and
equipment, with the potential to produce widely divergent estimates.
Some of this divergence is addressable through guidance on the degree of conservatism to be
exercised when specifying end states and path step scheduling. Similar to considerations of intrinsic
technical difficulty, estimates of time depend upon the end state of a path. Evaluating a range of
technological options of varying intrinsic technical difficulty challenges analysts to consider scenarios
that might otherwise go unnoticed or downplayed. For example, for a State known to have conducted
basic radiochemistry experiments, a large production reprocessing facility that takes a decade to
complete may be implausible, but a small pilot reprocessing facility completed is nearly plausible, and
a “quick and dirty” reprocessing system may be faster yet. (Table 5).[38], [39], [44] Path step
scheduling can also have dramatic impacts on time estimates. As evidenced by a Gannt chart timeline
of the Hanford facility form the Manhattan project, a path step that could have taken nearly two
decades in peacetime was claimed to have been substantially accelerated to about a third of that time
during wartime by performing steps more quickly and in parallel.[41]
Technology 
Estimated Time








Enrichment (diffusion) - 6 
Enrichment (centrifuge) 8 14 
Enrichment (EMIS) 2 3 
Enrichment (chemical) 6 11 
Enrichment (aerodynamic) 7 18 
Enrichment (laser) - - 




Research reactors 4-5 
Reprocessing 4-6 months 6 10 
Table 5: Estimated and historical timelines for various fuel cycle technologies, derived from [38], [39], [44]
Though engineering management methods have been used to estimate pathway time, some have
claimed that such estimates are often wrong without accounting for motivational factors and
institutional barriers that may hasten or slow progress. A review of related literature on estimating
proliferation time and latency suggests that the proposed APA process may omit factors that impact
time, including the influence of budgets, proliferator goals, and organizational issues.[37], [45] As
noted by a study on latency, “…if one uses [an engineering management] approach for specific known
cases, the time predicted for a State to develop its first nuclear device tends to be incorrect” as
“…pathway decisions are determined by various motivations and institutional impediments that often
outweigh the pure engineering resource management decisions.”[35]
Difficulties in quantifying these omitted factors (e.g. information related to the demand for nuclear
weapons, institutional issues, and budgetary resources) limits their practicality and their use may be
perceived as subjective and discriminatory. Nonetheless, guidance on these omitted State level
factors that influence pathway times may be necessary to limit analyst discretion and assure uniform
implementation across States. For example, analysts may be instructed to assess multiple challenging
scenarios and make assumptions that minimize path time e.g. assuming a motivated state with large
budgetary resources and competent management pursuing technologies that are easier than
commonly perceived.
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5. Beyond the APA: Technical Objectives, Safeguards Measures, and
Implementation Planning
The APA directly impacts processes of the SLA that establish the frequency and intensity of
safeguards measures.[25] As APA development requires an understanding of the SLC as a whole,
this section turns its attention to the processes following the APA that support the SLA, namely the:
 Establishment & prioritization of technical objectives
 Identification of safeguards measures
 Development of an annual plan[3]
As described by the IAEA, safeguards technical objectives and safeguards measures are established
on the basis of the results of the APA as diagrammed in Figure 3. Technical objectives are identified
for each path segment and safeguards measures are selected to satisfy the technical objective with a
frequency and intensity dependent upon path completion times and the effectiveness of safeguards
measures.[25] A SLA for safeguards implementation is then developed and executed through an
annual implementation plan.
Figure 3: Identification of technical objectives and safeguards measures from an acquisition path analysis,
reprinted from [18]
5.1. Technical Objectives
Informed by APA results, State-specific technical objectives are formulated and prioritized to achieve
the three generic safeguards State-level objectives as illustrated in Figure 3. The process of
establishing technical objectives translates path step information into safeguards-relevant terminology
by identifying what needs to be safeguarded and where. For example, a high priority pathway might
involve the clandestine reprocessing and conversion of diverted spent fuel from a declared reactor to
produce metallic plutonium. For this pathway, one of several technical objectives is the detection of
undeclared reprocessing activities in the State.
While the establishment of technical objectives appears relatively straightforward, the extent to which
their prioritization should reflect additional factors beyond those considered in the APA is unclear. In
the previous example, technical objectives can include the detection of diversion of spent fuel,
detection of undeclared reprocessing activities, detection of undeclared conversion, detection of
undeclared reprocessing R&D activities, etc. Whether all technical objectives should assume the same
or different priorities as the pathway is unspecified. For example, strong indicators of the pathway that
can be obtained at lower cost may be of greater interest than higher cost weaker indicators.
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5.2. Safeguards Measures
Presumably, safeguards measures and associated sampling/inspection plans are selected from a set
of technologies developed for a particular technical objective with defined performance characteristics
(e.g. measurement uncertainties, desired probability of detection and false alarm rate, cost, etc.). For
example, safeguards techniques and equipment used for material accountancy, containment and
surveillance, environmental sampling, and data security are described by the IAEA as are target
measurement uncertainties.[46], [47] Performance characteristics of safeguards measures to detect
undeclared activities may be less certain.[17], [48]
5.2.1. Model Facility and Pathway Approaches
Given possible variations in the application of safeguards measures, model pathway safeguards
approaches extending the model facility concept may support more consistent implementation of the
SLC. Under classical safeguards, model facility safeguards approaches developed for a postulated
reference facility serve as a starting point for the identification of applicable safeguards measures.
Similarly, modifications to model pathway approach would arise from the APA through the channels of
quantity and timeliness goals, facility-specific design and operational features, and other SSFs
associated with the capabilities of the SSAC and safeguards implementation issues. Much as model
facility approaches are modified on the basis of State-specific information, model pathway safeguards
approaches clarify the impact of SSFs on safeguards implementation, for instance, by defining
modifications to path priorities in response to previous instances of noncompliance.[49]
5.3. Annual Implementation Planning
While many details relevant to implementation planning are lacking, the IAEA appears to have
adopted a collaborative expert judgment approach.[18] Whether these collaborative State Evaluation
Groups (SEGs) will operate with the aid of formal expert elicitation techniques, with decision support
tools, or in a more ad-hoc manner remains to be seen. Moreover, to assure equal treatment and
dispelling potential accusations of discrimination, States may request extraordinary access to internal
deliberations and safeguards implementation data.
5.3.1. Algorithms vs. Human Judgment
Algorithmic approaches to safeguards implementation planning are an alternative to expert judgement
– the latter of which, as mentioned previously, can be subject to various biases. While any analytical
result, particularly those reliant upon models of the strategic interaction between the State and
inspectorate (e.g. game theoretic approaches [50]), should be treated with caution, algorithms may
nonetheless achieve more consistent results and outperform expert judgment on average. This may
be particularly true in “low validity” and “high validity” environments. In “low validity” environments,
humans have difficulties detecting weak causal linkages, make inconsistent decisions, and yet may
develop an illusion of skill. Predicting the future value of stocks and long-term political prognostications
are examples. In “high-validity” environments with frequent objective feedback, humans can develop
true skill, but algorithms might still outperform humans who are subject to lapses in attention. Medicine
and firefighting are examples where true skill can develop.[51]
Where safeguards analysis lies on this spectrum of validity is debateable. Some safeguards activities,
such as spent fuel counting, may be “high-validity” activities – though tedium is also a source of
error.[51] Though analysts can learn “best practices” for designing an annual safeguards
implementation plan, the relationship between cause and effect may be vague as the effectiveness of
a safeguards implementation plan is difficult to evaluate objectively. Coupled to the rarity of
proliferation events, the short tenure of safeguards analysts, and the limitations of institutional
memory, safeguards implementation planning may have aspects resembling a “low validity” type of 
activity. Algorithms will face similar issues without adequate data for verification and validation, but
they may nonetheless outperform human analysts on average and contribute to non-discrimination
goals through sheer consistency.
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6. Summary
Based upon a comprehensive study of methods proposed by the IAEA and member states and
drawing upon evidence available in the literature, this paper evaluates the technical basis of
Acquisition Pathways Analysis (APA) by assessing the influence of technical State Specific Factors
related to “the nuclear fuel cycle and related capabilities of the State” [3] upon safeguards
implementation. In addition to theoretical considerations, evidence was sought to derive process
insights. While the APA process appears conceptually sound at a high level, considerations of theory
and evidence suggests that there may be considerable uncertainties when assessing a State’s nuclear
fuel cycle and related capabilities.
Methodological insights are identified to support continued development. These insights reflect the fact
that estimating completion time is a complex task that not only may lead to inconsistent assessments
between individual analysts, but may leave safeguards implementation open to unpleasant surprises
should States acquire capabilities sooner than estimated. Process improvements essentially boil down
to the need for a “surprise-sensitive” [42] and strategic safeguards planning approach, including an
APA process that explicitly postulates a highly motivated, resourceful State that rapidly pursues
pathways that are easier than might be implicitly assumed and where information asymmetries favor
the “hider”. These types of analytical assumptions might be incorporated into model pathway
approaches to promote consistent implementation, constrain analyst discretion to limit the potential for
discriminatory biases, and clarify how safeguards implementation might change under the SLC.
The use of algorithmic approaches supporting the implementation of safeguards will continue to be an
area of debate. While algorithmic consistency contributes to nondiscrimination, decision models are an
imperfect science. Decision support tools can support expert judgment, but processes may be time
consuming and subject to cognitive biases leading to subjective and inconsistent outcomes that may
be construed as discriminatory. A resolution to the debate ultimately requires an evidence-based, not
faith-based, approach evaluating the impacts of safeguards on a State’s behaviour. Such evidence is
likely not forthcoming as a randomized controlled study of safeguards effectiveness is impractical.
Nevertheless, some insights may be derived by considering the validity (e.g. low vs. high) of the
safeguards environment. Such thinking, as noted in early work on collaborative human-machine
approaches for safeguards, [52] may better harness the consistency of algorithms while bringing
human reasoning to bear where it is needed most.
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Abstract:
A non-destructive assay technique, the Differential Die-Away (DDA) Instrument, is currently being
investigated at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to better understand the development and
deployment challenges. The DDA instrument is based on an active neutron interrogation technique which
uses an external deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator to induce fission in a fuel assembly. The time
of arrival (list-mode data) of the prompt fission neutrons are detected by nine 3He detectors positioned 
around the fuel assembly. The characteristics of an assayed fuel assembly, such as the enrichment and
presence of neutron absorbers, change the time required for the DDA signal to die away. Previously
performed spent fuel Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended transport code (MCNPX) simulations have shown
that the dynamic evolution of the DDA signal can reveal various characteristics of a spent fuel assembly.
The principal DDA instrument capabilities include measurement of multiplication, total effective fissile
mass, total plutonium content, estimation of basic fuel assembly parameters such as initial enrichment
and burnup, and identification of certain partial defects. In this work, results of experimental
measurements using fresh pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear fuel in a water tank are compared
with MCNPX simulations. The primary observables used in the comparison are the die-away times in
several time domains. The ability to reliably reproduce the experimental measurement results using
MCNPX is critical in the development and eventual deployment of the DDA instrument. We present
results of our efforts to identify possible discrepancies and to quantify sources of uncertainty in the
experiment and the simulation.
Keywords: differential die-away, nuclear fuel, non-destructive assay, safeguards, active interrogation
1. Introduction
The differential die-away (DDA) instrument is an active, non-destructive assay neutron interrogation
technique for nuclear safeguard applications currently being investigated at Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL). The instrument uses short pulses from an external deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron
generator to induce fission in the fissile material of a fuel assembly. The DDA signal depends on the
amount of fissile material in the fuel and the neutron absorber content. The time-dependent signal is
recorded using multiple helium-3 (3He) detectors positioned around the fuel assembly on a list-mode data 
acquisition system.
Spent fuel simulations using Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) [1] performed under the US
National Nuclear Security Administration’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Next Generation Safeguards 
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Initiative Spent Fuel project (NGSI-SF) [2] showed the capability of the DDA instrument to characterize
properties of a wide range of spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) [3]. Based on results of  MCNPX simulations,
the predicted DDA instrument capabilities include determination of SFAs multiplication, burnup and initial
enrichment, as well as the total fissile content, effective fissile mass, and identification of certain types of
partial defects. [4]
Previously, the DDA technique has been used to assay drums of nuclear waste for storage. [5] Compared
to the traditional use, we are investigating a new application for the DDA technique in the time domain
nearly directly after the short (~20 μs) neutron generator pulse. These short time scales require data
acquisition system to reliably operate in a very high counting rate environment.
2. Fresh Fuel Experimental Setup
2.1. DDA Components
The DDA instrument consists of nine 3He detectors inside three stainless steel detector pods, and an 
external DT neutron generator inside of a waterproof cylinder (Fig. 1). These components are all
submerged in a water tank. A template made of high-density polyethylene (HDPE) is positioned on the
bottom of the water tank to align the experimental components. A second HDPE template is used to
position the detectors, which are inserted into HDPE cylinders wrapped with cadmium (Cd), inside the
stainless steel pods. Neutron detection data from individual detectors are recorded using a list-mode data
acquisition system such that the time of arrival of each pulse is recorded.
Figure 1. The DDA instrument setup with the experimental components slotted into the base template (left) and the
setup submerged in the water tank (right).
2.2. Fresh Fuel and Assembly Specifications
Fresh fuel rods containing uranium dioxide (UO2) were used for the active assay with the DDA instrument.
A 15x15 PWR-like fuel lattice with 204 fuel pin positions and 21 guide tubes was used. The fresh fuel at
LANL consists of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and depleted uranium (DU) fuel pins with an average
enrichment of 3.19% and 0.22% 235U, respectively. The fuel assembly and fuel pin specifications are
provided in Table I.




Lattice geometry 15 x 15
Assembly width 21.5 cm
Fuel pin pitch 1.4 cm
Number of fuel pin slots 204
Number of guide tube slots 21
Fuel Pin Information
Fuel type UO2 
Cladding type Zircaloy-2
Average LEU rod enrichment 3.19% 235U 
Average DU rod enrichment 0.22% 235U 
Fuel pellet density 10.48 g/cm3 
Fuel pellet radius 0.4525 cm
Cladding thickness 0.0875 cm
Outer pin radius 0.54 cm
Total fuel rod length 130 cm
Active fuel length
LEU rod 102 cm
DU rod 120 cm
Inert fuel regions LEU DU
Top 17 cm 6 cm
Bottom 12 cm 5 cm
Table I: LANL PWR 15x15 fresh fuel and assembly specifications.
2.3. DT Neutron Generator
The Thermo Scientific P 385 DT neutron generator produces an approximate maximum yield of 5·108 n/s 
of 14.1 MeV neutrons from fusion. During experiments, the neutron generator is operated within standard
manufacturer recommended parameters of 125 kV or 90 kV high voltage, 70 μA beam current, 5% or
10% duty cycle, and 2500 Hz pulse frequency. The neutron generator output is monitored using a 3He 
flux monitor positioned outside of the water tank. The flux monitor data are compared between
experimental runs to verify the consistency of the neutron generator output over time.
2.4. Detectors and Electronics
During the course of the experimental campaign, we have tested a variety of detector models and
associated electronic components. In particular, we have performed a range of experiments using the
PDT-10A pre-amplifiers with an AMPTEK A-111 chip for fast pulse processing [6]. These pre-amplifiers
are specifically designed to operate in high count rate environments.
2.5. List-Mode Data Acquisition System and Analysis
List-mode data are acquired using a data acquisition system assembled at LANL from all commercially
available parts. The DAQ system, nicknamed ARIEL, can record 32 individual data channels at up to
2MHz each and is rugged and portable with 6 TB data storage. List-mode data acquisition and analysis
software was also designed at LANL for the fresh fuel DDA project.
3. Experimental Data
3.1. Deadtime Correction
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The data was corrected for the deadtime of the electronics using the infinite exponential method [7]. The
coefficients were determined by comparing the shape of the counting rate distributions at low and high
neutron generator intensities. The deadtime correction coefficient was slightly varied to determine the
impact on the die-away time magnitude in two time domains, 60-100 μs and 100-150 μs. The deadtime
correction coefficient was set to 800 ns, 850 ns, and 900 ns. The die-away time of the DDA signal was
determined using these three values for several fresh fuel enrichments.
As expected, we found that in the early time domain (60-100 μs), the die-away times of detectors closest
to the DT neutron generator (detectors 1 and 2) were most sensitive to changes (up to 12%) in the
correction coefficient. Also, cases with more fissile material (higher enrichment), were affected more than
lower enriched cases. Detectors positioned further from the neutron generator (and therefore
experiencing lower count rates) were considerably less affected by changes to the deadtime correction
coefficient (Fig. 2A).
For the later time domain (100-150 μs), we found the detectors were not as sensitive to the deadtime
correction coefficient (Fig. 2B). However, there was still a small change (0%-3%) in the determined die-
away time magnitudes which should be considered when comparing experimental data to simulation
results.
Figure 2. The experimentally measured die-away times in two time domains (A) 60-100 μs and (B) 100-150 μs for 
three different FFA enrichments (1.96%, 1.37%, and 0.20% 235U) were calculated using different deadtime correction 
coefficients: 800, 850, and 900 ns. The die-away times measured by detectors 1 and 2 exhibited significant sensitivity
to changes in the deadtime correction coefficient in the early time domain with die-away time values ranging ±5 μs. In 
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3.2. Estimation of Die-Away Time Uncertainty
The uncertainty in the experimentally determined die-away times was estimated by recording a series of
10 measurements each 30 s for three fresh fuel assembly configurations with different average
enrichments (1.67%, 1.08%, and 0.49% 235U) and the empty assembly without any fuel pins. For the 
empty fuel assembly, the DDA signal die-away time magnitude depends on the detector system
properties, such as the amount of moderating material around the detectors. For each measurement, we
determined the die-away time value in the 100-200 μs time interval. The mean die-away time, standard
deviation of the mean, and relative uncertainty were determined for the four cases (Table II). Overall,
within each set of measurements, the experimental die-away times generally differed by less than 0.5 μs, 
or less than 0.5%, from the mean. The relative uncertainty in the die-away time increased marginally as
the amount of fissile mass in the fuel assembly decreased. Based on these results, we concluded that a
measurement time of 30 s was sufficient for an accurate die-away time determination of fresh fuel. Typical
uncertainties for the measured die-away times are less than 1% per detector.
Die-Away Time [μs]
Average Enrichment (% 235U) 
Run 1.67% 1.08% 0.49% Empty
1 102.03 81.75 61.13 32.24
2 102.50 82.13 61.29 32.79
3 101.38 81.34 60.44 32.74
4 101.84 82.30 61.25 32.63
5 101.92 82.17 61.35 32.40
6 102.17 82.00 61.18 32.22
7 101.85 81.85 61.05 32.55
8 101.85 81.63 61.26 32.41
9 102.05 81.42 61.21 32.45
10 101.43 82.33 61.27 32.24
Mean [µs] 101.90 81.89 61.14 32.47
SDOM [µs] 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
SDOM [%] 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Table II: The results of ten 30 s measurements: the die-away time in the 100-200 μs time interval, the mean value,
standard deviation, and relative uncertainties were determined for three fresh fuel cases (1.67%, 1.08%, and 0.49%
235U) and the empty setup. The relative error gradually increased as the amount of fissile mass decreased.
4. MCNPX Fresh Fuel Simulations
4.1. Simulation Setup
The DDA instrument in the MCNPX simulations was designed to reproduce the experimental setup as
accurately as reasonably achievable. All of the main experimental components, including the fresh fuel
assembly, water tank, three stainless steel detector pods containing a total of nine 3He detectors, and the 
DT neutron generator in a waterproof stainless steel cylinder were modeled (Fig. 3). Material definitions
from a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory report [8] were used to standardize the materials in the
simulations.
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Figure 3. Schematic drawing of the DDA instrument setup as modeled in the MCNPX simulations.
4.2. Sensitivity Studies
Small variations of several parameters of the MCNPX simulations were investigated to determine the
effect on the overall results. The sensitivity studies included study of the statistical variation in MCNPX
results, neutron generator pulse wrap-around effects, and small changes to the detector positions.
4.2.1. Statistical Variation in MCNPX
The uncertainty of MCNPX tally results is calculated by the code based on analysis of sub-sections of the
simulation. In order to estimate the uncertainty on values obtained when the MCNPX results are
processed further, such as calculating the die-away time, we performed multiple MCNPX simulations with
different starting random numbers and evaluated the variance of the final results.
Five nearly identical simulations, differing only by the random number, were run for two different cases, a
1.96% 235U fresh fuel enrichment and an empty assembly (no fissile material). The die-away times for the 
nine detectors positioned around the fuel assembly were determined from the DDA signal. The mean
value and the standard deviation of the die-away times were found for three different time domains: 0-50
μs, 100-150 μs, and 150-200 μs (Table III).
The variance of die-away times has been found to be relatively small when different random numbers
were used, indicating that the statistical quality of each simulation was satisfactory. The 1.96% 235U case 
seems more affected by the different random number than the empty fuel assembly case. The back
detectors, primarily detector 5, experienced the largest variance. The relative error for all detector
positions for both fuel assembly configurations increased with time after the neutron pulse. Typical
uncertainties for the simulated die-away time values ranged from less than 1% to approximately 3.5% per
detector position for the two fuel configurations.
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1.96% 235U: DDA Signal Die-Away Time [μs] 
Time
domain: 50-100 μs 100-150 μs 150-200 μs
Mean SDOM Mean SDOM Mean SDOM
Detector 1 46.6 0.1 60.2 0.2 90.6 0.6
Detector 3 59.2 0.2 85.6 0.6 125.4 1.8
Detector 5 88.5 1.0 138.6 1.5 165.9 3.2
Detector 7 59.3 0.1 85.7 0.9 124.8 2.2
Detector 9 46.7 0.1 60.3 0.2 90.7 0.3
Empty: DDA Signal Die-Away Time [μs]
Time
domain: 50-100 μs 100-150 μs 150-200 μs
Mean SDOM Mean SDOM Mean SDOM
Detector 1 35.2 0.1 33.1 0.1 32.6 0.1
Detector 3 35.2 0.1 33.4 0.2 32.6 0.3
Detector 5 35.3 0.2 33.2 0.4 33.2 0.4
Detector 7 35.4 0.1 33.2 0.1 33.9 0.3
Detector 9 35.2 0.1 33.1 0.1 33.0 0.2
Table III: The standard deviation of the mean simulated die-away time in three time domains was calculated from five
MCNPX simulations starting with different random numbers to determine the statistical variation of the results. The
relative error increased in the later time domains. The back detector (detector 5) was most affected by statistical
variation in the transport code. The average and standard deviation values are in units of microseconds.
4.2.2. Neutron Generator Pulse Wrap-Around Effects
In each MCNPX simulation, essentially only one neutron generator pulse is simulated. However, during
an experiment, the neutron generator pulses tens of thousands of times as the DDA signal is typically
acquired over several minutes. We investigated how neutrons from the previous pulse which may still be
lingering in the vicinity of the fuel assembly and detectors could change the die-away time magnitude in
simulations.
For experiments, the DT neutron generator is typically operated at 2500 Hz with a 20 μs long pulse. 
Therefore, every 400 μs a new pulse from the generator arrives to interrogate the fuel assembly. To
reproduce the wrap-around effects, the tally signal from the 400-800 μs time domain respective time bins 
were summed with the signal from the 0-400 μs time domain. Simulated data not including the wrap-
around neutrons (Fig. 4, “Original”) and including the residual neutrons (Fig. 4, “Wrap Around”) were 
plotted. Including the residual neutron population slightly increased the overall number of neutrons
detected in the 0-400 μs time domain and slightly increased the DDA signal and die-away time
magnitudes. The residual neutron (Fig. 4, “Residual Neutrons”) population is approximately two orders of 
magnitude less than the DDA signal from the subsequent pulse but still influences the recorded signal.
On average, the pulse-wrap around effect increased the DDA die-away time magnitude by approximately
2% for all detector positions and fuel configurations (Fig. 5). The empty FFA case was not affected
because our detectors are not sensitive to thermal neutrons and therefore some fission is required to
create detectable signal. The results in this study have been corrected for the wrap-around effect, which
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is however not expected to significantly change the uncertainty estimate discussed in the previous
sections.
Figure 4. (Left) The simulated DDA signal from a single MCNPX simulation (“Original”) was compared to the previous
pulse wrap around effects included signal (“Wrap Around”) from Detector 5. (Right) The magnitude of the residual 
neutron population from the previous pulse (“Residual Neutrons”) was compared to the DDA signal magnitudes.
Figure 5. The relative differences between the simulated die-away times in the 100-200 μs time domain of the
original and the wrap-around corrected DDA signal. The wrap around corrected die-away time magnitude was
consistently larger than the original, due to neutrons still present in the vicinity of the fuel. The empty FFA die-away
time was not affected by pulse wrap-around effects.
Another potential effect is the influence of delayed neutrons on the DDA signal. Technically, delayed
neutrons are included in the MCNPX simulations; however, the time cutoff of the tally for a single neutron
history (1 ms) effectively excludes delayed neutrons from contributing to the tally. We expect delayed
neutrons to contribute a constant background to the DDA signal. We intend to investigate the influence of
delayed neutrons on the DDA signal in a future study.
4.2.3. Detector Position
The effect on the DDA signal magnitude by changing the detector positions with respect to the FFA and
the effect on the DDA signal die-away time when moving the detectors horizontally along the side of the
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Moving the detectors 4 mm away (relative to the best known position) from the fuel assembly resulted in a
1-2% decrease of the DDA signal magnitude recorded from most detectors. Shifting the detectors 4 mm
closer to the FFA resulted in a 1-4% increase of the DDA signal recorder by most detectors. Horizontal
shifts of the detectors also caused changes to the DDA signal die-away times; however, the magnitude of
the effect of the shift was partially dependent on the detector position and time domain over which the
die-away time was determined. Moving the detectors ±2 mm from the best known position resulted in the
largest changes to the back detector (detectors 4-6) die-away times in the 70-100 μs and 100-130 μs time
domains. The back detector die-away times changed approximately 1-5% with the horizontal detector
shifts. The die-away times in the front detectors were more affected in the 100-130 μs time interval (1-4%
change) than directly after the neutron generator pulse.
In future experiments, we will use additional components to strictly fix the positions of the detectors
relative to the FFA as small changes to the DDA instrument geometry results in measurable changes to
the DDA signal magnitude and die-away time.
5. Comparison of Experiment and Simulation
The experimental and simulated results were compared to determine how accurately we are able to
model the complex DDA signal using MCNPX. We evaluated two observables from both the experimental
data and the simulation results: the time-dependent behavior of the DDA signal and the DDA signal die-
away time magnitude in two time domains.
From previously performed niobium foil irradiations, the DT neutron generator yield at the operating high
voltage of 90 kV was estimated to be 1.8·108 n/s ± 5%. A deadtime correction coefficient of 875 ns was 
used to correct the experimental data. Both the experimental and simulated data were acquired in 5 μs 
bins; the DDA signals were then converted to counts per second.
5.1. The Dynamic Evolution of the DDA Signal
The experimental (red) time-dependent DDA signal is plotted with the MCNPX simulation results (blue) in
Figure 6. Overall, we found the experimental and simulated DDA signal distributions compared well within
experimental and simulation uncertainties. The DDA signals trend well for multiple enrichments and
detector positions. (Note: Detectors 3 and 7 are positioned symmetrically around the FFA such that we
expect statistically identical results for uniform assembly configurations.)
Detector 1 was heavily impacted by deadtime directly after the neutron generator pulse. The deadtime
effects are due to the very high count rate experienced by the detector and electronics due to its position
close to the DT neutron generator. The count rates in the front detectors (detectors 1 and 2) were so high
that the deadtime correction model failed at the earliest times (<70 μs) times, giving rise to signal
excursions (seen above the pulse peak in red). In the future, we intend to upgrade our experimental
detector/electronics packages by using LANL-made faster post-burst recovery electronics [9] to improve
the data quality in the early time domains. We will also consider reducing the efficiency of the front
detectors by decreasing the radial thickness of the HDPE sleeves.
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Figure 6. The dynamic evolution of the DDA signal is plotted for three fresh fuel enrichments for five detectors
positioned around the FFA.
5.2. Die-Away Time as a Function of Enrichment
The DDA signal die-away time values for the 70-100 μs and 100-150 μs time periods were determined
from the experimental and simulated results and compared. In the early time domain (70-100 μs), the
MCNPX simulated die-away times trended well with the experimental die-away times (Fig. 7). Detectors 1
and 2 were particularly sensitive to deadtime correction in the early time domain due to the very high
count rates recorded by the front positions (close to the DT neutron generator). The die-away times for
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detectors 7, 4, and 5 compared well for all fresh fuel enrichments and the empty case. We also found
good agreement between the experimental and simulated die-away times in the later time domain (100-
150 μs) when deadtime was no longer significantly affecting the DDA signal.
Figure 7. Comparison of the experimental (square) and simulated (cross) die-away times of the DDA signal in the 70-
100 μs and 100-150 μs time domain for four FFA enrichments.
We determined the relative differences between the experimental and simulated DDA signal die-away
times for the 70-100 μs and 100-150 μs time domains (Fig. 8). We found good agreement between the
experimental and simulated die-away times both in terms of trending with the average enrichment of the
fresh fuel assembly and the magnitude. In the early time domain (70-100 μs), the experimental DDA
signals from detector 1 was recovering from the DT neutron generator burst which affected the die-away
time magnitude. However, the die-away time values from detectors 2, 7, 4, and 5 compared well with the
simulated results, with an average relative difference of approximately ±2.3%. In the later time domain
(100-150 μs), the die-away time values compared well for all detectors for all fresh fuel arrangements,
with an average relative difference of approximately ±2.6%.
From the mainly positive relative difference values for both time domains, the simulation generally
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experiment die-away time magnitudes may have been caused by small geometry errors or the lack of
delayed neutrons contributing to the DDA signal in simulation.
Figure 8. In the early time domain (70-100 μs), the die-away times as a function of average FFA enrichment from
Detectors 2, 7, 4, and 5 compares fairly well with the simulated results, with an average relative difference of
approximately ±2.3%. Detector 1 was overwhelmed by deadtime which affected the die-away time determination. In
the later time domain (100-150 μs), the die-away times as a function of average FFA enrichment from all detectors
compared well with the experimental results, with an average relative difference of ±2.6%.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Overall, we found good agreement between the experiment and simulation, with the relative difference
(approximately 3%) between the die-away time results within uncertainty (approximately 5%). The
uncertainty on the die-away time is dependent on statistical variation in the exponential fit (<1%) and
small discrepancies between the experimental setup and simulation geometry (up to 5%). Other
uncertainties affecting the DDA signal magnitude include the DT neutron generator yield and the absence
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independent of the absolute neutron generator strength but is still affected by the uncertainty in the
deadtime correction coefficient, particularly for the front detectors in the early time period.
We plan to continue to perform experiments and simulations of the fresh fuel assay by the DDA
instrument. We are planning to upgrade our detector and electronics packages by using faster post-burst
recovery systems. Improved electronics will decrease deadtime effects and allow for more accurate
analysis of the DDA signal closer to the DT neutron generator peak. We also intend to investigate the
effect of delayed neutrons on the DDA signal through the experiment.
We have shown that the DDA instrument is capable of practically measuring the complex time-dependent
signal from a fuel assembly that is interrogated by pulsed external neutron source. Through the
experiments and simulations described in this paper, we demonstrate that MCNPX produces a reliable
and accurate DDA model. These results lend credibility to the previously performed spent fuel simulations
which showed the capabilities of the DDA instrument to characterize spent fuel for nuclear safeguards
applications.
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Abstract: 
We present a method for the detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) in shielded containers 
which is both sensitive and applicable under field conditions. The method uses an external pulsed 
neutron source to induce fission in SNM and subsequent detection of the fast prompt fission neutrons. 
The detectors surrounding the container under investigation are liquid scintillation detectors able to 
distinguish gamma rays from fast neutrons by means of the pulse shape discrimination method (PSD). 
One advantage of these detectors, besides the ability for PSD analysis, is that the analogue signal 
from a detection event is of very short duration (typically few tens of nanoseconds). This allows the 
use of very short coincidence gates for the detection of the prompt fission neutrons in multiple 
detectors while benefiting from a low accidental (background) coincidence rate yielding a low detection 
limit.  Another principle advantage of this method derives from the fact that the external neutron 
source is pulsed.  By proper time gating the interrogation can be conducted by epithermal and thermal 
source neutrons only.  These source neutrons do not appear in the fast neutron signal following the 
PSD analysis thus providing a fundamental method for separating the interrogating source neutrons 
from the sample response in form of fast fission neutrons.  The paper describes laboratory tests with a 
configuration of eight detectors in the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA).  The 
sensitivity of the coincidence signal to fissile mass is investigated for different sample and 
configurations and interrogation regimes.   
Keywords: Nuclear security, SNM detection, PSD, neutron generator 
1. Introduction
Passive and active non-destructive assay (NDA) methods have potential in practical applications as a 
means to detect special nuclear materials (SNM).  The prompt emission from fission of neutrons and 
γ-rays appear to be useful signatures for the detection of SNM in shielded containers.  One reason for 
this is that a component of the prompt γ-rays from fission are of high energy and thus very penetrating 
and difficult to deliberately shield from detection.  Furthermore identifying the detected radiation to be 
originating from fission events is evidence of the presence of SNM in the object under investigation. 
To this end it is useful to arrange the detection system to take advantage of the fact that during the 
fission event multiple prompt γ-rays and neutrons are emitted simultaneously [1-3].  
Using an external neutron source to induce fission extends the usefulness of this detection method to 
apply not only to spontaneous fissile elements but also to elements with a cross-section for neutron 
induced fission.  Pulsing of the external neutron source can provide further advantages to be exploited 
in the detection method.  This includes the fact that by proper timing (gating) of the detection period 
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with respect to the neutron emission from the external source, the object can be interrogated by a low 
energy neutron flux (epi-thermal or thermal neutron flux) only, providing the possibility to distinguish 
the fast fission neutrons from the low energy source neutrons in the neutron detection system [4].  
In the present work we study epi-thermal neutron interrogation only.  The thermal interrogation has 
been demonstrated to yield a response proportionally to the fissile mass. In the epi-thermal 
interrogation, which is desirable for nuclear security purposes, the response is harder to interpret due 
to the large proportion of gamma detection events in the detector during slowing-down of the source 
neutrons.  
2. Experimental setup
The Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA) of the Joint Research Centre is designed 
for experimental studies in non-destructive analysis (NDA) methods for nuclear safeguards and 
security.  Figure 1 shows a cross section of PUNITA and the positioning of the detectors used in this 
work.  The facility is composed of a large graphite liner surrounding a central cavity of volume 
50x50x80 cm3.  The (D-T) pulsed neutron generator, the sample under investigation and the 
scintillation detectors used for coincident detection are located inside the cavity.  In total 96 one metre 
long 3He neutron detectors are embedded in polyethylene modules and shielded by cadmium (fission 
neutron counters in Figure 1). In the present experiments these detectors are used as reference 
detectors of the prompt fission neutrons.  
Figure 1: Sketch of PUNITA showing the permanently mounted neutron detectors and the neutron generator 
mounted inside the sample cavity (left picture). The right hand picture shows the positioning of the eight liquid 
scintillation detectors within the sample cavity of PUNITA. 
In Figure 1 is also indicated, as source monitors, bare 3He neutron detectors which are used to 
normalize detector readings in all experiments to the same total neutron emission from the generator 
target.  The neutron generator (Model A-211 from Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.) is pulsed at 100 Hz 
which is chosen based on the average thermal neutron lifetime in the graphite/cavity configuration. 
The thermal flux generated by source neutrons being thermalized in the graphite peaks at about 250 
μs after the 14-MeV neutron burst [6].  The generator is able to produce short and intense bursts of 
neutrons with no neutron emission between bursts. This fact, together with the very short duty-cycle of 
one per mille, allow separation of the neutron interrogation into a fast/epi-thermal period from zero to 
120μs, and a thermal period from 250 μsec to 9 msec, respectively [4]. 
We use of an array of eight 3”x3” liquid scintillation detectors EJ-309 from Eljen Technology [5] for the 
detection of the prompt radiation from fission events (Figure 1).  These detectors can distinguish fast 
neutron interactions from other interactions by means of pulse shape discrimination (PSD).  The 
detection principle is based on the simple fact that detection of fast (fission) neutrons is evidence for 
the presence of fissile material.  The performance of scintillation detectors with respect to γ/n 
discrimination in the PUNITA facility is described in [4]. Due to the very fast response of the 
scintillation detectors the effect of the neutron generator burst can be followed in detail [7].  
The anode output of the photomultiplier is connected directly to a signal digitizer. Each detector was 
supplied with individual high voltage (NDT1740) [8] to allow having same response in all detectors to a 
given photon source. The detectors were calibrated using the following photon sources: 133Ba (Eγ=356 
keV), 137Cs (Eγ=662 keV), 54Mn (Eγ=835 keV), and 22Na (Eγ=511,1274 keV). The upper end of the 
dynamic range is set to eliminate the 2.223 MeV photons produced by thermal neutron capture in 
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hydrogen, and the lower end of the dynamic range is set to the PSD resolution value at 120.6 keVee 
as achieved with a 252Cf  source.  
The signal digitizers used in this work are from Signal Processing Devices Sweden AB 
(http://spdevices.com/). Figure 2 shows the triggering and data processing scheme used in these 
experiments.   
Figure 2: Data triggering scheme. 
By delaying the data recording period from the neutron generator burst (Figure 2, “Gate from 
PUNITA”) the data acquisition can be tailored to a certain neutron energy range.  In an earlier work 
interrogation was done by thermal neutrons only using a triggering scheme based on detection of 
multiple signals [7].  In the present work concerned with epi-thermal neutron interrogation this 
triggering scheme is not efficient due to the very high rate of photon detections during the slowing 
down of the generator neutrons.  In contrast the present triggering scheme (Figure 2) is very simple. A 
data stream from the eight scintillation detectors is recorded following a “ready” signal from the 
digitizers and for the duration of the PUNITA Gate.  The recorded waveforms are 95 µs long, digitized 
at 1 GS/s and 12-bit resolution and constitute a single data cycle.  Such data streams are recorded at 
100 Hz.  
All recorded waveforms are analyzed offline in MATLAB [9].  A signal is defined as having an 
amplitude larger than 3σ of the baseline variation.  Examples are shown in Figure 3. All signals are 
extracted by such criteria. 
Figure 3: Typical waveform of epithermal data (a), in picture (b) is shown analyzes of the last signal. 
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The initial data analysis produces a list of all signals.  The signals are described in terms of: signal 
amplitude, time stamp (t0), detector number and PSD value. From this list the neutron signals can be 
selected as in standard list-mode operation of neutron multiplicity analyzers. This allows us the 
possibility of using standardized principles from passive neutron multiplicity analyses. In addition we 
can analyze mixed photon/neutron streams.  
3. Measurements of uranium samples in PUNITA
A series of standard CNNM U3O8 sources [10] are used in conjunction with the pulsed neutron 
interrogation and eight EJ-309 scintillation detectors. The five CBNM standards are identical in all 
aspects (total U mass of about 169 grams, density, geometry, container type) except for the 235U 
enrichment. The mass of the fissile 235U component is 0.52 g (0.31%), 1.12 g (0.71%), 3.28 g (1.94%), 
4.99 g (2.96%) and 7.54g (4.46%), respectively. Also measurements of an empty CBNM container are 
included for the purpose of comparison. The sample is placed centered among the eight detectors at a 
distance of 150 mm. 
Figure 4 shows the MCNP simulated source neutron spectrum in discrete periods of the range 27 μs 
to 135 μs after the 14-MeV burst.  In the present analysis we use the period 28 μs to 123 μs i.e. 95 μs. 
Also shown in Figure 4 are the capture and fission cross-sections of some isotopes.  Clearly in the 
selected time period fission is only induced in the 235U isotope.  One can also estimate that for CBNM 
samples of small 235U content, the capture reaction in 238U becomes relatively important compared to 
fission in 235U. 
Figure 4: Epi-thermal neutron cross section for 235U(n,γ), 238U(n,γ),  and Al((n,γ), (top picture) and 235U(n,f), 
238U(n,f) (bottom picture). 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
414
3.1 Neutron multiplicity counting 
As mentioned above continuous waveforms of 95 µs length were recorded, starting at 28 µs delay 
after the 14-MeV neutron burst.  Figure 5 shows a distribution of the pulse time stamp (t0 ) for neutrons 
only. 
Figure 5: Distribution of time stamps (t0) for neutron associated pulses (a), picture (b) shows zoom of last 100 ns 
of the waveform for the CBNM446 sample (4.46% 235U). 
In Figure 5(a) the detected neutron counts decreases until about 30 µs.  The neutron detections in this 
range are mostly fast neutrons from the generator.  Neutrons of energy below about 700 keV do no 
longer produce a signal (PSD) in the detectors associated with neutron detection.  After 30 µs most 
detected neutrons are fast fission neutrons.  The slowly falling rate of neutron detections is due to the 
decaying neutron flux (in spite of the increasing fission cross section for lower energies).  We divide 
our data analyses into three parts: 28-59 µs, 59-81 µs and 81-123 µs. For this data we use a kind of 
Shift Register analysis on the neutron associated “Rossi-alpha” kind of distributions. 
Figure 6: Neutron asosiated “Rossi-alpha” kind of distribution for CBNM446 sample: (a) entire picture, (b) 
zooming of first 400 ns and (c) zooming of first 40 ns. 
As can be seen in Figure 6(b) a “Rossi-alpha” distribution of detected neutrons quite similar to what is 
observed in standard passive neutron counting of spontaneous fission events although the time scale 
is quite different.  We consider two time gates: one immediately following a neutron signal of length 20 
ns (called the prompt gate (PG)), and another in the period 250÷270 ns after the first (called the 
delayed gate (DG)).  We form frequency distributions of number of neutron detections in the gates, 
calculate the 1st factorial moment from the distribution, and make the subtraction PG – DG. For 
different samples measurements this result is normalized to the Source Monitor (SM) counts 
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(proportional to the neutron emission from the generator).  Figure 7 shows the results of the CBNM 
uranium samples. 
Figure 7: Difference between PG and DG gates of neutron pair events normalised to the neutron emission of the 
neutron generator. 
For the time period of 28-59 µs the linearity is not good for the smallest sample and the empty 
container. The reason might be that fast source neutrons still persist in this range. 
The result for counting the total number of neutron detection events (single neutrons) is presented in 
Figure 8.  In this case the earlier period (28-59 µs) does not show linearity with fissile mass.  The 
reason is likely due to source neutrons still being observed as fast neutrons in the detectors.  
Figure 8: Detected normalized rate of single neutrons. 
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4. Conclusions
In the present work we have investigated a detection method for special nuclear material based on an 
epi-thermal source of neutrons inducing fission is fissile isotopes, and the detection of fast prompt 
fission neutrons as a signature of the presence of fissile material.  The advantage of this method is 
that epi-thermal neutrons have sufficiently low energy not to leave a neutron signature in the liquid 
scintillation detectors, while the neutron energy is sufficiently high for the neutrons to pass through 
thermal neutron shielding, and induce fission in fissile isotopes.  The suitable source neutron energy 
range is selected by varying the delay of interrogation following a burst of 14-MeV neutron from a 
pulsed neutron generator placed in a strongly moderating detection assembly.  The difficulty in epi-
thermal interrogation is the overwhelming photon response in the detectors during the slowing-down of 
the source neutrons.  By recording all detection events in eight scintillation detectors in a selected 
period of about 30 μs during slowing-down of the source neutrons, a clear signature, proportional to 
the fissile mass, of prompt neutrons from induced fission by epi-thermal neutrons was observed. 
The purpose of this work is to investigate the feasibility of a device for the detection of SNM that would 
combine epi-thermal and thermal neutron interrogation, and would be both sensitive to the presence of 
fissile materials and be able to overcome potential thermal neutron absorbers placed around the fissile 
material. 
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Abstract: 
The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) system developed 
at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and designed for underwater measurement of research 
reactor spent fuel assemblies. The system has components for active and passive neutron 
coincidence counting and an ion chamber for gross gamma-ray counting. The basic measurement 
objective of the AEFC is to verify the residual fissile mass (i.e., 235U + 239Pu) in spent fuel assemblies 
using active neutron interrogation. Extended analysis of the passive neutron and gamma-ray 
signatures provides a consistency check on the operator declaration of parameters such as burnup, 
cooling time, and initial enrichment. The passive signatures can provide quantitative assessments of 
these parameters if combined with burnup and detector modelling codes. In 2014, the Institute of 
Nuclear Physics (INP) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan hosted an AEFC field trial. This paper summarizes the 
preliminary results of the measurements at the INP WWR-SM research reactor.  
Keywords: NDA; neutron; gamma; spent; fuel 
1. Introduction
The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) system developed 
at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and designed for underwater measurement of research 
reactor spent fuel assemblies. The system uses active and passive neutron coincidence counting and 
an ion chamber for gross gamma-ray counting. The basic measurement objective of the AEFC is to 
verify the residual fissile mass (i.e., 235U + 239Pu) in spent fuel assemblies using active neutron 
interrogation. Extended analysis of the passive neutron and gamma-ray signatures provides a 
consistency check on the operator declaration of parameters such as burnup, cooling time, and initial 
enrichment. The passive signatures can provide quantitative assessments of these parameters if 
combined with burnup and detector modelling codes. This paper summarizes the preliminary 
measurement results of the 2014 AEFC field trial at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan.  
There have been two previous field tests of the AEFC. The first occurred in 2006 in Australia,1 and the 
second occurred in 2011 at the INP WWR-SM reactor in Uzbekistan.2 The field trial that is the subject 
of this paper was also performed at the INP WWR-SM reactor. Participants measured a total of 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
418
twenty-one spent fuel assemblies, which included twelve IRT-4M and nine EK-10 assemblies. The 
field trial introduced a new three-point fuel scanning procedure and successfully demonstrated that 
252Cf can be used as the active neutron interrogation source for the AEFC in lieu of AmLi. Interrogation 
with 252Cf is based on the Time-Correlated Induced Fission (TCIF) concept.3 This paper describes the 
AEFC design, operating parameters, measurement procedure, and preliminary results of the IRT-4M 
measurements. 
2. AEFC Design
2.1. Signatures & Observables 
Verification of spent fuel assemblies is complicated by the fact that there are multiple fuel parameters 
folded into the radiation signatures. Where active neutron measurements can provide an 
unambiguous measure of the residual fissile mass in spent fuel for a given fuel type, the passive 
neutron and gamma-ray signatures are generally a function of burnup, cooling time, and initial 
enrichment. Furthermore, the fuel parameters often affect the passive signatures in competing ways 
(e.g., increased burnup increases passive neutron and gamma-ray signals, while increased cooling 
time decreases them). Analysis of AEFC data can be extended beyond the basic functionality of the 
active neutron signal to include the passive neutron and gamma-ray signatures.  
Figure 1 shows a diagram that maps relationships between the fuel parameters to the radiation 
signatures they affect. The arrows marked with a plus sign (+) indicate positively-correlated 
relationships, those marked with a minus sign (-) indicate negatively-correlated relationships, and 
those with no marking have more complex relationships. For example, an increase in burnup is 
positively correlated with the passive neutron count rates, but the burnup affects the shape of the 
passive neutron profile with plutonium, and possibly curium, growing in more quickly in the middle of 
the fuel assembly compared to the top or bottom of the assembly. 
Figure 1: Diagram mapping spent fuel parameters to AEFC measurements. 
2.2. Mechanical Design 
The AEFC is comprised of neutron and gamma-ray counters, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) 
moderating material, and lead shielding inside a watertight stainless steel shell as shown in Figure 2. 
The main detector body is cylindrical in shape with a 117-mm through-hole for fuel assemblies. There 
is a funnel on top of the through-hole that helps guide assemblies into the measurement position. The 
neutron and gamma-ray counters are positioned on the opposite side of the through-hole from a slot 
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for the active neutron interrogation source, and there is a crescent-shaped piece of lead shielding on 
the detector side of the through-hole. 
Figure 2: Mechanical design of the AEFC. 
For neutron detection, the AEFC has six boron-lined 3He tubes with 4 atm of gas pressure, each 
surrounded by a 10-mm-thick lead sleeve and embedded in the HDPE moderator. The ion chamber 
used for gross gamma-ray counting is located on top of the HDPE, next to a collimator hole that 
creates a window to the fuel assembly through the crescent-shaped lead pillar. When the system is 
underwater, detector signal and voltage cables run to the top of the spent fuel pool inside waterproof 
Tygon tubing. The interrogation source is contained inside a HDPE holder and connected to a Teleflex 
cable. It is moved into and out of the AEFC through a PVC guide tube that runs from the AEFC to the 
top of the spent fuel pool. 
2.3. Data Acquisition 
For the 2014 measurements, neutron data was collected in parallel with both a JSR-15 shift register 
and a PTR-32 list mode module being tested by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The 
shift register data was collected on a laptop and analysed in “Rates Only” mode using IAEA Neutron 
Coincidence Counting (INCC) software version 5.1.2 to obtain the singles and doubles count rates. 
INCC 6, which is currently under development, will include list mode data analysis capability that 
supports the PTR-32.4 The gamma-ray signal cable was connected to a current-to-pulse converter 
(CPC) that detects input current from the ion chamber and produces transistor-transistor logic (TTL) 
pulses at a rate proportional to the input current. The resulting TTL pulses were counted with the JSR-
15. This allowed the INCC software to record the gamma rate, time synchronized with the neutron
count rates, without the need for an additional software package to collect and analyse the gamma 
data. INCC outputs the neutron and gamma count rates for each assembly to a single file. 
3. Operating Parameters & Measurement Procedure
In this field trial, the AEFC operated with a predelay of 4.5 µs and gate length of 128 µs. The 252Cf 
interrogation source was supplied by INP and had a strength of 7.4×105 n/s. Before the AEFC was 
lowered into the spent fuel pool, we measured a high voltage plateau for the neutron detectors with 
the 252Cf source. Once the system was in the pool, we measured a high voltage plateau with the spent 
fuel assembly expected to have the highest gamma-emission rate (i.e., highest burnup level, shortest 
cooling time). This allowed us to choose an operating voltage below the point of gamma interference. 
Figure 3 shows a plot of both high voltage plateaus for comparison. The 252Cf curve shows the count 
rate level off at the plateau; whereas, there is a sharp increase in counts after ~1640 V for the IRT-4M 
curve due to gamma interference. For this field trial, the AEFC operating voltage was set at 1620 V to 
be below the point of gamma interference, which resulted in a 5% loss in efficiency.  
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Figure 3: High voltage plateaus for the neutron detectors showing the point of gamma interference. 
The AEFC measurement procedure was refined for the 2014 field trial. The development team tested 
a new three-point fuel scanning technique motivated by the fact that most of the residual 235U is 
located at the ends of the fuel. Figure 4 shows a photograph of the AEFC being lowered into the spent 
fuel pool at INP with an overhead crane (top left) and at the measurement location on top of the fuel 
storage grid (bottom left). Previous field trials of the AEFC included only one measurement position 
near the middle of the fuel assembly. In order to provide a full-length scan, we measured the top, 
middle, and bottom of each assembly using a positioning jig attached to the fuel handling pole, shown 
in Figure 4 (right). The jig was set on a platform that spanned the width of the pool during the 
measurements to hold the fuel assembly in place. For each position, we took a 5-min. passive and 5-
min. active measurement for a total of 30 min. of count time per assembly.  
Figure 4: Photographs of the AEFC being lowered into the spent fuel pool at INP (top left), at the measurement 
location on top of the fuel storage grid (bottom left), and the positioning jig attached the fuel handling pole (right). 
250 mm 
250 mm 
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4. Measurement Results
The field trial included measurement of twelve IRT-4M and nine EK-10 assemblies. Here, we 
summarize the preliminary results of the IRT-4M measurements. The IRT-4M fuel assemblies have 
19.75%-enriched UO2-Al fuel with a total length of 882 mm and an active length of 600 mm. The plate 
fuel elements are oriented as concentric squares. The IRT-4M fuel assemblies measured have two 
configurations: the six-plate model with ~266 g 235U when fresh and the eight-plate model with ~300 g 
235U when fresh. Eleven of the IRT-4M assemblies measured at INP are the six-plate type and one is 
an eight-plate type (assembly 04M). All of the IRT-4M assemblies measured have a declared burnup 
level near 60%. Two were discharged in 2002 and nine were discharged in 2011-12. 
4.1. AEFC Basic Analysis 
The basic measurement objective of the AEFC is to verify the residual fissile mass (i.e., 235U + 239Pu) 
in spent fuel assemblies using active neutron interrogation. In this section, we refer to this value as 
residual 235U mass because the analysis is based on the operator declaration of 235U mass. Figure 5 
shows a comparison of the active count rates as a function of the residual 235U mass for the middle 
position only versus the average of the top, middle, and bottom positions (the active singles and active 
doubles provide a redundant signature in the AEFC). 
Figure 5: Comparison of the middle and three-point average active neutron count rates as a function of the 
operator-declared residual 235U mass. 
The active singles are fit with a linear calibration curve forced through the origin, and the active 
doubles are fit with a second-order polynomial forced through the origin. The functional forms of these 
curves should be verified with Monte Carlo simulations that cover a wider range of residual mass 
values than measured in this field trial. We calculated residual 235U mass based on the measured 
count rate and the calibration curve for each assembly along with the relative difference between the 
declared and calculated value. Table 1 provides the relative standard deviation (RSD) from the 
operator-declared residual 235U mass with the three-point average analysis compared to analysis of 
the middle position only for both the active singles and doubles signatures. The large improvement in 
the doubles assay for the three-point average is partially due to improved counting statistics (i.e., 
three-times longer measurement time), but counting statistics do not play a significant role in the 
improvement of the singles assay. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Middle versus Three-Point Average Relative Standard Deviation (RSD) from the 
Operator-Declared Residual 235U Mass for the Active Neutron Measurements 
Singles Middle Average 
%RSD 7.0% 4.2% 
Doubles Middle Average 
%RSD 6.2% 2.2% 
2.2. AEFC Extended Analysis 
In addition to the basic analysis of the active neutron measurements for verifying residual fissile mass, 
extended analysis of the AEFC signatures provides a consistency check on the operator declaration of 
parameters such as burnup, cooling time, and initial enrichment. The extended analysis can provide 
quantitative assessments of these parameters if combined with burnup and detector modelling codes. 
For example, Figure 6 (left) shows a plot of the passive doubles count rate as a function of the 
operator-declared burnup. In low-burnup fuels, the passive doubles come primarily from plutonium; 
however, 242Cm and 244Cm become the dominant sources of passive doubles in high-burnup fuels, 
with neutron emission rates four orders of magnitude larger than that of 240Pu. Here, the dramatic 
increase in passive doubles as a function of burnup suggests that curium is present in the IRT-4M fuel 
assemblies. Furthermore, the passive singles are proportional to 239Pu (α,n) neutrons in low-burnup 
fuels. The dual-axis plot in Figure 6 (right) shows an overlay of the passive singles and doubles count 
rates. This plot shows that the singles are dominated by spontaneous fission neutrons in this case. 
Figure 6: Passive neutron signatures as a function of operator-declared burnup level. 
Figure 7 shows a plot of the passive doubles versus gamma count rates where the operator-declared 
burnup is indicated by the color gradient of the data point and cooling time is indicated by the size of 
the data point. This type of plot allows the analyst to examine multivariate relationships between the 
passive signals, burnup, and cooling time and can be used to identify structure within the data. As 
expected, we see a positive correlation between the passive neutron and gamma count rates. We also 
see the dependence of these signatures on both burnup and cooling time. The passive neutron and 
gamma signatures increase with burnup level but have a reduced gamma contribution for longer 
cooling times. There is a clear distinction between the assemblies discharged within the past three 
years compared to those discharged twelve years ago, where the short-lived gamma emitters have 
decayed away. The assemblies with similar cooling times are clustered together on the plot. 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the active and passive neutron profiles and position ratios for all of the neutron 
and gamma-ray measurements (the gamma data only includes measurements for the top half of the 
fuel). As with the data in Figures 6 and 7, the profiles facilitate consistency checks with the declared 
burnup and cooling times based on the relative magnitude of the signatures. The top-to-middle and 
bottom-to-middle position ratios facilitate analysis of the shape of the burnup profile to check for 
anomalies. The position ratios for the IRT-4M assemblies show a high degree of uniformity, which is 
consistent with the operator declaration that all of the assemblies have a similar burnup level. 
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Figure 7: Passive neutron versus gamma count rates showing operator-declared burnup and cooling time. 
Figure 8: Active and passive neutron profiles (top) and position ratios for neutron and gamma measurements. 
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5. Conclusions
The 2014 field trial of the AEFC at the INP WWR-SM reactor was a successful demonstration of the 
measurement system, helped the development team refine and simplify the implementation 
procedures, and significantly enhanced our understanding of the AEFC signatures. The new three-
point fuel scanning technique was motivated by the fact that most of the residual 235U is located at the 
ends of the fuel and shows promise to improve the accuracy of the residual fissile mass estimate. We 
recommend continued use of this technique in subsequent AEFC measurements. The field trial also 
demonstrated the viability of the 252Cf TCIF concept in lieu of AmLi as the active interrogation source. 
The current-to-pulse converter was a key enabling technology new to the AEFC kit in 2014. It provides 
a simple solution for the collection of time-synchronized neutron and gamma signals, which are both 
collected using INCC and output to a single file.  
Follow-on work from the field trial includes a focused study to generate an active calibration curve for 
the AEFC based on 252Cf interrogation. We also plan to use a combination of burnup and detector 
modelling codes to study the evolution the passive signatures as a function of burnup, cooling time, 
and initial enrichment. By isolating the effects of these fuel parameters on the AEFC signatures, we 
hope to strengthen the technical basis for the extended analysis capability. 
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Abstract:
Recently a new one-group Feynman-alpha theory was derived and experimentally (as well as numeri-
cally) evaluated for total (neutron and gamma without pulse shape discrimination) as well as gamma detec-
tion [1]. Extension of this theory to detection of gamma and total neutron and gamma opened a possibility
to use separately gamma and total variance-to-mean ratios for the evaluation of nuclear and radioactive ma-
terial mass without need for applying neutron-gamma discrimination techniques. However, the preliminary
evaluation showed differences between theoretical predictions and experimental (and numerical) results.
Analysis of the root for these discrepancies indicated that a possible reason might be hidden in the one-
group theoretical approximation used, which does not include removal of particles from the fast particle
group available for detection to the thermal particle group. Therefore, the subject of this paper is related
to theoretical derivations and analysis of a new theoretical model for two-group Feynman-alpha theory for
total and gamma detections. The new theory is tested against the previous one [1] experimentally and
numerically in a realistic setup. Results of these tests and conclusions drawn are presented in this work.
Keywords: variance to mean, Feynman-alpha, Feynman-Y, gamma Feynman-Y, total Feynman-Y, fast
detection
1. Introduction
An ability to use gamma-based time stamping measurement methods, such as Rossi-α or Feynman-
α methods, in evaluating nuclear material characteristics or detection of nuclear material attracts a lot of
attention in the Safeguards community. Despite the fact that this type of analysis represents a rather com-
plex problem due to the number of the processes which gamma particles can undergo, it is worth doing.
Therefore, recently a few attempts were done to approach this task [1, 2], in particularly, a new one-group
Feynman-alpha theory was derived, numerically and experimentally evaluated for gamma detections. To
our disappointment, experimental results were shown to be deviating from theoretical predictions for only
gamma detections [1]. A few hypotheses have been suggested to explain this disagreement. One of them
was related to the importance and influence of cascade gammas, or in other words importance of care-
ful analysis of energy information for gamma detections. This paper reports on preliminary tests of this
hypothesis and present a new theoretical model for two-energy groups for gamma particles.
2. Theoretical model
2.1. The main concept and assumptions
The neutron-gamma variance to mean (Feynman-alpha) formulas for separate gamma detection in two-
energy intervals and total gamma detection will be derived by using the Kolmogorov forward approach the
same way as described in [3, 4]. In the model that will be used for the derivations we assume that there are
one neutron and two gamma populations: neutrons (denoted as particles of type 1) and gammas (denoted
as type 2 and 3). Neutrons can undergo the reactions (i) listed below:
• absorption (i= a) with no gammas emitted,
∗Corresponding author, email: dina@nephy.chalmers.se
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• absorption (i= 2g) with one gamma emitted in the energy group 2,
• absorption (i= 3g) with one gamma emitted in the energy group 3,
• absorption (i= cg) with s gammas emitted in the energy group 2 and d gammas emitted in the energy
group 3,
• fission (i= f ) with corresponding gamma emission.
Gamma particles can be absorbed (i= a), detected (i= d) or removed (i= 2r) from energy group 2 to energy
group 3. As mentioned, the assumption behind the model is the same as with the traditional Feynman-alpha
theory, i.e. that the medium is infinite and homogeneous with space-independent reaction intensities.The
total transition intensities for neutrons and gammas are denoted as λ1, λ2 and λ3. In the model we include
a compound Poisson source of neutrons and gammas with emission intensity S. The source is assumed to
release m neutrons, n gammas in the energy group 2 and j gammas in the energy group 3 in one emission
event with the probability distribution p(m,n, j).
2.2. Separate and total detection of gamma particles in two energy groups: derivation
In order to derive the two-group (for gammas) one-point Feynman-alpha theory for separate detection of
gammas in two energy intervals, let us assume that the source S is switched on at the time t0 ≤ t, whereas
the separate detection processes are started at the same fixed time instant td , where t0 ≤ td ≤ t. Let the
random process N1(t) represents the number of neutrons at the time t ≥ 0, the random processes N2(t) and
N3(t) represent the number of gammas in two energy groups at the time t ≥ 0, and Z2(t, td) and Z3(t, td) - the
number of gamma detections in two energy groups in the time interval [td , t], respectively. Thus, the joint
probability of having N1 neutrons, N2(t) and N3(t) gammas (in two energy groups) at time t in the system,
and having detected Z2 gammas in energy group 2 and Z2 gammas in energy group 3 during the period
of time t− td ≥ 0 can be defined as P(N1,N2,N3,Z2,Z3, t|t0). By summing up the probabilities of all mutually
exclusive events of the particle not having or having a specific reaction within the infinitesimally small time






































p(m,n, j)P(N1−m,N2−n,N3− j,Z2,Z3, t)
(1)
where, the initial condition reads as
P(N1,N2,N3,Z2,Z3, t = t0 | t0) = δN1,0δN2,0δN3,0δZ2,0δZ3,0 (2)
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The various moments of the particle numbers and detection numbers can be obtained from this equation
by using the generating function technique in a way similar to as described in [3]. By defining the following
generating function for the probability distribution P(N1,N2,N3,Z2,Z3, t):










XN1YN2LN3WZ2V Z3P(N1,N2,N3,Z2,Z3, t) (3)
with the initial condition for t0 ≤ t
G(X ,Y,L,W,V, t = t0 | t0) = 1, (4)
the following partial differential equation is obtained:
∂G
∂ t
= [λ1a+λ2gY +λcgV (Y,L)+λ3gL−λ1X+F(X ,Y )λ1 f ]∂G∂X +[λ2a+λ2dW +λ2rL−λ2Y ]
∂G
∂Y
+[λ3a+λ3dV −λ3L]∂G∂L +S[P(X ,Y,L)−1]G.
(5)
Here the generating functions of the number distributions of neutrons and gamma photons in a source event
(spontaneous fission) and an induced fission event were introduced in a way similar to [1, 2].
Thus, a steady subcritical medium with a steady source, a stationary state of the system exists when
t0→−∞. For that case the following solutions are obtained for the constant neutron and gamma populations

































By introducing the modified second factorial moment of the random variables a and b as follows
µaa ≡ 〈a(a−1)〉−〈a〉2 = σ2a −〈a〉
µab ≡ 〈ab〉−〈a〉〈b〉
(7)
and then taking cross- and auto-derivatives, the following system of differential equations is obtained for
the modified second factorial moments µN1N1 , µN1N2 , µN2N2 , µN1N3 , µN2N3 , µN3N3 of the neutron and gamma

































































In a stationary system, these modified moments are constant, and can be easily obtained by solving the
algebraic equation resulting from setting the l.h.s. of (8) equal to zero.











































In the case when detection of gamma particles in the energy group 3 is considered the final expression
for the Feynman-alpha formula will have a three exponential form as below:
σ2Z3Z3(t)
Z¯3
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+ω1µN3N3 −λ2rµN2N3)+λcgλ2rµN1N3V (1,0)+λ2λcgµN1N3V (0,1)−λ2λ f µN3N3F(1,0)+λ f λ2rµN1N3F(0,1)








+ω2µN3N3 −λ2rµN2N3)+λcgλ2rµN1N3V (1,0)+λ2λcgµN1N3V (0,1)−λ2λ f µN3N3F(1,0)+λ f λ2rµN1N3F(0,1)








−λ2µN3N3 +ω3µN3N3 −λ2rµN2N3)+λcgλ2rµN1N3V (1,0)+λ2λcgµN1N3V (0,1)−λ2λ f µN3N3F(1,0)+λ f λ2rµN1N3F(0,1)
−λ f λ2rµN2N3F(1,0)+λ2gλ2rµN1N3 +λ2λ3gµN1N3 +λ1λ2µN3N3 +λ1λ2rµN2N3))
(17)









(0,1)−λ f λ2rµN2N3F(1,0)+λ2gλ2rµN1N3 +λ2λ3gµN1N3 +λ1λ2µN3N3 +λ1λ2rµN2N3))
(18)
In the case of total detection of gammas in two groups the assumptions below theory are similar to the
ones used above for the separate detection with the only difference that now Z(t, td) represents the number
of total gamma detections in two groups in the time interval [td , t]. Thus, the joint probability of having N1
neutrons and N2, N3 gammas at time t, and Z gammas in two energy groups together having been detected
during the period of time t− td ≥ 0 can be defined as P(N1,N2,N3,Z, t|t0). Repeating the same procedure as
before, one obtains the following generating function equation:
∂G
∂ t
= [λ1a+λ2gY +λcgV (Y,L)+λ3gL−λ1X+F(X ,Y )λ1 f ]∂G∂X +[λ2a+λ2dW +λ2rL−λ2Y ]
∂G
∂Y
+[λ3a+λ3dW −λ3L]∂G∂L +S[P(X ,Y,L)−1]G.
(19)
In a steady subcritical medium with a steady source the solutions for neutron and gamma populations N¯1,
N¯2, N¯3 are the same as in the case of separate detection of neutrons and gammas, though, the time-varying
detection counts Z¯(t) represents the sum of Z¯1(t) and Z¯2(t) (taken from the case of separate detection of
neutrons and gammas):
Z¯(t) = λ2dN¯2t+λ3dN¯3t (20)
The final expression for the Feynman-alpha formulas for total counts is given as below:
σ2ZZ(t)
Z¯
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−λ2dλ f µN2N2F(1,0)+λ3dλ2gµN1N3 +λ2dλ2gµN1N2 +λ1λ3dµN2N3 +λ1λ2dµN2N2
(25)







−λ2λ3dλ f µN3N3F(1,0)+λ3dλ fλ2rµN1N3F(0,1)+λ2dλ fλ2rµN1N2F(0,1)−λ3dλ fλ2rµN2N3F(1,0)−λ2dλ fλ2rµN2N2F(1,0)
−λ2λ2dλ f µN2N3F(1,0)+λ3dλ2gλ2rµN1N3 +λ2dλ2gλ2rµN1N2 +λ2λ3dλ3gµN1N3 +λ2λ2dλ3gµN1N2





(0,1)−λ3dλ f µN3N3F(1,0)−λ2dλ f µN2N3F(1,0)+λ3dλ3gµN1N3 +λ2dλ3gµN1N2
+λ1λ3dµN3N3 +λ2λ3dµN3N3 +λ3dλ2rµN2N3 +λ2dλ2rµN2N2 +λ1λ2dµN2N3 +λ2λ2dµN2N3
(28)
L2 = λ3dµN3N3 +λ2dµN2N3 (29)
2.3. Theoretical prediction for evaluation of variance-to-mean ratios for detection of gamma emitted
from 22Na
This case was chosen because of its similarity to the measurement setup. The comparison of the vari-
ance to mean ratios for gammas in two energy groups and total gamma (two energy groups are combined)
is made by using quantitative values of the transition probabilities and reaction intensities obtained in a way
similar to that described in [4–9]. A detection efficiency (ε) for gammas is assumed to be equal to 9%,
λd = ε ·λa in which the geometric efficiency is intended to be included.
As shown in Figure 1, the behavior of the dependence of the variance-to-mean ratio for the number of
gammas in two energy groups and total gammas (two energy groups are combined) shows that for a Group
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Time interval, a.u.























Gammas in Group 2
Gammas in Group 3
Total gammas in two groups
Figure 1: Theoretical prediction for evaluation of variance-to-mean ratios for detection of gamma emitted from 22Na.
2 variance-to-mean ratio is unity, which means that gamma particle in this energy range are not correlated.
At the same time, gamma particles in Group 3 appear to be correlated.
The alarming sign is that an asymptotic value of the Feynman-Y functions is higher for correlated gamma
detections in Group 3 in comparison with the total gamma detections. This means that most probably the
variance-to-mean ratio of the total gamma detections do not represent a reliable indicator in a situation when
cascade gammas are present.
3. Experimental evaluation
In the experimental evaluation we used the same setup and procedure, as described in [1] for 22Na
correlated gamma source (∼ 2125 kBq) with the only difference that the detection threshold was set to 0.06
V as compared to 0.2 V in [1]. Measurement time was chosen to 100 seconds sharp. As shown in Figure 2
Pulse height, V





















Figure 2: Pulse height spectra obtained for two detectors/channels with a 22Na source.
in order to perform the variance-to-mean ratio analysis we sorted data (time stamps) for two energy groups
(Group 2 and Group 3) with a threshold 0.6 V.
Finally, as it is shown in Figure 3 the behavior of variance-to-mean ratio for the number of gammas in
two energy groups and total gammas (two energy groups are combined) are in a good agreement with
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Total gammas in two groups
Gammas in Group 3
Gammas in Group 2
Figure 3: Experimental evaluation of variance-to-mean ratios for detection of gamma emitted from 22Na.
a theoretical prediction. Again the asymptotic value of the Feynman-Y functions is higher for correlated
gamma detections in Group 3 in comparison with the total gamma detections.
Thus, we shall conclude that in the case when cascade gammas are present it is very important to
perform time-analysis of energy-dependent data. The reasons, effects and the way to account for differences
caused by energy-related effects are to be investigated in future work.
4. Conclusion
In this paper a new theoretical formalism was created in order to account for energy-related information
of gamma particles when they are analyzed by using a Feynman-alpha approach. Theoretical formulas are
tested against experimental results obtained for a 22Na correlated gamma source (∼ 2125 kBq). Results
show a good agreement between theoretical and experimental behavior of the variance-to-mean ratio. This
indicates the importance of performing a time-analysis of energy-dependent data if gamma particles is to
be considered. At the same time the difference between asymptotic values of the Feynman-Y functions for
correlated gamma detection in Group 3 and the total gamma detection raises new questions to be answered
in a future work.
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Abstract: 
The IBAS (Improved Holdup Blender Assay System) 3He slab detector system was developed at LANL 
in collaboration with JAEA to improve the existing HBAS detector system for safeguards and nuclear 
material accountancy (NMA) of holdup measurements at the Plutonium Conversion Development 
Facility (PCDF). The IBAS consists of two slabs (one on each side the glovebox) where each slab 
consists of 20 3He tubes embedded in high-density polyethylene. The purpose of this detector is to 
measure the doubles rate from each glovebox in order to determine the mass of Pu holdup. In order to 
establish calibration curves for the IBAS detector and improve the holdup measurement methodology, 
JAEA conducted the IBAS calibration exercise with LANL support using MOX standards in 2010. In 
2011, a cleanout exercise was performed and the results showed that the holdup removed from the 
glovebox had a significantly higher alpha term (α=15.8~31.5) than the MOX standards (α=0.67) used to 
establish the 2010 calibration curves. To further investigate these findings, JAEA conducted slope 
validation measurements in 2013 to confirm the validity of IBAS calibration slopes for the case of high 
alpha holdup. This paper describes the IBAS slope validation tests, analysis of the experimental results, 
and the evaluation of the need for a correction factor for the high alpha holdup. Quantifying the alpha 
term of the holdup in each glove box and understanding how this value changes over time is important 
to improving the overall NMA at PCDF. The results from this work will provide invaluable experimental 
data that directly supports safeguards and NMA measurements of plutonium holdup in gloveboxes. 
Keywords:  holdup, nuclear safeguards, non-destructive assay, plutonium 
1. Introduction
The IBAS (Improved Holdup Blender Assay System) 3He slab detector system was developed at LANL 
in collaboration with JAEA to improve the existing HBAS detector system for holdup measurements at 
PCDF. The purpose of this detector is to measure the doubles rate from each glovebox (GB) in order to 
determine the mass of Pu holdup. In order to establish calibration curves for the IBAS detector and 
improve the holdup measurement methodology, JAEA conducted the IBAS calibration exercise with 
LANL support using MOX standards in 2010. From May to June 2011, JAEA conducted the IBAS 
validation test at PCDF.  This test consisted of measuring GB P14B01 with IBAS before and after MOX 
holdup was removed. The holdup removed from the glove box was measured using the non-destructive 
assay (NDA) equipment available at PCDF, which included the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter 
(PSMC) and Waste Drum Assay System (WDAS). The results from the 2011 cleanout showed that the 
holdup removed from the glovebox had a significantly higher alpha term (α = 15.8~31.5) than that of the 
MOX standards (α = 0.67) used to establish the 2010 calibration curves where alpha (α) is defined as 
the ratio of the (α,n) neutron yield to the spontaneous fission (SF) neutron yield. We believe that the 
change in the doubles rate being measured by IBAS may be driven by the high alpha of the holdup. The 
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high alpha values of the holdup samples create a situation where the sample itself acts as a neutron 
random driver such as the AmLi source used in the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) [1] and 
induces fissions in the sample. In this case, the doubles rate in the holdup from induced fission reactions 
increases even when the multiplication (M) is nearly 1.0. Thus, the induced fission rate is a function of 
alpha (the driver term), the Pu fissile mass (induced fission target), and the geometric distribution of the 
MOX holdup powder. To further investigate these findings, a new methodology for validating the IBAS 
calibration slopes was proposed.  
This report describes the IBAS slope validation tests, analysis of the results, and the evaluation of the 
need for a correction factor for converting 240Pu effective mass to Pu mass to account for high alpha 
holdup. Quantifying the high alpha term of the holdup in each glove box is important to improving the 
overall nuclear material accountancy (NMA) at PCDF. Furthermore, understanding what the alpha term 
of the existing holdup is and how it changes with time is essential to establishing a baseline calibration 
for distinguishing the different fuel types. The results from this work will provide invaluable experimental 
data that directly supports safeguards and NMA measurements of plutonium holdup in gloveboxes. 
2. NDA Equipment
2.1. IBAS (Improved Holdup Blender Assay System) 
The IBAS system was developed and calibrated in 2010 to improve the existing HBAS detector system 
for holdup measurements at PCDF. Figure 1 shows (a) side view of the measurement positions for a 
glovebox and (b) top-down schematic of the IBAS detector slabs in position A2/B2. Each slab consists 
of 20 3He tubes embedded in high-density polyethylene. The 3He tubes are 2.54-cm in diameter with a 
152-cm active length. Four AMPTEK preamplifiers are used in each IBAS slab and are located in the 
junction box housing on top of the slabs. The AMSR-150 multiplicity shift register with fast accidentals 
was used to count and record the total number of pulses and the time correlation of coincidence pulses 
in the IBAS slabs. IAEA Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC) software [2] version 5.04 was used to 
set the operating parameters for IBAS, as well as collect and archive all of the measurement data.  
Figure 1.  (a) side view of GB measurement positions and (b) top-down view of IBAS slabs in position A2/B2. 
Figure 2 shows a picture of IBAS measuring a glove box and the detector operating parameters used in 
INCC. As illustrated in Figure 1, the IBAS detector needs to measure 6 positions, A1 to B3 (depending 
on the size of the GB), in order to obtain a representative doubles count rate for the GB. The doubles 
rates collected from each position are then averaged to get the representative doubles count rate for 
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Figure 2.  Picture of IBAS measuring a glove box and the detector operating parameters used in INCC. 
2.2. PSMC (Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter) 
The PSMC is a high efficiency well counter that is used to measure impure plutonium and MOX samples 
with masses ranging from grams to several kilograms. Figure 3 shows a diagram of the PSMC modeled 
in MCNPX. This detector consists of 80 3He tubes at 4-atm pressure embedded in high-density 
polyethylene. The outer dimensions of the PSMC are 66-cm x 66-cm x 80-cm [3].  
Figure 3.  Diagram of the PSMC modeled in MCNPX. 
At PCDF, the PSMC is jointly used by both operator and inspectorate. The operator uses the PSMC for 
MOX powder standards (α = 0.67), sludge (PuO2-Na2U2O7; α = ~25) and scrap holdup powder removed 
from the glove boxes. The inspectorate uses the PSMC for inventory verification of the MOX powder 
standards, sludge and the scrap holdup powder. Figure 4 shows the detector parameters currently used 
for the PSMC at PCDF [4] and pictures of the PSMC and scrap container used for MOX holdup samples. 
The scrap container is made out of polyethylene and has an inner diameter of 8.0-cm. 
For the holdup measurements, the purpose of the PSMC was to measure the MOX cleanout scrap from 
the glove boxes at PCDF. The scrap was bagged out of the glove box and placed into small containers 
that fit inside the PSMC. The singles (S), doubles (D), and triples (T) were measured in the PSMC using 
long measurement times (15 to 23-hours) to obtain reasonably small statistical errors. The INCC 
software uses the measured rates to solve for the 240Pueff mass, the multiplication (M) and the alpha 
value (α). The 240Pueff mass [Eq. (1)] is defined as the mass of 240Pu that would give the same doubles 
coincidence response as that obtained from all the even Pu isotopes in the sample: 
( )240 238 240 2422.52 1.68TotaleffPu Pu Pu Pu Pu= + + (1) 
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Figure 4.  Detector parameters used for the PSMC at PCDF and pictures of the PSMC and scrap container used 
for MOX holdup samples. 
3. IBAS Slope Validation Procedure
For the IBAS slope validation test, holdup samples from two gloveboxes, P13B04 and P15B01, were 
cleaned out into scrap containers (see Figure 4) and measured with the PSMC. The location of these 
gloveboxes in room A126 at PCDF is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5.  Location of gloveboxes used for holdup assay measurements in room A126. 
The IBAS slope validation test was conducted by JAEA using the following procedure: 
1) IBAS health check, background, and normalization measurements were performed.
2) The condition of the gloveboxes (port cover and location of the boats) was checked prior to
beginning IBAS measurements before cleanout.
3) IBAS measurements were performed for every GB in room A126 before cleanout using a count
time of 45min/face except for P13B04 and P15B01 which were measured for 60min/face to
reduce the counting statistical error.
4) Holdup from P13B04 and P15B01 was collected, put into plastic bottles and then bagged out
of the gloveboxes.
5) PSMC measurements of the recovered MOX powder were performed to determine alpha (α),
multiplication (M), 240Pueff mass, and total Pu mass.
6) After the PSMC measurements were completed, the net weight of the MOX scrap powder was
measured and DA samples were taken to determine the Pu and impurity content in the
recovered scrap powder.
7) The condition of the gloveboxes (port cover and location of the boats) was checked prior to
beginning IBAS measurements after cleanout.
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8) IBAS measurements were performed for every GB in room A126 after cleanout using a count
time of 45min/face except for P13B04 and P15B01 which were measured for 60min/face to
reduce the counting statistical error.
9) The recovered Pu mass and 1σ standard deviation determined by the PSMC and weight/DA
measurements was compared to the recovered Pu mass determined by the IBAS
measurements (difference before and after cleanout) and the difference was calculated.
10) The results from step 9) were evaluated to determine the significance to the 2010 IBAS
calibration slopes and if a correction factor might be needed.
4. Analysis of Measurement Results
4.1. Validation of 2010 Calibration Slopes 
Prior to performing the IBAS slope validation tests, several samples of MOX holdup were taken from 
different locations in each GB and each sample was measured using the PSMC to determine the alpha 
value of the holdup. The purpose of these measurements was to assess the alpha distribution of holdup 
in each GB. These results were then used to calculate the weighted average alpha for each GB at 
PCDF. The IBAS slope validation tests were performed after these alpha map measurements so that 
the measured average alpha values for each GB could be used to help evaluate the need for a correction 
factor to the 2010 IBAS calibration slopes. It is important to note that the results from the alpha map 
measurements confirmed that the alpha values of the actual holdup (α = 0.9~41) were much higher than 
the alpha values of the MOX standards (α = 0.7) used during the 2010 calibration exercise. 
The measured IBAS doubles rates before and after cleanout at each position for gloveboxes P13B04 
and P15B01 are given in Table 2. A count time of 60 minutes was used for each measurement position. 
This enabled the relative 1σ uncertainty in the measured doubles rates to be reduced to approximately 
4-5%. It should also be noted that for both gloveboxes we see a measureable decrease in the average 
doubles rates after cleanout indicating that a sufficient mass of MOX holdup was removed from each 
GB which is necessary for validation of the 2010 calibration slopes.    
Position P13B04 Doubles ± 1σ [cps] Position P15B01 Doubles ± 1σ [cps] 
Before Cleanout After Cleanout Before Cleanout After Cleanout 
A1 42.22 ± 11.10 36.36 ± 9.55 A1 40.58 ± 7.95 42.03 ± 6.69 
A2 87.06 ± 14.18 90.48 ± 8.97 A2 38.55 ± 6.18 38.33 ± 7.55 
A3 96.42 ± 14.54 87.10 ± 10.35 A3 17.12 ± 3.73 9.707 ± 3.35 
B1 139.6 ± 14.55 154.4 ± 13.91 A4 9.699 ± 2.24 7.541 ± 1.99 
B2 272.1 ± 15.87 216.6 ± 16.55 A5 5.254 ± 1.22 1.806 ± 1.61 
B3 247.2 ± 19.32 145.3 ± 12.19 B1 127.6 ± 12.7 128.7 ± 13.1 
Average 147.4 ± 15.1 (10%) 121.7 ± 12.2 (10%) B2 116.6 ± 11.1 103.4 ± 10.6 
B3 42.39 ± 4.89 36.55 ± 4.67 
B4 20.15 ± 3.16 14.54 ± 2.81 
B5 10.95 ± 2.25 9.46 ± 2.06 
 Average 42.9 ± 6.7 (16%) 39.2 ± 6.6 (17%) 
Table 1.  Measured IBAS doubles rates before and after cleanout for gloveboxes P13B04 and P15B01. 
Table 3 shows the comparison of the results for the 240Pueff mass measured by IBAS and the PSMC. 
For IBAS, the 240Pueff mass was calculated by dividing the difference in the doubles rate before and after 
cleanout by the 2010 calibration slope measured for each GB. For the PSMC, the 240Pueff mass was 
calculated using the passive multiplicity analysis method in INCC. Based on these results, we see that 
for both gloveboxes (P13B04 and P15B01) there is not a significant difference (>3σ) between the 240Pueff 
mass measured by IBAS and the PSMC. Thus, this confirms that the 2010 calibration slopes are still 
valid.  
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Glovebox Alpha
240Pueff Mass ± 1σ Significant 
Difference (>3σ) PSMC IBAS 
P13B04 37.5   35 ± 10 99 ± 31 No 
P15B01 3.10 50 ± 3 45 ± 37 No 
Table 2.  Comparison of results for recovered 240Pueff mass measured by IBAS and the PSMC. 
In order to obtain a better understanding of how alpha (α) and multiplication (M) can impact the 
calibration slopes, the point model equations [5] were used to calculate the doubles rate as a function 
of 240Pueff mass using for two different values of α (0.7 and 34) and M (1.001 and 1.010). The results are 
shown in Figure 6. It should also be noted that the alpha and multiplication values given in the table next 
to the plot were determined from the alpha map measurements and represent the average for each 
glovebox. Based on these results, we see that the high alpha value only has a significant effect on the 
doubles rate when the multiplication is significantly greater than 1.00. This is an important result because 
we expect that the multiplication values of the holdup in the gloveboxes in PCDF to be approximately 
equal to 1.00. Furthermore, this also reiterates the conclusion above that the 2010 calibration slopes 
are still valid. 
Figure 6. Point model calculations for Doubles rate versus 240Pueff mass for different values of alpha and M. 
Another important factor that should be considered is that the PSMC measured alpha values may be 
higher than the actual alpha values inside the GB prior to clean-out, especially for higher mass samples. 
This may be attributed to the fact that the holdup is dispersed in the GB and then lumped together in a 
container when measured in the PSMC which increases the multiplication and alpha. The doubles to 
singles ratio can be used as an additional check for alpha since we expect changes in alpha to primarily 
affect the singles rate. Figure 7 shows the (a) average doubles rate and (b) average doubles / singles 
(D/S) ratio from each glovebox from 2010 through 2013. Based on the results, we see that the average 
doubles rates and D/S ratios are relatively constant for all gloveboxes except P13B04 which may be 
attributed to the removal of holdup.  
Since the increase in the multiplication of holdup with high alpha values affects the integrity of current 
calibration slopes, it is necessary for operator to determine the holdup location and recover the holdup 
as a cleanout activity prior to PIT (Physical Inventory Taking) in order to maintain the appropriate 
measurement conditions for nuclear material accountancy and inspection. Therefore, JAEA has 
reflected this knowledge into an operational procedure at PCDF. 
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Figure 7. (a) average doubles rate and (b) average D/S ratio from each GB from 2010 through 2013. 
5. Summary and Conclusions
We have conducted the IBAS slope validation test and analysis in order to confirm the validity of 2010 
IBAS calibration slopes for the condition of high alpha holdup. The slope validation tests were performed 
after the alpha map measurements so that the measured average alpha values for each GB could be 
used to determine if any corrections were needed for the 2010 calibration curves. The results from the 
alpha map exercise confirmed that the alpha values of the actual holdup (α = 0.9~41) were much higher 
than the alpha values of the MOX standards (α = 0.7) used during the 2010 calibration exercise. 
It is important to note however that the results from IBAS slope validation test confirmed that the 2010 
calibration slopes are valid even for high alpha holdup. Quantifying the alpha term of the holdup in each 
glovebox and understanding how it changes over time is important to improving the overall nuclear 
material accountancy at PCDF. The doubles to singles ratio can be used as an additional check for 
alpha since we expect changes in alpha to primarily affect the singles rate. The results from this work 
have provided invaluable experimental data that directly supports safeguards and NMA measurements 
of plutonium holdup in gloveboxes. 
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Training is fundamental to success in a new position at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
(CNSC) or any organization.  Training is particularly important to the area of safeguards as it is a 
specialized field in which a unique set of skills is required, including communication, mediation and 
diplomacy.  The safeguards staff of the CNSC remained static for many years, but an increase in 
turnover is expected due to an increasing retirement rate as well as the reality of increased staff 
mobility.  Historically, there has been a lack of documentation with regards to training, but due to the 
factors mentioned above it has become evident that a documented and standardized program for 
training was necessary.  The CNSC’s safeguards training program exists within the larger CNSC  
Inspector Training and Qualification Program (ITQP), a standardized process launched by the CNSC 
in 2009 with the goal of improving consistency and efficiency amongst all its inspectors.  All 
employees in a designated inspector position at the CNSC must enroll in this program.  The ITQP 
requires that new inspection staff complete a variety of knowledge-based activities and on-the-job 
training (OJT) activities – some of these are generic or core activities common to all CNSC inspectors 
and some are tailored to the specific field in which the inspector is working.  The OJT is of particular 
importance in the area of safeguards as some of the unique skills required in this position can only be 
learned by observing experienced staff in the field as opposed to self-study.  This paper will provide a 
brief description of the CNSC’s ITQP, and of training for safeguards staff in particular, including on the 
job training, with the focus ultimately shifting to what has worked well and what could potentially be 
improved upon. 
Keywords: training, on- the- job, inspectors, ITQP 
1. Introduction
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials 
to protect health, safety, security and the environment and to implement Canada's international 
commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and to disseminate objective scientific, technical 
and regulatory information to the public.  The Commission is an independent administrative tribunal 
set up at arm's length from government, with no ties to the nuclear industry.  The role of State System 
of Accounting for Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) is fulfilled by the CNSC, specifically the 
International Safeguards Division (ISD).  Figure 1 depicts the placement of Canada’s SSAC within the 
CNSC. 
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 Figure 1: Placement of Canada’s SSAC within the CNSC 
Historically, Canada did not have a domestic safeguards inspectorate.  The role of an ISD inspector 
during International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections is to ensure that the licensee complies 
with all of their safeguards obligations, thereby enabling the IAEA to carry out its inspection and to 
ensure that the IAEA limits its inspection activities to those permitted under the Integrated Safeguards 
procedure and/or the Safeguards Agreements for the facility.  The largest role for the CNSC during an 
inspection is to facilitate communication between the licensee and the IAEA, for instance, translating 
CNSC regulatory requirements into IAEA requirements (and vice versa).  In all cases, it is paramount 
to ensure that the inspections are performed safely and in compliance with the CNSC’s and the 
licensee’s health and safety regulations.  The Canadian domestic safeguards program differs from 
some other safeguards programs in that the IAEA does not necessarily have to be accompanied by 
the State, although the CNSC makes every effort to be present for all inspections. 
The advent of the State-Level Integrated Safeguards Approach (SLA) in 2005 has shifted that slightly, 
introducing the concept of Physical Inventory Taking Evaluations (PIT-E).  Under the SLA, a selection 
probability was introduced in which not all facilities in Canada were selected in a given year for a 
Physical Inventory Verification (PIV).  With the CNSC’s domestic safeguards program, those facilities 
not selected by the IAEA for a PIV will be subject to a PIT-E in order to be able to give assurances to 
the IAEA that those facilities were adequately prepared had they been chosen for a PIV. 
2. Safeguards at the CNSC
The field of safeguards is a specialized field with a unique set of challenges.  Safeguards staff at the 
CNSC remained static for several years, however, with the increasing retirement rate as well as the 
CNSC’s initiative promoting staff mobility within the organization, the CNSC has seen an influx of new 
safeguards staff in the last few years.  New staff typically has limited knowledge of safeguards and 
without the benefit of knowledge transfer from seasoned staff members, it became evident that a 
documented and standardized program was necessary.  The development of this standardized 
program is also part of a broader corporate initiative.  The CNSC launched its Inspector Training and 
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qualification requirements for all inspectors across the organization.  This program was also 
developed to continue to ensure the highest calibre of professional knowledge and experience among 
CNSC inspectors, give inspectors full confidence in their skills and abilities, and better support the 
authority of the CNSC. 
Another unique challenge associated with safeguards is the set of skills required to participate in IAEA 
led inspections.  As the CNSC must act as a point of contact between the facility and IAEA, 
communication, diplomacy and mediation are key.  These skills cannot be taught by self- study and 
are best learned by observing seasoned staff in the field. 
3. Overview of CNSC Inspector Training
Canada’s Nuclear Safety and Control Act gives authority to the CNSC to designate as an inspector, 
for the purposes of the Act, any person whom the CNSC considers qualified.  The inspector’s authority 
and powers are also described in the Act.  Given the extensive authority and powers of a CNSC 
inspector, only those who are qualified and whose duties and responsibilities require them to be an 
inspector will be issued a certificate.  Trained and qualified inspectors are issued certificates in 
accordance with the Act and the CNSC General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations.  Under the 
Act, any person designated as an inspector shall be provided with a certificate in the prescribed form 
certifying the person’s designation.  The Regulations prescribe the form of the inspector’s certificate 
and the information, in addition to that required by the Act, which must be included on it. 
The CNSC has approximately 800 employees, with an inspector population of approximately 160 staff 
comprised of inspectors and inspectors- in-training.  ISD currently has six active inspectors and five 
inspectors- in- training for a total of eleven inspectors. 
The CNSC has dedicated significant effort to formalize its training program for domestic inspectors 
across all CNSC directorates and divisions responsible for conducting inspections.  The purpose of 
this centralized CNSC-wide program, termed the Inspector Training Qualification Program (ITQP) is to: 
• establish a consistent approach to train, qualify and assess CNSC inspectors-in-training
across all service lines;
• empower inspectors-in-training with the skills and knowledge required to perform their duties;
• ensure inspectors-in-training possess the necessary qualifications and can demonstrate a
high level of competencies required to conduct inspections;
• support the mandate of the CNSC.
The ITQP is comprised of three components:  core training, service line-specific training and on-the- 
job (OJT) training.  These three components will be discussed in greater detail below.  The program 
also includes initiation training and an assessment of the employees’ understanding of the CNSC 
Regulations.  Inspectors-in-training and their director are responsible for ensuring that the inspector-in-
training has met all the requirements of the ITQP.  A standardized template is used by all inspectors-
in-training to record his or her progress. 
Typically, completion of all the training components of the program takes between 12 and 24 months. 
Completion of the program is dependent on many factors such as previous experience, operational 
requirements, timelines, and schedules. 
Once all the training is acquired, an overall evaluation is completed by a coach, whom is a senior 
employee, and by the director.  A successful evaluation is followed by a recommendation for 
certification from the director to a CNSC Designated Officer.  A Designated Officer is an individual 
from CNSC’s upper management authorized by the CNSC to make decisions on specific licensing 
actions and activities, such as designating inspectors. 
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3.1. Core Training 
All inspectors-in-training must complete the core training which consists of basic and transferable 
knowledge and skills required by all CNSC inspectors.  This training is based on the fundamentals of 
conducting a CNSC inspection, which are derived from international standards and good practice, 
including the IAEA Safety Standard Series titled Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for 
Safety.  All core training is offered through in-house classroom sessions or online modules and is 
followed by an exam. 
3.2. Service-Line Specific Training 
Service-line specific training is specific to the licensed activities and facilities that are inspected by 
each division.  Each division must identify the service-line specific training required for their inspectors. 
For example, inspectors working within the power reactor licensing divisions are required to take a 
course on the fundamentals of the CANDU nuclear reactors.  There is no service-line specific training 
that is required to be completed for safeguards staff to obtain an inspector’s certificate.  However, all 
safeguards inspectors are expected to take the IAEA’s International Training Course on 
Implementation of State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC course) at 
some point in their careers.  The CNSC attempts to get safeguards inspectors-in-training and 
inspectors on this course at the first available opportunity. 
3.3. On-the-job Training (OJT) 
OJT teaches the skills, knowledge and competencies that are required to perform a specific job.  It 
occurs within the normal working environment an employee will experience on the job. OJT uses 
workplace resources (personnel, equipment, documents) which allow an inspector-in-training to 
effectively learn how to perform his or her job.  The OJT process relies on and uses the experience of 
senior employees as coaches.  
In addition to the completion of the ITQP, inspectors-in-training must also complete training specific to 
their division.  The additional training required for safeguards inspection staff is detailed in the next 
section. 
4. International Safeguards Division (ISD) Specific Training
New ISD inspectors that facilitate IAEA inspections and conduct CNSC inspections are required to 
complete a variety of knowledge based activities and OJT under the guidance of a qualified ISD 
inspector.  The training program specific to safeguards includes a Safeguards Orientation Plan and 
On-the-Job Training (OJT) Guide for International Safeguards Inspection Staff (hereafter, the Guide) 
4.1. Safeguards Orientation Plan 
The Safeguards Orientation Plan consists of six modules intended to introduce the subject of 
international safeguards on both a generic level and also with respect to implementation at specific 
facility types and locations in Canada.  The staff presenting each module will discuss the subject area 
and make reference to their experiences, past presentations and relevant reference documents. 
Module 1 starts with an overview of safeguards in Canada including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
IAEA Statute and Canada’s safeguards agreements and arrangements with the Agency; safeguards 
procedures for Canadian facilities; CNSC regulatory requirements and documentation; the CNSC’s 
safeguards mandate; and future direction of safeguards in Canada. 
Module 2 provides a high level familiarity with nuclear material accountancy in Canada, including an 
overview and introduction to nuclear materials accounting (NMA) in Canada, reporting requirements of 
licensees and the Nuclear Materials Accounting System (NMAS) used by ISD staff. 
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Modules 3 to 6 cover safeguards at Canadian facilities in more detail.  Module 3 covers uranium 
processing and fuel fabrication facilities as well as Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs), Module 4 
covers CANDU reactors, Module 5 covers research reactors and Module 6 covers Chalk River 
Laboratories and static spent fuel dry storage facilities.  Each of these modules includes: 
• an overview of a facility or site;
• terminology
• an overview of safeguards implementation at the facility/site and how it relates to the State-
level approach;
• a detailed review of the current IAEA safeguards procedures and how they are applied at the
facility/site; and
• a review of the applicable CNSC regulatory requirements and the CNSC internal safeguards
procedures related to the different types of IAEA activities.
Other topics relevant to safeguards in Canada are also covered in these modules, such as the annual 
Additional Protocol update, and future direction of safeguards at the facility/site under the State-level 
concept. 
4.2. On-the-Job Training Guide (OJT) for International Safeguards Division Inspectors 
The purpose of this manual is to provide ISD with a standardized approach for training new inspectors 
who will participate in ISD inspections.  Such an approach supports the CNSC’s objective of having 
safe and effective inspections. 
The Guide contains the learning tasks for successfully participating in inspections and consists of four 
sections: 
• Role of an inspector
• Prepare for an Inspection
• Conduct an Inspection
• Document the Inspection and Follow-Up
Each section contains learning tasks, the role of the coach, the role of the inspector- in- training and 
any relevant references. 
5. On-the-Job Training (OJT)
All components of the training program are important, but as OJT is of particular importance, this 
section will be devoted to OJT.  Safeguards inspections differ from other types of inspections 
performed by the CNSC in that the IAEA is present.  This uniqueness requires safeguards staff to 
have not only technical knowledge, but effective communication and mediation skills.  As mentioned 
previously, these skills cannot be taught and are best learned by observing seasoned staff in the field.  
The importance of OJT in the field of safeguards has resulted in a training manual specifically for OJT, 
referred to as the Guide in this paper. 
The suggested OJT training process, as outlined in the Guide, is divided into three sections: prior to 
the inspection, during the inspection and immediately following the inspection.  Each section details 
recommendations for both the coach and the inspector-in-training such as focus of the training, review 
of tasks and relevant documentation, expectations and feedback. 
ISD strives to follow a three phase approach with respect to OJT.  During the initial phase of OJT, the 
coach demonstrates each inspection task and explains why it is important, while encouraging 
questions from the inspector-in-training.  The inspector-in-training is an observer, rather than an active 
participant, during the initial phase.  The second phase involves the coach and the inspector-in-
training completing the inspection together.  This phase allows the coach to guide and monitor the 
inspector-in-training during the inspection.  The third and final phase allows the inspector-in-training to 
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complete the inspection with minimal guidance from the coach.  The final phase can be performed as 
many times as required until the coach is satisfied that all inspections are being effectively completed. 
When the coach and inspector-in-training mutually agree that the inspection learning tasks are 
performed to an acceptable level, the coach recommends to the Director of ISD that the inspector-in-
training can be evaluated for that particular inspection process.  A senior inspector accompanies the 
inspector-in-training into the field and evaluates the inspection process for completeness.  As each 
evaluation is completed, the evaluator signs off on the OJT Evaluation Record. 
Under the ITQP, all inspectors in training must document their OJT training in the training log provided 
by the CNSC.  A new inspector will continue to participate in inspections until such time that the 
evaluation criteria is met to the satisfaction of the director. 
6. Lessons Learned
As for all CNSC employees, the inspector’s learning needs continue to be assessed on an ongoing 
basis using a performance based approach.  Effective April 2016, an inspector’s qualifications will be 
assessed against the existing ITQP qualifications prior to the expiry of the inspector’s certificate.  As a 
result, in addition to mandatory retraining in radiation protection and occupational health and safety, 
the inspector will have to retrain in areas determined to be required to confirm the qualifications have 
been maintained.  The inspector will also have to demonstrate commitment to continuous learning, by 
having attended five days of relevant learning activities - such as workshops, conferences and self-
directed learning - throughout the period he or she held an inspector certificate. 
The Guide for ISD staff was implemented in 2014 and like any new implementation, this program is 
subject to continuous improvement.  New safeguards staff are fortunate in that they are afforded 
several opportunities to observe and participate in field inspections with qualified safeguards 
inspectors.  This experience is invaluable to not only the inspector- in- training, but also to the division. 
Often times, ISD is participating in two or three inspection activities simultaneously, with limited 
resources, so it is important for ISD to have a full complement of trained inspectors.  Throughout this 
paper, the importance of OJT has been stressed and the greater the OJT opportunities, the sooner 
inspectors-in-training gain the confidence and competence to become qualified inspectors. 
7. Conclusion
The President of the CNSC is responsible for ensuring that the CNSC meets its obligations to 
Canadians and abides by all Government of Canada laws and policies, which includes implementing 
measures on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.  It is the vision 
of the President and the CNSC to be the best nuclear regulator in the world.  The fundamental 
principle of transparency plays an important role in achieving this goal.  The CNSC achieves 
transparency by being open and evident.  This involves ensuring that all regulatory requirements and 
expectations are available to stakeholders and that the CNSC’s inspection activities are open to formal 
scrutiny by the Government of Canada, stakeholders and the public, via reports and information 
requests.  The concept of transparency can be applied across the organization.  Informed decisions 
are documented within regulatory programs, processes, procedures and work instructions.  By 
documenting our inspection training process, we demonstrate transparency and help to ensure a 
quality, consistent and effective regulatory program. 
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Since 2008 SCK•CEN provides a short safeguards course for mainly students in nuclear engineering. 
This is done in collaboration with the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) of 
the Joint Research Centre in Geel, Belgium. This course is part of the BNEN  (Belgian Nuclear higher 
Education Network) programme, a master-after-master specialization course in nuclear engineering. 
An adapted version has been provided to members and collaborators of the Flemish Parliament. 
Based on these first initiatives, SCK•CEN and IRMM participate in the FP7 GENTLE project and have 
provided an updated course in 2014 to a group of international students. Next to theoretical classes, 
the course was extended with practical exercises in gamma and neutron NDA measurements and a 
workshop on safeguarding a country with a specific nuclear fuel cycle. These additional practical parts 
enabled trainees to enrich and illustrate their acquired knowledge with the practice of real-life 
situations.  
In line with the European EQF and ECVET principles, learning outcomes for this course were defined 
in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes. 
 
In this paper we will describe the development of the Belgian safeguards course from an almost purely 
lecture-based course into an interactive course with hands-on practices. The integration into several 
national and international course programmes is described. Lessons learned from the pilot sessions 
and the planned implementation of additional elements to optimise the effectiveness of the Belgian 
safeguards courses  are discussed. 
 




The present ESARDA Working Group on Training & Knowledge Management (TKM WG) was 
established in the beginning of 2004 as the ad hoc Working Group on Modules of Courses by the 
ESARDA Steering Committee. Whereas the traditional focus of academic nuclear engineering 
programmes is the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle and reactor safety, the ad hoc Working Group on 
Modules of Courses wanted to broaden that focus by introducing non-proliferation aspects to nuclear 
engineering students. At the end of their study nuclear engineers may well not have heard at all of 
non-proliferation aspects of nuclear energy. In addition to this, a significant loss of safeguards 
experience was expected for the next years due to the retirement of many experienced safeguards 
experts. Without the instream of new, young professionals this would pose serious problems for the 
safeguards community. 
 
In 2005 a first ESARDA safeguards course was given on the premises of the Joint Research Centre of 
Ispra, Italy, under the auspices of the ESARDA TKM WG. It was attended by 20 participants from 
various backgrounds and institutes. Students of the Belgian Nuclear Higher Education Network BNEN 
could acquire 2 ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) points for attending the course and writing a 
small essay. 
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With the financial support of JRC Ispra the course is continued annually with growing success. In 2007 
the TKM WG published a syllabus for the standard part of the course. This was required by the 
European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) to allocate 3 ECTS points to the course. 
 
From 2008 the course attracts so many students that a numerus clausus of 60 students per year had 
to be established. At the same time it was decided to start a limited version of the ESARDA course 
with the safeguards essentials at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK•CEN in Mol, Belgium. 
This course was a topical course in the curriculum of BNEN and 2 ECTS points were allocated to 
students that successfully wrote an essay. Similar initiative has been taken by Sweden, where a 
safeguards course was given at the University of Uppsala. 
 
Development of the Belgian safeguards course 
 
Since 2008 SCK•CEN provides a short safeguards course for mainly students in nuclear engineering. 
This is done in collaboration with the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) of 
the Joint Research Centre in Geel, Belgium. This course is part of the BNEN  (Belgian Nuclear higher 
Education Network) programme, a master-after-master specialization course in nuclear engineering. 
An adapted version has been provided to members and collaborators of the Flemish Parliament. This 
version contained a simple introduction to nuclear physics. 
 
The BNEN safeguards course is not part of the obligatory programme of the nuclear engineering 
master-after-master, but is optional. This means that not all BNEN students will follow the safeguards 
course. However, the BNEN safeguards course has been given almost every year since 2008 and 
attracted each time 15-20 participants. The participants were mostly BNEN students, but also young 
professionals from JRC Geel and SCK•CEN that were interested in safeguards. 
 
The content of this BNEN safeguards course is given in the Appendix A [1]. The course was based on 
vocational training only and lasted for two days. It discussed the legal basis of safeguards in the form 
of the various treaties and the safeguards systems (INFCIRC/66, /153, /540), safeguards concepts 
and the specific techniques used in safeguards (NDA, DA, C/S, …). Some country cases were 
discussed, like e.g. DPRK, Iran, Iraq. 
 
Whereas the first editions discussed at length basics of nuclear physics and the nuclear fuel cycle, it 
was decided to eliminate the basics of nuclear physics since nuclear engineers encounter this already 
in other parts of the BNEN curriculum, while the nuclear fuel cycle part was transformed to a lecture in 
which for each nuclear fuel cycle installation the safeguards approach was discussed, rather than the 
technical details of the installation itself. 
 
Based on these first initiatives, SCK•CEN and IRMM participate in the FP7 GENTLE project with the 
purpose to develop a safeguards course that makes an integral part of a nuclear engineering 
academic course. The pilot GENTLE safeguards course was provided in 2014 to a group of 
international students. 
 
We took the occasion to rethink the whole concept of the safeguards course in order to make it more 
attractive for the students and to provide them with much more hands-on practice in safeguards. To 
this end, we wanted to provide more practical training in both the more conceptual part of safeguards, 
i.e. how to inspect a state and the development of safeguards approaches for nuclear fuel cycle 
installations, and the practical aspects of measuring the quantity and quality of nuclear material by 
NDA methods. These are discussed in the next section. 
 
The pilot course will be adapted on basis of the feedback that was received by the students. The 
developed course with extended hands-on training will also be integrated in the BNEN training 
curriculum. 
 
The new aspects in the GENTLE safeguards course 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the GENTLE safeguards course aimed at providing more 
hands-on training in safeguards than its predecessor the BNEN safeguards course. 
To this end, new modules were developed to perform practical NDA measurements on nuclear 
material and to develop a safeguards approach for a state with a well-developed nuclear fuel cycle. 




Practical NDA measurements 
 
The students were divided into small groups of 6-7 persons and could perform gamma measurements 
and neutron measurements on nuclear material with the help of NDA experts from JRC-Geel, JRC-
Ispra and SCK•CEN. 
 
Gamma measurements were performed on uranium samples in order to assess the enrichment of the 
uranium. The measurements were carried out with the so-called CBNM standards by applying the 
infinite thickness method. For four samples the enrichment was known to the participants, who had 
then to determine the enrichment for a sample whose enirichment was unknown to them.  
 
Neutron measurements were performed on plutonium samples in order to quantify the plutonium 
mass. Aspects like necessary knowledge of the isotopic composition and related uncertainties, single, 
double and triple neutron measurements were discussed during this session. 
 
The focus of this practical session was more on the analysis of the measured data than on the 
measurements itself, given the limited time available.  
For this practical measurement workshop one day was allocated. 
 
Workshop on safeguards approach of a nuclear fuel cycle 
 
In the workshop on safeguards approach a fictitious country with a well-developed nuclear fuel cycle 
was presented. Students were divided in several groups and each group discussed separately 
following aspects. First a general discussion was held on the proliferation concerns of the presented 
fuel cycle. Based on the results of this discussion and further input on the history of the nuclear fuel 
cycle research in the country, the groups were asked to make an acquisition path analysis of the 
country's nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
The groups were allocated different roles (inspector, proliferator) and each group had to develop 
specific inspection strategies/acquisition paths with the purpose to defeat the adversary group. 
Finally, a discussion was held dealing with Additional Protocol aspects of inspections and how this 




The participants of the pilot safeguards course were asked to provide feedback about the course. 
Some requested less theory and even more practical sessions, and overall the practical workshops 
were very well appreciated. Remarks were received about too much content in the presentations, 
while other remarks mentioned that the lectures were given sometimes too slow. In general more 
practical examples were asked for. 
 
Some remarks were received about the practical organisation of the practical and vocational sessions. 
Due to limited availability of lecturers and support for the practical sessions it will not always be 
possible to take these remarks completely into account. 
One specific problem for the group of students that attended the pilot GENTLE session was that their 
knowledge of the nuclear fuel cycle was more limited than that of nuclear engineering students. 
Therefore there was a need to explain the nuclear fuel cycle in more detail, while it had been decided 
to skip this based on the assumption that the students would have this knowledge. 




In line with the European EQF and ECVET principles, learning outcomes for this course were defined 
in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes. Given the relative short duration of the course (3 days), the 
learning objectives for the vocational training sessions were often limited to the aspects of 
comprehension and description of the subjects treated. However, with help of the practical training 
sessions and workshop we succeeded in establishing a higher level of use of knowledge, i.e. the 
ability to apply the acquired knowledge to actually design a safeguards approach for a well-developed 
nuclear fuel cycle and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the designed safeguards 
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approach. Likewise, the students were able to make an analysis of gamma and neutron measurement 
results and discuss the influence of uncertainties on the conclusions that can be drawn regarding 
isotopic composition and quantity of nuclear material present. 
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
Thanks to the GENTLE FP7 project, the BNEN safeguards course has developed from a set of purely 
vocational lectures to a combination of vocational lectures and practical training and workshops.  
The use of practical sessions makes it possible to lift the students' acquired knowledge to a higher 
level, i.e. that they are not only able to repeat the treated knowledge but are also able to actually use 
the knowledge in a more independent way. 
 
From the feedback received from the students the practical sessions and workshop were highly 
appreciated, showing that this development should be maintained in the future and possibly more 
developed. 
 
Although the students indicated they wanted even more practical sessions, there should remain a 
balance between more theoretical (vocational) training and practical sessions. Without any 
background in safeguards principles it will not be possible to have a workshop on safeguarding a 
nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
Next sessions will be aimed to provide a better balance between vocational and practical training on 









[1] R. Carchon, K. van der Meer, "Safeguards course in the framework of BNEN (Belgian Nuclear 
higher Education Network)", 4th International Conference on Education and Training in 
Radiological Protection ETRAP 2009, 8-12 November 2009, Lisbon, Portugal 
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The course provides a specialised overview of all the elements needed to understand the basic 
principles of Safeguards, the verifications that take place within the framework of the Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
2.2. Basics of Nuclear Physics 
 
A repetition of basic concepts of nuclear physics was considered mandatory, because part of the 
students had a background in sociology. Concepts of atomic and nuclear structure, nuclear stability 
and the nuclide chart, radioactivity, natural radioactivity and fission, the chain reaction were discussed. 
 
2.3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
 
An overview was given of the nuclear fuel cycle: mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel 
fabrication (uranium and mixed-oxides), reactor operation, reprocessing, waste, final disposal.  
 
2.4. International Treaties 
 
Safeguards originates from the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Non-
proliferation Treaty – NPT) and some prior bilateral agreements. To better position the NPT, a 
comprehensive overview of international treaties was given, including those that are related to 
disarmament.  
 
2.5. The general safeguards picture 
 
In the sub-part on Safeguards principles, the objective (political and technical) and limitations of 
safeguards are explored. Safeguards principles for declared material were clarified, such as starting 
point of safeguards, Safeguards measurement techniques (in general), some definitions (material 
categories, significant quantity, timeliness goal, detection probabilities), diversion strategies, types of 
inspection. Safeguards principles for undeclared activities are also discussed. 
 
The sub-part on Safeguards approaches contains a historical overview of the different approaches 
existing, evolving from bilateral agreements on specific installations, towards full scope safeguards in 
the States that signed the NPT (since 1970). The Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) was developed 
after the discovery of an undeclared weapon programme in Iraq, and was explained in detail. 
 
In the sub-part on Case studies in (non-)proliferation, specific attention was given to historical and 




There were various sub-sections: 
Nuclear Material Accountancy 
The sub-section on Nuclear Material Accountancy explained Nuclear Material Accountancy as the 
basis of safeguards. 
 
C/S 
The sub-section on C/S contained the legal basis of C/S, some Application Examples, the underlying 
safeguards requirements, Digital Systems, current C/S equipment, C/S in the context of integrated 
safeguards, and current R & D projects and needs. 
 
NDA 
The sub-section on Non Destructive Analysis NDA dealt with nuclear techniques and other physical 
properties instruments. The aim of the topic was to give a flavour on how a single measurement, or a 
combination of, can contribute for the inspector to make independent conclusions in his verification 
activities. The recommended NDA methods are also part of the IAEA safeguards criteria, discussed in 
2.7. 
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The nuclear related NDA deals with Gamma-Ray Instruments and Neutron Instruments, with details on 
the detectors and associated electronics, and methodology. 
The non-nuclear related NDA deals with weighing and load-cells, ultrasonic thickness gauge, 
Cerenkov glow measurement devices, with details on the physical principles and methodology. 
Performance was considered in detail, as well as the different types of NDA Instruments, Equipment 
authorization for inspection use in the IAEA, and Equipment information. 
 
DA 
The sub-section on DA dealt with the currently applied techniques, such as Thermal Ionization Mass 
Spectrometry (TIMS), Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry, Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass 
Spectrometry (ICP-MS), alpha Spectrometry, Hybrid K-Edge, Compucea, which were described in 
detail. 
Particle analysis proved to be very powerful tool for detection of undeclared activities, considering that 
the highest sensitivity, accuracy and precision are required for answering specific questions. 
 
AP methods 
The sub-section on AP methods showed briefly the particular inspection techniques inflicted by the 
Additional Protocol: Open source information, Satellite monitoring, Environmental sampling (Swipes, 
Wide-area sampling). 
The link was made to safeguards inspection techniques in general, with DA methods in particular, and 
the complementarities highlighted. 
 
2.7. Verification measurement tables 
 
The structure of the IAEA Safeguards Criteria was explained following the structure of the 12 chapters 
corresponding to the different fuel cycle installations. 
The verification measurement tables were explained for the LWR and the RRCA. 
 
2.8. Import/export control 
 
Export controls on nuclear materials exist since the entering into force of the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). An extension to dual-use items was activated after the first 
Gulf war, and the detection of an undeclared weapons oriented programme in Iraq. This module 
explains in a historic context the various treaties related to export control.  
 
2.9. Physical protection 
 
Physical protection was explained as complementary to safeguards verification activities, in the sense 
that it is a first step in protecting sensitive goods from diversion or theft.  
The Convention on Physical protection of Nuclear Materials (INFCIRC/274 Rev 1) was explained. 
 
2.10. Design Information  
 
A special chapter was devoted to Design information, regarded as “information concerning nuclear 
material subject to safeguards under the agreement and the features of facilities relevant to 
safeguarding such material”, as it is considered vital for effective Safeguards. 
 
2.11. IAEA Member State Support Programmes 
 
A short overview was given of the IAEA Member State Support Programmes, their way of working, the 
projects involved, and some details about the Belgian Support Programme, as an example. 
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Abstract
The UK has maintained a long term commitment
to provide support to the International
Safeguards community in the form of training
and development activities for safeguards
inspectors and analysts. The majority of this
support has been provided and funded through
the UK's Safeguards Support Programme to the
IAEA. The assistance offered centres around
offering access to its nuclear facilities for the
conducting of a specific safeguards training
courses and activities in the UK. More
theoretically based training events are also
provided directly to IAEA in Vienna. This
involves the utilisation of various leading UK
technical experts in various fields across the
breadth of the nuclear fuel, as well as in more
specific safeguards related fields. Some of the
longer standing training events have histories
dating back over 25 years and these form the
baseline for UK support. However, with the
current evolutionary nature of IAEA safeguards,
new events are developed and existing courses
are constantly adapted to meet the changing
needs of IAEA
1. Introduction
The UK Safeguards Support Programme
(UKSSP) is currently funded through the
Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC), with programme management being
sub-contracted to the UK’s National Nuclear 
Laboratory.  The majority of the budget is
dedicated to offering technical support to the
IAEA’s Department of Safeguards, with a large 
proportion of this spending being dedicated to
the provision of training courses and exercises.
There are established procedures for IAEA
requests of support from Member State Support
Programmes (MSSPs).  On receipt of such
requests, UK then has to decide whether it is
technically able to offer such support and
whether it has the budgetary means to do so.
With only a finite budget available in any given
financial year, not all requests for support can be
accepted.  UK strategy in this regard is generally
to offer support in areas where the UK is able to
offer technical resources which are either unique
to the UK or not readily available to the IAEA
elsewhere.  The provision of specialist training
support related to UK nuclear facilties and
technology experts fits very well this criterion.
The UK has always operated a variety of nuclear
facilities in all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle,
with a particularly varied and high density of
facilities being located in the north-west of
England.  Importantly, UK facility operators have
always been extremely receptive to requests for
access to their facilities, and for the involvement
of their personnel for the purpose of providing
training opportunities for safeguards inspectors
from IAEA.  This coupled to relatively short
travel times from Vienna and easy transport
links within the UK, has led to the steady
development of an on-going portfolio of training
support provided to IAEA.
2. Long Term Evolution of UK
Training Portfolio
The origins of UK training support to the IAEA
go back over 25 years.  Initial support was in the
form of facility based training exercises for IAEA
Inspectors, primarily at fuel fabrication and
reprocessing facilities.  It was events following
the discovery of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear
weapons programme and the subsequent
initiative to improve and strengthen IAEA
safeguards that began a steady process of
increased training provision by the UK
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Safeguards Support Programme over the past
20 years.
The main basis for this increased involvement of
UK in IAEA training provisions was the initial
development of training in the area of
proliferation pathways and proliferation
indicators.  The training was aimed directly at
providing the IAEA with assistance in building a
capability for the identification of clandestine
activities.  Indeed it was stated during the
introduction to the early training events that
discussion and questions relating to traditional
safeguards inspections would not be allowed.
The Proliferation Pathways Course proved
extremely successful and received universally
excellent feedback.  This started a process of
the UK being asked to provide follow-up training
for individual groups such as the Iraq Action
Team and subsequently to develop more and
advanced in-field training.
At the same time, the IAEA was in the process
of expanding the number and variety of training
courses on offer to both its inspectors and staff
in other Division.  With an already increased
profile, and good feedback from existing
courses, the UK was suddenly being asked to
assist with training in a number of new areas.
This process has continued to the present time
and the provision of training services now makes
up a large proportion of the support offered by
the UK Safeguards Support Programme to the
IAEA.
3. Recent UK Training Support to
IAEA
3.1 Proliferation Pathways and
Indicators
This was the first UK training course developed
specifically as a consequence of the IAEA 93+2
Programme to introduce new and strengthened
safeguards measures following the discovery of
the Iraqi clandestine nuclear programme.  The
course was developed in the mid to late 1990's
and still continues to the present day with 2
events held most years, with over 30 events to
date.
IAEA requested a technology based training
course based around all the major elements of
the nuclear fuel from a technical rather than
safeguards perspective.  So rather than being a
conventional nuclear fuel cycle technology
course focused on safeguarding processes and
nuclear materials, the course was designed to
cover all supporting processes, equipment,
materials and technical expertise required.  As
such, the course lecturers selected were
technical experts in their respective fields and
not safegaurds experts.
Due to the intensive nature of the course and
the volume of technical material presented, the
event is always held away from IAEA HQ in
Vienna at a remote venue.  From a pure training
angle, this allows for the course participants to
be able to concentrate fully on the training event,
without any of the day to day work distractions
that can be evident when training is conducted
in the Vienna International Centre.
In addition to the base presentational material
and associated technical exercises, the course
documentation produced includes detailed
technical narratives on the Conversion,
Enrichment, Reactor and Reprocessing
modules.  As well as describing all the major
processes,  there is an emphasis on the
description of the main proliferation indicators,
which are also assigned relative strengths.
In many ways one of the initial aims of the
training was to change the mindset of the IAEA
inspectors.  The term "inquisitive inspector" was
used frequently; this was an attempt to remind
the inspectors that the new and developing
safeguards regime would not be solely aimed
solely at meeting prescriptive safeguards criteria
and inspection goals.
Although initially aimed at more senior IAEA
inspectors, the course was soon opened up to
all inspectors.  In more later years, with the rapid
development of Integrated Safeguards and the
State Level Approach, the course is now offered
to safeguards staff across all Divisions of the
Department of Safegaurds.
3.2 Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle
(ANFC) Course
This course was designed as a follow on to the
lecture based Proliferation Pathways Course.
The aim was to take the IAEA participants into
the field and let them see and "experience" the
processes and indicators described.  The initial
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week-long course itinerary included 2 days at
the Sellafield reprocessing facility, 2 days at the
Springfields fuel fabrication and conversion
facility and a single day the Capenhurst
enrichment facility.  At present, 2 events are
held each year in the UK and the course has
now been running for over 10 years.
Access to UK nuclear fuel cycle facilties for the
carrying out of training events remains key to
being able to offer this type of training to the
IAEA.  Fortunately, UK facilities have always
been extremely co-operative in allowing access
to their sites and where necessary will make
local staff available to provide expert technical
assistance.   However, access should never be
taken for granted and it is vital to maintain a
strong relationship with all the facility operators -
a task not helped by the splitting up of the UK
nuclear industry following the break up British
Nuclear Fuels.
The ANFC course has continued to evolve over
the years, mainly to reflect changes in the way
IAEA safeguards has developed in recent times.
As the IAEA moves to safeguards based on a
State Level Concept, the use and involvement of
safeguards analysts in the IAEA has increased.
Originally this course was designed just for IAEA
inspectors,  however it has now been modified
to accommodate the participation of safeguards
analysts too.  As such, the course now
considers and includes the use of satellite
imagery and open source information analysis
into its programme.
3.3 Design Information Verification
(DIV) Training at Bulk Handling
Facilities
Originally called the Bulk Handling Course, this
is the oldest UK training course that is still
offered to IAEA.  Current records for this course
go back in to the 1980s, when the course was a
mixture of plant tours, technical lectures,
accountancy exercises and some on-plant
measurement exercises.  The course has
always included weeks at both the Sellafield and
Springfields facilities in the UK.  Over the years
the course has undergone various iterations to
meet the changing needs of the IAEA and has
finally evolved in to a Design Information
Verification course, but still based around fuel
fabrication, conversion and reprocessing
facilities.
This course requires very close support from the
facilties involved.  As well as the provision of
technical guides to support on-plant inspection
exercises, the facilties are also extremely co-
operative in the provision of technical plant
details along with detailed process and plant
drawings for the course participants to work
with.  There is a strong emphasis in training the
course participants in the use and understanding
of technical engineering drawings.
The overall 2 week course itinerary includes
almost equal time in the classroom and on-
facility.  Extensive time is spent prior to the on-
plant exercises in the examination of Design
Information Questionnaires (DIQs) and a
multitude of supporting documents such as
building floor plans and elevations along with
engineering and process flow diagrams
3.4  Comprehensive Inspection
Exercise at Bulk Handling Facilities
This course more than any other required the
greatest degree of support from a facility
operator.  Hosted by the Springfields fuel
fabrication and conversion facility, the course
encompassed exercises in the measurement of
a number of different types of material using a
range of measurement techniques.  The course
was aimed solely at IAEA inspectors is one of
the basic technical training courses required by
inspectors visiting LEU conversion and fuel
fabrication facilities. IAEA also provided 4
technical experts, to cover the different
measurement exercises.
The main requirement of the course was to
provide the opportunity for participants to carry
out measurements on low enriched UF6, UO2
powder, UO2 pellets, PWR fuel rods and PWR
fuel assemblies.  A demonstration of UF6
sampling was also provided and the participants
were also provided with a detailed uranium
accountancy exercise to undertake.
The courses were held over a period of 2 weeks.
The first 3 days were reserved for the set up of
equipment by the IAEA instructors who arrived
in advance of the course participants.  Some
400kg of equipment was sent in advance from
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Vienna to Springfields.  Amongst other things,
this comprised, sodium iodide and germanium
detectors, hand held detectors and a neutron
collar.  Measurements were carried out in 4
separate plant locations, requiring extensive
effort in preparation of the training environments.
The remaining 2 days of the first week were
given over to technical lectures on measurement
techniques, a description of the measuremnet
exercises and the group based nuclear materials
accountancy exercise.  The second week
involved rotation of the 4 groups of 3 participants
around the different measurement exercises;
with one day being spent in each area.   The
final day was reserved for the write up and
presentation of the findings of the exercises.
As can be seen from the course description, the
course essentially involved 4 distinctly separate
exercises, each in a different plant area
controlled by a different plant management
team.  It was this aspect that made the course
particularly difficult to plan, organise and
administer.  Extra complications were created by
other aspects, such as the need to keep the
germanium detectors constantly re-filled with
liquid nitrogen for the duration of the course.
3.5 Ad Hoc Support
Further training support is offered by UK to IAEA
on an ad hoc basis - usually related to one off
requests for training needs that arise from time
to time in niche technical areas, or for groups of
staff from specific Departments or Divisions.
In recent years technical visits have been made
by a number of groups to many different facilties
in the UK.  These sometimes involve requests
for more in-depth access to facilities already
covered by existing training, but also involve
facilities not routinely offered for training
purposes.
4. Concluding Remarks
The UK continues to offer wide ranging support
to the IAEA through its Safegaurds Support
Programme.  Traditionally this support was
always facility based, making use of the wide
ranging nuclear facilties operated within the UK's
nuclear fuel cycle.  The extent of this support
has developed rapidly, particularly in the last 15
years.
The main challenge facing the UK at present is
to be able to maintain this level of support in the
light of the changes that are currently occurring
within the UK fuel cycle.  As some facilities enter
a period of planned shutdown and eventual
decommissioning, the facility based training
provided will need to be adapted to meet these
changes. In some ways the process of closing a
facility can also provide new opportunities, as
often this enables a better opportunity to inspect
equipment that would otherwise be difficult to
see close up whilst it was operating.  However,
this period of opportunity is obviously limited.
Challenges are also imposed by the ever
increasing levels of security and security
procedures surrounding nuclear facilities.  This
trend makes the process of obtaining clearance
for IAEA staff to visit UK nuclear facilities
increasingly painstaking and time consuming.
Increasingly the UK is being asked to provide
training in many different areas, some even non-
technical.  The UK remains committed to its
continued support to IAEA through its
Safeguards Support Programme and will
continue to respond positively to these requests
as far as it is able to do so in terms of technical
and budgetary constraints.
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1. Introduction
The problem of knowledge loss is the issue of the present day in all types of industry. Special attention
should be paid to nuclear industry. Nuclear energy technologies have a long life cycle, an obvious
example is a nuclear power plant. Designing of a nuclear power plant takes at least ten years; its
construction is also a long-term process, which needs the required knowledge and past experience.
The next step is operation of nuclear power plant and the last one is shutdown. The whole process
requires fixing of stored knowledge in the process of operation and in addition, it requires build-up and
improvement of knowledge. For example, Fermi identified the concept of fast reactors development in
1944. In 1946, an experimental plutonium-fuelled reactor was created (Climentina, USA). To date,
over twenty experimental and development fast breeder reactors have been created, the first industrial
prototypes of fast power reactors, cooled by liquid metal (sodium), are in operation: in Russia (BN-
600), France (PHENIX). These facts required knowledge transfer to the next three generations of
researchers. Countries, which had no knowledge transfer of fast neutrons reactors technologies and
closed nuclear fuel cycle, lost this knowledge considerably. The losses of experience and knowledge
are not just economic losses. It is full-on scientific and technology disaster, which consists of losses of
skilled workers, strong system of higher education, research and trial facilities, generation of young
researchers. It may take decades for the government to recoup the losses.
Often, the knowledge and experience of past years have not been documented. The reason for the
loss of nuclear knowledge, can serve a variety of factors such as aging of employees, decline of
technological skills and loss of know-how, potential reduction in the safety and feasibility of innovation
potential disappearance. In reference with the above nuclear knowledge stakeholders such as
governments, international organizations, and industry have a vigorous activity in development of
knowledge management. It includes strategies and programs to collect, exchange, store and transfer
information to new generation.
Incidentally, knowledge management is needed to be applied to academic institutions too. Knowledge
management formation in National Research Tomsk Polytechnic lets us provide an access to legacy
of the past, present and future of nuclear industry.
2. IAEA and nuclear knowledge management
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The IAEA nuclear knowledge management activities assist in transferring and preserving knowledge,
exchanging information, establishing and supporting cooperative networks, and training next
generation of nuclear experts. These activities in assisting Member States in the preservation and
enhancement of nuclear knowledge and in facilitating international collaboration have been recognized
by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Much work has been done by
the IAEA in addressing the knowledge management needs of different nuclear organizations [1].
3. International experience
Experience of other international organizations, not just in nuclear industry, shows there are no
universal systems of knowledge management for any kind of organisation. Each system has unique
elements, tools and technologies. All knowledge systems is developed according to the purposes of a
company, kind of activity and specificity of company`s knowledge. For the moment, the concept of
knowledge management is integrated in developed global scale companies. This can be exemplified
by Siemens AG, where in 1999 an information exchange system ShareNet29 started operating in
Siemens Information and Communication network (ICN) [2]. The next example is Skanska Group,
which has IT-platform called Skanska Knowledge Network [3]. Skanska Knowledge Network helps
corporate employee to find necessary information in inhouse database. The example of application of
nuclear knowledge management system is Canadian project CANTEACH [4]. This knowledge
repository provides high quality technical documentation relating to the CANDU nuclear energy
system. The CANTEACH Project aims to provide an information exchange network for people
interested in the CANDU energy system. Contributors are industry experts who hold valuable
knowledge and experience in diverse aspects of CANDU technology and its applications, and unique
expertise in the areas of science and technology, nuclear power design and construction, project
management and development of engineering tools [4].
Consequently, one of the main points of successful usage of stored knowledge is systematization and
management. Nuclear industry needs individual approach for integration of knowledge management
system.
4. Nuclear knowledge management system in National Research Tomsk
Polytechnic University
National Research Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU) is one of the leading nuclear universities of
Russia. Today TPU consists of twelve institutes, thirteen management units and has its own nuclear
reactor. Also, the university is included in association of consortium of main academic institutions of
Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom). Rosatom is integrating nuclear knowledge
management system in all branches of company.TPU with such complex organizational structure has
a significant knowledge and information flow. This flow needs to be managed. The goal of the present
work is to investigate the Rosatom`s experience in creating of nuclear knowledge management
system and, as a result, integrate this system in the Institute of Physics and Technology (IPT). The
introduction of the concept into the structure of the Institute will provide access to the existing legacy
of nuclear expertise, ensure the transfer of knowledge to a new generation, and will fill the gaps
emerged in connection with the loss of nuclear knowledge.
Organizational structure of IPT is detailed in figure 1. The structure includes Academic office, Science
office, Material Properties Measurements Centre (MPMC), Engineering support office, Nuclear
research rector, Information office. In addition, the institute consists of eleven departments and
seventeen laboratories. Authority of IPT is headed by the Director, Deputy Director for Academic
Affairs and Deputy Director for Research.
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Figure 1 Organizational structure of Institute of Physics and technologies
R&D results obtained by IPT staff and students need to be structured and preserved. The diagram of
knowledge generation processes is shown on figure 2.
Figure 1 Information processes
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Scientific and technical information portal of IPT has the form of library, which collects all scientific
research, projects, IPT employees and students’ publications; in addition, it consists of work
experience of last generations. All this information is available for both employees and students,
thereby reducing the time for information search.
Using a web-browser users connect to the portal and can perform the following actions:
• view information collections;
• add, edit and delete the items in information collections;
• perform a full-text, attributive search, and a search using the industry classifier or the thesaurus;
• create permanent thematic queries;
• use the "Calendar of scientific and technical activities".
Home page includes general information about this project, a newsportal, and materials of knowledge
management system with operating manual and history of the project. One can also find contact
information, and technical support line, where users can seek the advice of the portal content
administrators and technical experts on issues related to the preparation of documents and their
posting on the Scientific and Technical Information portal.
Portal includes nine information sections (figure 3).
1. Publication. This section includes articles, reports, presentations of employees and students
that were publish in national and foreign journals.
2. Repository of scientific and technical documentation. Catalogue of digitized scientific and
technical documentation of the Institute (research paper, developmental work. Inoperative patents,
etc.).
3. R & D works ready for commercialization.
4. Intellectual property. This section consists of IPT employees’ intellectual property.
5. Content of scientific events. This section consists of conference, seminar, and symposium
information.
6. Specialists. The details about specialists of IPT in different scientific fields.
7. Scientific online resource. Hyperlink for informative sources.
8. Trade journals.
Figure 3 Scientific and Technical Information portal of IPT
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5. Conclusion
At the beginning of scientific work, a researcher spends eighty percent of time for solving old tasks
and just twenty percent for searching innovation solutions. Thanks to the Scientific and Technical
Information portal of IPT this proportion can be changed exactly the opposite. Currently, TPU is
integrating into knowledge management system of Rosatom. The process of developing IPT system is
on the early stage. Digitisation of IPT stored knowledge and filling-in of the library have already
started. After successful application in IPT, it is planned to expand and integrate the system into all
institutes of TPU.
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This document proposes a new strategy for how the ESARDA organization could work with education, 
training and knowledge management in nuclear safeguards. With this document we want to anchor 
these ideas within the organization and its management, in order to have a broad support for this 
initiative. We propose to activate all ESARDA working groups in the process of identifying, selecting 
and preparing material for module based education and training. ESARDA could then more effectively 
broaden its education and training activities and strengthen the connections with academia. In this 
way, we would also create a way to export knowledge on nuclear safeguards to nuclear education 
programs on the European level. 
We propose to create a task force that addresses a set of identified questions; examples are how to 
implement the new strategy, how to interact with academia and young professionals and how to 
develop, maintain, and structure the educational modules. By the end of 2015, the findings of the task 
force should be presented to the ESARDA management in order to be able to make a more informed 
decision on how to proceed with the new strategy. 
Keywords: strategy, education, training, knowledge management, module 
1. Introduction
ESARDA is an association of European organisations formed to advance and harmonise research and 
development in the area of safeguards. It provides a forum for the exchange of information and ideas 
between nuclear facility operators, safeguards authorities and persons engaged in research and 
development. ESARDA was formed in 1969 with the purpose of facilitating collaboration in R&D in the 
field of safeguards and in the application of such R&D to the safeguarding of source and special fissile 
materials. Activities take place via  
• annual meetings and symposia,
• working groups (WGs),
• education,
• the ESARDA Bulletin and website
The ESARDA Training and Knowledge Management Working Group (ESARDA TKM WG) is one of 
several working groups in the ESARDA organization. The primary objective of this group has been to 
offer the ESARDA nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation course to students and young 
professionals at least once per year. However, there has been a wish from ESARDA to spread the 
knowledge about nuclear safeguards to more students than those of the ESARDA course, e.g. 
students taking courses in nuclear technology. Furthermore the wish had been also to encourage 
these individuals as well as young professionals to join and remain in the safeguards field. 
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1.1. Vision: Building a strategy for ESARDA education, training and knowledge 
management 
This document describes a vision of how the ESARDA organisation could implement knowledge 
management in a practical way. In addition, we believe that the ESARDA organisation should work 
actively to increase awareness of nuclear safeguards by making educational and research material 
available, thereby promoting education and training in nuclear safeguards to a broad audience. 
In the consideration of broadening the education and training activities of the ESARDA organization, 
we propose to map such activities performed by other networks, institutions and organizations to – if 
possible – benefit from collaborations and coordination of work.  
Preliminary ideas how to develop a strategy for ESARDA and ESARDA TKM were published in the 
ESARDA Bulletin No. 51 [1]. This document deviates from those ideas to some degree, mainly 
because we now consider to a larger extent what is realistically doable. One of the differences 
concerns the degree of control that ESARDA has on the education offered by other institutions e.g. via 
train-the-trainer courses. 
1.2. Objective of this report 
The objective of this document is to anchor the proposed vision in the ESARDA organization in order 
to have this initiative approved for further investigations. Specifically, we need a broad support from 
the ESARDA management to create a task force comprising individuals representing the ESARDA 
management (Executive Board and Steering Committee) as well as the different WGs. We also 
believe that the entire WG TKM should be involved in the process. Of course, other alternatives to the 
creation of this task force could be discussed, such as including one or two members from the 
Executive Board and/or Steering Committee as well as members of the Editorial Committee and the 
other working groups into WG TKM. In both cases, a dedicated group of people working with this issue 
is required. 
1.2.1. Task force 
The purpose of the task force should be to investigate a number of questions. Some of them have 
already been identified, while others will most likely be revealed later on in the process. 
Already identified tasks which the task force will need to address and answer are: 
• Map external educational and training networks for possible future collaboration
• Identify possible ways of implementing the suggested vision, taking available resources into
account
• Identify ways to develop, maintain and structure the educational modules and the content of a
train-the-trainer course
• List what material that may already be available for inclusion in the modules
• Consider to what extent the available material should be open-source and to what degree, and
using what resources, it should be quality controlled.
• Identify ways to interact with universities, university teachers, students and young
professionals
• Engage the different WGs in the process
• Identify possible sources for funding for the proposed work
• To develop a time-plan and suggest responsible actors (persons or organizations) for the
implementation
Ideally, the task force would work with these issues and come up with a realistic way to move forward 
with this initiative during 2015. After presenting the results of this work, it would be up to the ESARDA 
management to make a decision on what parts to implement and how.  
We are aware of that ESARDA as an organization has no available funding and that ESARDA 
members are involved at their own expense. We also know that any suggestions that require the 
involvement of people are associated with a cost in terms of time and money. A question whether 
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universities have funding for this has come up, but we cannot see that it is possible. Another option is 
to ask if and to what extent different ESARDA member organizations may contribute. In conclusion, it 
is crucial for the task force to investigate what sources of funding that may be available to finance the 
implementation of the proposed changes which are associated with the new strategy.  
1.3. Knowledge management 
Considering the comprehensive knowledge of ESARDA, we believe that there is plenty of room for 
improvement on how to benefit from, and make use of, this knowledge. We need to raise awareness 
of knowledge management (KM) itself, and at the same time discuss how we best deal with it 
internally, as it constitutes a new challenge for the organization. 
KM is a way to handle and align the knowledge inventory of an organization. By doing this, people, 
work processes and technology interact constructively and the work as well as the decision making is 
made effectively and in line with the organization’s goals. The knowledge itself can be abstract or 
know-how, stored on a media or applied in practise. The knowledge is associated to the people in the 
organization, to the programmes or tools that are used by the people and to the organizational culture 
and the practises within it. Unless the knowledge within the organization is transferred, shared, 
transformed, adapted, updated and applied it becomes useless, making the organization more 
vulnerable to external factors. 
KM is since long time an important issue in fields of business administration,  management and 
information sciences, but it is becoming more important as part of the business strategy also in several 
other fields. Within the IAEA, a special subprogram on nuclear knowledge management is in place [1]. 
It is aimed at helping governments and nuclear organizations to clearly recognize and meet their 
responsibilities for managing nuclear knowledge, having a focus on developing and implementing 
methodologies for KM, facilitating information exchange and providing services related to nuclear KM. 
We believe that ESARDA has much to learn about KM and that we may benefit from implementing it. 
We also acknowledge that we do not need to reinvent the wheel, and that there are several actors that 
may be very useful to us in this process. In the long run, we believe that ESARDA may be able to 
become one of those who are able to educate others on how to implement KM in practise. 
1.3.1. NuSaSET 
ESARDA currently has a portal for advertising activities of nuclear safeguards relevance. We would 
like to broaden its use because it constitutes an excellent platform for interaction.  We envisage that 
NuSaSET could be the place for interaction between ESARDA WGs, safeguards lecturers, students at 
universities, professionals as well as researchers in the fields and the new initiative ESARDA Young 
Generation. We will elaborate further on the possible expansion of NuSaSET in section 4 of this 
document. 
2. Education and training in nuclear safeguards
The education and training activities of ESARDA are currently restricted to organizing and giving the 
ESARDA course, arranged by JRC Ispra. It is a very popular course, attended by participants with 
various academic background and experience, and we think that there is both room and interest for an 
expansion of education and training activities beyond this course. The new education and training 
activities could be fitted to different target groups and it is not necessarily ESARDA members or JRC 
Ispra who are expected to do the actual teaching.  
2.1. Module based education and training 
When the TKM WG was discussed and established in 2003-2004, the purpose of the WG was to 
develop several safeguards modules that could be made available to and used by universities in a 
broader context of education of technical and non-technical students.  We revisit these ideas and 
suggest to develop module-based knowledge repositories for research and educational material. The 
modules should be made available by ESARDA. This strategy serves several purposes: 
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• To give researchers and individuals involved in education and training in nuclear safeguards
an overview of the current state of knowledge.
• To structure the work performed within ESARDA by clarifying what research that is ongoing
and by whom. This would in turn improve the possibilities of internal collaboration by stating
what the area of expertise is within each WG.
• To categorize and tag (associate with material with descriptive keywords such as e.g. “Non-
Destructive Analysis”) research and educational material
• To make nuclear safeguard material available (e.g. slides together with explaining text in order
to minimize the risk for misinterpretation of information) for internal as well as for external use.
The idea is that anyone may choose material from different modules to create his or her own
safeguard course (see Figure 2).
The actual content of each module could be e.g. one or several texts, e-books, case studies, 
published research papers, further references, video material etc. Seeing that ESARDA would not 
perform the teaching but only provide material, we have chosen not to include material for e.g. 
calculating and laboratory exercises. Instead we suggest to let the user of the material determine how 
it should be used. In a module based training package, a number of modules can be combined to suit 
different audiences with different needs. The module material should be kept in an electronic format 
which is easy to update, edit and “keep alive” and the course participants should be given easy access 
to download the selected modules. We foresee two levels of difficulty: an overview level, and an in-
depth level. Furthermore, we suggest a digital tagging system for each piece of material in order to 
make it easy to search and access. The material should preferably represent the full competence of 
the WGs, and the material of each module should be available in the NuSaSET portal.  A graphical 
representation of a module can be found in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. A module is a collection of material on a specific topic. The material is categorized as overview material 
or in-depth material (represented by the horizontal level in the figure). Each module could contain different 
material such as videos, books, scientific papers etc. The material is tagged to provide an easy navigation 
through the material. 
Each module is meant to comprise material sufficient to educate participants on a particular subject. 
The subject matter could be technical or non-technical in its nature, but should be of relevance to 
nuclear safeguards or a specific ESARDA WG. Modules could for example exist for the following 
topics:  non-destructive assay (NDA), KM in practice, safeguards for geological repositories, the legal 
framework of nuclear safeguards etc. Modules which are not explicitly part of research on nuclear 
safeguards and non-proliferation such as nuclear security could be encouraged by the ESARDA 
management via the Revision Board (see section 2.3). In that case, the topic could become part of an 
existing WG or constitute a new WG, and the development of the module then becomes the 
responsibility of that particular WG. It could also be possible to develop modules together with 
ESARDA partners such as research institutes, universities, educational networks etc. In the more 
distant future, this could lead to an exchange of modules between several partners. 
In the creation of a specific course, e.g. Non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards for non-technicians, 
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difficulty depends on the target group for that specific course and it is the person responsible for giving 
the course who makes the selection. 
Figure 2. An illustration of how material from different modules is selected to for a specific course. 
2.2. The role of the WGs 
ESARDA is currently divided into several WGs (discipline oriented, facility oriented, ad-hoc, Training 
and Knowledge Management –TKM, and Editorial Committee). Each WG consists of experts in that 
particular field, and each WG is in principle independent of other WGs and consequently the 
communication between the WGs is sparse. The development of the module-based knowledge 
repository for research and educational material would allow for a larger overlap of activities, since all 
WGs would need to make their material and expertise available to a broader audience and hence be 
part of promoting education, training and knowledge management. More specifically, the WGs should, 
beside their current activities, engage in the following specific tasks: 
1) Identify and update module material that is suitable for education and training. The material
is created by members or fractions of the WG and can be research papers, reports, videos
etc.Each WG shall identify material which they judge is suitable teaching material. The WG
categorizes this material into one or several modules and suggests an appropriate tagging for
each material. This material should be (continuously) revised by the WG so that it contains
also recent research results. We suggest that each WG selects one member who is
responsible for the material identified and collected by the WG. This person should in addition
participate in the Revision Board for the module-based knowledge repository for research and
educational material. In this way, the work of the WGs becomes formalised and become part
of the annual assessments of the Executive Board of the WG activities.
2) Scrutinize the material provided by the WGs in order to ensure that it is comprehensive and
on the right level. In some cases, WG needs to identify complementing background material,
references etc. For each module, a video and/or documentation could be made available,
explaining the scope and content of that specific module.
3) Actively work to attract and keep the involvement of students and (young) professionals
in ESARDA. In order to be attractive to this target group, the WGs must be able to offer
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a. Bachelor and Master thesis projects
b. Scientific scrutinizers for projects




The list can be made longer, but what is important is to prioritize this wish-list for students and 
young professionals and then to identify how we best contribute to that.  
2.2.1. WG TKM 
Knowledge management within ESARDA is currently done via the annual meetings and symposia, as 
well as the publishing of the ESARDA Bulletin. We believe that WG TKM, together with the aid from 
other WGs, also should deal with knowledge management by: 
1) Managing the module material that is suitable for education and training as follows:
a. Select the format(s) in which the available material should be made available.
b. Regularly invite the module responsible persons to a Revision Board meeting. In this
forum each module content is presented to
i. spread the current status of the research field within the consortium
ii. inspire other module responsible persons how to organise their modules
2) Offer the ESARDA course at Ispra and/or other places
3) Identify new research fields that should be included in the ESARDA network.
Note that we need to ensure that the knowledge management activities by different actors become 
constructive and not competitive. We invite representatives of the Editorial Committee to specifically 
take part in discussions on knowledge management within ESARDA.  
2.3. Revision Board 
In our current version of this strategy, we propose to create a Revision Board that should make sure 
that the module material is up to date. However, we are open for other options, proposed by the task 
force or other actors.  
The purpose of the Revision Board is to update the module material that is suitable for education and 
training during regular meetings. The Revision Board should comprise members of the ESARDA 
management and each WG. In case there is module material which is not tied to any particular WG, 
the person responsible for that module should also be in the board. 
The Revision Board should meet in connection to the annual meeting and review the material of each 
module. Depending on the scope and tags of that material, the Revision Board may become aware of 
material which is beyond the scope of existing WGs. It should then be up for discussion how this 
knowledge is best managed and if it is motivated to create a new WG. 
3. Networks
3.1. Young Generation 
The establishment of an ESARDA Young Generation (ESARDA-YG) is an initiative that may tie well 
into this strategy of promoting education, teaching and knowledge management. It is meant to support 
and work within ESARDA, and at the same time pay special attentions to its young members. YG will 
provide a meeting point for students and young professionals involved in different aspects of nuclear 
safeguards, and the aim is to contribute in the promotion and increase awareness of nuclear 
safeguards. Via ESARDA-YG, the ESARDA organization will be given access to students and young 
professionals who are interested in this field. This will hopefully lead to a larger fraction of people who 
will continue their careers this specific field. 
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The main objectives of the ESARDA-YG are to: 
• Facilitate the attendance to the ESARDA Symposium
• Encourage the participation to the ESARDA Working Groups
• Plan technical visits to nuclear facilities and research centers
• Organize lectures and workshops related to nuclear safeguards
• Provide opportunities for interactions and networking
• Create an informal forum for students and young professionals interested in nuclear
safeguards
Like many organizations dealing with nuclear topics, the ESARDA-YG is limited by the low number of 
young people working with this subject. Therefore, by grouping students and young professionals at 
European level it is possible to find sufficiently many people to create an active organization.  
The ESARDA-YG could offer its members an introduction to the safeguards community. The ESARDA 
association will benefit from the interactions with motivated students and professionals that bring 
innovative approaches to tackle current R&D. ESARDA-YG consequently benefits both safeguards 
newcomers and field experts. 
3.2. Partners and partner organizations 
There are a number of other organizations which engage in education and training activities related to 
nuclear power and nuclear education (such as e.g. INSEN, ENEN). The scope of activities within 
these organizations is not known to the authors at this moment, but we have identified a need to map 
them in order not to duplicate work and to possibly initiate collaboration. 
In addition, we have also identified a need to map initiatives and organizations that more generally 
deal with nuclear safeguards. Such organizations are e.g. be the IAEA and Institute for Nuclear 
Material’s Management (INMM), with which ESARDA already now has collaborations, but also 
possible new partners should be included. 
4. The connecting hub – the NuSaSET portal
The Nuclear Safeguards & Security Education and Training portal (www.nusaset.org) is an 
international initiative of the INMM, ESARDA and the IAEA.  The portal provides support to 
professionals in the field of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, specifically to promote the provision of 
training and education of students. We would like to expand the use of NuSaSET in several ways 
since we see it as the natural platform for internal as well as external collaboration. 
1) Each WG should make their module material that is suitable for education and training
available for lecturers and students here.
2) It could constitute a forum for discussions and the sharing of experience on how to educate
and train people on specific modules. It could also be the place where teachers could upload
their own material (e.g. slides and exercises) and keep in touch with other professionals etc.
3) University students taking nuclear safeguards courses could sign in on NuSaSET in order to
download the course material as well as getting information on thesis subjects and PhD
positions among the ESARDA community.
4) YG members could interact with each other and with professionals and students.
5) By activating both students and young professionals on NuSaSET , we allow for
o cross-European collaborations among students, and
o a (further expanded) platform for advertisement of thesis subjects, nuclear safeguards
courses, future PhD positions as well as positions in companies all over Europe.
6) The “train-the-trainer” course could be made available through NuSaSET.
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Figure 3. Different actors on NuSaSET. 
5. Summary
In this document, we have described a vision of how ESARDA could deal with education as well as 
training and knowledge management in a more effective way. We have described a development 
towards a module-based knowledge repository for research and educational material, aimed to 
facilitate awareness of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation to both students and young 
professionals. In the process of developing and maintaining the material, we foresee a larger overlap 
between the ESARDA WGs and a way to implement knowledge management in practice into the 
organization. 
We believe that the proposed strategy will greatly expand the extent to which ESARDA engages in 
education and training. It will make education and training more flexible and provides the possibility to 
offer different nuclear safeguards courses depending on different needs and target groups.  
We also suggest that the TKM WG should take steps to develop a train-the-trainer course in order to 
stimulate further interest in academia for teaching in the safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation field.  
6. Outlook
In the nearest future we suggest to form a Task Force that will develop the thoughts in this document 
as well as implementing them. Ideally the task force consists of members from all WGs (including 
steering committee). Therefore we urge the steering committee to rally a Task Force from the 
members of the WGs. 
During 2015 this Task Force develops and deepens the thoughts presented in this document and pays 
special attention to the funding of further development. By the end of 2015 the Task Force presents a 
more detailed plan for 2016. This plan should consist of an action plan for how and who to implement 
the changes. 
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Abstract:
Nuclear safeguards conclusions are based to a large extent on comparison of measurement results
between operator and safeguards laboratories. Nuclear forensics deals with consistency of
information, coherence between materials or samples, conformity of findings with declared processes
and comparison of external and internal data. Representative samples are measured by respective
networks of laboratories. For nuclear safeguards these are the Euratom safeguards and the IAEA
Network of Analytical laboratories (IAEA-NWAL). For nuclear forensics, the laboratories are mainly
members of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG). Metrological quality
control tools are a means to establish accurate, traceable and comparable measurement results. The
European Commission-Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC) has therefore put effort into the development
of certified reference materials and the provision of conformity assessment tools, particularly for "age-
dating" of uranium and plutonium samples, which is of importance to both communities. In this context
the new IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b, certified for the production date based on the 230Th/234U 
radiochronometer, will be presented, and the results from the Regular European Inter-laboratory
Measurement Evaluation Programme (REIMEP-22) on 'U Age Dating' will be discussed. Furthermore
the status of the on-going development of a 243Am spike reference material in the frame of the recently 
signed collaboration agreement between the EC-JRC and the CEA/DEN will be presented. This spike
is intended for use in the determination of the last separation date of plutonium samples by Isotope
Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) using the 241Pu/241Am radiochronometer.  
Keywords: nuclear forensic; nuclear safeguards, quality control tools; age dating; IDMS
1. Introduction
Nuclear forensics is a key element of nuclear security aiming at the identification and characterisation
of illicit nuclear material, such as uranium or plutonium, to re-establish the history of nuclear material
of unknown origin. By applying advanced analytical techniques to determine the isotopic compositions,
elemental concentrations, chemical impurities and physical dimensions or microstructure of the
nuclear material in question, the origin of an unknown material can be determined. More recently, the
determination of the "age" of the material has drawn increased interest, not only in nuclear security but
also in nuclear safeguards. The "age" of a nuclear material refers to its production date, i.e. the time
elapsed since the last chemical separation of the daughter nuclides from the mother radionuclide. This
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specific signature allows a narrowing of the possible origins of the material in question and provides
valuable information on its history [1-4]. In order to address the emerging need of the nuclear forensic
and safeguards communities for suitable reference materials, the European Commission - Joint
Research Centre (EC-JRC) is joining efforts within JRC institutes and with other national
organisations.
The JRC - IRMM (Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements) and the JRC - ITU (Institute for
Transuranium Elements) jointly produced the first uranium reference material certified for the
production date based on the n(230Th)/n(234U) radiochronometer. This certified reference material was 
produced in compliance with ISO Guide 34 and ISO 17025 [5,6] in two sizes, 20 mg (IRMM-1000a)
and 50 mg uranium (IRMM-1000b) as dried uranyl nitrate to be applied for mass spectrometric and
radiometric analytical techniques. Such reference materials are a prerequisite for validation of
measurement procedures and establish traceability of the measurement results to the SI.
Prior to the release of IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b, the REIMEP-22 inter-laboratory comparison
(ILC) entitled "U Age Dating- Determination of the production date of a uranium certified test sample"
was organised in support to the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG).
This ILC aimed particularly at the ITWG members, as well as the Network of Analytical laboratories of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA-NWAL), laboratories from industry and experts in the
fields of nuclear and environmental (geological) sciences. Inter-laboratory comparisons, such as
REIMEP-22, allow participants to benchmark their results against independent and traceable
reference values, to identify possible problems, and to improve their measurement procedures, if
necessary. Participants in REIMEP-22 received either a 20 mg and/or 50 mg certified test sample with
an undisclosed value for the production date and were asked to apply their routine measurement
procedure and to report the calculated production date with associated measurement uncertainty.
As a follow-up to a recommendation from the IAEA Technical Meetings on Reference Materials for
Destructive Analysis in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, CEA/DEN and JRC-IRMM joined efforts and engaged
in the future production of a 243Am spike reference material certified for the amount content and
isotope amount ratios, using an americium base material available at CEA/DEN/Marcoule. Currently
there is no 243Am spike commercially available, although a certified reference material is needed for 
method validation in nuclear forensics, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards for the accurate
measurements of 241Am content in nuclear materials. A particular application of this spike material 
would be in the "age dating" of Pu samples using the 241Pu/241Am radiochronometer.  
2. IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b
IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b were prepared at the JRC-ITU from a mixture of low enriched uranium
dioxide pellets resulting in a relative mass fraction m(235U)/m(U) of 3.6% in the final material. From the 
dissolved uranium dioxide, a mother solution containing about 20 g of uranium in nitric acid (c = 3
mol·L-1) was prepared. An aliquot of this mother solution (about 6 g) was used to produce the 
reference materials. Four chemical separation steps by extraction chromatography (TEVA® Resin,
Triskem International, Bruz, France) were performed in order to completely remove 230Th from its
parent 234U uranium to the maximum extent achievable. The completeness of the separation and the 
recovery were monitored by γ-ray spectrometric measurements and by Inductively Coupled Plasma-
Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) using a 232Th tracer [7-9]. The individual units were prepared by
dispensing the purified solution into PFA vials with a subsequent evaporation to dryness. This
reference material is available in two different unit sizes of 20 mg uranium for mass spectrometric
methods and 50 mg uranium for radiometric methods, corresponding to IRMM-1000a and
IRMM-1000b respectively. The production date of IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b corresponds to the
date and the carefully recorded time of the last (fourth) chemical separation [10].
The characterisation, homogeneity and stability assessments of the material were carried out in
accordance with the ISO Guide 34:2009 [5] and the associated uncertainties by the Guide to the
Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement [11]. Details on establishing the certified value and its final
uncertainty can be found in the certification report [10]. The following value was assigned to IRMM-
1000a and IRMM-1000b:





Production date based on
n(230Th)/n(234U) radiochronometer 09/07/2012 13
Table 1: IRMM-1000a/IRMM-1000b certified value and its uncertainty.
3. REIMEP-22
REIMEP-22 on "U Age Dating–Determination of the production date of a uranium certified test sample"
was organised in parallel to the production of the IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b in support to the
ITWG and the IAEA-NWAL and in compliance with ISO/IEC 17043:2010 [12]. Besides experts in
nuclear forensics, other laboratories that are at the stage of acquiring capabilities in this field were
particularly encouraged to participate in REIMEP-22. The measurand of interest was the production
date of the certified test samples. However, the participants were asked to report in addition either the
n(230Th)/n(234U) amount ratio or the activity A(230Th)/A(234U) ratio for the two uranium certified test 
samples, respectively. This made it possible to distinguish whether a deviation from the reference
value was due to mistakes in the measurements or in the calculations. Moreover, the participants had
the possibility to report the production date based on the n(231Pa)/n(235U) amount ratio or the 
A(231Pa)/A(235U) activity ratio although the material was not certified based on the 241Pa/235U 
radiochronometer. The production date had to be reported as dd/mm/yyyy with the associated
expanded uncertainty in days. The participant results were evaluated against the reference value by
means of zeta-scores in compliance with ISO 13528:2005 [13].
3.1. Participant results
Fourteen laboratories registered for REIMEP-22; however three laboratories could not report their
results due to technical problems. Finally, eleven different laboratories reported results; among these,
two laboratories submitted results both for the 20 mg and 50 mg uranium certified test samples,
making thirteen participant results in total. Nine participants reported results for the 20 mg sample and
four participants reported results for the 50 mg sample. Additionally, two laboratories reported the
production dates based on the n(231Pa)/n(235U) amount ratios. The results for the 20 mg uranium 
certified sample based on n(230Th)/n(234U) amount ratio and 50 mg uranium certified sample based on 
A(230Th)/A(234U) activity ratio are presented in Figure 1 and in Figure 2. Details about the participant 
results and REIMEP-22 can be found in the report [14].
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Figure 1: Reported results for the 20 mg uranium certified sample with uncertainties for production date (red
squares) and n(230Th)/n(234U) amount ratios (blue diamonds) normalized to March 6, 2013 (reference date). The 
reference value and its uncertainty are shown by the dashed red lines.
The challenge in REIMEP-22 was to determine the date of the last separation of 230Th from 234U in a 
young sample, i.e. with a very low amount of 230Th. Based on the calculated production dates and 
ratios reported by the participants, it can be concluded that the participants in REIMEP-22 performed
well for both mass spectrometric and alpha-spectrometric measurements; however, the spread of
results was larger for the activity ratio results measured by alpha spectrometry.
Figure 2: Reported results for the 50 mg uranium certified sample with uncertainties for production date (red
squares) and A(230Th)/A(234U) activity ratios (blue diamonds) normalized to March 6, 2013 (reference date). The 
reference value and its uncertainty are shown by the dashed red lines.













xlab is the measurement result reported by a participant,
Xref is the reference value (assigned value),
uref is the standard uncertainty of the reference value,
ulab is the standard uncertainty reported by a participant
The laboratory performance expressed as zeta-scores can be interpreted as satisfactory for zeta score
≤ 2 (green), questionable for 2 < zeta score ≤ 3 (yellow) and unsatisfactory for zeta score > 3 (red).
This score provides an indication whether the estimate of the uncertainty is consistent with the
laboratory's deviation from the REIMEP-22 reference value, Xref = 09/07/2012 ± 7.8 days (k = 2). An
unsatisfactory laboratory performance may be caused by an underestimated uncertainty or by a large
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deviation from the reference value. The zeta-scores per participating laboratory for the 20 mg and 50









10246 1.3 7.6 /
10250 -7.1 / /
10245 -6.0 / /
10249 1.5 / /
10243 -1.8 / /
10242 -6.0 / /
10248 -0.6 / /
10252 -2.6 -0.5 /
10247 -20.4 / /
10257 / / 2.5
10254 / / -1.5
10258 / / 0.3
10259 / / 4.8
Table 2: Overview of the zeta-scores for the 20 mg and 50 mg uranium certified test sample.
Six participants out of thirteen reported results obtained satisfactory performance and two participants
achieved questionable performance based on the zeta scores evaluation. The results confirmed the
analytical capabilities of laboratories for this type of measurements. The results also showed that more
care still needs to be brought to the estimation of measurement uncertainties, which were generally
underestimated. Two participants also reported n(231Pa)/n(235U) amount ratios and the associated 
production dates (Table 2). Nevertheless, this is already a good indication that the certified production
date of IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b may also be applicable for the 231Pa/235U radiochronometer, 
although these CRMs are not certified for this specific radiochronometer and further work is needed to
verify that.
4. 243Am spike CRM (IRMM-0243)
JRC-IRMM and CEA/CETAMA (CEA/DEN Marcoule, France) will jointly produce and certify a 243Am 
spike reference material. Currently there is no 243Am certified spike reference material commercially 
available to measure the 241Am content in a sample by IDMS. 3 mg of Am base material (88% 243Am 
and 12% 241Am) made available by CEA/CETAMA was purified by extraction chromatography and 
impurity analyses was performed by ICP-AES. Subsequently the Am material was shipped to JRC-
IRMM and further processing and certification in accordance with ISO Guide 34 is currently on-going
[5]. The Am solution will be diluted with nitric acid (c = 2 mol·L-1) to achieve a mass fraction of 1.5 
μg·g-1 and will be dispensed into screw-cap glass ampoules. About 600 units will be prepared; each 
unit will contain about 3.5 mL of a solution. The reference material will be certified for the 243Am and 
241Am amount contents and Am isotope amount ratios by ID-TIMS and TIMS, respectively. A flow-
chart of the various steps of this joint project is presented in Figure 3.
To certify the 243Am, in principle, a 241Am spike reference material would be required. In the absence 
of any certified 241Am, a rather unorthodox approach for certification had to be chosen. For certification 
purpose, a 241Am in-house spike will be prepared from a high enriched 241Pu (99.3%) material
available at JRC-IRMM. The ingrown 241Am, produced by beta decay of 241Pu (14.325 ± 0.024 y, [15]), 
will be used as the spike reference material for IDMS. The initial 241Pu material was purified by anion 
exchange (Bio-Rad, AG-1X4). The completeness of the separation (the absence of 241Am in the
purified 241Pu) was confirmed by γ-ray spectrometry. The purified spike solution (kept under weight 
control) was characterised by TIMS to determine the isotopic composition and by IDMS using a 242Pu 
spike CRM (IRMM-049d) to determine the 241Pu amount content. Before the release of the new 243Am 
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CRM CEA/CETAMA will organise an interlaboratory comparison exercise for this candidate reference
material, similar to what was done in REIMEP-22 before the release of IRMM-1000a and IRMM-
1000b. This ILC will be open to all (expert) laboratories in the field but also to laboratories that would
like to gain experience in the field of americium measurements.
Figure 3: Various steps for the preparation and certification of 243Am spike CRM (IRMM-0243). In full line squares 
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5. Conclusions
The IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b uranium reference materials were jointly produced and certified by
the JRC - IRMM and JRC - ITU according to international guidelines for the production date based on
the 230Th/234U radiochronometer. The certified reference value of the IRMM-1000a and IRMM-1000b 
and its expanded uncertainty was determined as: 09/07/2012 ± 13 day (k = 2). These novel CRMs will
contribute to more reliable measurements of the "age" and characterisation of intercepted uranium
materials in nuclear forensic and will improve method validation in nuclear safeguards. In parallel, the
REIMEP-22 interlaboratory comparison was organised on the certified uranium test samples. This ILC
gave the participating laboratories the opportunity to demonstrate that their measurement results for
the determination of the age of uranium nuclear or radioactive materials are fit for the intended
purpose and within the required measurement uncertainties of the current best practice in Nuclear
Forensics. Furthermore laboratories still acquiring capabilities in nuclear forensics could benchmark
their state-of-practice via participation in REIMEP-22. The evaluation of the laboratories’ performances 
showed that the participants performed well for this kind of measurements using either mass
spectrometry or alpha-spectrometry, although the spread of the results was larger for the
measurements performed by alpha-spectrometry. It also showed that there is still room for
improvement in the estimation and reporting of measurement uncertainties. The ongoing preparation
of a 243Am certified spike reference material required for the measurement of the last chemical
separation of plutonium samples by IDMS is one more example that cooperation within and between
institutes with expertise in the field of nuclear material analysis and quality control is an asset for the
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security communities.
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Abstract
The alpha spectrometry techniques aim to determine the activity of alpha-emitting radioisotopes
contained in soil samples, various materials (cement, iron), or liquid samples.
The identification and quantification of alpha-emitting radionuclides have a key role in the field of
radiation protection and the characterisation of nuclear materials. They have a fundamental role in
safeguards and security in general, since the relevant samples are often alpha-contaminated.
The experimental activities are carried out using certified alpha sources at the ENEA Casaccia
Nuclear Materials Characterisation Laboratory with an integrated alpha spectrometer for measuring
low-activity samples. The quantitative analysis of alpha-particle spectra is aimed to the determination
of the positions of bands in units of channel numbers and of the areas of bands in units of counts.
Both quantities must be determined together with their associated uncertainties. Using the energy -
and efficiency - calibration data, along with an appropriate nuclides library, these positions and areas
are then converted into absolute activities of the nuclides contained in the source.
A measurement repeated in identical conditions does not necessarily coincide with the previous one
because the emission mechanisms and detection of alpha particles are stochastic. The variability of
the measurements is characteristic of the physical phenomenon but is also a function of parameters
associated to the measurement system, such as the geometry of the detector, the properties of the
sample to be measured, and the electronics of the instrument. Therefore it is necessary to quantify the
extent of the variability of the measurements in order to estimate the associated uncertainty.
The present paper describes the methodologies for the alpha spectrometer characterisation to
quantify the inherent variability of the measured values both in terms of energy of the particles
revealed (position of the spectral bands) and in number (intensity of spectral bands).
Keywords: alpha spectrometry; uncertainties; nuclides; safeguards.
1. Introduction
The alpha spectrometry [1] is employed to measure natural radionuclides (polonium,
uranium, thorium) and anthropogenic (plutonium, americium, neptunium) alpha emitters in samples
deriving from different kind of matrices (water, sediments, dry atmospheric aerosols).
Alpha spectrometry is the process of measuring the energy and the number of alpha particles emitted
from a sample containing radioactive elements alpha-emitters. The alpha spectrometry techniques aim
to determine the activity per unit mass of radioisotopes alpha-emitters present in soil samples, various
materials (cement, iron), or liquid samples.
The identification and quantification of alpha-emitting radionuclides has a key role in the
characterization of nuclear materials and radiation protection in general and is an essential part of
safeguards and security.
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The alpha-emitting radioisotopes spontaneously produce alpha particles to energies characteristics
included between 4 and 6 MeV.
A typical energy spectrum of alpha particles emitted from a radioactive source is therefore constituted
by one or more lines, corresponding to the various possible transitions for that particular isotope.
The energy spectrum of the alpha particles can be detected by a silicon detector, placed in a vacuum
environment, since the alpha can be stopped even by small thicknesses of air.
The silicon detectors used for measurement of the energy of the alpha particles generally have a good
resolution in terms of energy, which may allow in many cases to distinguish the peaks corresponding
to different isotopes or different transitions of the same isotype.
The detector efficiency for these particles is virtually 100% and the linearity of the response with the
energy is very good over a wide range.
From an operational point of view, the sample should be as thin as possible and the path of the alpha
particles between the sample and the detector must be done in a chamber in which have been made
vacuum conditions. The reduced range value that characterizes the interaction of the alpha particles
with matter involves, in fact, a significant attenuation within the sample and within each material
interposed between the sample and the detector. From the spectrometer  point of view it results in an
asymmetrical deformation of the spectral bands characterized by a low energy tail, which limits the
instrumental performances.
In both cases, the sample must be prepared to be measured and the sample pre-treatment depends
on the type of measurement of choice.
The experimental activities are carried out using certified alpha sources at the ENEA Casaccia
Nuclear Materials Characterisation Laboratory with an integrated alpha spectrometer for measuring
low-activity samples.
In this work our goal is to provide an initial estimate of the performances and limitations of the ENEA
alpha spectrometry system in terms of the uncertainties associated with the energy and efficiency
calibrations obtained by means of specific certified radioactive sources.
2. Experimental set-up
2.1. Sample preparation
The material undergoing the measurement has to be deposited on a substrate to obtain a thin layer, in
a form chemically isolated that can be placed in a spectrometer and analysed with minimum
interferences and self-absorption.
Generally, the main steps for such a pre-treatment of the sample for alpha spectroscopy are the
following:
 homogenization and preparation of the sample for subsequent chemical processes;
 chemical separation: used to isolate elements of interest;
 production of thin source.
The sample preparation consists therefore in:
 extraction of the analyte from the matrix (co-precipitation, liquid-liquid extraction, ion-exchange
chromatography);
 separation of the analyte from potentially interfering nuclides;
 production of thin source by electrodeposition.
The source of the radioactive material must be very thin and homogeneous (ideally the substrate
should be coated with a single layer of radioactive atoms, without other impurities), and then the raw
material has to undergo various changes before be able to perform the measurement.
The initial matrix material is treated with suitable methods to obtain a solution containing the
radionuclides of interest; the final sample, ready for to be measured, is obtained by electrodeposition
solution containing the radioisotopes on a metal disk, the latter being the substrate of choice. This
procedure allows to obtain, in contrast to other methods, very thin and uniform sources in which the
layer of radioactive material on the surface of the substrate approaches very well the ideal case of a
monoatomic layer.
Various methods of electrodeposition have been studied to obtain the maximum yield and efficiency of
the process. The methodology used in this case was developed by N.A. Talvitie [2] and is the most
suitable for the electrodeposition of Pu, Th, U, Np, Cm and Am as hydrous oxides.
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2.2. Energy and efficiency calibration.
The instrumentation used to perform the measurements is composed by:
1) a Passivated Implanted Planar Silicon (PIPS) A-600-23AM, 600 mm2 surface, 140 μm
thickness, 23 keV resolution;
2) a vacuum chamber and electronic equipment (power supply voltage, preamplifier, amplifier,
analog-to-digital, multi-channel analyser);
3) a vacuum pump and connecting pipe.
In Figure 1 the ENEA spectrometry alpha system is illustrated.
Figure 1: Experimental setup for the alpha spectrometry.
The PIPS semiconductor detectors combine the techniques of ion implantation and photolithography
to produce detectors with very low leakage currents, input windows very thin, and excellent
operational characteristics.
The thin entrance window of the PIPS detectors provides increased resolution and the reduction of the
distance detector-source is required to have high efficiencies. The low leakage current helps to
minimize the drift of the peak with the temperature change. The ratio of the background count is
typically less than 0.05 counts/cm2 hr in the energy range from 3 to 8 MeV. 
In order to determine the capabilities of alpha spectrometry system [3], different measurement were
executed to determine the correct value of efficiency and to execute a correct efficiency calibration. To
pursue such a goal, certified alpha sources, with activity going from 10 kBq to 55 kBq, were placed
with different geometries (i.e., distances with respect to the PIPS detector; Fig. 2):
 mixed source 239Pu 241Am 244Cm with total activity of 5550 Bq;
 alpha source of 239Pu with activity of 2630 Bq;
 mixed source 239Pu 241Am 244Cm with total activity of 1018 Bq.
Table 1 shows energies and the corresponding branching ratio of the radionuclides in the  certified
alpha sources.









Table 1: Characteristics of the certified alpha sources
The detection efficiencies for the nine different distances of the source from the detector, for each
alpha certified sources, are shown in the Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Detection efficiencies as a function of the position of the sample
in the vacuum chamber, with all calibration sources.
Below, the uncertainties associated with the calibration potentially obtained using these described
sources are evaluated.
3. Uncertainties associated with the measurements
A measure repeated in identical conditions does not necessarily coincide with the previous because
the mechanisms of emission and detection of alpha particles are stochastic. The variability of the
measurements is characteristic of the physical phenomenon under examination (i.e. alpha decay) but
is also a function of the characteristics of the measuring system such as the geometry of the detector,
the properties of the sample to be measured, the electronics of the instrument. It follows that it is
necessary to quantify the extent of the variability of the measures in order to estimate the uncertainty
associated.
At this stage, the instrument has been characterized by the inherent variability of the measured values
both in terms of energy of the particles revealed (i.e., position of the spectral bands) and in number
(i.e. intensity of spectral bands).
3.1. Position of the spectral bands at different measurement geometry
The association between spectral bands with a source, that decays by emitting alpha particles of
known energy, and acquisition channels of the instrument determines the energy calibration of the
instrument. A spectrometer calibrated in terms of energy identifies the alpha particles energy of
unknown samples and then it allows to identify which alpha-emitters radioactive elements are present
in the sample.
The variability of the position of the spectral band at 5.157 MeV of the certified 239Pu source has been 
studied by varying the position of the sample with respect to the detector.
Ten different measurements have been performed for each position from number 9 (position closest to
the detector) to number 6 (Figure 2), with an acquisition time of 100 seconds each. Then, the mean
acquisition channel corresponding to the band peak, for each position, has been evaluated assuming,
in first approximation, a Gaussian profile of the spectral band (in this work we omit the complete
description of the asymmetries affecting the spectral bands), fitted by a Marquardt-Levenberg non-
linear minimization algorithm [5] (Figure 3).
The mean value of the peak position in the four positions falls on the channel 1796 with a maximum
uncertainty of 1.2 acquisition channels (relative uncertainty of 0.06%) corresponding to about 28 keV
(= 1.2 x 23 keV).
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Figure 3: Average size (symbols) and their functions interpolate (solid lines) at different
geometry measurement
3.2 Intensity of the spectral bands
The intensity of the spectral bands is proportional to the number of alpha particles detected by the
instrument and therefore provides information on the amount of alpha-emitting material contained in
the unknown sample. The association between intensity of the bands and quantity of the alpha-emitter
of a known source determines the efficiency calibration of the instrument.
A preliminary study of the variability of the intensity of the spectral bands was carried out using a
certified 239Pu 241Am 244Cm mixed source characterized by an activity of 5550 Bq. Ten measurements 
were made for each of the following three cases:
position 9: 100 seconds of acquisition,
position 8: 100 seconds of acquisition and
position 8: 200 seconds of acquisition (Figure 4).
It has been observed that the relative uncertainty of the peaks of the spectrum (Figure 4, bottom
panel) is substantially constant for both the different energies of the alpha particles revealed that for
different geometries and acquisition times.
Quantitatively this uncertainty is very low and roughly of the order of 0.2 %.
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Figure 4:  Measurements medium (top panel) and uncertainties relating percentages (lower panel) to vary
the geometry of the measurement and the time of acquisition of the same.
The results presented show that the uncertainty associated with the efficiency calibration is greater
than that associated with the energy calibration even if an uncertainty of 28 keV on the average value
of the peak does not always allow to uniquely identify the isotope alpha-emitter eventually  present in
an unknown sample. This disadvantage can be partially solved by performing the calibration in specific
energy for each different measurement geometry.
4. Conclusions
Due to the stochastic processes involved in the alpha decay and its detection, a measurement
repeated in identical conditions does not coincide with the previous one. For such a reason here we
quantify, in first approximation and with an empirical approach, the extent of the variability of the
measurements in order to estimate the associated uncertainty. This allows us to know the limitations
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of the energy and efficiency calibration obtained by means of certified alpha sources and, in turn, of
our alpha spectrometer.
Our results show that the energy calibration is accurate within 0.06% and the efficiency calibration
accuracy is roughly of the order of 0.2%.
Future work will include to consider an appropriate line shape (i.e., considering the asymmetries of the
spectral bands) in our fitting procedure and extend such evaluations to other parameters
characterizing the measurements (i.e., sample thickness).
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Abstract: 
Over the past few years, particle analysis of environmental swipe sampling has progressed 
significantly. For example, the minor isotope fractions of analysed uranium particles are routinely 
determined, requiring accurate and precise mass spectrometric measurements. Quality control 
measures play a major role in obtaining reliable analysis data. To this end, reference material in form 
of micro-particles with characterized or even certified properties may be used for quality control 
purposes of particle analysis methods. 
During the last years Forschungszentrum Jülich has developed a system for the production of mono-
disperse uranium micro-particles. The system is based on the production of an aerosol where droplets 
containing uranyl nitrate solution are dried and sintered to form solid uranium oxide particles with a 
diameter of approximately 1 μm. Such a system allows the production of particles with uniform 
properties which may serve as a reference material for particle analysis methods. Some results from 
the characterization of produced particles will be presented and some follow-up procedures will be 
discussed. This includes the further treatment of particles in order to get stable samples for handling, 
storage and transport, which is required when particles are to be certified with respect to isotopic 
composition and the elemental content. 
Keywords: Environmental Sample Analyses; Particle Analysis; NWAL; Reference Material 
1 Introduction 
The destructive analysis of safeguards samples forms part of the various verification measures applied 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to derive safeguards conclusions. Stringent 
requirements are applied to analytical measurements in which performance targets need to be 
reached, in order to ensure that the IAEA draws information from sound measurement data. Therefore 
analytical laboratories rely on the use of validated techniques and methods, where (certified) reference 
materials play an important role. Performance assessment of techniques and laboratories is 
undertaken by organizing interlaboratory comparisons or by blind QC sample analysis. In the area of 
destructive analysis used for verification of nuclear material accountancy certified reference materials 
are commercially available and performance targets have been established [1], the area of reference 
standards for particle analysis performed on environmental swipe samples is far less matured.  
The IAEA undertakes sample analysis relying on in-house analytical services (SGAS – Safeguards 
Analytical Services) as well as on a worldwide network of certified analytical laboratories within the 
member states (NWAL- Network of Analytical Laboratories). According to the 2013 IAEA Annual 
Report [2], 371 swipe samples were taken by the IAEA for analysis in the laboratories during that year, 
which justifies development and production of dedicated material for quality control and/or reference 
material. Various approaches on particle reference material have been reported (see [3] and 
references therein). Currently, particle analysis is routinely performed using (Large-Geometry) 
Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry and the Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry. However, as 
procedures and techniques are developed and refined, the requirements on the reference material 
evolve.  At Forschungszentrum Jülich, a setup for the synthesis of particles with certain properties was 
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(3) Quality Control 
(4) Proficiency Testing 
This paper presents the setup for production of particles, operating parameters and some 
characteristics of synthesized particles. The particle properties are bound to the production process, 
which therefore imposes certain boundary conditions for quality management related applications in 
particle analysis. These constraints will have to be considered for their use as reference material or as 
standard for quality control. On the basis of the current operational particle production setup some 
considerations on further preparation will be presented. 
2 Particle Production at Forschungszentrum Jülich 
2.1 The particle production setup 
The particle production setup was designed with the aim to prepare mono-disperse uranium oxide 
microspheres with a nominal diameter of about 1 µm. The particles should have a well-defined isotopic 
composition and the determination of the elemental content of individual particles may be of interest. 
In order to prepare the micrometer-sized particles, a system similar as described by Erdmann et al. [4] 
has been constructed at Forschungszentrum Jülich [3]. In short, the production process involves the 
generation of droplets out of a prepared feed solution using a commercial aerosol generator. The 
droplets are transported within a gas stream (e.g. Air) through the so-called drying column, in which 
the volatile component of the droplets evaporates. The particle within the air-stream passes a heat 
treatment (realized through one or several ovens), in which the particle is chemically transformed in 
order to bring it into a chemically and physically stable form (see Figure 1). The essential feature is 
that the particles are produced from mono-disperse aerosol implying that the resulting particles are 
homogeneous in size, elemental content and their physical and chemical form. The degree of 
homogeneity among the produced particle population makes such particles an interesting candidate 
for quality control purposes or as material for the purposes (1) - (4) described above. The production 
process allows for adjustment of specific characteristics of produced particles, which can be kept 
under control during the process. Most importantly for their application in analytical measurements, the 
isotopic composition of particles and elemental content is determined by the isotopic composition and 
the concentration of non-volatile part of the feed solution used for aerosol generation, respectively. 
This concentration also determines the final size of the particle. Each vibration of the orifice creates a 
droplet, as it virtually ‘chops’ a stream of liquid into individual droplets constituting the precursor of the 
actual final particle. The volume of the droplet Vd is simply the liquid volume flow-rate Q divided by the 
chopping Frequency f. The mass of the particle mP is equal to the amount of non-volatile material in 
the individual droplet which is determined through the concentration c of the non-volatile component in 
the feed solution. The operation principle expresses itself in few simple relations: 
Vd=Q/f (1) 
mP = Vd * c (2) 
When it is desired to obtain a uniform particle distribution in terms of elemental content and size (i.e. 
identical particles), the droplets should be as mono-disperse as possible. The production process 
yields particle of a certain physical and chemical composition, which so far has not yet been fully 
determined. 
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of microparticle production system (left) and online measurements of 
particle concentration (right-top) and particle size distribution (right-bottom). Online measurements 
performed using an optical particle sizer. 
There are multiple parameters determining the process, such as the non-volatile fraction of the feed 
solution, the heat treatment temperature and the heating time. Significant effort was spent to evaluate 
the different setting parameters of the production setup. With the setup outlined in the scheme of 
Figure 1 (left), routine production of uranium particles is possible. The typical operation mode for 
particle production will be reported in the following paragraphs. It needs to be mentioned, that the 
system provides some flexibility in terms of production output, where the entire parameter space has 
not yet been fully evaluated. 
2.2 Particle Production Tests 
In usual operation, uranyl nitrate aerosol is prepared using a vibrating orifice aerosol generator 
(VOAG) (TSI Inc. VOAG Model 3450). In order to produce micro-particles with a diameter of about 1 
µm an orifice with 20 µm diameter is used. A liquid feed rate Q = 2.32 10-9 m3 s-1 has been applied 
with a frequency f = 69 kHz. According to equation (1), aerosol droplets with a total volume Vd = 3:36 
10-14 m-3 are produced. As liquid feed a 1:1 mixture of a uranyl nitrate solution and ethanol has been 
used. The uranyl nitrate solution is obtained by dilution of certified reference material IRMM-183, a 
depleted, reprocessed uranyl nitrate solution with a precisely characterized isotopic composition. 
Beside the isotopic composition, the uranium concentration and HNO3 content are given as 
informative values as w(U) ≈ 0.2 g g-1 and m(HNO3) ≈ 6 mol kg-1, respectively. For the preparation of 
the liquid feed solution, the CRM is diluted gravimetrically (Mettler-Toledo XP205 DeltaRange) with 
ultra-pure water to an uranium content of about 250 µg g-1. In order to allow faster evaporation, the 
diluted sample is further diluted with ethanol to obtain a solution with a uranium content of 
approximately 125 g g-1. All solutions used have been analyzed by ICP-MS (PerkinElmer/SCIEX Elan 
6100 DRC) to determine the uranium content. Based on the droplet volume and uranium content, 
particles with a uranium content m(U) ≈ 3.76 pg are expected to be produced, calculated using 
equation (2). In order to minimize the impurities of the produced particles, all dilutions have been 
performed using ultra-pure water obtained using a Elga PURELAB Ultra installation which produced 
water with a resistance of 18.2 MΩ cm and Merck Millipore absolute ethanol. The prepared aerosol 
solution is dispersed with an air dispersion stream to prevent coagulation of aerosol droplets and for 
further transport. 
Some issues with the corrosion of the orifice were encountered, where the orifice plate made of a thin 
stainless steel diaphragm suffered from perforation induced by corrosion caused by the uranyl nitrate 
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solution. Using in-house available electroplating, a protective gold coating was applied in order to 
increase the durability of the orifice plate. Comparative corrosion tests have shown the increased 
stability of the gold-coated orifice as compared to the unmodified orifice. So far the production system 
shows promising performance using the modified orifice plate. Typical operation consists of a 
production cycle of ca. 1 h operation, in which ca. 10 ml of a prepared feed solution consisting of 
uranyl nitrate diluted in a 1:1 water-ethanol solution with an uranium concentration adjusted such to 
reach the desired final particle diameter is used. An optical particle counter (OPS) (TSI inc. Model 
3330) is connected in parallel to the main particle air stream allowing for on-line monitoring of particle 
number and particle size distribution. It should be noted, that the OPS provides an indicative value, as 
optical and geometric diameter may differ on the micrometre length scale. An example of typical 
operation is displayed in Figure 1 (right) over a period of 10 min clearly showing that stable output of 
mono-disperse particles can be maintained. After switching off the aerosol generator the particle count 
of the particle counter drops to nearly zero and far below the particle count level in the ambient air of 
the laboratory. This implies that the air stream within the closed system is clean and that remnant 
particles within the tubing of the system are not a source of possible contamination from previous 
particle production runs. It therefore seems feasible of performing production runs of various particle 
species without need for replacement of parts used for transport and treatment of the aerosol. To 
avoid any contamination of the liquid feed from prior usage it is necessary to thoroughly flush the liquid 
feed system. 
2.3 Uranium chemistry of particle formation 
The heat treatment leads to chemical transformation of the intermediate product consisting of the 
particle that resulted from the drying droplet. We assume that the intermediate particles (or precursor) 
is chemically composed of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate, UO2(NO3)2·6H2O, which is one of the most 
common hexavalant uranium compounds. Uranyl nitrate hexahydrate is commonly used in the 
uranium industry as intermediate product and has been studied intensively in the past (e.g. [5]). One 
of the main areas of interest is the thermal decomposition of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate to uranium 
trioxide, UO3. The thermal decomposition has been described in two main phases; first the thermal 
dehydration followed by the thermal denitration. The influence of the temperature with which particles 
are treated during the production becomes evident from literature data on thermal dehydration and 
denitration of uranyl nitrate. The dehydration process is complete at temperatures above 300 °C 
(Figure 2 – left). UO3 is the first oxide formed when uranyl compounds are heated in air or oxygen and 
is stable up to temperatures around 550 °C (Figure 2 – right). The difference in temperatures at which 
transformation is observed in the experiments reported in the literature stems from the different 
experimental conditions. Currently, the production setup is operated with a compact air heater at a 
final air temperature set to 500 °C. It must be noted, that the actual temperature of the particle within 
the air stream is unknown and that the heating component provide merely an indicative temperature 
value. Therefore, systematic analysis of the production output is necessary. So far systematic tests of 
the influence of heating temperature on produced particles can be interpreted according to the 
transformation of uranyl nitrate hydrate as reported in literature [5-10] by analysing the size and 
morphology with SEM accompanied with elemental analysis using EDX. The actual final particle 
diameter can be reproduced quite well, as has been confirmed by analysing a series of batches over 
time (October 2014 - May 2015) using different feed solutions with varying uranyl concentration. 
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Figure 2 The graphs represent data of the thermal decomposition of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate in an air 
atmosphere (left), measured by thermal gravimetrical analysis [5-8] and the reduction of various 
modification of UO3 to U3O8 (right) [9,10]. 
2.4 Particle sampling and characterization 
The particles in the air stream are sampled using impaction on a substrate, as similarly practiced in 
particle collection from swipe samples. This way, ca. 10,000 particles can be collected on an uncoated 
substrate (e.g. 1" diameter glassy carbon planchet) within 5 min deposition time. It has been reported 
in literature, that the IAEA impaction technique suffers from poor collection efficiency, which, however, 
can be increased by application of an adhesive coating. Such coating would have interfered in particle 
handling and characterization and in the currently evaluation phase the particle collection is not 
optimized for collection efficiency. 
For SEM characterization uranium particles are readily identified in the backscatter-electron imaging 
mode. A particle search was conducted and EDX elemental analysis has confirmed that the particles 
consist of uranium. Under optimal conditions the particles are spherical and mono-disperse. In 
previous work undertaken to characterize particles produced using the VOAG, it was reported that 
some voids may be present [11]. Under the currently optimized production parameters (500°C heating 
temperature), produced particles had been selected for preparation using a Focused Ion Beam (FIB) 
apparatus (Zeiss Nvision 40 Cross Beam Workstation). The FIB apparatus features high-resolution 
SEM such that the shape and surface of particles can be studied with high detail (Figure 3 – bottom 
left). The FIB technique allows for surface modification with an ion-beam thus serving as a ‘milling 
machine’ on the nano- and micro- scale and is ideally suited to study the internal morphology of 
particles (Figure 3 – right-bottom). A random selection of six uranium particles from a production run 
(heat treatment temperature 500 °C) was sliced to study the internal of produced particles. All particles 
on the sample were spherical and free of voids. Some porosity is observed in the centre of the 
particles, with higher density at the perimeter (see Figure 3 - right-bottom). The particle being formed 
from an evaporating droplet that is subsequently treated in an oven for a relatively short time, the 
presence of a certain degree of porosity is to be expected. Using the prior knowledge of the expected 
amount of uranium per particle allows an estimation of particle density assuming the particle consists 
of UO3, has a spherical shape and by determining the diameter of the particle population from the 
SEM analysis. With the production settings from above the estimated density amounts ca. 4.3 g cm-3, 
close to the value observed in quantitative analysis performed on uranium oxide particles [11]. The 
production of a range of particle sizes was undertaken, yielding spherical particles in the range of 0.8 
to 1.5 micrometers. At the smaller diameters the particle collection on uncoated substrates becomes 
increasingly inefficient. The density of the particles was consistent at the same value for the entire 
range of produced particle sizes and we conclude that the density within that range is determined by 
the heat treatment on not by the droplet evaporation dynamics. 
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Figure 3: SEM (left) and EDX (right-top) of produced microparticles deposited on a Si wafer and a cross-
section prepared by FIB milling (right-bottom). 
3 Considerations for Particles as Reference Material 
As most results of analytical methods, such as mass spectrometry, are used for further decisions, 
meeting certain quality goals like measurement accuracy and precision, or interfering background 
contributions is of high importance. A number of documents of the International organisation for 
standardization (ISO) describe quality control (QC) processes to assure that measurements are 
performed under proper conditions and the risk of obtaining incorrect results is minimized. One of the 
most important standards for analytical laboratories is EN ISO/IEC-17025:2005 [12]. With the current 
set of production parameters particles can be produced under certain boundary conditions. At this 
stage the suitability as material for quality control processes depends on the target application. 
3.1 (Certified) Reference Material 
In most cases, a certified reference material (CRM) is used as sample with a precisely known true 
value. A CRM is a type of reference material (RM). In the international vocabulary of metrology (VIM) 
[13] a reference material is defined as  
"material, sufficiently homogeneous and stable with reference to specified properties, which has been 
established to be fit for its intended use in measurement or in examination of nominal properties". 
A certified reference material is a reference material, but instead of fit for purpose, the properties are 
well characterized. The VIM has defined a certified reference material as  
"reference material, accompanied by documentation issued by an authoritative body and providing 
one or more specified property values with associated uncertainties and traceability, using valid 
procedures". 
As not only the property value is of importance, but also the associated uncertainty, the 
characterization of these certified reference materials is rather complicated and has been covered by 
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the international organization for standardization in a series of guides, where the production and 
characterization of (certified) reference materials is mainly covered in ISO guide 34:2009 [14] and ISO 
guide 35:2006 [15]. 
3.2 Particles as Reference Material 
For particles this means, that at least a homogeneity and stability assessment is required. With the 
stipulated quality goals in particle analysis where the isotopic ratios are determined, at minimum the 
isotopic ratios of uranium isotopes U-234/U-238, U-235/U-238, U-236/U238 property values of 
particles would have to be assessed with respect to the homogeneity and stability criterion. Further 
property values of particles like size and shape, elemental composition, uranium content and chemical 
form may be also relevant or can be provided as information values. 
For certification of particle properties significant additional effort would be required due to the stringent 
requirement, e.g. determination of uncertainties of the property value including uncertainties stemming 
from in-homogeneity and instability. 
Unlike (certified) reference materials that is usually available in solutions or powder form, it so far has 
remained undetermined, in which configuration particles will be prepared as material for the intended 
purpose (Validation, Calibration, Quality Control or Proficiency Testing). 
4 Particle Preparation Options 
With the production process delivering mono-disperse particles described in the previous section of 
this paper, the present chapter will discuss several options on how particles are packaged and 
implications on homogeneity and stability of the property value(s). In these considerations we will limit 
ourselves to the isotopic composition of the particles as the relevant property in safeguards analysis. 
Once the packaging of particles 'fit for purpose' is accomplished or property values have been 
certified, it constitutes a product that fulfils certain requirements as stipulated by the application in 
analytical measurements. Each option brings certain advantages and disadvantages in consideration 
of their use as material or use in quality control or reference material. Following options are currently 
being considered (see also Figure 4): 
(A) Impaction on substrate: The simplest strategy would be directly depositing particles onto a solid 
substrate (e.g. Si-wafer or glassy carbon planchet). Such deposition leads to a batch production of 
particle-loaded substrates. In terms of homogeneity and stability, a sampling scheme for statistical 
sampling of particles on selected planchets could be applied, along the lines followed by the 
NUSIMEP-6 and NUSIMEP-7 particle analysis interlaboratory comparison [16]. 
(B) Transfer into suspension: Another option is to directly collect a large number of particles in a 
suspension or the transfer of particles collected on the substrate(s) into a suspension. Liquid 
suspensions have a great advantage for subdivision and as they allow users to use any substrate 
material of their preference, e.g. from a single certified batch of micro-particle suspensions. Another 
interesting feature is offered by creating mixtures of different particle species (e.g. NU and LEU 
particle mixtures) by mixing several single species particle suspensions. 
However, the stability of particles in a suspension could prove difficult, as a number of processes 
could take place. Problems may arise for the stability of particles within the solution and possible 
isotopic exchange between the remaining uranium background in the solution and the uranium of the 
micro-particles. 
(C) Transfer on substrate: As a third option, the suspension is processed further to transfer onto a 
substrate of choice. This would mitigate the stability issues that may be present in option (B). 
Compared to option (A) mixtures of suspensions of varying particle species could be mixed prior to 
transfer thus facilitating creation of substrates with certified particle mixtures. 
(D) Transfer in matrix: A possibility for the stabilization of the micro-particles is by embedment into a 
solid matrix. An advantage is that the particle stability might be increased and that it might be more 
convenient for production. Fixation of embedded particles may also be of interest for certain analytical 
procedures for which the particles would have to fulfil the purpose as a reference material. 
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Figure 4 : Possible procedures for further processing of produced micro-particles before certification. 
In the current stage, option (A) seems realizable without little development effort. In the current setup, 
the particle collection would have to be modified to enable batch production of substrates. The 
preparation of particle suspensions has some challenges, like creation of clusters and the stability of 
particles within the solution. 
It is noteworthy to mention, that processing of particles can also include arrangement of particles in a 
regular pattern which offers better controlled measurement conditions in the analytical application of 
interest (e.g. LG-SIMS or LA-ICP-MS). Here, technologies using patterned masks and substrates may 
be of interest where larger numbers of particles from a solution (i.e. option (C) and (D)) can be 
arranged in regular patterns which is rather resource intensive when applying single particle 
deposition using micro-manipulation. 
5 Summary and Outlook 
A production process for uranium-oxide micro-particles of spherical shape and with diameter of ca. 
1 µm based on mono-disperse aerosol generator provides promising candidate material for use in 
quality control or as (certified) reference material. A number of particle properties have been 
characterized, such as size, shape, elemental composition and internal morphology have been 
characterized using SEM/EDX and FIB. Further particle properties like chemical composition may be 
of importance in terms of the stability over extended storage period and therefore characterization of 
particles using appropriate techniques (micro-raman, transmission electron microscopy, X-ray 
diffraction) will be of great interest. 
The production process, including the implemented particle collection and further processing to 
package particles into a suitable form that meets the analytical needs, needs to be considered. In 
particular certification of particle properties requires extensive analytical effort and therefore careful 
attention is required to properly determine the suitable form. Currently, the preparation of uranium 
particles in a suspension seems to provide attractive features in terms of handling by the end-user. 
However, open questions remain concerning stability of particles within the suspension which are 
currently being addressed by systematically studying processes like dissolution and isotope exchange 
on particles produced with the setup presented in this paper. 
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Abstract:
Large Scale Dried (LSD) spikes are used in nuclear safeguards laboratories world-wide for an
accurate Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometric (IDMS) determination of physical nuclear material
inventories, with relative uncertainties for U and Pu of better than 0.28 % (k=1). IDMS fully relies on
the mechanical integrity of the spikes. The spikes need to be robust during transport and storage for
their guaranteed life-time of 3 years. Mechanically damaged spikes are no longer fit for purpose (ISO-
guide 34 on "General requirements for the competence of reference material producers").
LSD spikes are produced by dispensing accurately-weighed quantities of a nuclear material reference
solution into penicillin vials, after which the solution is evaporated to dryness. Some commercially
available spikes are additionally covered with an organic coating to prevent unintented losses of
nuclear material when the spike vials are opened for use. The main requirements for such coatings
are good adherence to glass, mechanical stability, resistance to radiation and long term stability.
Furthermore, the coating should readily dissolve in nitric acid and should not interfere with
chromatographic chemical separation and subsequent mass spectrometric measurements.
JRC-ITU carried out research and development to improve on traditional coatings based on Cellulose
Acetate Butyrate (CAB) that is used in spikes such as JRC-IRMM 1027. CarboxyMethyl Cellulose
Sodium Salt (CMC) is proposed as an alternative to current CAB coatings that fail to offer the desired
shelf-life. In the JRC-ITU procedure, CMC is dissolved in water, changed to a nitrate form with a high
viscosity and added to spike vials containing the dried deposits of nuclear reference material. After
warming, the CMC forms foam that is extremely robust to mechanical impact and appears to have a
long shelf-life. The CMC foam coatings were scrutinized by Scanning Electron Microscopy and Energy
Dispersive X-ray Spectroscopy (SEM/EDX) and preliminary IDMS studies indicate that CMC does not
interfere with IDMS assays. CMC appears to be a promising coating material for LSD spikes.
Keywords: spike; safeguards; Carboxymethyl Cellulose;
1. Introduction
To be relevant, Nuclear Material Safeguards measurements need to be carried out to high accuracy.
Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) using high quality spikes is one of the primary
measurement techniques that offer the highest possible measurement accuracy (IAEA/ESARDA
International Target Values (ITV) [1]. The spikes used in IDMS are produced starting from ultra-pure
plutonium and uranium reference metals. Accurate masses of these metals are gravimetrically
dissolved to obtain a spike mother solution with known element mass fractions. Accurately weighed
portions of the mother solution are subsequently dispensed into vials and then dried. Each spike
produced in this manner will therefore, contain known amounts of Pu and U. Successful and accurate
IDMS analyses require the nuclear material isotopic composition in the spike mother solution to be
deliberately different from the corresponding isotopic composition for the Safeguards samples. The
dried deposits of the spike reference material are prone to damage by alpha-radiation, which readily
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converts the deposits to powder / dust. It is therefore desirable that the deposits are covered by an
organic coating to prevent unintended escape of nuclear material when the spike vials are opened for
use because unknown losses of nuclear material will render the IDMS results valueless. An ideal
coating needs to be mechanically robust, be resistant to radiation damage, needs to have good
adherence to glass, be long-term stable, be readily dissolved and destroyed by acid whenever the
spikes are used for nuclear material assay and the material used for coating should not interfere with
essential IDMS steps such as chromatographic chemical separation and mass spectrometry.
From the perspective of the spikes themselves, the accuracy of the results obtained through IDMS
assay depends, amongst others, on the accurate characterisation of the material used for spike
production both in terms of quantity and in terms of isotopic composition, the integrity of the spikes
and the ability to homogenise spike and sample material. One problem with the current CAB coatings
used on U/Pu spikes is that they have a rather short shelf-life and after this period they become brittle
and start to flaking soon after.
2. Chemistry and properties of the CMC
Carboxymethyl cellulose (CMC) sodium salt is a cellulose fiber with sodium hydroxide and chloroacetic
acid (see Figure 1). This anionic polysaccharide is a commercial product that finds uses in an
increasing number of applications (for instance as suspending agent, in adhesives, as a stabilizer,
etc.). Hercules Inc. [2] describes most of the physical and chemical properties of CMC, but here we
highlight only the most pertinent properties.
Figure 1: Structure of Carboxymethycellulose.
Cellulose ethers, such as CMC, are long-chain polymers. Their solution characteristics depend on the
average chain length or degree of polymerization as well as the degree of substitution, both of which
determine the molecular weight of the polymer. The viscosity of CMC solutions increases markedly
with increased molecular weight. Approximate values (weight averages) for the degree of











Table 1: Typical Molecular Weights and Viscosity.
2.1. Dispersion and dissolution of CMC
CMC is soluble in aqueous solutions (hot or cold), is insoluble in pure organic solvents, but can be
dissolved in certain mixtures of water and water–miscible solvents, such as ethanol or acetone.
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CMC particles have a tendency to agglomerate or lump, when first added to water. Adding water to
the dry solid produces clumps of solid CMC that are very difficult to dissolve. To obtain good solutions,
the dissolving process should be carried out in a two-steps operation:
1. Dispersing the dry powder in water. Individual particles should be wet and the
dispersion should not contain lumps.
2. Dissolving the wetted particles
Hercules Inc. [2] proposes several dissolution methods, and when the proper technique is used, good
dispersion is obtained and the CMC will go into solution rapidly.
2.2. CMC Stability and Chemical Degradation
CMC is subject to microbiological attack and chemical degradation, but in the JRC-ITU procedure, the
CMC used for the preparation of spike coatings is combined with concentrated nitric acid, which
makes the solution more resistant to the microbiological attack.
Under certain conditions, solutions of CMC are susceptible to chemical degradation. CMC with high
viscosity offers better resistance to viscosity degradation and precipitation. Sunlight, exposure to
oxygen and prolonged exposure to high temperatures are known to adversely affect the stability of
CMC solutions (Hercules Inc. [2])
2.3. CMC interaction with nuclear material
Although the applications of CMC in the food industry are well-researched, there are not many studies
on the interaction of CMC with nuclear materials. Popescu et al. [3] have proposed a structure for a
uranium-CMC polymer, which is shown in Figure 2 (red for O atoms, cyan for C atoms, white for H
atoms and purple for U atoms) and Figure 3:
Figure 2: Proposed chemical structure of CMC-uranyl
complex
Figure 3: Spatial structure of UO2(CMC)2 molecular
system
We have not been able to find similar studies on the interaction of CMC with plutonium. Nevertheless,
the known chemistry of plutonium needs to be taken into account when applying CMC to materials
containing plutonium-nitrate. As described by Neck et al. [4] and Walther et al. [5] plutonium forms
readily and partly irreversibly PuOx colloids at pH values exceeding 1.5. IDMS requires the plutonium
from both spike and sample to be available in the form of mobile ions and the formation of colloids
needs to be avoided at all cost. It is therefore, essential that CMC solutions are prepared at pH values
below 1, e.g. using nitric acid. Our studies have shown that, under acidic conditions, CMC mixes very
well with both plutonium- and uranyl-nitrates. The presence of the nitric acid is believed to generate
modest amounts of CO2 which would explain the formation of a CMC foam, as opposed to a solid
CMC coating, when the CMC solution is gently warmed to dryness. The foam, so produced, creates a
spike coating with highly desirable properties.
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3. Materials and equipment
The materials and equipment needed for the preparation are listed below:
 Milli-Q purified water.
 CMC HV: Carboxymethyl cellulose sodium salt, High Viscosity; cat: 217274, CAS: 9004-32-4;
pH: 7.3; Viscosity: 2550.0 mPa.s, Loss on drying: 4.5%, Company: CALBIOCHEM
 CMC LV: Carboxymethyl cellulose sodium salt, Low Viscosity; cat: 217277; CAS: 9004-32-4;
pH:6.8 Viscosity: 42.0 mPa.s  Assay: 99.61% Company: CALBIOCHEM
 Nitric Acid (HNO3): SUPRAPUR 65%; Cat: 1.00441.1000; Company: MERCK,
 Glass Vials: vo. 10 mL; 20.5 x 54.5 mm, flat-clear-Crip neck N20; Company: Macherey-Nagel
 Heater: VLM BIO1 GmbH, Type: V.668.061.624, supply: 230V, 50-60Hz; Power: 300W
 Erlenmeyer: 100mL-glass; Company: Schott&Gen;
 Syringe: OMNIFIX 20mL; Ref: 4616200V, sterile/nonpirogenic
4. Experimental CMC solutions
Several parametric variations with regards to CMC concentration, nitric acid molarity, and drying
temperature were carried out before good CMC-gels and desirable CMC-foam structures were
obtained. In these tests we controlled three main variables:
 Concentration of CMC in HNO3
 Viscosity of the CMC
 Molarity of the HNO3
The first attempts were done using low viscosity CMC in different concentrations and with different
molarities of the HNO3. The best foam structures were obtained using a CMC concentration of 70
mg/mL and a nitric acid molarity of 4 M. However, the gel itself is not perfectly stable due to the low
viscosity of the CMC (low molecular weight of the polymer chains).
Thereafter experiments were carried out using high viscosity CMC. However, in this case the nominal
CMC concentration of 70 mg/mL combined with a nitric acid molarity of 4 M produces a very dense
and viscous gel that is not easily dispensed into the spike vials. The concentration of CMC was
therefore, reduced to 50 mg/mL while keeping the HNO3 molarity at 4 M. The resulting gel is less
viscous and can be dispensed with ease. In addition, the CMC gel is stable over time. Subsequent
evaporation of the latter gel produces a stable white to beige foam that is remarkably resistant to
strong mechanical impact. Spike vials are typically charged with approximately 2.5 mL of the gel and
will therefore have a CMC inventory of approximately 125 mg of CMC. After gently heating most of the
water and acid will evaporate and will leave approximately 3-5 mL of CMC-foam behind.
When coated spikes are used in IDMS assays, it is essential that the coating dissolves easily to allow
intimate homogenization between the nuclear material of the spike and that of the sample. Less than
perfect homogenization falsifies the basic assumptions that underpin Isotope Dilution Mass
Spectrometry and will lead to biased results. Tests on the foam show that more than 95% of the foam
dissolves instantly on contact with 4 mL of 8-Molar nitric acid. Some 5% of the foam appears to resist
instant dissolution, but can be totally dissolved / destroyed after 2 hours of heating at 60 °C.
5. Stability test: degradation by heat, shocks and radiation
Many stability studies have been carried out and reported in the literature on CMC in gel form, but not
many studies report on CMC foam. In JRC-ITU, CMC in gel form is only used as an intermediary in the
production of a stable, impact-resistant foam. As it is this foam that protects and binds the nuclear
material present in the spike, the stability tests in JRC-ITU have focussed on the foam itself.
Temperature tests: the CMC foam produced has been exposed for three months to an elevated
temperature of 40°C. After this test, no flakes were detected inside the glass vials and the foam
remained resistant to mechanical shocks. Prolonged exposure to elevated temperatures does
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however, changes the consistency and colour of the foam, which changes from white to beige to a
darker brown (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, the valuable features of the coating material are preserved
as no lose particles were noticed.
Figure 4: CMC Foam exposed to temperature.
Shock tests: In order to check the resilience of the material, the vials containing the foam were
hammered hard against a solid surface without any damage to the foam. In addition, the vials were
subjected for 2 minutes in an ultrasonic bath. The ultrasonic treatment has been applied to a freshly
produced foam as well as to a foam that has been warmed for three months at 40°C. In either case,
no evidence of damage or flaking was seen.
Irradiation tests: 5 vials with CMC foam were exposed inside Hot Cells to a dose rate of 1Sv/h for one
month (a total aggregated dose of 730 Sv). After visual and microscope inspection no damage or
flaking has been detected. The only visible change was in the colour of the foam, which had changed
from white to beige. At this moment, more irradiation tests at the same high dose rate are running for
longer periods, 3 and 6 months. Choi et al. [6],[7],[9] and Lee et al. [8] have tested the degradation
under irradiation of CMC hydrogel and report a loss in viscosity.
6. Final process for the preparation of the CMC
6.1. Preparation of CMC in aqueous solution
The first step entails the dissolution of CMC in water as this produces a final product with a higher
viscosity as when CMC is dissolved directly in nitric acid. In this step High Viscosity CMC sodium salt
powder is used and 3 g of CMC is dissolved in 50 mL of distilled H2O while heating at 60 °C. To
prevent the formation of carboxymethylcellulose lumps, the mixture is stirred for two hours until total
dissolution of the CMC is achieved and a transparent solution is obtained. After this step the solution
is cooled down to room temperature, resulting in a transparent high viscosity gel.
6.2. Preparation of CMC in nitric acid solution
Once the CMC in aqueous solution has cooled down and while stirring at room temperature,
concentrated HNO3 is added until a HNO3 4 M solution is obtained with a CMC concentration of
approximately 50 mg/mL The CMC nitric solution is then ready to be dispensed into glass spike vials
using a 20 mL syringe, (see Figure 5)
6.3. Evaporation and foam production
The CMC nitric solution present in the vials is then heated at 40°C for three days. During this process
more water is lost from the gel with a corresponding rise in nitric acid molarity. When the gel has
almost dried, the interaction between the nitric acid and the CMC causes a gentle production of CO2
gas, which causes the remainder of the gel to turn into foam (Figure 6).
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Figure 5: CMC nitric solution. Figure 6: CMC foam state.
7. Test with foam-coated spikes
To prove that the CMC coating does not interfere with Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry, a test has
been carried out in which an accurately known quantity of approximately 3 mg of plutonium originating
from a high burn-up plutonium nitrate solution (known as SM4) was dried, coated with CMC gel and
finally heat-treated to produce foam. In parallel, another known quantity of approximately 3 mg of SM4
plutonium was deposited in a spike vial and received an identical treatment, but without the addition of
CMC gel (see Figure 8). After some weeks, the plutonium present in either vial was assayed using a
plutonium reference solution produced by gravimetric dissolution of a known quantity of CETAMA MP2
weapon grade plutonium metal (97.76 % 239Pu). The assay largely follows the procedure routinely 
used in JRC-ITU for the verification of spikes produced by external customers (van Belle and Zuleger
[10]). The test showed that the presence of CMC does not affect the outcome of an IDMS assay at the
level of 0.035% (k=1). More such tests will be carried out in future to improve that level of uncertainty.
Figure 7: Pu metal dried Figure 8: Pu in foam
Foam-coated U/Pu spikes have been also made using the (U/Pu) REIMEP17A solution Jakopič et al.
[11]. Foams charged with the REIMEP material were subsequently subjected to Scanning Electron
Microscopy and Energy Dispersive X-ray Spectroscopy (SEM/EDX) to obtain a detailed view of the
mechanical structure of the foam and to verify homogeneity in the distribution of both U and Pu (see
Figures 9, 10 and 11).
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Figure 9: SEM image Figure 10: Distribution of U in SEMimage
Figure 11: Distribution of Pu in
SEM image
8. Conclusions
The preliminary tests carried out in JRC-ITU show that CMC foam is a promising coating material for
LSD spikes. The first part of the research has been dedicated to the development of the CMC solution
with a good consistency for ease of application to spike vials and one that produces a robust, impact-
resistant foam coating. Chemical, mechanical and irradiation tests have been performed on some
samples to establish the properties and stability of the CMC foam.
The foam appears to offer a good adsorption capability for the dried U and Pu nitrates and the U and
Pu element distribution within the foam appears homogenous. The CMC foam is easily dissolved and
destroyed in nitric acid when heating at 60°C for about 2 hours.
These preliminary investigations suggest CMC foam to be a suitable candidate to stabilize Large
Scale Dried U/PU Spikes for use in Nuclear Safeguards Inventory Verification Measurements.
More research is needed to obtain better information on ageing effects with the aim of providing a
better estimate of the shelf-life of foam-coated spikes. Absolute proof that CMC does not affect the
outcome of IDMS assays will require a larger number of comparisons between coated and non-coated
spikes and a collaboration between JRC-ITU and JRC-IRMM has been set up to carry out a large-
scale study using 24 U/Pu Large Sized Safeguards spikes from JRC-IRMM batch 1027Q.
9. Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the Analytical Service of the JRC-ITU. The microscopy studies were
also performed at the laboratories of JRC-ITU. The authors are grateful to our colleagues Karin
Casteleyn, Lily Duinslaeger and Evelyn Zuleger, who provided much of the insight and expertise that
assisted the research.
10. References
[1] IAEA; International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear
Materials, IAEA-STR-368, 2010.
[2] HERCULES Incorporated; AQUALON® Sodium Carboxymethylcellulose: Physical and Chemical 
Properties; Technical report, 1999.
[3] Popescu IC, Filip P, Humelnicu D, Bligh Scott T, Crane R; Removal of Uranium (VI) from aqueous
systems by nanoscale zero-valent iron particles suspended in carboxy-methyl-cellulose. Journal of
Nuclear Materials; Volume 443; 2013; p 250-255.
[4] Neck V, Altmaier, Seibert A, Yun JI, Marquardt CM, Fanghänel Th; Solubility and redox reactions of
Pu(IV) hydrous oxide: Evidence for the formation of PuO2+x(s, hyd); Radiochimica Acta; Volume 95;
2006; p 193-207.
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
504
[5] Walther C, Rothe J, Brendebach B, Fuss M, Altmaier M, Marquardt CM, Buechner S, Cho H-R,
Yun J-I, Seibert A; New  insights in the formation processes of Pu(IV) colloids; Radiochimica Acta;
Volume 97; 2009; p 199-207.
[6] Choi JI, Kim JH, Lee KW, Song BS, Yoon Y, Byun MW, Lee JW; Comparison of gamma ray and
electron beam irradiations on the degradation of carboxymethylcellulose; Korean Journal of Chemical
Engineering; Volume 26; 2009; p 1825-1828.
[7] Choi JI, Lee HS, KimJH, Lee KW, Chung YJ, Byun MW, Lee JW; Effect of electron beam irradiation
on the viscosity of carboxymethylcellulose solution; Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics
Research Section B; Volume 266; 2008; p 5068-5071.
[8] Lee HS, Choi JI, Kim JH, Lee KW, Chung YJ, Shin MH, Byun MW, Shin MG, Lee JW. 2009.
Investigation on radiation degradation of carboxymethylcellulose by ionizing irradiation; Applied
Radiation and Isotopes; Volume 67; 2009, p 1513–1515.
[9] Choi JI, Lee HS, Kim JH, Lee KW, Lee JW, Seo SJ, Kang KW, Byun MW; Controlling the radiation
degradation of carboxymethylcellulose solution; Journal: Polymer Degradation and Stability; Volume
93; 2008; p 310-315.
[10] Van Belle P, Zuleger E; Procedure for the verification of large scale U/Pu dried spikes, Technical
Note JRC-ITU-TPW-2009/22; 2009.
[11] Jakopič R, Aregbe Y, Buják R, Richter S, Buda R, Zuleger E; Results of the REIMEP-17
interlaboratory comparison for the measurement of the U and Pu amount content and isotope amount
ratios in the synthetic input solution; European Commission Report EUR 26667 EN; 2014.
"I agree that ESARDA may print my name/contact data/photograph/article in the ESARDA
Bulletin/Symposium proceedings or any other ESARDA publications and when necessary for any
other purposes connected with ESARDA activities."
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
505
Poster Session 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
506
Chromatographic separation and on-line detection of long life alkali, 
alkaline earth and transition metal radionuclides by ICP-MS 
Andrius Budreika 1, Deivis Plausinaitis 1,2, Evaldas Naujalis 3, Birutė Knasiene 3 
Aleksandr Prokopchik 4. 
1
 Company LOKMIS, Visoriu str. 2, LT-08300, Vilnius, Lithuania 
2
 Department of Physical Chemistry, Vilnius University, Naugarduko str. 24, LT-
03225, Lithuania 
3
 Laboratory for Metrology in Chemistry, State Research Institute Center for Physical 
Sciences and Technology, A. Gostauto str. 11, LT-01108, Vilnius, Lithuania 
4
 Chemical technology department, Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Druksiniu km., 
Visagino sav. LT-31500, Lithuania 
E-mail: andriusb@lokmis.lt, deivis@lokmis.lt 
Abstract: 
A flow injection analysis system was developed for simultaneous detection and activity determination 
of long life alkali, alkaline earth and transition metal radionuclides, such as 90Sr, 135Cs, 59Ni and 63Ni. 
Highly active gamma emitters such as 134Cs, 137Cs, and 60Co which were detected at the same time, 
were used as references for measurements. The measurement system was composed of two coupled 
devices: interchangeable ion and liquid chromatograph (IC and HPLC), and a mass-spectrometer with 
inductively coupled plasma (ICP-MS). The method was based on the use of cation exchange 
chromatographic column. The proposed procedure was compared with two chromatographic columns: 
a strong cation exchange Zorbax SCX300 and an anionic/cationic mixed bed IonPac CS5A. Oxalic 
acid neutralized with ammonia was used as the main component of the mobile phase for the 
separation of 90Sr and 135Cs from isobaric mass (90Zr and 135Ba). Separation of 59Ni and 63Ni was 
achieved with a mobile phase containing tartaric acid neutralized with ammonia. Application of the 
method for determination of 134Cs, 135Cs, 137Cs, and 90Sr in samples from spent nuclear fuel storage 
has been demonstrated. 
Keywords:  long-life radionuclide; ICP-MS; ion chromatography; radioactive waste 
1. Introduction
The detection of radionuclides of alkali, alkaline earth and transition metal in various samples is one of 
the most important fields of research related to nuclear energy [1]. The nature of these radionuclides is 
twofold. The alkali and alkaline earth radioisotopes such as 134Cs, 135Cs, 137Cs, and 90Sr are usually 
nuclear fission products. Therefore, these pollutants can accumulate in the spent fuel storage. 
Meanwhile, the transition metal or specifically radionuclides of 3d elements are products of  neutron 
activation. When these metals are in a nuclear reactor core, neutron activation generates a whole 
range of radioactive isotopes of Fe, Ni, Mn and Co. During the corrosion process these radioactive 
contaminants are easily transported through pipelines and other constructional elements from a 
nuclear reactor core. Additionally, the concentrations of 3d radionuclides in the radioactive waste can 
be sufficiently high [2]. Therefore later they must be collected and properly insulated. 
Short-lived isotopes such as 134Cs, 137Cs, and 60Co are easily identified using gamma-spectrometry. 
However, 90Sr, 135Cs, and 63Ni are only β-emitter, so it could be determined by other radiometric 
methods such as β-spectrometry [3,4]. 59Ni emits low energy X-ray by electron capture, thus it can be 
determined by X-ray spectrometry [5]. The methodology of β-spectrometry is relatively complex, 
because the target radionuclide must be precisely separated from the sample matrix. This fact 
complicates application of β-spectrometry for routine analysis.  
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Currently, the most progressive method for the analysis of element isotopes is a mass spectroscopy 
(ICP-MS). Both the stable (natural) and the radioactive (technogenic) isotopes can be detected using 
ICP-MS, and their detection limits are often are as low as ppt levels. The main problem in the ICP-MS 
is the interference of masses. In order to determine a concentrations of radioactive 90Sr , 135Cs, 59Ni, 
and 63Ni in a sample, one needs to know the concentrations of stable 90Zr , 135Ba, 59Co, and 63Cu [6,7]. 
For the aforementioned reason, direct application of ICP-MS method can not be done to determine the 
exact concentrations of 90Sr, 135Cs, 59Ni, and 63Ni. High-resolution mass spectrometers, such as SF-
ICP-MS, can not be applied for this purpose alone. One of the most suitable solutions of this problem 
is using ion chromatography (IC) high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) when detection is 
performed with ICP-MS. 
2. Materials and methods
2.1 Instrumentation 
For developing methods of detection, we used two measurement systems. One was a metal-free 
Dionex ICS-3000 ion chromatograph (IC, Dionex, Sunnyvale, CA, USA) connected to the inductively 
coupled plasma quadrupole-type mass spectrometer Agilent 7500 (ICP-QMS, Agilent Technologies, 
Japan). The ion chromatography system consisted of the following modules: gradient elution was 
carried out using a dual pump (DP) to control the eluent percentage and flow rate as a function of 
time; for the direct injection procedure a 6-port two-positions sampling valve (in conductivity detector 
module DC) with 100, 300 or 1000 µL volumes of sample loops was used. Test solution loop was filled 
using a manual syringe. Ion chromatographic system was controlled by Chromeleon (v6.8, 2006, 
Dionex) chromatographic software. ICP-QMS quartz Scott-type spray chamber with MicroMist glass 
concentric nebulizer was connected to the column effluent through a PTF and 0.25 mm I.D. 
polyetheretherketone (PEEK) tubing. The ICP-QMS system was controlled and data were processed, 
by a means of Agilent ICP-MS Chemstation (B.03.02, 2004) software. 
The second measurement system consisted of Agilent 1100 series modular high performance liquid 
chromatograph (HPLC, Agilent Technologies, Waldbronn, Germany) connected to the inductively 
coupled plasma high resolution (sector field) mass spectrometer Element2 (ICP-HRMS, Thermo 
Finnigan GmbH, Bremen, Germany). HPLC was composed of a four-channel gradient pump G1311, a 
vacuum degasser G1322 and a 6-port two-positions valve G1158 for injections with sample loops. The 
same volumes of sample loops as in HPLC-ICP-HRMS system were used there as well. All HPLC 
couplings were made through a 0.25 mm I.D. polyetheretherketone (PEEK) tubing. The column 
effluent was connected directly to the nebulizer with a Scott double-pass quartz spray chamber. The 
operating conditions for the both ICP-MS are summarized in the Table 1. 
Agilent 7500 ICP-QMS Element2 ICP-HRMS 
Rf power 1500 W 1200 W 
Rf frequency - 27.12 MHz 
Sampling depth 7.00 mm - 
Reflected power - <5 W 
Gas flow rates: 
Cooling gas 15 L/min 14 L/min 
Carrier gas 0.8 L/min 1-1.3 L/min 
Makeup gas 0.3 L/min 0.75 L/min 
Masses monitored for 90Sr  and 135Cs 
detection 
85, 87, 88, 90, 133, 134, 
135, 136, 137,138 
85, 87, 88, 133, 134, 135, 137 
Masses monitored for 59Ni and 63Ni 
detection 
52, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 63, 
64 
52, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 64 
Number of acquisition points per 
mass 
3 - 
Scan type - E scan over small range 
Integration time per acquisition point 0.1 s - 
Sampling time 2.42 s - 
Mass window - 150% 
Table 1: Operation conditions of the ICP-MS’s 
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Two different columns were used in our measurements. The Dionex IonPac CS5A 4 mm ID and 250 
mm length analytical column with IonPac CG5A 4 mm ID guard column was used in the IC-ICP-QMS 
system. The CS5A can be operated at flow rates up to 2.0 mL/min, but in all our experiments the 
recommended flow rate 1.2 mL/min was used. Zorbax 300SCX (Agilent Technologies) 4.6 mm ID and 
150 mm length cation exchange column with 4.6 mm ID and 12.5 length guard column were used in 
the HPLC-ICP-HRMS system. 1.0 mL/min eluent flow was used in this system. 
A high purity germanium detector (HPGe) GC1020 (relative efficiency of 30%) with Genie2000 (v3.0, 
2004, Canberra Industries) gamma spectroscopy analysis software was used to acquire and analyze 
gamma spectra. 
2.2 Reagents and Solutions 
Ultrapure water for rinsing and dilutions was produced by reverse osmosis of distilled water followed 
by deionization NanoPure (Barnstead, USA) to yield 17.8 MΩ cm resistivity reagent. All plastic labware 
were cleaned by immersion in 10% (v/v) HNO3 (Suprapur, Merck) for at least 24 h and thoroughly 
rinsed with deionized water afterwards.  
Eluent was prepared by dissolution of the oxalic acid dihydrate (Suprapur, Merck) in freshly deionized 
water and adjusted to the desired pH with 25% ammonia (Suprapur, Merck). The same procedure 
was followed in  preparation of L(+)-tartaric acid (analytical grade, Merck) as well as citric acid 
(analytical grade, Merck) eluents. 
Working standard solutions of Cs, Sr, and Ba were prepared just before use by mixing and after 
stepwise dilution of a 1000 mg L-1 stock standard solutions (ICP Standard Certipur, Merck, 
respectively RbNO3, CsNO3, Sr(NO3)2 and Ba(NO3)2 in Suprapur HNO3 2-3% Merck). The Agilent 
Multi-element calibration standard (10 mg/L element concentration in 5% high purity grade HNO3 
solution) was used for detection of retention time of Ni, Co, Mn, and Cu.  
3. Results and discussion
Before the measurements both columns were preconditioned with the appropriate solutions. Dionex 
IonPac CS5A column was washed with 200 mL of 0.5 mol/L (~3%) HNO3 solution and with a small 
volume of deionized water. To clean strongly retained materials from the Zorbax 300SCX, the column 
was flushed with 100 mL of 1 mol/L NaClO4 (flow rate 1.0 mL/min) and then with 20 mL of water. After 
that both columns equilibrated with eluent before resuming normal operation. After each sample 
measurement the columns were washed with the eluent ensuring removal of the interfered elements 
such as barium, cobalt, and copper. Before the chromatographic measurements both ICP-MS were 
tested directly with prepared standards solutions. 
The main aim of our study was to create a chromatographic method for detection of long life alkali, 
alkaline earth and 3d transition metal radionuclides by IC-ICP-MS system. We have begun 
determination of the chromatographic conditions from selection of the proper eluent. Three eluents 
were prepared using citric, tartaric and oxalic acids. pH of all eluents was standardized by adding 
NH4OH. The chromatograms of 10 µL injection of 100 ppb standard of Cs, Sr, and Ba using IonPac 
CS5A column when the mobile phases were: (a) - oxalic acid, (b) - citric acid, and (c) - tartaric acid, 
are presented in Figure 1. As it can be seen, the retention times of Cs are practically independent of 
the nature of acid. Meanwhile, the eluent composition has a significant influence for Sr and Ba 
retention times (Ba ion retention time in oxalic and tartaric acids eluents was over 15 minutes). This 
effect can be explained by the fact that alkali metals and carboxylic acids do not form stable 
complexes, therefore Cs retention times are independent of the nature of acid. The data show that the 
shortest retention times of Sr and Ba are when the mobile phase consists of citric acid. It is related to 
the formation of citrate complexes of strontium and barium in the mobile phase. Retention time 
observed in oxalic eluent is comparable with that of Sr and Ba in tartaric acid eluent. A small 
difference is likely due to the slightly different stability of oxalate and tartarate complexes and different 
acidity constants of these acids. As the IonPac CS5A column manufacturer recommends the oxalic 
acid solution as the main eluent, the further research was carried out with oxalate mobile phase. 
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A similar experiment was performed with 3d metal ions. In figure 2 there are presented the 
chromatograms of 30 µL injection of 10 ppb standard of Mn, Co, Ni, and Cu using Zorbax 300SCX 
column when the mobile phases were: (a) - oxalic acid, (b) - citric acid, and (c) - tartaric acid. In this 
case, one can observe that the best separation of elements took place in tartaric acid solution. This 
result can most probably be explained by the specific complexing ability of tartaric ions. As the tartrate 
is a weakly complexing anion, therefore, only part of a metal ion are converted to a complexed form, 
which has a lower positive charge than the free metal ion. Meanwhile oxalate and citrate has a slightly 
stronger complexing property therefore, is difficult to separated different metal ions from each other. 
For these reasons in the further research we have used eluent of tartaric acid. 


































































Figure 1: Chromatograms of 88Sr, 133Cs, and 
137Ba recorded using 0.1 mol/L concentrations 
of 3 eluents (pH=6.8): (a) oxalic acid, (b) citric 
acid,  and (c) tartaric acid. 10 µL injection of 
100 ppb standard Sr, Cs, and Ba solution. 
Figure 2: Chromatograms of 55Mn, 59Co, 60Ni, 
and 63Cu recorded using 0.1 mol/L 
concentrations of 3 eluents (pH=4.0): (a) oxalic 
acid, (b) citric acid,  and (c) tartaric acid. 30 µL 
injection of 10 ppb standard Mn, Co, Ni, and Cu 
solution. 
While optimizing the chromatographic conditions it was noticed that retention times of ions were 
dependent on concentration and pH of the mobile phase. To verify influence of mobile phase 
concentration on the retention times of Cs, Sr, and Ba using column Zorbax SCX300 three oxalic acid 
eluents with concentration of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 mol/L were made. pH of these eluents was 
standardized to 5.0. As expected, the retention times decreases with increase of eluents 
concentration. The slopes of linear tendencies for Cs, Sr, and Ba are respectively 468, 1816 and 3731 
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s⋅L⋅mol-1. Similar experiments were conducted with the aim of evaluating the effect of pH. Retention 
times were determined using 0.1 mol/L oxalic acid solutions with pH 2.0, 4.0, and 5.5. It has been 
observed that with increase of pH of the mobile phase, retention times of all ions become shorter. The 
slopes of these tendencies for Cs, Sr, and Ba are respectively 18, 206, and 568 s⋅pH-1. 
Based on the results of these experiments it was decided that the optimal eluent for detection of Cs 
and Sr isotopes by using IC-ICP-MS system are 0.1 mol/L oxalic acid at pH 4.5 – 5.0. As it can be 
seen in figure 3, the total time of chromatographic measurement can reach ~30 minutes, i.e. until Ba 
ions elute from the column. When required, the total time of analysis can be reduced by significantly 
increasing the pH of eluent. 
With the aim of optimizing the chromatographic condition for detection of 3d metals, six eluents of 
tartaric acid were made: 1) three solutions of different concentration, but with the same pH, i.e. 0.025, 
0.05, 0.1 mol/L and pH 4.5; 2) three solutions of different pH, but equal concentration, i.e.  pH 4.0, 4.5, 
5.0 and 0.05 mol/L. Based on the obtained data, it was observed that retention times of Mn, Co, Ni, 
and Cu increase along with decreasing of either concentration and/or pH of an eluent. This result can 
be explained as a weaker metals’ complexation in a solution with low concentration of tartarate ions 
and low pH. The slopes of function of the retention times from concentration for Mn, Co, Ni, and Cu 
are respectively 3660, 5294, 3288, and 505 s⋅L⋅mol-1. In case of pH changes, the slopes are 235, 110, 
68, and 16 s per one pH unit respectively. As it can be seen, the tendencies of retention times’ 
changes are stronger with concentration variation rather than with the variation of pH. The best 
separation of Ni from Co and Cu is typically obtained when mobile phase is 0.05 mol/L and pH 4.5 
solution of tartaric acid neutralized with NH4OH. Figure 4 shows the chromatograms of 55Mn, 59Co, 
60Ni, and 63Cu. It can be seen that the total time of analysis when using of Zorbax SCX300 is 
approximately 10 min. and its limited by the retention time of manganese. 





















Figure 3: Chromatograms of 88Sr, 133Cs, and 
137Ba in a mobile phase containing 0.1 mol/L 
oxalic acid at pH 4.5 and isocratic flow rate of 1 
mL/min; 1 mL injection of 10 ppb standard 
solutions. 
Figure 4: Chromatograms of 55Mn, 59Co, 60Ni, 
and 63Cu  in a mobile phase containing 0.05 
mol/L tartaric acid at pH 4.07 and isocratic flow 
rate of 1 mL/min; 30 µL injection of 100 ppb 
standard solutions. 
Using these optimized conditions the main analytical characteristics, such as linear range of the 
calibration curve, slope (sensitivity of measurement system), relative standard deviation (RSD) of the 
mean value under the repeatability conditions, the limit of detection (LOD) and the limit of 
quantification (LOQ) were determined [8]. The slopes of the calibration curves of 88Sr and 133Cs were 
2.25·107 cps/ppb  ± 6.7 % and 2.60·107 cps/ppb ± 8.0% respectively. To verify the developed method, 
measurement of real sample was carried out. The sample was taken from the spent nuclear fuel 
storage. Since the sample matrix was deionized water, it was not necessary to treat it additionally. The 
chromatograms of Cs, Sr, and Ba isotopes were recorded using the IonPac CS5A column. The 
measurement was carried out in isocratic conditions using 0.1 mol/L oxalic acid eluent neutralized to 
pH 4.8 (NH4OH). In Figure 5, it can be noticed that 134Cs, 135Cs, and 137Cs radionuclides are separated 
from the isobaric masses, i.e. from 134Ba, 135Ba, and 137Ba. Referring to the previously described 
calibration, the concentrations of 134Cs, 135Cs, and 137Cs have been determined. Also traces of 90Sr 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
511
can be qualitatively observed in the sample. However, quantity of 90Sr is smaller than its LOQ (0.047 
ppb). The calculated activities of 134Cs, 135Cs, and 137Cs are given in the Table 2. A very slight 
difference was seen between the experimental results obtained from ICP-MS compared with the γ-
spectroscopy measurements. The authors of the source [9] also provide the data that ratio 134Cs /137Cs 
from γ-spectroscopy is a little bit higher than when measured by HPLC-ICP-MS. 


























134Cs 5.33 ± 0.11 7.25 ± 0.27 
135Cs (5.69 ± 0.12) × 10-5 n.a. 
137Cs 16.4 ± 0.35 20.0 ± 0.70 
Table 2: Activity of cesium radionuclides in 
the sample from the spent nuclear fuel 
storage. 
Figure 5: Chromatograms of Sr, Cs, and Ba 
isotopes in the sample from the spent nuclear fuel 
storage; eluent 0.1 mol/L oxalic acid pH 4.8, 1 mL 
injection. 
4. Conclusion
It has been demonstrated that IC-ICP-MS system can be exploited for  simultaneous determination of 
alkali and alkaline earth radioactive nuclides. The chromatographic method developed was able to 
separate 134Cs, 135Cs, 137Cs from all interfering barium isotopes. In one run 90Sr also can be detected. 
It has been found that the most suitable eluent is oxalic acid solution neutralized by adding NH4OH. 
The optimum concentration of oxalic acid is 0.1 mol/L, when the eluent pH is 4.5-5.5. 
In the second part of this research, it has been shown there is a possibility to adapt the same 
chromatographic columns for separation of 3d metals. It was found that the best eluent to achieve this 
aim is the 0.05 mol/L solution of tartaric acid neutralized by adding NH4OH to pH 4 – 4.5. In such case 
separation of 59Ni and 63Ni from interfering isotopes of cobalt and copper can be executed. 
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Abstract 
A new, simple and sensitive optical sensor for determination of uranyl ion (UO2
2+
) in aqueous solutions by
spectrofluorimetric technique was introduced. The fluorescence spectra and response characteristics of 4-
chloro-2 (furan-2-ylmethylamino) - 5-sulfamoylbenzoic acid (Furosemide) to UO2
2+ 
was investigated. It
showed preferable fluorescence response to UO2
2+
. Thereby, an efficient and sensitive optical sensor based
on the fluorescence enhancement of Furosemide as a new fluoroionophore for UO2
2+ 
determination at low
concentration levels has been developed. The reaction was extremely rapid at room temperature, and the 
fluorescence intensity remains unchanged for at least 24 h. Also, the response mechanism of the present 
sensor is discussed. This optical sensor is useful owing to the sufficient capability for determination of 
UO2
2+ 
in various real samples. Apart from the high sensitivity, the procedure is very simple, fast, wider
linear range and gains a low detection limit without any complicated equipment. The present sensor has 
been successfully tested for determination of UO2
2+ 
in real samples and the results obtained are comparable
to inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectrometry measured which could be used as a promising 
tool in nuclear safeguards material accountability measurements. 




Uranium is an important element in a view of 
nuclear safeguards due to its wide applications in 
many nuclear industries such as mining, nuclear 
fuel preparation and waste management. 
Uranium found in nature in the earth crust as a 
uranium ore [1]. The most interesting species of 
uranium is uranyl ions (UO2
2+
) because it is the
most widespread in nature. It can be found in 
low-pH water runoff, soil, around nuclear waste 
sites and processing facilities [2]. There are 
many different methods used for UO2
2+
determination in all stages of nuclear industry 
such as spectrophotometry, inductively coupled 
plasma-mass spectrometry, inductively coupled 
plasma optical emission spectrometry, atomic 
fluorescence spectrometry, gamma spectrometry, 
fluorimetry, potentiometry, colorimetric, 
voltammetric, x-ray fluorescence, ion 
chromatography, neutron activation analysis and 
alpha spectrometry have been used [3-15]. 
Although, these methods have a high sensitivity 
and favorable detection limits, but some of them 
require expensive equipment. Moreover, utilizing 
from some methods needs preliminary separation 
steps, such as solid phase extraction and ion-
exchange procedures for sample preparation. 
Also, some of these procedures include using of 
large volumes of organic solvents and acids 
resulting of large volumes of waste [16-18]. 
Optical sensors have been used for UO2
2+
determination, because of their advantages such 
as high sensitivity, good selectivity and low cost. 
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Depending on simple instrumentation, they are 
simpler and lower cost to be used than any other 
analytical method available, also enabling final 
products with high homogeneity and purity [19]. 
Development of optical sensor has been mostly 
based on the immobilization of a reagent in/on 
the membranes by either physical method such 
as adsorption, encapsulation, sol–gel, etc. or 
chemical covalent bond methods like formation 
of stable complexes. Optical sensors are used 
based on different analytical techniques such as 
absorbance, fluorescence, or reflectance 
measurements [20, 21]. Up to date the studies on 
the using of fluorescence optical sensors for 
UO2
2+
 determinations in aqueous solution remain
rare [22]. Therefore, we insist to pay more 
attention to a new, simple, stable and sensitive 
fluorescence optical sensor for UO2
2+
determination in aqueous solutions. Due to the 





the range of 1.12 – 0.82 Ǻ, respectively), these 
elements have different properties such as charge 
densities, size and hydration energy. Thus, by 
using 4-chloro-2 (furan-2-ylmethylamino) - 5-
sulfamoylbenzoic acid (Furosemide) as a new 
fluoroionophore for determination of UO2
2+
which have an intermolecular cavity and 
relatively high flexibility, it is possible to 
construct a sensitive actinide ion sensor. The 
existence of donating nitrogen and oxygen atoms 
in Furosemide structure which causes a semi or 
intermolecular cavity and forms a template 
complex with UO2
2+
 and considering the charge
density and the size of UO2
2+
, expect that
Furosemide can form sensitive complex with 
UO2
2+
. Thus, fluorescence study of the
complexation in aqueous solution was carried out 
as a primary test. In the present work, a new, 
stable and sensitive optical sensor by 
fluorescence technique for determination of 
UO2
2+ 
in aqueous solutions was introduced.
2. Experimental
2.1. Materials and reagents 
All chemicals were of analytical grade was used 
without further purification throughout the 
experiments. Uranyl nitrate hexahydrate, 
UO2(NO3)2·6H2O was manufactured by 
Mallinckrodt Company.  4-chloro-2 (furan-2-
ylmethylamino) - 5-sulfamoylbenzoic acid 
(Furosemide) from National Authority for 
Control and Pharmaceutical Research, High 
molecular weight poly (vinyl chloride) (PVC), 
dioctyl adipate (DOA), dioctyl sebacate (DOS), 
tributylphosphate (TBP), dibutylphthalate 
(DBP), ortho-nitrophenyl octyl ether (o-NPOE), 
sodium tetraphenylborate (NaTPB), 
tetrahydrofurane (THF), 1,2-cyclohexylene 
dinitrilotetraacetic acid (CyDTA), all from 
Sigma–Aldrich (Saint Louis, USA) or Fluka 
(Buchs, Switzerland) chemical companies.. All 
other solvents and salts used in this work were 








Furosemide were prepared by dissolving 
appropriate amounts of UO2(NO3)2·6H2O and 
Furosemide in deionized water, respectively.  
2.2. Instruments 
All fluorescence measurements were recorded 
with a Meslo- PN (222-263000) Thermo 
Scientific Lumina fluorescence Spectrometer in 
the range (190 – 900 nm), USA. Inductively 
Coupled Plasma Optical Emission Spectrometry 
(ICP-OES), an iCAP 6500 ICP-OES from 
Thermo Fisher Scientific, UK, with ITEVA 
operating software for full control of all 
instrument functions and data handling, was used 
for determination of UO2
2+
 and interfering ions
concentration as a reference measured. The 
experimental work was carried out at safeguards 
analytical laboratory (ETZ-, KMP-I), Egyptian 
Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority 
(ENRRA). 
2.3. Membrane preparation 
The membrane was prepared by dissolving 32.0 
mg of PVC, 58.0 mg of o-NPOE, 8.0 mg of 
Furosemide and 2.0 mg NaTPB in 1.0 mL THF. 
The solution was immediately shaken vigorously 
to achieve complete homogeneity. A quartz plate 
was cleaned with pure THF to remove any 
organic impurities and then placed in the spin-on 
device. Ninety microliter of the above solution 
was injected to the quartz plate. After 30 s 
spinning, at rotation frequency of 600 rpm, the 
membrane was located in ambient air and 
allowed to dry in air.  
2.4. The fluorescence measurement of 
UO2
2+
To determine the concentration of UO2
2+
, the
sensing membrane was placed in a 1.0 cm quartz 
cell filled with 3 mL of the test solution 
containing CyDTA (as masking agent) [23] and 
different concentration of UO2
2+ 
at pH 5.5. After
5 min the fluorescence emission intensity was 
measured at λex / λem = 320 / 522 (nm). The 
fluorescence emission intensity linear range of 










plotting the calibration curve of the fluorescence 
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emission intensity on the y axis versus the UO2
2+
concentration on the x axis, the unknown UO2
2+
concentration can be read from the calibration 
curve.  
2.5. ICP-OES measurement 
An aliquot of an ICP standard solution of 
uranium (1000 mg L
-1
) containing is used in the 
preparation of calibration solutions. Working 
standard solutions are prepared by dilution of the 
stock standard solutions to desired concentration. 
The ranges of the calibration curves (5 points) 
were selected to match the expected 
concentrations (0 – 1 mg L-1) for samples 
measured by ICP-OES. The correlation 
coefficient R
2
 obtained for all cases was 0.999. 
In addition, U concentrations calculated from 
emission intensities measured at two 
wavelengths as follows: U(385.958{87}) and 
U(409.014{82}) confirmed that each dataset is 
consistent in itself. To ensure the accuracy of U 
concentration, certified reference material was 
analyzed in regular intervals during the 
measurement sequence. While no perfectly 
matrix-matched reference materials are available. 
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Preliminary investigations 
Furosemide can exhibit fluorescence emission 
band owing to the conjugated double bond 
system and the mobility of its π - electrons. It 
was observed that by optimized fabricating a 
sensor from immobilization of Furosemide and 
NaTPB in a plasticized PVC membrane 
containing o-NPOE, the determination of UO2
2+




membrane, it formed a complex with 
Furosemide. Fig. 1 shows the fluorescence 
emission spectra of Furosemide membrane and 
in different concentrations of UO2
2+
. As seen, the
membrane spectrum without UO2
2+ 
has no
fluorescence emission band at λex / λem = 320 / 
522 (nm). Upon addition of increasing amount of 
UO2
2+
 to membrane, it subsequently reacts with
excited state of UO2
2+ 
to generate a fluorescent
product. Furthermore, with the proper selection 
of excitation wavelength at 320 nm, this reaction 
is selective for UO2
2+
 over other common
interferences. The fluorescence emission 
intensity of Furosemide membrane is linearity 
enhanced with the increase amount of UO2
2+
,
which demonstrates that the chelating reaction of 
Furosemide membrane with UO2
2+ 
can be used to
















a -  4 X 10-6 mol/L of UO2
2+
b - Zero of of UO2
2+
























Figure 1. Fluorescence spectra of the present 








ions, (b) Zero of UO2
2+
; conditions: pH 5.5;
T=25 ◦C; response time= 5 min; membrane layer 
contained 32.0 mg of PVC, 58.0mg o-NPOE, 
2.0mg NaTPB and 8.0 mg Furosemide (inset (the 
fluorescence emission intensity of UO2
2+ 
at λex /
λem = 320 / 522 (nm)
 
by the present sensor
 
versus 




The enhancement of the fluorescence emission 






experimental conditions revealed that the 
formation of the complex between UO2
2+ 
and
Furosemide is 1:1 molar ratios. The mechanism 
of the binding of the present sensor to the UO2
2+
can be explained by a diffusion of UO2
2+
 through
the sensor layer. Once the UO2
2+
 existed on the
surface of the sensor, it reacts with one molecule 
of Furosemide through a highly electronegativity 
site (hydroxyl group, -0.22) and (amine group, -
0.12) releasing protons and forming complex. By 
addition of 0.01M HCl, this increasing the 
concentration of protons in the sensor, 
reprotonates the sensor and releasing the UO2
2+
into the medium, as shown in Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2. The proposed mechanism of the reaction between Furosemide and UO2
2+
3.3. Optimization of the method  
To take full advantages of the sensor, amounts of 
the sensor ingredients and reaction conditions 
should be optimized.  
3.3.1. Effect of membrane composition 
The response characteristics and working 
concentration range of each optical sensor 
depends significantly on the different ingredients 
such as base matrix, solvent mediator, 
fluoroionophore and the necessary additive used 
in the membrane structure. Therefore the sensor 
matrix should be selected. It was observed that 
high molecular weight PVC could be used as the 
membrane base. This selection was due to 
several parameters such as appropriate 
transmittance, suitable immobilization of 
Furosemide as a fluoroionophore without any 




In order to have a homogenous organic phase, 
solvent mediators (plasticizer) must be 
physically compatible with the polymer used in 
membrane preparation. In this work, several 
solvents such as DOA, DOS, TBP, DBP and o-
NPOE were tested as potential plasticizers. As 
shown in Fig. 2 plasticizers of DOS and DOA 
showed good sensitivity but membranes 
containing these plasticizers showed leakage of 
the reagent. The membranes containing TBP and 
DBP were showed low sensitivity. The 
membrane containing o-NPOE was the 
appropriate selection with respect to high 
sensitivity and minimum leakage of Furosemide 
from the membrane 
























Figure 3. Effect of plasticizer nature on the 
response of the membrane, conditions: pH 5.5; 
T=25◦ C; response time= 5 min; membrane layer 
contained 32.0 mg of PVC, 58.0 mg o-NPOE, 
2.0 mg NaTPB and 8.0 mg Furosemide. 
As listed in Table 1, the membrane sensors with 
32.0 mg of PVC and 58.0 mg of o-NPOE were 
provided better fluorescence emission intensity. 
Thus, it was selected as optimal amount in the 
membrane composition. In the present sensor, 
Furosemide acts as a fluoroionophore. Therefore, 
it is necessary to optimize its amount in the 
membrane composition. Due to the complete 
mass transfer of UO2
2+ 
into the membrane and
also decreasing of the response time, the 
presence of an anionic additive such as NaTPB 
facilitates the ion-exchange equilibrium. As 
listed in Table 1, the presence of NaTPB caused 
to increasing of the sensor responses and reagent 
leakages from the all membranes. It is obvious 
that the membrane containing o-NPOE was the 
suitable selection in order to the maximum 
response and also minimum leakage of 
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Furosemide from the membrane. The amount of 
NaTPB was investigated in the range of 1.0–4.0 
mg as listed in Table 1. It is obvious that the 
highest fluorescence emission intensity is 
recorded by using 2.0 mg of NaTPB. But at 
lower amounts of NaTPB the fluorescence 
emission intensity decrease, this is due to the less 
of UO2
2+ 
mass transfer, also at higher quantities
of NaTPB the leakage of Furosemide caused a 
decreasing in fluorescence emission intensity. 
Therefore, 2.0 mg NaTPB was selected as an 
optimal amount in the membrane composition. 
Effect of different amounts of Furosemide on the 
membrane response is listed in Table 1. As 
resulted, the fluorescence emission intensity 
increased by increasing the amounts of 
Furosemide up to 8.0 mg and decreased at higher 
amounts that were resulted from membrane 
leakages. Therefore, 8.0 mg Furosemide was 









Fluorescence at λex / 
λem = 320 / 522 (nm) 
1 28 62 2 6 1487 
2 30 60 2 6 1510 
3 32 58 2 6 1546 
4 32 58 1 6 1501 
5 32 58 3 6 1538 
6 32 58 4 6 1533 
7 32 58 2 4 1497 
8 32 58 2 8 1572 
9 32 58 2 10 1554 
Table 1: Effect of membrane composition on the fluorescence emission intensity of the present sensor for 








3.3.2. Effect of pH 
The complex formation between heavy metal 
ions and most of ligands is depending on the pH 
of the solution because of the protonation (or 
deprotonation) of ligand at various pH. The 
fluorescence emission intensity was measured at 






at various pH values. The pH values were
adjusted by the addition of dilute NaOH or HCl 
solution. The best response was obtained at about 
pH 5.5. At pH values more than 5.5, the response 
decreases. This could be due to the hydrolysis of 
the UO2
2+ 
in aqueous solutions, which results in
the formation of different insoluble hydroxide 
forms of UO2
2+ 
[24]. Thus, it was not possible to
examine pH effects in alkaline solutions, as 
UO2
2+ 
precipitated in these media. The decrease
in the response of the present sensor at low pH 




3.3.3. Effect of time 
The response time of the sensor is defined as the 
diffusion time of the metal ions from solution 
into the membrane (the slowest step in 
complexation process). The effect of this 
parameter on the present sensor response was 
investigated in the range of 1–10 min. The 
response time of the present sensor was of the 
order of 5 min for 98 % attainment of the final 







It was observed that the fluorescence emission 
intensity of the membrane remained constant for 
more than 24 h. which implies that the 
fluoroionophore is quite stable in a membrane 
contacting with water.  
3.4. Method validation 
3.4.1. Analytical characteristics 
A linear correlation was found between 
fluorescence emission intensity of the present 
sensor at λex / λem = 320 / 522 (nm) and 
concentration of UO2
2+







. The calibration curve was 
obtained by plotting the peak intensity of ions
 
at 
λex / λem = 320 / 522 (nm)
 
versus the concentration 
of UO2
2+ 
and the graph (Fig. 1 (inset)) was
described by the regression equation: 
Y = a + bX 
where Y = fluorescence emission intensity of the 
present sensor at λex / λem = 320 / 522 (nm); a = 
intercept; b = slope and X = concentration in mol 
mL
−1
. The limit of detection (LOD) and 
quantification (LOQ) calculated according to 
ICH guidelines [25] using the formulae: LOD= 
3.3 s/b and LOQ= 10 s/b (where s is the standard 
deviation of blank luminescence intensity values, 
and b is the slope of the calibration plot) are 
listed in Table 2. 
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Parameter Values 
λex, nm 320 
λem, nm 522 



















Table 2: Analytical characteristics of the present sensor with UO2
2+  
3.4.2. Regeneration of the sensor 
The fluorescence emission intensity of the 
present sensor was not recovered completely 
when the solution was switched from high to low 
concentrations of UO2
2+
. To regenerate the
present sensor already immersed in UO2
2+
solution, several reagents including HCl, HNO3, 
H2SO4 and NaOH were tested. Among all of 
them, HCl (0.01 M) fully regenerated the present 
sensor after 10 min. It should be mentioned that 
after regeneration step, and for the next analysis, 
the present sensor must be placed in buffer (pH 
5.5) for at least 5 min. 
3.4.3. Selectivity 
For the selectivity investigation, the interference 
of different inorganic cations on the response of 








concentrations of the interfering cations in pH 
5.5 The tolerance limit was fixed as the 
maximum amount of an ion causing an error not 
greater than 5% in fluorescence emission 
intensity of the consequent solutions.  The 
resulting tolerance limits are listed in Table 3. It 












considerably diminished in the presence of 
CyDTA as a proper masking agent [23]. As it is 
clear from Table 3, the UO2
2+ 
content of
solutions can be selectively determined using the 
present sensor in the presence of excess amounts 
of the potential interferences examined. These 
results indicate that the present UO2
2+
 optical
sensor can be applied for determination of UO2
2+
in real samples and in the presence of excess of 






















































a After addition of CyDTA.







To test the practical application of the present 
sensor, various real samples spiked with different 
amounts of UO2
2+ 
were analyzed and the
concentration of UO2
2+ 
were measured by using
the present sensor and RSD % are calculated and 
listed in Table 4. To further investigate the 
performance of the present sensor, we compared 
the results obtained above with ICP-OES 
technique as a reference measured. As listed in 
Table 4, mean values are obtained with Student’s 
t- and F-tests at 95% confidence limits. The 
results showed comparable accuracy (t-test) and 
precision (F-value), since the calculated values 
are less than the theoretical values, which 
confirmed that there is no significant difference 
between the performance of the present sensor 
and a reference measured. The results obtained 
are denoted on applicability of the present sensor 
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Tap water 10 10.4 ± 0.94 3.63 0.50 2.05 10.3 ± 0.65 2.57 
20 20.3 ± 0.62 1.24 0.36 1.58 20.2 ± 0.49 0.99 
40 40.5 ± 1.08 1.08 0.20 1.33 40.4 ± 0.94 0.94 
Well water 10  10.5 ± 1.08 4.15 0.43 1.84 10.4 ± 0.79 3.10 
20 20.3 ± 0.76 1.50 0.29 1.47 20.3 ± 0.62 1.24 
40 40.6 ± 1.22 1.22 0.27 1.49 40.5 ± 1.00 1.00 
Synthetic 
wastewater 
10 10.6 ± 1.23 4.67 0.37 1.70 10.4 ± 0.94 3.63 
20 20.4 ± 0.89 1.77 0.24 1.39 20.3 ± 0.76 1.50 
40 40.6 ± 1.29 1.28 0.17 1.27 40.5 ± 1.15 1.14 
a The values are multiplied by 10−7 mol L−1 for measured. 
b CL, confidence limits were calculated from: CL =±tS/(n)½. The tabulated value of t is 4.303, at the 95% confidence level; S = 
standard deviation and n = number of measurements, the values are multiplied by 10−7. 
c % RSD, relative standard deviation. 
d Theoretical values of t- and f-tests at 95% confidence level are 4.303 and 19.0, respectively.  
Table 4: The practical application of the present sensor for determination of UO2
2+
 in various real samples
4. Conclusion
An efficient and sensitive optical sensor has been 
developed for the determination of UO2
2+ 
ions
based on the fluorescence enhancement of 
Furosemide immobilized in a PVC based 
membrane. UO2
2+ 
can be determined by applying
the optimum conditions which described in this 







. Also, the sensor showed short response time 
and higher selectivity to UO2
2+
. By the means of
an easy and low-cost methodology, satisfactory 
experimental results were obtained for the 
determination of UO2
2+
 by the present sensor.
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Abstract: 
A promising non-destructive assay method for verification of irradiated nuclear fuel is gamma 
tomography, i.e. the use of measurements of the gamma radiation field around a nuclear fuel 
assembly to reconstruct detailed information about the internal source distribution. 
Typically, tomographic reconstructions result in two-dimensional images of cross sections of the fuel. 
We demonstrate how such images can be searched for fuel rods using a template matching 
technique, which is a method commonly used in the field of image analysis. In this case, a template or 
mask corresponding to the size and shape of a fuel rod is translated across the image in order to find 
the region with the highest reconstructed activity, which is assumed to correspond to the location of a 
fuel rod in the image. This is done iteratively, allowing no overlap of the rods. By defining the threshold 
between background and fuel rod objects in the image, we can identify and count the fuel rods using 
no other assumptions than the rod radius. 
Thus the rod identification procedure provides a possible means to verify whether all fuel rods are 
present, and it may also be implemented to identify the fuel type of the measured assembly. The 
procedure is robust in cases of irregularities, such as assembly bow or torsion, or the dislocation of 
individual fuel rods in the measured cross section. 
Here we demonstrate fuel rod identification procedure, using authentic images collected with a 
tomographic measurement device on commercial fuel assemblies. The results show that image 
analysis can support tomographic partial defect verification of irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, even 
on the single fuel rod level. 
Keywords: image analysis; nuclear fuel; partial defect verification; nuclear safeguards; gamma 
emission tomography 
1. Introduction
Digital image processing is an important technology with a wide variety of applications. A digital image 
is fundamentally a matrix of numbers – values that can be represented as colour. The image may be 
analysed with the help of computer algorithms. The human brain is exceptionally good at recognising 
certain types of pattern in images, but for many applications it is efficient to make use of automated 
pattern identification. We see this for example in the ubiquitous bar code scanners. 
Here we will describe the use of image analysis for applications in nuclear safeguards, with special 
focus on non-destructive partial defect verification of used nuclear fuel assemblies using gamma 
emission tomography. 
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1.1. Image analysis for safeguards applications 
Digital image processing has been used in various ways for nuclear safeguards applications. One 
example is the use for camera surveillance at nuclear facilities [1], another is the analysis of satellite 
images as a supporting technique for international treaty monitoring [2]. 
In our case the main focus is on verification of used nuclear fuel, in particular before deposition in 
underground storage which is difficult to access. A related application is the DCVD (Digital Cherenkov 
Viewing Device) [3][4], making use of the Cherenkov radiation emanating from used nuclear fuel in a 
storage pool. Image analysis techniques are implemented to reduce noise, and to improve 
measurement quality by centring the fuel within the image. The DCVD is approved by IAEA for gross 
defect verification as well as partial defect verification.  
1.2. Tomography and image analysis in the UGET project 
As part of the efforts to provide reliable tools for partial defect verification of used nuclear fuel, the 
IAEA has initiated the JNT 1955 project on Unattended Gamma-ray Emission Tomography, UGET. 
Using the gamma radiation emanating from irradiated fuel, it is possible to reconstruct tomographic 
images of the source distribution within a nuclear fuel assembly. This is a powerful technique for non-
destructive analysis of fuel, which can be enhanced by the use of digital image processing to extract 
quantitative information. The ongoing first phase of the UGET project is evaluating the feasibility of 
gamma emission tomography for attended and unattended partial defect testing, with the goal of 
presenting a design that could be constructed and tested if the project is continued in a phase 2. 
Much of this work relies on experience from two previously operated gamma detection devices. 
Tomographic measurements on nuclear fuel were performed at the Forsmark NPP in 2002, using a 
test platform called PLUTO, which was constructed at Uppsala University [5]. Another device has been 
developed within the IAEA JNT 1510 project [6], and measurements using this device were performed 
at Olkiluoto in 2013 and Loviisa in 2014.  
Both of these devices use detectors mounted in collimator packages which can be moved around the 
fuel assembly to perform measurements from different angles. In the JNT 1510 device, 208 
semiconductor detectors are mounted in two opposite packages which are rotated around the fuel. In 
the case of PLUTO four scintillation detectors were used, within a collimator block that could be 
moved to different lateral as well as angular positions.  
Figure 1: Schematic sketch of the PLUTO (left) and the more compact JNT 1510 devices (right), used for 
measurements of the gamma radiation field around used fuel assemblies. The images are not to scale (the 
relative size is indicated by the fuel at the centre). In PLUTO four BGO detectors are placed within one collimator 
package with 300 mm deep collimator slits, while the JNT 1510 makes use of 208 semiconductor detectors 
(CdZnTe) in two packages with a collimator slit depth of 100 mm.. 
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2. Image analysis on SPECT images of nuclear fuel
The gamma emission measurements are taken as input to tomographic reconstructions, creating 
images of a two-dimensional cross section of the fuel. There are a variety of different tomographic 
algorithms, each with different strengths. Two types of reconstructions are the basis for the current 
work. One of them is a fast analytical method requiring minimal assumptions about geometry and the 
gamma attenuation within the fuel area [7], which is used to create the images used for image 
analysis. Another type of tomographic reconstruction method is based on an algebraic algorithm 
includes detailed modelling of the gamma attenuation within the fuel, returning the activity of each fuel 
rod. This method has previously been applied on measurements on irradiation commercial fuel 
assemblies, demonstrating that detailed information about the activity for each individual fuel rod can 
indeed be extracted from the measurements [8][9].  
This second type of reconstruction requires taking into account accurate knowledge of the position of 
the fuel rods within the imaged area, and here image analysis can be used as a supporting technique. 
Image analysis can be used to very precisely find the position of the fuel bundle within the measuring 
device [10]. First, an analytic reconstruction is performed, calculating the source distribution from the 
measured gamma intensities. A template matching technique is applied to the resulting image in order 
to determine the precise location of the fuel bundle within the imaged area, which can then be used as 
input for the algebraic algorithm in order to quantitatively determine the activity of the individual fuel 
rods.  
Template matching can also be used to individually identify and count the fuel rods within an image, 
and here lies the potential for automatic detection of missing rods also in cases when no operator 
declared information is available. 
In the following sections, the template matching capabilities for position determination and for fuel rod 
counting are demonstrated. 
3. Demonstration of positioning procedures on experimental images
3.1. Image analysis procedures used for assembly positioning 
The resolution of the tomographic image is limited by the number of measurements and the 
reconstruction method. The images presented in this work have been reconstructed with 55x55 pixels, 
from a measurement set of about 10000 data points [7]. For example, the images of SVEA-96 fuel 
reconstructed from PLUTO data have sides corresponding to 138.6 mm with a pixel size of 2.52 mm. 
In order to be able to find the location of the fuel with the desired precision of 0.1 mm and 0.1° an 
interpolation technique has been applied, increasing the number of pixels to 1024x1024.  
To find the position of the fuel assembly, a template corresponding to the known geometry of the fuel 
was compared with the image. This template is essentially an image with the value 1 where the fuel 
rods are located, and the value 0 where there is no fuel material. The template is translated and 
rotated across the tomographic image and multiplied with the fuel data, in search of the position with 
the highest intensity in the pixels covered by the template rods. In order to reduce the sensitivity to 
noise in the image and avoid finding a point in the coordinate space with randomly higher intensity, a 
function of the coordinates x, y and angle can be fitted to the intensities found for all tested template 
coordinates. This function constitutes a hyperplane which is then searched for the global maximum, 
taken as the position of the fuel. 
3.2. Positioning of BWR fuel in the PLUTO device 
The method described above was applied to PLUTO measurements on irradiated BWR fuel [10]. 
The results obtained in this way were cross checked with the independent measurements of the 
position of the fuel in the device, which were performed in connection with the tomographic 
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measurements. In this way it could be confirmed that a precision of 0.1 mm and 0.1° is indeed 
achievable using this method. 
3.3. Positioning of VVER-440 fuel in the JNT 1510 device 
When the reconstruction is not centred on the fuel, boundary effects can reduce the quality of the 
resulting image. In some of the measurements taken with the JNT 1510 device, the fuel was placed 
off-centre in the device. In such cases the positioning algorithm can be used to find the fuel position in 
the image, and a new image can be reconstructed with the centre of the image moved to correspond 
to the centre of the fuel. In figure 2 the reconstruction of a particularly misaligned VVER-440 fuel 
assembly is shown, together with a fuel mask (in red) showing where the fuel would be located if it had 
been perfectly centred in the device. The side of this image corresponds to 165 mm. Making use of 
the positioning algorithm, the actual position of this fuel was found to be +29.9 mm in the x direction 
and +10.2 mm in y, compared to centre of the measuring apparatus.  
Figure 2: A reconstructed image of a VVER-440 fuel which was located off-centre in the measurement. A 
perfectly centred fuel mask is shown in red, demonstrating the misalignment. With the help of image analysis the 
misalignment was determined to be +29.9 mm in x and +10.2 mm in y. 
4. Demonstration of rod counting on simulated and experimental images
Template matching can be used not only to find the location of a complete fuel bundle, but can also be 
applied to locate individual fuel rods in an image.  
4.1. Image analysis procedures for fuel rod counting 
We search an image for fuel rods without making any assumptions about the number and the location 
of these rods. The algorithm needs as input only a reasonable fuel rod radius. This radius is used to 
form a single rod template, rather than the complete fuel template discussed in section 3. The rod 
template is moved around the image, searching for the position giving the maximum intensity, i.e. the 
position corresponding to the maximum reconstructed activity in a rod-sized area. When this is found, 
the information is stored and the search is performed again, allowing no overlap with the result of the 
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first search. The search is iterated a pre-defined number of times, or until the whole image is covered. 
Earlier studies [10] have shown that the precision in the rod-positioning results is sensitive to the used 
radius of the rod template, and also indicated that assuming a rod radius slightly smaller than the 
actual imaged rods is better than using a radius that is too large. 
4.2. Rod counting in images from simulated measurements of BWR fuel 
In order to test and verify the reconstruction and the image analysis techniques, we used a simulation 
of the PLUTO device, modelling the 662 keV gamma emission from 137Cs in a BWR fuel assembly of 
the SVEA-96 type. In this simulation all of the rods were identical, i.e. with equal activity.  
The reconstructed image was searched for maximum activity positions corresponding to the size of a 
fuel rod. When 124 positions were found, there was no more room in the image to add any more rod 
candidates, as can be seen in the image in figure 3. 
The intensities in the resulting positions were plotted in a histogram, in blue for the positions 
corresponding to actual fuel rods, and in red for the non-fuel image positions. There is a clear 
separation between the two groups, even with the spread in the distribution of rod intensities (the 
standard deviation is 17%) that is caused by the processes involved in the propagation and detection 
of the gamma radiation, and the subsequent image reconstruction.  
It should be noted that this is the type of reconstruction including no a priori assumptions about the 
internal assembly geometry. Compare to a detailed modelling of the assembly geometry in a 
dedicated algebraic reconstruction, which results in an agreement with the simulation of 0.87% (1σ) 
[9]. 
Figure 3: To the left is the result of the search for rod-sized parts of the image in decreasing order of intensity. 
The histogram shows the intensities corresponding to actual fuel rods in blue, and the other positions in red. 
4.3. Rod counting in images from experimental measurements on irradiated BWR fuel 
In an experimental campaign in 2002 the PLUTO equipment was used to measure the gamma 
radiation around a SVEA-96 fuel assembly. The 1596 keV peak from the 140Ba/La decay chain was 
selected, and the data used in tomographic reconstructions. We apply the rod search method to this 
image and find 124 possible rod positions before the image is full, as shown in figure 4. 
The standard deviation of the distribution is now larger, 33%, which reflects the variation in the actual 
activities of the rods (known to be 14% [8]), as well as the uncertainties from reconstruction and the 
stochastic processes involved in gamma transport and detection. There is still a clear separation 
between the activities of rods and non-rods, indicating that it would be possible to automatically 
discriminate between them. Again, note that this image is created using the type of reconstruction 
which includes no assumptions about the internal geometry, in contrast to the type of detailed 
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modelling in an algebraic reconstruction where the uncertainties are much smaller and we can get 
quantitative measures of the rod activities, as discussed in the references [8] and [9]. 
Figure 4: To the left is the result of the search for rod-sized parts of the image in decreasing order of intensity. 
The histogram shows the intensities corresponding to actual fuel rods in blue, and the other positions in red. 
5. Conclusions and outlook
It has been demonstrated that image analysis of tomographic images of irradiated fuel assemblies can 
provide useful information for verification purposes. 
The positioning method discussed in section 3 provides accurate information about the position of the 
fuel bundle, which is a prerequisite for the detailed quantitative rod-by-rod activity reconstruction 
discussed for example in [9]. This type of reconstruction algorithm is a powerful tool that can give an 
independent assessment of burn-up and cooling time of each fuel rod. This in turn can be used for 
verifying operator declared information and detecting anomalies. 
Another useful procedure demonstrated in this work is individual fuel rod identification can be 
performed with an automatic algorithm in tomographic reconstructions of nuclear fuel assemblies. In 
the tested cases, including experimental as well as simulated data of various nuclear fuel types, all 
rods have been correctly identified. In all images the non-fuel parts had lower intensity, which 
indicates that a threshold level can be introduced to achieve full separation between true rods and 
false image artefacts arising from measurement noise and reconstruction errors. We conclude that this 
type of image analysis can support tomographic partial defect verification by providing a tool for 
counting of the fuel rods. 
We can think of several additional ways these techniques can be put to use. For example, the output 
of the rod search algorithm described in section 4 could be used as the input to a pattern matching 
algorithm identifying the fuel assembly among a set of known fuel types. When gamma emission 
tomography is implemented for inspection use, verification of operator declared fuel information can 
be done with only minimal assumptions. In cases where operator information is missing, this type of 
test would compare the image to standard fuel types. An algorithm for rod and fuel type identification 
could be implemented to automatically flag images where the fuel geometry has some anomalies, 
making the method convenient to use on a large scale.  
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Abstract: 
Possibility of detection of prompt gamma-rays emitted by shielded neutron source by means of high-
purity germanium (HPGe) detectors is investigated. Properties of hydrogen, boron, cadmium and 
gadolinium based neutron-to-photon converters are studied. Special focus is made on the usage of 
HPGe spectrometers as neutron detection tool in different neutron shielding scenarios. 
Keywords: Radiation Portal Monitor, HPGe detector, thermal neutrons, PGAA, nuclear security  
1. Introduction
Research and development on detection of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) by means of Radiation 
Portal Monitors (RPM) have been pioneered in Los Alamos in 1980th [1-4].  
Basic efforts of scientists were focused on the development of passive automated system which could 
detect presence of gamma and neutron radiation emitted by SNM at distance of several meters and 
within couple of seconds.   
Large volume plastic scintillation detectors have been chosen for detection of gamma radiation and 
later 3He counters have been introduced for detection of neutrons [2].   
NaI and HPGe photon detectors have been considered too, however higher manufacturing costs and 
technological constrains precluded their usage for a long time [1-4].  
Initially RPMs have been installed to control exits from the objects dealing with storage and processing 
of nuclear materials and have been considered as a measuring tool used with complementary metal 
detectors and x-ray scanners and later they have found their place at the border crossing points [5] 
and thousands of systems have been deployed all over the world.  
Properties of such passive systems have been well documented [7] and their advantages and 
limitations clearly defined [8]. 
Conventional RPMs installed at the border crossing points detect significant quantities [9] of SNM; 
however detection capabilities of conventional RPMs become questionable in case if SNM is shielded. 
In this article prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGAA) detection option for shielded 
neutron source is considered on the example of hand-held instruments. Considerations could be 
extended to RPM increasing sensitive volume of HPGe detectors to the level of sensitive volume of 
thermal neutron detectors such as 3He used in conventional RPMs. 
2. Materials and method
Radiation Portal Monitors are equipped with two types of radiation detectors. One type of detectors is 
used for detection of photons and second type of detectors is used for detection of neutrons. Basic 
purpose of RPM is in detection of Special Nuclear Materials, i.e. weapons-grade uranium (WGU) and 
weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu). 
WGU consists mostly from 235U (>90%) and 238U (<10%). WGPu consists mostly from 239Pu (<93%) 
and 240Pu (>6%). Photons emitted by 235U, 239Pu and 240Pu are characterized by relatively low energies 
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and therefore could be easily shielded using thin layer of material with high atomic number and high 
density. Photon detectors, particularly plastic scintillators are effective measurement tool only for 
detection of unshielded Special Nuclear Materials.  
In terms of detection of high-Z shielded WGPu neutron detectors are used. Neutrons are emitted by 
240Pu at rate of about 1000 s-1 per gram [8]. Neutrons in general are more difficult to shield compared 
to photons due to the facts that photons interact with electrons of atom but neutrons interact with 
nucleus of atom and dimension of nucleus is thousands times less then dimension of atom.   
For shielding against fission neutrons low-Z materials and material having high-cross section for 
absorption of thermal neutrons are used first to slow down neutrons and then to capture them. In the 
result of neutron capture in most cases characteristic photon is emitted.  
Method used for analysis of material composition by irradiating material with neutrons and detecting 
photons emitted by material in the result of irradiation is called prompt gamma-ray neutron activation 
analysis (PGAA) [10, 11]. 
Neutrons emitted for example by shielded WGPu are captured by materials of shield and in the result 
prompt photons could be detected. Detected signal provides information about type of shielding 
material in case if specific full-energy absorption peaks are detected and about presence of source of 
artificial nature in case if photons with energies above 2614 keV are detected. This information is a 
useful signal which makes possible detection of shielded WGPu.  



















HDPE 1H 99.9885 0.332 1H + n → 2H + γ 2223 1
Boron 10B 19.9 3846 10B + n → α + 7Li* 
7Li* → 7Li + γ 478 0.94 






155Gd 14.8 60850 155Gd + n → 156Gd + γ Gadolinium 











* JEF-2.2 evaluated data library
** Data derived from Database for Prompt Gamma-ray Neutron Activation Analysis, IAEA 
High-density polyethylene could be considered both as a neutron moderator and as an absorber. In 
absolute case if HDPE is purely used as a neutron shield and thickness of HDPE allows absorb all 
neutrons emitted by source all of them will be converted into photons with energies 2223 keV. 
This specific spectral line according to IAEA minimal technical requirements [7] for Radionuclide 
Identification Devices (RIDs) shall be included in library of RID.   
Other materials such as Boron, Cadmium and Gadolinium having high thermal neutron capture cross-
sections called neutron converters in combination with moderator such as HDPE could be used to 
suppress neutron signal from source. In this case specific prompt gamma-rays will be emitted at a 
lower than 100% rate. These specific spectral lines according to IAEA minimal technical requirements 
[7] for Radionuclide Identification Devices (RIDs) are not included in library of RID. Emission 
probabilities of prompt photons for specific converter materials are listed in last column of Table 1.  
In this article on the example of 252Cf source and HPGe detector properties of typical neutron shield 
materials are studied. 
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3. Experimental results for HPGe detector #1
3.1. Detection efficiency of HPGe detector depending on composition of neutron 
shield  
In order to compare HPGe detector response to different neutron-to-photon converters number of 
measurements have been performed with HPGe detector #1 [12] using 252Cf source and neutron 
shields of different compositions. Depending on neutron-to-photon converter material HPGe detector 
response in energy range from 50 to 3000 keV has been studied. Detection efficiency of prompt 
gamma-rays in under moderated and over moderated shielding scenarios has been measured. 
Results have been compared with reference 3He detector. Parameters of detectors and intensity of 
252Cf source are listed in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2. 
Detector Diameter, cm Length, cm Sensitive volume, cc 
3He counter 1.9 12.7 28 
HPGe detector #1 50 30 53 
Table 3. 
Source Neutron flux into 4π steradian, s-1 
252Cf 160 000
252Cf source was placed at 115 mm distance to HPGe detector endcap. Neutron moderator with 
dimensions 65x200x200mm (DxWxH) made from two HDPE bricks was placed between source and 
HPGe detector. Boron carbide powder, cadmium plate and gadolinium foil have been placed 
sequentially between moderator and HPGe detector. In Figure 1 experimental setup for HPGe 
detector is illustrated. 
Figure 1. Example of experimental setup (source - moderator - converter - detector) 
600 seconds live time spectra have been recorded by HPGe spectrometer, results of spectral 
measurements have been analysed and compared. Parameters and results of measurements are 
summarized in Table 4 and Figures 2 - 5 below. 
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Table 4. 










of Cd layer, 
mm 
Thickness 








rate in energy 
range from 










115 0 - - - 9 - - - -
115 65 - - - 9.1 2.9 - - -
115 65 - - 5 7 2.6 - - 19.4
115 65 1 - - 13.5 2.6 - 7.5 -
115 65 - 0.12 - 11.3 2.8 5.0 - -
According to the analysis of measurement results the following conclusions could be made: 
a) Intensity of 2223 keV spectral line is approximately the same for HDPE, HDPE/Boron,
HDPE/Cadmium and HDPE/Gadolinium converters. This line could be used as a useful signal 
indicating presence of neutron source.  
b) The highest count rate in characteristic full-energy absorption peak is obtained for 478 keV
peak with HDPE/Boron converter. This is in good agreement with data of emission 
probabilities listed in Table 1. 
c) The highest integral count rate in energy range from 2650 to 3000 keV is obtained for
HDPE/Cadmium converter. This is also in good agreement with data of emission probabilities 
listed in Table 1. 
d) The lowest integral count rate in energy range from 2650 to 3000 keV is obtained for
HDPE/Boron converter. Count rate is less then count rate obtained with pure HDPE 
moderator. This could be related to presence of thermal neutrons on the output from pure 
HDPE moderator and to the absence of thermal neutrons on the output from HDPE moderator 
with Boron converter. Thermal neutrons are captured by Germanium isotopes of HPGe 
detector, prompt gamma-rays are emitted and in the result count rate above 2650 keV for pure 

























Figure 2. Comparison of HPGe detector response to different neutron-to-photon converters in 
energy range from 50 to 3000 keV 
































Figure 3. Comparison of HPGe detector response to different neutron-to-photon converters 























Figure 4. Comparison of HPGe detector response to HDPE and HDPE/Boron converters 
























Figure 5. Comparison of HPGe detector response to HDPE and HDPE/Cadmium converters 
3.2. Comparison of detection efficiency of HPGe detector with detection efficiency of 
3He proportional counter depending on composition of neutron shield  
For the evaluation of detection efficiency of HPGe detector under different neutron shielding scenarios 
reference 3He proportional counter embedded into TSA PRM-470CGN radiation monitor [13] was 
used. In order to improve its sensitivity to shielded neutron sources 3He counter is under moderated 
i.e. surrounded just by about 1 cm thick HDPE.  
In Table 5 measurement results of neutrons detection efficiency of TSA PRM depending on the 
thickness of additional HDPE moderator are shown.  
Table 5. 
Distance between source 
and detector, mm 
Thickness of additional 
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3.2.1. HDPE/Cadmium shield 
For comparison of detection efficiency of HPGe detector and 3He counter under HDPE/Cd shielding 
scenarios several measurements have been performed. 
Cf-252 source was placed at 250 mm distance to HPGe detector endcap. Blocks of HDPE moderator 
with dimensions 195x200x200mm have been used. Thickness of HDPE moderator was increased 
from 0 to 195 mm with a step of 65 mm. Then measurement with HDPE moderator and single 0.15 
mm thick plate of Cd placed between moderator and detector was performed. 
Last measurement was performed using sandwich type arrangement of HDPE moderator and 
Cadmium converter i.e.:  
1. Source
2. 65x200x200 mm HDPE
3. 0.15 mm Cd
4. 65x200x200 mm HDPE
5. 0.15 mm Cd
6. 65x200x200 mm HDPE
7. 0.15 mm Cd
8. Detector
10 sequential 20 seconds measurements were made using TSA PRM for each experimental setup 
and average values of signals were obtained.   
600 seconds live time spectra have been recorded by HPGe spectrometer for each experimental 
setup.  
Measurement results are summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6. 
Net count rate in prompt 














rate in energy 
range from 2650 





250 0 - 7.6 2.3 - -
250 65* - 30 2.3 0.7 -
250 130 - 15.9 1.8 1.2 -
250 195 - 6.1 1.3 1.1 -
250 195 0.15 1.9 1.6 1.1 0.5
250 65+65+65 0.15+0.15+0.15 1.9 2.3 0.7 0.9 
*Dimensions 65x200x200mm (DxWxH)
According to the analysis of measurement results the following conclusions could be made: 
a) Sensitivity of TSA PRM to unshielded neutron source is about 4 times less then to the neutron
source shielded by 65 mm of HDPE. 
b) Sensitivity of TSA PRM to unshielded neutron source is about the same as to the neutron
source shielded by 195 mm of HDPE. 
c) Sensitivity of TSA PRM to neutron source shielded by 195 mm of HDPE is about 6 times
higher than sensitivity of HPGe detector  
d) Sensitivity of TSA PRM to neutron source shielded by 195 mm of HDPE and single Cd layer is
about the same compared to sensitivity of HPGe detector  
e) Sensitivity of TSA PRM to neutron source shielded by sandwich type HDPE/Cadmium shield
is about 1.4 times less then sensitivity of HPGe detector  (but is about 1.4 times higher per 
unit of sensitive volume) 
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3.2.1. Borated HDPE shield 
Neutron shield was made using borated HDPE bricks (5% Boron content by mass). 
Cf-252 source was placed at 250 mm distance to HPGe detector endcap. Thickness of borated HDPE 
was increased from 0 to 200 mm with a step of 50 mm. 10 sequential 20 seconds measurements have 
been performed with TSA PRM for each experimental setup and average values of signals were 
obtained.  600 seconds live time spectra have been recorded by HPGe spectrometer for each 
experimental setup. Measurement results are summarized in Table 7.  
Table 7. 
Net count rate in prompt 














250 0 7.6 -
250 50* 19.2 3.9
250 100 10 5.7
250 150 2.5 4.3
250 200 2.0 3.0
*Dimensions 50x200x200mm (DxWxH)
According to the analysis of measurement results the following conclusions could be made:  
a) 2223 keV full-energy absorption peaks are not registered in spectra due to uniform distribution
of 10B across volume of HDPE 
b) Sensitivity of TSA PRM to neutron source shielded by 150 and 200 mm of borated HDPE is
less then sensitivity of HPGe detector 
c) Sensitivity of HPGe detector to neutron source first increases but then drops with increase of
shield thickness due to increase of absorption of characteristic photons with energies 478 keV 
in the shield 
4. Container for shipment of neutron sources
Container for shipment of neutron sources has been developed in Nuclear Security Unit of the 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements. Container is 
made from borated HDPE and was fabricated by commercial vendor in 2014 in accordance with our 
design and specification. Container was made for TaskMED Project in the framework of Instrument 
Contributing to Stability and Peace. 
Radiological characterisation of container was performed and comparison of the 3He and HPGe 
detectors ability to detect presence of neutron source in this container was made.  
4.1. Characterisation of container 
Radiological characterisation of container was made using 252Cf source with intensity 60000 s-1 and 
neutron and Gamma/X-ray dose rate measurement instruments. Results of neutron dose-rate 
measurements are listed in Table 8.  
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Figure 6. Radiological characterisation of container, neutron dose-rate measurements 
Table 8. Shielding container from borated HDPE for shipment and storage of neutron sources 
Parameter Value Notes
Diameter of container, mm 320 
Height of container, mm 300 
Source 252Cf
Activity, kBq (intensity, s-1) 518 (60000)
Neutron background dose rate, µSv/h* 0.05
Neutron dose rate at 50 cm distance to 
the unshielded source, µSv/h 3.1
from the geometrical 
centre of detector 
Neutron dose rate at 50 cm distance to 
the source in container, µSv/h 0.32
from the side of 
container 
Neutron dose rate at 50 cm distance to 
the source in container, µSv/h 0.43
from the top of 
container 
*Neutron dose rate measurement
instrument Berthold LB6411 
4.2. Comparison of detection efficiency of HPGe detector with detection efficiency of 
3He proportional counter for container made from borated HDPE 
Measurements have been performed on the surface of container loaded with 252Cf source using HPGe 
and 3He detectors and at 160 mm distance to the open source. 
10 sequential 20 seconds measurements have been performed with TSA PRM for each experimental 
setup and average values of signals were obtained. 600 seconds live time spectra have been 
recorded by HPGe spectrometer for each experimental setup.  
Measurement results are summarized in Table 9.  
Figure 7. Measurements of HPGe and 3He detectors response on the surface of container 
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Table 9. 
Net count rate in prompt 











TSA PRM + 3cm of 
HDPE,  
neutron count rate, 
cps 10B, 478 keV 
160 0 13.4 45.4 0
160 160 9.3 10.5 23.6
According to the analysis of measurement results the following conclusions could be made:  
a) Well moderated 3He counter has more then 3 times better detection efficiency over under
moderated 3He counter for unshielded source 
b) Under moderated 3He counter has practically no advantage in terms of efficiency of neutrons
detection over well moderated 3He counter for this particular configuration of neutron shield 
c) HPGe detector has approximately the same detection efficiency per unit of detector sensitive
volume as reference 3He counter in under moderated or well moderated configuration for this 
particular configuration of neutron shield 
4.3. Evaluation of HPGe spectrometer as a neutron search device 
In order to evaluate ability of HPGe spectrometer to detect presence of neutron source in container in 
search mode, series of 10, 5 and 2 seconds independent measurements have been performed 
measuring detector response at the surface of container (Figure 7). Results of measurements are 
summarized in Table 10 and Figure 8. 
Table 10. 
Net count rate in prompt gamma-ray energy peak, cps 
10B, 478 keV 
TSA PRM, neutron 
count rate, cps Number of 








1 23.2 35.2 30.5 8
2 22.2 22.4 25.0 9
3 20.2 25.0 20.5 8
4 23.0 20.8 26.5 10
5 25.4 24.0 22.5 9
6 21.7 16.2 16.0 11
7 20.3 22.0 23.5 10
8 28.4 25.4 25.0 7
9 26.1 23.2 21.0 10
10 25.3 30.4 18.0 11
Average, 




2.7 5.2 4.2 1.3



























Figure 8. Measurements of HPGe and 3He detectors response on the surface of container 
5. Experimental results for HPGe detector #2
In order to evaluate HPGe detector response at energies above 2614 keV and up to 8500 keV, HPGe 
detector #2 [14] with higher sensitive volume compared to HPGe detector #1 was used and quite 
similar measurements to measurements described in Paragraph 3.1 have been performed. Basic 
parameters of detector, source and geometry of measurements are shown in Table 11 and Figure 9. 
Results of measurements are summarized in Table 12 and Figure 10.  
Table 11. 
Parameter Value
HPGe detector #2 N-type coaxial  
Diameter, mm 52 
Length, mm 54 
Sensitive volume, cc 111 
Source 252Cf 
Neutron flux into 4π steradian, s-1 160 000
Distance between source and HPGe detector endcap, mm 115 
Table 12. 






























65 5 34.9 7.2  40.6
65 1 86.2 7.3 16.8
65 0.12 68.4 7.5 -
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From the analysis of measurement results listed in Table 12 and Figure 10 it could be noted that 
HPGe detector #2 in contrast with HPGe detector #1 has better detection efficiency to 
HDPE/Cadmium converter then to HDPE/Boron converter due to higher sensitive volume compared to 
HPGe detector #1 and due to operation in extended up to 8500 keV energy range. 
























Figure 9. Comparison of HPGe detector response to HDPE/Gadolinium, HDPE/Cadmium and 
HDPE/Boron converters in energy range from 200 to 8500 keV. 
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6. Conclusions
In the results of competitive analysis of HPGe and 3He detectors response in different neutron 
shielding scenarios feasibility study on possibility of PGAA detection option for shielded neutron 
source was performed and the following conclusion could be made: 
a) It could be useful to include information about energy of most prominent prompt gamma-rays
produced in the result of neutron capture on 10B and 113Cd into libraries of HPGe-based RIDs,
for more exotic converter materials such as Gd this option could be considered.
b) Operational energy range of RIDs based on HPGe detectors could be extended from 3 MeV to
8 MeV, what could be useful for detection of sources of artificial nature or for detection of
shielded WGPu when for example HDPE/Cadmium or HDPE/Gadolinium neutron shield is
used.
c) Usage of HPGe detectors in RPM potentially allows detection of shielded WGPu with same or
better detection efficiency compared to detection efficiency obtained with conventional thermal
neutron detectors in case if comparable to conventional 3He detectors sensitive volume is
achieved.
d) Simultaneous usage of HPGe and thermal neutron detectors such as 3He of comparable
sensitive volume in RPM shortens requirement for thermal neutron detectors to be under
moderated, so thermal neutron detectors used in conventional RPMs could be well-moderated
and their detection efficiency to unshielded neutron source will be therefore improved.
7. Acknowledgements
Author would like to tell thank you to colleagues from Nuclear Security Unit for their support at different 
stages of this feasibility study.  
Special thanks to Dr. Erica Fanchini from INFN (Italy).   
8. References
[1] Chambers, W.H.; Atwater, H.F.; Fehlau, P.E.; Hastings, R.D.; Henry, C.N.; Kunz, W.E.; Sampson, 
T.E.; Whittlesey, T.H.; Worth, G.M. Portal Monitor for Diversion Safeguards. Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, LA-5681, 1974. 
[2] P. E. Fehlau and G. S. Brunson. COPING WITH PLASTIC SCINTILLATORS IN NUCLEAR 
SAFEGUARDS. IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. NS-30, No. 1, February 1983. 
[3] Paul E. Fehlau. An Application Guide to Pedestrian SNM Monitors. Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, LA-10633-MS, 1986. 
[4] P. E. Fehlau. An Application Guide to Vehicle SNM Monitors. Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-
10912-MS, 1987. 
[5] Rob L. York and Paul E. Fehlau. 1997 Update for the Application Guide to Vehicle SNM Monitors. . 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-12347-MS, 1997. 
[6] TSA Systems, Ltd. Vehicle and Pedestrian Monitor VM-250AGN / PM-700AGN, Operations & 
Service Manual. Doc: # 5000 Rev. A, January 30, 2006. 
[7] IAEA. Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment. Nuclear Security 
Series No. 1. 2006. 
[8] Steve Fetter, Valery A. Frolov, Marvin Miller, Robert Mozley, Oleg F. Prilutsky, Stanislav N. 
Rodionov and Roald Z. Sagdeev. Detecting Nuclear Warheads. Science & Global Security, 1990, 
Volume 1, pp. 225-302. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
541
[9] Thomas B. Cohran and Christopher E. Pain. The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched 
Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons. NRDC, 1995. 
[10] IAEA. Database for Prompt Gamma-ray Neutron Activation Analysis.  
Available online:  https://www-nds.iaea.org/pgaa/pgaa7/index2.htm 
[11] IAEA, Database of Prompt Gamma Rays from Slow Neutron Capture for Elemental Analysis, 
2007. ISBN: 92-0-101306-X.  
Available online:  http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/7030/Database-of-Prompt-Gamma-Rays-
from-Slow-Neutron-Capture-for-Elemental-Analysis 
[12] R. Keyser, T. Twomey, D. Upp. Performance of Light-Weight, Battery-Operated, High Purity 
Germanium Detectors for Field Use. INMM, July 2003. 
[13] TSA Systems, Ltd. PRM-470CGN OPERATIONS MANUAL. December 7, 2005. 
[14] R. Berndt, P. Mortreau. Monte Carlo modelling of a N-type coaxial high purity germanium 
detector. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, 
Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment. Volume 694, 1 December 2012, pp. 341–347. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
542
Software Development for Radionuclide Analysis Applications 
Kaiser, Matthias M.Sc. 
Kim, Sergey M.Eng. 
Baltic Scientific Instruments, Ltd.Ganibu dambis 26, LV-1005 Riga, Latvia 
E-mail: m.kaiser@bsi.lv, s.kim@bsi.lv 
Danilenko, Vladimir Ph.D. 
Kovalsky, Eugene 
LSRM, Ltd., General Alekseev avenue 15, Zelenograd, 124460 Moscow, Russia 
E-mail: danilenko@lsrm.ru, kovalsky@lsrm.ru   
Berlizov, Andrey Ph.D. 




In the field of gamma-ray spectroscopy, high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors are widely known for 
their excellent energy resolution, which can’t be reached by any other detector type. However, to be 
able to use this high energy resolution to the full extend, the spectrum has to be processed and analysed 
by highly sophisticated software applications. To offer the best possible solutions for our customers, we 
constantly improve our software and develop new software applications.  
Software applications in gamma-ray spectroscopy have to fulfil a wide range of tasks. In laboratory 
applications, extremely precise measurements have to be obtained, analysed and later presented in a 
report. The analyzation process as well as the report have to fulfil national and international standards 
like ISO 11929. The user-friendly integration of these standards into the SpectraLine software was 
crucial to assure precise results and verifiability in the every-day laboratory routine.  
In-situ measurements are, due to their diverse applications, a complicated field for the software 
development. To assure precise measurements of radioactive waste, nuclear or scientific facilities and 
other structures it is necessary to calibrate the detectors for a large variety of sample geometries. To 
avoid time consuming physical calibration processes, mathematical Monte-Carlo simulations, as 
implemented in the EffMaker software, are used. In the case of border controls, first-response or 
defence applications the software has to include next to the expert mode of operation, also an easy 
mode. These two user levels are implemented in the basic spectrometric software for handheld devices 
such as NitroSPEC or HandSPEC in such a way, that both user types can operate the device easily 
and get the best possible results. 
Additional, the SpectraLine software allows to monitor the health of the detector closely to assure the 
quality of each measurement and to avoid the undetected deterioration of the detector specifications. 
This Quality Assurance (QA) system is user-friendly, to enable all users to monitor the detector health. 
Keywords: spectroscopy; HPGe; software; analysis 
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1. Introduction
To offer our customers together with our spectrometers a high quality software solution, we constantly 
develop new software and improve the already existing solutions. These new developments and 
improvements are conducted in strong cooperation with our partner LSRM.  
As the field of gamma spectroscopy is very broad, we offer different software packages for different 
applications. Additionally, we often develop and produce highly customized solutions, to address the 
specific needs of our costumer. In these cases, often also special software applications or add-ons 
have to be developed. 
In section 2 we will give you a short introduction to the different software solutions Baltic Scientific 
Instruments offers. 
To show you our solution, to avoid time consuming physical calibration in cases like in-situ 
measurements, body-scanners, and waste assay monitoring, applications, etc, we will introduce our 
EffMaker software in section 3. 
Further, we will introduce our newest efforts to provide full, high quality solutions for the end-user in 
section 4 and 5, where we will talk about the implementation of the ISO 11929 and a QA system into 
our software. 
Finally, we will give a short introduction into our new software language packages, which will enable 
more users to use our software without any language barrier in section 6. 
2. Software Applications
The basic software module for all our devices is the SpectraLine software family. Depending on the 
application, we offer several specialized versions. For the most cases SpectraLineGP (Gamma 
Precision) is the software package of choice. It comes with an automatic calibration tool, nuclide 
library, activity calculation function, QA module (more in section 5), a report editor and an editor for 
reference materials (Etalon editor).  
Other software applications of the SpectraLine software family, are SpectraLineADA (Alpha Decay 
Analysis) for our alpha spectrometers, SpectraLineBG (Beta Gamma) for beta-gamma 
spectrometers, SpectraLineNM (Nuclear materials) that is used for the measurement of the 
enrichment level of Pu or U in nuclear materials, SpectraLineHandy which includes attenuation 
corrections and an estimation tool for the activity calculation for hand held applications and the 
SpectraLineDefender that was specially designed for border controls, safe guard applications and 
other operations to detect illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. 
All our hand held devices include a basic software application based on SpectraLineGP. This basic 
software allows the calibration of the device, the acquisition of spectra and includes basic analytical 
tools for radionuclide detection and the calculation of the activity. Additionally, it includes a gamma 
dosimeter and the possibility to connect wireless to the device. 
We are often involved in R&D projects and new developments for costumers with special applications. 
A good example for that are automated systems like our Automated Spectrometer or the 
FlowSPEC. These highly automated spectrometers require a high level of software automation. The 
SpectraLine software family is flexible enough, to provide these automation possibilities with small 
modifications and add-ons. Other modifications are possible. 
Additionally to the SpectraLine software family we offer the NuclideMasterPlus software that 
includes an extended nuclide library with the possibility to create customized nuclide libraries for the 
SpectraLine software, detailed decay chains, true-coincidence-summing corrections [1] and a basic 
module for the mathematical efficiency curve calculation using Monte-Carlo Methods for rotation 
symmetrical samples (for more information see section 3). 
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In case more advanced sample geometries have to be modelled, we offer the EffMaker software with 
a full Monte-Carlo simulation for the efficiency curve of the detector and any sample geometry (more 
in section 3). 
3. Monte-Carlo Efficiency Simulations
We offer, as mentioned in section 2, two levels of efficiency curve simulations. Both options use 
Monte-Carlo simulation techniques to create an efficiency curve from the detector and sample 
geometry. The basic difference of the EffCalcModule as implemented in the NuclideMasterPlus 
software and the EffMaker software, is the level of complexity for the sample geometry.  
The EffCalcMC module allows the efficiency simulation of semiconductor and scintillation detectors of 
arbitrary sizes and for basic laboratory sample geometries like Marinelli beakers, cylindrical objects 
and point sources of arbitrary size and composition. 
Besides the efficiency calculation the option of calculation of true coincidence correction factors is 
supported in EffCalcMC module [1] [2]. These factors have a significant impact for geometries with 
great registration efficiency. The true coincidence modelling is performed using the decay schemes of 
radionuclides in ENSDF-file [3]. 
EffMaker has been developed for in-situ registration efficiency calibration of spectrometers. Since the 
package has been intended firstly for the modelling of objects with high attenuation of gamma-
radiation, like the containers with radioactive wastes, transport containers for radioactive and nuclear 
materials, the importance sampling is used in the modelling process. Moreover the modelling process 
is broken down into 2 steps: 1) modelling of the function of the detector response to the 
monochromatic photon emission; 2) getting the sample radiation spectrum outside the detector. 
The operation of convolution of the sample radiation spectrum and the detector response function is 
resulted in both the spectrometer efficiency in the geometry of the measured sample and the 
spectrum of the sample of the certain radionuclides 
composition. 
The EffMaker software provides the possibility to 
model any detector or sample geometry. EffMaker 
uses for this purpose an in-built 3D GUI (see Figure 
1) with preprogramed 3D patterns to simplify the
modelling process. The software not just simulates 
the detector, but the whole spectrometer, which 
gives the possibility to calculate shielding effects of 
different components of the set up. The in-built 3D 
GUI enables the user to model even very 
complicated objects, like loaded trucks, human or 
animal bodies, complicated waste structures, etc. in 
a reasonable amount of time. 
Figure 1: Example picture of the 3D GUI of EffMaker. 
EffMaker has passed the metrological certification in one of the key metrological institutes in Russia 
as a part of the method of measurement detailed in the document «The method of measurement of 
activity of gamma- emitting radionuclides in the containers with radioactive wastes using the gamma-
spectrometric system and SpectraLine-EffMaker software of LSRM Ltd».  
4. Implementation of ISO 11929
Metrological Institutes and many research facilities have to apply national and international standards 
to their work routines. In the field of ionizing radiation measurement the ISO 11929 is one of the most 
important standards and defines the characteristic limits, their calculation and the presentation of the 
measurement results in a report. Laboratories have to prepare their measurement results often in 
accordance to this standard with additional requirements for their national standards.  
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The current version of the ISO 11929 is the ISO 11929:2011-01 [4], which was implemented into our 
SpectraLine software family. The main point of this standard is the calculation of the so called 
characteristic limits. The characteristic limits are an indicator of the reliability of the measurement 
results and consist of the decision threshold, detection limits and the limits of the confidence interval 
(for more information and the definition of these terms, please check [4]).  
Classical software packages follow the formalism of Curie [5]. The ISO 11929, however, is breaking 
with this tradition and is using Bayes statistics instead of frequentist statistics as used by Curie. This 
allows to include uncertainties due to sample preparation, geometrical uncertainties and other effects 
that can influence the overall measurement uncertainty of a value. 
In a mathematical sense that means, that any measurement value 𝑦 is equal to a measurement 
specific model function 𝐺, which is a function of a set of estimated input values 𝑥𝑖  : 
𝑦 =  𝐺(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚)
In which the 𝑥𝑖 are the estimated values gathered from prior knowledge and the current measurement 
results. This leads to the formula for the standard uncertainty in Bayes statistics that is given by: 







In which the 𝑋𝑖 are exact values that correspond to the estimated values  𝑥𝑖. The exact mathematical 
expression for 𝐺 depends on the model that is used to describe the measurement process. I will not 
go further into the choice of the function G and the explicit calculation of the standard uncertainty, for 
more information, please check [4]. 
For our software package the usage of Bayes statistics for the calculations has two major impacts. 
The first difference is, that the software has to have the possibility for the user to input the information 
about the uncertainty he gathered prior to the measurement. For this purpose, an easy to understand 
user interface was created to enable the user to insert the pre-calculated uncertainties. The second 
major difference is the calculation of the resulting standard uncertainties and most important of the 
characteristic limits, which are used as an indicator for the reliability of the statistical calculations. 
All results of the measurement, together with the characteristic limits and all information that 
characterize the circumstances of the measurement and analyzation are then presented in form of a 
report file, that is created in accordance with ISO 11929. 
5. Implementation of Quality Assurance System
Quality Assurance Systems are a very important part of a modern Spectra analyzation software. 
These systems monitor the detector health in user defined intervals, to detect deterioration of the 
detector specifications at an early stage. This allows the user to proof the quality of his measurements 
and the service company to detect detector problems faster and to react before a fatal error occurs. 
The QA system as integrated into the SpectraLineGP software will allow the user to monitor the 
temporal change of the FWHM values, peak position and efficiency for user selected energy peaks 
and the background level of the whole system. This data is acquired in user defined intervals and 
visualized in a graph (see Figure 2). The results can be printed in a user defined Report. 
The resulting graph consist of three different coloured lines (user defined colouring) and the data 
points. The middle line is the average of the value, which is calculating at the installation of device 
with three separate measurements. The second pair of lines mark the borders of the warning level, 
which depends on the user defined confidence interval. If a value is outside the warning level, the 
measurement is marked. In case of warning, the system should be monitored strictly and the checking 
intervals should be minimized. In case the detector specifications deteriorate further, the producer or 
service company should be informed. The third pair of the lines are the lines that indicate the borders 
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of the alarm level. Is a value outside this alarm level it is marked red and is a strong indicator for a 
detector failure. In this case the producer or service company should be informed immediately. 
Figure 2 : Visualization of the QA measurement results. 
6. Language Packages
To enable our international user community to use our software without barriers, we are constantly 
increasing the amount of languages our software is available in. Currently the software supports 
English, German, Russian and Chinese language visualization. In the near future we will add Spanish 
and French. Please contact our Team in case you need additional language packs, we are happy to 
help. 
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Abstract:
The aim of the present work is the method development and validation of a plutonium age dating
reference material. The principle is based on the complete separation of decay products at a well-
known time and with a verified separation efficiency. The completeness of separation was verified by
the addition of 233U and 243Am spikes to the starting material and their re-measurement from the final 
product. The final chemical purification of the material took place on 23 July, 2014. Altogether about
1.2 mg Pu age dating reference material was purified to produce 10 items, each containing ~120 g
Pu in solid form. The prepared material can be used for method validation and development in
nuclear safeguards and forensics.
Keywords: plutonium; age dating; radiochronometry; reference material
1. Introduction
Several characteristics (so-called signatures) of the material can be used to verify the declaration of
an unknown or questioned material, such as isotopic composition of Pu, U, Pb or Sr, elemental
impurities, trace-level radionuclide content, crystal structure or anionic residues [1, 2]. Besides these
parameters, the elapsed time since the last chemical purification of the material (commonly referred to
as the age of the material) can also be measured for radioactive and nuclear materials. This unique
possibility is based on the presence of radionuclides and their radioactive decay: during its
production, the radioactive material is chemically purified from the impurities, including also its
radioactive decay products. After the chemical separation of a radionuclide, its radioactive progenies
start to grow-in into the material. The theoretical amount of daughter nuclide formed by the decay can
be calculated by the use of the equations of the radioactive decays (Bateman equations) [3]. The ratio





















where Ndaughter/Nparent is the amount (atom) ratio of the daughter and parent nuclides in the sample,
daughter and parent are the decay constants of daughter and parent nuclides, respectively, Ndaughter0 is 
the residual daughter nuclide after the chemical separation, and t is the elapsed time since the
separation of the radionuclides. The daughter-to-parent ratio (Ndaughter/Nparent) is often referred to as
chronometer, while the elapsed time (t) is called the age of the material. If the residual daughter
nuclide is completely separated (Ndaughter0 is equal to 0), the age of the material (t) can be determined 
after the measurement of the Ndaughter/Nparent ratio in the sample.
The obtained material age is a self-explaining parameter, and does not require any comparison
sample or database for its interpretation. Therefore, it is highly useful to verify the declared origin in
nuclear safeguards, or to identify the origin of an unknown illicit material in nuclear forensics [4-6].
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This work describes a novel procedure for the preparation of a plutonium age dating reference
material and the validation of the method. No such material is currently available to validate plutonium
age dating. Our approach is based on the complete chemical separation of plutonium from its U and
Am decay products at a well-known time. The completeness of U and Am separation was verified by
the addition and re-measurement of 233U and 243Am at the beginning and after the chemical
separation. Therefore, the Pu decay products present in the material shall derive solely from the
decay of the Pu isotopes present in the material after the chemical separation and their ratio relative
to the parent nuclide is governed by the radioactive decay laws. This method has already been
proven for the production of U age dating certified reference material (IRMM-1000) [7]. Using this
approach, a reference material with an accurately known production date can be prepared, together
with a very low uncertainty down to a few hours. To validate the applied method the production date
was measured by ICP-MS and gamma spectrometry following a known period of time after the
preparation of the material and by comparing the measured ages with the known production date.
2. Experimental
2.1. Reagents and materials
All labware was thoroughly cleaned before use. Nitric acid was Suprapur grade (Merck, Darmstadt,
Germany), which was further purified by subboiled distillation (AHF analysentechnik AG, Germany).
For dilutions ultrapure water was used (Elga LabWater, Celle, Germany). Purum grade hydroxylamine
nitrate solution (18% NH2OH.HNO3 in H2O) and analytical grade NaNO2 were purchased from Sigma-
Aldrich (Steinheim, Germany). 233U and 242Pu isotopic standards were used to spike the samples for 
the uranium concentration measurements. The 233U concentration in the spike was calibrated against 
EC NRM 101 uranium metal by thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), while the 242Pu spike 
was a IRMM-085 standard from the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (Geel,
Belgium). Nominally 1% enriched uranium U-010 standard reference material from National Bureau of
Standards (NBS, USA) was used to correct for instrumental mass discrimination. IRMM-185 (certified
n(235U)/n(238U) is (2.00552 ± 0.00060) × 10-2) isotopic reference material was used to check the 
accuracy of the uranium isotope ratio measurements. TEVA extraction chromatographic resin (50-100
m particle size, active component: aliphatic quaternary amine) supplied by Triskem International
(Bruz, France) was used for the chemical separation. 0.4 mL of the TEVA resin was placed in plastic
Bio-Rad holders (diameter: 6 mm, length: 14 mm) and was covered with a porous Teflon frit (Reichelt
Chemietechnik Heidelberg, Germany) to avoid mixing. Before use, the column was cleaned with 1 mL
of 0.02 M HF/0.02 M HNO3 followed by conditioning with 4 mL 3 M HNO3.
2.2. Preparation of the Pu age dating reference material
The Pu material was separated from U and Am progenies using extraction chromatography (TEVA
resin). For the preparation approximately 2 mg Pu standard was dissolved with 5 mL 3 M HNO3
solution in a perflouroalkoxy alkane (PFA) screw cap vial. The sample was mixed with a weighed
aliquot of 233U and 243Am spikes, each containing of about 50 ng of the spike. The sample was
thoroughly homogenized. The solution was mixed with 0.1 mL 1 M NH2OH.HNO3. The NH2OH.HNO3 
serves to adjust the oxidation state of Pu to Pu(III). After a few minutes' waiting (the sample colour
changes from dark green to pink), 0.3 mL 3 M NaNO2 was added to the sample, which oxidizes the
Pu to Pu(IV) oxidation state. Under such conditions Pu(IV) and Th(IV) retains strongly on the TEVA
resin, while U and Am have little affinity to the resin. After loading the solution on the TEVA resin, the
vial and the column were washed with 5 mL 3 M HNO3, followed by the stripping of Pu as Pu(III) with
1 mL 3 M HNO3/0.02 M NH2OH.HNO3.After evaporation the TEVA separation was repeated twice. 
The time of the last chemical separation was registered (23 July, 2014, 11:00-11:40 a.m.), which
serves as the production date of the material.
The separation was followed by ICP-MS and alpha spectrometry by taking samples from each step of
the chemical separation (load, wash and Pu elution). The Pu chemical recovery was about 85%,
however, relatively large portion of the Pu sample was taken and lost due to the fact that a sample
aliquot was taken from each step of the procedure. The Am and U separation factors were calculated
based on the ratio of the known 233U and 243Am amount added to the material before the separation 
(50 ng each) and their amount in the final, purified solution. The 233U and 243Am amount in the final 
solution was below detection limit, corresponding to minimum U and Am separation factors of 2.0 ×
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104. This value results in that the residual U and Am amount correspond to less than 1 day if 
converted to age by Eq. 1.
2.3. Measurement of age by ICP-MS and gamma spectrometry
The sample preparation and Pu age measurement are described in details elsewhere [8]. The Pu and
U isotopic measurements were carried out using a double-focusing magnetic sector inductively
coupled plasma mass spectrometer (ICP-MS) equipped with a single electron multiplier (Element2,
Thermo Electron Corp., Bremen, Germany). The ICP-MS instrument is attached to a nuclearized
glove box in order to handle plutonium. All measurements were carried out in low resolution mode (R
= 300) using a low-flow micro-concentric nebulizer operated in a self-aspirating mode (flow rate was
approximately 50 L min-1) in combination with a stable introduction system (SIS) quartz glass spray 
chamber. The measured isotope ratios obtained by ICP-MS were corrected for instrumental mass
bias using linear correction. All dilutions and spike additions for the isotope dilution analysis were
done gravimetrically.
The gamma spectrometry measurements were carried out to measure the age based on the
241Am/241Pu chronometer. Spectra were taken by a planar high-purity Germanium detector (ORTEC 
SGD-36550), set to record spectra in the energy range 0-300 keV Total spectrum acquisition time
was 60 hours. The 241Am/241Pu activity ratio and the corresponding age were calculated from the 
spectra by the software MGA v10 [9-11].
3. Results and discussion
The measured age results of the Pu certified reference materials are summarized in Table 1. The
241Am/241Pu chronometer was measured by gamma spectrometry, while the 234U/238Pu, 235U/239Pu and 
236U/240Pu chronometers were measured by ICP-MS. The measured ages are given relative to the 
measurement date for the gamma spectrometry or to the time of the sample preparation in case of
ICP-MS, i.e. the calculated elapsed time (t) was subtracted from these specified reference dates. The
obtained results agree well with the know production date of the material (23 July, 2014).
Furthermore, the ages obtained by the different chronometers give identical results (concordant ages)
proving that the both Am and U separations were complete.
Chronometer
241Am/241Pu 234U/238Pu 235U/239Pu 236U/240Pu 

















Table 1: Measured ages and production dates of the Pu age dating reference material. Known production date of
the sample is 23 July 2014. Uncertainties are expressed as expanded uncertainties (k = 2).
4. Conclusions
A novel method has been developed for the preparation of a Pu age dating reference material. It is
based on the proven concept developed for the production of the IRMM-1000 uranium age dating
material. Using these finding we have a possibility to produce Pu age dating reference material at
larger scale, and also to tailor the reference material target characteristics to the needs of the
safeguards and forensic laboratories (e.g. concentration, amount or Pu isotopic composition).
Although the current work focuses on the bulk Pu age dating methodology, it can be extended in the
future to produce Pu particles with known production date.
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Best practices for determining uranium isotopic composition by 
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MGAU and FRAM are software codes which can be used for determining uranium isotopic 
composition by gamma spectrometry. The aim of this study is to establish best practices for using 
these codes to obtain the results as accurate as possible under given constraints. Uranium 
measurements can take place either in a laboratory (under optimal conditions) or in field (under non-
optimal conditions). Both scenarios were investigated in this work. There are several factors affecting 
accuracy of analysis results. Some of the factors cannot be controlled. However, there are crucial 
factors that can be controlled such as the sample-to-detector distance and acquisition time. These two 
particular factors were studied. The study was based on using gamma-ray uranium spectra generated 
from real spectra of various certified materials and well characterized fuel pellets. The spectra were 
generated by Cambio software. This software randomly samples data from a real spectrum and allows 
generating "daughter spectra" having different number of total counts. This way enough statistically 
relevant data can be obtained. More than 10 000 spectra have been used in this study. This study also 
discusses influence of bismuth on the accuracy of MGAU and FRAM. The results of this work can help 










MGAU and FRAM are software codes which can be used to determine uranium isotopic composition 
by analysing gamma ray spectra [1] [2]. Both codes are used by nuclear inspectors and analysts in 
many NDA applications. This study targets on establishing best practices for recording gamma spectra 
to by analysed MGAU and FRAM. 
  
MGAU can report abundances of 235U, 238U and 234U using gamma spectra in the energy range 0-300 
keV. For certain samples MGAU is able to estimate 236U/U ratio and detect the presence of 232U. The 
code is capable of analysing uranium ranging from 0.3% to 93% 235U enrichment [3]. FRAM 
possesses similar features to those of MGAU, however, gives advanced users more freedom to make 
their own customizations in the analysis procedure. Moreover, FRAM can also analyse plutonium and 
can utilize different energy ranges. However, this study deals solely with uranium and planar HPGe 
detectors to be used in the 0-300 keV energy range.   
 
There are certain basic requirements that have to satisfy for using MGAU and FRAM and can be 
found in [4] [5]. The precision and accuracy of the MGAU and FRAM results is also influenced by other 
conditions and parameters. In this study, the particular interest is given to finding an optimal number of 
total counts and an optimal count rate. Results of this work may serve as guidelines for analysts and 
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inspectors to optimize their measurements and therefore determine the uranium isotopic composition
by MGAU and FRAM more accurately.
2 Materials and equipment
The gamma spectrometers and software used in the study are listed in Table I and Table II,
respectively.
Table I Spectrometers used in the study
Manufacturer Internal Name Detector Type Preamp Cryostat Rise time Flat top
Canberra AMM GL0210R LEGe Plnr. 2002CPSL 7600SL 5.6 μs 1.2 μs
Canberra CP5 GL0210R LEGe Plnr. 2002CPSL CP5SL-Plus 5.6 μs 0.8 μs
Ortec SGD SGD-36550 LEGe Plnr. - Nitrogen Dewar 6 μs 0.8 μs
Table II Software used in the study
Software Version Year Licence Parameters
MGAU 4.2 2010 Canberra -
FRAM 5.1 2011 Ortec LEU_Plnr_060-250, HEU_Plnr_060-250
Cambio 120822 - Freeware (U.S. DOE) -
Following uranium samples have been used in the study:
 EC Certified Nuclear Reference Material 171 with various enrichments (0.7% -  4.5%) [6]
 6 NBS standards (U3O8 powders) having various enrichments (from 3% up to 90% ) [7]
 CRM 125A certified LEU fuel pellet [8]
 Two in-house characterized LEU fuel pellets1 [9]
3 Optimal number of counts
Longer acquisitions lead to better counting statistics of gamma spectra. However, recording a
spectrum beyond a certain acquisition time does not generate significantly better results. In other
words, there is no sense to record a spectrum indefinitely, as the results of the analysis do not change
after a certain time. The goal is to find the acquisition time after which the MGAU and FRAM results do
not change anymore (or do not change significantly). Therefore this part of the study aims at finding
the optimal acquisition time for MGAU and FRAM analysis with planar HPGe detectors
The optimal acquisition time depends on the count rate, which, in turn depends on many factors such
as the sample activity, shielding, geometry, detector efficiency etc. Therefore, to be able to give
general recommendations, the influence of the total number of counts in the spectrum on the accuracy
of the results was studied. This resulted in finding an optimal number of total counts, above which the
MGAU and FRAM results do not change anymore.  Knowing the count rate, this can be easily
converted to an optimal acquisition time, for any given sample and measurement setup.
3.1 Procedure for determining the optimal number of total counts
For carrying out a representative study, it is necessary to have a large amount of gamma spectra
covering wide range of 235U enrichments. Covering not only different kinds of samples (from depleted 
to high enriched uranium) but also different numbers of total counts for each of the samples would be
almost impossible with real measurements. Therefore, so called "daughter spectra" were used in the
study. They were generated by randomly sampling data from real high quality spectra recorded in our
laboratories.
Spectra of the certified reference materials and well characterized fuel pellets were recorded. These
so called "mother spectra" then served for generating sets of "daughter spectra" having different
number of total counts (less than their mother spectra). This was done by using Cambio software [10]
1 Detailed information on the isotopic composition and ratios can be found in [11].
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which allows generating simulated spectra by randomly sampling data from real spectra. For each
sample, 12 sets of 50 spectra were generated, each set having different number of total counts. More
than 10 000 simulated spectra were used in this study. The results of the MGAU and FRAM analysis
were then compared with certified isotopic ratios. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure of determining the
optimal number of counts.
For comparing the MGAU and FRAM results with certified ratios, the so called MARD (Mean Average
Relative Difference) was used. The MARD is described by Equation 1. To calculate the MARD, first
the relative difference between measured and declared abundance of 235U is determined. Then, the 
absolute value of this difference is taken and finally a mean for N spectra is calculated. In this
particular case N is equal to 50 spectra that were generated for each of the sets of total counts.
Equation 1 Mean Absolute Relative Difference (MARD). An indicator which has been used for comparing the








Where: Mi – Measured value
D – Declared value
N – Number of spectra
Figure 1 General procedure of determining the optimal number of total counts
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In order to determine the optimal number of counts, it was necessary to take a look at the
development of the MARD values over the whole range of total counts. Differences between the
consecutive steps (sets of 50 spectra) were calculated and plotted as it is illustrated in Figure 2. When
the differences between consecutive steps become very low, it indicates that the results (expressed by
MARD) do not change anymore or considerably. From this point onward, there is no sense to carry on
recording gamma spectra because MGAU and FRAM results do not improve further or do not improve
reasonably.
3.2 Results: optimal number of total counts for MGAU and FRAM
Figure 3 shows that above 4.32E+07 total number of counts in the spectra recorded by the AMM
detector (see Table I) the MGAU results do not change considerably. Before this point, the values are
spread over mainly due to poorer counting statistics. From this point onward the differences between
the consecutive steps are negligible. In addition, most of the biases (expressed by the MARD) lie
below 1%. One cannot reach significantly better results by performing longer acquisitions. Therefore it
is recommended to acquire a gamma spectrum until reaching roughly 4.32E+07 total counts2. This 
value is estimated to be the optimal number of total counts.
Analogous graphs were constructed for FRAM as well. For both investigated FRAM parameter sets,
the graphs show that the results do not change after the 4.32E+07 total counts are reached. It was
found that for all the detectors listed in Table I the optimal number of counts is close to 4.32E+07, both
for FRAM and MGAU. Therefore, changing the detector does not affect the conclusion regarding the
optimal number of counts as long as the detector satisfies the basic requirements for the applicability
of MGAU and of the specified FRAM parameter sets.
2 The stated optimal number of counts has its own statistical uncertainty, which is determined by the
size of the steps between the numbers of total counts used in this work. By taking smaller steps, in
principle, the value for the optimal number of total counts could be refined
Figure 2 Detailed look at the procedure of determining the optimal number of counts, particularly at the process
of getting the differences between the consecutive steps. The mother spectrum at the top serves for generating
sets of daughter spectra having different numbers of total counts. For each individual set of 50 spectra the MARD
value is calculated. In order to see how the MGAU and FRAM results change over the increasing number of total
counts, the differences between every single step are calculated. The differences between consecutive steps are
then plotted.
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4 Optimal count rate (optimal sample-to-detector distance)
The purpose of studying the optimal count rate arose from unsureness about how to position samples
to be measured by gamma detectors and analyzed by MGAU and FRAM. The sample-to-detector
distance affects the final appearance of the sample's spectrum. Placing a sample too close to the
detector may lead to coincidence summing, higher dead time and eventually result in distorted peak
shapes. On contrary, positioning a sample too far from a detector makes it difficult to reach better
counting statistics. The sample-to-detector distance and the respective count rate clearly affect
accuracy of MGAU and FRAM results. The purpose of this part of the study was to determine the
optimal count rate and corresponding optimal sample-to-detector distance giving best MGAU and
FRAM results.
4.1 Procedure of determining the optimal count rate
In order to test the influence of different count rates on MGAU and FRAM results, an approach similar
to the one in the previous chapter was employed. The certified materials CBNM 071, 194, 295, 446
and some of the NBS standards were measured for very long time (until reaching 2E+08 total counts)
at various count rates. The count rates were set by adjusting sample-to-detector distances.
Corresponding simulated spectra were then generated and subsequently analysed by MGAU and
FRAM. The results of the analysis were compared with the certified data. Instead of using the MARD,
the relative bias from declared values was calculated in order to find the optimal count rate. Since a
bias is either positive of negative, it provides useful information whether the software overestimate or
underestimate the abundance of 235U.  
4.2 Results: optimal count rate
The three detectors listed in Table I were used in this part of the study. The relative biases were
plotted as a function of count rate for each of the detectors. Each point in the graph represents the
average relative bias of a set of 50 spectra. Each set of the spectra has a certain number of total
counts listed in the graph's legend. The points in the graph were fitted with a linear function and the
intersections with zero were calculated for each of the trend lines. The intersections with zero
represent the desired optimal count rate. As the count rate increases the bias lines go lower down
from positive to the negative values. This declining trend is common for all of the CBNM samples and
Figure 3 The graph shows differences between consecutive steps in MARD for MGAU4.2. The solid line 
represents average differences calculated for each of the steps. The average line converges to 4.32E+07 total
counts. After this point the differences between consecutive steps are negligible and oscillate around zero, which
means that the MGAU results (expressed by MARD) become nearly invariant. Therefore this number of total
counts is estimated to be the optimal number of counts. For FRAM the corresponding graph looks alike
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detectors with some exceptions. As an illustration, the results for the SDG detector and CBNM 446
sample are shown in Figure 4.
As we have already published in [11], there is a dependence of the optimal count rate on the
enrichment of 235U. Furthermore, the study shows that the optimal number of counts depends also on 
the detector. Figure 4 clearly illustrates that the optimal count rate also differs for both MGAU and
FRAM. There are a lot of factors affecting a detector's count rate such as the size of detector crystal,
type of preamplifier, filter settings and many more. Therefore, it is not feasible to give a general
recommendation on optimal count rates for all detectors available on the market. However, it is
achievable for users to carry out this experiment in order for them to determine the optimal count rate
for their detectors.
Figure 4 The graph displays relative biases of MGAU and FRAM results as a function of count rate for CBNM
446 when the number of total counts in the spectrum is more than 2.16E+07. Each point represents the average
bias of 50 spectra having a certain number of total counts. The higher the count rate, the lines drop down to
negative values. While for MGAU the optimal number of counts is close to 4000 cps, for FRAM the optimal
number of counts is close to 9000 cps.
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5 Validation of the approach
The spectra generated by Cambio are similar to their corresponding mother spectra but they have less
total counts. They are created by randomly sampling data from their mother spectra. All the daughter
spectra take after their parent the same information on background conditions, disturbances,
interference etc. In reality, background and interference conditions vary over the time. Hence, the real
spectra of the same sample measured in the same laboratory can differ from each other. Therefore
the results of analysis could be also different. Since all the measurements have been done in a
laboratory under controlled conditions, the real spectra should not be significantly different from one
another. This approach of testing the software's performance had to be validated with real spectra.
The simulated spectra were tested whether they correspond to real ones.
5.1 Procedure of validation
Two of the certified materials were chosen for the validation test. One sample from the enrichment
range where the codes perform the best (CBNM U446) and another one from the high enrichment
range where their performance is weaker (NBS U900). The samples were measured for certain
periods of time listed in the Table II. In order to have enough spectra and to be able to calculate an
average and standard deviation, each measurement was repeated ten times. After the acquisitions of
real spectra were done, corresponding simulated spectra (having the same number of total counts)
were generated. At the end, the MGAU and FRAM results for simulated spectra were compared with
the results for real spectra.
5.2 Results of validation
Figure 5 depicts results of the validation test for one of the samples used in this study. Towards the
greater number of total counts, as the statistics improves, the two points in the Figure 5 (triangle and
rectangle) lie closer to each other and also their respective error bars are getting overlapped. The
error bars represent the standard deviation of the MARD. There is also an apparent decreasing trend
of the values along the x-axis. Having a similar decreasing trend line and having a similar standard
deviation together with being in the same range, the simulated spectra correspond to the real ones in
all aspects.
Figure 5 Comparison of the MARD values of real spectra versus simulated spectra. The sample comes from the
enrichment range (4.46 %) where the code performs the best. For the other sample which was used in validation
test the corresponding graph looks similar.
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6 Ratio of counts in 0-300 keV and in 100 keV region
Uranium spectra are generally not as complex as plutonium spectra. Therefore, it was chosen to use
the total number of counts as a parameter for deriving the optimal acquisition time - above referred to
as the optimal number of counts.  FRAM and MGAU use mainly the 100 keV region3 for determining 
the isotopic ratios. Since samples from LEU to HEU were used in this study it was necessary to check
if the ratio of the counts in the 0-300 keV and 100 keV region is similar for all of the samples. The
study shows that the 300/100 keV region count ratio stays nearly constant over the whole range of
235U enrichments for uranium oxides.
Figure 6 Ratio of the counts in the 300 keV region and in the complex 100 keV region. The 100 keV region is
used by MGAU and FRAM for determining the uranium isotopic abundances. The linear trend-lines have very low
slopes indicating that the 300/100 keV region count ratio is nearly constant for uranium oxides regardless of the
enrichment.
7 In-field measurements
All the information above covers measurements in laboratories under controlled and nearly optimal
conditions. In-field measurements usually have to be carried out under uncontrolled conditions within
the shortest possible time. There is not that high demand on precision and accuracy as for laboratory
measurements. MGAU and FRAM are also used for in-field measurement analysis. Therefore, it is of
interest to establish best practices for measurements that are carried out on site.
Acquisitions of 5 min, 10 min, 20 min and 30 min in-field measurements were simulated using Cambio
software. All the high quality mother spectra recorded for the optimal count rate test were reused for
this purpose. Results of the evaluation should provide a clearer view on how to position a sample and
how long to acquire a spectrum when it comes to in-field measurements.
Preliminary results indicate that the optimal count rates for in field measurements are slightly higher
than those for laboratory measurements. Table III shows that for this particular sample and detector,
the accuracy of the 5 min spectra stays roughly within ± 1%. The precision improves with the
increasing time of acquisition (the standard deviation gets lower). Best practices for in field
measurements are a subject of our ongoing research.
3 100 keV region refers to a complex area ranging from 89 keV to 101 keV. This region is mainly, but
not solely, used for determining uranium isotopic ratios by MGAU and FRAM.
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Table III MARD and optimal count rate for in-field measurements
CBNM 295, MGAU4.2, SGD detector 5 min 10 min 20 min 30 min
Optimal count rate [cps] 5377 5433 5088 4677
MARD [%] 0.754 0.685 0.479 0.542
Standard deviation of MARD 0.637 0.523 0.407 0.384
8 Bismuth as a source of bias
We observed systematic biases of 235U/U from certified values for certain detectors and first could not 
find their origin. After careful examination of the detectors' spectra, we found bismuth x-rays which
were not present in the background. Bismuth when struck by gamma rays emits fluorescence x-rays at
similar energies to those of 235U. MGAU and FRAM, in their default mode, are unable to unfold
bismuth x-rays from the peaks originating from 235U. Therefore, bismuth can be a source of bias when 
present in spectrometric measurements of uranium isotopic composition. Bismuth has been used for
soldering as a substitute for toxic lead since a new European directive took effect in 2006 [12].
The 89.830 keV bismuth XRF peak falls into the area of two 235U peaks and causes overestimation of 
the 235U/U ratio reported by MGAU and FRAM. The overestimation ranges from 2% up to 7%. FRAM 
is customizable and bismuth peaks can be added into FRAM's algorithm. By doing so, the bismuth
induced bias can be minimized. Figure 7 shows results of MGAU and FRAM with their default settings
in comparison with customized FRAM's parameters. Adding bismuth peaks or removal of the 235U
peaks at 89 keV reduces the bias of 235U/U ratio. 
Figure 7 The figure shows how bismuth affects precision of MGAU and FRAM. The comparison between MGAU
and three FRAM parameter sets is provided. FRAMv5.10-ULEU_Plnr_060-250* is similar to the default parameter
set, but without the 89.957 keV peak of 235U used for efficiency and activity calculations. FRAMv5.10-
ULEU_Plnr_060-250** is also similar to the default parameter set, but with the 89.830 keV bismuth peak added.
There is an apparent improvement in the accuracy of FRAM results for the modified parameters.
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9 Conclusions
The optimal number of counts in the gamma spectrum for determining uranium isotopic composition
by MGAU and FRAM was estimated to be 4.32E+07 counts. The study has shown that recording
gamma spectra with more counts does not generate better results.
The optimal count rate differs for MGAU and FRAM. The optimal count rate was also found to be
dependent on the 235U enrichment and detector type. We were not able to give general
recommendations for the optimal count rate. However users can carry out similar optimal count rate
test for their detectors. The present work may serve as an example for doing so.
Simulated spectra were used for determining the optimal number of counts and optimal count rate.
These spectra were generated by Cambio software. This software allows simulating acquisitions by
generating daughter spectra from real mother spectra. It has been validated that these simulated
spectra correspond to real ones in all aspects relevant for this work.
The ratio of the counts in the 0-300 keV region and in the 100 keV region was confirmed to be nearly
constant over the whole range of 235U enrichments for uranium oxide samples. Therefore, the optimal 
number of total counts in a spectrum is justified to be used as a parameter for classifying the statistical
quality of uranium spectra.
The presence of bismuth can be an important source of bias in the measurement of U isotopic
composition by MGAU and FRAM. Bismuth, when hit by gamma rays, emits fluorescence x-rays at
energies similar to gamma and x-rays of 235U. MGAU and FRAM attribute the counts from bismuth to 
235U and report results with biases ranging from 2% to 7%. The bismuth induced bias can be
minimized by appropriately customizing parameters of the software.
The users of MGAU and FRAM can use the findings in this work to establish best practices for their
spectrometric apparatus.
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Abstract: In the context of fissile material detection, the determination of Uranium enrichment and of
the Plutonium isotopic vector is tremendously important. The negligence of such information may lead
to drastic if not fatal consequences to the general public in case the material in question is used in
explosive devices such as an Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND). The implemented automatic analysis
routine of the electrically cooled Detective 200 detector has been investigated in earlier measurements
measuring Uranium and plutonium sources of different enrichment respectively isotopic composition.
The results have been partly disappointing. The object of the present work was to investigate the
general ability and the quality of the spectra obtained with the Detective200 in comparison to the
commonly used U-Pu detectors cooled with liquid nitrogen. To determine the uranium enrichment
measurements were carried out with a source of depleted Uranium and different shielding materials.
The evaluation of the spectra was performed with the isotopic analysis code FRAM. The results for the
Uranium enrichment for the Detective200 system were compared to the enrichment result of the
commonly used U-Pu detectors. The results of these measurements and an assessment of the ability
of the FRAM software combined with the Detective200 system in determining the Uranium enrichment
will be presented.
Keywords: gamma measurement, Uranium enrichment, U-Pu, FRAM
 Introduction
The detection and identification of radioactive and especially nuclear material are crucial with respect
to countermeasures against nuclear terrorism. Uranium and Plutonium play an especially important
role in this context as these materials are the core substance of explosive devices such as an
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) which may be used to cause severe or even fatal injuries to the
public in comparatively large areas, rendering them uninhabitable as a consequence. To prevent such
acts from happening, this material must be tracked either before such devices are assembled of at
least before they are ignited.
In order to achieve an identification of said material, highly sensitive gamma detectors with electrically
cooled germanium semiconductors are a reasonable choice, primarily because of their excellent
gamma energy resolution. U-Pu detectors cooled with liquid nitrogen (LN) are also a good option,
although these devices have limitations with regard to on-site measurements due to the size and
weight of their cooler and the availability of LN in the field.
The electrically cooled detectors are commonly equipped with an implemented identification routine.
The ability of such analysis routines to reliably determine the isotopic composition of Pu or the degree
of enrichment of U has been the subject of previous measurements [1, 2]. The results were, at least in
part, quite disappointing although the quality of the gamma spectrum would have enabled an
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appropriate identification. Therefore the special code called FRAM by Ametek/ORTEC was used for
subsequent analysis of the measured spectra regarding uranium enrichment for a comparison of
several electrically cooled germanium detectors with another germanium detector cooled with LN.
 Measurement set-up
A series of measurements with low and high enriched as well as natural and depleted uranium was
performed at the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe, Germany, as low or high
enriched uranium is not available at our institute. Additional measurements were performed with
depleted uranium and a sample of mineral containing natural uranium at Fraunhofer INT.
2.1 Measurements at ITU
At ITU, four different uranium samples with different degrees of enrichment were available: 0.3%
(depleted), 0.71 % (natural), 4.5 % (low enriched), and 91.4 % (high enriched). As shielding material
2 mm of lead and a combination of 1.5 cm of steel and 5 cm of an explosive simulate were used. The
latter contained the same chemical components as explosive without actually being an explosive. This
combination of steel and explosive simulate represented the configuration of an IND.
Four different measurement systems with electrically cooled germanium crystals were tested during
this series: the Detective EX, the Micro Detective, the Detective 200 (all designed by Ametek/ORTEC),
and the FALCON 5000 by Canberra. Figure 1 shows these detectors in a typical setup positioned
around a source.
Figure 1: Measurement array with four detectors positioned around an unshielded source; the detectors are
(clockwise starting on the bottom left): Detective EX, Micro-Detective, Detective 200 and Falcon 5000.
The main characteristic values of the detectors are given in table 1 as well as the outer dimensions of
the systems. The three Detectives (Detective EX, Micro-Detective and Detective 200) differ from each
other in respect of the Germanium crystal and the firmware. Detective EX and Micro-Detective are
comparable concerning the crystal (see table 1) but differ in the firmware. Detective 200 and Micro-
Detective both have the newer firmware V3, but the Detective 200 has a larger crystal.

























ORTEC 12 37 x 18 x 34 5 / 3 1.3 1.7 16 > 3
Micro-Detective
ORTEC 7 37 x 15 x 28 5 / 4 1.3 1.7 11 5
Detective 200,
ORTEC 21 43 x 24 x 39 8.5 / 3 1.1 1.5 52 3
Falcon 5000,
Canberra 15 40 x 35 x 16 6 / 3 1.1 1.4 18.5 6 - 8
Table 1: Overview of the detection systems and their specifications; the weight and the size of the Falcon 5000
do not include a necessary PC; weight and size figures for all systems include batteries; the relative efficiencies
are obtained using the standard measurement procedure in which a 60Co source is placed 25 cm away from the
end-cap of the detector.
In all cases the spectra can be stored and the spectrum files can be exported and transferred to a
specialist. The systems feature automatic identification and in particular special SNM (Special Nuclear
Material) modes. The latter have been specially considered for these uranium measurements. In order
to gain additional information concerning uranium enrichment and the isotopic composition of
plutonium, the data were analyzed with the isotopic analysis software PC/FRAM 5.1 (ORTEC version)
[3]. Thereby we used the existing parameter files u_cx_120-1010 for the Detectives and
uleu_plnr_060-250 for the U-Pu detector after adapting the energy calibration but without any further
optimization.
Compared to the firmware used by the Detective EX, the firmware of the Detective 200 and Micro-
Detective has limited information output especially in the standard non-expert mode. To have a better
comparability we therefore did not strictly use the recommended settings for the subsequent
measurements although we wanted to evaluate the results which non-expert users would gain.
The identification mode displays of the Detective devices continuously update the results and run until
they are manually stopped by the user. The Falcon 5000 can be operated with a preselected time or
without a preset. However the result of the SNM Mode will be only displayed after the end of the
measurement. The chronological development of the measurement results were specially observed
for all detectors. Whenever possible, spectra with longer measurement times were obtained for
example during midday or night.
2.2 Measurements at INT
These measurements were done to compare the performance of electrically cooled germanium
detectors mentioned above to the quality of a U-Pu detector cooled with LN. The U-Pu detector yields
gamma spectra in the lower energy region up to 300 keV which is a relevant region for measurements
with nuclear material. Such type of detector is part of a wide-range collection of measurement systems
at INT for detecting radioactive or nuclear material [4].
Measurements were performed with several detectors: the Detective 200, the Micro Detective, and a
U-Pu detector cooled with LN. A 1.8 kg block of depleted uranium and a sample of mineral containing
natural uranium were measured, both unshielded and shielded with 5 mm of Fe. Figure 2 shows a
typical measurement layout with the depleted uranium shielded by Fe and the Micro Detective.
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Figure 2: Measurement array with Micro Detective (on the right) and 1.8 kg block of depleted uranium (on the left)
shielded by 5 mm of Fe.
Measurement Results
3.1 ITU Measurements
With each of the four uranium (depleted: DU, natural: nat. U, low enriched: LEU, and high enriched:
HEU) at least one measurement was performed without shielding material and with the combination of
steel and explosive simulate. LEU and HEU were additionally examined with lead shielding. Time
permitting; multiple measurements were done with the same setup.
Tables 3 to 5 show comparisons of the identification results yielded by the implemented analysis
routines of the devices and the results subsequently gained by the analysis with FRAM for the
Detective 200, the Detective EX, and the FALCON 5000 for the uranium measurements. The derived
results base on the categorization limits in table 2:
Material Characterization limits
DU 235U < 0.64 %
Nat. U 0.64 % < 235U < 0.78 %
LEU 0.78 % < 235U <   20 %
HEU 235U > 20 %
RGPu 239Pu < 90 %
WGPu 239Pu > 90 %
Table 2: Limits for the characterization of uranium and plutonium material
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Sample Shielding Life Time (s) ImplementedAnalysis
Result Derived
From FRAM
DU Unshielded 956 Nucl. U DU
DU Steel + Simulate 1458 Nucl. U DU
Nat. U Unshielded 874 Nucl. U LEU
Nat. U Steel + Simulate 1079 Nucl. U DU
LEU Unshielded 1189 Nucl. U LEU
LEU Steel + Simulate 7765 Nucl. U LEU
LEU Lead 255 Nucl. U LEU
HEU Unshielded 1575 Nucl. U, HEU HEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 691 Nucl. U, HEU HEU
HEU Lead 57613 Nucl. U, HEU HEU
Table 3: Comparison of Detective 200 analysis results for the uranium measurements yielded by the
implemented analysis routine and calculated with FRAM; color code: blue color refers to a correctly identified
isotope or material, but the degree of enrichment or categorization is wrong, green color means both the
identification and categorization are correct.
Sample Shielding Life Time (s) ImplementedAnalysis
Result Derived
From FRAM
DU Unshielded 225 DU, elev. Uconcentration DU
DU Steel + Simulate 207 elev. U conc. DU
Nat. U Unshielded 890 – nat. U
Nat. U Steel + Simulate 596 DU, elev. U conc DU
Nat. U Steel + Simulate 712 DU, elev. U conc. DU
LEU Unshielded 1732 LEU, elev. Uconcentration LEU
LEU Steel + Simulate 302 elev. U conc. DU
LEU Steel + Simulate 6425 nat. U, elev. Uconc. LEU
LEU Lead 352 DU, elev. U conc. DU
LEU Lead 152 DU, elev. U conc DU
HEU Unshielded 1004 LEU HEU
HEU Unshielded 212 LEU LEU
HEU Unshielded 137 LEU LEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 419 – DU
HEU Steel + Simulate 392 – LEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 157 – HEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 899 – LEU
HEU Lead 322 – LEU
HEU Lead 59771 nat.U, elev. Uconc. LEU
Table 4: Comparison of Detective EX analysis results for the uranium measurements yielded by the implemented
analysis routine and calculated with FRAM; color code: red color refers to a completely incorrect identification
result or no result at all, blue color refers to a correctly identified isotope or material, but the degree of enrichment
or categorization is wrong, green color means both the identification and categorization are correct.





DU Unshielded 299 DU DU
DU Steel + Simulate 599 - DU
DU Steel + Simulate 937 DU DU
Nat. U Unshielded 201 DU DU
Nat. U Unshielded 89 DU DU
Nat. U Unshielded 103 DU LEU
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Nat. U Steel + Simulate 482 DU DU
LEU Unshielded 797 LEU, WGPu LEU
LEU Steel + Simulate 300 DU DU
LEU Steel + Simulate 221 Nat. U LEU
LEU Steel + Simulate 6199 Nat. U LEU
LEU Steel + Simulate 600 Nat. U LEU
LEU Lead 180 DU DU
LEU Lead 446 DU LEU
HEU Unshielded 264 LEU, WGPu -
HEU Unshielded 902 LEU, WGPu HEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 303 LEU HEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 617 LEU LEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 901 LEU HEU
HEU Steel + Simulate 22 LEU LEU
HEU Lead 179 LEU -
HEU Lead 58302 HEU, WGPu HEU
Table 5: Comparison of FALCON 5000 analysis results for the uranium measurements yielded by the
implemented analysis routine and calculated with FRAM; color code: red color refers to a completely incorrect
identification result or no result at all, blue color refers to a correctly identified isotope or material, but the degree
of enrichment or categorization is wrong, green color means both the identification and categorization are correct.
The Detective 200’s implemented analysis routine does not include discrimination between LEU and
HEU (merely “nuclear uranium” and HEU are defined) or between RGPu and WGPu (only “nuclear 
plutonium” is defined), respectively. Since the Micro Detective’s routine is of the same type, no 
analysis results of this device are presented here as they were equally limited and therefore less
interesting than the results by the Detective EX and the FALCON 5000, at least regarding the
implemented routines.
In general, an obvious enhancement of the initial analysis results provided by the implemented
routines was achieved with the FRAM analysis. The Detective 200 results benefitted most from the
FRAM analysis as the latter produced the correct categorization in almost all cases. As for the other
detectors, the FRAM analysis managed to enhance the previous identification result in some cases
and failed to achieve this in others.
The use of FRAM appears to be most reasonable for the detector with the highest efficiency. The
detectors mentioned above all cover a large range of gamma energy in order to analyse all types of
radioactive and nuclear material. For cases when the focus of detection and identification is laid on
nuclear material which emits photons in the lower energy region, specific U-Pu detectors are suitable.
To evaluate if the FRAM analysis could be even more useful for a U-Pu germanium detector, a new
series of measurements was done at INT with such a detector. Moreover, if the flaws of the detectors’ 
implemented analysis routines were due to the large range of their gamma energy spectra and
therefore due to limits of the energy resolution, these routines should be able to yield better results
with spectra focussing on the lower energy region.
3.2 INT Measurements 
The gamma energy spectra were collected by the detectors with the samples mentioned above.
Tables 6 and 7 show, as examples, the comparison of the calculated mass percentages of 235U in the
sample of depleted uranium and the mineral sample, respectively, measured with the Detective 200,
the Micro Detective, and the U-Pu detector, with 5 mm Fe shielding and without shielding.
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Detector No Shielding 5 mm Fe Shielding
Life Time (s) 235U Content (%) Life Time (s) 235U Content (%) 
Detective 200 26751 0.49 ± 0.01 6752 0.40 ± 0.03
Micro Detective 7005 0.16 ± 0.02 7030 0.17 ± 0.03
U-Pu Detector 7200 0.45 ± 0.06 7200 0.3 ± 0.1
Table 6: Mass percentages of 235U in the sample of depleted uranium for three detectors as calculated by FRAM.
Detector No Shielding 5 mm Fe Shielding
Life Time (s) 235U Content (%) Life Time (s) 235U Content (%) 
Detective 200 6752 1.0 ± 0.2 7200 0.0001 ± 0.000328800 1.5 ± 0.1
Micro Detective 3600 0.6 ± 0.3 28800 0.30 ± 0.0628800 0.6 ± 0.1
U-Pu Detector 7200 3.2 ± 0.4 28800 2.4 ± 0.4
Table 7: Mass percentages of 235U in the mineral sample for three detectors as calculated by FRAM.
The correct result of the 235U mass percentage of the used depleted uranium would be approximately
0.25 % to 0.3 %. The Detective 200 and Micro Detective results were out of this range, even when
taking the error figures into account. The results of the measurements with shielding, though, were
closer to the expected value. The results for the U-Pu detector in general were higher than 0.3 %. The
lower limit for the characterization as depleted uranium in general is 235U < 0.64 %. This is fulfilled for
all results, so an analysis would lead to the correct categorization.
For natural uranium the results were not in the correct range (0.64 % < 235U < 0.78 %). In the shielded
case the analysis was even more complicate. While the results for natural uranium are not correct this
may not be of high concern for the decision makers. They are interested in correct results in terms of
HEU/LEU in the case of uranium and of WGPu in the case of plutonium.
The fact that the FRAM analysis yielded not completely satisfactory results was primarily because of
poor statistics leading to small numbers of counts in the relevant photo peaks. The samples used here
emitted too weak a gamma radiation for an appropriate analysis. The FRAM analysis software was
mainly designed for calculating enrichment of LEU or HEU samples and not for samples with such a
low content of 235U. In order to gain insight regarding the reasons for the flaws of the implemented
analysis routines mentioned above by measurements with U-Pu detectors, other samples of nuclear
material will be necessary. Therefore further measurements at institutions such as ITU must be taken
into account.
Conclusions
Comparing the identification and categorization results of the detectors’ implemented analysis routines 
to those achieved by means of the FRAM analysis with respect to measurements on uranium at ITU, a
significant enhancement can be stated when using FRAM. In most cases, the implemented routines
managed to identify the correct material, but the categorization was often false. Here the FRAM
results were considerably superior, especially in the case of the Detective 200.
The measurements at ITU raised the question whether the flawed results obtained by the detectors’ 
implemented analysis routines were due to limits of the measured spectra’s energy resolution or 
because of weaknesses of the analysis routines themselves. To gain insight here, the additional
measurements at INT with a U-Pu detector were performed. Unfortunately, the spectra measured with
depleted uranium suffered from poor statistics due to the small amount of 235U in the samples. Hence,
other measurements with a U-Pu detector with low and high enriched uranium would be necessary to
clarify this matter.
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In general the quality of the spectra with electrically cooled germanium detectors was comparable to
LN cooled germanium detectors. Therefore there is also a potential to enhance automatic analysis
routines. Currently, the use of automatic analysis routines could be recommended only for unshielded
or weekly shielded samples of SNM combined with a cautious review of the results.
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Abstract:
Measurements of neutron induced gammas allow the characterisation of fissile materials. Most prompt
gamma-rays from radiative neutron capture reactions in plutonium and uranium have energies
between 3 and 6.5 MeV. High energy photons have a high penetrability and therefore minimise self-
absorption and shielding effects. They are isotope specific and therefore may be well suited to
determine the isotopic composition of fissile material. Since this measurement technique is non-
destructive, its application in dismantlement verification is potentially attractive. Challenges are low
transition probabilities, low detector efficiencies at high gamma energies, a high background of
gammas from induced fission in the fissile material and delayed fission gammas from both radiative
capture and induced fission. In addition, only few radiative neutron capture lines can be resolved,
while most form a quasi-continuum.
The gamma emission rates of neutron interrogated fissile material are analytically estimated. From the
variety of possible neutron sources, a DD-generator and a research reactor are selected. Additionally,
the application of a chopper, neutron-gamma anti-coincidence counters, moderation of the neutrons
and attenuation of the gammas by additional shielding have been investigated. The analytical
estimates are compared to the few published measured spectra.
The results for plutonium with thermal neutrons from either a research reactor or a moderated DD-
source are promising. Additional shielding to protect the gamma detector is indispensable. Highly
enriched uranium has much lower transition probabilities and it is not very attractive to measure the
enrichment with prompt gamma-rays from neutron capture. Potentials and limits of radiative neutron
capture measurements are summarised and an outlook is given.
Keywords: dismantlement; verification; PGAA; plutonium; uranium
1. Introduction
It is possible to determine the isotopic vector of
special nuclear material (SNM) with passive
gamma-ray spectroscopy. However, the emitted
photons are subject to strong self-attenuation
and absorption. Active measurements present a
promising alternative, especially if Information
Barriers (IB) are required and a black box is
measured [1, 2, 3]. Radiative neutron capture
reactions in SNM isotopes lead to a gamma
spectrum up to energies of 6.5 MeV. Such high
energy photons have a much higher
penetrability and therefore minimise shielding
and self-absorption effects.
In this paper, the potential of (n,γ)-
measurements for characterising fissile material
is assessed and open questions are addressed.
2. State of research
Radiative neutron capture reactions were most
researched in the 1990s and focused on low-Z
materials, e.g. to identify explosives1. In the last 
decade research in the US has shifted to SNM,
too, but only little information has been
published. Examples of such research are the
1 personal communication with Volker
Dangendorf, PTB, in November 2011
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“Nuclear Materials Identification System” 
(NMIS, which uses (n,γ) to identify explosives
[4]), the “Nuclear Car Wash” (NCW, which uses
(n,f) [5, 6]), Chemical Warfare Agents and
Explosives PGAA (which focuses on (n,γ) to
identify explosives [7, 8, 9, 10]) and the Nuclear
Resonance Fluorescence (NRF, which uses
gammas to activate the SNM [11]). Runkle et al.
give an overview on active interrogation of SNM
[12].
Figure 1: Measured plutonium-239 (n,γ)-intensities.
The references are specified in the plot legend.
Most papers on (n,γ) in plutonium date in the
1970s and 1980s and do not discuss isotopic
vectors [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. The
measured intensities vary between one and two
orders of magnitude between the different
publications and databases, see Figure 1.
Uranium has also been researched in the
2010s: Molnár et al. were able to assess the
enrichment up to 36% U-235 [21] and
Chichester et al. showed that a simple DD-
generator set-up is not fit to identify highly
enriched uranium [22].
There are two databases, which summarise
(n,γ)-intensities and specific cross sections,
respectively. The Prompt Gamma-ray neutron
Activation Analysis database (PGAA [23]) was
created from 1999 to 2003 by the International
Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Data Service
(IAEA NDS) and contains the natural elements
(up to uranium with Z=92). Plutonium is not
included, but the PGAA database refers to Lone
et al. [15]. The Thermal Neutron Capture
gamma's database (CapGam [24]) by the
Brookhaven National Laboratory National
Nuclear Data Center (BNL NNDC) was last
updated in 2013 and goes up to berkelium.
Most publications and both databases refer to
thermal neutron capture.
3. Assumptions
A Mathematica code has been written to
analytically anticipate the neutron induced
gamma spectra of fissile material above 3 MeV.
Two different neutron sources and three
different targets will be compared.
3.1. Neutron source
Two neutron sources are considered, a nuclear
research reactor and a Deuterium-Deuterium
Electronic Neutron Generator (DD-ENG). The
research reactor estimates are oriented towards
the existing PGAA set-ups in Garching and
Budapest [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. The
assumed FRM-II reactor has a thermal
equivalent neutron flux of 2.7 ∙ 1010 s−1 cm−2 at 
the target position and a cold source made of
25 K liquid D2 [25]. In the following, we use the
thermal equivalent flux because no
comprehensive neutron flux spectrum is





𝛷(𝐸𝑛)𝑑𝐸𝑛 = 𝜎𝛾,0𝛷0 
Deviations from the 1/v dependence are
accounted for with the according Westcott g
factors [33]. Their high neutron fluxes and low
neutron energies are major advantages of
research reactors, especially of the FRM-II.
For the DD-generator the continuous neutron
energy distribution given by Fantidis et al. [34]
is used. The total neutron flux is 105 s−1 cm−2 at 
the target position and the peak energy 2.5 𝑀𝑒𝑉
[35, 36]. The DD-source generates fast
neutrons and a lower flux, but has the decisive
asset to be portable.
3.2. Fissile material target
Target Mass ΔMass Isotope wt.% Δwt.%
HEU
[22] 610 g 1 g
U-235 90 1
U-238 10 1
HEU 100 g 1 g U-235 90 0.01U-238 10 0.01
WGPu 100 g 0.01 g Pu-239 95 0.01Pu-240 5 0.01
Table 1: Characteristics of the simulated
fissile material samples.
The assumed fissile material samples are
summarised in Table 1. The first target is
identical to a measured Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU) sample to allow comparison
[22]. The masses of the other two samples are
generic to facilitate extrapolation. All targets are
assumed to have a cross section of 1 𝑐𝑚²
perpendicular to the neutron beam and to
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approximate a point source in respect to the
HPGe detector.
3.3. Gamma detector efficiency
A point source in 10 cm distance of a HPGe
detector (50% NaI) is assumed. The following
efficiency calibration curve has been provided
by Helmut Fischer, University of Bremen2: 
ln(𝜀) ˭ {
 ,   𝐸≥100 𝑘𝑒𝑉
+0.382 𝑙𝑛3(𝐸)−0.01423 𝑙𝑛4(𝐸)
− 28.50+16.260 𝑙𝑛(𝐸)−3.83000 𝑙𝑛2(𝐸)
 
  ,    𝐸≤100 𝑘𝑒𝑉
+15.18 𝑙𝑛3(𝐸)− 0.89420 𝑙𝑛4(𝐸)
−294.7+273.70 𝑙𝑛(𝐸)−96.6700 𝑙𝑛2(𝐸)
 
Its uncertainty (including geometrical
uncertainties) is set to 10%.
3.4. Nuclear reactions
The reaction of most interest here is the
radiative neutron capture. In addition, the
background from neutron capture, prompt
fission gamma-rays and delayed fission
gammas are considered and added to the
signal. All other nuclear reactions, e.g.
spontaneous fission and neutron scattering are
neglected. The latter assumption is more
justifiable for slow, than for fast neutrons, as
non-elastic scattering with uranium and
plutonium occurs only at high neutron energies.
3.4.1. Radiative neutron capture
Most gamma-rays from radiative neutron
capture in fissile material form a quasi-
continuum and only few gamma-rays, mainly at
the extremes of the spectrum are distinct [32].
The radiative neutron capture signal is
assessed by the (n,γ)-reaction rate. Their cross
sections are taken from ENDF/B-VII.1
(duplicates were manually deleted3). As 
discussed in Section 2, the published intensities
vary significantly. The gamma-ray intensities
used here are from Chrien et al. [13] for Pu-239
and from the CapGam database [24] for U-235,
U-2384 and Pu-2405. These are the most 
reliable data sets in the view of the authors.
2 personal communication, June 2013
3 There exist more than one cross section for
some energies
4 The gamma-rays at 3913.1 keV and at 3406.9
keV are adapted from the according PGAA-
database intensities by the authors.
5 might be originally from White et al. [43], then
arbitrary intensities
Only gamma-rays with energies ≥ 3𝑀𝑒𝑉 are
considered here. The highest gamma energy is
at 6.5 𝑀𝑒𝑉 emitted by Pu-239, the lowest at
3.0 𝑀𝑒𝑉, emitted by U-238. The gamma-ray
energies for plutonium can be seen in Figure 4.
All these energies are valid for thermal neutron
capture; with moderately higher neutron
energies, the capture gamma energies are
shifted, too [19] and more and more transitions
are possible. These effects are neglected here
and the results for the DD source therefore
preliminary.
The gamma-ray intensities per neutron capture
range from 3.79 ∙ 10−6 (U-238) to 1.3 ∙ 10−1 (Pu-
240). The sums of all regarded discrete (n,γ)-
intensities for the four isotopes U-235, U-238,
Pu-239 and Pu-240 are 8.49 ∙ 10−3, 4.09 ∙ 10−2,
3.06 ∙ 10−2 and 9.37 ∙ 10−1, respectively. On 
average, 3.78 gammas are emitted per radiative
neutron capture [37] (for 𝐸𝑛 < 1.09 𝑀𝑒𝑉), but 
most of these form a quasi-continuum and only
very few gamma-rays at both ends of the (n,γ)-
spectrum can be observed [32].
To consider the most important physical effect
in the HPGe detector, each gamma-ray is
broadened to a Gaussian distribution with a
constant Full Width at Half Maximum (FWHM)
of 4 𝑘𝑒𝑉.
The count-rate is estimated as




where 𝑁𝐴𝑋 is the number of target atoms, 𝐼𝛾(𝐸𝛾) 
the intensity, 𝜀(𝐸𝛾) the detector efficiency, 
𝛷(𝐸𝑛) the neutron flux and 𝜎𝑛,𝛾(𝐸𝑛) the (n,γ)-
cross section.
3.4.2. Prompt fission gammas
The prompt fission background is assessed by
the (n,f)-rate. Their cross sections are taken
from ENDF/B-VII.1 [38]6. On average, each 
neutron induced fission leads to the emission of
8.095 photons [37] (for 𝐸𝑛 < 1.09 𝑀𝑒𝑉). Most 
fission gammas have energies smaller than 1
MeV. The gamma energy distributions used in
the following have been measured by [37, 39,
40]. Spontaneous fission and induced fission by
secondary neutrons are neglected. The prompt
fission gamma background count-rate is
calculated analogous to the (n,γ)-count-rate:




6 Again after deleting duplicate entries
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3.4.3. Delayed fission gammas and contin-
uous capture gammas
An additional background is caused by delayed
gammas from fission. To our knowledge no
such data is recorded in ENDF. Thus, an
estimate for the delayed fission gamma
spectrum was obtained by calculating the ratio
of delayed fission to prompt gammas for the
spectra given in Matussek et al. [16]. This
energy dependent ratio is then multiplied by the
intensities estimated for prompt gammas.
Most gamma-rays from radiative neutron
capture form a continuum. This additional
background is estimated analogously to the
delayed fission gammas.
A limitation of our approach is the incomplete
data base of measured spectra. First of all, only
Weapons-Grade Plutonium (WGPu) and HEU
were measured by Matussek et al., but not Pu-
240 and U-238. Hence, here the WGPu data
had to be used for Pu-239 and Pu-240 and the
HEU data for U-235 and U-238. Secondly, the
energy ranges covered only 4 𝑀𝑒𝑉 to 6 𝑀𝑒𝑉
and 4.2 𝑀𝑒𝑉 to 6.5 𝑀𝑒𝑉, respectively. Therefore
the ratio had to be extrapolated to include all
gamma lines (from 3.0 𝑀𝑒𝑉 to 6.5 𝑀𝑒𝑉). The
uncertainties are accordingly high.
4. Results
This section is divided in three subsections.
First, the application of a chopper and n-γ-anti-
coincidence set-up is discussed; second, the
estimate with a DD-generator; third, the
estimate with a thermal reactor neutron
spectrum.
4.1. Chopper and n-γ-anti-coincidence
It is possible to separate the (n,γ)-signal from
part of the background by the use of a chopper
and n-γ-anti-coincidence measurements as
successfully applied by Matussek et al. [16]. A
chopper or pulsed neutron beam allows a
differentiation between prompt and delayed
fission gammas, the n-γ-coincidence/-anti-
coincidence method between fission and (n,γ)-
reactions.
Figure 2 shows the simulated spectrum of the
HEU target with 90% enrichment and a DD-
source without delayed fission and prompt
fission gammas. This corresponds to the
application of a chopper and anti-coincidence
set-up as used by Matussek et al. As a result,
the (n,γ)-peaks become significantly more
visible. This effect is more intense for lower
energies, i.e. it favours the nuclei with an even
number of neutrons, Pu-240 and U-238.
Therefore, the U-238 peak at 4.060 𝑀𝑒𝑉 is
visible. Unfortunately, the fission product Rb-90
has a decay line at 4.062 𝑀𝑒𝑉 [41], which gives
additional background. The U-235 peak at
6.4 𝑀𝑒𝑉 is also significantly more distinct, but
still weak. This is due to the continuous (n,γ)-
background. In addition the overall count-rate is
very low. All (n,γ)-peaks above 4.81 𝑀𝑒𝑉 are
from U-235 and all below 4.64 𝑀𝑒𝑉 from U-238.
Figure 2: Theoretical (n,γ)-spectrum of a 610 𝑔 90%
enriched HEU sample and a DD-generator with
chopper and n-γ-anti-coincidence differentiation.
Shaded areas represent uncertainties.
For all four simulated set-ups (HEU/WGPu with
DD-ENG/FRM-II) the application of a chopper
and the anti-coincidence method increases the
signal to background ratio significantly, but
does not change the general picture.
4.2. DD-generator
4.2.1. Comparison with measurement of
uranium
For a 610 𝑔 90% enriched HEU sample our
estimated (n,γ)-spectrum does not show any
significant peak. Our estimations are in
agreement with the finding of Chichester et al.,
who used a similar set-up [22]. The background
is mostly due to the delayed fission background
and to a lesser degree due to prompt gammas
from induced fission in uranium-235 and to the
capture background.
4.2.2. Plutonium
The following results are produced with generic
targets to allow easy extrapolation. However,
due to self-absorption, a simple multiplication
does not suffice.
The identical set-up with the same DD-
generator, but a 1 𝑔 WGPu target shows an
lower count-rate, even if the mass difference is
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accounted for. No single Pu-239 (n,γ)-line can
be identified, at most some Pu-240 lines. For
plutonium, the three different background
contributors (Pu-239 fission, delayed fission
and neutron capture gammas) are in the same
order of magnitude up to 4 𝑀𝑒𝑉. Thereafter, the
delayed fission gammas become dominant.
4.2.3. Moderated DD-generator
The previous results indicate that an
unmoderated DD neutron source does not allow
the determination of the isotopic vector of
neither SNM.
Moderation of the fast neutrons shifts the ratio
between prompt fission (and following delayed
fission) and neutron capture gammas to more
desirable values. If one assumes a perfect
moderator, all neutrons will be slowed down to
the thermal state. Due to scattering, even with
such a perfect moderator, a loss of neutrons
still reaching the target will occur.
The used loss factor is established by MCNP
(Monte Carlo N-Particle code [42]) simulations.
An isotropic, mono-energetic 2.5 MeV neutron
point source is assumed. The neutrons are
moderated by 5 𝑐𝑚 thick and 10 𝑐𝑚 by 10 𝑐𝑚
wide polyethylene (PE) in 28 𝑐𝑚 distance of the
sample. This distance is derived from the
known total flux of the DD-ENG and that at the
target position [34, 35, 36]. The sample is a
sphere with 1.3 𝑐𝑚 radius, centred 6.3 𝑐𝑚
behind the PE. All neutrons entering the sample
sphere are detected. The neutron energy
distribution simulated by MCNP confirms the
assumption that many neutrons are
thermalised. Their number results in nmod,
whereas ncom is the number of neutrons that
would enter the sample if it was located at the
PE position (in 28 𝑐𝑚 distance of the source).
The loss factor results in 𝐿 = 𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑑
𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚
= 0.28. 
A perfectly moderated neutron spectrum
corresponds to the reactor spectra, which use a
thermal equivalent neutron flux. The difference
between the simulations of the moderated DD-
source and the reactor spectra lies in the
original relative neutron flux ratio times the loss
factor L. Only the count-rates and uncertainties
vary, while the shape of the gamma spectra can
be expected to be almost identical. The
potential of a maximally moderated DD-ENG
can therefore be estimated with the reactor
spectra, e.g. Figure 4. With the assumed loss
factor of 𝐿 = 0.28 and the relative flux difference
between the FRM-II and the supposed DD-
ENG, an overall factor of 𝐹 = 4.8 ∙ 104 results. 
4.3. Reactor spectra
This subsection is again divided in two parts.
First, uranium is discussed, second, plutonium.
4.3.1. Uranium
Figure 3: Theoretical (n,γ)-spectrum of a 100 𝑔 90%
enriched HEU sample and neutrons from the FRM-II
research reactor with “chopper” and n-γ-anti-
coincidence differentiation. Shaded areas represent
uncertainties.
As expected from the much higher neutron flux
of the neutron source, the overall count-rate is
much higher than with the DD-generator. It is so
high that dead time effects will dominate and
the detector might even be damaged.
Therefore, additional shielding will be
necessary, see Subsection 4.3.3.. However, the
fission background is still suppressing most
(n,γ)-peaks. The U-235 peak at 6.4 𝑀𝑒𝑉 is by
far the strongest peak. The U-238 4.06 𝑀𝑒𝑉
peak visible in the DD-spectrum (Figure 2) is
not visible here, due to a shift in the cross
section ratio 𝜎𝑈−235 𝜎𝑈−238⁄  and a high 
background from neutron capture and fission in
U-235.
By the application of a chopper and an anti-
coincidence set-up the (n,γ)-peaks become
more distinct, see Figure 3. However, the
general picture does not change. The U-238
peaks are still suppressed and the U-235 peak
at 6.4 𝑀𝑒𝑉 clearly dominates. This is consistent
with Matussek et al. [16], who could identify this
peak only. All (n,γ)-peaks above 4.81 𝑀𝑒𝑉 are
from U-235 and all below 4.64 𝑀𝑒𝑉 from U-238.
As discussed, these results are transferable to
an ideal moderated DD neutron source.
4.3.2. Plutonium
Figure 4 shows the simulated (n,γ)-spectrum of
a 1 g WGPu target with 95% Pu-239 and 5%
Pu-240 and the FRM-II research reactor as
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neutron source. All (n,γ)-peaks above 5.08 𝑀𝑒𝑉
are from Pu-239, all below 4.40 𝑀𝑒𝑉 from Pu-
240. The background is due to induced fission
gammas in Pu-239, subsequent delayed fission
gammas and continuous neutron capture
gammas.
Figure 4: Theoretical (n,γ)-spectrum of a 1 𝑔 WGPu
sample with 95% Pu-239 and 5% Pu-240 and the
FRM-II research reactor as neutron source (upper-
most curve). Shaded areas represent uncertainties.
Again, the overall count-rate is much higher
than with the DD-generator. Therefore,
additional shielding will be required. For
plutonium, most (n,γ)-lines are visible for both
isotopes, Pu-239 and Pu-240.
4.3.3. Attenuation of prompt and delayed
fission gammas
Figure 5: Pu spectrum (Figure 4, 95% Pu-235, 5%
Pu-240, FRM-II), attenuated by 0-20 𝑐𝑚 Pb.
The application of a chopper and anti-
coincidence set-up does not sufficiently reduce
the high gamma count-rates for the research
reactor spectra. Therefore, the gamma-rays
should be attenuated by additional shielding.
Figure 5 compares the FRM-II plutonium
spectrum in Figure 4 with the same spectrum
attenuated by 3 𝑐𝑚, 10 𝑐𝑚 and 20 𝑐𝑚 of Pb7. 
7 Mass attenuation coefficient data from Hubbel
and Seltzer [44]
The spectrum is extrapolated below 4 𝑀𝑒𝑉, see
Subsection 3.4.3., resulting in high
uncertainties. The peak/background ratio
between 3 and 6.5 𝑀𝑒𝑉 does hardly change.
This also applies to the simulations with
uranium as target and/or the DD-generator as
neutron source.
5. Conclusion
The estimates presented here indicate that
(n,γ)-spectroscopy with a simple DD-generator
set-up is not possible, neither for uranium as
already reported by Chichester et al. [22], nor
for plutonium. Even suppression of the major
external background effects (fission and
delayed fission gammas) would not allow the
determination of the isotopic compositions.
It is shown that the identification of Pu-239 and
Pu-240 is possible with reactor neutrons. It also
looks promising to measure the isotopic vector
of plutonium with thermalised neutrons from a
DD-generator.
This does not apply to uranium. A solution
could be to use thermal neutrons to measure U-
235, fast neutrons for U-238 and then combine
both results to determine the enrichment.
Lead shielding poses an effective instrument in
attenuating undesirable gamma-ray background
without significant adverse mitigation of the
(n,γ)-peaks between 3 and 6.5 𝑀𝑒𝑉.
6. Outlook
The (n,γ)-measurement technique could
expand current dismantlement verification
techniques. It could solve the issue of an
unknown shielding of the nuclear warhead or
weapon pit in the container. Uncertainties could
be reduced and therefore trust in the
measurements and information barriers
strengthened.
This measurement technique might also be
useful in IAEA Safeguard applications and
CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear) defence. While active interrogation
and the measurement of induced fission
gammas might suffice to find hidden fissile
material, it does not give information on the
isotopic vector, although it may be crucial.
In order to show the feasibility of the (n,γ)-
technique, we are going to perform
measurements with research reactor and
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moderated DD-ENG neutrons. For CBRN
defense additional estimates with radioactive
neutron sources such as americium-beryllium
and californium-252 are carried out.
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Abstract:
The present paper reports on an investigation of the presence and nature of impurities in a 185 GBq
241Am α-source and their influence on the associated neutron signatures. Originally this work was initiated
by the appearance of a few highly energetic Doppler broadened gamma-ray peaks in the gamma spectrum
measured with a Detective-EX HPGe detector. In order to explain the nature of these gamma-lines several
hypothesis have been checked. As a part of this procedure, the source was measured for signs of neutron
radiation. The results of a test using a neutron monitor detector indicated a presence of neutron emission
in the source. Following investigations of the source using EJ-309 fast liquid scintillators, which enable
a separation between neutron and gamma, confirmed the presence of neutrons. This allowed obtaining
a neutron spectrum and a quantification of the neutron source. Together, the experimental results and
the results of Monte-Carlo modeling of underlying processes which causes specific neutron and gamma
emissions allowed to uncover the possible type and nature of impurities in the 241Am alpha-source.
Keywords: impurities, alpha source, neutrons
1. Introduction
The presence of neutrons in the emission spectra of strong alpha-sources can obscure the correct iden-
tification of the material being investigated, leading, therefore, to confusing conclusions. For example, a 185
GBq 241Am α-source discussed in this paper originally was automatically identified as a plutonium sample[1].
This was a result of measuring a specific combination of gamma and neutron signatures of the source.
In most of the cases, appearance of neutrons is quite easily explained by the (α,n)-reactions on the ad-
joint materials of the source, such as Be, Li or Al. However, it is not as simple to explain and trace neutrons
originated from impurities-base reactions. Often impurities itself first become a subject for a separate inves-
tigation and only afterwards an origin of neutron emission is uncovered. The case which is considered in this
piece of the research falls under the latter category. Thus, the complete investigation of age and impurities
in the source is reported in [1]. The present paper is meant to be focused mostly on the investigation of
associated neutron signatures and provide additional details in the study of impurities.
2. Description of an experimental set-up and procedure
In order to investigate the presence of neutron emission in a 185 GBq 241Am sealed α-source and
suggest hypothesis on possible origin of the neutron emission experimental studies were performed in two
different setups. First experimental setup consisted of one EJ-309 (D76 x 76 mm) liquid scintillation detector
placed at the distance of 19 cm from the source as shown in Figure 1. The source was enclosed into
the lead container to decrease a contribution of low energetic gammas to the measurement data. Second
experimental setup consisted of two EJ-309 (D76 x 76 mm) liquid scintillation detectors placed each at the
distance of 23 cm from the source (at the 180◦). This setup was used in order to evaluate a count distribution
∗Corresponding author, email: dina@nephy.chalmers.se
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Figure 1: Photo of the configuration of the experimental setup (for one detector case).
for emitted neutrons. In all cases detectors were connected to the 8 channel, 12 bit 250 MS/s, VX1720E
CAEN digitizer. A calibration procedure was performed with 137Cs and 22Na sources in the same way as
described in [2]. As a result of this procedure, the high voltage bias and the DC offset were adjusted for each
detector/channel individually as follows: Channel 0 (Ch 0, Voltage: 1915 V, DC offcet: -38.4) and Channel
3 (Ch 3, Voltage: 1750 V, DC offcet: -39.9). In the first experimental setup data were collected during 610
seconds and afterwards post-processed offline (pulse height threshold was equal to 0.06 MeVee). Time
of data collection in the second setup was 877 seconds. Background was also measured and substructed
when needed, as a routine part of the procedure.
3. Indicators of neutron presence
Originally, a presence of neutron emission in the 241Am sealed α-source was discovered by using a
Neutron Monitor 2222A He-3, Pig detector. Results obtained in that measurements indicated the need
of careful separation between gamma and neutron particles which in the present study were approached
by using liquid scintillation detectors to obtain signals and pulse shape discrimination signal processing
procedure in a way similar to [3]. Pulse shape discrimination was performed by using a robust charge
comparison method [4]. It should be noticed that better discrimination quality may be obtained with other
methods, e.g. correlation-based techniques [5] or artificial neural networks [6, 7]. Although, as shown in
Figure 2, the charge comparison method shows good performance in the present case, the neutrons and
gammas are well separated. As it is shown, there is a clear presence of significant amount of neutrons in
Figure 2: 2D plot of the counts as a function of the pulse energy and the PSD parameter[3].
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the emission spectra of strong α-source. To achieve a sufficiently good separation between neutrons and
gammas, the PSD parameter threshold was set to a value of 0.175.
Thus, by taking into account the solid angle and point source model, the first approximation of the neutron
(with energy higher than ∼600 keV) emission intensity provides a value of (1.9±0.1)· 104 neutrons per
second. The corresponding value for gammas (with energy higher than ∼60 keV) is (6.19±0.08)· 105
gammas per second. However, it should be mentioned that these values are still underestimated and are
planned to be further investigated with a joint use of MCNPX modeling and experimental tests.
In order to investigate a neutron pulse height spectra measured by liquid scintillation detectors, measured
light output in the units of MeVee was converted to the transferred neutron energy in the units of MeV by
using following expression:
E(MeV ) = 3.2169+1.223∗L(MeVee)+3.368591∗LambertW (−0.367∗ e−0.3632∗L(MeVee)), (1)
where LambertW is the Lambert W function (the omega function), L(MeVee) is the measured light output in
the units of MeVee. Quantitative values of the expression implicitly corresponds to the experimental values
of the exponential light curve 3-inch EJ-309 liquid scintillation detector measured in [8].
In Figure 3 one could see measured neutron pulse height spectra. In order to get any correspondence
Pulse height, MeV









Figure 3: The neutron pulse height spectra measured by liquid scintillation detectors.
between the measured and source-related neutron spectrum an unfolding procedure shall be performed.
This is, however, a subject for future work.
4. An investigation of impurities
4.1. Identified gamma lines and corresponding impurities
The analysis of impurities and their sources is well described in our paper [1]. However, it is important
to recall some results. As a first step of impurities evaluation, the strong α-source was measured using a
high purity germanium (HPGe) detector of coaxial type with high voltage bias set to -3000 V. The data was
collected during 26100 seconds with a dead time of 13.66 %. The normalized results of these measurements
are shown in Figure 4 together with a pulse height gamma spectrum obtained by EJ-309 liquid scintillation
detector. The analysis of energies of gamma lines in the spectrum together with analysis of the slowing-
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Figure 4: The gamma pulse height/energy spectra measured by liquid scintillation detector and HPGe detector (normalized).
down time of ions (23Na, 26Mg, 29Si etc.) in a 241Am source1[1] and half-lives of the excited states of 23Na,
26Mg, 29Si etc., in particular, analysis of Doppler shift in the gamma peaks, allowed us manually draw the
conclusions on the presence of specific impurities in the source and on the possible scheme of their evolution
within the source, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Identified gamma lines from nuclides other than 241Am and its progeny, and suggested scheme of reactions.
One should mention that there are a number of programs which are normally used to evaluate origin
of gamma-rays in the sources; most of them cover a wide range of energies and reaction types. However,
as far as we are aware, none of them is polished enough to evaluate impurity types using specifically α
particle induced gamma-rays. For example, even if 23Na impurity can be identified by some of the programs,
identification of the 26Mg, 29Si and 26,27,29Al impurities (present at the same time) can lead to a confusion.
Therefore, in order to verify our ”half-manual” identification of impurities the artificial neural networks
1MCNPX simulations
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were applied together with experimental data as a result of measurements of prompt gamma-rays induced
by 5 MeV alpha-particles on 56 elements of periodic Mendeleev table[9].
4.2. Application of artificial neural networks
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) can be applied to many data processing applications, among them
rapid pattern recognition. In order to identify impurities in the 241Am source by using the ANN, we have
created a library of 56 elements with gamma peak energy data obtained by bombarding the elements with
5 MeV alpha particles[9]. The first tests were performed for nine single elements and five combinations of
two elements. It is planned in further work to include all 56 elements and their combinations.
The ANN used in this work is constructed from the Neural Network Toolbox in MatLab[10]. Different
structures of networks and training algorithms were investigated and the best combination was selected
by method of trials and errors. The ANN training procedure includes gamma-ray energies from individual
elements as input data with a back-propagation (BP) algorithm.
The Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) back-propagation training algorithm was found to be the most effective
one for the given task. The ANN is composed of an input layer with energy gamma peaks provided to each
neuron of the input layer, two hidden layers with 35 and 15 neurons, respectively determined through trials
and errors to be optimal and an output layer for 9 elements and 5 combinations of two elements. Each
output neuron corresponds to one element or combination of elements and the output value corresponds to
a probability of existence of the elements or their combinations. The log-sigmoid transfer function was used
for the hidden and output layers, giving values between 0 and 1. The training target values were set to 1 for
the correct element and 0 for the other elements or their combinations. The input data were pre-processed
with histogram with energy step of 10 keV in the energy range between 700 and 3854 keV.
After the time-consuming training process, the identification procedure with the ANN is fast. The network
was tested with the gamma spectrum of the source of 241Am measured by a high purity germanium (HPGe)
detector of coaxial type [1]. After subtraction of background gamma peaks and gamma peaks from the pure
241Am, the rest of gamma peaks in the measured spectrum of 241Am source is presented to the trained
network in order to identify impurities.
Table 1 shows the list of elements and their combinations which were used in the training procedure,
as well as probabilities of their recognition by the ANN for the measured spectrum of 241Am (spectrum in
question).
Table 1: Recognition of impurities by the ANN.
Element Na Mg Cu Al Si B O2 Fe Zn Na+Mg Al+Si Na+Cu Mg+Cu Cu+Si
Recognition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Results shown in the Table 1 indicate that the trained network with a high probability recognizes the
presence of the combination of Na and Mg impurities in the strong 241Am source.
Thus, ANN algorithm which was tested in the present work shows a potential to be used for high accuracy
identification of combination of impurities present in a strong 241Am α-sources. It may possibly be used for
other types of α-sources but it is not adapted for this yet. This type of ANN approach is considered to be
useful in situations that require rapid response without accurate quantification.
5. Possible sources of neutrons
Both manual and ANN-based analysis of impurities partially confirms the presence of 23Na and 26Mg
impurities in the 241Am source. Therefore, as shown in Figure 5 for the 241Am source there are three main
reactions which can lead to the production of neutrons in the strong α-source containing impurities:
23Na+α → (α,nγ)26Al
26Mg+α → (α,nγ)29Si
241Am− spontaneous f ission→ p(n,γ)
(2)
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Regarding the last item in the list, i.e. a production of the neutrons in spontaneous fission of 241Am itself, it
should be mentioned that branching of 241Am decay by spontaneous fission is very rare, i.e. the probability
is 3.6(9)E-10 %. However, 241Am has a high cross-section for induced neutron fission (both low energy and
high energy neutrons), which may play a significant role in estimation of neutron emission intensity of the
241Am source with impurities. Therefore, this effect was investigated additionally in the second experimental
setup with two liquid scintillation detectors. The same data processing procedure was followed with the only
difference that a time stamping information was retrieved and used to build a neutron count distribution in
the time gate, as shown in Figure 6.
Number of counts in the gate



















Figure 6: The neutron count distribution in the time gate.
In a case of induced fission neutrons present, the individual detections of neutrons should not be inde-
pendent, instead rather positive correlations should exist between them due to the branching character of the
fission process. At the same time, in the case of neutrons emitted from a source that follows simple Poisson
statistics, the individual detections of neutrons are independent. Figure 6 indicates that with a high degree
Figure 7: Cross-section data from Experimental Nuclear Reaction Data (EXFOR)[11].
of confidence it is possible to conclude that most of the neutrons emitted from the strong 241Am α-source
obey Poisson statistics. It means that certainly these are not fission neutrons, and therefore, most probably
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these neutrons are emitted in (α,nγ) reactions (see discussion above). According to [12], in sodium a yield
of neutrons per 106 alpha particles with average energy of 5.3 MeV is ∼ 1.5, which is 5.55·106 neutrons
per second per Ci, or 2.49·108 neutrons per second per gram. At the same time in magnesium a yield of
neutrons per 106 alpha particles with average energy of 5.3 MeV is ∼ 1.4, which is 5.18·106 neutrons per
second per Ci, or 2.33·108 neutrons per second per gram.
However, as one can see in Figure 7 it is not clear which element, 23Na or 26Mg, contributes the most to
the neutron emission. This therefore, is to be investigated further.
6. Conclusions
As a result of present study, the intensity of emission of neutrons with energy higher than ∼600 keV
was evaluated as (1.9±0.1)· 104 neutrons per second in a first approximation. Since most of the neutrons
emitted from the strong 241Am α-source are obeying Poisson statistics they are certainly not born in a fission
process. Therefore, most of these neutrons are suspected to be emitted in two (α,nγ) reactions on 23Na and
26Mg. As shown by manual and ANN investigations, these are the main impurities in the strong 241Am α-
source. However, at the present state it is not possible to draw any conclusion on the individual contribution
of each element 23Na or 26Mg to the neutron emission. This therefore, is to be investigated further.
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Abstract: 
A rapid and effective preparative procedure has been evaluated for the accurate determination of low-
energy (40-200 keV) gamma-emitting radionuclides (210Pb, 234Th, 226Ra, 235U) in uranium ores and 
uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) using high-resolution gamma ray spectrometry. The measurement 
of low-energy gamma photons is complicated in heterogeneous samples containing dense, mineral 
phases. Attenuation corrections using mean density estimates result in an underestimation of the 
activity concentration where dense grains are dispersed within a less dense matrix (analogous to a 
nugget effect). The current method overcomes these problems using a lithium tetraborate fusion that 
readily dissolves all components including high-density, self-attenuating minerals/compounds in a 
matter of minutes.  This is the ideal method for dissolving complex, non-volatile components in soils, 
rocks, mineral concentrates, and other materials where density reduction is required. This approach 
avoids the need for theoretical corrections or sample-specific matrix matching. The resulting 
homogeneous quenched glass produced can be quickly dissolved in nitric acid.  The technique has 
been tested on uranium-bearing Certified Reference Materials and provides accurate activity 
concentrates compared to the underestimated activity concentration estimates derived from direct 
measurements of a bulk sample. The procedure offers an attractive solution for initial nuclear forensic 
studies where complex refractory minerals or matrices exist and is significantly faster, safer and 
simpler than alternative approaches and produces low-density solutions that can be counted by 
gamma spectrometry.  
Keywords: Borate fusion; photon self-attenuation; heterogeneous matrix. 
1. Introduction
The Nuclear Forensics International Technical 
Working Group recommend high-resolution 
gamma spectrometry (HRGS) on receipt of 
unknown, illicitly recovered materials such as 
uranium ore and uranium ore concentrate 
(UOC) [1–4]. In addition, the development of a 
database of gamma nuclide signatures for U-
ores and UOCs of known provenance, 
combined with Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) could aid in identifying the origin and 
history of recovered uranium ores and their 
concentrates.  
The variance in sample matrices from HRGS 
calibration standards can cause an under or 
overestimation in photopeak efficiency for the 
detector due to the self-attenuation of low 
energy gamma photons within the matrix. 
Several radionuclides from the uranium and 
thorium series have low energy gamma 
emissions, which could be attenuated (table 1). 
Previous studies to overcome photon 
attenuation typically require direct transmission 
observations with a highly active source [5]; 
proxy measurements of higher energy gamma 
photons [6]; or theoretical density corrections 
derived from modelling photon interactions with 
the sample matrix [7]. This is not practical for 
rapid characterisation of recovered illicit 
materials. Additionally, adjusting the HRGS 
calibrations based on the relationship between 
photon efficiency and sample bulk density 
results in lower than expected activity 
concentrations.  This problem is caused by 
dense U particles (uraninite = 8.5 g cm-3) of 
varying size and concentration supported in 
less dense bulk matrices (typically < 2.0 g cm-
3). 





210Pb 46.5 4.3 



























226Ra 186.2 3.6 
Table 1: Selected gamma emitting radionuclides where energy = < 200 keV and yield = > 1%. 
A sample dissolution method using di-lithium 
tetraborate borate fusion was developed to 
reduce self-attenuation effects observed in U-
bearing compounds to yield accurate activity 
concentrations from gamma-emitting 
radionuclides. This method does not require 
accurate characterisation of the sample prior to 
measurement, nor does it require any 
assumptions to be made about the samples 
composition or history.  
2. Instrumentation
Radionuclide activity concentrations were 
determined with Canberra 50% N-type High 
Purity Germanium (HPGe) well-type detectors. 
Gamma spectra were acquired using Genie 
2000 acquisition software (Canberra Industries, 
Harwell, UK) and analysed using Fitzpeaks 
spectral deconvolving software (JF-Computing, 
Stanford in the Vale, UK). The spectrometers 
were previously calibrated using a traceable, 
mixed nuclide source (NPL, Teddington, UK) 
with the addition of a 210Pb solution standard 
(PTB, Braunschweig, Germany) mixed into a 
range of difference density matrices (cellulose, 
water, sand, steel and boron and a tin-tungsten 
ore) to produce a set of efficiency calibrations.  
All samples were counted for one hour, as this 
was found suitable to obtain adequate counting 
statistics. The limit of detection values 
presented are based on the decision limit (or 
critical level) as defined by Currie [8]. 
3. Methodology
Three certified reference materials for uranium 
(CUP-1, BL-5 and CUP-2, Canadian Certified 
Reference Materials Project, Ottawa, Canada; 
table 2) were selected for this study. 
CUP-1 [9] BL-5  [10–12] CUP-2 [13] 
Uranium (Wt%) 0.128 ± 0.002 7.09 ± 0.03 75.42 ± 0.17 
238U (Bq g-1)a 15.8 ± 0.3 876 ± 3.7 9313 ± 21 
235U (Bq g-1)a 0.70 ± 0.01 41.0 ± 0.2 434 ± 1 
226Ra (Bq g-1) As 238U 866 ± 21 < LOD 
210Pb (Bq g-1) As 238U 857 ± 38 < LOD 
Table 2: Certified Reference Materials Data. aActivity concentration calculated from certified U wt% assuming 
natural 238U/235U abundances (99.275% and 0.72% respectively). 
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3.1 Initial characterisation of certified 
reference materials 
All three certified reference materials were 
weighted into 20 mL polythene vials (CUP-1 = 
28.1 g, BL-5 = 31.6 g, CUP-2 = 34.8 g) and the 
bulk densities were determined (1.36, 1.53 and 
1.68 g cm-3 respectively). Apparent photon 
efficiencies of each measured radionuclide 
were calculated based on the bulk density of 
each reference material from the known 
relationship between photon detection 
efficiency and calibration standard density. The 
samples were characterised for 210Pb, 234Th, 
226Ra, 235U and 234mPa activity concentrations. 
Protactinium-234m was measured as its high-
energy gamma emissions (1001 keV) should 
not undergo sufficient photon attenuation in 
comparison to the lower energy radionuclides. 
Lead-214 and 214Bi were not assessed for their 
extent of attenuation due to the possible 
disequilibria caused during sample preparation 
and radon de-gassing. 
3.2 Lithium borate fusion 
Borate fusion is well established as a sample 
digestion or dissolution method in geochemistry 
and is known to be effective in dissolving 
minerals and rocks comprising oxides, 
carbonates, chlorides, sulphates, sulphides, 
phosphates and metallic materials. Given the 
beneficial characteristics of borate fusions as a 
sample dissolution technique, it is surprising 
that there were no reported applications in the 
field or radioanalytical chemistry until the 
radiometric work of Croudace et al 1998 [14]. 
Prior to that study all reported radioanalytical 
preparations used a range of less effective and 
hazardous acid digestions or laborious alkali 
fusions. 
The three certified reference materials were 
ignited at 600 °C for 3 hours to oxidise the 
sample and to inhibit volatilisation of elements 
such as Pb. An aliquot of 0.5 g of ignited 
reference material was weighed in to a platinum 
crucible at a 1:1 ratio with di-lithium tetraborate 
flux (Fluxana, Germany). The crucible is 
agitated to mix the two components and fused 
on a Vulcan Fusion Machine (Fluxana, 
Germany) where the sample is heated to 1200 
°C and periodically agitated for approximately 
10 minutes. The resulting melt is quenched in 
50 mL of Milli-Q water and acidified with 50 mL 
concentrated nitric acid. Any residual material in 
the platinum crucible is collected and 
transferred to the digest. The sample is then 
heated at 80 °C to reduce the sample volume. 
Boric acid and silica may precipitate which 
requires filtering. The digest and precipitate is 
separated with a Whatman GF-C filter paper 
supported on a Whatman No 540 filter paper 
using vacuum filtration.  The filters papers are 
then rinsed with 8M HNO3 and effectively 
retained the precipitate resulting in a clear 
solution being collected. The precipitate 
contained no detectable radioactivity. The 
filtered solutions are reduced in volume to < 20 
mL on a hot plate at 80 °C and then transferred 
to a 20 mL polythene vial with washing and 
made up to 20 mL. The samples were counted 
immediately for the same radionuclides 
identified above. 
4. Results
The direct measurements for all three of the 
certified reference materials yielded low than 
expected activity concentrations for measured 
radionuclides (figure 1). The extent of the bias 
between the measured and certified activity 
concentrations is proportional to the increasing 
uranium content in the reference material. This 
can be observed with 234Th where the activity 
concentration is 94%, 65% and 7% of the 
certified value for CUP-1, BL-5 and CUP-2 
respectively. Where a certified activity 
concentration is not available for one of the 
measured radionuclides, the closest parent 
isotope value has been used. Reference 
material CUP-1 had no measurable 234mPa as it 
was not likely resolvable from the Compton 
background as the emission yield is very low 
(0.847%) in a low uranium concentration 
material (0.128%). Reference material CUP-2 
had no measurable 226Ra or 210Pb due to the 
material being a uranium ore concentrate and 
insufficient time for ingrowth following the ore 
processing. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
601

































































Figure 1: Activity concentrations for selected radionuclides of both solid and fused certified reference materials 
against the expected activity concentrations based on certified values. 
The discrepancy with the direct measurements 
was identified as being proportional to the 
uranium concentration and the uranium particle 
size causing a “hot-particle effect” where the 
uranium is supported within a less dense bulk 
matrix. This characteristic would be difficult to 
matrix-match without significant sample 
characterisation and is the cause of the self-
attenuation observed when directly measuring 
the certified reference materials.  
The measured activities of the reference 
materials via the lithium borate fusion technique 
are all within uncertainty of the certified values. 
The fusion technique significantly reduces any 
matrix effects present in heterogeneously 
distributed uranium-bearing samples where 
grain size, density and concentration can vary. 
The average uranium weight percentage 
obtained from the fused materials yields 0.12 ± 
0.02, 7.24 ± 0.33 and 75.2 ± 1.8 for CUP-1, BL-
5 and CUP-2 respectively and are in agreement 
with certified values (table 2). 
Both 235U and 226Ra emit ~186 keV gamma 
photons with a yield of 57.0% and 3.6% 
respectively. The deconvolving software uses 
lower energy 235U gamma photons to determine 
how much of the 186 keV photopeak to assign 
to each radionuclide as 226Ra only has one 
major emission energy. However, if the lower 
energy gamma photons of 235U (143.8 keV with 
11% yield) are being attenuated then this 
correction will be inaccurate resulting in lower 
235U and higher 226Ra activity concentrations. 
This is observed in certified material BL-5 
where 235U and 226Ra measured activity 
concentrations are 64 ± 12% and 113 ± 17% 
respectively and are not within uncertainty of 
one another. Once the reference material was 
fused, the activities were measured as 96 ± 7% 
and 95 ± 7% 235U and 226Ra respectively. This 
is important as a qualitative correction could 
produce an inaccurate 235U activity 
concentration if the sample has been enriched 
in 235U, does not contain the natural 238U/235U 
ratio, or has been processed whereby 226Ra 
would not be expected to be present.  
5. Conclusion
The lithium borate fusion technique achieves a 
highly effective and rapid dissolution of virtually 
any difficult to dissolve material (silicates, 
oxides, sulphates) as well as dissolving 
carbonates and halides.  This ability makes it 
an attractive approach for rapid sample 
dissolution. The fusion process solubilises 
mineral particles removing the “hot-particle 
effects” and increases the detection efficiency 
of low-energy gamma-emitting nuclides such as 
210Pb and 234Th in heterogeneous U-bearing 
samples. The high uranium content of CRM 
CUP-2 (75 Wt% U) had a 234Th activity 
concentration of 7 ± 1% of the certified value 
when measured in its solid form using an 
efficiency correction based on its bulk density. 
After the borate fusion and digestion technique, 
the 234Th concentration was 100 ± 2% of the 
certified value. The dense uranium-bearing 
grains are present within a lower bulk density 
matrix with variable grains sizes causing self-
attenuation of low-energy gamma photons. The 
fusion technique avoids the need for sample-
specific matrix matching or correcting and, 
combined with rapid sample preparation, offers 
an attractive, efficient alternative for accurate 
radiometric characterisation.  
The procedure developed could be used to 
develop a database containing radionuclide 
activities, U-concentrations, 238U:235U / 
238U:232Th ratios, and extent of secular 
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equilibrium for U-ores and uranium ore 
concentrates of known provenance so that 
recovered, illicit nuclear materials can be 
rapidly analysed and compared as part of a 
nuclear forensic characterisation. 
The borate fusion technique can be used in 
other applications where accurate and rapid 
characterisation of low-energy gamma photons 
is required, such as accurately measuring 
241Am, 239Pu or 241Pu as part of a nuclear 
forensic effort or environmental monitoring. The 
technique was used to process and analyse 
>700 soil samples in only 12 weeks from the 
Greenham Common Airbase where an alleged 
nuclear incident took place in 1958. The fused 
samples underwent extraction chromatography 
of U and Pu in preparation for high precision 
radiometric and TIMS measurements [14,15]. 
Any material that may be affected by a “hot-
particle effect” that requires accurate 
radiometric characterisation would benefit from 
the borate fusion technique, e.g. the accurate 
characterisation of hot-particles near nuclear 
sites such as Dounreay, UK [16] or Chernobyl, 
Ukraine [17,18] .The petroleum and mineral 
processing industries also regularly encounter 
NORM scales and deposits having high 
densities that contain Ba, Ra, U and Th and 
thorium. The accurate determination of the 
associated low-energy gamma radionuclides is 
critical for radiological assessment and for 
appropriately handling and disposing of waste 
and tailings. Such characterisations could also 
be facilitated using the lithium borate fusion-
based technique.  
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The relationship between industry and authorities represents one of the most pressing export control
issues in Europe and worldwide.
The strategic export control legal framework in its regional or national formulations normally puts
responsibility on exporters, whose awareness and compliance are key in making export controls an
important non-proliferation tool. Without due collaboration with and contact to authorities, the licensing
process would be less effective and illicit procurement could occur more easily, with enforcement
measures the only possibly remaining effective barriers to an illegal shipment.
However, compliance could be seen by exporters as a burden slowing down trade, or even
excessively controlling it, with unavoidable costs that not all exporters can afford, for example SMEs.
At the same time, not all goods and destinations are equally sensitive. An adequate risk analysis,
cost/benefit , discussion and consideration of incentives as well as enhanced collaboration could bring
such an approach even further, providing useful information to the authorities and simplified
procedures for exporters.
While the topic has been discussed repeatedly over the years, concrete and significant changes to
the relationship have yet to be conceptualized or implemented.
The ESARDA export control working group recently held a meeting to identify concrete ways in which
industry and authorities can communicate and cooperate more effectively in order to achieve common
non-proliferation goals and aim towards a risk-based export control approach. The conclusions of the
meeting and further reflections are presented in the paper.
1. Introduction
Strategic export control is one of the pillars of nuclear non-proliferation, complemented by the
international safeguards and physical protection requirements.
Nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation programs are always potentially inter-twinned, which is a
point to be taken into account when analysing the development of civil nuclear energy.
Since the end of WWII, the State-level proliferation in the 60’s and 70’s and the advent of
transnational illicit procurement networks in the 90’s and early 2000s, the awareness of WMD
proliferation risks has grown, together with the risks for exporters. In this long period of time the
control was extended to non-nuclear “dual-use” materials, technology and equipment.
UNSCR 1540 [1] “Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their
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means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials..” and hence
calls States to implement an efficient export control systems to prevent illicit trafficking.
In this respect it is clear that only States whose exporters comply with the DU export control
regulatory framework can contribute to such a challenging effort.
In the EU, the legal framework is set by EC Regulation 428/2009 [2] and subsequent amendments,
the latest of which brought the dual-use control list (Annex I) up to date with the changes decided by
the international export control regimes [3,4,7,8] until 2013 (a new revision is already in progress).
The dual-use Regulation places an increased emphasis on the responsibility of the exporter. For
instance, the catch-all provision in article 4 of the DU Regulation not only require a licence for non-
listed items if the exporter has been informed by his national authority, but also if the exporter is
aware or has grounds for suspecting that the items will be used for WMD proliferation purposes. The
same applies in other legal frameworks, like the US one.
2. A system with many stake-holders
The scope and the efficacy of export control systems depend on the political will of governments, their
legal systems and procedures, the awareness and training of their services, the international
coordination of their efforts, their interaction with the industry and many more aspects of the complex
machinery to put in place in order to mitigate the risk that legitimate trade is abused for illegitimate
purposes.
Unlike other domains such as the regulation of nuclear energy or chemical agents, no law-based
institution exists that oversees and sets international standards for strategic trade control. The so-
called International export control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group [3] are only politically
binding for a, which have anyway a crucial importance because they define the control lists
incorporated by national laws or regional regulations [4,5].
The implementation is responsibility of national authorities and therefore of all the other stake-holders
involved, starting from the exporters. Indeed little would be effectively possible without informed,
aware, collaborative and complaint suppliers and exporters. They are the primary actors to comply
with requirements, starting from turning down unclear requests of export, to seeking the advice and
authorisation of licensing authorities, and making correct declarations enabling enforcement of
controls by customs.
The IAEA does not implement export controls, but benefits from their existence in terms of barrier to
the uncontrolled diffusion of goods and technologies, and from the reporting duties foreseen under the
Additional Protocol, although limited to the 1992 version of the Trigger List [9] meanwhile amended
several times [10]. IAEA reporting requirements do not cover supply of Trigger List technology,
although States may report such transfers, where they are known, on a voluntary basis.
Amongst the international organisations, the World Customs Organisation has made a significant step
by launching its program on Strategic Trade Control Enforcement, which is geared to customs
authorities but also has significant links to the other stake-holders. Just to mention one aspect,
customs universally rely on the Harmonised System to identify goods, just as well as exporters have
to use it in order to rate their goods first of all in order to calculate VAT and duties. Licensing
authorities start from the different angle of the Dual Use coding system in 10 categories, which is not
at all aligned with the HS. Correlation tables exist which trigger warnings on certain HS/CN codes as
they may refer to dual-use items, but probably more efforts should be done to bring first of all the dual-
use codes in line with the customs/exporters jargon.
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Figure 1 – Strategic export control scheme
3. Challenges
Strategic trade control’s challenges apply to all stake-holders, from the private sector to governmental
services. As recalled in [11], there are challenges intrinsic to export control regulations and systems
and others deriving from continuous and sometimes spectacular evolutions of technology,
communication and trade in an increasingly globalized environment.
They can summarised as:
- Interpretation of technical control text
- Intangible Technology Transfers
- Implementation and enforcement
- Catch-all clause
- Dual Use technology evolution
- Foreign availability of goods
- Technical capabilities of authorities
- Information exchanges among authorities
- Transit / Transhipment interpretation
- Brokering controls
- Sanctions
- Military control lists
- Extra-territorial controls, typically required by the US administration, as the control on re-
exports and even deemed re-exports [JRC NNSA ESARDA seminar]
3.1 Technical challenges
The dual-use control list derives from the international export control regimes [3,4,7,8] and the
Chemical Weapons Convention [13]. The EU list is contained in Annex I to EC Regulation 428/2009,
lately amended as Regulation 1382/2014. Some EU national versions of the list may contain
additions. The US Commodity Control List uses the same structure and adds about 25% more goods.
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The interpretation of the very technical nature of controls on dual use items presents challenges to
exporters and authorities. The controlled items are defined in advanced technical terms, difficult to
understand by nonspecialists, as well as to relate to commercial products.
Sometimes, only manufacturers and users (sensitive or not) can easily assess whether their products
meet specifications of control lists. Interaction and exchange with the authorities can help mutual
understanding, also when deciding how to choose the relevant dual-use code and Harmonised
System code, which is needed for both checking the possible duties in export countries, as well as a
tool for customs enforcement at borders which may be triggered by warnings raised by possible
correlation between DU and HS/CN. This is a complicated exercise supported by e.g. the TARIC
correlation table.
Figure 2 – EU dual-use control list
Other technical lists are included in measures targeting certain countries, like Iran [14 and
amendments] and DPRK [15].
3.2 Transparency and catch-all
As introduced by some regimes, the EU regulation and other national legal instruments allow the
authorities to impose catch-all requirements on non-listed items that may contribute to proliferation
programmes. It enables governments to request licenses for any transaction on the basis of the
assessed risk of contribution to a WMD program, even if the item is not on a control list.
This is a complicated matter, as it creates a grey area around the official control list (which already
has its degree of interpretation). The increased use of catch all clauses creates new uncertainties for
the trade and manufacturing industry.
Sensitivity and security consideration may impose serious limits to the transparency of licensing
decisions and to coordination between governments. In certain countries a catch-all requirement may
lead to a no-license required, or automatically to a denial. The result is a certain level of uncertainty,
unpredictability and inconsistency of licensing decisions which is uncomfortable for the private sector
as much as for governmental implementers. It is prone to creating a uneven playing field among
countries and hence the so-called “license shopping”.
As Figure 3 pictorially shows, also no concern states might be the target of a catch-all denial, because
of fear for diversion and re-export to sensitive destinations, e.g. because the declared consignee/end
user and/or the country’s legal and enforcement framework do not offer sufficient guarantees.
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Figure 3 – Mapping of the various types of dual-use related controls versus countries of destinations.
3.3 Globalisation and foreign availability of goods
The globalisation of strategic trade was caused by a general increase in the flow of nuclear materials
and equipment and technology in the past decade.
New countries engaging in nuclear trade are becoming able to supply nuclear dual-use goods and
technology
Various important transit and trans-shipment points along supply routes.
It is hence increasingly important to have effective and efficient export control systems in partner
countries along the supply chain route.
Industrial production apparatus have evolved to become worldwide integrated productions systems.
Even without externalization, the functioning of large industrial groups involves many intra-company
movements of commodities cross borders.
Production processes have been fragmented between multiple production sites and legal entities
worldwide, in countries having its own export control regulation and practice.
Traditional technology holding countries delocalised their production only in countries where sufficient
trade controls are in place. In this respect it can be said that having an export control system allowed
these countries getting advanced technology and jobs. Some “trusted” countries even appear in the 
list of destinations for which General Export Authorisations or license exemptions apply.
A side aspects of globalised production is also that companies located in the EU or countries were
controls are stringent may fear unfair competition by competitors based in countries with a lower level
of controls. Exchange of information with authorities is hence key to provide evidence which can be
used to try and establish a communication among governments to address the issue.
3.4 Intangible technology
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New challenges are posed by intangible technology transfers (ITT) and the increasing importance of
dual use research across national borders, which can also be exploited by front institutions in
countries of concern. Awareness of dual-use controls in the research and academic community
present particular challenges for regulators.
Monitoring technology transfers by intangible means poses its own set of problems. Cloud computing
is a typical case. Centralised data storage and access are widely used and can pose export control
issues even within large companies located in various countries. In this respect, the link to cyber-
threats and data integrity is very close.
Export control systems are still best suited to control finished products physically crossing borders;
when the production process and corporate organization fit within political boundaries. There may be
opportunities associated. Modern technology provides new tools for detection, data processing and
information analysis to enforcement services, licensing officers and compliance departments of
companies.
Enhanced communication among stake-holders remains the only effective way of raising awarenss
and duly implementing controls without suffocating business and research activities.
4. The role of exporters
4.1 Awareness
Awareness and compliance, triggering the export authorisation process in circumstances where this is
required, are the primary elements of an effective export control system. The system cannot be
effective if it relies solely on enforcement action, fines and imprisonment. It must be embedded in the
company’s policy and procedural arrangements.
Many small and medium size enterprises, the transportation industries or trade agents, may have
difficulties staying up to date with their export control obligations and finding the means to be
compliant.
More in general, if we take into consideration a sensitive, potentially WMD-related process and all the
“actors” involved, we can reasonably say that all the suppliers directly dealing with controlled items
are aware of sensitivities and, ideally, act consequently following all the necessary procedures. But
the further we go from the central process, e.g. relying on sub-contractors, consultants and other
professional (or research bodies) involved, the level of awareness, information and hence compliance
may differ greatly.
Awareness is also perceived differently, depending on the “distance” from the core-controlled process
and the type of business.
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Figure 4 – The “awareness ring”
4.2 Internal Compliance
Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs) are a key instrument to promote suppliers’ awareness raising 
and the fulfilment of export control requirements (e.g. the supply chain, systems integrators,
distributors and others such as research centres).
A properly implemented ICP provides an organisation exporting sensitive items and technologies with
a structured approach, and supports a culture of doing business in ways that ensure delivery of items
to legitimate end-users thus minimizing the risk of diversion.
Compliance should be ensured all along the supply chain, by adequate information and training
provided by the main contractor and of course the authorities, as long as they are correctly mapping
the suppliers, or are informed by other sources.
Information exchange is hence the crucial point, of course on a cautious need to know basis.
In this respect, ICPs can also be a model enhancing communication and cooperation between the
State and the exporter.
While the implementation of an ICP is the responsibility of the exporter, the State may also consider
measures and stimuli in domestic laws and regulations encouraging to introduce an ICP, as well as
foreseeing incentives following its adoption (e.g. global licenses). Having widespread ICPs favours
export controls and creates an environment supportive of non-proliferation efforts.
However, no certified ICP models exist, although general guidelines are available, for example
defined by the Wassenaar Arrangement or as reported in [11]. Certain national administrations
attribute high value to company’s ICP during audits, or even require it by law (e.g. Hungary). There is 
a tendency however to remove the legal obligation and maintain the requirement of an ICP for
exporters seeking a global license.
4.3 Risks and incentives
Risks are perceived differently by exporters (sanctions, reputational loss) and authorities (violation of
non-proliferation commitments)
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Apart from the legal consequences of non-compliance, exporters also face risks in terms of
reputation, with direct economic consequences for penal and financial sanctions.
Loosing good reputation is not just a matter of ethics and self-perception, it is also about losing the
benefits of certifications, possibly appearing on US black-lists and being associated with risks that
other players don’t want to take by dealing with your supply chain.
5. Enhanced dialogue
Exchanges and communication among stake-holders, starting from exporters and authorities, have
come up all along the previous paragraphs, for example related to detecting illicit requests or
providing ground for catch-all controls.
Also the IAEA encourages suppliers to provide information on procurement attempts for nuclear-
related (dual and single use) goods. This is a valuable source of information to enable the early
detection of potential undeclared nuclear activities and help States identify covert procurement
networks worldwide.
The ESARDA Export control WG debated the topic of enhanced dialogue in various meetings guided
by a Concept paper which formulated key questions that the discussion should address.
Communication among trusted partners can be the cornerstone of a possible evolutionary export
monitoring framework, proposed by AREVA.
Not all destinations are equally sensitive, and hence an evolutionary export control system might put
more emphasis and resources where needed. Besides EU General Export Authorisations
(corresponding to license exceptions in the US), also a different approach based on risk could be
envisaged.
Proposals for a graded country-based approach were sent by AREVA [16] to the French national
authority and the European Commission. These include e.g. reactor export free on licensing in the
EU; EU General authorisations for exports to NSG-members; individual license for non-NSG trusted
countries; prohibition to banned countries; training to raise exporter and authority awareness.
The concept is summarised in Figure 5, which actually reverses inside-out the scheme of Figure 3, by
putting the emphasis on “automatically” agreeable exports to trusted partners, e.g. NSG members, 
leaving the requirement for an authorisation to other destinations. The “free” export would need to be
notified instead of seeking individual authorisation.
This may be correctly seen as an extreme scenario, which anyway brings in the position and view of
large exporters dealing with thousands of licenses. A possible alternative could be the definition of a
EU General Export Authorisation for large projects, as well as a strong improvement in the procedures
requested for Intra-EU transfers, also under discussion.
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Figure 5 – Evolutionary export control model [16]
6. Way forward
6.1 EU revision of the export control framework
In October 2014 the EU held its annual open consultation EU industry forum, where exporters were
invited to provide their views on the European Commission’s Communication on the proposed
improvements to the export control framework [18].
The discussions focused on the set of priorities and possible measures contained in the
Communication. These include i.a. ITT, emerging threats, common criteria for catch-all,  a risk-based
approach, involvement of industry, more EUGEAs, capacity building initiatives and , Cooperative
implementation of controls with partners. New EUGEA related to some category 0 items; removing
Annex IV, or reducing its scope.
Procedural improvements are needed but must be legally justified and reasonably achievable
Unique export control guidelines are missing. In the EU, the control of intra-EU transfers is an
historical burden probably used only for getting licensing data to be sent to IAEA for the AP
declarations. That need could have other solutions (e.g. notifications).
The US has a general license for nuclear reactors, but no EU country has one (e.g. limit case of
exports from France to Finland requiring 400 individual licenses)
Time is hence ripe to try and include new provisions safeguarding non-proliferation, but also meeting
the needs outlined by exporters.
6.2 Doing the right thing: towards a strategic trade control culture
An interesting concept is expressed in [19]. Compliance and commitments to duly control trade should
be fostered by the spreading of a Strategic Trade Control Culture, taking the inspiration for the
nuclear security one.
International community, States, exporters, including of course research and academia, should all be
encouraged to embed the concept of compliance not just in their procedural arrangements but also in
their own mind sets. Non-proliferation would hence be reinforced by the necessity to do the right
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thing, not just what it required. This would develop a culture of compliance that would see exporters
understand, support, and adhere to official requirements— the most important being nonproliferation.
Moreover, now that strategic trade control is becoming not just the purview of a few officials in a few
countries, but expanding as a legal obligation for all states and for many actors within states, the
public also has a role to play in developing a basic level of awareness.
7. Conclusions
Many challenges apply to strategic trade controls.
Exchange of information is crucial to facilitate on the one hand the access to faster and more efficient
instruments and procedures, on the other to improve the efficiency of the system and allowing to put
more resources where the risk is higher.
Enhanced dialogue is hence key to establish a system of trusted partners, notwithstanding the
necessary respect of each other’s roles.
As anticipated in the Commission’s Communication, a possible evolution in implementing export
control encompasses introducing a risk-based framework. This may be part of a broader approach
followed also by other like-minded partners.
Apart from legal obligations and requirements, success is also linked to the achievement of strategic
trade culture fostering compliance as part of an overall striving for nonproliferaion goals.
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Abstract:
Nuclear export control is in part an assessment on goods potential use in a nuclear weapons program
and assessment of the end-user. A credible export control must keep abreast of both technical
developments to judge the potential use of the goods and of political developments in the recipient
country. Technology development, in for example laser enrichment technologies and new reactor
concepts, will have an impact on the type of goods that has to be controlled. Non-proliferation
commitments and how it is manifested in internal control of the recipient country are also factors to
take into account.
To ascertain that SSM has access to up-to-date information we have funded research covering both
technical and political aspects of export control. This work is done in research institutes outside SSM.
The technical research has been done by the Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI, and covers
areas as for example laser enrichment and accelerator driven reactors. The aim of the research is to
have knowledge about new technologies but also other sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. A
project on non-proliferation commitments examined the relationship between the NPT and various
non-proliferation initiatives and institutions, such as NSG. An important aim of the research is to have
access to groups outside SSM to judge export applications.
The paper will present more in detail how SSM work with research groups and how we use the results
in our work with export applications and in our international engagement, such as ESARDA working
group on export control. Some results of the research will briefly be presented as well as future
challenges such as intangible technology transfers (ITT).
Keywords: export control; nuclear non-proliferation; research
1. Introduction
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) has a mandate within nuclear safety, radiation
protection and nuclear non-proliferation, and may act as a regulatory authority as well as a supervising
and a licensing authority. The Authority reports to the department of Environment and Energy and has
around 300 employees with an office at Solna, north of Stockholm.  With the vision of “a society safe
from harmful effects of radiation” the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority strives at working proactively
and preventively within the mandated areas. To meet the challenges of today and in the future the
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority needs to keep abreast of developments within these areas, where
technical issues represent a large part, but also for example safety culture and behavior science, as
well as policy issues are of importance. Looking at the nuclear non-proliferation tasks of the Authority
and especially the area of export control, the main challenges of today is linked to the ongoing
technology advancements of material and equipment within the nuclear fuel cycle, together with an
increasingly globalised world of cooperation, trade and technical solutions for communication. This
paper gives an overview of the philosophy behind the research activities at the Swedish Radiation
Safety Authority, with a focus on export control, and presents examples of financed research projects
and other studies.
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2. Export control and the role of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)
2.1. The export control framework
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, ratified in 1970, constitutes inarguably
the foundation of the global non-proliferation community, export control included. The NPT is often
interpreted as a three-pillar system:
 non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
 disarmament of nuclear weapons and
 the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology
One may view export control as a balance between the first and the third pillar, with the object to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons without hampering the legitimate civil nuclear trade, however,
the main goal is off course to hinder proliferation, expressed in Article III.2 of the NPT:
“Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:
(a) source or special fissionable material, or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the
source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.”
Each non-nuclear weapons state has, according to the NPT, to accept safeguards by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to control that all nuclear material declared by the state is not misused,
including that a shipment from one facility arrives at the designated recipient. The control is based on
a safeguards agreement concluded with the state. The IAEA also keeps track of exports of nuclear
related goods through an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement, where the state agrees to
report all exports of goods listed in an annex to the protocol. The additional protocol is optional but is
by many states seen as a fundamental part of safeguards.
Out of an export control perspective, the Article III.2 of the NPT was interpreted in the 1970’s by a 
group of states later called the Zangger Committee. The Committee agreed on principles on
conditions of supply of nuclear goods that fall under Article III.2 of the NPT, and the principles was
published as IAEA Information Circular number 209, commonly referred to as the Trigger List.  Today,
however, the most potent export control association is rather the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
consisting of 48 states with common principles on how to ensure that supplied goods are used solely
for non-nuclear weapons purposes. The principles, together with annexes describing the type of goods
that are considered to fall under export control, are published as the Guidelines of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (as IAEA Information Circular number 254). The Guidelines of the NSG go further
than the Zangger Committee and have extended the scope of to control to include many products
which do not fall under Article III.2 of the NPT but which clearly have a potential and crucial use in a
nuclear weapons programme.
The Guidelines of the NSG, as well as of other export control regimes, are incorporated into the
legislation of the European Union through Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 on export control [1].
This regulation provides for common EU control rules and describes the scope of control including a
list of all controlled goods with a dual use, i.e. with civilian applications but also useful in a military
programme or weapons of mass destruction programmes. The regulation covers not only exports out
of the EU but also intra-EU transfers, transit and brokering.
2.2. The role of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
As part of the national export control system (legislation, licensing, enforcement and sanctions) SSM’s
main role lies within the licensing and enforcement area.
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is the licensing office for exports out of the EU and intra-EU
transfers of nuclear related goods, as well as brokering and transit. These goods include nuclear and
other materials, complete nuclear plants and systems as well as individual equipment and
components, plus related software and technology.
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Before permitting a supply of nuclear goods, the following assessments need to be performed:
 Evaluate if the goods fall under the export control legislation.
 Evaluate the conformity between the exported goods and the stated addressee or end-user,
the stated end-use as well as the risk of diversion
 Assess the non-proliferation commitment of the recipient state
 Assess if the intended export is in conformity with the non-proliferation commitments of
Sweden and does not violate any international sanctions
To make solid decisions on export licensing and other forms of export control, in view of the above,
the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority must ensure that there is adequate knowledge available. For
some areas, the SSM has the competence in house, for other areas the Authority can rely on the
expertise of other national authorities. In some cases other, external parties are preferred. The
research strategy is formed around all these needs.
3. The SSM research strategy
The research funded by SSM provides valuable knowledge which can be used directly in its decision-
making. SSM´s funding of research has also a purpose to develop and sustain an adequate
competence in the relevant fields, both at SSM and nationally. The research should also support
Sweden’s international engagement and co-operation in areas relevant for SSM.
The SSM has an annual research budget totalling approximately 80 million Swedish kronor
(approximately 8.5 million euros). The research covers mainly nuclear safety and radiation protection
but also other areas, such as nuclear non-proliferation are included. The SSM has adopted a policy for
more frequently use of advertising research projects broadly with the aim of having a transparent
process and fostering competition to find the most competent researchers in the respective fields. The
decision to qualify a research project for funding is based on requirements on relevance and scientific
quality of course, but also a long-term plan is considered to ensure a sustainable research
competence in the future within the fields of interest for the Authority. To ensure the appropriate use of
the research budget an analysis of events and trends in the world which affect the Authority is
performed regularly.
The research activities financed by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority are in general mainly
conducted by institutions of higher education and consulting firms in Sweden, since SSM does not
have access to a dedicated Technical Support Organisation, TSO. However the export control has a
little bit different approach as is described below.
3.1. Research strategy applied on export control
To sustain a credible export control, and perform the assessments listed in chapter 2, several areas of
knowledge need to be attended, such as:
 The purpose of equipment and components in a facility and their technical requirements
 Technical developments of nuclear products
 Trade patterns and technical solutions to support trade
 Technical, political and social developments in the world
 International non-proliferation framework
The purpose of equipment and components in a facility and their technical requirements
Of the listed areas above, the first one is perhaps the most obvious; it is of course crucial to maintain a
competence regarding the use and the technical requirements of material, equipment and components
used in nuclear facilities. This includes both the technical and economical demands of the civilian
nuclear power industry on these products as well as the usability of the products in a nuclear weapons
program.
Technical developments of nuclear products
Knowledge of the technical progress of both materials and equipment is important to judge the
potential use of the goods as well as to anticipate future needs to extend the export control regulations
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to include new products. An example of this is new reactor concepts, both those belonging to the so-
called Generation IV and those described as accelerator driven subcritical systems (both are
described in section 4).
Trade patterns and technical solutions to support trade
To keep an effective export control, without hindering the legal trade, it is also important to follow the
trends of company structures, which seem to get more and more globally integrated with each other,
and to know how the trade of nuclear fuel and other materials and equipment works. One other
element to keep track on is the development of technical solutions to support the trade, such as the
use of the internet and servers which are physically placed in foreign countries.
Technical, political and social developments in the world
As the export control system also has to account to international relations, security policy and other
policy studies are also relevant. Before exporting products related to the nuclear fuel cycle an analysis
of the prerequisites of the recipient state, to handle and use the exported products as anticipated, is
performed. It is therefore of significance to be informed on both political and social developments in
the recipient state as well as other changes in the state which may affect the non-proliferation efforts.
The technical developments in the nuclear industry are evaluated as well.
International non-proliferation framework
There is also a need to keep an eye on the work and the shifts within the international non-proliferation
framework, both the NPT and the established export control regimes such as the NSG, but also all
non-proliferation initiatives and institutions founded over the years. Furthermore, the IAEA and the
development of both its activities and its role are of importance. All these developments affect the
judgments on how to perform export control and how to use these groups and organisations in the
most efficient and effective way for the benefit of non-proliferation. Understanding the non-proliferation
framework and its history are also essential as guidelines when, as a licensing authority, SSM
implements international commitments as well as EU legislation and national legislation. Policy studies
and legal studies could support this.
3.2. Where the is knowledge found
The SSM has an in-depth knowledge of the use, function and technical developments of nuclear
facilities corresponding mainly to the Swedish national nuclear plants, i.e. basically light water
reactors, uranium conversion and fuel fabrication. The main part of the research funds is dedicated to
nuclear safety and radiation protection and concentrates naturally on these types of facilities. This
research does not focus on export control but it serves nevertheless as a valuable source of
information for the technical evaluation of products within export control. The research on technical
subjects related to export control includes these areas as well to bring a non-proliferation perspective,
but the aim is to cover technical developments in all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.
For the military dimension and the usability of a product in a nuclear weapons program, SSM has to
turn to another source of information. Thus, since many years, SSM has a well-developed cooperation
with the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, being main governmental heir to the legacy of the
Swedish nuclear research programs, the civilian but also the military program (in an era where many
states explored both options, long time abandoned now for the sake of non-proliferation and
disarmament) and with a commitment within the Swedish non-proliferation community as a support in
technical and policy issues. FOI has the possibility to link the civilian and the military dimensions of the
nuclear fuel cycle out of a proliferation point of view and make a judgement on the possible risk of
misuse of materials, equipment and technology which may be supplied by Sweden. SSM therefore
financially contributes to research projects and literature studies at the FOI with the aim at sustaining
and developing this national competence. The choice of FOI is therefore reasonable even though it is
a deviation from the general research approach of SSM aiming at competition and a transparent
process. These research projects and other studies focus on technical issues, such as the technical
ability of materials and equipment as well as the technical performance requirements depending on
the purpose of the operation. A handful of these projects are described in section 4.
To find entities for conducting non-technical research projects and studies the SSM has in one case
used the approach of advertising more broadly within the non-proliferation area. No specific research
project was proposed, but it was left to the applicant to narrow down and interpret and fashion after its
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own competence. Several interesting research projects of value were submitted and a proposal by the
Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt was selected (see section 4.5). An advantage of advertising
broadly is that SSM gets in contact with research groups that have not been familiar to the Authority
before.
Further, SSM has initiated a study to map relevant research groups active within the non-proliferation
field. The aim is to find and learn of entities, both in Sweden and abroad, with a potential to support
the nuclear non-proliferation activities at SSM and to be funded by SSM.
4. A selection of research projects and studies through the years
The export control research budget is between 400 and 800 thousand Swedish kronor (approximately
42-85 thousand euros). Unfortunately these financial means do not allow all areas of concern to be
covered and a priority has to be made based on considerations such as the following:
 What does the Swedish nuclear industry looks like? The answer gives us an idea of possible
and plausible trade and transfers of nuclear related goods from Sweden.
 Which are the Swedish knowledge centres? This gives us an idea of possible transfers of
technical know-how from Sweden.
 What exports are performed today? This gives us extra information on unmapped actors to be
the objects for non-proliferation outreach.
The answers to these kinds of questions give a decision basis to focus the means on the areas where
we can achieve the maximum effect on compliance to the export control legislation as well as
minimisation of the proliferation risk. Some examples of financed research projects and other studies
are presented below, and how the results are used in the export control activities of the Swedish
Radiation Safety Authority.
4.1. Analysis of export data
This study was issued to partly answer the question regarding Swedish exports raised above. The
project was conducted in 2013 by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and consisted of
screening and analysis of data of performed and declared exports out of Sweden. The screening was
made through translating Customs commodity codes, stated in the export declarations, to product
category numbers of the export control legislation, followed by a scan of the product portfolios of the
exporters. Thereafter, exports and exporters were categorised using a three-step triage; “controlled 
goods”, “possibility of controlled goods”, “low probability of controlled goods”. The resulting list of
ranked exports and exporters will serve as a basis for audits to companies and other entities in
Sweden, to improve the level of compliance if needed, and for outreach programmes to raise
awareness of the export control legislation and of proliferation.
4.2. New reactor concepts – a study on Generation IV reactor models
Any deployment of the so-called Generation IV reactors is still in the future, but advanced plans and
studies already exist. There are major technical differences between the various proposals, but all are
intended to be safer, cheaper and more efficient than the current generation of reactors. The study
was initiated to explore potential risks that Generation IV could imply regarding the issue of nuclear
proliferation and exports.
The study [2] showed that some of the proposed reactor types in Generation IV could pose a
proliferation risk in the future. The current subsystems and components are similar only in part to
those found in contemporary reactors, and the reactor core conditions require other materials than
those used today. Because of this, the non-proliferation and export control community, both nationally
and internationally, should monitor the development in this area closely, so that it can respond and act
at an early stage to any deployment of reactors belonging to Generation IV.
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4.3. Accelerator Driven Subcritical systems for use as a “nuclear reactor”
New, emerging technologies have to be evaluated from its potential use in a nuclear weapons
program. Accelerator Driven Subcritical systems (ADS) have been drawing attention the last years
because of the possibility to use such a system for the production of special fissionable material. A
study on the issue was conducted by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) in 2013. An ADS
consists of a subcritical core of fissionable material, very much like a conventional core in a
contemporary nuclear reactor. A proton accelerator and a target are then used to create neutrons for
sustaining a fission process in the core making it not only look like but also behave as a “nuclear 
reactor”, however with the difference that the neutron feed could be turned off at any time. This can be
exploited for energy production, but also for the production of special fissionable material and
therefore usable in a nuclear weapons programme.
The report [3] from the study presents an immature technology, still on the research stage. However
the study also showed the clear potential of ADS to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. A
conclusion was that even though exports of this kind of technology are not controlled today one should
exercise some vigilance.
4.4. Technologies for separation of isotopes other than uranium and plutonium
This research project evaluated the differences and similarities between uranium enrichment and the
separation of other elements. Although uranium enrichment is not strictly necessary to produce
nuclear weapons, all known nuclear weapons programs have contained enrichment in some form. The
export of equipment needed for uranium enrichment is strictly controlled. At the same time, a market
for other more or less enriched elements has emerged, such as for use in the electronics industry or
for medical applications. These substances can be enriched with equipment which, completely or
partially, coincides with that used for uranium enrichment. As export control in its strictest
interpretation applies only to equipment and technology exclusively for enrichment of uranium, this
situation creates a potential gap that could be exploited for proliferation.
The resulting report, published in 2015 [4], compares different separation methods and their usability
in a proliferation sense and draws conclusions valid for non-proliferation and export control. The
results show that uranium enrichment and the separation of other elements are closely related,
however generic rules on the usability of equipment for different elements are not self-evident, such
conclusions require examinations of materials and specific technical solutions.
4.5. Relationship between the NPT and various initiatives and institutions
The study, conducted by the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK), analysed the
relationship between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT and various
initiatives and institutions (‘clubs’) based outside the NPT framework, which aims to improve and
strengthen the Treaty. The study identified conflicts and possible synergies and proposed options for
developing and improving the interaction between the NPT and ‘clubs’ in order to increase the overall 
efficiency.
The final report [5] describes facts about the various non-proliferation ‘clubs’, and also analyses and
formulates conclusions about the various international initiatives in non-proliferation. The report
contains several ideas that can be studied further.
4.6. The use of low enriched and high enriched uranium
The efforts to replace highly enriched uranium (HEU) with low enriched uranium (LEU) in research
reactors and reactors for the production of medical isotopes have been going on for several decades.
Still, HEU is in use in several countries, and there is an international discussion on how the amount
can be reduced further in order to minimize the risk of diversion to military uses. If research reactors
and radiation targets could be converted to use LEU, the amount HEU in circulation could be reduced,
while also reducing the motives for further production of HEU.
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The report [6] was commissioned to increase knowledge about how strong the arguments are to retain
HEU in research reactors and other civilian use. The study provides an overview of the use of HEU in
the world outside the military programs, and describes and analyzes the technical difficulties that a
conversion to LEU may result in.
5. Export control challenges of today
Some of the challenges that the export control authorities are facing concern the globally integrated
world of today and technical solutions which support communication. The progresses within
information technology have brought an easy access to information across the globe, such as e-mail
and remote access servers, and new solutions to store information, such as cloud storage, which bring
an ambiguity regarding the physical location of information, and the national boundaries become less
clear. The modern IT world therefore generates questions on how to practice an effective export
control today. The practice of export control affects off course the way companies and other entities
conduct their business. A glance at the company structures of the nuclear industry today, both
regarding ownership and operation, show large multinational corporations with shared ownerships and
local branches in many different states. The legitimate trade should off course not be hindered and a
company needs to be able to communicate with its branches wherever based physically, at the same
time there is a need to track all transfers out of a proliferation concern.
Related to the globally integrated world is the trend of migration of competence for manufacturing and
supplying high-quality material and equipment to states outside the export control regimes, due to for
example lower labour costs or better strategic locations for trade and shipments. In addition, within the
nuclear area an increasing number of nuclear power nations can be seen, ranging from states in a
start-up phase of a nuclear power programme to states reinitiating or reinforcing its existing nuclear
fleet. There is no doubt that economic and educational developments are very positive things to be
supported. However, the events create a much larger number of actors and potential recipients of
nuclear related goods, and thereby an increased nuclear industry sector to follow. One challenge is to
raise awareness in new and emerging nuclear countries. Another challenge is how the export control
regimes, the NSG in particular, shall adapt to the growing number of nuclear supplier states that need
to be involved in the non-proliferation community and be engaged to embrace the concepts of export
control.
Another area of concern is new emerging technology concepts which have to be monitored. In
addition there is a continuing technical development of equipment and materials, where the line
between products specially designed or prepared for nuclear use and those products used in other
industry becomes thinner, and for some products the line is nearly erased. Graphite is one of those
materials where the industry use of very pure graphite is widely spread and the distinction between
this graphite and the graphite for use as moderator in a nuclear reactor is not so much a matter of
technical properties anymore. How to keep an effective export control without hampering the
legitimate trade is therefore a challenge.
Harmonisation of the interpretation and implementation of the legislative text of the EU regulation is a
challenge that also deserves mentioning. 28 sovereign member states of the EU share a common
European market but have also national security, safety, foreign policy other concerns to consider as
well. The level of export control beyond the minimum level stated in the Council (EC) regulation No.
428/2009 is therefore a summary of all these and the result may differ quite a bit between the states.
We should nevertheless continue to strive towards a higher level of harmonisation within the EU for
fair competitiveness within the EU.
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Abstract: 
The present paper describes some applicative examples of the comparison, by means of relational 
database techniques including a detailed content's analysis, of the Annex II of Additional Protocol (AP) 
to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, with reference to IAEA INFCIRC/193/Add.8, to the analogue 
trigger list from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in particular Annex A of NSG Guidelines - Part 1 
(2013).Such a comparison produces a potentially useful tool to every final user in different Institutions 
involved in activities related to the AP and Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons principles. 
This work originated from the need of tracking technological upgrades occurred since the compiling of 
the AP Annex II (1998). This need inspired such an activity carried out by the ENEA AP Working 
Group. It can be divided into two parts: in the first we describe a methodology to define a common 
semantic, coherently with document's contents and structure. A XML file or equivalent database 
representation of documents is fully described in the paper and represents the first goal of the work. 
Having obtained a common semantic structure, the data collected from the two documents can be 
compared by an algorithm as a query, in some query language and tools. In the second part of the 
paper we provide possible applications and developments for the presentation, comparison, and 
integration, with technologies such as web semantic, of the data contained in the Annex II and the 
NSG Guidelines in order to make possible a higher fruition and comprehension of data. 
Keywords: Additional Protocol; NSG Group; Database; Semantic 
1. Introduction
This work originates from the need of tracking the technological upgrades occurred since the 
compiling of the Annex II of the Additional Protocol (Annex II hereafter) of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [1]. To address this challenging task, the Annex II is compared to the 
Trigger List [2] provided by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and updated on a regular basis. 
The Nuclear Suppliers Group is an organization which includes member States that are suppliers of 
nuclear components and technology to the industry. It operates in the context of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It fosters exchanges between Countries for a peaceful 
development of nuclear technology. Documentation, in the form of Guide Lines, are produced by the 
NSG to consider changes due to scientific and technologic progresses of important items for the 
nuclear and non-nuclear industry.  
Here we consider the June 2013 edition of NSG Guide Lines which, as usual, is labeled ‘Trigger List’. 
The goal of this work is to compare the Annex II the Trigger List by defining the appropriate criterions 
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and methods. The result is a list of differences between the information conveyed by such documents 
and, therefore, potentially, a list of implementations to be done in the Annex II to take into account the 
changes due to scientific and technologic progresses. 
This complex goal translates in the definition of an appropriate database able to represent the 
structure and contents of the two documents. 
2. Methodology for the database definition
The first step of the comparison process is to identify the appropriate documents to analyze and 
compare. Annex II is equivalent to the IAEA document INFCIRC/193/Add.8 [3]. The Trigger List [2] is 
provided directly from the NSG.. 
The second step is to identify the information contained in the two documents in terms of systems and 
components and their corresponding quantitative definitions. The latter are the variables used for their 
full description. 
Then the data have to be described using a suitable architecture and format. In this work we use a 
relational database and a representation based on the Extensible Markup Language (XML) [4]. In 
such a  way it's possible to define a semantic from our data and use query languages for retrieving 
back the information from it. Tables of the database and the corresponding relationships strongly 
depend on the structure adopted for the data architecture. This depends on the semantic structure 
defined for the documents. 
3. Database layout
The documents [1], or rather [3], and [2] share the same layout. They are divided into chapters, 
sections, and subsections in the same order. In our view, the information is organized in the following 
categories: 'Structures', 'Components', 'Subcomponents', 'Variables', 'Materials', 'Constraints', and 
'Function'. This choice is suggested by the original document layout allowing to sort out all the 
information easily. It looks a  natural choice for defining the database tables (Figure 1). 
Given this choice for the database tables, 'Structures', 'Components' and 'Subcomponents' are easily 
identified. The following is a simple example of table compiling. Chapters such as 'Nuclear reactor 
components’ clearly represent the macro-containers of information, broken down in 'Components' and, 
where necessary, in 'Subcomponents'. 'Complete Nuclear Reactors' is the first occurrence and 
'Complete Rotor Assemblies' is the second. 'Function' contains the information regarding the use of 
the component or subcomponent within the ’Structure’, while 'Materials' indicates, of course, the type 
of material that it is made of. 'Variables' is a table populated with all the parameters characterizing the 
item. For example it may be a length, a mass, or the electric conductivity. In general it can be any 
physical quantity that characterizes the item. The value that each variable can take, that is a range of 
all the possible values, are contained in the table 'Constraints'.  
All information is retrieved from the text of the two documents and populates the database. The result 
are two XML-type documents equivalent to the original documents which represent a relational 
database where the complete information of each original document is contained and is ready to be 
easily manipulated and interpreted by an algorithm. In Figure 2 a portion of the information coded into 
XML is provided. 
The XML-type document is accessible by any software. For the purpose of the present work we used 
the Access format for representing the two original documents. They are named after the original 
names, specifically INFCIRC_193 and NSG_2013, respectively. The structure of the two databases, 
as discussed previously, is the very same and the information contained in each of them is splitted by 
adopting the same layout. Sharing the same layout makes the information immediately comparable, if 
the appropriate criteria are defined.  
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In general, such a layout choice makes a simple database query sufficient to highlight a particular 
relationship between items in terms of the value of a variable associated with it. The relationships 
between the tables are the key part of the comparison and the core of the search logic. 
The process described so far is therefore proposed to define a semantic associated with the original 
documents. The XML representation is then used for building assertions like the following: X structure 
is divided into components Y1,...,Yn, each characterized by variables V11, V12,...,V1n,...,Vnn, with data 
values C11,...,Cnn, made by materials M1,...,Mn, and operating functions F1,...,Fn. 
Figure 1 Relationships between tables. 
Figure 2 XML representation of the information 
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4. Potential applications
Here our main purpose is to show how to use the potential of the semantic layout definition to locate in 
a fast, simple way the unique differences between the documents examined. 
Let’s consider the Access implementation of the XML-type documents. In such a case the information 
retrieval can be made through the execution of SQL queries. The result is  again in form of a table. 
Performing the same queries on the two databases it is possible to check(through a software 
application or even manually) for differences in the values of the table 'Constraints' in connection with 
'Variables'. The comparison provides whether a given component has been modified in the documents 
prepared by the NSG, our reference and has then been subject to a relevant technological upgrade 
with respect to the Annex II. 
The following is a brief description of a practical example for using our the semantic database. We are 
interested in determining the characteristics of a rotor tube ('rotor tubes' in our information system). 
The result of a simple query applied to both databases will provide the desired results. Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 show in tabular form the results of the appropriate queries. 
Figure 3  Rotor tubes information from the Annex II. 
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Figure 4  Rotor tubes information from the NSG Trigger List. 
The retrieved tables contain all the information which is conveyed by the Annex II and the Trigger List 
translated in a for which is easily interpretable by an algorithm or a human user. 
From such a result, it is immediately clear that they are subcomponents used in the component 'Gas 
centrifuges and assemblies'  and are characterized by properties such as the thickness which must 
not exceed the maximum value of 12 mm. They consist of materials that have, among other features, 
also a high strength to density ratio.  
The next step is to identify the differences between the two tables. It is very easy to see that the value 
of the maximum diameter of this subcomponent went from 400 mm as reported in the Annex II to 650 
mm as specified in the last Trigger List revision by the NSG. 
5. Conclusions
Common textual documents can be represented by a XML database by defining table fields and an 
appropriate layout. This can be done with great precision by defining a semantic associated with the 
information conveyed by a document. the definition of such semantic is critical to make the document 
fully represented and its content available to users who do not share the same basic understanding of 
the technologies described. As an example, the XML tag that describes the 'Rotor tubes' may be 
associated with a URL containing information about the material 'Maraging Steel'. 
The perspectives are definitely aimed  to greater usability for allowing the dissemination of such 
information to a wider community potentially involved in these Safeguard regimes. 
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Abstract: 
The Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory is 
an information analysis center that collects, archives, evaluates, synthesizes and distributes 
information, data, and codes used in various nuclear technology applications. RSICC retains more 
than 2,000 software packages provided by code developers from various federal and international 
agencies. RSICC’s customers (scientists, engineers, and students from around the world) obtain 
access to such computing codes (source and/or executable versions) and data to promote ongoing 
research, to help ensure nuclear and radiological safety, and to advance nuclear technology. 
However, in light of nonproliferation and national security concerns, it is prudent to explore alternatives 
to distribution of certain codes and data that pose a greater risk of diversion from their intended 
purposes or that could be utilized for nefarious activities. The international secure platform for export-
controlled computing tools addresses the concern of providing access to export-controlled modeling 
and simulation (M&S) tools while also providing an avenue to foster cooperation among existing and 
new-entrant nuclear countries. This presentation provides a general overview of the secure cloud 
computing system, along with the access requirements and protocols established to permit use of 
certain export-controlled M&S tools and data. 
Keywords: modeling, simulation, export, control, cloud, computing 
1. Introduction
For the past five decades, the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) has served 
as the official repository for nuclear modeling and simulation (M&S) and data for the Department of 
Energy (DOE) and its predecessors and has collected and disseminated related information worldwide 
under specific distribution restrictions and guidelines set forth by the US government. RSICC 
maintains collaborations with other similar international organizations to foster cooperation and 
exchange of M&S tools and data to benefit to our customers. RSICC houses nearly 2,000 software 
packages provided by code developers supported from various research institutes and universities in 
the US, as well as international agencies and research centers. Many of these codes have a broad 
range of applications and uses.    
One revolutionary challenge that RSICC has faced is the ever-expanding capability of computing 
technology accompanied by growing reliance on the need for M&S tools. In some part, the demand 
and reliance on M&S tools is a consequence of the increasing cost associated with operation of 
experimental nuclear facilities and the reduced availability of such facilities. Therefore, being able to 
provide quality-controlled software and data that can be utilized across a diverse set of computing 
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technologies is of growing importance, yet it is no easy task. Fortunately, RSICC has had the support 
of sponsors and code and data developers, along with access to a variety of computing resources to 
ensure that the packages that we supply to the user community span the breadth of resources for our 
users and address the range of the applications for which such software is needed.   
RSICC’s distribution of M&S tools and data helps to promote international cooperation in nuclear 
safety, ensures the safe development and deployment of nuclear technology, and provides those 
countries possessing or pursuing nuclear technology access to state-of-the-art software. However, in 
the light of nonproliferation and national security concerns, alternatives to distribution of certain codes 
and data that pose a greater risk of diversion from the intended purposes or that could be utilized for 
nefarious activities have been explored. Some of the most modern and versatile codes pose the 
greatest risk of diversion and/or theft. To help to resolve the dilemma between the open sharing of 
nuclear technology and the need to minimize the potential use of nuclear technology for nefarious 
purposes, RSICC developed, deployed, and implemented a system to provide access to modern 
software and data for which access would otherwise be limited or restricted. The deployment of this 
system also has additional benefit because some new entrant countries may lack access to sufficient 
computing infrastructure to effectively utilize modern M&S tools. In addition, the development and 
deployment of a secure computing architecture allows the user to access M&S tools  installed under a 
controlled quality assurance process, thereby ensuring that the M&S tools function as designed. This 
paper describes the growing demand for M&S tools, along with a general description of the secure 
cloud system, as well as the protocols for accessing the system. Through its implementation, the 
system will help foster international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology while 
minimizing the diversion of M&S software for other purposes.  
2. Software Demand
The demand for state-of-the-art M&S tools has nearly doubled over the past 5 years, as shown in 
Figure 1. Over the past 4 years, RSICC has distributed over 4,000 software and data packages 
annually to customers and has seen a substantial growth in the number of packages delivered to 
customers who are not US citizens (shown in the figure as “foreign”). At the same time, RSICC has 
seen substantial growth in the number of requests from US universities at which a growing number of 
students are not US citizens.  
Figure 1. RSICC’s annual software package distribution 
Along with the growth in the demand for M&S tools and data, RSICC’s customer base has expanded 
to include over 100 countries (Figure 2) and over 20,000 registered individuals. The greatest number 
of our customers is in the US, but RSICC has seen additional growth over the past 5 years in 
countries pursuing development and deployment of nuclear technology. Over 16,000 active customers 
from the US have requested or received software from RSICC since 2005. Outside the US, most of 
RSICC’s clients reside in Canada, France, the United Kingdom, China, South Korea, and Germany. 
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As reliance on advanced M&S tools and data grows, RSICC anticipates further growth in the demand 
for its services.  
Figure 2. RSICC’s customer demographics. 
The use of M&S tools spans a range of applications. The M&S software and data distributed by 
RSICC are being used for designing advanced reactor concepts, computing radiation source terms, 
designing and developing fusion devices, ensuring nuclear criticality safety, designing accelerators, 
implementing nuclear medicine applications, and implementing nuclear security applications. The Los 
Alamos Monte Carlo code MCNP [1] and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory SCALE system [2] can 
be applied across all of these areas and are in the most demand by our customers. These codes can 
also be used for other purposes when there are concerns regarding diversion, theft, or proliferation of 
the codes. Given these concerns, a balance between open sharing of advanced M&S tools and 
mitigation of improper code was sought through development and deployment of a secure cloud 
computing system. As previously stated, the primary purpose of this system would be to minimize 
national security concerns while allowing access to state-of-the-art M&S software and data for 
peaceful purposes.  
3. System Description and Access Protocols
3.1. System Description 
The general specifications of RSICC’s secure cloud computing system are provided in Table 1. This is 
a capacity system capable of supporting 50 to 100 intermittent users. The system is comprised of 10 
compute servers with 4 compute nodes per server and 2 processors per node. The system is built on 
“Abu Dhabi” Opteron eight core servers. The theoretical peak performance of the cluster is 
approximately 12 teraflops (TFlops). The system has 5,120 gigabytes (GB) of total memory, with more 
than 12 terabytes (TB) of disc space. The system is accessed through a log-in node using an RSA 
SecurID service for two-factor authentication as shown in Figure 3. The system is also segregated 
from other computing systems at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for network security 
purposes.  
Secure cluster Each node Each server Total cluster 
10 compute servers/cluster 1 10 
4 compute nodes/server 1 4 40 
2 processors/node 2 8 80 
16 cores/processor 32 128 1280 
Memory 128 GB 512 GB 5,120 GB 
Peak theoretical performance 0.307 TFlops 1.23 TFlops 12.3 TFlops 
Table 1. RSICC’s secure cloud computing system description. 
Blue >750; Red 350-749; Green 150-349; Yellow 50-149; Light Blue <50 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of RSICC’s secure cloud computing system. 
3.2. Access Protocols 
As previously stated, individuals who otherwise cannot be provided access to certain M&S software 
will now be able to use state-of-the art M&S software on the secure cloud system. Currently, targeted 
users include foreign nationals collaborating or working at US national laboratories and universities. 
Additional users are likely to include individuals identified by the US Department of Energy for whom 
the use of the system is deemed to be in the interest of the US government.  
The access process requires that the user register with RSICC by providing their contact information, 
including their physical address and their email address. After registering with RSICC, individuals can 
request software from our extensive collection. When foreign nationals who meet the selection criteria 
request MCNP, SCALE, and RELAP from RSICC, [3]  they will be evaluated for access to the secure 
server, and instructions for access will be provided on approval. Approved users with access to the 
secure cloud system will be provided with instructions for using the system and will be provided with 
RSA SecurID tokens that are usable for a 5-year period. The RSA SecurID token will be mailed to the 
address the user provided during registration.  
Each user will have a unique identifier and password associated with his or her account. The user will 
only be able to access the system remotely through a secure shell (ssh) using both the password and 
RSA SecurID token. The user will be permitted to upload and download ASCII text files and to send 
and/or retrieve input and output files. Each uploaded file will be scanned for viruses, and uploading of 
non-ASCII files will not be permitted. A users attempting to upload non-ASCII files will have his or her 
account suspended. Furthermore, a user will only have access to his or her personal area on the hard 
drive, and any attempt to access other areas of the system will result in the suspension of the user’s 
account. Scripts have been written to execute MCNP, SCALE, and/or RELAP. The installed versions 
of these codes will be the production versions and will be updated as warranted. Beta versions of the 
codes will not be available on the secure cloud computing system.  
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4. Summary
Development and deployment of a secure cloud computing system at RSICC allows for controlled 
access to state-of-the-art M&S tools and data with extensive applications while simultaneously 
addressing concerns with diversion, theft, or nefarious uses of the codes. System deployment will also 
provide some users with computing infrastructure that may not be easily accessible in their own 
organizations. In addition, the system has been built to support 50 to 100 intermittent users at one 
time and can be accessed remotely using a unique customer identifier along with a secure token. 
Approved users will be able to use the production releases of MCNP, SCALE, and RELAP that 
currently reside at RSICC. Additional codes may be added to the secure cloud system as warranted.  
The benefits of this system are notable. Individuals who otherwise would not be allowed access to 
these modern programs will now be able to use them on a rigorously tested and verified computing 
platform. System users will be able to focus on addressing scientific problems without being 
concerned with software installation or quality control. Individuals from some participant countries 
lacking modern computing infrastructure will now have access to a high-capacity computing system. 
Successful deployment of this system will permit sharing of state-of-the-art M&S tools and data to 
facilitate the safe application of nuclear technology while also fully addressing and mitigating 
proliferation concerns.  
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Abstract:
Additive manufacturing—a technology that encompasses 3D printing—is a rapidly developing field.
Use of this technology is now an industry standard for aiding production of high-strength components
in the aerospace and automotive industries. Nor is 3D printing used only for rapid prototyping; it is now
increasingly being used to produce final components. There have been significant recent advances in
the strength and quality of printed components as well as the use of high strength metals. This paper
will examine the implications of this technology on current issues in non-proliferation based on open
source information.
Keywords: 3D printing, additive manufacturing, non-proliferation
1. Introduction
A day does not seem to pass without a groundbreaking application of 3D printing in such diverse
areas as law enforcement [1], space [2], and medicine [3]. Advances appear to be so rapid any
attempt to provide a comprehensive review of this field would be quickly outdated. Nevertheless, the
technology referred to more broadly as digital manufacturing has been described by many societal
commentators as a revolutionary technology [4] [5].
Discussions of 3D printing are typically centred around the ability to customise parts (“complexity is 
free”), the transformative effect on supply chains and uniform cost per unit changing economies of
scale. However, the principal concern when looking through the lens of non-proliferation is the ability
to print high strength or chemically resistant materials and the corresponding possibility of
circumventing export and intellectual property controls.
There exists only a small body of previous work on 3D printing and non-proliferation [7], addressing
export controls [8], perceptions and risks of 3D printing [9] and a general report on WMD and 3D
printing [10].
Most recent advances in 3D printing have no direct relevance to non-proliferation; but of particular
interest are advances in the aerospace industry which has in the last few years moved from a
prototype R&D model to direct parts production [6]. Manufacture of high strength material, as is
required in aerospace, is of special interest due to its applications in centrifuge production, one of the
most sensitive technologies the nuclear fuel cycle. Overall, advances are being made in accuracy,
detail, strength, time, cost, and materials used. However, significant challenges remain for 3D printing
in increasing the ability to print multiple materials as well as warping effects when printing large items.
3D printing is the manufacturing step in the larger process known as additive manufacturing. Additive
manufacturing (AM) includes the digital design of objects and the 3D scanning of existing objects.
This, in practice, could create an enormous challenge for proliferation if sensitive objects are
converted into a digital format useable in a 3D printer. Designs then could change hands through a
targeted cyber attack, illicit digital exchange (for instance through email) or legal exchange through
online marketplaces, where plans are available to download like any other digital good. Once a 3D
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plan is available it has proven very difficult to control—the challenge of US law enforcement removing
plans for the 3-D printed gun is a good example [11] [12].
The term “3D printing” actually encompasses multiple technologies that often bear little relation. Food
and biomaterials printing are very different technologies to printing high-strength metals and plastics.
The materials that can be printed depend on the method: metals can only be printed using lasers and
the technologies that use molten plastics are not suitable for metals.
2. Overview of the Additive Manufacturing Process
Additive manufacturing is the full process from producing digital files by computer design or 3D
scanning to production using a 3D printer. The moniker additive manufacturing is in contrast to
traditional manufacturing that can be considered to be subtractive; the fundamental process being to
take a piece of material and remove parts of it and then possibly stretch and manipulate it into the
required final form.
Blurring the distinction between traditional, subtractive, manufacturing and additive manufacturing is
the class of Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools, or Computer Aided Manufacturing
(CAM) tools. These machine tools are already in wide use. Indeed, whilst it is often said that 3D
printing is ideal for rapid prototyping, subtractive manufacturing using CNC may be able to perform
such activities faster.
CAM files are a shared property of AM and modern advanced manufacturing using CNC machine
tools. A single file can be sent to any machine in the world and the item can be manufactured. The
industrial process can therefore be split into two parts: the digital file design and the manufacturing
process.
From a proliferation standpoint attribution is also a big question in this new supply chain. For most
traditional goods the manufacturer is printed on the product. This is not the case for locally printed 3D
items, especially those originating from consumer to consumer design exchange. Solutions to this
problem that have been discussed include using chemical signatures and including particular
nanoparticles in the final object that can be identified.
2.1. Additive Manufacturing Design Preparation
Files can be prepared for 3D printing by scanning a real object and using software to convert this
information into a useable file format. Alternatively, software can be used directly to design an object.
2.1.1. 3-D Scanning
3D scanning technology can be used to produce a digital file from an object placed in a 3D scanning
machine. The resulting file can be used in a 3D printer or digitally altered using an appropriate editing
software application.
The technology used to scan is broadly split into two areas: contact scans and remote scans. Contact
machines may damage sensitive delicate objects and are slower than remote methods.
Remote scanning techniques all exploit light in various methods such as Time of Flight (ToF) or
structured light scanning. Methods that rely on a single beam are relatively slow and can suffer from
inaccuracies. The structured-light technique, an especially active subject for current R&D is far more
promising, allowing rapid scanning of an entire field of view simultaneously.
2.1.2. 3-D Printing Digital Files
Files for use in 3D printers use a number of different file formats. The STL is the industry standard
format for printing and stores the object by storing the object surface as a series of triangles. Complex
and curved geometries can be represented with a fine triangulation. Other file types are in use such as
OBJ files but the vast majority of the industry uses STL.
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2.1.3. 3D Printing Software
A large number of different software package are available for use in AM. Some are used in file
conversion and producing the correct file type from information from 3D scanners or conversion from
some CAD file to STL type. The key software for this technology is taking a 3D model and converting it
into 2D layers suitable for printing, into slices on a scale of 40 µm. Other software can be used to
manipulate existing digital design files to modify the produced product and often high-end 3D printers
are accompanied by their own software package used for operation.
3D printing allows infinite customisation for the same price as an ‘off the shelf’ design and software is 
the ideal vessel for this creativity. For non-proliferation purposes these software manipulation
packages are not especially relevant: only design files of certain objects are sensitive.
2.2. Additive Manufacturing: 3-D Printing
Once a file exists in the correct format the object can be printed using variety of different technologies
available that are all considered to be 3D printing. The technology dictates the material available. The
fundamental method for all these technologies is the same: to 2D print layer by layer in succession to
build a 3D structure. The process is time-intensive for all technologies, requiring many hours to print
anything but small items.
Once printed, 3D printed items require extensive quality control, which can include interior scanning
for defects. Other post-production steps are necessary to polish and remove granularity. Many 3D
printing techniques leave the object freestanding, so the supports that are in place will need to be
removed.
A large number of different technologies are available. A non-exhaustive description of the most
relevant technologies is provided below and for an in-depth review see [13].
2.2.1. Direct Metal Laser Sintering
Direct metal laser sintering (DMLS) uses a laser to sinter metal powder. The process is very similar to
selective laser sintering. The powder is printed in layers and is sintered by a laser, whereby the
boundary is heated between the materials to bind the structure in an adaptation of this common
industrial process. The powder is pushed in layers to a bed of powder which is lowered as each layer
is completed.
This technique was used to print the first 3D printed gun [11]. This is the most important process for
non-proliferation concerns and can be used to print high-strength metals. The accuracy of this process
is published to be +/- 0.05 mm but in practise accuracy is closer to +/-0.1mm per 100mm.
The process will leave residual material with a surface size of typically around 30 µm. Post-build
finishing is also very important for this process. The object will be printed such that a small metal
frame will hold in place for objects without a flat surface. Objects will also require surface smoothing
and a heat treatment to relieve internal stresses applied. The process is also lengthy and may take
several days for large components.
2.2.2. Selective Laser Melting
In Selective Laser Melting (SLM) a laser melts metal power into a solid homogenous mass. This is in
contrast to laser sintering, which fuses homogenous small particles together at the boundary.
Typically, lasers are used for this process, but electron beams can also be used. A sea of powder is
also used in this technique in a similar manner to selective laser sintering. This technology is also
important for high-strength metals.
2.2.3. Direct Metal Deposition
In this process the powder is injected via a nozzle onto a surface exposed surface, but in other
respects is similar to DMLS.
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2.2.4. Fused Deposition Modelling
In fused deposition modelling (FDM), also known as Fused Filament Fabrication (FFF), thermoplastic
material is used. Plastic filament is melted and the molten plastic is injected with a nozzle. The plastic
then hardens immediately. The technology is of interest due to the possibility to print fully fluorinated
plastics. Stratasys is the leader in this technology (FDM their patent name of the technology) and it is
used for prototyping in defence, aerospace, automotive and other technologies.
2.2.5. Stereolithography
In stereolithography, a photoactive resin is cured with a UV laser. A liquid resin is exposed to the laser
in order to build up the layers of material from a pool to which successively more material is added in a
technique similar to selective laser sintering and SLM. Beyond prototyping, there is little application of
this technology to non-proliferation.
2.2.6. Other 3D Printing Technologies
Other 3D printing technologies, such as food, biotech and nanomaterials are available but not relevant
to non-proliferation.
3. Available Hardware and Services
The marketplace for 3D printer production is increasingly global. However, the most technologically
advanced printers that can be used to print high strength materials are restricted to states with
advanced industrial bases. This is especially the case for metals production.
3.1. Available 3-D Printers
The number of suppliers of 3D printers is increasing and expanding globally. Stratasys, a US leader in
3D printer manufacture offers its cheapest printer from USD 3000 to USD 750,000 for its most
advanced models and specializes in FDM [14]. XYZ Printing is another major manufacturer for
household FDM printers which are available for USD 500 [15].
For printing metals there are fewer manufacturers and the printers are more expensive typically in the
six-figure range (USD). Companies such as 3D Systems offer Direct Metal Printing machines (as well
as stereolithography and SLS machines for plastic) [16]. Renishaw offers the AM250, a laser melting
machine, which prints in a high-purity argon gas atmosphere for building reactive metals for around
USD 500,000 [17]. The materials available include Stainless Steel, aluminium, titanium, cobalt chrome
and inconel. Arcam, a Swedish 3D printing manufacturer have developed a series of printers for use in
Aerospace and industry priced around USD 1m and able to print Titanium and cobalt-chrome [18].
Realizer, a German company offers SLM machines [19]. BeAM, a French company, offers a range of
metal printers and is actively working towards developing new industrial applications for “aeronautics,
aerospace defence and nuclear industries” with “multi-material capabilities” [20].
Independent developers are also developing 3D printers, in efforts to provide desktop printers in the
thousands of dollars price range, rather than a six-figure industrial metal printer. A Kickstarter
campaign to provide a low-cost printer was cancelled [21] but such low cost printers are already
available, albeit with limited functionality [22].
A more comprehensive list of available printers is found at Aniwaa.com, a 3D printer comparison site
which lists 37 printers capable of metal printing [23]. The ability to print high-strength metals is still
restricted to a very small number of printers and is covered in more detail in section 4.
3.2. 3D Scanners
Commercially available 3D scanners are split into ‘hand-held’ battery operated and immobile systems.
High-quality scanners are far cheaper than metal printers at around USD 40,000. At the high end of
the range the GFMesstechnik TopoCAM uses structured light technology to a 2.5 µm resolution and is
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priced at USD 100,000, although the scan volume is limited [24]. At a far lower price of under USD
50,000, the portable 3D Digital Corp Optix 500M has 50 µm resolution [25].
Academic literature is available on quality: various scanners have been assessed by biomedical
academics to access their suitability for research [26].
3.3. Online Marketplaces
There are a wide variety of online marketplaces for exchanging 3D printing designs, typically in the
form of STL files. They typically take the form of consumer-to-consumer sites, such as Thingiverse
which varies from toys and jewellery to tool parts and household items. Most online marketplaces are
variations on this theme, with some such as Cubify allowing software customisation. Defense
Distributed, the company behind the first 3D printed weapon, has a site defcad.com, but this has been
down since February, and the weapon design was removed by order of the US government [11]. Many
sites are specifically catered to professionals and developers, such as Cubehero and 3DVIA. A non-
exhaustive list of marketplaces is available from an aggregated list [27].
3.4. Exporting Hardware
There are no current export controls for 3D printers. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) dual use
items list contains export controls for precision Computer Numerically Controlled manufacturing, such
as spin-forming and flow-forming machines that are capable of manufacturing various materials
associated with the nuclear fuel cycle [28]. The Wassenaar Arrangement manages export controls for
conventional arms, and this control list also does not account for 3D printing [29]. Additive
manufacturing equipment is controlled for the specific purpose of manufacturing of gas turbine engine
blades, vanes or “tip shrouds” using single-crystal additive manufacturing equipment.
Some classes of 3D scanners could potentially be controlled under NSG item 1.B.3 from the dual use
items list [28] and Wassenaar Arrangement item 2.B.6 [29] which control coordinate measuring
machines operating on 2 or more axes operating with sufficient accuracy. It is not clear if this would
control non-contact machines, particularly those using the structured light technology.
Materials used for printing themselves are not controlled unless manufactured in specific geometries
[28].
4. Case Study: Can You Print a Rotor Suitable for Use in a Centrifuge?
Centrifuges used for enriching uranium rotate at such a rapid rate to require high-precision, high-
strength material. Until very recently, these materials—carbon fibre, maraging steel and high strength
aluminium—have only been available in a small number of countries with advanced manufacturing
bases. If it were possible to 3D print high strength material for use in a centrifuge this would present a
serious challenge to current export control regimes.
Is 3D printing a centrifuge possible? In comments to the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, Michael Hopmeier from Unconventional Concept Inc., a Virginia-based defence consultancy
company, stated that the technology already exists for 3D printing an entire centrifuge for uranium
enrichment, without substantiating the comment [30].  There is not much literature available on this
subject and we here attempt to examine this claim.
3D printers that can print maraging steel are already commercially available [31]. The mechanical
properties “as built” are too weak for centrifuge use, according to NSG requirements [28] with an
ultimate tensile strength (UTS) of around 1110 MPa. However, after age hardening the UTS exactly
meets the NSG requirement of 1950 MPa. This clearly points to the technology being on the
threshold—if not beyond—the capability to 3D print parts suitable for a centrifuge. In fact, a 2012
paper claims that mechanical properties comparable to conventionally produced maraging steel can
be produced by SLM [32]. However, there are a number of important factors to consider.
The critical industrial process for maraging steel, though, is the age hardening, meaning a potential
proliferator would require the infrastructure to perform this part of the manufacturing process for
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maraging steel. Beyond obtaining the steel with the correct chemical composition martensic aging to
alter the microscopic composition of the steel, commonly referred to as maraging, is the most difficult
part of the industrial process. A 2014 paper leaves questions over the microscopic properties of
maraging steel produced by SLM [33] but progress is consistently being made in this area. It should
be pointed out that under current export controls only complete maraging steels that meet the required
dimensions in addition to the UTS requirements are export controlled. The maraging steel powder that
would be used in this process is not. Again we state that the printers themselves are also not currently
export controlled.
The size of 3D printed objects is also an issue. Centrifuge rotors are longer than the current
generation of commercial 3D printers allows: for instance the aluminium rotors of the Iranian IR-1 are
about 1m in length and the carbon fibre IR-2m about 50 cm. A commercial system such as the EOS M
280 has a building volume of 25 x 25 x 32.5 cm3 [34]; which is far too small. 
4.1. Maraging Steel 3D Printers
The primary company that makes maraging steel capable 3D printers is Electronic Optical Systems
(EOS). Others include the Matsuura, located in Japan [35]. The list of maraging steel capable 3D
printers is provided in Table 1.
Maraging Steel Printers Building Volume Material
EOS M 270 25 x 25 x 21.5 cm3 MS1 
EOS M 280 25 x 25 x 32.5 cm3 MS1 
EOS M 290 25 x 25 x 32.5 cm3 MS1 
EOS M 400 40 x 40 x 40 cm3 MS1
LUMEX Avance-25 25 x 25 cm3 Matsuura Maraging II
Table 1: 3D printers of maraging steel.
Maraging steel capable 3D printers are not yet cheap, costing between USD 400k-750k. 3D Systems’
Pro X range are also potentially maraging steel capable [16]. The Renishaw AM250, as discussed in
section 3.1 may also be capable of printing maraging steel; a list of materials in development is was
not available at the time of writing.
4.2. Maraging Steel Powder
The powder used for printing is EOS maraging Steel MS1 [31], a fine alloyed steel powder, which is
designed to be used in the EOS M systems. The powder is US classification 18% Ni maraging 300,
European 1.2709 and German X3NiCoMoTi 18-9-5. It is designed to be age hardened after printing at
490 Celsius. Other powders such as the Matsuura Maraging II are available [35].
4.3. Other High Strength Materials
High-strength aluminium is also suitable for centrifuges, although is far less desirable than maraging
steel or carbon fibre. The EOS M systems can also print aluminium; however they are far below the
strength needed for centrifuges [36].
4.4. Maraging Steel 3D Printing Services
Many Companies offer 3D printing services with 1.2709 Maraging Steel using EOS printers. These
companies typically require CAD files, usually in the form of STL files and will use a professional 3D
printer to print an item and then ship it to the customer. A selection of these service providers are
listed in Table 2.
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Company Model Location
3d-alchemy.co.uk unknown Shropshire, UK
axis proto EOS M 270 Quebec, Canada
CDRM (3D systems) unknown Buckinghamshire, UK
GPI prototype & manufacturing EOS M 270, 280 Illinois, USA
3D Material Technologies EOS M 280 Colorado, USA
3trpd EOS M 270, 280 Berkshire, UK
Table 2: 3D printing service providers offering maraging steel printing.
Not all information was available for all companies, but no printers were confirmed to be capable of
printing maraging steel other than the machines previously identified. The list is certainly non-
exhaustive, and the search methodology would likely miss non-English language companies.
5. Case Study: Printing UF6 Resistant Components
Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) is a highly corrosive substance. Typically, Fully Fluorinated Materials
(FFM)—that are resistant to UF6—are the only materials in contact with the gas during an industrial
process. Other materials can be used such as aluminium, aluminium oxide, stainless steel nickel
alloys such as inconel and phosphor bronze may also be used [28].  The piping between centrifuges is
a typical component, as well as the contact point for pressure transducers and other applications in
reprocessing. A complex object with moving parts such as a pressure transducer is not yet a realistic
possibility. However, piping and other components required in a UF6 enrichment plant is a realistic
object for a 3D printer.
5.1. Fully Fluorinated Materials
Fluoropolymers, the most common type of FFM, are a suitable material for chemical resistance of
UF6. PTFE or Polytetrafluorethylene is polythene with a carbon chain and the hydrogen replaced with
fluorine. However, this material does not melt when heated so would not be suitable for FDM 3D
printing. Other materials include: FEP, PFA, PCTFE and Vinyidene fluoridehexafluoropropylene [26].
Currently, it does not seem that any FFM are being 3D printed. Current materials may not be suitable,
due to melting requirements and would have to be developed.
5.2. Other Materials
Printing with metals such as stainless steel [37] and Inconel [38] is also possible. As these materials
are in such common use they are only export controlled for very specific components [28].
6. Conclusions
Printing high strength components or corrosion resistant components for use in the nuclear fuel cycle
is already possible with today’s commercial 3D printers. However, due to the time it takes to print, as
well as questions over cost, size and quality issues, it is highly unlikely that an actor pursuing a
nuclear program would choose to 3D print unless it was not possible to obtain parts through traditional
manufacturing supply chains. Complex multi-component parts are still beyond the current (and the
next) generation of 3D printers as are parts with internal electronics.
3D printers and the high-strength materials used in them are not yet under export controls. Due to the
digital nature of the files used in 3D printing, proliferation of sensitive designs could become a future
issue in the current cyber security environment. The precedent for export controls for these items
already exists with CNC machinery, which are controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
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Abstract: 
In the last decades, the international community has negotiated a number of multi or bilateral agreements on 
nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, partly including also provisions for the verification of compliance. 
Among the different verification measures, earth observation (EO) by scientific or commercial satellite 
imaging sensors has been considered as an important source of information. If the area of interest is not 
accessible, remote sensing sensors offer one of the few opportunities to gather almost real-time data over 
the area. The study reviews the technical progress in the field of satellite imaging sensors and explores the 
recent advances in satellite imagery processing as to the extraction of significant observables and signatures 
of possible non-compliance to non-proliferation and arms control. Some examples for potential applications 
of SI for nuclear verification in the context of the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a potential future Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) will be given..  
Keywords: satellite imagery, satellite sensors, image processing, verification regimes, arms control 
1. Introduction
In the past years, research and development (R&D) activities related to the use of satellite imagery for non-
proliferation and safeguards purposes have become less visible than in the 2000er years. One indication, 
among others, is the decreasing number of related topical papers at safeguards conferences. While earlier 
INMM or ESARDA conferences featured at least one technical session on satellite imagery, since some 
years it is increasingly difficult to fill a related topical session at all.  
This is in some contrast to the actual technological developments in this area. 15 years ago, with the launch 
of the first very high resolution imaging sensor IKONOS, the space-based imaging technologies changed 
dramatically, in particular with regard to spatial resolution of optical data to 1 m and better. , and a more 
significant change is imminent. Video data from space is increasingly available, the spatial resolution of 
optical data has further enhanced up to 31cm, two of the most recent sensors also provide data from the 
shortwave infrared region of the electromagnetic spectrum at spatial resolution below 6m, and with the 
evolution of the so-called SmallSats, the temporal resolution has increased significantly. Besides the 
emerging space-based imaging technologies, also the image processing technologies are advancing, in line 
with the increasing computer performance improvements.  
On the other hand, R&D on satellite imagery has been less considered by the safeguards-related Member 
State Support Programmes (MSSPs) in the past years. The European Framework Programme, which 
represented a source for funding in the past, e.g. through the Copernicus initiative [1-3] offers only very 
limited opportunities today. The Horizon 2020 calls issued so far, showed only limited links to advancing the 
application of satellite imagery for non-proliferation and safeguards purposes. 
The contradiction between the technological advancements on the one hand, and the less funding 
contributions or options on the other hand could be due to the fact, that science and technology have solved 
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all relevant issues. And indeed, the potential of available satellite imagery (SI) for safeguards verification has 
been widely investigated and understood, and the IAEA is using SI on a routine basis. However, also the 
IAEA needs to keep pace with the technologic developments and therefore, feasibilities studies of the future 
SI are necessary. The IAEA may need to enhance the efficiency of using satellite imagery, e.g. by semi-
automation of processes, and also the effectiveness by extracting more safeguards-relevant information from 
satellite imagery. 
As far as other non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament agreements are concerned, satellite imagery 
has been considered as verification measure, in some case long time ago when the technical parameters of 
open source satellites were not as promising as they are today. Accordingly, these feasibility studies need to 
be updated or extended, taking the current and future technologies into account. 
Against this background, the given paper will review the emerging satellite imagery technologies, both the 
imaging sensors and the image processing and give some examples for potential applications of SI for 
nuclear verification in the context of the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) and a potential future Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). 
2. Emerging Satellite Imagery Technologies
The era of civil Earth observation (EO) started 1972 with the launch of the first civil satellite by the US 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS), later 
renamed as Landsat-1, provided image data in three spectral bands (green, red, near infrared) with a spatial 
resolution of 80 m. A number of papers demonstrated the application of Landsat, ASTER and SPOT imagery 
for nuclear safeguards applications (see e.g. [4,5]), however, the medium resolution of this imagery up to 
15m does not allow for detailed analysis of nuclear facilities. 
The first paradigm shift in the satellite industry and civil EO occurred in 1999, when the first very high-
resolution satellite sensor IKONOS-2 was launched. Following the availability of this data, the use of satellite 
imagery in the nuclear safeguards system has tremendously gained in importance [6]. Today, commercial 
satellite imagery has become one of the most important information sources the IAEA’s Department of 
Safeguards uses for monitoring nuclear sites and activities. The Department has implemented a customized 
geoinformation system (GIS) called the Geospatial Exploitation System (GES) based on industry-standard 
GIS server technologies, enterprise geodatabase and commercial relational database management system 
(RDBMS), which is deployed to process, analyse, visualize, and disseminate geospatial information at the 
IAEA [7]. 
Table 1 gives an overview on current and future very high-resolution optical imaging sensors providing a 
spatial resolution of 1.0 m or better. The sensors are ordered by their best spatial resolution and launch date. 
Following the merger of the former U.S. competitors GeoEye and DigitalGlobe in January 2013, DigitalGlobe 
has become the leading global provider of commercial satellite imagery, now operating six very high 
resolution sensors. In June 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce lifted the restrictions to sell imagery at 
resolutions sharper than 0.50 m only to U.S. government authorities and not to any other customers in or 
outside the US and allowed DigitalGlobe to collect and sell imagery at the best available resolutions at that 
time. Beginning six months after the launch of WorldView-3, DigitalGlobe has been permitted to sell imagery 
at up to 0.25 m panchromatic and 1.0 m multispectral. The latest imaging satellite development by GeoEye 
dubbed GeoEye-2 was postponed in the course of the merger of the two companies in order to give launch 
space to WorldView-3; however, DigitalGlobe has now accelerated the completion of the satellite and plans 
to launch it as fourth-generation satellite in the WorldView series in mid-2016 providing customers with 0.30 
m resolution imagery. 
Besides the technical and economic supremacy of DigitalGlobe, another 11 satellites are under operation by 
the national space agencies or commercial companies of the Republic of Korea, France, Israel, Spain, India, 
and Dubai. Most of the sensors listed in Table 1 include multispectral bands from the visible and near 
infrared spectrum; the two most recent ones, Kompsat-3A (Korea) and WorldView-3 also provide image data 
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from the shortwave infrared spectrum of the electromagnetic spectrum at 5.5 m and 3.7 m resolution. All 
listed systems offer along- and cross-track stereo capabilities, and the scene size varies between 10 by 10 
km² and 20 by 20 km². 
Table 1: Very high spatial resolution optical imaging sensors (<=1m), ordered by spatial resolution. PAN: panchromatic; 
VNIR: visible and near infrared spectrum; SWIR: shortwave infrared spectrum. (Sources: Operators’ websites, Earth 
Observation Portal at http://directory.eoportal.org/) 
As a general trend, EO solutions continue to expand and diversify, in terms of spatial, spectral and temporal 
resolution, and in national ownership. More and more newcomer States plan to launch an EO satellite in 
order to respond to national policy or security interests, to assist in developing a national space infrastructure 
and to expand current commercial data offerings. From 2004–2013, 133 satellites for civil Earth observation 
(EO) were launched by civil governments and commercial entities from 33 countries. This number is 
expected to grow to 283 satellites for civil EO over 2014-2023 as further governments and commercial 
enterprises develop EO programs [8]. By 2016, more than 50 satellites are expected to offer commercial 
solutions [9]. Whether the increasing number of satellite will cause lower prices for satellite data or not, 
remains to be seen. While some developing EO programs use off-the-shelf solutions for their satellites, 
missions with a highly specialized sensor design providing for high ground resolution and geolocation 
accuracy, such as the WorldView series from DigitalGlobe, are expected to remain at the current price levels. 
The second paradigm shift is just around the corner. After the first shift mainly addressed the spatial 
resolution of satellite imagery, the second shift will target its temporal resolution. Following the launch of 
SkySat-1 in November 2013, the U.S. company SkyBox Imaging has successfully demonstrated that also 
small satellites are capable to produce sub-meter imagery and high-definition videos. While small satellites 
or “SmallSats” are usually considered as satellites below 500 kg mass and smaller than a kitchen oven-size, 
must most of the EO SmallSats under development are far below these limit; in comparison: the WorldView 
series satellites get to 2.8 t. Due to much lower costs associated to development and launches, 
constellations of numerous SmallSats have become possible, allowing for more frequent revisits of areas of 
interest. SkyBox Imaging, acquired by Google in 2014, plans a total constellation of 24 satellites and there 
are other start-ups such as Planet Labs that has launched already 132 of its Dove satellites (a 3U CubeSat) 
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from the International Space Station (ISS) in 2014 [10], see Table 2 for other missions. For the sake of 
completeness, though not a satellite on its own, also the UrtheCast’s developed world's first Ultra HD video 
camera Iris mounted on the ISS should be mentioned here, providing of true colour videos with 1 m spatial 
resolution and duration of up to 60-seconds.  
Table 2: SmallSats. PAN: panchromatic; VNIR: visible and near infrared spectrum; MS: multispectral, band specification 
unknown. (Sources: Operators’ websites, Earth Observation Portal at http://directory.eoportal.org/) 
Although SmallSats do not offer the same very high spatial resolution as the mostly car- or truck-sized 
satellites listed in Table 1, its higher temporal resolution allows for other applications also for nuclear 
verification, such as more continuous change detection once their constellations are fully deployed. Once 
fully deployed, the SmallSats will be able to take a daily snapshot of the entire planet.  
The last entry in Table 2, the development of SmallSats capable to acquire hyperspectral data by the 
Canadian company NorStar Space Data [12], points to another field of sensor advancements. While the 
multispectral sensors acquire data in a number of bands covering only parts of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, hyperspectral sensors record the reflected radiation in several hundreds of very narrow contiguous 
or overlapping wavelength bands and therefore provide a continuous spectrum from the visible to shortwave 
infrared. While the future and the technical details of the project is yet uncertain, it could mark the start of the 
third paradigm shift, now in terms of spectral resolution.  
At the time being, there are just two satellite-based hyperspectral instruments in orbit, Hyperion, flying 
onboard the Earth Orbiter-1 (EO-1) spacecraft, launched by NASA in 2000 and CHRIS, flying on the Proba-1 
spacecraft, launched by the European Space Agency (ESA) in 2001. Hyperion provides 220 spectral bands 
from 0.4 to 2.5 µm, CHRIS 62 bands from 0.4 to 1.05 µm. Besides the low temporal resolution (revisit), also 
the medium spatial resolution of 30 m and 20 m is a limiting factor for the application of hyperspectral data in 
a number of nuclear monitoring applications. This will also apply to other future missions, such as the 
German EnMAP (Environmental Monitoring and Analysis Program) or the Italian PRISMA (PRecursore 
IperSpettrale della Missione Applicativa). 
Besides the optical sensors, State-of-the-art SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) sensors provide not only an all-
weather, day and night monitoring capability, but also different information with regard to man-made 
structures and surface deformations (see Figure 1). For SAR data, the paradigm shift happened in 2007, 
when the first sensors providing 1m resolution were launched (see Table 3). Processing SAR data, however, 
needs some expert knowledge and often also optical imagery for interpretation. Though application of 
satellite data is usually restricted to very high-resolution optical data, SAR data have a lot of potential in order 
to assess movements and deformations due to drilling, mining or camouflage. 
3. Potential Applications of Satellite Imagery for Nuclear Verification
Commercial high resolution imagery is routinely used within the IAEA’s safeguards system as a reference 
source to aid in in-field and inspection planning, to verify the accuracy and completeness of information 
supplied by Member State, to detect changes and monitor activities at nuclear sites, to investigate 
undeclared activities, and to provide analytical input to the State Evaluation process. Geoinformation 
technologies further advance the use of satellite imagery to generate site plans and store and manage 
critical information related to sites and facilities. 
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Figure 1: Different information given by optical & radar sensors. Left: Optical image GeoEye-1 (Credit: GeoEye); Right: 
TerraSAR-X (Credit:Astrium) 
Table 3: SAR sensors with spatial resolution <= 5m. (Sources: Operators’ websites, Earth Observation Portal at 
http://directory.eoportal.org/) 
In some contrast to the use of SI for verifying NPT compliance, the CTBT verification regime does not 
include SI as verification measure yet. However, the treaty text considers satellite monitoring as an additional 
technology whose verification potential should be examined (Article IV, paragraph 11). The CTBTO has 
investigated the application of airborne and space-borne imagery in the preparation of on-site inspections 
with regard to the specification of inspection area and point of entry, and for focusing activities during 
inspections [13]. The recent CTBT Integrated Field Exercise, which was held in Jordan end of 2014 (IFE14), 
included the use of multi-spectral imagery including infrared (MSIR) during on-site inspections for the first 
time. In addition, SI may also be used complementary for confirming information gathered from the 
International Monitoring System (IMS), including seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide 
monitoring. 
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For verifying compliance with a potential future FMCT, SI should be considered as one tool among other 
verification measures in order to monitor declared shut-down facilities or undeclared facilities, and to prepare 
or initiate on-site inspections.  
Due to the quality of today’s satellite imagery, a variety of information can be extracted from this space-
based data, such as spatial, spectral (reflective, emissive), polarization, temporal and/or semantic properties 
of image pixels or image objects by visual and/or computer-based analysis. For monitoring declared nuclear 
facilities or detecting clandestine activities using satellite imagery, specific object features related to the 
nuclear fuel cycle and its processes as well as geographical and cultural characteristics need to be surveyed. 
An imagery analyst has to identify objects regarding size, shape, height, color, surroundings, functionalities 
and temporal changes, and determine their significance [14].  
Very high resolution optical satellite imagery provides a good basis for analyzing the facilities’ installations 
and verifying design information and Additional Protocol declarations. Furthermore, the stereo capabilities of 
the sensors allow the extraction of high-resolution Digital Surface Models (DSMs) for 3D visualization of the 
sites and the surroundings [15]. 
DSMs can also be derived from high-resolution SAR imagery by applying either radargrammetric or 
interferometric techniques. Some current research studies have investigated whether SAR image analysis 
can meet the expectations with regard to safeguards applications [3,15,16]. 
Image acquired over the same area of interest at different acquisition times can be compared visually or by 
computer-driven processing techniques in order to assess the safeguards relevant changes, such as 
construction of buildings or streets, surface movements due to underground activities and others [3]. While a 
number of sophisticated image processing algorithms exist, the degree of robustness, automation and user-
friendliness need to be improved. In particular (semi-)automated change detection techniques still suffer from 
too many false and negative false alarms that require extensive user interaction. 
Thermal infrared data can be used to evaluate the operational status of facilities. After converting the thermal 
infrared data to emissivity and temperatures, image fusion with bands of higher spatial resolution facilitates 
the interpretation of the temperatures. Anomaly detection tools are useful for extracting “hot spots” in a 
specific region or the whole scene. Here, algorithms for temperature estimation and anomaly detection are 
well established for other applications [17]. However, as nuclear verification is generally restricted to space-
borne remote sensing today, even the current sensors with their moderate spatial resolution of 60 to 100 m 
per pixel can provide relevant information. 
Using well-calibrated hyperspectral imagery, surface materials can be characterised, identified and 
potentially tracked from source to destination [18]. By fusing the results of lower resolution hyperspectral 
analysis results with high-spatial resolution imagery, objects and information on materials can be identified 
simultaneously. 
Besides information extraction from satellite imagery, information management, including the huge range of 
open source information and open source geospatial tools, manifold the application of geoinformation for 
non-proliferation and arms control. [19] 
4. Summary & Conclusion
Satellite imagery (SI) generally represents a key source of information for the different national and 
international bodies involved in the implementation of (nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and 
disarmament) Treaties. SI has a lot of potential in verifying Treaties compliance by supporting the efficient 
management of arms control and non-proliferation issues, and by contributing to improve the performance of 
the Treaty. 
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As a general trend, the supply of EO solutions continues to expand and diversify, with newcomer States to 
launch an EO satellite in order to respond to national government policy interests, assist in developing a 
national space infrastructure and expand current commercial data offerings.  
In order to keep track of these developments, more feasibility studies on the application and benefits of new 
and future SI for nuclear verification are required. Feasibility studies should focus on the use of SmallSats 
imagery (high temporal resolution, videos), KOMPSAT-3A (night imaging, hotspot detection, …), and 
hyperspectral & TIR imagery (high spectral resolution); for the latter, a case study based on airborne data 
could be useful. Moreover, studies investigating the identification of SI signatures of (preparations of) nuclear 
tests, operational status of nuclear facilities, and others need to be continued.  
The role of SI within nuclear non- proliferation and arms control verification regimes should also be enhanced 
by improving SI processing tools as to increasing robustness and degree of automation. Besides, synergy 
effects when combining analysis of multisensor satellite imagery need to be strengthened. 
In order to promote SI as effective, efficient and politically accepted verification measure also within the 
CTBT and potential FMCT verification regimes, more in-depth case studies and the development of sound 
image processing techniques for extracting relevant information are required. Research and development in 
the context of the CTBT should focus on off-site identifying relevant signatures of preparations and 
realisations of nuclear tests, providing information with regard to the specification of inspection area and 
point of entry, for focusing activities during inspections, and on complementing the information gathered from 
the International Monitoring System (IMS). Research and development in the context of a potential FMCT 
should look into procedures to monitor declared shut-down facilities or undeclared facilities, and to prepare 
or initiate on-site inspections. 
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SPAIN
ABSTRACT 
The mission of the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) is “to support the decision making and 
actions of the European Union in the field of the CFSP and in particular the CSDP, including European 
Union crisis management missions and operations, by providing, at the request of the Council or the 
HR, products and services resulting from the exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data, 
including satellite and aerial imagery, and related services” [1].
The SatCen Non-Proliferation Team, part of the SatCen Operations Division, is responsible for the anal-
ysis of installations that are involved, or could be involved, in the preparation or acquisition of capabilities 
intended to divert the production of nuclear material for military purposes and, in particular, regarding 
the spread of Weapons of Mass destruction and their means of delivery [2].
For the last four decades, satellite imagery and associated remote sensing and geospatial techniques 
have increasingly expanded their capabilities. The unprecedented Very High Resolution (VHR) data 
currently available, the improved spectral capabilities, the increasing number of sensors and ever in-
creasing computing capacity, has opened up a wide range of new perspectives for remote sensing ap-
plications. Concurrently, the availability of open source information (OSINF), has increased exponen-
tially through the medium of the internet.
This range of new capabilities for sensors and associated remote sensing techniques have strengthened 
the SatCen analysis capabilities for the monitoring of suspected proliferation installations for the detec-
tion of undeclared nuclear facilities, processes and activities. The combination of these remote sensing 
techniques, imagery analysis, open source investigation and their integration into Geographic Infor-
mation Systems (GIS), undoubtedly improve the efficiency and comprehensive analysis capability pro-
vided by the SatCen to the EU stake-holders.
The following document aims at reviewing the benefits of the suite of sensors and associated remote 
sensing capabilities afforded with regards to the monitoring of nuclear facilities.
1 INTRODUCTION
The number and capabilities of space-based elec-
tromagnetic sensors has increased dramatically 
over the last four decades. Meanwhile, the huge 
leaps in computing power, associated technology 
and communications has strongly supported the 
development of a wide range of applications utilis-
ing satellite imagery. Currently, almost any part of 
the earth can easily be imaged in High (HR) or 
even Very High Resolution (VHR) through web 
applications. However, remote sensing tech-
niques based mainly on the three pillars com-
monly called spatial, spectral and temporal reso-
lution remains a specialist domain.
This paper aims to review the potential techniques 
based on electromagnetic measurements ac-
quired from space-borne platforms to support EU 
decision makers regarding Non-Proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction issues dealing 
mainly with material diverted from the nuclear fuel 
cycle.
The nuclear fuel cycle is the set of industrial pro-
cesses which make use of nuclear materials in the 
production of electricity. Most of these processes 
can be scrutinised and assessed using remote 
sensing techniques based on the analysis of sat-
ellite imagery [3].
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Remote sensing is the art and science of obtain-
ing useful information about an object or area ac-
quired by a device that is not in contact with the 
object, area or phenomenon under investigation 
[4].
The first civilian remote-sensing sensor based on 
a space-borne platform launched on 23 Jul 1972, 
known as Landsat-1 (originally named ERTS-A -
Earth Resources Technology Satellite) supplied 
satellite imagery with a ground sample distance 
(GSD) of 80 metres. [5].
However, military programs such as CORONA, 
the first US military satellite-based reconnais-
sance program, were already operating from Au-
gust 1960 until May 1972. 
Over the last decade, Hollywood movies have 
highlighted, and most of the time overstated, the 
abilities of satellite imagery.
Satellite imagery and associated remote sensing 
techniques are applied and analysed by humans. 
By nature this analysis is driven by a range of mo-
tivational and emotional factors which undoubt-
edly influence the processing of visual stimuli.
Our eyes do not send images to our brains. The 
images are constructed in our brain based on the 
very simple signals sent from our eyes.  We only 
"see" after the brain has interpreted what was sent 
by the eyes.  The human brain forms images 
based on pattern recognition learned from an 
early age.
2 THE SENSORS
Nowadays, more than 160 earth-observation sat-
ellites are commercially available worldwide [6]. 
Of the wide range of sensors available, the selec-
tion of the most suitable and efficient sensor is the 
key issue in order to broaden remote sensing 
techniques and to strengthen the analysis. 
2.1 Space-based EO Sensors
Space-based sensors and in particular Electro-
Optical (EO) sensors may be categorised by GSD 
capacity (Spatial resolution), electromagnetic ca-
pabilities (Spectral resolution) or revisit frequency 
abilities (Temporal resolution).
• Spatial Resolution is "a measure of the 
finest detail distinguishable in an image”. The 
most commonly used descriptive terms for spatial 
resolution is the ground sample distance (GSD). It 
is commonly agreed on the following scale of spa-
tial resolution
 Low Resolution: larger than 30 m
 Medium Resolution: 2 - 30 m
 High Resolution: under 2 m
 Very High Resolution: sub-metre
• The Spectral Resolution of the sensor is 
based on the number of bands, their location on 
the electromagnetic spectrum and how narrow the 
bands are. Spectral resolution is commonly ap-
plied to EO sensors, optical and infrared, which 
measure reflected or radiated energy. Panchro-
matic sensors acquire data from a single broad re-
gion of visible light, and sometimes also from the 
adjacent near-infrared of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. Multispectral sensors are capable of 
acquiring simultaneously from 3 to 10 wider bands 
while hyperspectral instruments can capture hun-
dreds of narrow bands. 
• The Temporal Resolution specifies the re-
visit frequency of a satellite sensor for a given lo-
cation.  It is commonly agreed on the following 
scale:
 High temporal resolution: < 24 hours - 3
days
 Medium temporal resolution: 4 - 16 days
 Low temporal resolution: > 16 days
High temporal resolution is significantly enhanced 
by the capability of on-board sensors to point both 
along and across the satellite track, providing a 
revisit capability of 1 to 3.5 days, depending on 
latitude. A constellation of satellites can also con-
siderably shorten the revisit period. 
2.1 SPACE-BASED SAR SYSTEMS
The Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is an active 
and coherent sensor working in the microwave 
domain of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. It 
collects the backscatter signal of an electromag-
netic wave. This electromagnetic wave is charac-
terized by two fundamental properties: amplitude 
and phase.
• The amplitude is a function of backscat-
tered energy displayed as intensity (I = A²) and 
can be considered as the “visual” part of the infor-
mation. The behaviour of the backscattered elec-
tromagnetic energy depends on the interaction 
between the electromagnetic wave and the phys-
ical and dielectric properties of the target; the 
roughness and the moisture. Some materials 
such as metal have a high reflective quality while 
other such as grass have a poor capacity to reflect 
incidental energy. 
• The phase is a property of a periodic phe-
nomenon which is the fraction of one complete 
sine wave cycle (from –π to +π) corresponding to 
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the wavelength. It is a key element for the estima-
tion of displacement (sensor-to-target distance) 
and thus used for interferometric measurement. 
The analysis of differences between phases of re-
flected radiation is called interferometry. There are 
two main possible sources of phase shift: vertical 
(terrain altitude) and horizontal (terrain motion). 
The processing of the backscatter signal collected 
by the multiple antenna locations which form the 
synthetic antenna aperture allows the formation of 
a matrix of pixels in two dimensions: range and 
azimuth (cross range).
Space-borne SAR sensors use L, C or X-band 
and most of them are able to emit and receive with 
various polarizations (multi-polarization). These 
bands provide different spatial resolution and 
moreover a range of capabilities regarding ground 
and foliage penetration.
On 17 July 1991, the first Earth-observing SAR 
platform, the European Remote Sensing satellite 
(ERS) was placed into orbit. Since 03 April 2014, 
Sentinel-1A operates in the C-band and provides 
Copernicus, the European Programme for the es-
tablishment of a European capacity for Earth Ob-
servation, with SAR imagery/data at medium res-
olution [7].
3 REMOTE SENSING & IMAGE ANALYSIS
3.1 ANALYSIS OF MULTI-SPECTRAL IMAGERY 
Despite a poor spatial resolution, the Terra (Aster) 
and Landsat series are the most useful space-
borne sensors for multi-spectral analysis. The ca-
pability to simultaneously collect radiation from 
multiple narrow wavelength bands, in particular 
the reflected infrared (including near infrared 
“NIR” and shortwave infrared “SWIR”) of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, enhances the ability to dis-
criminate and characterise a wide range of natural 
elements which, by nature, have different spectral 
reflectance signatures. 
This technique is particularly useful for the char-
acterisation of soils by the discrimination of vari-
ous minerals (eg. Uranium mines) or the classifi-
cation of a range of vegetation/crops.
Amongst other wavelength bands, all high-resolu-
tion multi-spectral sensors provide at least one 
spectral band in the NIR, relevant for the analysis 
of vegetation stress or diseases by using NDVI 
techniques.
To a further extent, NIR bands are also frequently 
used to highlight moisture or vegetation growing 
on the roof of workshops, a main indicator for a 
derelict status. 
WorldView-2 provides high-resolution 8-band 
multispectral imagery of which [8]: 
 Red-Edge spectral band (705-745 nm)
improves the accuracy and sensitivity of
NDVI and plant studies. It can also en-
hance the discrimination between healthy
vegetation, and those impacted by dis-
ease.
 Coastal Blue band (400-450 nm)
strengthens the capabilities for “bathy-
metric” measurements. In addition, the
absorption of this wavelength by chloro-
phyll in healthy plants may improve vege-
tation analysis.
 Yellow (585-625 nm) band enhances veg-
etation classification capabilities.
These spectral bands can also be very useful in 
determining the density and/or turbidity analysis of 
liquid ponds as well as demonstrating vegetation 
stress caused by toxic gas release or fire. 
3.2 USE OF THERMAL DATA 
The infrared (IR) wavelengths of the spectrum, lie 
between 1µm and 14µm and can be further bro-
ken down into two sub-domains respectively: the 
reflected infrared (1µm to 2.5µm) and the thermal 
infrared, also called TIR (3µm and 14µm).  Due to 
atmospheric absorption windows, TIR is generally 
measured over two wavelength extents: 3µm - 
5µm and 8 µm to 12 µm.
Terra (Aster) and Landsat series (Landsat 7 and 
8) space-borne sensors acquire low spatial reso-
lution (respectively 100 m, 60 m and 120 m GSD) 
temperature data between 8 µm and 12 µm.
In remote sensing, the radiance measured (radi-
ant temperature) by thermal radiometers in the 
TIR are firstly converted into Digital Numbers 
(DNs) and subsequently to degrees Kelvin (Ki-
netic heat). The derived estimated surface tem-
perature map is a significant asset for the analysis 
and assessment of various processes within the 
nuclear fuel cycle.
KOMPSAT-3A (Arirang 3A), successfully 
launched on 26 Mar 2015, hosting among other 
sensors an Infrared Imaging System (IIS) operat-
ing over the 3 µm - 5 µm wavelength region at high 
spatial (5m GSD) and thermal resolution [9]. Until 
now this type of imagery has not been commer-
cially available. It will provide the community with 
a tremendous improvement in capability, in partic-
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ular for the detection and monitoring of local pro-
cesses where, for example, heat/steam is gener-
ated/inducted.
The use of the longer wavelengths of the infrared 
domain avoids anomalies from solar reflection 
and also therefore allows for the use of imagery 
collected by night.
3.3 PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS OF SAR DATA
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is a coherent sys-
tem. SAR images comprises of complex data 
which contains both amplitude and phase infor-
mation. 
A series of specific techniques are commonly 
used by SatCen image analysts to extract infor-
mation from SAR data. 
The analysis of single SAR data requires a lot of 
experience and a good understanding of SAR ge-
ometry regarding phenomenon such as layover, 
foreshortening, shadowing and texture. The visu-
alisation (display) of the full range of SAR dynamic 
data is one of the main challenges. The SatCen 
routinely uses coloured dynamic look-up tables 
(LUT) and in particular the rainbow colour display. 
This coloured image enhances the analysis of 
high reflected radiation as well as features which 
do not reflect any, or very poor, radiation.
The Amplitude Change Detection (ACD) tech-
nique consists of comparing at least two examples 
of SAR data acquired using similar orbit and fre-
quency parameters on different dates. The ampli-
tude data is co-registered before being respec-
tively assigned to the corresponding colour chan-
nel (Red, Green and Blue). Thus, changes appear 
according to the colour synthesis model defined. 
The monitoring of nuclear-related nocturnal activ-
ity is one of the main application of amplitude SAR 
data at the SatCen. However, the analysis derived 
solely from SAR amplitude imagery can only pro-
vide assumptions and therefore requires confir-
mation by electro-optical analysis.
One of the benefits of SAR systems is coherence. 
When two or more examples of SAR data have 
been collected along identical orbits with similar 
acquisition parameters, commonly known as in-
terferometric acquisition conditions, a coherence 
map derived from the processing of a SAR inter-
ferometric pair can be generated. The Coherence 
Change Detection (CCD) techniques highlight co-
herence losses mainly due to structural changes 
between the two acquisition dates. It is particularly 
relevant for the monitoring and the activity assess-
ment of large uranium mines. 
The Multi-Temporal Coherence product combines 
the two previous techniques. It consists of the 
combination of two multi-temporal amplitude im-
ages and the corresponding computed coherence 
image. Each image is assigned to one of the col-
our channels (Red, Green and Blue). The MTC 
image highlights changes between two states of a 
target which appeared unchanged by ACD analy-
sis. This technique is particularly relevant when 
surveying large storage areas (UO2 or UF6 
casks) and often use to complement the CCD 
technique.
Ground-surface deformation phenomena induced 
by underground development may be detected 
using a Synthetic Aperture Radar differential inter-
ferometry subsidence map. Subsequent interfero-
grams, formed by patterns of interference be-
tween the phase components of two SAR data ac-
quired from the same orbit with slightly different 
incidence angle and at different times, provides 
high-density spatial mapping of ground-surface 
displacements. Under ideal conditions, it is possi-
ble to resolve changes in elevation in the order of 
a few millimetres. 
Amongst the differential interferometric tech-
niques, the permanent or persistent scatterer in-
terferometry (PSI) [10] may provide evidence of 
tunnelling or ongoing underground activity. How-
ever, the amount of SAR data required for input to 
process and produce an accurate and reliable 
subsidence map, as well as the timeline for the 
acquisition of the required dataset, means that 
this technique is not very well suited for time sen-
sitive operational usage. In addition, natural 
changes due to vegetation or seasonal variation 
will denigrate the relevant results.  Thus, differen-
tial multipass Synthetic Aperture Radar Interfer-
ometry (DInSAR) is a technique useful for accu-
rately detecting and estimating the ground dis-
placement or land deformation. In this case, the 
phases of less SAR data (3 to 5), acquired from 
slightly different orbit configurations at different 
times, are combined in order to exploit the phase 
shift of the signals and compute a surface dis-
placement map.
From the range of space borne SAR platforms 
available, the Italian COSMO-SkyMed constella-
tion provides the SatCen with the most relevant 
advanced SAR capabilities, particularly regarding 
the high revisit frequency which allows relevant in-
terferometry products [11].
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3.4 ANALYSIS OF MULTI-TEMPORAL DATA 
(MONITORING/SURVEY) 
The accuracy of the assessment of a nuclear fa-
cility using remote sensing is based mainly on the 
capability to detect nuclear facilities at the earliest 
stage of construction. The foundations of the var-
ious constructions, the network of underground 
utility ducts, the internal layout and structure of the 
main buildings are crucial for the analysis of the 
facility.
Subsequently, the monitoring of a nuclear facility 
is driven mainly by the revisit capability commonly 
referred to as temporal resolution and the availa-
bility of the sensor.
Once the facility is operating, the analysis of the 
status of the facility from satellite imagery relies 
on indirect indicators of activity such as vapour 
plumes, efflux, liquid output, cooling fan rotation, 
vehicle activity, maintenance activity, damage, 
etc.
As an example, the analysis of snow covered im-
agery may reveal human activity, vehicle tracks, 
heat, etc. The low solar incidence during the win-
ter period provides extended shadows which can 
significantly enhance the analysis of vertical fea-
tures.
The monitoring of infrastructure and the analysis 
of changes can be visually strengthened by the 
processing of anaglyph views formed from two 
satellite images taken with slightly different an-
gles. The image acquired with the larger incidence 
is assigned to the red-colour channel while the 
other imagery is allocated to the two remaining 
colour channels. This combination will create the 
illusion of relief and can be seen using bi-coloured 
lens glasses commonly RED/GREEN or 
RED/BLUE.
Monitoring data sets including heterogeneous 
sensor, viewing angle and season, can also be 
used to create 3D modelling [12]. The 3D models 
derived from satellite imagery provide the analyst 
with a more realistic contextual view of specific 
features. 
3.5 Use of Digital Elevation Model (DEM)
An accurate Digital Elevation Model (DEM) can be 
obtained from the processing of an interferometric 
data pair as well as from an optical stereo-pair and 
can be used for the 3D rendering of an optical sat-
ellite imagery. This product provides the image 
analyst with an enriched contextual insight and a 
more realistic and natural perspective of the area 
of interest (AOI). 
Furthermore, the difference between two DEMs 
may also be used to estimate volume variation, in 
particular in assessing spoil from underground ex-
traction over a specific time period.
3.6 OPEN SOURCE 
Open Source Information (OSINF) includes any 
piece of information which can be obtained legally 
and ethically from public sources.
The amount of information or data available has 
grown exponentially over the last decade and new 
techniques are required nowadays in order to in-
vestigate the tremendous volume of data and be 
able to extract only the useful and relevant pieces 
of information. 
Data Mining is a process which consists of analyt-
ical tools capable of exploring and analysing data 
from varying perspectives by investigating corre-
lations or patterns amongst predefined key val-
ues.
As an example, the report which followed the visit 
to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex on 12 Nov 
2010 by Standford University experts provided, 
amongst other pieces of information, a detailed 
description of the “Uranium Enrichment Work-
shop” layout. The “transcription” of this textual de-
piction into a 3D model, based on satellite imagery 
along with knowledge of the current techniques for 
enrichment has provided the SatCen with a far 
greater understanding of the facility [13].
However, the reliability of open source information 
is an issue and all sources must be cross-checked 
and/or verified to become effective. Open source 
information which is knowingly biased, falsified or 
perverted is called deception. Over the recent 
years, the spread of false, edited or mocked-up 
pictures and imagery has become commonplace. 
Something as simple as the manipulation of the 
acquisition date (or time) of one satellite image 
may cause an entirely inaccurate assessment. In 
addition, the falsification of imagery is also widely 
used to serve propaganda or doctrine dissemina-
tion purposes.
The SatCen dedicates significant effort when us-
ing satellite imagery and open source information, 
in order to corroborate and verify reliability and ac-
curacy across the whole range of data used. 
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4 CONCLUSION AND WAY AHEAD
The significant number of earth observation satellites placed into orbit for the last two decades, and the 
ensuing deterrence of steady overhead surveying, has not refrained the ambition of some states to 
develop or pursue undeclared or illicit nuclear programmes. 
Although satellite imagery and subsequent remote sensing techniques will never supply all the relevant 
information required for the assessment of nuclear facilities, and moreover of undeclared facilities, the 
number of space-borne platforms, the progress in sensor techniques and the development of a range 
of applications described in this paper should contribute profoundly to a more comprehensive analysis.
The synthesis of the range of information acquired over various part of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
as well as the synergy of the remote sensing proficient techniques strengthen the SatCen’s capabilities 
while assessing potential proliferation facilities. Subsequently this is of benefit to the EU stakeholders 
by providing reliable arguments and evidence.
The development of remote sensing techniques and in particular emerging novel space-borne sensors 
will most likely offer new favourable perspectives.
The High-Definition video sequences (Up to 90 seconds) already commercially available, will very soon 
provide multiple intra-daily acquisitions capabilities (eg. SkyBox constellation) while High Resolution 
imagery from Geostationary platform would improve (ESA study - 2025) scrutinize potential. In addition, 
medium-resolution (MR) hyperspectral sensors such as EnMAP (Environmental Mapping and Analysis 
Program), planned for 2018 and capable of collecting hundreds of narrow bands from 420 nm to 2450 
nm with a spatial resolution of 30 m, will provide the community with an unprecedented capability to 
detect specific gases released during the different steps of the nuclear fuel cycle and also to distinguish 
a large collection of materials.
Finally, innovative technology such as Big Data will be needed to investigate the huge amounts of data 
for the extraction of valuable and relevant information (http://big-project.eu).
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As several states have signed the Additional Protocol to their Safeguards Agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), they will need to declare their nuclear activities in
considerable detail, including their operational and shut down uranium mines.  This could significantly
increase the burden on the resources of the IAEA in carrying out its safeguards procedures. The IAEA
could use space-based high-resolution panchromatic, multi-spectral and, to some extent hyper-
spectral sensors to verify some aspects of uranium mining and milling.  Such techniques could reduce
the overall costs. The availability of such data cost free on the Google Earth web site and
commercially from various imagery providers makes it possible for analysts to make assessments
concerning the nuclear fuel cycle activities of various countries of interest. The mining of uranium and
its conversion through a milling process into U3O8 (yellowcake) is the first step of a complex
conversion cycle that determines how the mined material will be used.
Our study discusses the possible use of satellite imagery as well as open source information that
includes ground and aerial photographs of facilities, for identifying and monitoring uranium mining and
milling activities. In the study an attempt is made to answer the following questions:
1. Can we identify uranium mines using openly available satellite imagery?
2. Can we use various steps in uranium milling operations to identify such mills across the world?
3. Are there other extraction processes that share similar features with those for uranium? If so, then
are there any special features present or absent in the sequence of operations for their extraction that
helps an analyst separate a uranium operation from other operations that share some or all of the
features present in the extraction of uranium?
4. Can satellite-based imagery be used to estimate the production capacity of a mill?
Based on empirically derived observables and signatures from satellite imagery for typical uranium
extraction operations we have derived a decision making algorithm for determining whether a
particular facility can be categorized as a uranium mill or whether it should be categorized as some
other facility.
The method has been used to look at some copper mills across several locations and has shown that
the decision making algorithm does help us to separate a uranium mill from a copper mill.
Keywords: Fuel cycle, Spatial features, Uranium mills, Uranium mines, International Safeguards,
Satellite Images.
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
660
1. Introduction
The need to prevent nuclear material proliferation has been of serious concern for the last several
decades. In fact the setting up of the International Atomic Energy agency (IAEA) was primarily to
deter nation states from pursuing nuclear weapon programs. The States periodically declare all their
activities according to the protocol agreed with the IAEA, specifically on nuclear material inventory
control, containment and surveillance at facilities. Verification of these declared activities is a major
task and with the Additional Protocol the verification has become more difficult; newer methods and
technologies are always useful to strengthen the verification methods.
Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation.
Under the Additional protocols agreement, the signatory states are required to provide IAEA
inspectors access to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle – uranium mines, processing facilities, fuel
fabrication, and enrichment plants, nuclear reactors potentially capable of producing weapons grade
plutonium, nuclear waste sites as well as any other location where nuclear materials may be present.
This has vastly increased the amount and type of information that states will have to provide to the
IAEA. At the same time, the burden of verification has also vastly multiplied as far as the IAEA
inspectors are concerned. Given the security or the lack of it in the world in recent years, the IAEA is
bound to find itself in a situation where physical verification of the declared nuclear facilities will
become difficult. Undeclared facilities particularly in the early part of the nuclear fuel cycle such as
uranium mining and milling could pose special problems. It is in this context that the role of satellite
imagery in identifying nuclear fuel facilities becomes significant.
There have been several studies carried out to assess the usefulness of high resolution satellite
images for verification of safeguard treaties between the IAEA Member States and the IAEA. [1]
These efforts try to identify key features of a nuclear facility and seek to uniquely identify them from a
satellite image.
It is well known that together with open sources of information including ground and aerial
photographs, satellite images are useful for identifying and monitoring some nuclear facilities [2]. The
IAEA has been using satellite images as a part of a routine toolset for safeguard purposes [3]. With
the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, IAEA inspection involves more extensive monitoring the
early part of the nuclear fuel cycle which includes uranium mining and milling. However, satellite
images have not been used in a major way for looking at existing or newly created mining or milling
operations for assessing whether they are used for the production of Uranium.
The present paper is an effort to demonstrate the possible use of openly available satellite imagery
along with ground and aerial photographs for identifying and monitoring uranium mining and milling
activities. Towards this end it seeks to answer the following questions:
 Can we use the various steps in uranium milling operations to identify such mills across the world
using satellite imagery available in public domain particularly Google Earth images and other
open sources of information?
 Are there other extraction processes that share similar features with uranium extraction
processes? If so, how do we distinguish uranium mills from these mills in a satellite image?
 How can we make an assessment of the uranium production capacity of a mill identified in a
satellite image?
2. Past Work
One of the earliest studies that attempted to demonstrate the use of satellite images for identifying
uranium mines and mills was by Jasani et al. [4] The steps involved in the conversion of uranium ore
to yellow cake were used to develop a set of keys to identify a uranium mill in a high resolution hyper-
spectral satellite image. Taking the Ranger mine and mill as an example the study demonstrated that
the potential observables which are present in the uranium mining and milling operation, but not in
copper mining and milling, include the discriminator station, pyrolusite (manganese dioxide) which is
used as an oxidant in leaching, the pregnant uranium leach liquor produced in the sulfuric acid
leaching process, the concentrated uranium strip solution generated from solvent extraction, and
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finally the yellowcake produced from the precipitation and drying steps. The study also pointed out
that most of these features do not have unique spectral signatures and their identification is further
complicated by their small spatial extents.
Using the Ranger mine and mill again as an example, researchers at the Sandia National Laboratory
analysed the potential use of multi-spectral as well as hyper-spectral data from a number of remote
sensing satellites to separate out any unique features of a typical uranium mining and milling
operation [5]. Apart from magnesium chlorite the only other identifiable signature came from the
Sulphur heaps at the Ranger site which is used to manufacture Sulphuric acid for the acid leaching
process at the site. The study concluded that hyper-spectral data could not distinguish between
uranium processes from other milling processes such as that of copper, zinc, vanadium, phosphorous
and Rare Earths. Further the study pointed out that while high spatial resolution satellite systems such
as Quickbird lack sufficient spectral resolution to uniquely identify many materials, spatial information
provided by these systems could complement information obtained from high spectral resolution
systems such as Hyperion.  A unique aspect of this study however, was the creation of a decision tree
that linked each step in the milling operation at Ranger to similar processes used in the extraction of
other materials of commercial and strategic importance.
Another notable study demonstrated the use of satellite images for the IAEA to verify the reports
submitted by the concerned country on the operational schedules of a uranium mine and mill [6].
An important conclusion that emerges from these studies is that it is difficult to identify a uranium mill
using only spectral signatures be it multi spectral or hyper-spectral satellite images.
3. Our Approach
We identify a uranium mill using a novel approach which contrasts with the earlier studies. A set of
keys for identification of a uranium mill is developed based on the spatial features of the equipment
used in the milling operations. This is achieved by interpreting the Google Earth (GE) images of a
large number of commercial uranium mills across the world.
A comprehensive understanding of the uranium operations at each site is built up using the process
flow sheets of the mill along with publicly available information about the mill including ground and
aerial photographs of the mill. Together with the GE image of the mill, the keys for identification are
developed and these keys are then linked to the process taking place. Through such an approach we
establish a pattern of connected signatures that are linked to specific process steps. The most
commonly occurring features in the sample sets along with their signatures are then used to decide
whether a mill seen on a satellite image is a uranium mill or not.
4. Uranium Milling Process
The process of uranium extraction is very well known [7]. However, to integrate it with our study, a
schematic of a typical process for the extraction of uranium from its ore is shown in Figure 1. The
associated equipment / reagents with each of these steps are also shown in the figure. Our objective
is to determine which of these are unique to a uranium milling operation and are visible and
identifiable in a satellite image. For the purpose of this study we have not considered those mills that
use heap leaching as the only method for leaching. The reason for this omission is that the process
steps involved in this case will differ slightly and it may not be possible to uniquely identify such mills
in a satellite image.
We selected 11 uranium milling operations and our sample set is shown in Table 1.
The imagery available on GE for each of these mills and when possible ground and aerial
photographs were studied in detail along with other publicly available information. For example, an
aerial view of the Key Lake mill is used along with a Quickbird satellite image, to identify specific
features (Figure 2). The flow sheet of the mill along with the site description of the mill provided by
CAMECO further helps to identify some of the features. For instance, the solvent extraction building is
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 Figure 1 A Simplified Overview of the Steps involved in Uranium Milling Process
Country Mill Name
Location
(Lat / Long) Owner Start Year
USA Sweet Water 42 03 N 107 54 W Shut Down 1981
Canada Rabbit Lake 58 15 N 103 40 W CAMECO 1975
Australia Ranger 12 41 S 132 55 E ERA 1981
Canada Mclean Lake 58 21 N 103 50 W Areva 1999
Canada Key Lake 57 13 N 105 40 W CAMECO 1983
Niger Arlit 18 47 N 7 21 E Areva 1970
Namibia Rossing 22 28 S 15 03 E Rio Tinto 1976
Namibia Langer 22 49 S 15 20 E Paladin 2006
Russia Krasnokamensk 50 06 N 118 11 E Argun 1968
Czech Republic Rozna 49 30 N 16 14 E DIAMO 1958
Romania Feldiora 45 50 N 25 30E State Owned 1978
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identified by the presence of the solvents stored alongside the building and by the connecting pipe
that goes from the CCD to the building.
Figure 2 An Aerial Image (Bottom) and a QuickBird Image (top) of Key Lake Mill
(A – Heat Exchangers, B – Acid Plant, C – Leaching Section,
D – CCD, E – Solvent Extraction – precipitation)
5. What can be observed in a Satellite Image of a uranium mill?
The uranium mill features observable in a satellite image for the sample sites is summarised in Table
2. Though crushing, grinding and slurry preparation facilities are identifiable in most of the imageries
they do not offer any special features associated with only a Uranium Milling operation.
Radiometric sorters are used in many Uranium mills to improve the ore quality. However they cannot
be uniquely identified in a satellite image.
The most commonly visible feature in the satellite image is the Counter Current Decantation (CCD)
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Table 2 Uranium Mill Features Observable in a Satellite Image (S - Seen, NS - Not Seen, NA – Not
Applicable)
Figure 3 CCDs units as seen in a GE satellite image
mills. In all the cases except the Sweet Water mill, this feature is easily identifiable. The Sweet Water
mill was closed down in 1984 and according to reports available the CCD is housed inside a
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building.There are several features associated with the leaching process many of which can be seen
in a satellite image. Some feature or the other that can be linked to a leaching step is seen in all the
mills. Of the 11 mills Langer Heinrich, Rozna and Feldiora use alkaline leaching, while the other mills
use acid leaching. Since alkaline leaching involves higher temperatures; one can look for evidence of
chimney, heat exchangers or even smoke.  Additionally in the case of acid leaching one can see
either the acid plants or the leach tanks and in certain cases the acid storage tanks close to the
leaching facility. Sulphur heaps or Sulphur storage can also be seen in some of the plants. Figure 4
shows typical leach tanks and leaching sections of some of the mills in our sample.
Unlike the CCDs, the leaching facility may need one or more features to be identified uniquely.
However we do know that the leaching operation follows the ore preparation step and precedes the
CCD step. This sequence of operation helps in the easy identification of the various features that can
be linked to a leaching operation.
The next feature of interest is the equipment associated with the process of concentration and
purification. In most mills this is done using either the Solvent Extraction (SX) or the Ion Exchange (IX)
process. Occasionally a combination of both may be used. In our sample mill sites we noted that in
many mills the Solvent extraction units are housed inside a sequence of identical buildings and linked
to these are the storage tanks containing the solvents used in the process (Figure 5). In some cases
such a sequence is however not seen though the presence of solvent storage tanks could provide an
indirect indicator. The IX columns are usually left in the open and are visible in the satellite image
(Figure 6).
The features associated with precipitation, drying and calcining are not uniquely identifiable in a
satellite image. In most cases they have to be identified indirectly by the presence of containers
holding solvents and reagents used for this purpose. Proximity to the SX or IX facilities of such
features is another aspect that we can use to identify this facility. In some of the mills where ammonia
is used, the ammonia cylinders are seen clearly in the satellite image.
Figure 4 Leaching equipment as seen in a GE satellite imagery
To summarise the procedure for identifying a uranium mill from a GE image, we first identify the CCD
circuit; then try to locate the leaching facility upstream. If the CCD process is followed by a SX or IX
facility and some ammonia tanks are also seen we could conclude with high level of confidence that
the facility is a uranium mill.
Figure 7 summarizes the likelihood of unique identification of a Uranium Mill from our sample set. The
leaching as well as the solid-liquid separation process (CCD) provides robust signatures in a satellite
image. The concentration step (Solvent Extraction or Ion Exchange) though easily identified in many
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Figure 5 Solvent Extraction Buildings as seen in a GE satellite image
Figure 6 Ion Exchange columns as seen in a GE satellite image
mills does not always provide as robust a signature as the other two steps. The precipitation step also
does not provide very reliable signatures that can be used under all circumstances. This therefore
creates certain limitations because many other mineral extraction processes could share the leaching,
CCD and solvent extraction steps as well. For instance the process steps of some copper, zinc and
vanadium operations could be very similar to those of Uranium. If, however we are able to identify
additional features which are unique to these mills, we will be able to improve upon our classification
process.
Of all the commercially important elements the one whose signatures are most likely to be confused
with a Uranium Mill is that of a Copper Mill. If we are therefore able to identify some feature in a
copper mill that is not present in a Uranium Mill we can enhance the reliability of our Uranium mill
classification.
In order to do this we need to examine the various operations associated with the extraction of copper
and see whether copper mills offer satellite signatures that help separate a Uranium mill from a
Copper mill.
6. Copper Extraction Process and Observables in a satellite image
The major steps involved in a copper extraction process are shown schematically in Figure 8.
A major difference between copper and uranium is the scale of operation. Invariably due to economic
considerations, the copper processing facility will be several times larger than the uranium operation.
Copper occurs mostly in the Sulphide or Oxide forms. While the crushing and grinding steps are
common to all extraction processes, the process steps in the case of a sulphide ore are different from
those of the oxide ore. This is shown in the Figure 8.
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Process Image Likelihood of seeing
Leaching Signatures in all the mills
Separation Seen in all mills except one
Concentration Not always identifiable
Precipitation/drying One of the features identifiable
Not always present, however.
Figure 7 Likelihood of the features identifiable in a satellite image of a uranium mill
The sulphide ore goes through a froth flotation process after the initial crushing and grinding which
concentrates the copper part. The froth from the flotation process contains the bulk of the copper.
The froth is dried and then sent directly to a smelter. The smelter may be located at the mill site or
may be located elsewhere. The smelter converts the copper concentrate into blister copper which is
further refined to produce anodic copper and finally goes through an electro winning step to produce
high purity copper.
The tailings from the froth flotation may also contain copper which could be recovered. These tailings
are leached with sulphuric acid, passed through a series of CCDs followed by a solvent extraction
step. The copper solution that comes out of the solvent extraction step is then sent to an Electro
winning Facility for the extraction of copper.
Thus, a mill which processes low grade copper ore or a part of a copper mill which processes the
tailings from a froth flotation process will look similar to a uranium mill. It will have the features such as
CCD circuits, SX units in addition to the acid leach facilities that we have seen in a uranium mill.
However, the differentiating factor for the extraction of copper from flotation tailings is that after
solvent extraction it goes to an electro winning facility instead of a precipitation facility. Since such an
electro winning facility has a typical signature evidence of this step in a satellite image can be used to
separate out a Uranium mill from a copper mill.






    
  
 
Figure 8 A Simplified Diagram showing the Copper Extraction Process Steps
In Figure 9 a typical electro winning facility as seen in a satellite image is shown. This is a GE image
of the Nchanga copper tailings extraction plant in Zambia. In the figure the long building (D) is an
electro winning facility which can be easily identified and this is co-located with the solvent extraction
facility in the foreground (C). The CCD circuits and the acid leach facilities are also seen in the image
Copper occurring in the oxide form is leached using sulphuric acid after suitable crushing and
grinding. Following concentration through a solvent extraction process the solution containing copper
is sent to an electro-winning facility. Depending on the concentration of the ore the leaching step may
also be followed by a CCD sequence prior to solvent extraction and electro-winning. Again the
differentiating step between copper and uranium is the electro winning facility.
7. Key Differentiators for a Uranium Mill
The sequence of Acid or Alkaline leaching – CCD – solvent extraction – precipitation is typical of all
Uranium mills.
The CCD unit of these mills is the most amenable to observation from satellite. Though its absence
does not completely rule out Uranium, its presence is a robust indicator of a potential Uranium milling
operation.
The leaching step is the next most visible feature in a satellite image. Both direct and indirect
signatures are available to make inferences about this step. The absence of a leaching process rules
out a Uranium mill.
Thus the sequence of CCD preceded by a leaching step provides a baseline signature for a possible
Uranium Mill.
In many cases solvent extraction facilities have features such as repetitive identical buildings close to
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Figure 9 GE image of Nchanga Copper mill (D – Electro winning, C – SX)
Ion exchange facilities can be seen in a satellite image unless in rare cases they are housed inside
buildings.
In the case of precipitation, storage tanks for the various chemicals and their location in the flow of
material provide some indications. Ammonia tanks used in many cases for the precipitation of
Uranium are often identifiable in a satellite image. Along with a CCD and a leaching step Ammonia
tanks provide a firm indication of a Uranium extraction operation.
Since the solvent extraction or ion exchange or even the precipitation steps in a Uranium mill do not
always provide very robust signatures one way to enhance the reliability of our classification is to
eliminate other materials that share the Leaching - CCD - Solvent Extraction sequence.
The presence of an electro-winning, smelting or froth flotation facilities along with the Leaching – CCD
– Solvent extraction sequence is a clear indicator that the mill is not a uranium mill. The electro-
winning, smelting and froth flotation equipment have clear spatial signatures and can be identified
easily in a satellite image. Through such elimination of various alternatives that share the leaching
step and in some cases the CCDs as well as solvent extraction steps, we can increase the probability
that the mill we are seeing is indeed a Uranium Mill.
8. Assessment of the Production Capacity of a Uranium mill from a satellite
image
Using the observables from the satellite image such as the number of CCD circuits, the diameter of
the CCD in a mill along with the average ore grade, we have been able to arrive at an empirical
equation to estimate the production capacity of the mill. The equation was derived linking the nominal
production capacity data of the sample mills in our study with the measurements made on the satellite
images of these mills.
The equation is in exponential form:
P = k * aG * bN * cA 




G = Ore grade in percentage
N = Number of CCDs
A = Area of the CCD in meter square
Expressed in log form and estimating the coefficients k, a, b and c using the sample data gives,
Ln P = 3.112976 + 0.457613*LnG + 0.956309*Ln N + 0.561587*Ln A
















USA Sweet Water 0.048 6 9.75 350 401.41
Canada Rabbit Lake 0.790 4 30.00 4615 3467.43
Australia Ranger 0.130 8 34.65 4660 3463.12
Canada Mclean Lake 1.220 8 12.85 3077 3166.65
Canada Key Lake 3.400 8 20.00 7200 8320.77
Niger Arlit 0.300 6 23.00 2330 2434.56
Namibia Rossing 0.030 10 56.32 4000 3781.54
Namibia Langer 0.050 7 23.15 1425 1251.39
Russia Krasnokamensk 0.180 6 52.01 3000 4817.18
Czech
Republic
Rozna 0.378 5 24.98 3200 2493.75
Romania Feldiora 0.120 4 28.01 1120 1354.75
Table 3 Data from the Sampled Mills
(All data taken from Uranium 2009: Resources, Production and Demand,  A joint Report by OECD NE Agency
and IAEA, 2010, Also called the Red Book)
The data used for this purpose is shown in Table 3. The nominal capacity for the mills is taken from
the Red Book. The estimated capacity values for the mills from the empirical equation are also shown
in the table for comparison. The results are reasonably good except for the Russian Mill. Agencies
such as IAEA having access to more accurate data will be able to improve upon these estimates.
This estimation process is applied to an Indian mill at Turamdih, Jharkhand. This mill uses acid
leaching and ion exchange (Figure 8). The mill processes uranium ore of grade 0.034%. In the
satellite image we can identify 3 CCDs of diameter 13m.
Using the empirical equation, we estimate the production capacity of the mill to be 244 tonnes which
compares well with the nominal capacity of 190 tonnes.
9. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how publicly available images from Google Earth and other open sources of
information can be used for the purpose identifying a uranium mill.
It is possible to identify a uranium mill in a satellite image using the spatial features of the equipment
used in the extraction process.
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Figure 8 GE Image of Turamdih Mill, India (A –Sulphur heap, B – Ore Preparation, C – Leaching
area, D – CCD, E – Ion Exchange, F – Leach tanks, G – Precipitation & Drying, H – Packing)
It is also possible to distinguish a uranium mill from a copper mill since the spatial features associated
with the copper mill are different from those of the uranium mill. In particular, the presence of an
electro-winning facility in a copper mill enables us to differentiate it from a uranium mill. By eliminating
copper we can enhance the confidence that a particular sequence of operations associated with a
Uranium mill is indeed only a Uranium Mill.
An empirical equation is provided to estimate the production capacity of a uranium mill identified on a
satellite image. The number of CCDs, the diameter of the CCD and the ore grade are used to make
this estimate.
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Abstract: 
The FP7 project G-SEXTANT (Geospatial Intelligence Services in Support of EU External Action, 
01/2013-03/2015) was intended to develop a portfolio of earth observation products and services to 
support the geo-spatial information needs of EU External Action users and stakeholders. G-SEXTANT 
was part of Copernicus, a European earth observation programme which combines the use of satellite 
imagery and other data with local, in situ, data sources to deliver geo-spatial information services and 
products to a wide range of end-users. Copernicus is expected to create an autonomous and 
operational European capability in environmental and security information services.  
G-SEXTANT contained a work package entitled “Nuclear activities scenario”, which provided tools in 
support of monitoring nuclear-related sites and activities using satellite imagery. The activities of the 
work package were grouped into two sub-scenarios, namely “Monitoring of nuclear decommissioning 
activities” and “Monitoring of nuclear activities in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT)”. The paper presents the developments of two sub-scenarios, in detail: i) SAR (Synthetic 
Aperture Radar) visualization tools, aimed at visualizing the changes maps over a SAR time series 
(e.g. multi-temporal coherence maps), and the automatic geometric correspondence between 
SAR/SAR and SAR/optical georeferenced data; ii) SAR time series analysis using the Method for 
generalized Means Ordered Series Analysis (MIMOSA), including the steps estimation of the 
amplitude distribution, computation of the probability density, and automatic thresholding. iii) SAR 
change detection using a complex Wishart algorithm for dual and quad polarimetric imagery in look-
averaged covariance matrix format in order to define a per-pixel change/no-change hypothesis test. iv) 
Optical change detection using object-based techniques. v) GIS-based integration of the products in a 
system which provides access to all available products and information via standard web interfaces. 
The system is able to integrate and manage multi-temporal and multi-type information (satellite 
imagery, Open-Source documents, 3D-data information, GIS data). 
Keywords: satellite imagery; Copernicus; G-SEXTANT; integrated analysis; SAR visualization; SAR 
change detection; optical change detection 
1. Introduction
The goal of G-SEXTANT is to consolidate a portfolio of earth observation products and services that 
respond to geospatial information needs in support to EU External Action. The main objectives of G-
SEXTANT are: 
• Development and delivery of products within user-defined scenarios;
• Further enhancement of already mature products and mature products and users; and
* Corresponding author: i.niemeyer@fz-juelich.de
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• Elaboration and definition of standardised portfolio.
G-SEXTANT is based on user defined scenarios covering potential application areas of interest 
identified by the previous working group “GMES-Security Support to External Action” (2010-2012) and 
mentioned in the Call SPA.201.1.1-03, e.g. humanitarian-aid-operations, border monitoring outside 
Europe, treaty monitoring and nuclear non-proliferation, illegal exploration of natural resources or 
monitoring of illicit crops and land use planning. 
The objective of the scenario “Monitoring of nuclear sites and activities” is to monitor nuclear facilities 
and nuclear decommissioning areas. From the lessons learned (mainly from the users’ feedback on 
the previous Copernicus project GMOSS [1-3], LIMES [4] and G-MOSAIC), tools dedicated to the 
monitoring of nuclear facilities and decommissioning sites should provide additional information to 
complement the daily tasks carried out by satellite imagery analysts. Thus, this scenario aims at 
generating relevant tools in support of User’s activities related to monitor nuclear-related sites.  
The activities covered in this scenario are organised in two sub-scenarios designed to meet the users’ 
requirements: (1) Monitoring of nuclear decommissioning and (2) Monitoring of nuclear activities in the 
context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
The paper presents the tools developments in the context of both sub-scenarios, in detail: 
i) SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) visualization plugin for the ERDAS IMAGINE processing
software. Based on automatic geometric correspondence between slant range SAR images 
and optical images, the satellite model of each loaded image (SAR and optical) is used to 
automatically obtain the true ground coordinates of each pixel, thus allowing to link the views 
in ERDAS IMAGINE.  
ii) SAR time series analysis plugin for the ENVI image processing software. The Method for
generalized Means Ordered Series Analysis (MIMOSA) includes the following steps: 
estimation of the amplitude distribution, computation of the probability density, and automatic 
thresholding. The procedure is computationally efficient without need for spatial speckle 
filtering.  
iii) SAR change detection plugin for ENVI and as (Python) stand-alone tool. The procedure uses
the complex Wishart algorithm with dual and quad polarimetric imagery in look-averaged 
covariance matrix format in order to define a per-pixel change/no-change hypothesis test. The 
method includes approximations for the probability distribution of the test statistics, and so 
permits quantitative significance levels to be quoted for change pixels. The processing chain 
generates geo-coded change maps at the desired statistical significance level.  
iv) Optical change detection plugin for the eCognition Developer image analysis software. Using
object-based techniques, the procedure starts with the segmentation of the images of both 
acquisition times, and continues with the transformation of the feature space using multivariate 
statistical methods in order to emphasize and classify relevant changes.  
v) GIS-based integration of the products in a geodatabase system which provides access to all
available products and information via standard web interfaces. Using Google Earth and a 
HTML browser as graphical user interfaces, the system is able to integrate and manage multi-
temporal and multi-type information (satellite imagery, Open-Source documents, 3D-data 
information, GIS data). 
2. Developments
2.1. SAR Visualization Tool 
The SAR visualization tool is composed by a set of modules aimed at achieving two main objectives: 
• Visualization of the changes maps over a SAR time series (multi-temporal non-coherent,
multi-temporal coherent); 
• Automatic geometric correspondence between SAR/SAR and SAR/optical georeferenced data
For achieving the first objective, a set of modules were used to exploit the Multi-Temporal (MT) 
analysis and the Multi-Temporal Coherent change detection (MTC). The MT analysis is a simple 
change detection technique in which the different SAR complex images acquired over the same area 
of interest are co-registered, and their amplitudes are combined in a multi-band colour image. The 
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colour resulting from the combinations show the different changes occurred in the area of interest in 
the considered time interval.  
This analysis allows working with temporal series of SAR images and shows the evolution of changes 
during long periods of time. Up to three SAR images obtained at different acquisition times can be 
combined in a Red-Green-Blue (RGB) image but commonly two SAR images are combined to form a 
MT RGB image 
The interpretation of these changes depends on the terrain characteristics, as SAR images allow 
mainly to distinguish the terrain surfaces by roughness. The areas with changes can be interpreted as: 
• Negative changes: The decrease of the radar backscatter signal in the second image may be
caused by removed objects (e.g. vehicles, constructions), harvesting in cultivated zones, thus
eliminating the elements that can cause backscatter, making the texture in the image darker
and more fine and homogeneous. Flooded areas may appear darker because of the reflection
of the radar signal on the water surface.
• Positive changes: The increase of the radar signal backscatter in the second image may be
caused by new constructions, vehicle movements, vegetation growth in cultivated areas,
drying of previously flooded areas.
The technique of MTC change detection starts with two co-registered Single Look Complex (SLC) 
SAR images (S1 and S2) captured with the same acquisition geometry. The interferometric complex 
coherence, which is a measure of phase correlation between them, is defined as the correlation 

















The phase of the coherence is proportional to spatial elevation differences. The magnitude of the 
coherence is proportional to backscatter randomness and/or change in placement.   
Coherence magnitude is 1 if backscattering phase and amplitude are the same on both images and it 
is equal to 0 when the backscattering has completely changed. The coherence value is influenced by 
the following factors: 
• Systemic spatial decorrelation (orthogonal baseline between sensor positions at each
acquisition times); 
• Additive noise inherent to the sensor;
• Temporal decorrelation between the two scenes (typical of forested areas, water bodies);
• Atmospheric effects;
• Human activity.
For interferometric applications, such as the generation of digital surface and terrain models and 3D 
change detection, the coherence value is related to the phase noise in the interferogram, i.e. high 
coherence values represent good signal to noise ratios; therefore, height estimation is not possible in 
areas where the interferogram shows low coherence values. For the extraction of surface and terrain 
models, the SAR images should be acquired almost simultaneously in order to maintain a sufficient 
coherence degree and to reduce the temporal decorrelation. 2D change detection applications, 
however, exploit the temporal decorrelation of the coherence to find the changes in the area of 
interest. 
The coherent change detection technique uses the so-called Multi-Temporal Coherence colour 
composite (MTC) RGB image for visualising the changes. The convention used is to compose the 
RGB image with the SAR image from the first acquisition time called master image in the red channel, 
the SAR image from the second acquisition time called slave image in the green channel, and the 
coherence map in the blue channel. The visualization of the composite image allows the interpreter to 
have a better representation and interpretation of change. The change map in Figure 1 can be 
interpreted as follows: Red and green indicate changes (negative and positive), yellow indicates low 
coherences zones (natural vegetation) with no changes, white indicates man-made objects with no 
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changes, light blue indicates flat/bare soil surfaces with no changes, and dark indicates water bodies 
or very flat areas with no changes. 
Figure 1: Extract of a MTC product (produced from two different TerraSAR-X VHR images and the coherence 
image) showing the changes: red/green = changes (negative and positive); yellow = low coherences zones 
(natural vegetation) with no changes; white = man-made objects with no changes; light blue = flat/bare soil 
surfaces with no changes; dark colours = water bodies or very flat areas with no changes. 
The second objective was to develop a customized tool for assisting the image interpretation process 
in the frame of nuclear decommissioning activities. For enabling the joint analysis of several 
SAR/optical images in their native geometry without any resampling process, geometric 
correspondence between SAR/SAR and SAR/optical georeferenced data is automatically established. 
The development focused on TerraSAR-X products and sensor model. The functionalities of the 
developed tool include: 
• Ingestion of TerraSAR-X data and their metadata;
• Integration of TerraSAR-X sensor model using a preconfigured DEM of the area of interest;
• Refinement of geometric model for taking into account systematic errors
The tool, in addition, enables to dynamically navigate through one of the SAR images and to compute 
ground coordinates on the fly. It also allows the comparison of heterogeneous images (SAR/SAR and 
SAR/optical) and removes restrictions to the SAR acquisition geometry for time series analysis (see 
Figure 2). 
The achieved accuracy in the sensor model application algorithm, using a precise DEM of the area, 
reaches sub-pixel level, when obtaining the row and column (pixel) in the SLC image from a 
geographic coordinate. 
However, several problems were encountered during the development process when integrating the 
rigorous TerraSAR-X sensor model into the selected software framework. Therefore, the tool has 
some limitations by the time being, that are still under analysis with the objective of overcoming them: 
• Due to the complexity of the applied model, the processing time slows down when moving
from an area in the image to a far off area or the zoom level is changed not smoothly.
• The internal mechanism of the selected software framework for the implementation of the
sensor model module and its behaviour implies the application of the sensor model in both
directions: from ground coordinates to pixel, and from pixel to ground coordinates. The
application of the sensor model in the latter direction is an iterative process that has been
proven to be too complex and slow for its integration into the sensor model module. An
alternative approach, which uses an approximation of the ground coordinates by interpolating
them over a georeferenced grid, makes the sensor model module work but not as accurately
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as expected: The coordinates shown for a given cursor position have a precision proportional 
to the density of the georeferenced grid, but as the results of the application of the sensor 
model in both directions is not coincident, the geographic link between the different images 
loaded is still imprecise. 
Figure 2: Screenshot showing the obtained on-the-fly coordinates of a TerraSAR-X (left) image in slant range 
geometry and the corresponding coordinates of an optical orthorectified image (right). NOTE: Due to the 
sensitivity of the selected area of interest for the sub-scenario, the screenshot has been taken with images from 
another area (Madrid Barajas Airport, Spain). 
2.2. SAR Time Series Analysis using MIMOSA 
The Method for generalIzed Means Ordered Series Analysis (MIMOSA) is a new technique that can 
detect changes between SAR image pairs or within time series [5]. Unlike many numerous existing 
techniques, this approach does not require any spatial filtering, uses the full resolution, is fully 
automatic and requires a single parameter. The only strong constraint is the acquisition mode as 
interferometric conditions are required. 
The MIMOSA tool provides a complete chain for change detection using SAR imagery from pre-
processing to post-processing. The MIMOSA tool is a set of three toolboxes presented as an ENVI 
menu (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: MIMOSA toolboxes implemented in the ENVI software. 
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After pre-processing of the SAR images, consisting of image co-registration and radiometric 
calibration, the algorithm requires tree steps. The aim of the first step is to estimate the three statistical 
parameters (i.e. μ, M and L) of the Fisher distribution in the amplitude images. The second step is, 
under previous assumption, the estimation of the joint probability density function pm0,mk (m0,mk) and of
the conditional distribution of mk under the knowledge of m0, pmk|m0 (mk|m0) between the pair of images,
where m0 (the geometric mean) and mk (with k > 0) are two different Hölder means. Finally, the global 
change detection procedure consists in a double thresholding of pm0,mk (m0,mk) and pmk|m0 (mk,A|m0,A)
according to the definition of a single parameter based on the false alarm rate, separating the changed 
from the unchanged pixels. 
The MIMOSA interface allows then to superimpose the change detection results on images, showing 
appearance or disappearance over time. Isolated detections can also be eliminated through 
morphological filtering.  
The MIMOSA tool has been deployed at CEA and tested in various situations and with different 
sensors, such as TerraSAR-X and COSMO-SkyMed X-Band. The false alarm rate in MIMOSA is taken 
as a constant value (equal to 1%) for general use and set between one and five percent for particular 
analyses. 
Figure 4 shows the change detection results calculated based on a set of 24 images acquired during a 
campaign in which also ground information was provided. The detected changes, represented in 
green, confirm the good performance of the algorithm.  
Figure 4: Left/middle: Amplitude images of the test site, where vehicle deployment is visible in the centre image 
and can be compared with the ground truth. Right: Automatic change detection; results obtained with MIMOSA 
are represented in green and represent appearance of vehicles between the two acquisition times. 
2.3. Polarimetric SAR Change Detection 
We investigated the application of multivariate statistical change detection with high-resolution 
polarimetric SAR imagery acquired from commercial satellite platforms for observation and verification 
of nuclear activities. A prototype software tool comprising a processing chain starting from single look 
complex (SLC) multitemporal data through to change detection maps has been developed.  
Multivariate change detection algorithms applied to polarimetric SAR data are not common. This is 
because, up until recently, not many researchers or practitioners have had access to polarimetric data. 
However with the advent of several spaceborne polarimetric SAR instruments such as the Japanese 
ALOS, the Canadian Radarsat-2, the German TerraSAR-X, the Italian COSMO-SkyMed missions and 
the European Sentinal SAR platform, the situation has greatly improved. There is now a rich source of 
weather-independent satellite radar data, which can be exploited for nuclear safeguards purposes. 
The method will also work for univariate data, i.e. is also applicable to scalar or single polarimetric 
SAR data.  
The change detection procedure investigated here exploits the complex Wishart distribution [6] of dual 
and quad polarimetric imagery in look-averaged covariance matrix format in order to define a per-pixel 
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change/no-change hypothesis test. It includes approximations for the probability distribution of the test 
statistics, and so permits quantitative significance levels to be quoted for change pixels. The method 
has been demonstrated previously with polarimetric images from the airborne EMISAR sensor, but is 
applied here for the first time to satellite platforms. In addition, an improved multivariate method is 
used to estimate the so-called equivalent number of looks (ENL), which is a critical parameter of the 
hypothesis test.  
Figure 5 shows a processing sequence for generating a change map from two polarimetric SAR 
images available at the single look complex (SLC) processing level, in this case using open source 
software only. First of all, two geocoded multi-look polarimetric SAR images suitable for further 
processing with the change detection algorithm are generated from the SLC data with the open source 
software packages PolSARpro (European Space agency), together with MapReady (Alaska Satellite 
Facility). PolSARpro is first used to create multi-look images in covariance matrix format, which are 
then exported to MapReady for georeferencing with or without a DEM. MapReady will generate the 
covariance matrix images in the form of co-registered GeoTIFF files, one for each diagonal matrix 
element and two (real and imaginary parts) for each off-diagonal component. The python script 
geo2polsar.py is then used to combine these files to a single multi-band image in floating point
format. The equivalent number of looks is a critical parameter for the statistical distribution of the 
image pixels and hence for a valid hypothesis test [7]. The Python script enlml.py implements a
multivariate estimation procedure for the ENL, which is superior to univariate methods, especially in 
the presence of background clutter [8]. Finally, the Python script wishart_change.py calculates the
per-pixel decision statistic −2 log Q and the probability of observing that value or smaller. A 
significance threshold may be set to generate a change map, that is, a classification image for 
change/no change. Single, dual, quad and diagonal polarimetric covariance matrix images can be 
processed with the script. In the context of G-SEXTANT the same processing chain has been 
implemented with the commercial software system ENVI/IDL/SARscape. 
Figure 5: Processing Chain. 
The method has been verified with quad polarimetric data, however, results are not shown here due to 
lack of space and we restrict discussion to two TerraSAR-X dual polarimetric images, which have 
been provided by the G-SEXTANT project. They were acquired on March 12 and September 26, 
2013. The transmitted and received polarizations were HH and VV. Because of the hilly terrain, a DEM 
was used for geo-referencing in MapReady. It was downloaded from the freely available ASTER 
Global DEM V2 database. Ground resolution of the processed covariance images was 12.5m and the 
nominal number of looks was 6. The ENL estimates were 3.7 and 4.7 for the March and September 
data, respectively. Figure 6 (left) shows the HH intensity band of the March 12 image overlayed onto 
the DEM together with the one percent significant changes. Figure 6 (right) shows an enlarged 
projection of the changes around the fuel fabrication complex onto Google Earth. Lack of ground truth 
makes it difficult to interpret the changes seen, but there are no apparent changes to the on-site 
buildings. 
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Figure 6: Left: Surface view of the March 12 TerraSAR-X dual polarimetric image over the Yongbyon nuclear 
facility in North Korea including 1% significance changes. Right: Google Earth projection of the March 12 
TerraSAR-X dual polarimetric image over the Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea including 1% significance 
changes. 
2.4. Object-based Optical Change Detection 
Aiming at providing a robust approach to optical change detection, the procedure for object-based 
change detection described in [9] was adopted and extended to the needs of the sub-scenario. The 
method supports the analyst in monitoring relevant changes at nuclear facilities. The procedure 
includes six steps which will be explained in the following. Improvements achieved within G-SEXTANT 
compared to [9] will be highlighted. 
a) Preprocessing: In order to accurately compare the remotely sensed data acquired at two different
times, the method requires geometrically corrected input imagery. Therefore the input data is
expected to be orthorectified and co-registered. Besides geometric correction, the image data is
normalized spectrally using the relative correction method IR-MAD, which is described in [10].
b) Object extraction: The basis of each object-based image analysis method is the object extraction
step also known as segmentation. Here, a bitemporal segmentation algorithm called
Multiresolution Segmentation for Change Detection (MRS4CD) is applied. This algorithm produces
stable results for different acquisition dates in areas where no changes in the objects’ shape
occurred, and adapted segmentation in areas where the objects’ outlines did change. The result of
this step is a segmentation for each of the two input images. For details on the method see [9].
c) Object correspondence: In order to allow an object-to-object comparison of the data, the two
segmentations obtained in the previous step are linked using the method of Change Detection
using Intersecting Objects (CDIO). This approach creates a third segmentation consisting of a
spatial intersection of all object pairs from the two original segmentations (for details see [9]).
Moreover, the object features used for change detection are selected in the third step. As possible
correlations between the features are automatically removed in the next process step, the user
can freely select the object features. The resulting pairs of feature vectors for each segment in the
spatial intersection segmentation will serve as input to the next processing step.
d) Change detection: The objects’ feature vectors are transformed using a combination of two
multivariate statistical methods in order to emphasize changes between the two images. Firstly,
the principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to the data in order to maximize the variance of
each vector component. The resulting object vectors are then transformed using the canonical
correlation analysis (CCA) which maximizes the variance of the difference in each vector
component. The step results in uncorrelated difference images, the MAD variates, as well as a
change intensity image, the so-called Z-value.
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e) Change classification: Using the change intensity image obtained in the previous step, an
extended version of the supervised classification method SEATH (see [11]) is used. The extended
SEATH estimates the distribution of the change intensity for both classes, i.e. changed and
unchanged objects, based on the samples given by the user. Then, an optimal threshold
separating the two classes is calculated. Compared to [11], the methodology is now capable of
applying also non-Gaussian distributions. The tool is implemented using the open source software
GNU R.
Alternatively, also an iterative unsupervised classification scheme was developed within G-
SEXTANT WP450 which takes advantage of a clustering algorithm called Fuzzy Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (FMLE) (see [12]). At the beginning of each iteration, this method assigns a
cluster to each of the objects using the MAD variates as input. Then, the cluster with the lowest
average Z-value is removed from further analysis and the algorithm continues with the next
iteration. In the current version, the user terminates the process based on visual inspection of the
result.
f) Post-processing: In the last processing step, very small changes that are considered to be results
of co-registration errors are removed. Also, the change objects’ outlines are smoothed using the
Douglas-Peucker algorithm (see [13]) in order to produce well legible maps.
The whole procedure was implemented in Trimble’s eCognition software in combination with the GNU 
R statistical software package. Figure 7 shows input and products from optical change detection 
procedure. 
Future developments of the methodology will comprise the implementation of the semi-automated 
change classification routine as an extension to the image processing software ENVI, going from 
scientific tools to software in an operative environment as well as training of the image analysts. 
Figure 7: Input and products from optical change detection procedure. 
2.5. Information Management and Integration 
The work package provides an integrated platform to the non-proliferation image analyst which allows 
to retrieve, view and analyse all available (spatial and non-spatial) information for a given site, 
including satellite imagery, GIS information, external databases and open source information. It is 
based on a standard three-tier architecture - database (DB), application server (AS) and web client - 
as illustrated in Figure 8.  
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In order to support information of different types (both spatial and non-spatial), the platform 
incorporates three independent pillars each serving a particular purpose: a geographic information 
system, a Wiki system and a document repository:  
• Geographic information system (GIS): The GIS provides an intuitive map-based interface to
the user. It allows storing, retrieving and visualising spatial information. Each feature in the
geo-database is context-sensitive, i.e. it can be selected from the user interface and cross-
linked with other information, such as meta-information, collateral data and analysis results.
• Wiki system: The objective of the Wiki system is to capture unstructured, tacit information
available in an organisation. For example, each feature in the geodatabase (e.g. a particular
facility) can have a corresponding Wiki page containing relevant information or previous
analysis.
• Document repository: The document repository is designed as a central archive for all relevant
documents collected from various sources. In particular, open source information is becoming
increasingly important to trigger, guide and support imagery-based analysis.
In order to facilitate information integration, the meta-data used to describe the information in all sub-
systems is based on the same geographic and thematic taxonomy. This allows for example to 
automatically generate ‘country’ or ‘site’ pages, which provide direct access to all available information 
for the country or site of interest.  
Figure 9 illustrates the concept with example snapshots of the Geo-Browser and HTML browser which 
show spatial and textual information related to the same nuclear site. The user interface provides links 
to easily navigate between the two environments. 
The developments under G-SEXTANT focused on interfacing the GIS platform with the Nuclear 
Security Media Monitor (NSMM), which is used to monitor and review Open Source information related 
to Nuclear Security and non-proliferation [14]. 
Figure 8: High-level architecture of the integration platform. The system integrates a geographic information 
system (left), a Wiki system (centre) and a document repository in order to support spatial and non-spatial 
information. 
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Figure 9: Left: Geo-browser (Google Earth) which allows loading and viewing all spatial data (images, vectors, 
results from processing) that are available in the local database for a given nuclear site. Right:  HTML browser to 
view the non-spatial data for the same nuclear site. The snapshot shows the Open Source information that has 
been collected and stored on a regular basis.
3. Summary & Outlook
The work package related to monitoring of nuclear sites and activities was intended to develop tools to 
support the EO data analyst rather than producing ready-to-use products.  
At the beginning of the project, the following user’s requirements were expressed: 
a) The degree of automation in the analysis and use of geospatial information should be
increased. 
b) Tools for automatic change detection in optical and radar imagery are needed.
c) Synergy effects should be used when combining the analysis of optical and radar satellite
imagery.
d) Geospatial tools for improving the preparations of nuclear safeguards inspections would be
helpful.
Regarding the request to create synergy effects between optical and radar satellite imagery, a SAR 
visualization tool was developed. This tool is able to visually connect pixels between radar and optical 
imagery. Thus, it allows for a better interpretation of SAR imagery. 
Three tools for automatic change detection were developed: a SAR change detection tool using the 
Wishart distribution, a tool for SAR change detection named MIMOSA as well as a tool for object-
based optical change detection. These image analysis tools fill the needs for such tools that were 
expressed by the user. Furthermore, they are able to be integrated into existing workflows. However, 
the tools require further software development to some extent in order to obtain a software tool to be 
used in an operative environment. 
With respect to the request for geospatial tools supporting preparations of nuclear safeguards 
inspections, a GIS tool was developed. This software is based on the Google Earth Engine and allows 
visualizing EO data as well as the results from the image processing tools in a consistent, geo-
referenced manner. Furthermore, it is able to integrate non-EO data using a wiki system. 
While all tools developed proved to work properly, there is still room for improvements. In this context, 
the following next steps in the tools’ development might be considered: 
• Performance improvements for SAR visualization tool;
• Implementation of semi-automated change classification routine as an extension to the image
processing software ENVI;
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• Going from scientific tools to software in an operative environment;
• Training of users.
Acknowledgements 
This paper was prepared as an account of work partly sponsored by European Commission under 
FP7- Space-2007-1/FP7-SPACE-2012-1 (GMES SECURITY). 
References 
[1] Niemeyer, I.: Challenges in Treaty Monitoring. In: BICC brief 37, 2008, 64-67  
[2] Canty, M., Jasani, B., Lingenfelder, I., Nielsen, A.A., Niemeyer, I., Nussbaum, S., Schlittenhardt, 
J., Shamoni, M. & Skriver, H.: Treaty Monitoring. In: Jasani, B., Pesaresi, M.,Schneiderbauer, S. 
& Zeug, G. (Eds.): Remote Sensing from Space. Supporting International Peace and Security. 
Springer, Berlin, 2009, 167-188 
[3] Dekker, R.J., Kuenzer, C., Lacroix, V., Lehner, M., Niemeyer, I., Nussbaum, S., Schoepfer, E., 
Sequeira, V. & Stringa, E.: Change Detection Tools. In: Jasani, B., Pesaresi, M., 
Schneiderbauer, S. & Zeug, G. (Eds.): Remote Sensing from Space. Supporting International 
Peace and Security. Springer, Berlin, 2009, 119-140 
[4] Gonçalves J.G.M., Gutjahr, K.H., Listner, C., Loreaux, P., Marpu, P.R., Niemeyer, I., Patrono, 
A., Ussorio, A. & Wolfart, E: Integrated Analysis of Satellite Imagery for Treaty Monitoring - The 
LIMES Experience. In: ESARDA Bulletin 43, 2010, 40-56 
[5] Qiun, G., Pinel-Puysségur, B., Nicolas, J.M. & Loreaux, P.: MIMOSA: An Automatic Change 
Detection Method for SAR Time Series. In: IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote 
Sensing 52(9), 2014, 5349-5363 
[6] Conradsen, K., Nielsen, A. A., Schou, J., and Skriver, H.: A test statistic in the complex Wishart 
distribution and its application to change detection in polarimetric SAR data. In: IEEE 
Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing 41(1), 2013, 3-19 
[7] Thonfeld, F., Nielsen, A. A., Skriver, H., Conradsen, K., and Canty, M. J.: Complex Wishart 
distribution-based change detection with polarimetric TerraSAR-X imagery. In: Fifth TerraSAR-X 
Science Team Meeting, DLR Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, June 2013, 2013. 
[8] Anfinsen, S., Doulgeris, A., and T. Eltoft, T.: Estimation of the equivalent number of looks in 
polarimetric synthetic aperture radar imagery. In: IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and 
Remote Sensing, 47(11), 2009, 3795–3809 
[9] Listner, C. & Niemeyer, I.: Object-based Change Detection. In: Photogrammetrie-
Fernerkundung-Geoinformation, PFG, E. Schweizerbart'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2011, 
2011, 233-245  
[10] Canty, M. J. & Nielsen, A. A.: Automatic Radiometric Normalization of Multitemporal Satellite 
Imagery with the Iteratively Re-weighted MAD Transformation. In: Remote Sensing of 
Environment, Elsevier, 2008, 112, 1025-1036 
[11] Nussbaum, S., Niemeyer, I. & Canty, M.: SEATH-a new tool for automated feature extraction in 
the context of object-based image analysis. In: Proceedings of the OBIA 2006 Conference - 1st 
International Conference on Object-based Image Analysis, 2006, 36, C42  
[12] Gath, I. & Geva, A.: Unsupervised optimal fuzzy clustering. In: IEEE Transactions on Pattern 
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, ITPAMI, 1989, 11, 773 -780 
[13] Douglas, D. & Peucker, T.: Algorithms for the reduction of the number of points required to 
represent a digitized line or its caricature. In: Cartographica: The International Journal for 
Geographic Information and Geovisualization, UT Press, 1973, 10, 112-122  
[14] Cojazzi, G. G.M., van Der Goot,  E., Verile, M., Wolfart, E., Rutan Fowler, M., Feldman, Y., 
Hammond, W., Schweighardt, J. & Ferguson, M.: Collection and Analysis of Open Source News 
for Information Awareness and Early Warning in Nuclear Safeguards”. In: ESARDA Bulletin 50, 
2013, 94-105 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
685
Mobile 3D Laser Scanning for Nuclear Safeguards
E. Wolfart, S. Ceriani, D. Puig, C. Sanchez, P. Taddei, V. Sequeira
Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Ispra, Italy
M. Murtezi, P. Turzak, A. Zein
DG ENER, European Commission, Luxembourg
L. Enkhjin, M. Ingegneri, S. Rocchi, Y. Yudin
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
Abstract:
3D laser scanning is an established verification technology in nuclear safeguards, applied inter alia for
Design Information/Basic Technical Characteristics Verification (DIV/BTC) and change monitoring in
nuclear facilities. Current systems are based on high-accuracy, high-resolution 3D laser scanners
which require one minute or more to acquire a single scan. Therefore, the scanners need to be
immobile during data acquisition. In order to cover the complete scene, several scans are acquired in
a so-called ‘stop-and-go’ mode, which are then registered into a single coordinate frame in an offline 
post-processing phase.
Recently, new 3D laser scanners with a significantly increased acquisition speed have emerged. They
acquire 3D scans at a frame rate of 10Hz and more - at the cost of reduced accuracy and resolution –
and thus enable the scanner to be mobile during acquisition, i.e. the data can be acquired while
walking or driving. Mobile laser scanning can significantly increase the efficiency of existing
safeguards applications for 3D laser scanning, i.e. DIV/BTC and change monitoring.
Furthermore, by registering each scan with a reference model (which can either be generated a priori
or while scanning), it is possible to compute the current position and track the movement of the
scanner. Hence, mobile laser scanning with real-time data processing provides indoor positioning
capability to nuclear inspectors during their field work. It enables all observations and measurements
to be connected with their respective location and time stamps and to retrieve location-based
information as required.
The paper presents the Mobile Laser Scanning Platform (MLSP) developed at the JRC, which
consists of a commercial mobile scanner, the processing unit and the proprietary software for real-time
processing and visualization. The system will be illustrated using two test cases: a DIV/BTC scenario
for the future Finnish underground repository (ONKALO) and indoor localization.
Keywords: 3D scanning, Design Information Verification, BTC Verification, change analysis, indoor
localization, nuclear safeguards
1  Introduction
3D laser scanning is an established verification technology in nuclear safeguards and is approved by
IAEA and EC for safeguards use. It has been applied inter alia for Design Information/Basic Technical
Characteristics Verification (DIV/BTC) in several nuclear facilities throughout the world, both by IAEA
and Euratom inspectors. [1], [2]
Current systems are based on high-accuracy, high-resolution 3D laser scanners which require one
minute or more to acquire a single scan. Therefore, the scanners need to be immobile during data
acquisition. In order to completely cover a given area of interest, several scans are acquired in a so-
called ‘stop-and-go’ mode, which are then registered into a single coordinate frame in an offline post-
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processing phase. The resulting 3D model is used to verify the correctness and completeness of the
design drawings provided by the operator and it is stored as a reference for subsequent visits. On
return, the inspector re-scans the area of interest and the data is analysed to verify that no undeclared
modifications to the facility have occurred. Figure 1 illustrates the use of 3D laser scanning for
detecting changes in a facility. The change map is calculated from the distances between 3D
measurements acquired before and after the scene was changed.
Figure 1: Left: snapshot of a 3D model of a (non-nuclear) facility; Right: change map generated by
comparing the 3D model acquired before and after modifying the scene (Blue pixels correspond to
unchanged objects; Green and red corresponds to changed objects).
Although 3D laser scanning provides detailed and accurate as-built information and change analysis,
data acquisition and processing using stop-and-go scanning can be a considerable effort depending
on the size and complexity of the facility. Recently, new 3D laser scanners with a drastically increased
frame rate have emerged. They acquire 3D scans at 10Hz and more - at the cost of reduced accuracy
and resolution – and therefore allow that the scanner is moved during acquisition, i.e. the data can be
acquired while walking or driving.
JRC has developed a portable Mobile Laser Scanning Platform (MLSP), intended for real-time change
monitoring inside nuclear facilities, in particular geological final repositories. It is also applicable for
indoor localization which allows nuclear inspectors to associate all measurements and observations
made during an inspection with the corresponding location inside the nuclear facility and thus facilitate
subsequent analysis and future inspections. Section 2 describes the main MLSP components and
section 3 outlines the core algorithms running on the system. Section 4 illustrates the applications of
mobile laser scanning in nuclear safeguards; section 5 outlines future activities and section 6 draws
conclusion.
2  Mobile Laser Scanning Platform
The Mobile Laser Scanning Platform (MLSP) is a portable sensor and processing system developed
at the JRC. It is based on a mobile 3D laser scanner and provides real-time mapping, localization and
change analysis in indoor, GPS-denied environments.
The main hardware components of the MLSP are (see Figure 2):
 A real-time laser range scanner. The current MLSP implementation uses the commercially
available Velodyne HDL-32E, which acquires up to 15 frames per second.
 A processing unit which analyses the scanner data in real-time and generates a 3D
map/model, localization information and change information.
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 A tablet computer to control the system and view the processing results.
The hardware components can be mounted on different carrier systems according to the application
need. Figure 3 shows the backpack-mounted MLSP (left) and the car-mounted MLSP (centre, right).
The analysis software which runs on the portable processing unit is the core of the MLSP system. It
runs fully automatically in real-time and therefore needs to be highly efficient, reliable and accurate.
Additionally, it is able to manage very large data sets, i.e. it is able to handle facilities and buildings
that cover several thousands of square meters.
Processing results (tracks and change maps) are transferred to the portable device for visualization
and interaction with the user.
Figure 2: Hardware components of MLSP system: 3D laser scanner, processing unit and tablet.
Figure 3: Left: backpack-mounted MLSP for scan-while-walk acquisition. Centre, Right: Car-mounted
MLSP. The processing unit is situated inside the car.
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3  Data Processing
The core of MLSP’s data processing is the self-localisation within known environments, i.e.
environments for which a 3D reference model has been acquired a-priori. The reference model is
typically acquired with the stop-and-go scanning as described above. However, it can also be acquired
with mobile scanning if the global accuracy is not essential (see section 4. 2). Since MLSP was
developed for indoor use it relies solely on 3D measurements, in particular it does not require any
GPS information. The process is divided in two components, which are briefly described in the
remainder of this section: Pose Recognition and Pose Tracking. For a detailed description see [3].
3. 1 Pose Recognition
Pose recognition estimates the current user pose (position and orientation) within a given search
space (i.e. the space covered by 3D reference model) when no prior knowledge of the current position
is available, e.g. after system start-up.
Pose recognition runs in real-time and must be scalable to large environments. Therefore, a pre-
processing stage is introduced that (1) reduces the search space of possible poses and (2) transforms
the 3D reference model to a compact search tree that enables efficient searching:
 Search Space Reduction. Since we focus on ground motion (backpack or vehicle mounted
sensor), the MLSP sensor is expected to be in a narrow space parallel to the navigable floor
and we can reduce the search to the poses within this navigable space. Therefore, the
navigable floor is computed using on a flooding-algorithm which detects the floor surface
based on the surface normals (which are expected to be predominately vertical) and a
‘’reachable” condition (e.g. a table surface would not be detected as floor because it is not
considered to be reachable from the floor surface). We also introduce physical constraints
related to the specific mode of system operation (e.g. vertical and angular limits on the
possible sensor pose).
 Search Tree. In order to enable efficient searching, we transform the 3D reference model into
a compact descriptor space as follows: i) we randomly generate a set of poses in the known
effective navigable space (computed as described above); ii) for each pose, we synthesize a
depth image and extract a compact descriptor from the generated depth image: we split the
range image in regular bins. For each bin, we estimate a median range value which is stacked
to form a single descriptor (see Figure 1Figure 4); iii) we build a kd-tree which maps all
generated descriptors to their corresponding pose.
Figure 4: Example of a synthesized depth image and the derived compact descriptor. The depth image is
divided in twelve bins and the median depth value is calculated for each bin. The descriptor is then stored
as a 12-dimensional vector.
At run-time, the system creates a compact descriptor for each depth image (i.e. 3D scan) in the same
way as it is done when constructing the search tree. In order to resolve ambiguities, the pose
recognition is based on a temporal series of descriptors and can be divided in an initialization and
update phase as follows:
 During the initialization, i.e. when the pose recognition is started and no a priori information is
available, the algorithm searches the descriptor space for descriptor/pose pairs matching the
current descriptor thus returning a set possible poses of the sensor. Since the descriptors are
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highly compacted and several positions might have similar geometries (e.g. offices of identical
dimensions or positions in long corridors), we typically obtain several ambiguous candidate
poses for the initial query.
 The algorithm reduces the set of candidate poses during the update phase: as the user
navigates within the environment, the algorithm estimates the movement (using the odometer
described below) and re-evaluates the likelihood for each initial candidate pose based on the
query results at the new pose. The update stage is iterated until the candidate poses converge
to a single location and the algorithm is able to disambiguate the current pose. At this point we
consider the problem solved and the pose tracking component is started. Figure 5 shows an
example of candidate poses after initialisation and after convergence.
Figure 5: Top: Snapshot of pose recognition after initialization. The image shows several ambiguous candidate
poses in the two areas that have similar geometries. Bottom: Snapshot of the pose recognition after convergence.
The image shows that the candidate poses converge to the correct location (shown as the coordinate frame on
the right side) as the user explores the environment for several meters.
3. 2 Pose Tracking
Pose tracking starts after the sensor pose has been identified by the pose recognition component.
Since the sensor only moves small distances between two scans (i.e. within 0.1 sec), we have a good
estimate of the pose of each new scan and it is possible to register the scan using the well-known
Iterative Closest Point (ICP) algorithm [4]. Given an initial estimate of a scan pose, the basic ICP
algorithm registers a scan with a 3D reference model as follows:
1. Select a sub-set of points from the new scan (control points).
2. For each control point, find the nearest neighbour in the 3D reference model (corresponding
points).
3. Compute the transformation that minimises the distance between the control and
corresponding points.
4. Update the scan pose using the computed transformation.
5. Iterate steps 1 to 4 until the pose of the scan converges.
The ICP registration accurately estimates the current scan pose (see Figure 6) and therefore the
movement since the previous scan, which in turn allows estimating the pose of the next scan. In this
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way, the ICP is repeatedly applied to each new scan to track the sensor pose as the user moves
through the environment.
Figure 6: The green and red points are a scan acquired with mobile scanner; the grey points are the 3D
reference model. The current sensor pose is determined by registering the scan with the reference model. The
trajectory is obtained by applying the registration repeatedly as the sensor moves through the environment.
However, it is challenging to carry out the ICP registration in real-time. The most time consuming step
is the nearest neighbour search that has to be carried out for each control point in each iteration. The
remainder of this section describes the ICP extensions that were developed to allow real-time ICP
processing, namely (1) the transformation of the 3D reference model into a data structure specifically
designed for nearest neighbour searches, (2) a point selection and outlier removal strategy to ensure
fast and accurate convergence.
3.2.1 Nearest Neighbour Search
In a pre-processing step, two different lists are computed from the 3D reference model: a compact list
of points (together with their normals) and a dense grid of voxels. Each voxel can be either full, empty
or near. Full voxels store an index to an associated point which is computed as the mean of the points
inside the voxel. Empty cells store a null reference and near cells store an index to the nearest plane
(see Figure 7, left image). 
With this data structure, all nearest neighbour searches are pre-computed offline and stored inside the
dense grid. At run time, given a query point in world coordinates, we estimate the nearest neighbour in
the map by calculating the voxel that contains it. Then, if the cell state is full or near, we return the
associated point. Otherwise, we notify that there are no neighbours. 
3.2.2 Point Selection and Outlier Removal
For each control point, the nearest neighbour search returns the corresponding point in the reference
model. However, outliers (mismatches between control and corresponding points which are, for
example, due to objects that have been added or removed after the reference model was acquired)
might introduce an error in the computed transformation. In order to allow an accurate and fast
convergence of the ICP algorithm, outliers need to be detected and corresponding points need to be
selected to properly represent the environment. Therefore, we modify the basic ICP as follows:
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 In order to minimise the number of required control points, the selected points should
represent all surface directions in 3D space. For example, if we would select only control
points from the floor, the registration would not be able to properly lock the current scan in the
direction of the walls. Therefore, we create three bins for the principle normal directions of the
scan points and the points are classified according to their normals.
 Whereas the basic ICP uses a single set of (typically several hundred) control points, we
select many sets, each containing only a small number of points (at minimum 3 points per set
are required). The control points are selected from the bins that were pre-calculated as
described above.
 For each set, we compute the transformation that minimises distance between control and
corresponding points. All computed transformations are distributed around a well-defined
central position. However, transformations computed from point sets containing outliers
significantly differ from the central position.
 We compute the normal distribution of the transformations and remove the outlier
transformations based on their distance to the mean value. This step is iteratively repeated
until no transformations are discarded, or a minimum number of transformations is reached.
Figure 7 (right image) illustrates the process of the outlier removal. Notice how all independently
computed transformations are distributed around a well-defined central position. Also notice that, after
each iteration of outlier removal, the distributions quickly converge to the final estimated
transformation, when considering all the correspondences marked as inliers.
Figure 7: Left: Dense voxel structure where, for the sake of clarity, only the closest near voxels are shown. Full
cells are displayed as grey boxes. Near cells are represented by yellow boxes with a red line connecting. Right:
Example of a scan. Right:  Outlier removal. Axes represent the main dominant dimensions of the detected
transformations. Each point represents a candidate transformation coloured according to the iteration in which
they have been marked as outliers (some outlier transformations too far from the centre have been omitted). Dark
red points represent transformations marked as inliers. The ellipses represent the normal estimations at specific
subsequent iterations. 
3. 3    Odometer Integration
The odometer component tracks the movement based only on the sensor data, i.e. without the need of
a pre-existing 3D reference model. It works on the same principle as the pose tracking described
above, but instead of using the 3D reference model for the ICP registration, the current scan is
registered with the previous scan thus generating an estimate of the local movement. Since no global
reference model is available, the odometer accumulates drift over time. The odometer is used in two
situations:
1. The pose recognition component uses the odometer to estimate the local movement during
the update phase (see above).
2. If the user leaves the 3D reference model during the pose tracking (e.g. he might enter a room
that has not been scanned during the acquisition of the reference model), the track is
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
692
estimated using the odometer output. The pose tracking automatically reverts to the 3D
reference data when the user re-enters the reference model (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Results of the odometer integration during a sample walk-through inside a building where the user
moves to a non-scanned room (A) without losing track of the position. Then, the user performs two loops outside
the building (C and D). The trajectory is shaded according to the percentage of points used from the 3D reference
model. The rest is taken from the odometer map. 
4  Applications of Mobile Laser Scanning in Nuclear Safeguards
MLSP provides indoor localisation with unique accuracy and robustness under the condition that a 3D
model of the environment is available. Additionally, it generates a new 3D model of the environment,
which can be used for detecting changes with respect to the reference model in real-time: since the
3D scanner is accurately located at any time, an updated 3D model can be generated by simply
merging the acquired 3D scans.
Therefore, MLSP is suitable for a series of applications, such as facility management and construction
monitoring. In the field of nuclear safeguards, it can be used for position authentication and change
monitoring during DIV/BTC verifications and as an enabling technology for location-based
applications, for example during Complementary Access inspection. More details are provided below.
4. 1 DIV/BTC Verification
Stop-and-go laser scanning is an established verification technology in nuclear safeguards. It allows
generating as-built 3D models of nuclear facilities with millimetre accuracy, which then can be
compared i) to the design information provided by the operator for DIV/BTC verification or ii) to
previously acquired 3D model for change monitoring.
However, stop-and-go data acquisition and the required off-line processing can be a considerable
effort in large and complex facilities. In cases where millimetre accuracy is not required, mobile laser
scanning is a complementary technology that significantly decreases acquisition effort and provides
change information in real time.
The concept is illustrated using the DIV/BTC verification of the future Finnish underground repository
in ONKALO. In November 2014, IAEA and DG ENER carried out a DIV/BTC verification at ONKALO
using stop-and-go laser scanning. During one week, four teams of inspectors acquired over 900 scans
covering more than 6km in total. In parallel, an additional team processed the data to generate an as-
built 3D model. At the end, the drawings provided by the operator were verified by comparing them to
the 3D model. Figure 9 illustrates the data acquisition and analysis carried out for the 2014 DIV at
ONKALO.
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Figure 9: The top left image shows a schematic drawing of the ONKALO repository (yellow corresponds to
excavations existing in 2014; green corresponds to deposition tunnels to be excavated in the future. Image
courtesy of POSIVA). Data acquisition for the 2014 DIV at ONKALO was carried out in stop-and-go mode. Two
scanners were mounted on a car roof (top right image) and two were mounted on a tripod. Over 900 scans were
acquired in order to generate an as-built 3D model of the complete repository (the bottom left image shows a
model of the first two km which was acquired during a technology demonstration in 2007). A cross section of the
3D model was generated and used to verify the drawings provided by the operator. The bottom right image is the
zoom of a sample drawing; the blue line is a cross-section of the as-built laser data, which was used to verify the
CAD drawing.
The next DIV at ONKALO is scheduled for late 2015. Although some excavations might take place in
2015, the major part of the repository will be the same as in 2014. It is planned to combine stop-and-
go and mobile laser scanning as follows:
 The inspector visits the part of the tunnel that already existed in 2014 using the MLSP. The 3D
model acquired in 2014 will be used as reference, which will allow to i) always have accurate
knowledge of the current location and ii) have real-time information on possible changes with
respect to 2014. Figure 10 illustrates the information provided to the inspector in real-time.1
 If the inspector identifies any significant changes or makes other relevant observations, he can
add notes and comments, which will be location-tagged based on the MLSP information and
stored for later reporting, analysis or inspections.
1
 See [8] for a video which replays the information shown to the user during a demonstration in November 
2014. The stop-and-go data acquired during the demonstration in 2007 was used as 3D reference model. The 
changes that occurred in between (e.g. newly constructed firewalls; newly excavated side tunnels) are 
highlighted in red.  
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 In the areas excavated after November 2014 and in the areas where any significant changes
are identified, the inspector acquires new 3D data using stop-and-go scanning, which will be
integrated into the 3D model acquired in 2014 in order to obtain an updated as-built 3D model.
 New or updated drawings received from the operator will be verified against the updated as-
built 3D model.
 The updated 3D model will be stored on site and serve as a reference for subsequent
inspections.
The effort for the 2015 DIV will be considerably smaller than in 2014 while maintaining an accurate
and up-to-date 3D model of the complete repository. If the procedure is repeated in subsequent
inspections, it will enable the inspector to efficiently and effectively verify the correctness of the
provided design information and to assure that no undeclared modifications to the facility occurred. It
will also allow to navigate and authenticate the position in a facility which will become larger and more
complex as the excavations advance.
Figure 10: Left: MLSP demonstration in ONKALO in 2014. Right: Snapshot of the MLSP interface as it is
provided to the user in real-time. The model acquired during the 2007 demonstration (which is used as reference)
is shown in grey. The data acquired during the 2014 demonstration is color-coded as follows: green corresponds
to objects that already existed in 2007 (i.e. the main tunnel excavation); red corresponds to changes (e.g. the fire
door that was constructed after 2007).
4. 2 Indoor Localisation
Accurate indoor localisation of the inspector increases the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards
activities. It allows i) verifying the position and layout of a facility and ii) associating all observations
and measurements made during the inspections with the respective location. Location-tagging the
data acquired during the inspection greatly facilitates subsequent reporting, analysis and future
inspections. For this reason, the IAEA tool kit of portable instruments, which is used to support
complementary access activities, includes a GPS instrument. However, GPS measurements are not
available indoors and therefore safeguards inspectors currently have no means to accurately localise
themselves inside nuclear facilities.
As shown above, mobile laser scanning can be used for localization in indoor environments.
Depending on the availability of a 3D reference model, it can be operated in two different modes:
1. 3D reference model available. If a 3D reference model of the indoor environment is available,
mobile laser scanning provides real-time localization with centimeter accuracy as described in
section 3 . The reference model can be acquired with stop-and-go scanning. However, this
might be a considerable effort, depending on the size and complexity of the environment. In
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some cases (e.g. at ONKALO as described above), a 3D reference model has already been
acquired for DIV purposes.
2. 3D reference model not available. In cases where it is not practicable to acquire an accurate
reference model prior to the inspection, the mobile laser scanner can be operated in an
Odometer mode, i.e. the location is tracked (with reduced accuracy and robustness) using
only the data acquired with the mobile scanner. After the inspection, the mobile 3D data can
be re-processed using a SLAM (Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping) approach, which
globally optimizes the generated track and generates a 3D model from the acquired data.
Hence, inspector observations can be accurately located retrospectively and the 3D model
can be used as reference for subsequent inspections. SLAM processing for the MLSP is
currently under development. [5]
In 2014, the IAEA organised a technology workshop which aimed to evaluate the performance and
suitability of currently available indoor navigation systems [5]. It defined the following use-cases:
 Position Authentication: “Inspector quickly verifies that he has been taken to the expected site
location”.
 Mapping: “Inspector decides to perform an overall site survey; he walks or drives through the
site so he may confirm / complete the IAEA knowledge of the site.”
 Tracking and navigation: “While surveying, the inspector continuously traces his itinerary
through the site; he may also navigate toward a specified location.”
 Geo-tagging/Location-based services: “During the site survey, the inspector writes notes,
draws sketches, records audio notes, takes pictures, takes samples, and makes various
measurements. The inspector can also review on the map the actions conducted during the
previous inspections.”
For the technology evaluation, IAEA defined a set of scenarios, which aimed to simulate different
situations where the inspectors need to position themselves and navigate inside vast and complex
sites. The evaluation was carried out inside and outside the IAEA HQ in Vienna. In total, eleven
systems were tested, which can be grouped in two categories: i) systems using laser scanning, such
as JRC’s MLSP and ii) systems based mainly on MEMS (Micro-electro-mechanical-systems) sensors
including inertial measurement systems (IMU), magnetometers and compass. The JRC participated in
the evaluation using an early version of the MLSP. Figure 11 shows the result of one of the scenarios.
In its final report, the IAEA concludes that “laser-based sensors are the only solutions today that can
offer near-perfect constant accuracy”. Due to operational issues (i.e. the size of the system), IAEA
does currently not envisage laser-based systems to be part of the standard inspector equipment,
“however they could become extremely valuable tools for specific missions” [7].
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Figure 11: Results obtained with the MLSP for one of the scenarios of the IAEA technology evaluation workshop,
in which the user walked through a corridor of the IAEA HQ. Left: top view of the 3D model created from the
acquired 3D data. It covers the corridor and some of the offices (where the doors were open). Right: the track
followed by the user as computed by MLSP.
4.2.1 Localisation Accuracy
In April 2015, JRC participated in an indoor localization competition in order to confront the MLSP
accuracy to other state-of-the-art systems. The competition, organised annually by Microsoft, gathers
teams from industry and academia to evaluate the performance of their respective localisation
systems. The competition is carried out in two categories, involving infrastructure-based systems
which require installation of equipment such as radio emitters in the environment and infrastructure-
free systems which rely only on sensor readings. The JRC competed in the infrastructure-free
category, where it came first, with a localisation error of 0.2 m, which also surpassed the best result in
the infrastructure-based category, in which the winner had a localisation error of 0.31 m (see [7]).
The competition evaluated the measured 2D position of the user at pre-defined markers, i.e. the
results were influenced by the accuracy with which the user positioned himself on the markers. The
actual accuracy with which the MLSP sensor can be located in 3D space corresponds to the accuracy
of the laser scanner, i.e. approximately 0.02 m.
5  Future Activities
IAEA and ENER plan to use the MLSP for future DIV/BTC verifications at the ONKALO underground
repository in Finland as described above and it might be similarly be applied at other facilities.
JRC will further develop the system to make it more applicable for indoor localization during
complementary access activities. Inter alia, JRC plans to i) implement a SLAM approach so that MLSP
can be used without prior availability of a 3D reference model and ii) provide an interface to easily
integrate with other in-field tools, location-based applications and HQ infrastructure.
Furthermore, MLSP will benefit from related technology advances: i) the miniaturization of 3D sensors
will continue and therefore the overall size and weight of the system will reduce and ii) further
developments in augmented and virtual reality technologies (such as Google Glass) will complement
MLSP’s accurate 3D positioning capability to provide enhanced infield inspection tools.
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6  Conclusion
The paper describes the Mobile Laser Scanning Platform (MLSP), which was developed at the JRC
for nuclear safeguards applications. MLSP is a portable system that combines a mobile 3D laser
scanner with on-board processing for real-time localization, tracking and change analysis.
Mobile laser scanning can complement traditional stop-and-go laser scanning for DIV/BTC verification,
thus significantly reducing the required acquisition and processing time. IAEA and ENER intend to use
mobile laser scanning for future DIV/BTC verification at the Finnish underground repository to verify
that no undeclared modifications to the facility have occurred.
Indoor localization is an enabling technology for many location-based applications and facilitates the
storage, analysis and retrieval of observations and measurements made by an inspector, for example
in complementary access scenarios. Mobile laser scanning provides an indoor localization accuracy
which is currently not achievable with any other technology and therefore has the potential to
significantly increase the inspector’s efficiency and effectiveness during specific missions such as
complementary access inspections. Future developments will further increase the applicability of 3D-
based indoor localization for nuclear safeguards.
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Monte Carlo codes have found applications in nuclear safeguards as complementary tool in Non-
Destructive Assay (NDA). Up to now, the use of Monte Carlo has been limited to specialised experts, 
due to the complexity of the modelling and to the skills required to properly use the code. In order to 
open the direct in-field use by nuclear inspectors, JRC and i-Science have developed 
XFUELBUILDER. This is a program that allows the inspector to prepare an MCNP-PTA input deck 
using a simple and user-friendly graphical interface, and then running the calculation simulating the 
measurements done with neutron coincidence collars. 
This paper describes the functionalities of XFUELBUILDER and discusses the potential implications 
for its in-field use. 
Keywords: neutron counting; Monte Carlo 
1. Introduction
Monte Carlo codes are classical tools for computational simulation of particle and radiation transport in 
experimental physics [1]. They have found applications in nuclear safeguards as complementary tool 
in Non-Destructive Assay (NDA). Monte Carlo simulation has been extensively used for design 
optimisation of neutron counters [2, 3, 4, 5], for parametrical studies on the influence of different 
parameters on the detector response and, last but not least, to perform numerical calibration of 
counters in absence of suitable calibration samples. 
JRC has developed MCNP-PTA [6], an extension of the classical Monte Carlo code from Los Alamos, 
specifically intended to simulate the response of neutron coincidence and multiplicity counters used in 
nuclear safeguards. The code adds to the standard model of neutron transport the possibility to 
reproduce the functionalities of the electronics used in neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting. 
Models for a large variety of counters used by IAEA and Euratom have been developed and validated 
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10], providing an extremely satisfactory accuracy in the prediction of detector response, 
typically within few percent with respect to experimental data. 
Up to now, the use of Monte Carlo has been limited to specialised experts, due to the complexity of 
the modelling and to the skills required to properly use the code. In order to open the direct in-field use 
by nuclear inspectors, JRC and i-Science have developed XFUELBUILDER. This is a program that 
allows the inspector to prepare an MCNP-PTA input deck using a simple and user-friendly graphical 
interface, and then running the calculation. This paper describes the functionalities of 
XFUELBUILDER and discusses the potential implications for its in-field use. 
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 2. Main functionalities of XFUELBUILDER 
 
XFUELBUILDER has already built-in the models of several neutron coincidence collars (JCC-71, 72 
and 73), in thermal or fast configuration. The inspector can retrieve from a library the model of the fuel 
element (or build it if not already available) and introduce the operator’s declaration. This is all he 
needs to do before launching the simulation that will provide the Totals and Reals count rates 
expected in the selected collar configuration. 
 
When launching the application, the user has the possibility to select one of the main features allowed 
by the code that include the creation of new pin or assembly geometry, manage the library of existing 
pins/assemblies, the definition of measurement conditions, operator’s declarations and Monte Carlo 





Figure 1: Screenshot of the main window of XFUELBUILDER 
 
 
2.1. Build the fuel assembly geometry 
 
To build new fuel assembly geometry, the user must first define the geometry of the pins and then the 
geometry of the lattice. 
 
2.1.1. Pin geometry 
 
To create a new pin the user must select the “Rod Edit” option in the task bar. A pin is defined by its 
radial dimensions (pellet, inner and outer clad diameters), the active length and the materials. For the 
clad composition the user can select from a drop-down menu the most common cladding materials 
(Zircalloy or stainless steel). Concerning fuel the current version of XFUELBUILDER is limited to 
uranium oxide, the only parameters to define is the nominal enrichment and eventually the gadolinium 
content if burnable poison rod. 
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XFUELBUILDER 2.0 allows axial heterogeneity of pins with multiple zones with different enrichments 
and/or poisoning. Any pin geometry can be saved with a “Rod Name” for use in different assembly 
geometries. 
 
2.1.2. Lattice geometry 
 
A fuel bundle is then built by assembling the pins in a lattice, using the “Assembly Edit” menu. The 
current version accepts only square lattices: then the lattice is determined simply by fixing the number 
of rows/columns and their pitch. 
 
Once the empty lattice is defined, a simple graphical interface allows the user to fill the cells with the 
appropriate content: fuel pins (different fuel pins are allowed in the same assembly), poison rods, 
guide tubes or empty cells. 
 
Any assembly geometry can be saved for future use. 
 
2.2. Retrieve an assembly from a library 
 
There are a limited number of PWR and BWR fuel assembly types used in European reactors. 
Therefore it is possible to pre-build the XFUELBUILDER library with the most common models. In this 
case, accounting for the large majority of cases, the inspector will not need to use the functionality for 
building the assembly, but he will have simply to retrieve from the library the assembly type of his 
interest. 
 
2.3. Match the operator’s declaration 
 
Once the nominal geometry of the assembly is defined, the uranium mass is fixed and determined by 
the fuel volume, the theoretical density of uranium oxide and the ideal stoichiometric uranium mass 
fraction in UO2. Then the U-235 mass is determined by the uranium mass and the nominal 
enrichment. As soon as an assembly is created or retrieved from the library, XFUELBUILDER 
computes and displays the nominal values of total uranium and U-235 masses (total in grams and 
linear in g/cm). 
 
Then the inspector should provide the declared values of the actual element he wants to simulate. The 
code will rescale the nominal values in order to match the declared values. The reconciliation of the 
total uranium mass is done by adjusting the fuel density, whereas the U-235 mass is corrected using 
the declared enrichment (U-235/U mass). 
 
2.4. Define the measurement parameters/conditions 
 
Having completed the fuel assembly model, the detector and measurement conditions must be 
defined using the “Detector Setup” menu. The models of the most commonly used neutron collars are 
pre-built in XFUELBUILDER: the JCC-72 for BWR, the JCC-73 for PWR and the variable JCC-71 in 
PWR and BWR configuration. The detector can be selected from the menu. 
 
Neutron collars can be operated in thermal or fast mode, which means without or with cadmium liners 
within the detector cavity. Also the thermal/fast mode configurations can be simply selected from the 
menu. 
 
The next operational parameter to provide is the intensity of the AmLi source: this value can be either 
known from a calibration certificate or through cross-reference with a calibrated source. In case the 
intensity is not available it can be computed using XFUELBUILDER itself by the comparison of a 
simulation with empty fuel cavity with respect to a measurement with source and without fuel. 
 
Finally, in case of axially heterogeneous elements, it becomes relevant to define the axial position of 
the detector. This can be done by activating the “Set 3D Collar Position” option, which allows moving 
the detector along the assembly length in a three-dimensional visualisation (figure 2). 
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Figure 2: 3D panel for axial positioning of the collar 
 
 
2.5. Run the Monte Carlo simulation 
 
The user can finally launch the simulation by selecting the “Run MCNP” button. Monte Carlo run set-
up parameters can be optionally adjusted: definition of the modality of termination of the simulation (by 
total number of neutrons or computing time or both), maximum number of simulated neutrons, 
maximum computing time, number of repetitions of PTA (Pulse Train Analyser). 
 
XFUELBUILDER runs in sequence the MCNP module for neutron transport simulation, then the PTA 
module for the construction of the time distribution of pulses and simulation of the coincidence 
electronics (JSR-12) and at the end it prints the results: Simulated measurement time, Total neutron 
counting rate, coincidence rates (Reals and Accidentals) and associated statistical uncertainties. 
 
 
3. Impact of simulation on in-field inspections 
 
The use of XFUELBUILDER opens a possibility of changing the way verification are performed by 
replacing the classical method (measure the item, convert Reals to mass through the calibration law 
and compare measured versus declared mass) with a novel approach (measure the item, build a MC 
model from declaration, simulate the measurement, and compare measured versus expected count 
rate) that will eliminate the need of calibration [11].  
 
 
   
 
Figure 3: classical and new verification process [11] 




XFUELBUILDER is a new approach to the use of Monte Carlo in NDA techniques for safeguards, 
allowing the in-field use by nuclear inspectors. Its user-friendly human-computer interface has been 
conceived in order to enable non-experts in nuclear physics to generate an input deck and run the 
Monte Carlo simulation on his laptop. 
 
Using XFUELBUILDER, the inspector will be able to verify the operator’s declarations by comparing 
the measurements of fresh fuel assemblies with neutron coincidence collars and the predictions from 
the Monte Carlo simulations. This will eliminate the need of specific calibrations or the use of 
corrective factors for the measurements of complex fuel elements containing burnable poisons and/or 
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Abstract:  
To verify that all Pu in a reprocessing plant is accounted for, IAEA inspectors need a method for 
measuring Pu in high-active liquid waste (HALW) remaining after reprocessing of spent fuel. Some of 
the Pu in HALW is attached to undissolved residues. However, constraints at the IAEA on-site 
laboratory do not allow use of common destructive methods to measure Pu in the residues. The non-
destructive method presented here is based on X-ray fluorescence (XRF) measurement combined 
with stirring the particles. Tests with known amounts of Uranium in simulated HALW were done using 
a miniature stirrer installed into a modified sample changer. During these tests the hardware 
parameters have been optimized. Furthermore, it was shown that the XRF peaks of undissolved 
residues can be seen by stirring the synthetic HALW. The optimal stirrer speed has been determined 
and the shielding effect of the particles has been quantified. Hot tests with real HALW are planned to 
be done in the EURATOM on-site lab in La Hague, France, in co-operation with the French support 
programme. The planned implementation of the method at the IAEA laboratory will enable the 
verification of the total Pu content of HALW. 
Keywords: Hybrid K-Edge, XRF, reprocessing, liquid waste, plutonium, residues,  
1. Introduction
In this work a method for measuring the Pu concentration in high-active liquid waste (HALW) that 
contains particles is presented. HALW is what remains after reprocessing of spent fuel. It includes 
concentrated fission products, fines suspension and alkaline liquid waste [1]. 
IAEA inspectors need a robust method for timely measurement of Pu in HALW at reprocessing plants 
to prove that there is no significant amount of Pu in the HALW. This measurement in some specific 
material balance areas needs to be done before HALW is introduced to the vitrification process. The 
method routinely used by IAEA to measure Pu in homogeneous liquids at reprocessing plants, Hybrid 
K-Edge/K-XRF densitometry [2], cannot be directly applied because HALW is not homogeneous and a 
significant part of the Pu in the HALW is attached to undissolved particles. The methods applied by the 
operators of reprocessing plants to measure the Pu in HALW (such as dissolution in a pressurized 
vessel under high temperature) are complicated and practically cannot be implemented in the IAEA 
laboratory due to safety and other on-site constraints. 
Therefore, in 2009 the IAEA launched a support programme request for developing a method 
compatible with on-site constraints and not requiring major new hardware or modification of the 
existing instrumentation. The French and European Commission's support programmes accepted the 
task. 
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Under this joint task the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) is developing a method using the 
XRF branch of the Hybrid K-edge/K-XRF setup combined with homogenizing the HALW by a miniature 
stirrer. The method is being developed in ITU using simulated HALW. To be able to use the stirrer for 
HALW measurements in a hot cell, ITU designed a mechanical setup which does not interfere with the 
usual operation of the instruments in the hot cell. The method is planned to be tested in 2015 with real 
HALW in the EURATOM on-site laboratory in La Hague in co-operation with AREVA and the French 
support programme. 
2. Method
The HALW sample is irradiated by a 150 kV X-ray tube. This produces X-ray fluorescence (XRF) of 
the elements, including U and Pu, present in the sample. The fluorescent X-rays emitted by the 
samples are recorded by a high-resolution gamma spectrometer. The intensity of the peaks in the XRF 
spectrum increases with the concentration of the elements emitting these XRF peaks in the observed 
sample volume. For homogeneous samples this represents the concentration of these elements in the 
entire sample. 
HALW is not homogenous, because it contains particles which settle to the bottom of the sample jug. 
Therefore, they are not in the field of view of the XRF spectrometer. In this study the HALW is 
homogenized by a miniature stirrer during the XRF measurement, so that the XRF detector can "see" 
the particles, 
The concentration of the Pu attached to the particles can be deduced from the difference between the 
measurement with stirrer on and stirrer off. The Pu concentration in the HALW is very low, both in the 
particles and in the supernatant (in the order of the mg/l). Furthermore, the XRF spectrum is "flooded" 
by high background radiation from the fission products in the HALW. Therefore, it might be difficult to 
evaluate the small Pu XRF peaks from the spectrum of real HALW and the uncertainties will be quite 
high. Nevertheless, it is expected that giving an upper limit on the Pu concentration in the HALW 
would be sufficient to show that there is no significant amount of Pu in the waste stream. 
3. Instruments and materials
The X-Ray fluorescence branch of a hybrid K-edge/K-XRF densitometry (HKED) system available in 
ITU was used for method development. HKED systems are widely used around the world in 
reprocessing facilities to quantify the U and Pu content in reprocessing solutions. The particular setup 
used for the present studies is similar to the setups that are in use at the EURATOM on-site laboratory 
in La Hague, France and in the IAEA on-site laboratory in Rokkasho, Japan. 
The main parts of the system are a 150 kV X-ray tube and two high-resolution gamma spectrometers 
(one for recording the transmitted X-ray spectrum and one for the X-ray fluorescence spectrum). The 
samples are introduced into the shielded measurement position by a sample changer, which accepts 
cylindrical sample jugs (the so called "COGEMA cruchons"). The detectors are controlled by Canberra 
Lynx electronics. 
The XRF spectra were evaluated using the software "XRF" developed by R. Gunnink, based on 
detector response fitting. 
A magnetic stirrer (12 × 12 × 5 mm) which fits inside the cavity of the sample changer was used 
(Variomag Mini produced by Thermo Scientific) to homogenize the material. As the stirrer has a height 
of 5 mm, the height of the sample cruchon had to be slightly reduced, in order that in can safely enter 
the tunnel of the HKED setup.  
The system used for the studies in ITU is connected to a glove box which is not yet closed. Due to 
radiological safety reasons, no Pu measurements could be done at this box. Therefore, uranium was 
used to optimize the measurement setup and to develop the method. The results should apply by 
analogy to Pu, with minor modifications. 
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A synthetic waste solution containing the inactive isotopes of the elements which are present in real 
HALW, as well as particles composed of those elements, was used to simulate the samples expected 
in the waste of reprocessing plants. The synthetic HALW was donated to ITU by the Karlsruhe Institute 
of Technology, Institute for Nuclear Waste Disposal, Karlsruhe, Germany. Pure uranium solution was 
mixed to the synthetic waste in different proportions, to obtain different uranium and particle 
concentrations. 
4. Results
4.1. Optimal sample position 
In the "classical" HKED setup the sample position is a compromise between K-edge and XRF 
measurement. For the present application, however, the sample should be positioned in such a way, 
as to achieve the lowest possible detection limits for the XRF measurement. Therefore, the sample 
changer positions for which the count rate of the uranium XRF peaks is the highest in the HKED setup 
used in ITU were determined. These positions do not coincide with the positions of highest KED count 
rates. 
4.2. Optimal stirrer bar and control unit 
Five types of stirrer bars and two types of controllers were tested. The power of the default controller 
unit (7 W) was not sufficient to move the stirrer bars in the simulated HALW and all bars got stuck in 
the viscous medium of the undissolved residues. Therefore, a more powerful control unit (Telemodul 
20C) was purchased, which is able of supplying up to 20 W power to the stirrer motor.  
With the Telemodul 20C it was established that only one type of the available stirrer bars is able to stir 
the simulated HALW: the rounded cylindrical "Power Magnet" of 10 mm length and 6 mm diameter. All 
the other bars get stuck in the viscous medium and are unable to stir the simulated HALW, even at 
maximum power setting. Therefore, the cylindrical "Power Magnet" stirrer bar with dimensions 10 mm 
× 6 mm was selected for the further tests. 
4.3. The effects of stirring 
The experiments have shown that stirring has no effect on pure HNO3 and clear U solutions. That is, 
the stirrer bar is below the field of view of the collimator and the detector does not "see" it. 
In the synthetic HALW the XRF peaks of undissolved residues become visible in the spectrum when 
the stirrer is turned on. That is, the stirrer brings the particles into suspension, so that the detector can 
see them. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. XRF spectra of simulated HALW. The XRF peaks from the un-dissolved residues are clearly higher for 
the spectrum with stirrer ON. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
707
4.4. Optimal stirrer speed 
The stirrer speed was varied from 0 to 1100 rpm and the height of several XRF peaks of the elements 
in the simulated HALW was recorded. It has been observed that turning the stirrer on has different 
effects on two groups of peaks: for one group the peak height increases, while for the other group the 
peak height decreases. 
a)      b)
Figure 2. The dependence of the peak height of several XRF peaks on the stirrer speed (The peak height is 
normalized to the height measured with stirrer off.) The numbers in the legend denote the energies of the XRF 
peaks in keV. 
In Figure 2 we can see that for the first group the height of the XRF peaks of the elements present in 
the particles increases as soon as we turn on the stirrer at 300 rpm. As we further increase the stirrer 
speed the peak height drops. This is explained by the fact that when the stirrer rotates slowly the 
particles from the bottom of the sample jug rise slightly from the bottom coming into the view of the 
XRF collimator. However, the stirrer speed at this point is not enough to homogenize the suspension 
and the particles concentrate in the lower part of the jug in front of the collimator. As we increase the 
stirrer speed some particles rise higher and go to the volume which is above the collimator. As we see 
in Figure 2a) at 500 rpm the peak height reaches a plateau, which extends up to 1000 rpm. This 
means that when the stirrer speed is between 500 and 1000 rpm the particles are homogeneously 
distributed in the volume of the sample jug and small variations of the stirrer speed do not change the 
concentration of the particles in the view of the collimator. At 1100 rpm the stirrer bar starts to jump 
and to move chaotically causing some of the particles to fall to the lower part of the sample jug, 
increasing again the concentration of the particles in front of the collimator.  
Figure 2b) shows an opposite effect. For the XRF peaks of the elements which are mainly present in 
the liquid phase (and possibly not present in the solid particles) there is a shielding effect from the 
particles. At low speeds there are many solid particles in front of the collimator so they shield the 
radiation coming from the elements present in the liquid phase. Between 500 and 1000 rpm there is a 
plateau of the height of the XRF peaks of the shielded elements corresponding to the constant 
concentration of particles in front of the collimator. 
These measurements confirm that the optimal stirrer speed for the simulated HALW samples is at the 
middle of the plateau, that is, around 700 rpm. 
4.5. Shielding effect of the particles 
In order to estimate the shielding effect of the particles synthetic HALW was used. The original 
synthetic HALW ("mother solution") contained 11 g/l of particles. It was diluted and concentrated to 
obtain HALW solutions with 6 g/l and 19 g/l of particles. Then, known amounts of uranium solution 
were added to the synthetic HALW to achieve a U concentration of 30 g/l. Adding the U solution to the 









































































Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
708
As in the synthetic HALW the particles did not contain any U, there was no increase of the intensity of 
the U XRF peaks from the particles when the stirrer was turned on. On the contrary, the intensity of 
the relevant XRF peaks of U decreased due to absorption by the particles. The decrease was 0.091 % 
for each g/l of particles. This means that for a typical particle concentration of ~10 g/l, the bias can go 
up to ~1 % 
Figure 3. Counts of the U Kα1 peak in the synthetic HALW doped with U solution as a function of stirrer speed. 
The counts are given as the percentage of the counts with the stirrer off, for particle concentrations of 4, 8, and 14 
g/l. The counts are unstable for low stirrer speeds because some of the particles are already in the view of the 
collimator while the solution is not yet homogenized. Above 500 rpm the particle distribution becomes 
homogeneous and it is clearly seen that the shielding effect is the highest for the highest particle concentration. 
To measure the Pu content of HALW in the reprocessing plant, the XRF detector has to be calibrated 
with well characterized HALW, having well known particle concentration and well known Pu content in 
the particles and in the supernatant.  Using this kind of well characterized HALW a bias-correction 
procedure can be implemented. 
4.6. Confirming that pure HNO3 can be used as reference for the background 
continuum 
To evaluate the areas of the XRF peaks from the spectra, the "XRF" software needs a reference 
spectrum to be able to subtract the contribution of the background X-ray continuum. For pure U and 
Pu solutions without particles, the reference spectrum is the spectrum of a pure HNO3 solution which 
has the same molarity as the solution with U and Pu. For HALW, however, the matrix is not pure 
HNO3, but a solution with undissolved particles. Therefore, we investigated whether we should use 
this kind of matrix for obtaining the reference spectrum. 
For this investigation we recorded at each stirrer speed also the spectrum of the "blank", that is, the 
spectrum of the synthetic HALW which had (roughly) the same particle concentration as the sample 
with U. Then we analysed each sample spectrum in two ways: using the spectrum of pure HNO3 as 
reference and using the spectrum of the synthetic HALW as reference. 
We calculated the difference between the two types of evaluations and obtained that it is -0.09 % on 
average. The difference is less than the combined statistical uncertainty of the peak areas (0.27 %). 
We noticed, however, that the result obtained with synthetic HALW as reference is always lower. 
Nevertheless, if we evaluate the calibration solutions in the same way using pure HNO3 as reference, 
this small bias is expected to be automatically removed from the result for Pu concentration. 
Therefore, pure HNO3 can be used for recording the XRF reference spectrum. 
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5. Conclusion
A method is being developed for measuring the Pu concentration in high-active liquid waste (HALW). 
The method should enable the safeguards inspectors to verify that no significant amounts of Pu are 
present in the liquid waste of reprocessing plants. 
The method is based on using the XRF branch of the HKED instrument combined with stirring the 
particles by a miniature stirrer. Tests were done with a HKED instrument available in ITU. Various 
hardware parameters were optimized using synthetic (simulated) HALW mixed with uranium. 
Tests with real HALW are planned to take place soon in a hot cell in the EURATOM on-site laboratory 
at the reprocessing facility in La Hague, France, in co-operation with the French support programme. 
For these tests real HALW will be used, characterized by the operator of the reprocessing plant. If the 
hot tests are successful the method can be implemented at the IAEA laboratory. 
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The Hybrid K-Edge Densitometer (HKED) is an active X-ray interrogation system combining K-Edge 
transmission densitometry (KED) and X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) analysis for the determination of the 
actinide concentrations of dissolver solutions in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.  The hybrid 
analysis requires knowledge of the relative K-shell vacancy production rates in order to determine the 
concentration of minor actinides (i.e., Np, Pu, Am, and Cm) relative to the primary actinide (typically U 
for present commercial power reactors).  The K-shell vacancy production rates vary with sample 
composition and energy distribution of the interrogating X-ray flux within the sample.  Commercially 
available HKED analysis software currently employed for international safeguards applications 
includes a simple correction for the impact of U concentration on K-shell vacancy production rates 
and is suitable only for U:Pu concentration ratios around 100:1.  In this paper we present a more 
complete representation of K-shell vacancy production rates for use in the HKED analysis, thereby 
extending the applicability of the hybrid analysis to a broader range of U:Pu concentration ratios (e.g., 
1:1) as well as the inclusion of additional actinides (i.e., Np, Am, Cm).  This approach incorporates the 
energy distribution of X-rays from the generator directly into the determination of the relative K-shell 
vacancy production rates, removing a potential source of bias (the impact of which has been found to 
be significantly greater than previously estimated) in the determination of the relative actinide 
concentrations. 
 




1.  Introduction 
 
The HKED measurement combines two separate measurement techniques, K-edge densitometry 
(KED) and relative X-ray fluorescence (XRF) analysis, to ultimately determine the concentration of 
both uranium and plutonium in dissolver solutions [1]. In its “hybrid” analysis mode, the KED 
transmission measurement provides the concentration value for the dominant actinide component of 
the solution (typically U) while the concentrations of minor actinide components (e.g. Pu, Np, Am) are 
determined relative to the U concentration by means of the XRF measurement.  This combination of 
methods allows the HKED to provide both accurate and sensitive assay of the sample across a wide 
dynamic range of actinide concentrations within a sample. 
 
Historically, the HKED system was used to examine a fairly narrow range of actinide sample 
compositions. Typically uranium was the dominant component of the solution while the other actinides 
might be present at near impurity levels constituting 1 to 2% or less of the total actinide content. The 
system and its associated software were optimized for these solutions characterized by U:Pu 
concentration ratios of 100:1. More recently efforts have been undertaken to extend the capability of 
the HKED technique to a broader mixture of actinide concentrations (e.g. U:Pu =1:1) and to include 
the capability for quantitative assay of actinides other than U and Pu [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. To date these 
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efforts have largely focused on the multi-elemental KED analysis. The inclusion of multi-elemental 
capabilities into the Hybrid XRF analysis is a two part problem, the first is development of a proper 
spectrum fitting methodology for the XRF spectra that can yield accurate relative peak areas for the 
minor actinides in the presence of both the major elemental components and fission products, the 
second is the development of an accurate method for converting the observed peak areas to relative 
concentration values.  This paper focuses on the later need. 
 
 
2. Relative Peak Intensities to Relative Actinide Concentrations 
 
The intensity of the characteristic X-rays emitted through the fluorescence reaction is proportional to 
the number of K-shell vacancies produced in each elemental component of the sample solution. The 
K-shell vacancy rates in each element are influenced by the presence of the other elements in the 
solution primarily through attenuation of the interrogating X-ray beam.  
The traditional HKED Hybrid analysis [1, 7] was developed for use with aqueous dissolver solutions, 
where  uranium is the dominant actinide, the uranium-to plutonium ratio is approximately 100 to 1, 
and other actinides (e.g., Am) can be treated as impurities. The relative U:Pu concentration is 
determined from a ratio of the uranium and plutonium Kα1 peaks [7] and a semi-empirically determined 
conversion coefficient,   𝑅! !". In this analysis the U:Pu concentration ratio is given by  
 𝑈:𝑃𝑢 = 𝐴!𝐴!" ∙ 𝐼!"#!𝐼!"#$! ∙ 𝜀!"#$!𝜀!"#! ∙ 1𝑅! !"  , (1) 
 
where 𝑅! !" is related to a calibration parameter, 𝑅! !"! , adjusted for the attenuation due to the 
uranium in the sample 𝑅! !" = 𝑅! !"! ∙ 𝑒!∙ !   , (2) 
where 
 𝛼 = 1.81079 ∙ 10!! − 1.61582 ∙ 10!! ∙ 𝑑!"#$ + 4.16665 ∙ 10!! ∙ 𝑑!"#$!   , (3) 
 
and dvial  is the diameter of the sample vial in cm 𝐼!"#!  is the count rate in the uranium Kα1 peak 𝐼!"#$!  is the count rate in the plutonium Kα1 peak 
AU and APu  are the atomic weights of U and Pu respectively 𝜀!"#$! is the detection efficiency for the plutonium Kα1 X-ray  𝜀!"#! is the detection efficiency for the uranium Kα1 X-ray and 
[U] is the uranium concentration within the sample in g/liter 
 
For the most common type of HKED system and traditional U:Pu dissolver solutions (U: 100 to 300 
g/U and U:Pu~100), 𝑅! !"!  ≈ 1.5. 
 
In the traditional analysis the conversion factor, RU/Pu, captures both the relative K-shell vacancy 
production rate and the attenuating impact of the matrix on the emitted fluorescence X-rays. The Eq.3 
accurately reproduces the behavior of the conversion factor as a function of uranium density. 
References [1, 7] also detail a similar expression for the Am conversion factor, RU/Am. However, this 
semi-empirical treatment has three drawbacks 
 
1. The relationship is only valid for U:Pu ratios of approximately 100:1.  
2. While in principle the method described in Ref. [1] can be extended to other elements, to 
date it has not yet been implemented in the common software packages. 
3. The constant, R0, must be determined through calibration with a variety of U-Pu solutions 
and is unique for each HKED instrument. 
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In developing the expressions in Eqs. 1 to 3 Ottmar et.al.  appear to have followed a similar process 
to that described in the following sections, however, rather than working to provide a simplified 
algorithm set targeted towards limited elemental compositions, we seek to develop a robust solution 
applicable to an arbitrary mix of actinides. 
 
 
3. Expanded Approach 
 
The traditional method assumes an approximate U:Pu concentration ratio of 100:1 and that the other 
actinides will be present at even lower levels. For these solutions the impact of the minor actinides on 
the U:Pu ratio is small and is generally neglected. The more complex solutions will require that the 
attenuating effects on the interrogating X-ray spectrum and the fluoresced X-rays be addressed. 
Additionally, the fluorescence X-rays from the higher Z actinides can increase the emission rate of 
fluorescence X-rays from the lower Z actinides, also through the photoelectric effect.  (For example, 
all of the Kβ X-rays from Pu and Am have sufficient energy to eject a K-shell electron from U while only 
the Kβ2, Kβ4 and KP2,3 lines from Np have sufficient energy.) This enhancement effect [8] of the low Z 
fluorescence rates increases with the relative concentration of the higher Z actinides. To further 
complicate matters, these effects vary as function of position within the sample vial. 
 
With this in mind we expand Eq. 1 to highlight the various dependences of the U:Pu measurement 




where 𝑔 𝐸  is the interrogating X-ray flux at the detectable interaction region of the sample vial, 𝐹!:!" is the relative uranium fluorescence rate due to the presence of higher Z actinides, 𝑓!"! is the relative yield for the ith fluorescence X-ray (per K-shell vacancy) in uranium, 𝑓!"#! is the relative yield for the ith fluorescence X-ray (per K-shell vacancy) in plutonium, 𝜀 𝐸!"#  is the detection efficiency of the ith fluorescence X-ray in uranium, 𝜀 𝐸!"#$  is the detection efficiency of the ith fluorescence X-ray in plutonium, [𝑈] = the uranium concentration within the sample in g/cc, [𝑃𝑢] = the plutonium concentration within the sample in g/cc, 𝜇!,!" = the mass attenuation coefficient for photoelectric effect in uranium above the K-shell, 𝜇!",!" = the mass attenuation coefficient for photoelectric effect in plutonium above the K-
shell 
 
In the expansion of Eq. 3 we have redefined the conversion factor, 𝑅!/!", from the traditional analysis 
as 
 𝑅!/!" = (1 + 𝐹!:!") ∙ ∙ 𝑔 𝐸 ∙ [𝑈] ∙ 𝜇!,!"(𝐸) ∙ 𝑑𝐸!!! 𝑔(𝐸) ∙ [𝑃𝑢] ∙ 𝜇!",!"(𝐸) ∙ 𝑑𝐸!!! 𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑧  , (5) 
 
The function for the X-ray energy distribution, g(E) incorporates the properties of the X-ray source and 
attenuation from all sources between the X-ray tube and the point where the K-shell vacancy is 
created.   
 
Extension of Eq. 4 for the other actinide components is fairly straight forward and will be addressed 
later in this paper. First, however, this rather complicated expression needs to be simplified for 
practical application. In order to accomplish this simplification we need to understand the spatial 
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distribution of the K-shell vacancies leading to the emission of a detectable fluorescence X-ray. Monte 
Carlo simulations using the MCNP6 code [9] were used to map the creation of K-shell vacancies that 
would ultimately lead to the emission of a detectable fluorescence X-ray. Fig. 1 shows the simulated 
distribution of events within the sample vial containing a nitric acid solution of 321 g U/L within the 
ORNL HKED system. For the ORNL system, we find that there is a fairly high degree of collimation on 
the interrogating X-ray beam. This allows us to approximate the spatial distribution of the K-shell 
production rates as a simple exponential attenuation function (e.g. 𝐼! = 𝐼!! ∙ 𝑒!!"#). To correct for 
attenuation of the emitted fluorescence X-ray we need to determine the thickness of the material 
between the emission point and the edge of the sample vial (the attenuation path length) relative to 
the distance into the vial where the K-shell vacancy was produced.  
 
The attenuating path length, dF, for the emitted X-ray as a function of the interrogating path length, dI, 
is given as:   
 𝑑! = 𝑑!"#$! 4 + 𝑑!!−2 ∙ 𝑑! ∙ 𝑑!  , (6) 
 
where θ is the angle between the XRF detector collimator and the axis of the interrogating beam and 
 




Based on the realization that the active portion of the sample vial is essentially a thin rectangular 
region in the center of the sample vial and for simplicity, we will assume that all K-shell vacancies are 
produced along the central axis of the interrogating X-ray beam. The expression simplifies to 
 𝑅!/!" = (1 + 𝐹!:!") ∙ ∙ 𝑔 𝐸 ∙ [𝑈] ∙ 𝜇!,!"(𝐸) ∙ 𝑑𝐸!!! 𝑔(𝐸) ∙ [𝑃𝑢] ∙ 𝜇!",!"(𝐸) ∙ 𝑑𝐸!!!   
!!
!! 𝑑𝑦, (8) 
 
where d1 and d2 are the limits in y defined by the intersecting views of the XRF collimating aperture 
and the X-ray tube shielding aperture.  The effective dimensions of the XRF collimator can be seen by 
re-examining the plot shown in Fig 1 after lowering the limit on the log intensity scale. Using this plot 
we determine that d1=3.1 and d2 = 11.0 mm for the ORNL system. 
 




Fig.1. This figure, generated from MCNP6 simulations, shows the effective interaction region within a 250 
U g/L in 3M nitric acid solution leading to detectable fluorescence X-rays (note the log scale). The circle 
represents the inner diameter of the sample vial. Even though interrogating X-ray beam has spread from 
2 mm to 2.8 mm wide due to scattering at the tungsten aperture, K-shell vacancy production is 




Fig.2. This figure presents the same data as presented in Fig.1. but with a much lower threshold (4 orders 
of magnitude lower) to highlight the interrogation region within the sample vial and more clearly 
illustrating the field of view of the XRF collimator. Note that the vacancies produced outside of the 
volume defined by the intersection of the collimator and the X-ray aperture do not contribute significantly 
to the observed count rates. 
 
3.1 Representation of Interrogating X-ray Flux 
 
Only a portion of interrogating X-ray beam creates K-shell vacancies resulting in detectable 
fluorescence X-rays. The interrogating X-ray flux reaching the detectable interaction volume is 
attenuated by the sample vial, any beam filters and the sample solution between the detectable 
interaction region and the X-ray source. The effective interrogating flux is given by 
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𝑔 𝐸 = 𝑒!!!"#$%&∙!! ! ∙ 𝑒! !!∙!! ! ∙!! ∙ 𝑔! 𝐸 , (9) 
 
where 𝑔! 𝐸   is the X-ray source term (from the X-ray tube), 
dI  is the weighted path length of the interrogating X-ray beam through the sample  
  leading to a detectable fluorescence X-ray, 𝜌! is the density of ith attenuator (e.g., Be window, Cd filter, vial wall) between the    
  sample and X-ray source, 𝜇!(𝐸) is the mass attenuation coefficient of the ith attenuator between the sample and X-ray 
  source, 𝑡! is the thickness ith attenuator between the sample and X-ray source, and 
 
3.2.  X-ray Source Term: 𝒇𝑿 𝑬  
 
There are many representations of the X-ray source term described in the literature, however, we 
have chosen to use that of Shaltout [10]  due to the completeness of their description. The 
interrogating X-ray source term is given by  
 𝑔! 𝐸 = 𝐶   ∙   Ω   ∙   𝐼   ∙     𝑍       ∙ 𝑓!(𝐸)    ∙    𝐸!𝐸   −   1 ! ,   (10) 
where 𝑓!(𝐸) = 1 − 𝑒!!∙!!(!)∙!"∙!"# ! !"# !2 ∙ 𝜇!(𝐸) ∙ 𝜌𝑧 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝜑 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝜖   , 
 𝜌𝑧 = 𝜌𝑧!    ∙    0.49269   −   1.0987   ∙ 𝜂   +   0.78557   ∙   𝜂  !     0.70256   −   1.09865   ∙   𝜂   +   1.0046   ∙ 𝜂  !   + ln 𝑈! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 𝑈!   , 
 𝜌𝑧! = 𝐴𝑍 ∙    0.787 ∙ 10!!    ∙ 𝐽 ∙   𝐸!!!   +   0.735 ∙ 10!!    ∙   𝐸!!   , 
 𝜂 = 𝐸!!      ∙    0.1904   −   0.2236   ∙   𝑙𝑛 𝑍 +   0.1292   ∙    ln 𝑍 !   −   0.0149   ∙ ln 𝑍   !   , 
 
and 𝑈! = !!!   , 
C    is a constant, 
I  is the X-ray tube beam current, Ω  is the solid angle of the detector (or in our case the interaction region), 
Z  is the atomic number of the X-ray tube tungsten target (i.e., 74), 
A is the atomic weight of the X-ray tube tungsten target (i.e., 183.84), 
x is empirically determined to match the observed X-ray energy distribution and is ~0.92 
for our system 𝜇!(𝐸)  is the mass attenuation coefficient of tungsten, 
E0  is the X-ray tube endpoint energy,  𝑚 = 0.1382 − 0.9211/ 𝑍 =0.03112, 𝐽 = 0.135 ∙ 𝑍 = 9.99, 
 
For our purposes we only require the shape, not the yield of the X-ray energy distribution. The relative 
K-shell production rates depend on the energy distribution of the interrogating X-ray source, 
specifically the distribution above the K-shell binding energies of the actinides. We have found that 
after the initial characterization of the X-ray source it is necessary to adjust the values of the end point 
energy, E0, and the shape parameter, x, in Eq. 10 to obtain an accurate representation of the X-ray 
energy distribution. Because the X-ray generator output can vary even during a single HKED assay, 
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to obtain an accurate value for RU/Pu it is necessary to obtain values for E0 and x for each 
measurement. While it is difficult to determine these parameters form the XRF spectra, it is fairly 
simple to extract these values from a fit to the KED transmission spectra.   
 
3.3  Detection Efficiency 
 
The detection efficiency term in Eq. 4 includes both the detector efficiency and the attenuation of the 
sample and vial on the emitted fluoresced X-rays on the attenuation of the fluoresced X-rays through 
the attenuator between the sample vial and High Purity Germanium detector (HPGe) detector and the 
intrinsic detection efficiency of the HPGE detector. The detection efficiencies for the U and Pu X-ray 
lines are given thus by, 
 𝜀 𝐸!"# = 𝜀!"# 𝐸!"# ∙ 𝑒!!!"#$%&(!!"#)∙!! ∙ 𝑒! !!∙!! !!"# ∙!! , (11) 
 
where 𝜇! 𝐸   is the mass attenuation coefficient of the ith attenuator between the sample and  
  detector, 𝜏!  is the thickness ith attenuator between the sample and detector, 𝜀!"# 𝐸!"#   is the HPGE detector efficiency for the ith K-shell X-ray of energy 𝐸!"# of element Z  Σ!"#$%&(𝐸) is the macroscopic mass attenuation coefficient for the sample 𝑑!  is the average distance the traveled though sample vial by the fluoresced X-rays   
  assuming they originate along the axis of the interrogating X-ray beam. 
 
3.4  High Z Enhancement Effect 
 
To discuss the enhancement effect, we consider a solution containing only U and Pu. In this case the 
Kβ X-rays from plutonium have sufficient energy to induce fluorescence of the uranium atoms.  From 
Fig. 2 we can see that K-shell vacancy production from the interrogating beam is confined to a small 
region of the sample vial. The Pu X-rays inducing secondary fluorescence events will originate from 
this volume and will be emitted isotropically. The production rate of secondary U fluorescence events 
is proportional to the Pu K-shell vacancy production rate and the overall detection efficiency for the 
primary and secondary X-rays is the same so that the relative increase in the U X-rays is given simply 
as 
 𝐹!:!" = 𝑓!! ∙ 1 − 𝑒[!]!!,!"(!!")∙!!/!! , (12) 
 
where  𝑓!! is the relative yield for the ith Kβ X-ray (per K-shell vacancy) from Pu and 𝐸!! is the energy of the ith Kβ X-ray from Pu. 
 
 
4.  Calculation of the Conversion Factors  
 
The conversion factor RU:Pu  is determined from a complex series of equations, the integration and 
summation will be carried out numerically rather than analytically. However, it is clear from this 
discussion that prior knowledge is required of the concentrations of the dominant actinides within the 
solutions. This information along with the values for E0 and the shaping parameter x, will be provided 
from the KED transmission measurement performed in parallel with the XRF measurement. 
To illustrate the importance of the expanded approach Fig. 3 plots the calculated values of RU:Pu for a 
typical HKED operating at 149.6 kV with a sample vial diameter of 1.418 cm for a range of U and Pu 
concentrations. For samples with U:Pu ratios of 100:1 the expanded approach and the traditional 
approach yield essentially the same values for concentrations above 100 g U/L. The observed values 
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for several measurements with U:Pu = 100:1 are also shown on the plot and agree well with the 
expected values.  As the total concentration of actinides increases with the sample, the interrogating 
energy spectrum becomes harder resulting in less production of U K-shell vacancies relative to Pu. 
The magnitude of this effect can be seen in Fig 3. Use of the traditional algorithms for samples with 





Fig. 3. Dependence of the conversion factor 𝑹𝑼 𝑷𝒖on the concentration of uranium and plutonium for a 
14.2 mm diameter sample vial. Calculated values for a variety of U:Pu ratios are shown along with and 
measured ratios for several solutions with U:PU~100:1.The traditional conversion factor based on the 
expression from the work of Ottmar and Eberle Ref. [7] is shown for comparison. 
 
When the HKED is operated in the Hybrid mode, the KED transmission measurement and the XRF 
measurement are performed simultaneously. The KED provides the concentration values for one or 
more dominant elements while the XRF provides relative count rates for each of the actinides present.  
The conversion factors RU/Pu, RU/Np, RU/Am, and RU/Cm are calculated based on the KED results and the 
concentration values for Pu, Np Am and Cm are calculated from the measured XRF ratios.  
 
As an example, Fig. 4 shows portions of the fitted KED and XRF spectra obtained from a sample with 
nominal concentration values of 100 g U/L and 7.5 g Pu/L. The fit to the KED spectrum provides a 
measured U:Pu ratio of 12.8 ± 0.3 but did not detect the Np clearly evident in the XRF spectrum. The 
hybrid analysis allows determination of the Np concentration, improved assay result for the Pu 
concentration and provides much lower detection levels for the Am and Cm concentration than is 
possible with only the KED measurement (Table 1). The observed minor actinides (Np and Cm) will 
have no impact on conversion factors. 
 
The conversion factors (RU/Pu, RU/Am, RU/Np, etc) are dependent on the actinide concentrations such 
that an iterative solution is necessary if only the XRF results are available. In use, it is expected that 
the KED transmission measurement will be used to determine the uranium and plutonium 
concentrations, and these results will provide the U:Pu ratio for use in determining the conversion 
factors for the minor actinide components of the solution.  
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Fig. 4.  KED (left) and XRF (right) spectra acquired from the assay of a sample containing nominally 100 g 
U/L and 7.5 g Pu/L. The fit to the KED spectrum provides the U and Pu concentrations as well as the X-
















U 100.60 ± 0.09 148.56 0.9018 -- --  --   
Np -- 
 
-- -- 1.200 758.58 0.133 ± 0.008 
Pu 7.81 ± 0.21 -- -- 1.435 13.25 7.597 ± 0.022 
Am --  -- -- 1.803 1031338 0.000 ± 0.003 
Cm -- 
 
-- -- 2.587 16469 0.006 ± 0.003 
 





5.  Conclusion 
 
We have reexamined the calculation of the conversion factors RU/Pu and RU/Am developed by Ottmar 
and Eberle [1]. While the expressions they developed well addressed the traditional needs of the 
HKED analysis, changes in the nuclear fuel cycle and application of the HKED required extension of 
their work to accommodate a broader range of actinide mixtures and for potential use with non-
aqueous reprocessing. We have developed a more robust and versatile algorithmic approach that will 
accommodate both the traditional 100:1 U:Pu mixtures as well as more challenging mixtures of high 
burn-up MOX materials and solutions with arbitrary relative U:Pu concentrations. The algorithms 
discussed here address the presence of additional actinides (e.g. Np, Am, Cm) and can be modified 
simply to determine the relevant conversion factors. The algorithms have been tested with only a 
handful of spectra covering a number of elemental combinations with nominal U:Pu ratios of 100:1, 
10:1 and 1:1. Testing and evaluation is on-going and a follow-on report is planned.  
 
The algorithm set developed for determination of the elemental conversion factors to convert relative 
count rates to quantitative concentration values provides several advantages over the traditional 
model. These advantages are summarized as: 
 
Benefits of the enhanced approach 
• Applicable to an arbitrary concentration ratios (i.e. not just U:Pu=100:1) 
• Determination of conversion factors for arbitrary actinide combinations 
• Corrects for high Z enhancement effect 
• Corrects for variations in X-ray generator output 
• Does not require calibration  
(while the traditional method required measurement of the calibration parameter, R0) 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
719
 
6.  References: 
 
[1]  H. Ottmar and H. Eberle, "The Hybrid K-Edge/K-XRF Densitometer: Principles – Design – 
Performance; Report KfK 4590," Karlsruhe, 1991. 
[2]  H. Zhu, M. Villani, J. Lamontagne, S. Croft, S. Gailey, H. Hassoubi, G. Landry, R. McElroy, R. 
Patel, S. Philips, P. Rouleau, R. Venkataraman and V. Yuschuk, "A New Software Application for 
Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry," in Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of the Institute of 
Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), Tucson, AZ, 2009.  
[3]  Canberra Industries, Canberra Hybrid K-edge Densitometry (HKED) Software User’s Manual, 
V1.0, Meriden, CT, 2010.  
[4]  M. Collins and S. T. Hsue, "Nonlinear Fitting of Absorption Edges in K-Edge Densitometry 
Spectra," in Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, July 1997., 1997.  
[5]  M. L. Collins, "Validation of the KORINZU Four-Delta-Mu Method for KED Analysis of U-Pu 
MOX," in Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, July 2014.  
[6]  R. D. McElroy, S. Croft, C. E. Romano and T. Guzzardo, "Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry Research 
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory," in 35th Annual Meeting ESARDA (European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association) Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material 
Management, Brugges, Belgium, 2013.  
[7]  H. Eberle and H. Ottmar, "Interner Berricht, Window-Based Calibration of the Hybrid K-Edge / 
XRF Spectrometer," Kernforschungscentrum Karlsrue, Karlsrue, Germany, 1993. 
[8]  R. Sitko and B. Zawisza, "Quantification in X-Ray Fluorescence Spectrometry," in X-Ray 
Spectroscopy, InTech,http://www.intechopen.com/books/x-ray-spectroscopy/quantification-in-x-
ray-fluorescence-spectrometry, 2012, pp. 137 - 162. 
[9]  J. T. Goorley and et.al., "Initial MCNP6 Release Overview - MCNP6 version 1.0, LA-UR-13-
22934," Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, 2013. 
[10]  A. A. Shaltout, "On the X-Ray Tube spectra, the dependence on the angular and electron energy 
of X-rays from the targets," Eur. Phys. J. Appl. Phys., vol. 37, pp. 291-297, 2007.  
 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
720
Mass Attenuation Coefficient Data for Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry 
Stephen Croft, Robert D McElroy Jr, and Andrew Nicholson 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA 
E-mail: crofts@ornl.gov, mcelroyrd@ornl.gov, nicholsonad@ornl.gov 
Abstract: 
In the domain of international nuclear safeguards measurement science, hybrid K-edge densitometry 
(HKED) is an example of a highly developed nondestructive assay method for the accurate and rapid 
quantification of actinides in nitric acid aqueous solutions.  Experimental and theoretical work at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory over recent years has focused on creating and demonstrating alternative 
algorithms so that the application space may be extended with confidence based on a first principles 
physics description of the photon spectra being analyzed. 
This paper is concerned with one small part of this larger effort, concentrating particularly on how to 
describe the energy dependence of the actinide mass attenuation coefficients in the near K-absorption 
edges region as an example of data evaluation and applied uncertainty quantification.  For many years 
the preferred reference data source has been the NIST XCOM database.  The fundamental 
photoelectric cross-sections available in XCOM, although generally considered consistent with 
experiment, are actually based on theoretical calculations by Scofield [1].  As represented by XCOM 
the K-shell photoelectric cross-section has a perfectly sharp edge at the K-edge (although the 
calculated K-edge energy of Scofield is necessarily replaced by an experimental value) and in the 
near edge region falls (i.e. either immediately ahead of and/or after the K-edge), to a good 
approximation, according to a power-law energy dependence.  The position and height of the step, 
and the energy dependence of the cross section are especially important in relation to modelling and 
fitting HKED spectra.  An estimate of realistic associated uncertainties is also needed but it is difficult 
to obtain based on XCOM alone.  Additionally, and most importantly, for full spectrum fitting, the K-
shell absorption edge is not sharp but rather is broadened, owing to the natural line width (NLW) 
governed by finite lifetimes of the underlying quantum states. 
To build a more realistic description and to establish associated confidence limits we use best 
available edge-energy data and natural line width values.  We use the scatter between evaluations to 
estimate the uncertainty in the step height and the underlying energy dependence.  We Lorentzian 
broaden the ideal saw-tooth behavior using an approximate analytical result as an alternative to full 
convolution, and add-in the underlying photo-absorption and incoherent scattering processes.  In the 
case of uranium we make a comparison to the measurements of Materna et al who used a tunable X-
ray source (with an energy spread comparable to the overall NLW) to map the near K-edge region [2]. 
We conclude that at the present time the uncertainty in the photoelectric step heights is far too large 
than required to enable an absolute HKED calibration to be made to the accuracy of current 
safeguards international target values.  Furthermore, new and considerably improved measurements 
across the K-edge are needed to directly confirm the shape. 
Keywords:  K-shell photoelectric interaction; hybrid K-edge densitometry; data evaluation 
1. Introduction
As commonly applied the Hybrid K-Edge Densitometer (HKED) is used to assay accountancy tank 
solutions with a U to Pu concentration of about 100 to 1.  The U concentration is determined from the 
step change in transmission across the K-shell photoelectric absorption edge measured using high 
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resolution gamma ray spectroscopy by shining a filtered Bremsstrahlung beam through a vial of well-
known dimensions containing a sample of solution.  The Pu concentration is usually determined 
relative to the concentration from a simultaneous measurement of the induced x-ray fluorescence 
yield.  In this paper we are concerned solely with the KED measurement.  In principle the method is 
absolute, but is traditionally applied with calibration to empirically account for small potential biases.  
When the internal path length of the vial is 1-3 cm and the U concentration is 50-300 g/L the U 
concentration based on a 60-minute live-time assay may be expected to be accurate to 0.3% or better. 
KED is both a rapid and accurate analytical tool and, compared to exclusive use of destructive 
analysis, is cost effective, convenient, and saves both on shipment of radioactive materials and 
secondary waste generation.  The KED method can also be applied to other elements.  For the 
purposes of the present paper our focus is on the co-assay of the actinides Ac (Z=89) to Lr (Z=103) 
and how to describe the shape of the transmission spectrum from first principles.  In particular we 
consider how to represent the K-shell photoelectric (PE) cross sections of the actinides. 
Our discussion begins with one approach to interpreting a transmission measurement acquired with a 
white light source with a few to extracting the photoelectric cross section.  Next we shall consider how 
to represent the PE cross section analytically.  The heart of the paper is a brief review of the 
availability of the model parameters we need to compute the PE cross sections.  We find that for the 
HKED application the present PE tables are in need of significant improvement. 
2. Extraction of the K-shell Photoelectric Cross Section
The KED technique is essentially a cross section determination applied in reverse.  It is useful to 
summarize the process we have in mind.  For the present discussion we consider a KED style 
measurement based on interpreting a pair of measured transmission spectra assuming narrow beam 
geometry.  One can write the recorded blank nitric acid reference energy dependent Bremsstrahlung 
spectrum as follows 
𝑌!"# = 𝜀𝑖!"# 𝐼!"#𝐼!
where 𝐼!"# is the transmitted beam intensity;  𝐼! is the incident electron Bremsstrahlung beam intensity 
per unit electron beam current;  𝑖!"# is the electron beam current used to measure 𝑌!"#; and 𝜀 is the 
efficiency of the detector system. 
Similarly for a nitric acid actinide solution we may write 
𝑌!"# = 𝜀𝑖!"# 𝐼!"#𝐼!𝐼!"# 𝐼! and 𝐼!"# 𝐼! are the transmission factors of the sample vial and contents and the observed rates 
are proportional to the transmission factors because the detection efficiency of the system is controlled 
and the shape 𝐼! is taken as fixed.  It is assumed that corrections for rate loss and ambient 
background have been applied. 
The transmission factors obey the Beer-Lambert-Bouguer law and so we may express the following 
ratio in terms of the so called optical thicknesses of the various attenuating materials as follows 
𝑇 = 𝑌!"#𝑌!"# = 𝑖!"#𝑖!"# 𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝑥!",!"# − 𝑥!",!"# 𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝑥!"# − 𝑥!"# = 𝑎𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝑥!"# − 𝑥!"#
where 𝑥!",!"# and 𝑥!",!"# are the combined optical thicknesses, expressed in multiples of mean free 
paths, of the vial walls (vw) of the solution and reference containers, respectively, and by design these 
are closely matched.  𝑥!"# and 𝑥!"# are the optical thicknesses of the contents. 
Rearranging we have 
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𝑙𝑛 1𝑌!"# 𝑌!"# = 𝑥!"# − 𝑥!"# − ln  (𝑎) 
where 𝑎 ≈ 3 if the solution is measured using a current of (say) 15 mA and the less attenuating 
reference is measured using a current of 5 mA (to approximately match counting rates) and matched 
sample vials are used.  Its value might be estimated more accurately than the nominal electron current 
setting by using a Gd-foil x-ray flux monitor. 
In terms of basic photon interaction data we can write this expression as follows, assuming, for the 
purposes of illustration we have a known U solution 
𝑙𝑛 1𝑌!"# 𝑌!"# = 𝜇𝜌 !,! 𝜌!𝑡!"# + 𝜇𝜌 !,!"!!! 𝜌!𝑡!"# + 𝜇𝜌 !"# 𝜌!"#𝑡!"# − 𝜇𝜌 !"# 𝜌!"#𝑡!"# − ln  (𝑎)
where 𝜌! is the mass density of U in the solution;  𝑡!"# is the internal path length across the solution 
vial; !! !,! is the mass attenuation coefficient (MAC) of U for the K-Shell PE process; !! !,!"!!! is 
the MAC of U for photon removal processes other than PE;  !! !"# is the MAC of the solution ‘matrix’ 
and 𝜌!"# its mass density; and similarly for the reference (nitric acid blank). 
The portion of the above equation in brackets !! !,!"!!! 𝜌!𝑡!"# + !! !"# 𝜌!"#𝑡!"# − !! !!" 𝜌!"#𝑡!"#
represents the smooth difference of the sample of interested from the reference sample.  Note the 
‘mat’ and ‘ref’ terms partially cancel each other and we may scale the ‘ref’ term without changing our 
basic approach – this is like using 𝑌!"# raised to some power, 𝑌!"#! , as the fiducial.  Collectively the four
terms surrounded by the  brackets represent a variation in energy that is both smooth and gradual. 
Over the narrow energy range in the vicinity of the K-edge we may approximate this contribution by a 
low order (e.g. quadratic) polynomial [3].  Using this approximation we arrive at our PE cross section 
measurement model 
𝑓(𝛥) =   𝑙𝑛 1𝑌!"# 𝑌!"# ± 𝜎!!"#𝑌!"# ! + 𝜎!!"#𝑌!"# ! ≅ 𝑏! + 𝑏!𝛥 + 𝑏!𝛥! +𝜌!𝑡!"# 10!" 𝑁!𝐴! 𝑅 ∗ 𝜎! 𝛥
where the energy parameter 𝛥 = 𝐸 − 𝐸! is the distance to the K-edge, 𝐸!;  𝑏!, 𝑏! and 𝑏! are empirical 
fitting parameters;  𝜌! is the U density in g/cm3;  𝑡!"# is the path length through the solution in cm;  𝜎! 𝛥  is the U K-shell microscopic PE cross section in units of barn per atom as a function of the 
energy parameter 𝛥;  𝑁! is Avogadro’s number, atoms per mole; 𝐴! is the molar mass, 𝑔.𝑚𝑜𝑙!!, of the 
U present in solution; and we have introduced the influence of the detector response function 
(resolution), 𝑅, which has the effect of resolution broadening (smearing) the true shape of the cross 
section via the convolution 𝑅 ∗ 𝜎!.  The quadratic term is being used here to represent the smooth 
contribution to the function 𝑓(𝛥) and the convolution term represents the additional jump created by 
the PE interaction.  This is just one measurement approach to probing the K-edge region.  The point 
spread function of the Low Energy Germanium planar energy dispersive spectrometers typically used 
in HKED instruments are well described by a tailed Gaussian with shape parameters which may be 
estimated by fitting narrow, isolated, gamma-ray peaks.  We are now left with the question of how to 
represent 𝜎! 𝛥 , the K-shell PE cross section.  A traditional approach used in KED analysis has been 
to treat the PE cross section as a sharp step and to use the projected step change across the edge as 
the measure of the actinide concentration. 
The step change in MAC as one crosses the K-edge from below is related to the step change in the 
ideal underlying microscopic atomic K-shell PE cross section as follows 𝜇𝜌 ! − 𝜇𝜌 ! = 𝑁!𝑥10!!"𝐴 𝜏! − 𝜏! = 0.6022141  29𝐴 𝜏! − 𝜏! , 𝑐𝑚!𝑔!! 
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where 𝑁! ≈ 0.602214129 ± 0.000000027 𝑥10!" atoms per mole is Avogadro’s number (the 
uncertainty being negligible for the present discussion), 𝐴 is the molar mass of the target element is 𝑔.𝑚𝑜𝑙!!, and the units of 𝜏 are 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑛 (1 b =10-24 cm2).  Since the cross section step is more 
fundamental than the MAC step, because the latter also requires the isotopic composition of the target 
element to be known so that 𝐴 might be calculated, we elect to work in terms of the microscopic 
atomic cross section in what follows.  A weakness of a number of studies and data evaluations that 
report MAC values is that the associated molar mass is not stated.  Because we are dealing with 
various grades of, for example U and Pu, and are focused on accuracies at the 0.1% level, this alone 
can be a serious flaw. 
3. Representing the K-shell Photo-Electric Cross Section
For a variety of mainly technical reasons, in the current generation of commonly used general purpose 
photon cross section databases, the K-shell PE cross section is represented as a sharp, power-law 
step.  One of the challenges is that direct measurements of the photo-electric cross section are 
difficult, few in number, and subject to significant uncertainty within and between independent 
determinations.  Direct methods detect the ejected photoelectrons or measure the intensity of the x-
rays that follow the PE process.  However, they still require some theoretical knowledge for data 
reduction, and close to the absorption edge the emergent photoelectrons are of low energy and easily 
perturbed so that direct methods are unsuitable.  Consequently, experimental values are generally 
obtained by subtracting theoretical estimates of the Rayleigh and Compton scattering contributions 
from the observed values of the total interaction cross section.  The total cross section is relatively 
easy to measure accurately, being a simple ratio measurement, although limited discrete photon 
source energies (radionuclide or pseudo-monochromatic beams), and sample uniformity (and 
thickness determination) can present challenges.  Agreement with theoretical PE cross section values 
is generally within uncertainties and so theoretical PE values are generally used in compilations which 
side steps the issue of performing a complex evaluation of experimental data and also allows 
experimental gaps to be readily plugged in a self-consistent way [4].  Furthermore, in general purpose 
compilations near edge fine structure, the result of resonant behaviour with bound (Rydberg) states 
and the interaction of the outgoing electron wave function with the spatial pattern of electrons in the 
neighbourhood, is also disregarded.  Uncertainties in the calculated PE cross sections for the 
actinides have been difficult to estimate and verify but accuracies of several percent in the vicinity of 
the absorption edges is typical of the guidance provided by data evaluators for many years [5]. 
It should be possible to accurately determine the magnitude of the K-edge jump from total cross 
section measurement data alone by fitting the regions below and above the edge and extrapolating to 
the edge energy – for example according to the approach we developed in the previous section.  What 
do we mean by accurate?  If each branch of the fit is based on multiple points, each individually 
determined to a few tenths of a percent, then the extrapolated values should be of comparable 
accuracy and the difference to similar accuracy (the upper branch being the more dominant).  The role 
for calculation or data evaluation would then be to estimate the systematic (with Z) energy 
dependence of the PE cross sections. 
If the natural line width is zero our model for the K-shell photoelectric cross section is 𝜏 𝐸 = 0,𝐸 < 𝐸! 𝜏 𝐸 = 𝐶! ∙ 𝐸!𝐸 ! ,𝐸 ≥ 𝐸! , 𝑛 > 0 
This form neglects chemical bonding and wave interference effects which could be present in the near 
edge region.  We shall not consider these effects further, but we do want to address broadening of the 
edge due to the finite lifetime of the quantum states [6].  Thus, we refine our picture by considering the 
K-shell PE cross section to be more faithfully represented by a Lorentzian broadened sharp power-law 
step with a narrow natural line width (NLW) parameter 𝛤.  On this basis the PE cross section requires 
four parameters to describe it:  the energy of the edge, 𝐸!;  the ideal step height 𝐶!;  the value of the 
power law parameter 𝑛, which governs the underlying energy dependence; and the NLW, 𝛤.  If we use 
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‘book values’ for 𝐸! and 𝛤 then only two parameters need to be extracted from measurements or 
calculations to describe the K-shell PE cross section and these two parameters can become the focus 
of (photon cross section) data evaluation. 
The convolution between a Lorentzian and the stepped power-law must be handled numerically.  It is 
convenient however to also to have an algebraic approximation for rapid early iteration calculations.  
We shall now justify such an approximation based on the assumption that the ideal underlying PE 
cross section may be considered to be a sharp step over the narrow energy range where there is 
significant Lorentzian smearing.  That is to say: 
𝑚   !!! ∙ !!!∙ !!! !!" !! ∙ 𝛤 ≪ 1.
where m is a small positive number (of the order of a few).  Then, in the vicinity of the K-absorption 
edge energy 𝐸!, either below it or above it, the observed cross section will have the shape of a 
Lorentzian smeared rectangular step 
𝐶! ∙ 12 + tan!! 𝐸 − 𝐸!𝛤 2𝜋 = 𝜏 𝐸! ∙ 𝑆 𝐸 − 𝐸!𝛤 2
where 
𝑆 !!!!! ! = !! + !"#!! !!!!! !! . 
In the far region above the edge, where !!!!! ! ≫ 0, 𝑆 !!!!! ! → 1 and the observed cross section will 
take the unperturbed form 𝜏(𝐸). 
Combining these two observations, made under the conditions stated, above the edge, we have the 
approximation for the observed cross section 
𝜎! 𝐸 = 𝜏 𝐸 ∙ 𝑆 𝐸 − 𝐸!𝛤 2
We recall that the mathematical operation of convolution preserves area and so the ‘loss’ of cross 
section above the edge results in an area matched redistribution below the edge.  Additionally, guided 
by the ideal step result, this redistribution should be smooth and as symmetric as possible. 
At a given energy above the edge if we approximate the observed cross section by 𝜏 ∙ 𝑆 then we see 
that the corresponding value to be placed an equal distance below the edge is 𝜏 ∙ 1 − 𝑆 .  We can 
express this mathematically in a convenient way by writing the two functions in terms of the energy 
difference 𝛥 = 𝐸 − 𝐸!, so that 
𝑆 𝛥𝛤 2 = 12 + tan!! 𝛥𝛤 2𝜋
which has the property 𝑆 − 𝛥 =1-  𝑆 𝛥 . 
Re-expressing the shape of the ideal non-Lorentzian broadened PE cross section can be done as 
follows 
𝜏 𝐸 = 𝑃 𝛥 ≈ 𝐶! ∙ 11 + 𝛥 𝐸! ! ,𝛥 ≥ 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  
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𝜏 𝐸 = 0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
We note that 𝑃 𝛥  is an odd function of 𝛥 with physical meaning only for positive 𝛥 that is for energies 
above the K-absorption edge.  But mathematically we can reflect the trend below the edge by using 𝑃 𝛥 .  We can now assemble all of the pieces of our approximate description to show how to 
conveniently represent the K-shell PE cross section in the following way 𝜎! 𝐸 ≈   𝑃 𝛥 ∙   𝑆 𝛥   ∀  𝛥 
or explicitly 
𝜎! 𝐸 ≈   𝐶! ∙ 1 + 𝐸 − 𝐸!𝐸! !! ∙    12 + tan!! 𝐸 − 𝐸!𝛤 2𝜋
where 𝐶!, is barns per atom, is the ideal underlying (non-Lorentzian broadened) cross section jump at 
the absorption edge in our simple physical picture, and 𝑛 > 0 is a dimensionless number describing 
the energy dependence of the underlying ideal (non-Lorentzian broadened) cross section.  One of the 
few published estimates of the cross section behaviour over the K-edge in the actinide region is that of 
Materna et al who used a quasi monochromatic beams selected by crystal diffraction from a LINAC 
derived white light source to map the energy dependence [2].  In general U is perhaps the best 
experimentally studied actinide.  So it is perhaps the most favourable case for comparison.  In the next 
section we shall review our state of knowledge regarding the model parameters. 
4. Review of K-shell Photo-Electric Cross Section Parameters
We shall conclude with a review of 𝐶! and 𝑛 values that can be used to describe the K-shell PE cross 
section and hence KED transmission spectra along the lines we have explained above. 
Our focus on 𝐶! and 𝑛 is because estimates for 𝐸! and 𝛤 are perhaps less contentious, although the 
situation is certainly not ideal.  Deslattes et al [7] provide an extensive discussion and impressive 
tabulation of modern high accuracy evaluated experimental data and sophisticated relativistic many-
body problem theoretical atomic calculations of x-ray energies for the K- and L-series transitions, 
edges and their estimated standard deviations for elements Z=10-100.  For some high-Z elements 
small isotope dependent shifts are also included (239Pu and 244Pu being one relevant example).  In 
these tables the absorption edge locations are associated with the energy needed to produce a single 
inner vacancy from an isolated ground state non-ionized atom with the photo-electron ‘at rest at 
infinity’.  For elements with atomic numbers 101 to 103 we extend Deslattes using the listing of 
Agarwal but with a linear adjustment of the energy difference with respect to Z=100 [6].  In passing we 
note that for the XCOM database (which stops at Z=100) the edge energies for the actinides are in 
good agreement with our adopted values with the exception of Z≥98 when a large deviation appears 
with XCOM being systematically high by about 1.07, 1.11 and 1.17 keV for Z=98, 99 and 100 
respectively [5]. 
Papp, Campbell and Varga [9] discuss the significant challenges & complexity associated with the 
various experimental methods (usually on elemental solids), theoretical single-particle & many-body 
calculations (of free atoms), and data evaluation of generating x-ray and atomic energy level widths for 
a variety of pure and applied needs.  The level width is the sum of radiative and non-radiative (Auger 
and Coster-Kronig) widths.  Solid state and binding effects are often important – but we have no 
information about this.  The energy distribution is usually described as a Lorentzian distribution, 
although deviation is expected when the so called dynamical relaxation (DR) is important this has to 
do with non-hole-hopping (static, the hole remains within the same orbital and so acts in monopole like 
way) and hole-hopping (dynamic, in which the holes fluctuates between orbitals and so acts in a dipole 
like way) relaxation [10].  DR can be relatively large (ie it is not just a within orbital perturbation, which 
additional introduces angular momentum quantum number dependence) and also alters the energy 
dependence from the Lorentzian shape – but again we have no information to go on.  Updated values 
for the NLW’s with extended coverage are available for Z=10 to 92 in Campbell and Papp [9].  Above 
Z=92 we extend the table by the procedure given in [4]. 
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Although we have empirically extended the 𝐸! and 𝛤 data sources, and despite the fact that the 5f 
level electron filling sequence is anomalous, we feel justified in our approach because 𝐸!   𝑣𝑠.𝑍 is quite 
linear, the resulting 𝛤  𝑣𝑠.𝑍 curve is reasonably linear, the K-jump is quite linear in 1 𝑍, and 𝑛  𝑣𝑠.𝑍 
gives the impression of being monotonically decreasing and basically smooth as a function of atomic 
number.  Table 1 summarizes the set of 𝐸! and 𝛤 values obtained. 
Z Element EK (keV) ΓK (eV) 
89 Ac 106.759 84.4 
90 Th 109.648 88.2 
91 Pa 112.5984 92.1 
92 U 115.5962 96.3 
93 Np 118.6887 100.5 
94 Pu 121.7902 104.4 
95 Am 124.9861 108.2 
96 Cm 128.2413 112 
97 Bk 131.5556 115.7 
98 Cf 134.9354 119.2 
99 Es 138.3915 122.6 
100 Fm 141.9304 125.8 
101 Md 145.5 129 
102 No 149.14 132 
103 Lr 152.85 135 
Table 1:  A set of K-shell absorption edge energies and Lorentzian natural line widths for the 
actinides.  Absorption energies up to Z=100 were taken from Ref. [8], while for Z>100, Ref. [7] was 
used. Lorentzian line widths up to Z=92 were taken from Ref. [9] and the rest were extended via the 
procedure described in the text. 
The NIST XCOM database is one of the most widely used and influential sources of photon interaction 
data for the applied sciences [5,12,13].  In this compilation, the energy dependence of the PE cross 
section is represented by ideal simple sawtooth shapes based on the theoretical free static atom 
calculations of Scofield [1].  Uncertainties are not discussed in any detail.  Scofield calculated and 
tabulated (on a reasonably coarse energy grid that steps across the absorption energies in an element 
dependent but unexplained way) for each of the individual sub-shells the photoelectric cross section to 
the continuum for photon energies from 1 to 1500 keV for isolated atoms with atomic number Z=1 to 
101.  In the calculations the electrons are treated relativistically and the ejected electron is assumed to 
be moving in the same (static atom) self-consistent effective screened Hartree-Slater central potential 
after absorption of the photon as the bound electron was beforehand.  The Hartree-Slater potential 
approximates the effect of electron exchange that is not correct at the origin.  A modification was used 
to cap the value of the potential in the outer regions.  All contributing multipoles and retardation effects 
were included.  Screening is least important for high-Z elements in the inner shells so for the actinides 
we expect the results to be relatively insensitive to the choice of potential.  The Hartree-Fock model 
gives a more accurate charge density at the nucleus and so the Hartree-Fock wavefunctions should 
give more accurate results for high-energy photons and inner shells.  For Z=1 to 54 Scofield provides 
some cross section scaling factors.  However, comparison to data tends to favour the Hartree-Slater 
results without normalization [4].  Agreement with experimental data is within experimental uncertainty 
except for 10-30 keV for light elements.  Because of the relatively large uncertainty in some of the 
experimental data Scofields cross sections are used as photoelectric reference data.  In the 100 keV 
region for the actinides the K-shell cross section calculations of Scofield have a (computational) 
numerical accuracy of better than 0.1%.  Because each shell is calculated separately we can 
represent the energy dependence of the two branches below and above the K-edge by ‘other’ and 
‘other+K’ respectively.  For the K-shell PE process the 1s1/2 state, which with the exception of 
hydrogen is populated by two electrons, is not degenerate and so we have a simple single.  The K-
shell binding energies calculated by Scofield are not, on the other hand, in fine agreement with direct 
measurement and we adjust the step change to our adopted edge values. 
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An older but valuable source of experimentally founded results is the work of McMaster et al [3].  Only 
the actinides Th, U and Pu are included.  Data are given to four significant figures so the precision is 
better than the accuracy of the data.  Note the energy dependence (n-value) is significantly steeper 
than for analysis based on the Scofield data. 
The tabulation of Storm and Israel remains both detailed and easy to use [14].  The cross-section 
values are listed to 3 significant figures.  In the region 6 keV to 200 keV it is stated that the results 
generally tend to be within 3% of both other calculations and measurements.  We are concerned with 
the actinide region and of the comparisons made in Table VII (for the six elements Z=4, 13, 26, 50, 74, 
and 92) the data for uranium is of especial interest. 
Z Scofield [2] McMaster [3] 
Storm & 
Israel [14] Veigele [15] R&C [16] Materna [2] 
CK n CK n CK n CK n CK n CK n 
barn barn barn barn barn barn 
89 1545.0 2.520 1532 2.507 1711 2.719 1564 2.535 
90 1492.1 2.512 1513 2.596 1482 2.489 1497 2.556 1164 2.558 
91 1440.4 2.505 1431 2.459 1616 2.708 1350 2.523 
92 1390.2 2.495 1444 2.588 1381 2.428 1423 2.607 976 2.466 1479 2.736 
93 1342.5 2.490 1338 2.395 1519 2.687 
94 1296.5 2.479 1349 2.589 1278 2.375 1301 2.51 
95 1251.3 2.466 1236 2.329 
96 1207.3 2.443 1194 2.28 
97 1166.2 2.419 1150 2.207 
98 1125.4 2.365 1109 2.094 
99 1085.0 2.285 1066 1.779 
100 1047.3 2.303 1033 1.346 
101 1009.9 2.215 
Table 2:  Summary of main 𝐶! and 𝑛 values discussed in the main text 
An older but still valuable table of cross section is that of Veigele [15].  The work covers the energy 
range 0.1 keV to 1 MeV for elements H to Pu are based on some 153 sources of experimental total 
and photoelectric cross sections generated over the period 1920 to 1970.  Calculated scattering cross 
sections were subtracted from total cross section data and the resulting photoelectric and measured 
photoelectric cross sections from 1 keV to 1 MeV were empirically evaluated by performing a least-
squares fitting procedure.  The theoretical scattering cross sections were then added to the resulting 
values to estimate the total cross sections over the range 0.1 keV to 1 MeV. 
For our purposes the evaluation of Veigele provides a convenient source of experimentally based 
photoelectric cross sections as a function of energy, 𝜏(𝐸).  In the vicinity of the K-edge the 
photoelectric cross section was represented by a power series in logarithmic space as if the behaviour 
were hydrogenic: ln 𝜏 = 𝑎! ln  (𝐸) !!!!! , where 𝑛 = 3 above and 𝑛 = 1 below the K-absorption edge.  
In the atomic number (Z) direction low order (linear or quadratic) logarithmic series fitting was also 
used to complete the table.  Uncertainties in the total cross section estimates were assigned to the 
recommended values of the cross sections based on the quantity of data, experimental errors and 
weights, the agreement of data among the different experiments, and the internal consistency of the 
compiled values.  In the K-edge region of the actinide elements the relative uncertainties indicated are 
in the ±(5-10)% band.  Original listings are given only to 3 significant figures.  Veigele uses the 
following molar masses for U, Np, and Pu:  238.025, 245.697, and 241.946 g/mol.  The conversion 
factors between MAC and cross sections appear to be identical between Veigele and Storm & Israel 
[14,15]. 
The compilation of Robouch and Cicerchia is potentially valuable and is experimentally based, but is 
also problematic [16].  MAC data are listed for Ac to U.  In converting to cross section we take molar 
masses of 227, 232.0381, 231.0359, and 238.0289 respectively for these four elements.  The 
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agreement with the other values reviewed is not very good.  Closer inspection shows that the edge 
energies used by Robouch and Cicerchia are 106.9, 119.7, 115.9 and 121.6 keV (they quote the 
wavelength to three significant figures) whereas our adopted values are (rounding to four significant 
digits) 106.8, 109.6, 112.6 and 115.6 keV.  The values for Ac and Th agree, but the Robouch and 
Cicerchia values for Pa and U seem to be those of U and Pu and not of Pa and U.  So one is left to 
wonder if some mistake has been made.  If we transform the step value to our standard energy grid 
we obtain values of 1568, 1166, 1452, and 1105 barn respectively, but whether this is a valid thing to 
do or not is uncertain. 
The measurement of Materna et al for U is indicative of how future measurements might be conducted 
using modern methods to satisfy the data needs we have been discussing [2].  We have placed the 
step value onto our adopted energy grid.  The accuracy is difficult to judge but can’t be better than 1%, 
the approximate accuracy of the U-foil thickness determination.  Materna et al also report their results 
as fit coefficients for the regions below the edge and above the edge (rather tan reporting the actual 
data points) and without covariance information on the parameters they can’t be used to make 
meaningful uncertainty statements which is a pity.  The n-value for the PE cross section shape 
function again is quite different to our estimate based on Scofield.  Measurements of higher resolution 
across the edges of a wider range of targets would be desirable. 
In Table VII of their Appendix, Storm and Israel tabulated values for U for three other estimates 
described as experimental values and reported without uncertainties to three significant figures [14].  
For completeness we reproduce these here ascribed by author (see Storm and Israel for reference): 
Rakavy & Ron, 1369 b;  McCrary et al, 1375 b;  Perkin & Douglas, 1385 b.  A summary of the other 
main results is given in Table 2. 
5. Discussion
It is difficult to objectively estimate the accuracy of K-shell PE cross section data.  If we take the view 
that the scatter between different respected compilations and selected measurements reviewed here 
is indicative of our state of knowledge then Table 2 is instructive.  We see that more data covering the 
actinides is desirable – U, Np, Pu, Am and Cm are especially important to safeguards in dissolver 
solutions and Th could be a valuable inter-comparison standard.  For U and Pu we see that an n-value 
of about 2.5 is supported but there is considerable uncertainty, of the order of 0.2.  Concentrating on 
U, which is perhaps the most favourable case, and using all the data discussed, but excluding 
Robouch and Cicerchia for the reasons discussed, we have presented 8 values of the PE cross 
section steps, arranged on order these are:  1369, 1375, 1381, 1385, 1390.2, 1423, 1444, 1479 barn – 
a range of 110 b.  The mean is 1406 b with a relative sample standard deviation of 2.8% and a relative 
standard error of 1%.  A 1% uncertainty is about an order of magnitude larger than we need for HKED 
applications.   
6. Conclusions
The behaviour of the K-shell photoelectric absorption cross section of the actinides is of scientific 
interest for a variety of both basic and applied reasons.  The experimental database in the vicinity of 
the K-edge for the actinides is meagre and the uncertainties are wholly inadequate to permit HKED to 
be applied as an absolute method to meet current international target values [17].  New 
measurements with both fine energy resolution and high accuracy are needed in order to improve on 
this situation, and to enable testing the theoretical shape discussed in this paper.  Experimental work 
using continuous Bremsstrahlung beams and the HKED instrument itself is complementary and 
requires actinide solutions of known concentrations at the 0.1% relative uncertainty level to be 
prepared.  Solutions are uniform, but we caution that second order effects including scattering off the 
collimator and back scatter in the detector must be allowed for.  A search for fine structure in the near-
edge region, just above the edge, for foil and solutions would be especially interesting but the energy 
resolution of the HKED cannot address this.  If the Lorentzian broadened edge model holds, the 
implication is the K-shell x-rays may be produced by photons with energies less than the binding 
energy by multiples of the natural line width.  We have not seen this in a preliminary search. 
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Abstract: 
COMPUCEA (Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment Assay) is used to 
support physical inventory verifications (PIV) at uranium fuel production facilities by high-accuracy in-
field uranium concentration and enrichment measurements. In order to improve the robustness of the 
COMPUCEA measurement procedure, new software was developed by the IAEA. The new software 
guides the user through the sample preparation process and provides a user-friendly interface for 
calibration, sample evaluation and quality control. Its development started in 2011 and since then it 
was constantly tested and refined to reach its current stage. In addition, some improvements of the 
analytical procedure were implemented in the new software. It was tested and validated by ITU to 
authorize its use for measurement campaigns at fuel fabrication plants and for analyses in ITU. The 
results calculated by the new software agree very well with results from the previous software and with 
results from Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry. As the new software makes it much easier to 
provide high-accuracy analytical results with COMPUCEA, it is planned to be used in field from 2015 
onwards. 
Keywords: U concentration, 235U enrichment, in-field analysis, fuel-fabrication plants 
1. Introduction
COMPUCEA (Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment Assay) is a procedure 
for providing high-accuracy in-field uranium measurements to support physical inventory verifications 
at fuel production facilities. COMPUCEA was developed by the Institute for Transuranium Elements 
(ITU) [1], [2] and its present version is in routine use for EURATOM inspections in Europe since 2007 
[3]–[5]. In 2011 it has been authorized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and it is 
used by the IAEA for PIV campaigns in Kazakhstan [6]. 
COMPUCEA determines the uranium concentration and 235U enrichment in fuel pellets and powders. 
Prior to analysis the pellets or powders are dissolved in nitric acid, so the method is destructive. One 
aliquot of the solution is used to measure the uranium concentration based on X-ray transmission at 
the uranium L-absorption edge. Another aliquot is taken to determine the 235U enrichment from the 
count rate of the 186 keV gamma peak of 235U measured in a very well defined geometry by a LaBr3 
based gamma spectrometer. A third aliquot is used to determine the density of the solution, to be able 
to convert the results obtained in terms of U mass per unit volume of the solution (g/l) into results in 
terms of U mass per mass of the original pellet (weight %). The typical combined uncertainty of 
COMPUCEA is 0.20 % for U concentration and 0.30 for 235U enrichment (given at the "1 sigma" 
confidence level of 67%) [4], [5], [7]. 
In 2011 the IAEA started the development of a new software package for performing COMPUCEA 
measurements and analyses [6]. It is based on the algorithms implemented in the well-established 
COMPUCEA software, developed in ITU, which has been in use since 2007. The aim was to improve 
the user friendliness of the interface, the traceability of the results, the fitting of the LaBr3 spectrum and 
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the calculation of the uncertainties.  Furthermore, a new module providing matrix correction for 
samples with gadolinium was added. 
The new software, called CMPU hereafter, was tested and validated by ITU to authorize its use for 
measurement campaigns at fuel fabrication plants and for analyses in ITU. The objectives of the 
validation were the following:  
• Check for bugs (and remove them)
• Test and fine tune the user interface
• Prove that the new software gives same (or better) results as the well-established software
• Validate correction for enrichment measurement for samples with Gd
The validation has shown that the results calculated by the new software agree very well with results 
from the previous software and with results from Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry. As the new 
software makes it much easier to provide high-accuracy analytical results with COMPUCEA, it is 
planned to be used in field from 2015 onwards. 
2. Method of the validation
As the "old", well-established software has been already validated [4], [7], the performance of the new 
software was first checked by comparing its results to the results given by the old software. This was 
done by importing gamma and X-ray spectra to the new software. This kind of parallel evaluations by 
the two software codes was done for more than 60 samples, analysed during in-field and in-house 
campaigns. 
In order to validate the matrix correction for samples which contain Gd, the 235U enrichments 
calculated by the new software were compared to the results from Thermal Ionisation Mass 
spectrometry (TIMS). 
Figure 1. Default view of the new COMPUCEA software, showing the tab with details of sample preparation. 
3. Results
3.1. User interface 
With the old software 3 executables had to be used to carry out the analysis. A total of 5 excel sheets 
was used to keep track of the sample preparation, calibration and quality control and to calculate the 
results for U concentration and 235U enrichment. An "analysis parameter file" had to be prepared for 
each campaign, containing the parameters used to carry out the analysis of the spectra. Finally, for 
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each sample a "sample information file" had to be made, containing the relevant information on 
sample preparation. The user had to select the correct files to introduce the data and to do the 
analysis. 
Figure 1 presents the default view of the software, showing the details of sample preparation. The new 
software has a centralized, tabbed interface. It guides the user through the measurement and analysis 
process and by this it helps to avoid mistakes. All required settings can be adjusted from within the 
user interface. Extended testing with spectra from 4 measurements campaigns has proven the user-
friendliness and robustness of the new interface. 
3.2. U concentration 
The U concentration was calculated by the new software from spectra already evaluated by the old 
software. Then the relative difference of U concentration calculated by the two software codes was 
determined. Figure 2 presents an example from an in-field campaign, where this difference was below 
0.0024 % on average. For 3 other campaigns the difference was similar. This proves that the 
calculation of the U concentration is correctly implemented in CMPU. 
Figure 2. Example from an in-field-campaign, showing the differences of the U concentration calculated by the 
two software codes. The average difference is 0.0024%. The limits shown on the figure are the historical 
operator-inspector differences. 
3.3. 235U enrichment 
Analogously to the U concentration, the 235U enrichment was calculated by the two software codes. 
The differences for the same in-filed campaign as in Figure 2 are presented in Figure 3, showing an 
average of -0.091 %. For 3 other campaigns the difference was similar. 
Figure 3. Example from an in-field-campaign, showing the differences of the 235U enrichment calculated by the 
two software codes. The average difference is -0.091 %. The limits shown on the figure are the historical 
operator-inspector differences 
If the sample contains neutron poison additives (e.g. Gd or Er) or impure materials with significant 
amount of heavy metals (e.g. dirty scraps), a matrix correction for the enrichment measurement is 
necessary because these additives and impurities affect the self-absorption of gamma rays in the 
sample. This correction is determined computationally using a custom Monte Carlo routine [6]. 
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The algorithm models the transport of the 186 keV photons. The full energy events inside the detector 
are counted for two cases of sample material - with and without neutron poison content. The ratio of 
the two values gives the correction factor. An "effective Gd-content" is calculated by CMPU using the 
X-ray transmission measurement. This value or a user specified value for the Gd-content is used as 
input for the Monte-Carlo routine. For 0.05% relative accuracy, a typical computation time is about 10-
15 min. The calculation is implemented as an independent process, thus it can be run simultaneously 
for several samples and with no interference with other functions of the CMPU software. 
The performance of the matrix-correction algorithm was tested by comparing the 235U enrichment 
obtained by CMPU to the 235U enrichment from Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS). Figure 
4 clearly shows that the enrichment results calculated by applying the matrix correction are closer to 
the TIMS values than the un-corrected results. 
Figure 4. The differences between the 235U enrichment calculated by CMPU and Thermal Ionisation Mass 
Spectrometry with and without applying matrix correction for samples containing neutron poison additives. 
Therefore, the calculation of the 235U enrichment in CMPU for samples without impurities is as good as 
in the old software, while for samples with impurities it is even better. 
4. Conclusion
The required features of the new software for high-accuracy in-field uranium concentration and 
enrichment measurements by COMPUCEA were tested and validated in ITU. Some bugs were 
removed and the user interface was fine-tuned. The interface is more user-friendly than the previous 
one and it helps to avoid mistakes and improves traceability of the results. It was checked that the 
results given by the new software are consistent with the result from the well-established software. 
Furthermore, for samples with Gd the new software gives better results due to the implemented matrix 
correction algorithm. 
As the validation has proven the good performance of the new software, it will be used for in-field 
campaigns in Europe from 2015 onwards. 
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Abstract:
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any
associated material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution by determining origin, history, transit
routes and purpose involving such material. Nuclear forensics activity includes sampling of the illicit
material, analysis of the samples and evaluation of the attribution by comparing the analysed data with
database or numerical simulation. Because the nuclear forensics technologies specify the origin of the
nuclear materials used in illegal dealings or nuclear terrorism, it becomes possible to identify and
indict offenders, hence to enhance deterrent effect against such terrorism. Worldwide network on
nuclear forensics can contributes to strengthen global nuclear security regime.
In the ESARDA Symposium 2015, the results of research and development of fundamental nuclear
forensics technologies performed in Japan Atomic Energy Agency during the term of 2011-2013 were
reported, namely (1) technique to analyse isotopic composition of nuclear material, (2) technique to
identify the impurities contained in the material, (3) technique to determine the age of the purified
material by measuring the isotopic ratio of daughter thorium to parent uranium, (4) technique to make
image data by observing particle shapes with electron microscope, and (5) prototype nuclear forensics
library for comparison of the analysed data with database in order to evaluate its evidence such as
origin and history. Japan’s capability on nuclear forensics and effective international cooperation are 
also mentioned for contribution to the international nuclear forensics community.
Keywords: nuclear forensics; impurity; isotopic composition; age determination; database
1. Introduction
International threat of nuclear terrorism is increasing according to IAEA report [1] and other security
documents. Domestic technologies against illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radioactive
substances must be established for criminal specification and prosecution for security and
maintenance of public peace even in Japan. When illicit trafficking of nuclear material happens in a
third-country in future, there is possibility that the nuclear material is suspected to be stolen in Japan
because we have various nuclear facilities and multiplex nuclear materials. Japan’s own technology 
for nuclear forensics (NF) should be retained in order to keep reliance of our nuclear activities.
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has engaged in research and development activities of NF for
strengthening nuclear security in accordance with Japan’s national statement at the Washington
Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 [2]. The JAEA has developed analytical methods for measurement of
isotopic abundance and impurity in nuclear material in order to identify its source and determine the
point of its origin and routes of transit. Joint researches with the US national laboratories have been
implemented in the fields of uranium age dating measurements, characterization of nuclear fuel for
forensics purposes, and establishment of a proto-type national NF library. In this paper, capabilities of
the NF technologies in Japan are presented for the purpose of sharing our experience with
international NF community.
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2. Development of nuclear forensics technologies
The JAEA has developed the fundamental technologies for NF from 2011 to 2013, namely (1)
technique to analyse isotopic composition of nuclear material, (2) technique to identify the impurities
contained in the material, (3) technique to determine the age of the purified material by measuring the
isotopic ratio of daughter thorium to parent uranium, (4) technique to make image data by observing
particle shapes with electron microscope, and (5) prototype nuclear forensics library for comparison of
the analysed data with database in order to evaluate its evidence such as origin and history.
2.1. Isotopic composition of nuclear material
Isotopic abundances of nuclear material can be measured by means of Thermal Ionization Mass
Spectrometry. A mass dependent bias observed in this analytical technique was previously corrected
by measuring well characterized standards. Total evaporation (TE) is, however, an excellent analysis
technique for the measurement of uranium isotopic ratios, where highly precise and accurate data can
be obtained because the mass dependent bias is neglected. This TE technique has been
demonstrated for isotope ratio measurements of uranium using well characterized Certified Reference
Materials (CRMs) of U500 and U050 from New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL). The certified values and
our results are shown in Table 1. It is concluded that the TE technique is applicable to the NF analysis
of illicit nuclear materials. The TE technique has been applied to the analyses of several kinds of
uranium (yellow cake, ammonium diuranate (ADU), UO2, UO3, U3O8) possessed in JAEA. The




234U 235U 236U 238U
NBL U500 Certified Value 0.5181+0.0008 49.696+0.050 0.0755+0.0003 49.711+0.050
Our Measured Value 0.5187+0.0001 49.703+0.004 0.0760+0.0001 49.703+0.007
NBL U050 Certified Value 0.0279+0.0001 5.010+0.005 0.0480+0.0002 94.915+0.005
Our Measured Value 0.0279+0.0001 5.011+0.001 0.0482+0.0001 94.913+0.001
Table 1: Isotopic abundances of uranium standards of CRM U500 and U050.
2.2. Impurities contained in nuclear material
Contents of impurity elements are quite different among the samples, because the points of their
origins and routes of transit are varied. Information on the impurities of nuclear materials is useful for
the purpose of NF investigation. Impurity analysis was then examined by ion exchange separation and
mass spectrometry. Procedure for impurity analysis was accomplished by using extraction
chromatography and inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) measurement. A result
is shown in Table 2, where 53 elements can be analysed within one week by our method.
2.3. Age determination of uranium
The age of nuclear material is also essential information to identify the source of the material,
especially for knowing the date when the material was produced or purified. The 234U-230Th 
chronometer is widely applied to NF, because the radioactive decay of 234U provides a chronometer. 








where R is measured 230Th/234U atom ratio and x is the decay constant of isotope X. 
Procedure for age determination of uranium by ion-exchange purification and mass spectrometry has
been developed in JAEA. We conducted procedure exchange and inter-laboratory comparison
exercise on uranium age dating between US national laboratories (LANL and LLNL) and JAEA, where
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the same NBL standard materials of CRM U050 were independently analysed [3]. The analysis of age
determination on the uranium oxide standard was performed and the time of its purification can be









Li 3 Sn 3
Be 1 Sb 1
Ca 500 Te 10
Sc 0.3 Cs 0.5
Ti 15 Ba 3
V 1 La 0.2
Cr 5 Ce 0.3
Mn 4 Pr 0.1
Fe 100 Nd 0.5
Co 1 Sm 1
Ni 3 Eu 0.2
Cu 2 Gd 0.4
Zn 15 Tb 0.2
Ga 2 Dy 0.3
Ge 10 Ho 0.1
As 4 Er 0.2
Se 100 Tm 0.2
Rb 1 Yb 0.2
Sr 1 Lu 0.2
Y 0.2 Hf 0.4
Nb 2 W 0.5
Mo 2 Re 0.5
Ru 1 Ir 0.2
Rh 0.5 Tl 1
Ag 1 Pb 2
Cd 3 Bi 1
In 0.5
Table 2: Analysable elements and their limits of determination in impurity analysis.
Laboratory Determine Model Age (years)
LANL 56.75 + 0.99
LLNL 56.23 + 0.43
JAEA 55.36 + 0.60
Table 3: Results of age determination for the NBL standard material of CRM U050.
2.4. Particle analysis by electron microscope
Visual inspection of a sample can give useful information as an NF evidence. Scanning electron
microscopy (SEM) displays an image or map of the sample. Figure 1 shows an example of particle
image observed by SEM. Backscattered electrons carry information about average atomic number of
the area and can detect spatially resolved phases of chemical composition. For the NF analysis, we
have installed a transmission electron microscopy (TEM). The energetic electron beam of TEM
transmits through an ultra-thin sample and can image extremely fine structure more than SEM in spite
of tight restrictions on sample thickness. Transmitted electrons can undergo diffraction effects to
determine crystal phases in the material.
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Fig. 1: Particle image of uranium (ADU) observed by SEM.
2.5. NF library
A prototype national nuclear forensics library (NNFL) was constructed based on the data related to
nuclear materials and other radioactive materials. The data gathering on the nuclear materials
possessed in JAEA has been continued. The JAEA participated in the first international table top
exercise of NNFL “Galaxy Serpent,” held by the International Technical Working Group (ITWG) as a 
part of our NNFL development project [4]. Figure 2 shows an isotope correlation plot in order to
evaluate the seizure. The seized material strongly associated with the PWR-2 reactor as seen in this
figure. The present prototype system will be transferred to the future national responsible authority as
a real NNFL which will support the nuclear security activities in Japan.
Fig. 2: Isotope correlation plot of 235U/TotalU vs. 242Pu/240Pu for international table top exercise of 




































Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
741
3. Recent activities to enhance the NF technologies at JAEA
Under the fundamental technologies of NF mentioned above, the JAEA has started a next project for
enhancement of functionality of the NF technologies from 2014, which are (a) improvement of the
library, (b) new technology of particle analysis by TEM, (c) database construction, (d) development of
new age determination, and (e) further international cooperation.
3.1. Improvement of the NF library
In order to attribute the belonging of nuclear material to a datum from huge NF database by evaluating
its analysed data, a multivariate analysis tool for seizure analysis is being developed together with
image evaluation tool for microscope images. Knowledge accumulation system for such NF analysis is
important for serial evaluation methodologies which deal with conditions for survey, data items,
applied procedure, evaluation of results, and all performed records. According to the knowledge
accumulation system, it is possible to carry out reliable and rapid attribution analysis which is
independent of evaluator’s ability.
3.2. JAEA database
A prototype system of NNFL deals with the data of nuclear and other radioactive materials that the
JAEA has possessed in the past research activities. Basic data handling system for nuclear material
database (NMDB) was already installed in our NNFL. Data compiling on the JAEA NMDB has been
now continued. In the next step of the NNFL project, it is planned to develop a prototype of radioactive
materials database (RMDB), which will contain the radioisotopes in medical and industrial usage and
the radioactive waste produced in nuclear facilities. An integrated NNFL will consist of the combination
of NMDB and RMDB complementally.
3.3. Particle analysis by TEM
Fine feature of nuclear material like crystal structure can be observed by using TEM. Such particle
analysis is useful to obtain new NF signature, because fine structure of uranium oxide depends on its
sintering temperature. For the purpose of particle analysis by TEM, observation method is now
investigated by making very thin (less than 100 nm) specimen with focuses ion beam (FIB). Diffraction
contrast image to observe crystal defect and damage, electron diffraction image to analyse crystal
structure, and high-resolution transmission image to understand grain boundary become important
evidences for NF. Electron energy-loss spectroscopy (EELS) installed in TEM is also available to
analyse the elements and their bonding states.
3.4. New age determination
Age dating to elucidate the final purification date of uranium is important subject on NF analysis. The
parent/daughter pair of 234U-230Th established in the field of geochemical science has been applied for 
nuclear forensics. If the uranium has not been fully separated or purified, the chronometer misleads
incorrect information about the age. To avoid this systematic error, it is recommended to measure
various parent/daughter ratios. The parent/daughter pair of 235U-231Pa is our next subject for age 
dating.
3.5. International cooperation
Exchange of the newest NF information through international cooperation is useful for each State,
because the NF activity has a global side of criminal investigation. The JAEA implements joint
researches with US and EC/JRC for forensics purposes. The Integrated Support Center for Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) under the JAEA has been providing training courses to
support domestic and international capacity building for regulators, mainly from Asian countries in
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
742
cooperation with the IAEA. The IAEA Regional Training Course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics
was hosted by the ISCN in May 2012 and received total 24 participants from ten Asian countries. The
ISCN will promote International Training Course on Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics in
February 2016.
4. Nuclear forensics capabilities in Japan
In view of the importance of nuclear security and international impetus to construction of NF regime,
the pertinent agencies in Japan must cooperate with one another. It is necessary to organize Japan’s 
own system for NF by establishing a national NF laboratory and collaborating with traditional forensics.
We must “improve capabilities to search for, confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held
nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or devices using them,” as mentioned in the
Statement of Principles committed to the participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (GICNT)
The NF laboratory consists of analytical and storage facilities for seizure materials and NNFL. The
laboratory should have ability to secure the reliabilities of evidence analysis techniques, guarantee of
quality to the results analysed as evidence, database and its comparison with evidence. Because the
JAEA has developed the fundamental technologies for NF as mentioned above, it is possible for us to
take charge of the analysis for nuclear materials as a work of NF laboratory. In the NF analysis of
seizure and the database construction of NNFL, the judicial reliability of the data is required on the
basis of standardization of the analytical scheme and inter-laboratory round-robin exercises. We
should enhance our analytical skills for the sake of international progress of the nuclear security.
5. Conclusion
The JAEA has developed fundamental and reliable technologies for NF (Nuclear Forensics) and is
now measuring actual uranium samples to make a NF database. A prototype system of NNFL
(National Nuclear Forensics Library) is constructed on the basis of international cooperation. The
pertinent agencies in Japan must cooperate with one another to organize Japan’s own system for NF 
by establishing a national NF laboratory. The laboratory should have the reliabilities of evidence
analysis techniques, guaranteed quality of the evidence, and database and its comparison with
evidence. Another important subject of ours is domestic and international capacity building of nuclear
security, especially for Asian countries, in cooperation with IAEA, GICNT and ITWG.
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Abstract
For determining the origin of nuclear material out of regulatory control, information on the age of the  
material  seems relevant.  A novel  method for  uranium age dating was invented in  2001 in  our  
laboratory at the Institute of Isotopes, one of the legal predecessors of our present institute, using  
high  resolution  gamma-spectrometry  (HRGS)  for  determining  the  daughter/parent  activity  ratio  
214Bi/234U by directly measuring the relevant gamma peaks. The method is non-destructive and does  
not require the use of reference materials of known ages. It works well for high-enriched and aged  
samples first of all. Applications extend to dating metal, oxide, powder, etc. seized and reference  
samples, reactor fuel rods and pellets, in the enrichment range of 4.4 to 90%. The least enriched  
uranium sample  dated  by  HRGS was a 4.5% enriched  oxide  material,  the  age of  which  was  
determined  as  29  ±  3  yr.  The  youngest  sample  was  a  6.7  ±  0.7  yr  old  metallic  U  of  90.8%  
enrichment. In order to extend capabilities to low enriched uranium and improve sensitivity and  
accuracy of the method, a higher efficiency well-type HPGe detector was used and tested. The  
characteristics of the age dating measurements by this well-type detector and the first results are  
discussed. 
Keywords: Nuclear  forensics;  non-destructive  assay;  low  background  HRGS;  Bi-214/U-234 
activity ratio; well-type detector 
1. Introduction 
For identifying the provenance of unknown material, the age of a sample has a unique significance in 
the nuclear forensic analysis. Although usually provide more sensitive analysis with lower detection 
limits, destructive (DA) methods (mass spectrometry, α-spectrometry) have certain drawbacks in such 
activities/applications,  namely  lack  of  promptness,  sample  preparation;  need  for  preservation  of 
evidence.  They  cannot  be  used  e.g.  for  items  which  cannot  be  dismantled.  Among  other  non-
destructive  assay  (NDA)  methods,  high  resolution  gamma-spectrometry  (HRGS)  has  long  been 
routinely used for quantitative assay of U-bearing nuclear materials. No special sample preparation is 
necessary, whereas assay of some material as a whole is possible, without sampling (e. g. reactor fuel  
rods).  Preservation  of  evidence  can  easily  be  ensured.  This  is  essential  for  nuclear  forensic 
application,  where  the  material  is  evidence  in  jurisdiction.  At  the  same time destructive  methods 
preserve  their  traditional  role,  and  combination  of  different  analytical  techniques  increase  the 
confidence in the results and can help to further narrow down the set of possible origins and intended 
uses of the investigated materials.
For categorization and characterization, including the determination of the origin of nuclear material 
out of regulatory control, information on the age of the material seems relevant. The daughter/parent  
ratio as a function of decay time is widely used for determining the age of radioactive samples. A new 
method  for  uranium  age  dating  was  developed  using  gamma-spectrometry  based  on  the 
daughter/parent  214Bi/234U activity ratio by direct measurement [1, 2]. The method is non-destructive 
and does not require the use of reference materials of known ages. It was invented and first applied in  
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our laboratory at the Institute of Isotopes, one of the legal predecessors of our present institute, on the  
occasion of an inter-laboratory comparison (“Round Robin” Exercise) organized by the International 
Technical Working Group on Nuclear Forensics (ITWG) in 2001, where a 90% enriched oxide sample 
was assayed. Our age result obtained by HRGS was consistent with those of other labs measured by  
mass spectrometry. 
2. Theoretical background 
Uranium  age-dating  is  based  on  the  determination  of  the  daughter/parent  ratio  of  the 
radioactive decay chain of uranium. In course of enrichment process the elements of decay chain 
are removed from the sample, then the decay chain starts to build up again. Due to long half-life of 
238U and 235U isotopes of uranium, the decay chain of these isotopes is not building up in measurable 
amount in human time scales. Since the half-life of 234U is essentially shorter (2,455×105 years), this 
isotope  may be a  candidate  for  age  dating.  In  natural  uranium the  234U/235U ratio  is  roughly  1%. 
According to practical experiences, 234U undergoes enrichment/depletion in parallel with 235U, therefore 
the amount of 234U in processed uranium remains roughly proportional to 235U. 
One has to consider that  234U is the element of  238U decay chain as well. Due to the long half-life of 
238U, the amount of 234U from the decay of 238U is lower by at least 3 orders of magnitudes than 234U 
coming from the enrichment, in time-scales relevant in uranium age-dating. 
Upon encountering unknown (e. g illicit) nuclear materials, 234Th (24 d half-life) may be supposed to be 
practically in radioactive equilibrium with its parent 238U in the occurring samples. Thus, determination 
of the daughter/parent ratio  230Th/234U is the first candidate for age dating of U samples. Indeed, the 
determination  of  this  ratio  is  the  basis  of  mass  spectrometric  U  dating  [3].  Considering  gamma 
spectrometry,  234U has  well  measurable  gamma rays,  whereas  its  daughter  230Th  does  not  have 
abundant gamma lines. Next member of the 234U decay series is 226Ra, with a significant gamma-line at 
186,2 keV. However, this line strongly overlaps with the intense gamma-line of  235U at 185.7 keV, 
therefore cannot be measured in trace amounts. 26Ra decays to 214Bi through three short-lived nuclides 
which have useful gamma lines, especially 214Bi, whose 609.3 keV line can be appropriate to measure. 
The longest-lived daughter of 226Ra is 222Rn, with a half-life of 3.825 days. Thus, the time needed for 
secular equilibrium between 226Ra and 214Bi is about 2 weeks, so it can be assumed that the activities 
of  226Ra and  214Bi  are  equal  at  the  time  of  the  measurement.  Due to  characteristics  of  gamma-
spectrometry, the 609.3 keV line of  214Bi is the best candidate for age dating measurements. The 
signal/background ratio of 214Pb lines are worse, while other gamma-lines of 214Pb (1120.3 keV, 1764.5 
keV) overlap with other lines in the spectra. 
Hence, according to the kinetics of the radioactive decay series the activity ratio  214Bi/234U at time T 










where  λ-s are the respective decay constants. Secular equilibrium is considered between  214Bi and 
226Ra. 











Due to the characteristics of gamma-spectrometry these activity ratios can be measured easier: the 
representing gamma-lines are closer to each other in energy, thus due to the smaller correction factors 
for efficiency and self absorption the activity ratio can be measured more precisely. Practically the 
Bi214/U238 activity ratio is measured by a coaxial HPGe detector, while the uranium isotope ratios are  
measured by a planar one.
There are some limiting factors of the 214Bi determination. Due to small amount of 214Bi from 234U decay, 
the gamma-spectrometric determination of this nuclide requires efficient detector and low background.  
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Since  238U, as a terrestrial  radionuclide occurs in  the environment,  its  progeny including radon is 
always  present  in  the  laboratory  background.  The  fluctuation  of  the  natural  background  due  to 
atmospheric 222Rn, precursor of 214Bi, has a substantial influence on the result. Even the reduction of 
radon level can also be considered to reduce the background. 
In addition, a Compton background caused by high energy peaks of  234mPa (238U daughter) is also 
present in the spectrum, hindering the evaluation of the 609 keV peak of  214Bi (and of the U peaks, 
too). 
Due  to  these  limitations  a  lower  limit  on  the  235U  abundance  of  the  material  exists  that  allows 
determining the age by gamma-spectrometry, depending on the amount and the age of the material, 
detector efficiency and background level. 
3. Applications 
In  case  of  high  enriched  uranium samples  the  availability  of  this  method  was  demonstrated  by 
measurements in an iron chamber using a high purity germanium (HPGe) coaxial detector PIGC3520 
with 30% relative efficiency. In case of low enriched uranium (LEU) samples, the lower amount of 234U 
(and therefore of 214Bi) is lower as well, so the corresponding activity is more difficult to measure and 
the uncertainty caused by the variation of the natural background becomes higher. Difficult-to-measure 
samples are the same as in case of mass spectrometry, i. e. low-enriched and/or “young” uranium. 
The described age-dating method was tested on a set of uranium samples available in our laboratory. 
The method was tested with 90 % and 36 % 235U-containing samples of ages known as > 41y from 
records. The measured age of the sample 90% was 43 ± 2y; that of the sample 36% was found 43 ± 
5y by relative efficiency calibration and 45± 4y by determining absolute detector efficiency.
Results of a certified reference material (CRM) of 10% 235U content, measured in ITU, Karlsruhe and in 
our lab at the Institute of Isotopes, Budapest, agree well with each other and were consistent with 
certificate. The result of a CRM of 5 % enrichment was consistent with the certificate. Result of a LEU 
pellet of 4.4% 235U content was confirmed by LA-ICP-MS.
Among  practical  applications,  we  assayed  materials  whose  integrity  is  to  be  maintained,  thus 
destructive methods were to be avoided. Such dismountable U-bearing materials like fuel assemblies 
used in research reactor or a fission ionization chamber containing 235U above 90% abundance cannot 
even be analyzed by destructive methods at all. These objects may occur in illicit trafficking, too.
Research reactor fuel rods (type VVR-SM), enriched to 36%, of known ages as 39, 38, 21, and 6 y 
were dated as 45±4, 40±3, 29±4, and < 13 y, respectively. A 10% enriched EK-10 fuel rod of age either 
39 or 47 y according to records was dated 47±4 y old.
Due to the Compton tail of high energy 234mPa lines (and some time those of 208Tl peaks coming from 
the decay of 232U being present in reprocessed material), the sensitivity of detecting the 609 keV 214Bi 
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line decreases toward low enrichment. Using the 150 cm3 coaxial detector, the least enriched uranium 
sample  dated  in  our  lab  by  HRGS was  a  4.5% enriched  oxide  material,  the  age  of  which  was 
determined as 29 ± 3 yr,  whereas the youngest sample was a 6.7 ± 0.7 yr old metallic U of 91% 
enrichment.
Summarized age results [7] obtained in our lab, plotted against the measured activity ratios ABi214/AU234 
are shown in Fig. 1 below. 
Fig. 1. U age determinations by gamma spectrometry at our laboratory so far
In course of the tests on various samples the limitations of the method became clear. The assessed  
detection limits  of  detection of  age-dating as a  function of  enrichment  are  plotted in  Fig.  2.  This  
detection limits are calculated for a 150 cm3 coaxial HPGe detector. The sensitivity and the range of 
applicability of the method can be improved by using a detector of higher efficiency, e.g. a bigger well-
type Ge detector. 
Fig. 2. Detection limit of age-dating vs. enrichment 
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4. Experiences by the well-type detector
Extension of the lower limits of both enrichment and age is, however, possible with the aid of a newly 
acquired large well-type HPGe detector (60% relative efficiency, 293 cm3 active volume) used in low 
background. However,  the high efficiency afforded by the high solid angle of the detector causes 
additional difficulties. Since 214Bi shows a cascade-type gamma-decay, the true coincidence effect is 
rather significant  using this detector.  A direct  method was developed for  the measurement  of  the 
coincidence factor for the relevant lines (Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3. Coincidence effect of 214Bi gamma-lines 
Since  the  age  dating  is  based  on  the  measurement  of  214Bi/234U  activity  ratio,  the  evaluation  is 
favourable  using relative efficiency calibration by multi-line gamma emitters. It is an effective method 
in the case of lower efficiency detectors. By the well-type detector, this method is more complicated 
due  to  the  changing  of  line  intensities  caused  by  the  coincidence  effect.  Therefore  the  true-
coincidence-effect is necessary to take into consideration for the calibration. The measured relative 
calibration curve of the detector measured is plotted in Fig. 4. 
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Fig 4: Relative efficiency of the detector 
The  relative  efficiency  (intrinsic)  calibration  can  be  determined  from  the  same  spectrum  as  the 
measured activity ratios [4 - 6]. At the same time, it accounts for the attenuation of different energy 
gamma rays in the absorbers and in the sample as well. The activity ratio can be obtained from the 
measured intensity ratio, the relative efficiencies taken at the corresponding energies, and from the 
values  of  the  emission  probabilities  taken  from  literature.  The  relative  efficiency  calibration  is  
applicable to samples of arbitrary shape and chemical form (e.g. fuel rods).
The radon in the air causes not only the increase of the background, but due to the varying of the  
radon level in the air causes the instability in time of the background to be subtracted. The radon level  
of the chamber was reduced by continuous nitrogen flow at ~ 1m3/day flow rate. Due to this flow the 
reduction  of  the  absolute  value  of  the  radon level  was approximately  20% only,  but  its  variation 
reduced from 30% to below 10%. This more stable background allows the reduction of detection limit.  
The continuous monitoring of radon level by an AlphaGuard radon monitor (based on an ionisation 
chamber) was tested also, which allows to take into consideration the radon background even if it is  
varying. 
The size of samples is limited by the well-diameter of the detector. Taking into consideration the size of 
the plastic sample-holders, the maximum diameter is approximately 1 cm. Due to high efficiency of the  
detector the activity of samples is limited also to avoid long dead times. The total activity of samples 
should not be more than 1 kBq. In case of age-dating measurements of uranium samples, the intense 
lines of 235U (143.8 keV, 185.7 keV) are reduced by a Pb shielding of 0.2 mm thickness. 
In addition to the above discussed sample size limitations the optimal measurement geometry is not 
trivial. In the closest sample-detector geometry the sample is in the well of the detector. This geometry 
provides a rather good counting efficiency, but the coincidence effect is significant, and the continuous 
(Compton) background and the dead time are also increased. In order to test the effects of different  
sample-to-detector  geometries,  the  same  sample  was  positioned  at  various  distances  from  the 
detector. The signal/background ratio was plotted as a function of sample-to-detector distance (Fig.:  
3.). Zero distance means that the sample is positioned onto the upper surface of the detector capsule, 
while negative distances refer to the sample being in the well of the detector. The curve shows a 
significant maximum at zero distance. This was preferred at the measurements. 
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Fig. 5: Peak/continuous background ratio for the 609.3 keV peak of 214Bi 
Age-dating of LEU samples was tested on a sample of 10% nominal enrichment from a fuel rod of the  
training reactor of the Budapest University of Technology (BME). A piece of a fuel rod was available,  
which was already present at the start of operation of this reactor (1971). The rod was used for test 
purposes at the beginning of the operation, then it was cut to pieces for different analyses. A piece of  
~1 g was measured (Fig 6). The 661.7 keV peak of 137Cs is also visible in the spectra, since the fuel 
rod was irradiated for a short period. 
Fig. 6: Gamma-spectra of EK-10 fuel rod piece on the well-type HPGe detector
In order to check the correct accounting of the true-coincidence correction, the sample was measured 
at three positions, marked in Fig 7. 
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Fig. 7: Sample positions on the well-type detector
The results of measurement are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Determined age of the EK-10 fuel rod measured at 3 sample positions 
Sample position Calculated age 
(year)
Limit of detection 
(year) 
bottom 56    5 24
middle 59    7 22
up 62  35 33
One can see that in the upper sample position the error is significantly higher than at the other two 
positions. At this position the signal intensity from the sample is rather small comparing to the radon 
background, therefore after the background subtraction the error is increased. The medium and upper 
measurement  positions  geometrically  allow  the  increase  of  the  sample  size.  However,  the  self-
absorption of the sample limits the sample size to this 1-2 g range. 
This result is reliable and does not contradict to the fact that the sample was present at the 
beginning of operation of the Training Reactor (age > 44 years in 2015). 
5. Conclusions 
A non-destructive gamma-spectrometric method for age-dating of uranium samples was developed 
and tested for various HEU and LEU samples. The method was extended to low enriched uranium 
(LEU)  samples.  The  application  of  a  well-type  HPGe  detector  was  developed  and  its  specific  
properties and characteristics focusing on the true coincidence effect were tested. The method was 
successfully tested on a fuel rod piece of 10% enrichment. 
Our  future  plan is  to  test  the  method of  more  LEU samples.  A more efficient  radon  background 
reduction should allow lowering the detection limit. Taking into consideration the self-absorption would 
allow the increase of sample masses and the signal to background ratio, making available the method 
even for LEU and young samples. 
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Abstract: 
At a distance or standoff laser based techniques such as LIBS and standoff Raman are being 
investigated at the PHAROS laboratory, a collaboration between the UK NNL and the Manchester 
University.  An extensive database of material characterisation information that is relevant to security 
and safeguards has been developed, especially using LIBs. This ranges from fuel furniture (ties, 
pneumonic springs, cladding materials etc) to graphite, waste grouting and building cladding cements 
etc. The ability to measure the composition of spent fuel gases in storage canisters has also been 
demonstrated. We have designed and built standoff Raman capable of identifying compounds from up 
4 m (limited at present only by the length of the available containment box), to identify compounds 
relevant to nuclear site operations and to waste disposal studies. The results from these studies and 
the technical scope of future technical investigations will be discussed. 
As these methods are both fast (seconds for analysis), stand-off and either non-destructive or 
minimally destructive (approx. 1-2um surface ablation), the tools being developed at the PHAROS 
laboratory will be of interest both to nuclear site operators and to those interested in independent 
safeguards and security inspection..  
Keywords: LIBS, Raman, standoff technologies. 
1. Introduction
At-a-distance or standoff analysis offers the capability to measure the composition of material at 
several metres distance, in real time and at detection limits that can provide useful. The development 
of high quality and spectrometers, optics and laser sources at lower costs over the last 10 years has 
meant that standoff technologies such as laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) and standoff 
Raman are being developed and tested for multiple purposes. A few of these include real time 
characterisation of materials on production lines for quality control purposes [1,2] the detection of 
explosive residues and precursors for military and CBRN uses [3-5] and characterisation of materials 
on Mars during space exploration [6-8].  
NNL and the University of Manchester has developed a collaboration that has established the 
PHAROS laboratory at the Photon Sciences Institute at the University of Manchester to develop 
standoff and also remote technologies including LIBS and Raman for application principally to the 
nuclear industry but also wider applications.    
This paper will review the application of standoff technologies to security and safeguards and provide 
examples of work being undertaken by NNL/Manchester and by other workers to develop these 
technologies to deployable systems. As well as the measurement of spectra, key issues that affect the 
ability to use the technologies including data analysis methods are discussed.   
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2. Component of standoff systems
2.1. LIBS 
LIBS has the merits of: (i) being a fast measurement technology (few seconds), (ii) sample preparation 
is not required, (ii) ablation only needs a microgram of material, (iii) being able to identify elements 
present in the <1ug of sample, and (iv) the LIBS system components are readily obtainable [9-10]. The 
basic principles of LIBS are that a high powered pulse laser (up to 100mJ) is focussed on a surface, 
into solution (rarely) or at a point in a gas, generating a high enough power density (up to a GW/cm-3) 
to generate a microplasma spark, over nanosecond durations. Within a microsecond after the pulse 
the plasma has cooled sufficiently for ions to start recombining with stripped-off electrons and emit 
atomic emission spectral lines as electrons lose energy to regain stable atomic orbitals by emitting 
photons. After a couple of microseconds the atoms start to recombine to form molecules and in some 
cases molecular emission lines can also be measured.    
No matter the specific logistics of deployment, the key components of standoff LIBS systems are: (i) a 
high powered pulsed laser generator, (ii) optics for laser focussing and signal collection, (iii) a gated 
system to allow synchronisation between pulse generation and (iv) spectral analysis of the return 
signal. A typical LIBS setup is shown in Figure 1. At the PHAROS Laboratory we are currently using a 
LIBSCAN 100 as supplied commercially by Applied Photonics Ltd, with modifications to house the 
equipment so that analysis can be undertaken with high precision in a controlled and safe working 
environment (Figure 2). In-house development of our own systems is on-going, to enable greater 
flexibility in developing bespoke equipment that is appropriate for a wide range of nuclear site 
applications.     
Figure 1: Typical LIBS apparatus. 
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Figure 2: LIBSCAN 100 at used at the PHAROS laboratory (image by APL Ltd) 
2.2. Raman 
Standoff Raman has the benefits of: (i) being non-destructive, (ii) identifying the compounds present in 
a sample (iii) the low powered laser can be sent through liquors to identify e.g. solids in material stored 
underwater, and (iv) has been tested to work at open path distances of up to 100m. Raman works by 
exciting and de-exciting vibrational and rotational energy states in compounds, resulting in a inelastic 
scattering of the incident laser photons. The spectra is obtained by measuring the compound specific 
wavelength shifts relative to the wavelength of the elastically scattered (Raleigh effect) incident laser 
photons.     
Typical system components are shown in Figure 3 and the development and testing system put 
together at the PHAROS laboratory is shown in Figure 4.     
Figure 3: Typical standoff Raman apparatus. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
755
Figure 4: NNL’s test purpose standoff Raman at the PHAROS laboratory. 
3. Applications
3.1. LIBS analysis of structural materials 
In a security and safeguards context, identifying the type or composition of e.g. a grout, concrete or 
other building material may not be a priority. However work undertaken by NNL in a nuclear 
decommissioning context is useful to discuss in this paper as it highlight how spectral data from 
samples can be treated to understand how significant differences in data can be detected. 
In this context 5 samples disks roughly 1.5cm in diameter and 2mm thick of cement grout were 
produced by the University of Leeds, systematically covering a range of compositions of Ordinary 
Portland Cement/Blast Furnace Slag (OPC/BFS). The challenge was to determine of the composition 
of a grout could be measured by Standoff LIBS. For each disk 10 analysis were performed rastering 
over the sample, giving 50 analysis in total. Each analysis was obtained as the average spectra from 4 
laser pulses, to even out the effect of laser energy fluctuations and surface heterogeneity. Each 
spectrum was converted to numerical values of peak intensity versus wavelength (in nm). The data 
was analyses by using the R statistical package [11-12]. 
Each of the 50 spectrum were normalised to the highest peak and centred. Principle component 
analysis (PCA) revealed that the key spectral peaks that systematically varied with compositional 
changes were for Si (504nm) and Ca (315nm) (Figure 5). Setting aside 10 spectra, 40 randomly 
selected spectra were used with partial least squares with discriminant analysis (PLS-DA) to produce 
a calibration line based upon the composition of the cement versus the measured Ca and Si line 
intensities (Figure 6). The composition of the reserved 10 samples was then predicted given the 
calibration curve. Analysis showed that compositions of each single measurement were predicted to 
within 10% given 95% confidence limits. 
This suggests that, for these cements, LIBS can be used as a screening level tool to quickly determine 
the approximate composition of cements and identify samples or locations where compositions of 
interest need to be investigated. It also shows the uncertainty associated with identification; in this 
case a precision of 10% was obtained (for unreplicated or single data points) in blind predictions.      
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Figure 5: PCA loadings and scores for OPC/BFS sample . 
Figure 6: PLS-DA calibration for OPC/BFS samples . 
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Figure 7: Predicted OPC content of 10 blind samples given the PLS-DA calibration. 
3.2. LIBS analysis of steels 
Different types of steel may be used for nuclear and non-nuclear applications. In a security and 
safeguards context, can a nuclear processing specific composition of steel be identified using standoff 
technologies? NNL and the University of Manchester have measured the LIBS spectra for a variety of 
steel materials as part of on-going studies. The spectra for a variety of metals and steel types used in 
the UK nuclear industry are shown (Figure 7). Studies concerning type SA508, 308L and other specific 
steels are on-going. The data to-date shows that the type of steel clearly produces unique spectra 
based upon the composition of the material, i.e. compositional differences can be detected. This is 
study is on-going; further work is required based upon systematic variations in steel compositions 
followed by PCA and PLS-DA analysis to produce calibration curves to numerically determine how 
well unique nuclear industry steel compositions can be identified. This type of statistical study will 
confirm: (i) if the steels can be readily distinguished; (ii) the confidence in the measurements and (iii) 
how many repeated measurements may be necessary for the desired level of confidence..     
Wider than the nuclear industry, LIBS analysis of steels and metal alloys in general is widely used [12-
12], particularly as a means of product quality control where bespoke and automated LIBS systems 













Figure 8: NNL LIBS spectra of various metals/steels used in the nuclear industry. 
3.3. LIBS analysis of U and Pu isotopic ratios 
One of the highest priority areas in safeguards work is to identify the isotopic ratio of materials. NNL 
has not begun work on LIBS and Raman analysis of nuclear materials to-date, but some work has 
been undertaken at CEA on uranium isotopic analysis [14] and in Los Alamos concerning Pu 
analysis[15]. The CEA studies showed that with sufficiently high resolution spectrometers, U-238 and 
U-235 can be measured. This was undertaken using the U(II) line at 424.437 nm. The lines for U-238 
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and U-235 were 0.025nm apart, which their spectrometer could pick up as each peak was 
approximately 0.012 nm wide, given an instrument resolution limit of 0.0055 nm.  
The Los Alamos study utilised the Pu emission line at 594.522nm with a shift between Pu-239 and Pu-
240 of 0.0067nm (Figure 9). The key difference in the CEA and Los Alamos experiments was the use 
of a longer wavelength peak and several microseconds longer delay between plasma formation to 
allow the Pu peak to increase in intensity and measure much smaller isotopic peak shifts.      
Figure 9: LIBS analysis of Pu-239 and Pu-240  isotopes at Los Alamos. 
3.4. How can Raman be applied to safeguards studies? 
To date, standoff Raman applications have focussed to a large extent on CBRN and military 
applications, particularly concerning detection of explosives, their residues and precursor 
chemicals[16].  NNL has so far investigated identifying algae and organic breakdown products through 
water in ponds and silos, and minerals that could be present in geological waste disposal 
environments, all measured at distances of up to 3m, limited only by the width of the facility. NNL 
routinely use desktop Raman for research studies concerning nuclear process chemistry [17]. Table 1 
shows that many actinide species in solution are Raman active which means that Raman 
spectroscopy based tools have the potential to monitor process solutions for safeguards monitoring 
purposes.  





Table 1: Raman spectral lines for several actinide species [18]. 
As an example of such an application, the measurement of UO22+ and NO3- is reported as a means of 
PUREX process monitoring using remote Raman using fibre optic cables to carry the laser to a sample 
cell and to carry the return signal back to the spectrometer [19] (Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: In-situ monitoring of PUREX using Remote Raman [19]. 
These observations suggest that in-line monitoring of actinides in solution using standoff and remotely 
operated (“remote”) Raman has potential for independent verification of nuclear material accountancy, 
and could be an area for further development. 
4. Conclusions
Standoff LIBS is already used for a wide variety of purposes and has potential as a means of readily 
identifying materials during site inspections as a verification tool. NNL is aiming to develop standoff 
LIBS into portable hand held devices that, for instance, security and safeguards inspectors could use 
to identify a material within minutes.  
To date NNL has investigated the potential of the standoff LIBS for identifying unique nuclear-use 
construction materials and chemical processing vessels/pipework. Development work is required 
concerning direct measurement of nuclear material. Under laboratory conditions, recent investigations 
that have shown that the isotopic ratios of nuclear materials can be measured; this requires 
development into practical standoff measurement equipment. 
Remote Raman is less well developed; benchtop Raman is a routinely used by NNL for investigations 
concerning process chemistry. The challenge is to turn this into equipment that could be used for in-
line monitoring of actinides for nuclear material accountancy verification purposes.      
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A Safeguards Friendly Device for Monitoring Reactor Anti-Neutrinos
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Abstract:
Technology developed for the T2K particle physics experiment has been adapted to make a
small footprint, reliable, segmented detector to characterise anti-neutrinos emitted by nuclear
reactors. The device has been developed and demonstrated at the University of Liverpool and
is currently undergoing field tests at the Wylfa Magnox Reactor on Anglesey, UK. It is situated
in an ISO shipping container, above ground, ~60 m from the 1.5 GWth reactor core. Based on
the design of the T2K Near Detector, the device detects anti-neutrinos through the distinctive
delayed coincidence signal of inverse beta decay interactions using plastic scintillator and
Hammamatsu MPPCs.
Keywords: Anti-neutrino; remote monitoring; ISO-container; Novel Technologies
1. Introduction
The diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful use is of concern to the global community. Member
States and the IAEA agree an array of safeguards measures to provide assurances that no diversion
is taking place or that any diversion is detected in a timely manner. The methods applied at reactor
site are numerous and comprehensive, including operator reports on fuel usage and reactor
operations. The expected increase in the number of reactors worldwide will likely increase the cost
and demands placed on the operators and regulatory agencies in applying safeguards. The
application of reactor anti-neutrino monitoring technology could automate reporting in a non-intrusive
manner whilst meeting the increasing demands and thus reduce costs for all parties.
The project presented here aims to provide a reliable, autonomous and safeguards friendly device for
the monitoring of reactor anti-neutrino emissions. A version of such a device is currently deployed at
Wylfa Power Station, Anglesey, UK through the aid of the Department of Energy and Climate Control
(DECC) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) in the UK. The detector was constructed and
commissioned at the University of Liverpool, loaded into a 20’ ISO shipping container, and shipped to 
Wylfa. The container is situated approximately 60 m from the reactor core outside the inner security
barrier and requires only a standard 3-phase power supply for operation. The detector itself is roughly
1 ton in mass and utilizes technology from the T2K [1] particle physics experiment which is highly
suitable for use on reactor sites being non-toxic, non-flammable and extremely robust. The T2K
detector that formed the baseline design for this device withstood the magnitude 9 earthquake in
Japan 2011 with minimal damage.
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2. Reactor Anti-Neutrinos
Anti-neutrinos are, weakly interacting, sub-atomic, particles produced in the β-decay of nuclei. In
operating nuclear reactors they are produced at a rate of roughly 1021/s by the decays of fission 
daughter nuclei. Both the number of neutrinos produced and the average energy of the anti-neutrinos
produced are dependent on the parent fission nuclei. At the these energies the inverse beta decay
interaction, ?̅?𝑒 + 𝑝 → 𝑒+ + 𝑛, is dominant. The detection of the positron, followed shortly by detection of 
a thermal neutron capture gives a distinctive delayed conicidence signal that identifies anti-neutrino
interactions. The energy of the detected positron is linearly correlated with the energy of the anti-
neutrino, allowing anti-neutrino spectroscopy measurements with a sensitive detector.
The detectors used in particle physics experiments are generally large (~1 kiloton) liquid scintillator
devices using Photo-Multiplier Tube (PMT) readout. Liquid scintillator is generally highly-flammable
and toxic while PMTs are expensive and fragile. Coupled with their large size, this makes traditional
detectors unsuitable for reactor monitoring applications. Any ideal safeguards detector should be safe,
robust, transportable and easy to operate. Failing to adhere to these ideal criteria creates an obstacle
to use and wide scale deployment.
Smaller detectors must be of order 1 ton and constructed of suitably ‘safe’ materials to be placed in
close proximity to a reactor whilst being cheap enough for wide scale deployment. Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory developed a prototype, liquid scintillator based, anti-neutrino detector
of order 1 ton in size [2]. The detector was deployed at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
(SONGS) where reactor anti-neutrinos were used to observe both the reactor’s operational state 
(on/off) and the fuel burn up during operations as shown in Figure 1. The fuel burn-up manifests as the
decrease in anti-neutrino count rate as the fuel cycle progresses.
Figure 1: Anti-neutrino event rate in the SONGS1 detector showing fuel burn-up and refuelling period [2]
The observations made by the SONGS1 detector successfully showed the concept of a small scale
reactor anti-neutrino monitoring device to be sound. However, the use of flammable liquid scintillator is
not ideal for safeguards usage where the detector must be located close to the reactor core.
By utilizing the isotope dependance of both the anti-neutrino rate and energy, as shown in Figure 2., it
is possible to measure the isotope content of the reactor core as well as its thermal power output over
a given time period. As such, anti-neutrino detectors could provide material accounting, non-
intrusively, during reactor operation. Due to the weakly interacting nature (i.e. low interaction cross-
sections) of anti-neutrino particles, they pass through the containment vessels and other shielding,
allowing direct, unshieldable, observation of the core. Therefore, a reliable, safe, device could be
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beneficially deployed as an automated safeguards and accountancy measure, continuously providing
detailed information about the reactor core
.
Figure 2: The anti-neutrino energy spectra per fission for the main fission reactor isotopes [3]. As fuel burn-up
increases the number of anti-neutrinos emitted will decrease and the spectrum shift to lower energies.
3. The Liverpool Anti-neutrino Detector
3.1. Technology
The device deployed at Wylfa uses cutting edge neutrino detector technology from the T2K
experiment’s Electromagnetic Calorimeter designed to precisely measure the energy of electrons and
positrons[1][4]. In contrast to traditional neutrino detectors the sensitive volume is formed of extruded
plastic scintillator bars read out by silicon photo-multipliers, Hammamatsu Multi Pixel Photon Counters
(MPPCs). The plastic scintillator is robust, non-toxic, non-flammable and cost effective. A wavelength
shifting optical fiber is threaded through each bar to guide the light on to the MPPC readout. The
MPPCs operate on low voltage and are incredibly resilient making them highly transportable and easy
to operate in when compared to traditional PMTs. The active detector region is doped with gadolinium
to allow the detection of thermal neutrons. The electronics readout system is based on the same Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) boards used in the T2K experiment with significant firmware
adjustments for the detection of inverse beta decay interactions. An internal veto system is included in
the design for the rejection of cosmic ray events and to allow effective operation at ground level.
The anti-neutrino detector contains roughly 1 ton of plastic scintillator as the neutrino interaction target
and occupies a 1.7 m by 1.7 m footprint. The detector is surrounded by 75 mm of high density
polyethylene neutron shielding to reduce background from the fast neutrons produced by the reactor.
For ease of transport and deployment, the detector was loaded into a 20’ ISO refrigerated shipping
container. The shipping container was converted into a mobile laboratory such that all required
resources for the operation of the detector were included within, including climate control and power
supply. The self-contained unit proved simple to deploy on the reactor site with minimal overheads for
the power station staff. The unit requires a 3-phase 420 V power socket, and preferably a data
connection for remote operations of the device. Pictures of the full detector are shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Pictures of the completed anti-neutrino detector. Left: at Liverpool. Right: Installed into the shipping
container
3.2. Anti-neutrino interactions in the detector
The plastic scintillator forms the active target region for anti-neutrino inverse-beta decay interactions.
These interactions produce a positron and an epi-thermal neutron in the detector. The positron is
detected immediately through the light emitted as it passes through the scintillator. The neutron does
not create scintillation light as it travels through the detector and so will not be detected until sometime
later when it captures on a nucleus. Gadolinium is used in the detector as a neutron capture agent due
to its high thermal neutron capture cross-section and the release of an 8 MeV gamma ray cascade on
capture. In the detector the neutron capture is observed through the Compton Scattering of the
emitted gamma rays, creating a spatially diffuse energy deposit that is strongly correlated in time. Anti-
neutrino interactions are then selected by looking for the distinctive signal of a positron followed by a
neutron capture event within a given time window. The time elapsed between the positron and the
neutron capture event follows an exponential decay pattern allowing the rejection of randomly
coincidence events which display a flat timing distribution.
3.3. Detector commissioning and testing
A small scale prototype was built with removable gadolinium inserts to observe the difference between
gadolinium and hydrogen neutron captures (hydrogen has a smaller capture cross section and gives a
single 2.2 MeV gamma ray on neutron capture).  Californium-252 was used as a neutron source. The
source was enclosed in lead shielding to attenuate out its gamma ray emissions. Figure 4 shows the
clear difference in neutron capture rates with and without gadolinium.
A full scale detector was subsequently constructed and tested using the same californium source
with shielding. The full scale detector was also exposed to a colbalt-60 gamma ray source. Figure 5
shows the clear neutron-gamma discrimination of the detector.
Figure 4: A histogram of integrated charge deposit for neutron capture events in a small prototype detector. The
integrated area of the curves is proportional to the neutron capture rate
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Figure 5: The neutron-gamma discrimination abilities for the full scale detector using Cf-252 and Co-60
sources. The x axis shows integrated charge for individual MPPC hits. The y axis shows total integrated charge. 
In addition to the data taken with radio-active sources, several data runs were taken selecting cosmic
ray muons for data performance check as well as a cross check for the energy scale calibrations.
Muons passing through the detector deposit energy in accordance with the Bethe-Bloch formula. By
comparing the observed charge deposit in the detector with the predicted energy deposit, an absolute
energy scale calibration can be made. Energy scale calibrations from the radioactive Co-60 source
and cosmic ray muons were found to be consistent. Figure 6 shows an event display of a cosmic ray
track passing with a fit of its calculated path through the detector
Figure 6: A cosmic ray track passing through the detector. Each plot shows a projection of the track on each face
of the detector with each block representing a scintillator bar.
4. Field tests at Wylfa power station
4.1. Wylfa Power Station
The Wylfa site is located on the Isle of Anglesey, North Wales in the U.K. and houses two 1.6 GWth
Magnox reactors which began generating in 1971. Reactor 2 was shut-down permanently in 2012.
Reactor 1 continues operation under the novel inter reactor transfer (IRX) programme whereby
partially irradiated fuel is transferred from reactor 2. Reactor 1 will be shut-down permanently at the
end of 2015.
Magnox reactors are named for the magnesium-oxide cladding on the fuel assemblies. They use
natural uranium fuel, carbon dioxide gas cooling and a graphite moderator. Due to the low burnup of
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the natural uranium fuel, Magnox reactors were designed to be re-fuelled on load. In terms of the anti-
neutrino field tests, this means that the effects of fuel burnup should be minimal as depleted fuel
elements are replaced regularly. From a safeguards perspective, it is also interesting to note that the
North Korean Yongbyon reactor was based on the Magnox design and that the re-fuelling on load
makes the production of weapons grade plutonium simpler than in other reactor designs.
4.2. Deployment at Wylfa power station
The University of Liverpool detector has been deployed at Wylfa power station for testing since April
2014, shortly before the start of Wylfa’s final power generating cycle. The container was transported
via road from University of Liverpool to the Wylfa site. The flat-bed truck used for delivery, was an
industry standard for transportation of cargo containers. It came with its own HIAB (lifting crane),
hence reducing the requirements and burden on the power station for installation. Figure 7 shows the
container being loaded on to the transport vehicle at the University of Liverpool. The detector was
placed outside, between the reactor building and turbine halls at a distance of roughly 60 m from the
reactor core. The detector is outside of internal security barriers, minimising the issues with site
access and security clearance at the cost of being further from the reactor core. Figure 8 shows the
container and project team on-site after successful deployment.
Figure 7: A picture of the shipping container being loaded on to the flat-bed truck at the University of Liverpool.
Figure 8: A picture of the University of Liverpool team and Wylfa power station staff after the successful
deployment of container on the reactor site.
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4.3. On-site test data and commissioning
On-site checks and commissioning runs were performed after deployment of the detector on-site.
Through the analysis of cosmic ray events it was confirmed that no damage had occurred during
transit. Minor calibrations were performed to adjust for the change in local environment. The detector
then began collecting data before the reactor returned to service.
Further data was taken with a neutron source at the Wylfa site for the development of a neutron
identification algorithm in the presence of realistic backgrounds. This data was combined with data
from cosmic rays for comparison. A PID comparison plot is shown in Figure 9. The background data
contains small clusters of energy deposit from high energy gamma rays and cosmic muons that clip
the detectors edge, where the spatial size in the detector (x-axis) is roughly equal to the number of
scintillator bars hit (y-axis). Cosmic rays that fully penetrate the detector are seen at a cluster length of
49 cm which is the height of the detector’s active region. From the californium source data it can be
seen that for neutrons there is no correlation between a cluster’s size and the number of hits in the
cluster. A series of cuts were developed from these PID plots to select Neutron capture candidate
events. Candidate neutron capture events are selected at the rate of roughly 1 Hz as shown in Figure
10. By comparing data from reactor-off and reactor-on periods the neutron rate was observed to
increase by roughly 15x103 during reactor operation at 1600 MWth. 
Figure 9: Neutron PID plots. Left: Data taken at Wylfa before reactor restart combined with cosmic ray data
Right: Data taken with a Cf-252 neutron source.
Figure 10: The number of neutron capture events selected per day over the period of 1 month.
4.4. Positron selection and fast neutron rejection
The neutron selection is used to select the delayed signal in an inverse beta decay event. A
preliminary positron selection has been developed to identify the prompt signal component in the anti-
neutrino events. The positron selection has been partially developed utilising electrons from high
energy gamma ray interactions. Electrons (and positrons) leave a small clustered energy deposit in
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the detector in the form of a particle track. The energy range of the positron track is dictated by the
energy of the interacting anti-neutrino which informs energy range in which to search for the prompt
signal. Data from the californium source was also used to develop methods for the rejection of fast
neutron backgrounds which produce a correlated time signal similar to that of an anti-neutrino event.
The time window for the delayed coincidence search is constrained by the electronics at 30 µs in the
detector
4.5. Uncorrelated background suppression
Uncorrelated background events are when independent prompt and delayed events randomly occur
within the time window of the delayed coincidence search. As the prompt and delayed signals are
created independently they show a flat time-delay distribution rather than the exponential decay
distribution from correlated events. The probability of such uncorrelated events occurring in the search
window is continuously monitored in the data and thus their contributions to the anti-neutrino signal
candidate events sample can be calculated and subtracted. Figure 11 shows the time delay
distribution for anti-neutrino candidate events after subtraction of uncorrelated backgrounds. The data
is fit with an exponential decay plus a constant. The constant is consistent with zero indicating that the
majority of the uncorrelated background has been subtracted out.
Figure 11: The time between delayed and prompt signals for candidate anti-neutrino events during reactor-on
data taking after subtraction of uncorrelated backgrounds. Data is fit with an exponential function plus a constant
(P2). Detector efficiency effects alter the timing distribution in the first two and the final bins which have been
excluded from the fit.
5. Summary and Outlook
An anti-neutrino detector for safeguards purposes has been constructed and commissioned at the
University of Liverpool based on the technology used for the T2K experiment. The detector design
uses only safe, robust materials in order to be as safeguards friendly as possible. Commissioning data
shows the detector to be highly effective at neutron-gamma ray discrimination due to the use of a
gadolinium neutron absorber. Combined with the baseline design’s ability to detect positrons, the anti-
neutrino detector is well suited to the observation of inverse beta decay interactions. The detector has
been deployed in and ISO container at the Wylfa power station reactor site in the UK for over one
year. Analysis of the data and selection of anti-neutrino events is on-going and initial results have
been presented here.
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Abstract:
This paper reports on the results of the EURATOM testing and evaluation programme of the Next
Generation Surveillance System (NGSS).
EURATOM Safeguards has started replacing the aging DCM-14 based surveillance systems with NGSS
since July 2014. Before beginning this replacing, an intensive testing and evaluation programme was
carried out in close collaboration with the IAEA and Dr. Neumann, the system developer. The goal of this
programme was to confirm the system’s reliability and suitability for in-field use. Because the programme
was started after hardware and security development had been completed, the focus was placed on the
operating system features, performance, usability and NGSS compatibility with existing infrastructures.
The programme resulted in a series of important improvements to the system, making it more reliable,
better performing, and more user-friendly. The programme also helped to determine the operational limits
and optimal in-field system set-ups and configurations.
In parallel to the testing and evaluation campaign, an infrastructure was created to work with the NGSS.
This included the development of software tools for installation and maintenance, evaluation of the
system’s performance, as well as analysing and archiving of data. In addition an inspectors’ training
programme and a documentation package including working papers and work instructions, was created.
Experiences drawn from the first installations in field, together with some further development needs, are
presented in this paper.
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1. Introduction
The European Commission’s Directorate of Nuclear Safeguards (EURATOM) at the Directorate-General
for Energy, is responsible for installing, operating, maintaining and reviewing about 600 safeguards
cameras in the nuclear installations across the European Union. About 350 of these cameras are
operated together with the IAEA Safeguards Department (IAEA).
Currently EURATOM is using two different surveillance technologies. In the Non-Nuclear Weapon States
of the European Union (EU-NNWS), where EURATOM is present together with IAEA, the surveillance
systems are based on the Digital Camera Module DCM-14 [1] technology. In the Nuclear Weapon States
(EU-NWS) the EURATOM surveillance systems are based on FAST-NICE [2] technology.
Both of these currently used surveillance technologies will be reaching the end of their life in a few years
time. The Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS) [3] has been developed as a successor to these
now outdated technologies. Initially, this development was driven by the IAEA and was financed by the
German and US support programmes. Since 2012, EURATOM has contributed to the development of
NGSS firmware and supporting software tools. EURATOM has also started its own project for further
development of the NGSS components.
The reliability of installed safeguards equipment plays a very important role. Above all, reliable operation
is needed in order to avoid complex and often very expensive re-verification measures in the case of loss
of continuity of knowledge (CoK) of safeguarded nuclear material. Secondly, frequent maintenance of the
equipment in the facilities is remarkably expensive. Furthermore, EURATOM has to optimise its limited
installation and maintenance resources. Therefore, before releasing any equipment for safeguards use,
EURATOM put much effort on testing. In many cases, the surveillance cameras are particularly difficult to
access for maintenance. Consequently, it was imperative for the NGSS system to undergo an intensive
testing and evaluation programme.
2. Scope of surveillance equipment upgrade
When planning safeguards instrumentation upgrades, it is very important to take into account every
aspect affected by that work. In the case of surveillance equipment upgrades there are - besides the
equipment itself - many other aspects like system set-up tools, re-use of existing infrastructures, data
retrieval, data archival, data review, state-of-health monitoring, work instructions and training of
technicians & inspectors to be taken in account.
Picture 1. The scope of NGSS upgrade project
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The fact that EURATOM is using two completely different surveillance technologies adds to the
complexity of the upgrade planning. In the EU-NNWS, the video surveillance systems jointly used with
IAEA are mainly applied in power reactors and storage facilities. With a few exceptions, the surveillance
systems in these facilities are relatively small having only 1 to 6 cameras per system.
However, in the EU-NWS the surveillance needs are often much different. The surveillance systems are
usually installed in large facilities and the number of installed camera per system can sometimes be
higher than 30. This complexity places special requirements on the system’s design.
EURATOM has observed, already in the early phases of the NGSS development, that the resulting
products might not fully satisfy the technical requirements in the EU-NWS. Therefore, in 2012 EURATOM
launched an open call for tender especially for digital multi-camera surveillance systems (DMSS) to be
installed in the large facilities of the EU-NWS. The major award criteria of this tender were reasonable
cost, reliability, modularity, and low maintenance need. Because of the high quality and the competitive
price of NGSS compared to rival bidders, EURATOM awarded the DMSS contract to the developer of the
NGSS system. The DMSS is foreseen to be an enhanced version of the NGSS with additional features
such as analogue video input, image capturing in burst mode, enhanced front-end motion triggering and
better system scalability. It is to be noted that the development of NGSS analogue video input was started
under the German Support Programme already before the DMSS project.
3. NGSS test programme
EURATOM was not directly involved in the NGSS hardware development phase. Therefore, the test
programme was developed after the point where the hardware development was already completed. The
main objective of the testing was to prove NGSS equipment could be deployed for safeguards use by
testing it in all circumstances and set-ups in which the equipment could be later used.
The focus of the test programme was on two key areas. The first area was the performance and reliability
of individual NGSS components. In this context also the camera usability was assessed carefully in order
to make sure it could be operated by the end users without difficulty and with minimal risk of entering
incorrect settings by mistake.
The second key area of the testing was to simulate the use of the NGSS with all known cable
infrastructures present in the nuclear facilities. This was particularly important because replacing the
cabling in operating nuclear plants would be very time consuming and expensive. In some cases this
might not be possible at all.
Besides the re-use of the cable infrastructures, EURATOM was also seeking possibilities to use the
existing camera and recording enclosures for the NGSS installations. The goal of this was to reduce the
materials cost and to optimise installation times.
EURATOM has collected the results of all tests performed in a NGSS test report. This report serves as a
EURATOM guideline for the NGSS system design and provides recommendations on the NGSS
installation.
3.1 Tests on NGSS components
3.1.1 DCM-C5 camera
EURATOM received the first DCM-C5 [4] camera units at the end of 2012. The first tests focused on the
picture taking capacity and picture quality. The DCM-C5 features, besides normal single channel mode, a
virtual 4-channel mode where 4 video channels can be recorded simultaneously from any selected area
of the image sensor. Further, the camera can be equipped with either a normal varifocal lens or with a so-
called fish-eye lens allowing viewing angles up to 185 degrees. All combinations of these features were
covered in the tests.
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Picture 2. DCM-C5 camera
Besides confirming the camera performance, the test on the picture taking capacity and picture quality
helped to discover some software problems. The problems discovered were shared with IAEA and the
system developer who delivered, within short times, firmware updates fixing the problems. During the
evaluation period, from beginning of 2013 to end of 2014, altogether 8 camera firmware updates were
released and tested.
A close cooperation with the IAEA resulted - besides the software bug fixing – in many valuable
improvements to the camera. These included numerous improvements to the camera performance,
reliability and cryptographic key management. A good example of such improvement is the changes
made into the key management of the camera. These changes allow EURATOM and IAEA to install the
cameras independently from the other organisation.
EURATOM also agreed with IAEA considerable improvements to the camera user menu structure. These
modifications greatly improved the camera usability for the end users. Further, the joint testing with the
IAEA resulted in a set of commonly agreed standard settings for the jointly used cameras.
Another area of interest with regards to the testing programme of the camera was the power autonomy. In
the case of a mains power supply failure, the camera is powered from its emergency battery. The length
of this power autonomy is an important parameter when setting up safeguards strategies or when
planning maintenance of the surveillance system.
The tests done on the power autonomy delivered very positive results. Compared to the DCM-14
technology, the power autonomy of the NGSS camera is considerable higher. The firmware updates also
resulted in an improved power management system of the camera. This improved the power autonomy
even further.
EURATOM released the camera firmware for in-field use in July 2014. A large number of EURATOM and
IAEA cameras have been operating since, without any significant problems. There are however ongoing
investigations to improve some features of the camera. Both EURATOM and IAEA are willing to
implement future improvements to the DCM-C5 in the form of firmware upgrades.
3.1.2 Digital Camera interface
Besides the camera, the second core component of the NGSS system is the Digital Camera Interface
(DCI) [5]. The DCI polls data from the camera either over an Ethernet or over a RS-485 connection. Both
connections types were intensively tested.
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Picture 3. DCI together with DCR-1 user interface
The tests on the DCI began in early 2013. The first firmware versions limited the number of connected
cameras per DCI to 4. Also, the download speed using the RS-485 protocol was not very satisfactory.
Bearing in mind better scalability and cost optimisation of the systems, EURATOM was actively seeking,
together with IAEA and the system developer, possibilities to improve the DCI performance.
In the course of the testing the system developer did indeed succeed to achieve several improvements on
the DCI firmware. After 6 tested firmware releases, the DCI is now able to collect data from up to 32
cameras and the RS-485 download speed has improved by factor of four. Another important improvement
in the firmware version released for in-field use is that information of connected cameras and downloaded
data volume is displayed on an attached user interface.
3.2 Cable tests
As noted before, the new surveillance equipment to be installed must be able to work with the cable
infrastructures already in place in the nuclear facilities. This means that both power transmission and data
communication between the data collection point and the cameras must be backwards compatible.
EURATOM and IAEA have installed surveillance instrumentation in European nuclear sites since the
1980's. This is why many different cable types and cable layouts have been used in these installations.
Even though the NGSS system has been designed to use the existing cable infrastructures, all different
installation variations had to be taken in account and tested.
The experience from the DCM-14 technology has shown that the data communication over RS-485
protocol works reliably in an industrial environment. On the other hand, it is also known that some of the
old cable types do not allow using an RS-485. In order to cover all existing, and also possible future, data
transmission options, the following cable test plan was drafted.
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Picture 4. Extract of EURATOM cable test plan
The objective of the testing was to determine for each cable type and configuration, the maximum cable
lengths on which the data transmission would still work reliably. The different cable types installed in the
field are: shielded and unshielded twisted pairs in various dimensions; coaxial cables; and fibre optic
cables.
One limiting factor on selecting the data transmission method is the cable topology. Due to the
architectures of the surveillance systems used in the past, the existing cables are laid down from the
recording unit to the cameras either in a star or in a daisy chain topology.
Due to its architecture, the Ethernet connections can be established over only a limited number of cable
types and over a maximum cable length of 100 meters. Daisy chaining is not possible without additional
switching devices. Therefore, some industrial Ethernet extenders were selected and tested in order to
cover longer distances and to allow daisy chaining with the Ethernet protocol.
In turn, the RS-485 architecture does not support the star topology. Even though on some current DCM-
14 systems the RS-485 transmission has been implemented in star topology, without fully respecting the
bus structure, this would not work on the NGSS because of much higher data transfer rates. To overcome
this problem and to avoid use of too many DCI units, EURATOM initiated the development of a simplified
data retrieval interface. The result of this development was a Dual Comport Server (DCS). The DCS
converts the traffic of two independent RS-485 buses to Ethernet.
Picture 5. DCI (left) together with DCS in a DCI-B8 rack
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One part of the testing programme was to study how interferences occurring in industrial environment
affect the data transmission. Although it is very difficult to simulate industrial conditions in laboratory
environment, the influence of electromagnetic interference was simulated by coiling the data transmission
cables and introducing electromagnetic fields inside these coils. Such interference affected remarkably
the data transmission over some cable types. This has been taken in account in the test results.
The conclusion of the cable testing was that the cameras can be connected using existing cables. In
some cases the data link has to be established using special media converters. The most reliable data
communication method is the RS-485 protocol.
4. Software tools
A prerequisite for the successful installation and operation of a surveillance system are adequate set-up,
monitoring, remote data transfer (RDT) and safeguards review software tools. The following chapters give
an overview on the tools developed during the course of the evaluation programme.
4.1 NGSS set-up tool
The NGSS system developer has provided a list of commands allowing the system set-up and status
monitoring over a http protocol. In the beginning of the testing programme this was the only method to
set-up the system. As this method was not practical, EURATOM designed and programmed a NGSS
User Interface software tool for flexible system set-up, maintenance, manual system monitoring and
manual data download.
Picture 5. NGSS User Interface tool
4.2 Automatic data download and monitoring
The software modules for the data download over RDT and data archiving in headquarters have been
developed by the NGSS developer and by the IAEA. EURATOM currently uses the modules from IAEA
which have proven their reliability in production use. As part of the DMSS development the NGSS
developer will provide EURATOM with new data download software.
EURATOM has also developed a state-of-health monitoring software for the systems connected over
RDT. This Log File Parser can monitor both DCM-14 and NGSS systems and many other data acquisition
systems.  The tool alerts the EURATOM technicians if any predefined anomaly occurs on the connected
systems.
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Picture 6. Log File Parser status of health monitoring tool
4.3 Review tools
Further, another essential tool for a surveillance system is the safeguards review software. The IAEA has
developed software modules allowing NGSS to be reviewed on the General Advanced Review Software
(GARS) review software platform. The tests and practical experiences have shown however that,
because of its outdated structures and limited possibilities on modern computer processor technologies,
the GARS is too slow and therefore not well suited for the NGSS review. EURATOM and IAEA have
started a joint project to develop a new review tool. Also, the developer of the NGSS system is working on
a review tool as part of the DMSS contract. EURATOM expects to receive the first versions of the DMSS
review tool in the second half of 2015.
5. Work instructions
Written procedures are important tools for the quality assurance throughout the planning, installation and
operation of all safeguards systems. EURATOM has written work instructions for both technicians and the
inspectors. The technical work instructions cover all processes starting from the keying and set-up of the
equipment through the lab testing, up to final installation of the equipment in the nuclear facilities. For the
inspectors, the EURATOM surveillance team has prepared working papers for all different versions of the
installed NGSS systems.
6. Training
Training is another essential element for new equipment. Since the beginning of the testing and
evaluation programme, EURATOM has organised basic and expert training sessions for the technicians.
These trainings cover introduction of individual system components, keying procedures, set-up, testing
and installation.
The NGSS training for the EURATOM inspectors includes familiarisation with the system components
and hands-on training on set-up and media exchange. The surveillance team has also produced a series
of NGSS training videos targeted for the inspectors. On one hand preparation of these videos is an
additional burden to the surveillance team, but on the other hand, the availability of such training videos is
expected to reduce the need of traditional training sessions.
The fact that EURATOM has selected NGSS for both EU-NNWS and EU-NWS reduces the training effort
remarkably. For the technicians, as well as for the inspectors, it is much easier to work on systems
coming from the same manufacturer.
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7. Experiences in the field
EURATOM started NGSS installations in July 2014. The first systems installed were single camera
systems in nuclear power plants. For upgrading of DCM-14 based camera systems, EURATOM has
purchased from the NGSS system developer modular components to be installed into the existing camera
and recoding unit enclosures. This method helps to reduce the installation costs and shortens remarkably
installation times. The modularity has also been found to improve the installation quality. The experiences
from these installations have been very positive.
Picture 7. Modular single camera NGSS components in old enclosures
For example, in order to upgrade a DCM-14 based DSOS single camera system, the technician first
removes the old components from the enclosures without the need to dismantle the whole system. Then
he mounts the new NGSS components in the old enclosures using the existing mounting points. If the
camera and recording unit are easy to access and the plant operator can provide mains power isolation
when requested, the upgrade of such a system can be completed in just a few hours.
EURATOM installed the first NGSS multi camera system in March 2015. Thanks to the system’s
modularity, also these systems can be installed in the existing enclosures. In the case of old systems the
diverse cable infrastructures and non-standard camera enclosures cause some additional effort but with
careful planning, problems can be avoided and the systems can be upgraded in a reasonable time.
The first experiences from the multi-camera installations show that the Ethernet data transfer can be very
challenging in the industrial environment. In order to avoid such problems the RS-485 communication
protocol should primarily be used and if Ethernet transmission is unavoidable, the conditions where this
will be applied should be known in advance in order to allow sufficient testing.
In the first multi-camera installation, EURATOM faced problems with the Ethernet transmission between
the cameras and the DCI. These data transmission problems probably also caused some problems on
the operation of the DCI itself. At the time of writing this paper, these issues are still under investigation.
In 2014, EURATOM installed 5 single camera NGSS systems. In 2015, the goal is to install a further 48
single camera and 4 multi camera systems.
8. Conclusions
EURATOM has spent almost two years on the NGSS testing and evaluation programme. These 2 years
have resulted in numerous improvements to the NGSS system and qualified it for in-field use. The NGSS
hardware and software have proven, through the tests and first in-field applications, to be of a very high
quality and a reliable surveillance system.
The tests performed, helped to generate a list of recommendations which EURATOM uses as a guideline
for further NGSS implementation design. The testing and evaluation programme also made it possible to
create high quality work instructions and training material for both technicians and inspectors.
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The modularity of NGSS has proven to be a great advantage for system installations and quality
assurance. In addition the synergies from using components from only one manufacturer are notable.
The time spent on the testing and evaluation programme provided knowledge to design proper software
tools for system set-up, data download, state-of-health monitoring, data archiving and safeguards review.
Without these tools, the field implementation would have been very difficult.
EURATOM concludes that the testing and evaluation programme has been very well justified. The
improvements made to the NGSS, have shown that the time selected for starting the in-field
implementation has been well selected.
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Abstract:
This paper presents a new seal for dry storage containers with nuclear material. Currently, sealing of
dry storage casks containing spent fuel presents various challenges to safeguards inspectors.
Continuity of knowledge needs to be reliably maintained over periods of time that can be decades.
Seal replacements and verification , require significant Inspector efforts, radiological dose, and is
continuing to grow. A decrease in Inspector effort is required and fail-safe redundancy is sought.
These needs called for the development of a new compact sealing bolt covering these requirements.
The Ultrasonic Optical Sealing Bolt (UOSB) is based on the JRC Candu Sealing System (JCSS),
which is approved for safeguards use by IAEA and EURATOM safeguards. The new seal includes the
same integrity element with the same identity element In addition, the UOSB integrates the additional
element of a Fibre Optical Cable (FOC).  This construction is in principal two seals-in-one allowing
versatility.
After several design iterations, field trials and a positive Vulnerability Assessment, the UOSB design
was finalized.  The first UOSBs, combined with EOSS and Cobra seals, were installed on dry storage
containers at the Ignalina nuclear power plant (Lithuania) in June 2014. IAEA gave a Category A label
to the UOSB system later on October 2014.
Keywords: seal; cask; dry storage; optical fibre; Ignalina
1. Introduction
The Seals & Identification Laboratory (SILab) is part of the Joint Research Centre of the European
Commission. As one of its main activities, SILab develops technologies and equipment based on
ultrasonic techniques, suitable for sealing and identification of nuclear spent fuel assemblies in
underwater storage ponds. Ultrasonic seals present, as main advantage, stability against time and
radiation. Being purely static pieces of stainless steel they will last the lifetime of the stacking frames
and remain stable as identity. There is an extensive literature explaining how the ultrasonic seals are
designed and read [1].
The ultrasonic  seals are currently used by both nuclear safeguards agencies, IAEA and Euratom in
Europe, in France and Romania and outside Europe, in Canada and Pakistan.
2. Sealing dry storage casks
There is a need to have a simple and reliable sealing principle for dry storage casks of huge
dimensions like Castor and Constor casks, sealed up to now with metallic seals with a cable passing
through a drilled bolt. After a design review, a decision was taken to add to the ultrasonic sealing bolt
a fiber optic passing through the main body of the seal. When the bolt is removed, the fibre is cut.
On top of simple installation and low vulnerability risk the seal has to fulfil the following minimum
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requirements:
- To be used on the primary lid of a nuclear container for the replacing of one or more of its
bolts, without any modification of the container body or of the lid;
- To be easily installed and removed, in any environmental condition;
- To include a fiber optic in the body of the seal that breaks at any attempt of tampering;
- To allow remote monitoring of the cask(s) looped by the fiber;
- To allow verification of the identity and integrity of the seal through an ultrasonic
Inspection;
- To carry an identity which can be univocally coupled with the container;
- To have the possibility to identify a seal after removal (case of a broken seal);
- To be able to withstand harsh operating conditions;
- To maintain a proper answer to any check over a period of several years, as needed. 
3. Ultrasonic Optical Seal Bolt design
Two possible designs were identified for the seal. The first design with a fiber optic passing through
the seal and a design with connectors to allow the removal of the seal without replacing all the fiber
loop. There are also two types of casks with different mechanical interfaces, one is called Castor with
an Allen M36 structural bolt and the other is called Constor, with a threaded hole M36.
3.1. UOSB with connectors
This type is made for connection with an EOSS electronic seal, which explains why one connector is
needed on each side of the UOSB. Internally, there is a short piece of optical fiber with two
connectors, not visible on the design. This fiber is linked to the pin, which breaks when the seal is
removed and cuts the fiber, then a real time alarm can be triggered by the electronic seal.
Figure 1: UOSB with connectors for EOSS
3.2. UOSB with the fiber passing through
This UOSB is much simpler because there is no need to add any connector. The seal has just two
inclined holes drilled on each opposite sides of the seals, together with an associated hole inside the
pin, where the fiber will pass through pushed by the inspector. This configuration could be used with a
Cobra or any type of electronic seal with an optical fiber without connectors, like the new Active
Optical Loop Seal (AOLS) developed by JRC.
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Figure 2: UOSB without connectors, for Cobra type of seal
4. Inserts design
Two possible designs were identified for the two different types of casks.
4.1. Inserts for Castor Casks
The lid of the Castor cask is bolted with several M36 Allen bolts, tightened with a specific high torque
(figure 3 & 4). In order to seal the lid, one or two bolts are removed, one after the other and replaced
with our own inserts. The insert Castor, is a standard Allen M36 bolt, drilled with a grip inside and
resists to the same torque as the original one (figure 5).  
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4.2. Inserts for Constor Casks
The insert Constor, instead is based on a nut/counter nut assembly and is installed by the inspector.




The upper parts seen on figure 8 (ref. 1, 3, 4, 5 & 11) assembled the tool needed to put the insert at
the right depth and to block the nut counter nut system. Just the lower parts (ref. 6, 7, 8 & 9) remain
into the M36 threaded cavity.
5. Seals & Inserts
There are two different types of casks, Castor & Constor and two types of UOSBs, with connectors for










A first field trial was performed in June 2014 in Ignalina (Lituania), followed by a second one later in
July. Several inserts and seals were installed by IAEA, Euratom and JRC technical experts on Constor
and Castor casks and fibers were connected to EOSS and Cobra seals.
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Figure 13: View of the dry
storage casks
Figure 14: Seal installation Figure 15: Ultrasonic reading of
UOSB
7. Category A, ready for operational use
Following these successful two field trials and a positive Vulnerability Assessment, the IAEA decided
to give a Category A label to the UOSB system, on the 2nd of October 2014. This very important
recognition means that the UOSB seals developed by JRC are now ready for operational use in
nuclear dry storage facilities. Euratom in charge of inspections within European countries
acknowledged this category.
Within a few weeks from this recognition, the first set of 30 UOSB seals with and without connectors
and 30 inserts for Castor and Constor casks were delivered.
Figure 16: 4 UOSBs & 2 inserts Figure 17: Seals ready for shipment
8. Next steps
Inspectors from Euratom and IAEA will be trained in Ispra mid April on the installation of inserts &
UOSBs, as well as reading ultrasonic signatures. Beginning of May, another batch of 62 UOSBs will
be installed on Castors and Constors casks.
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Containment/Surveillance (C/S) measures are critical to any verification regime in order to maintain
Continuity of Knowledge (CoK). The Ceramic Seal project is research into the next generation
technologies to advance C/S, in particular advancing security and improving efficiency. The Ceramic
Seal is a small form factor loop seal with advanced tamper-indication including a frangible seal body,
tamper planes, external coatings, and electronic monitoring of the seal body integrity. It improves
efficiency through a self-securing wire and in-situ verification with a handheld reader.
Sandia National Laboratories and Savannah River National Laboratory have previously designed and
are now fabricating the Ceramic Seal. Currently at the prototype stage, the Ceramic Seal will undergo
a series of tests to determine operational readiness, and field tested in a representative verification
trial in 2016. Design and development of seal readers are required for operation and testing and
included in the current project scope. In this paper, we will describe the Ceramic Seal prototype, the
design and development of a handheld standalone reader and an interface to a data management
backbone, fabrication of the seals, and planned field testing.
Keywords: loop seal; tamper-indicating device; containment/surveillance; Continuity of Knowledge
1. Introduction
Containment/Surveillance (C/S) measures are critical to any verification regime in order to monitor
declared activities, detect undeclared activities, verify the integrity of equipment or items, reduce
inspector burden, and to maintain CoK between inspections [1]. Equipment used in C/S can include
tags, seals, tamper indicating enclosures, optical surveillance, and radiation detectors, and this
equipment currently exists at varying levels of technological sophistication and maturity. Some C/S
equipment, such as the metal cup seal, has been fielded for 50 years. The legacy optical surveillance
equipment, based on the DCM-14 camera module, is currently undergoing replacement. It is critical
that C/S equipment evolve given the continuing advances in the threats posed by and the capabilities
of potential adversaries as well as to take advantage of technology advances for continued efficiency
and effectiveness gains for inspectors and to reduce burden on operators.
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Research & Development funds the Ceramic Seal [2-7] effort underway at present to address the
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technical containment requirements for securing access points (loop seals). Loop seals are common
equipment used for C/S measures, as reflected by the tens of thousands of metal cup seals deployed
globally, in addition to the Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS), the electronic Variable Coding
Seal System (VACOSS), the passive Cobra seal, and the electronic/wireless Remotely Monitored
Sealing Array (RMSA).
The Ceramic Seal has been in development by SNL and SRNL for more than three years and
prototypes for operational testing are now in fabrication. The Ceramic Seal can provide an advanced
and modernized alternative to the metal cup seal or other single use seals. The metal cup seal,
although environmentally robust, inexpensive, and small in size, is operationally burdensome and its
integrity is not able to be verified in-situ. The Ceramic Seal addresses issues with the metal cup seal
and makes additional security advancements (tamper indication and unique identification) and
efficiency improvements (in-situ verification and ease of application). Its innovation is the integration of
these advanced capabilities in a small volume, including a self-securing wire feature; multiple levels of
tamper indication via a frangible seal body, surface coatings, and active detection of state through low
power electronics; electronic identification number verified in-situ through a contact reader, and
physical identification via non-reproducible surface features.
2. Ceramic Seal Background
The most critical element of a seal applied in a treaty verification regime is its tamper-indicating
features. A loop seal will employ a wire or fiber-optic cable (FOC) threaded through a monitored item’s 
hasp or otherwise secured, and the wire or FOC will terminate within the seal body. In single use
seals such as the Ceramic Seal and metal cup seal (versus multiple use seals in which the seal wire
can be removed and reattached), confidence must be maintained that the wire is unable to be
removed from the seal body once secured without detection and that the seal body has remained
intact such that the seal body has not been opened and the wire removed/replaced. Tamper-
indicating features on the seal body serve the role of providing this confidence. It is important to note
that a vulnerability review (VR) team iteratively worked with the design team to evaluate and guide the
tamper-indicating features of the seal.
The properties of the alumina (99.8% Al2O3) material used in the Ceramic Seal body meet the
requirements of “frangibility” – that is, upon deformation it tends to break into fragments rather than
retaining cohesion, yet the material is strong enough to withstand the operational environment.
Frangibility is important so that a tamper attempt is prone to result in difficult-to-reassemble
fragments.
The Ceramic Seal will be coated with spray coatings developed in partnership with Tetramer
Technologies. These exterior fluorescent coatings act as a tamper indicating feature [8-10] as
modification/tampering of the seal will be visible under UV illumination. The coatings are transparent
to allow Laser Surface Authentication (LSA) for unique physical identification of the seal body.
The Ceramic Seal provides active tamper indication by monitoring both “tamper planes” embedded in 
the interior of the seal, as well as monitoring connectivity between the cap and base of the seal (to
determine if the seal has been opened). The tamper planes are connected to the electronics and if
disrupted, i.e., signals cannot pass, software within the electronics records a tamper attempt.
Seal firmware is programmed prior to deployment; however, the Ceramic Seal requires personality
programming in-situ, meaning configuration must happen via the RS-232 serial communication vias
located on the cap of the seal. Personality programming loads secret keys onto the seal, sets
message creation interval, and sets absolute time. The electronics will not be powered until the seal
cap and base is connected, so personality programming the seal must happen after it has been
closed.
A seal reader (two variations are currently under development and described later in this paper),
which will also have the secret keys, will be able to send an authenticated command to the seal (over
the serial port), receive the requested message(s), and authenticate them using its copy of the secret
key.
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The capability of self-securing wire not only improves efficiency but touches upon security as well.
The wire ends must securely terminate in the seal body in such a manner that they cannot be easily
removed, and must do so in an efficient manner. In the Ceramic Seal design, the wire is routed
through the monitored item and into the seal base, where it is secured by a tortuous path. The design
team and SNL VR team iterated on several designs before choosing a final design.
The wire itself is important as well, and appropriate commercial candidates have been identified. The
current seal prototype does not have the capability to monitor the integrity of the wire using the
internal electronics; however, such a capability is anticipated in future research. There are instruments
available to externally connect to the wire after deployment and subsequently during verification to
determine if the wire has been tampered with.
Figure 1: (Left) The Ceramic Seal design features. (Right) Ceramic Seals are shown on top uncoated, with
alumina based sol gel doped with terbium coatings on the bottom. Excited by 254 nm UV. Images
courtesy Tetramer Technologies.
The Ceramic Seal will operate as follows: the Ceramic Seal wire is looped around the item to be
monitored and secured within self-securing grooves in the seal base. The battery is inserted into the
seal base, and the seal cap is snapped onto the seal base, secured by a snap ring. Personality
programming of the Ceramic seal is then performed, and once that is completed the seal is ready for
use. Note: expected seal lifetime under stressed conditions is 12 years. It is expected that the seal
would be periodically inspected physically and electronically. An inspector would attach a reader to
download state-of-health (SOH) and events. Physical inspection (visual or instrumentation) would
reveal deformations in structure or coatings.
3. Fabrication
As described above, the design of the Ceramic Seal is complete, and prototypes of various
components of the seal have been fabricated and tested independently. The seal is now undergoing
fabrication with the intent of testing complete prototypes in various scenarios. The fabrication has
been an iterative optimization process. This section will describe some of the fabrication issues with
the seal and our current progress.
The fabrication of the Ceramic Seal consists of the following steps:
 Fabricate ceramic caps and bases
 Brazing of metal pins into cap for electrical contact
 Application of exterior, tamper-indicating coatings
 Application of tamper planes onto seal cap
 Application of dielectric onto tamper planes
 Application of electrical patterning for circuit board onto dielectric layer
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 Attachment of circuit board to cap
 Metallization of seal base interior for power contacts
The ceramic caps and bases are machined and fired by Astromet. Brazing of metal pins into pre-
determined slots on the caps for the electrical contacts occurs at SNL. Brazing is a joining process
whereby a filler metal is heated above 450ºC and distributed between two or more close-fitting parts
by capillary action. The caps with brazed pins and bases are sent to SRNL for application of the
exterior, tamper-indicating coatings and characterization using Laser Surface Authentication. (Figure
2).
Figure 2: Tamper-indicating coatings illuminated with 254 nm UV in ambient light.
Tamper planes have been challenging due to the fine lines, narrow line spacing, and small size of the
seal.  The team originally pursued direct write technology for application of tamper planes as the
parameters (line width and spacing) could be easily adjusted. However, direct write was ultimately
unsuccessful due to the geometry of the seal and substrate porosity. The team instead pursued
physical vapor deposition which is more suited for manufacturing, but requires deposition masks.
These masks are fixed and thus the line width and features need to be known in advance. The team
began by developing a laser cut mask at SNL, which is a simple and fast process. Unfortunately, the
laser cut masks produced a melted slag on the pattern edges of the mask itself. This prevented
uniform deposition of the metal onto the alumina cap, and was found to be unacceptable. The team
next pursued a photoetch-processed mask made of Kovar created by Photo Stencil. The photoetch
mask uses a chemical etching process and produced a much better result in terms of uniformity.
Figure 3: Physical vapor deposition process – requires physical mask to define pattern.
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Figure 4: Photoetched Kovar masks. (Left and center) tamper planes use two separate spiral patterned
masks. (Right) mask for circuit board electrical connections.
Figure 5: First and second half tamper planes.
Once the tamper planes are deposited, a dielectric coating is applied over the pattern. Next the
patterning for the electrical connections is deposited while another photoetch mask is in place. The
circuit board is attached to the cap and aligned to the proper electrical connections.
Figure 6: Electrical connection pattern.
Figure 7: Completed seal cap with circuit board attached.
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For the base, a fixture is used to prevent metallization of all except the interior section of the base.
See Figure 8.
Figure 8: Seal base.
We have completed fabrication of a prototype and optimized the manufacturing process. We will
continue to fabricate additional prototypes using this process.
4. Reader Development
The Ceramic Seal is read in-situ via a contact reader and the pins located on the seal cap. SRNL is
developing a handheld, standalone reader and SNL is developing an interface to a data management
system that is typically responsible for multiple devices.
The standalone reader, developed by SRNL, uses an Archer 2 handheld computer from Juniper
Systems with a custom seal module. The Archer 2 is designed for industrial use, is shock-resistant,
waterproof, has a high visibility screen for outdoor applications, and can operate up to 20 hours on
one charge. Rather than modifying the rugged Archer 2 case, it was decided to design a separate
seal module to connect to the Ceramic Seal electrical contacts. This module will communicate with
the Archer 2 via USB. To use the seal reader, the seal would be slid into the seal module. The seal
module is designed to automatically capture the seal and make electrical contact with the seal once
the seal is fully inserted into the module. The module has internal electronics that alert the Archer 2
that a seal is connected. The Archer 2 then processes the data from the seal. If the state-of-health of
the seal is “healthy” and no tamper attempts are registered, the seal module will indicate that the
inspection is complete. If the seal is “unhealthy”, a tamper attempt is detected, or if there is an error in 
communicating with the module, the Archer 2 will direct the seal module to indicate to the inspector
that further information is needed. The inspector will then activate the Archer 2 to determine the path
forward based on the information processed by the reader. Once the seal interrogation is complete, a
lever on the seal module is pushed to eject the seal from the module.
SRNL has completed a first generation reader (tested on a development board) and is currently
implementing authentication and key management.
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Figure 9: SRNL handheld standalone reader. (Left) Reader with seal (rapid prototype) inserted in module.
(Right) Seal partially inserted in module.
The SNL-developed tablet interface reader is a Nexus 10 tablet with a USB to serial connection to the
Ceramic Seal. Once physically connected to the seal, the tablet downloads state-of-health and event
messages, and passes the received data via Wi-Fi to a data management system (DMS). The DMS
may be responsible for multiple sensors/devices. SNL has completed a first generation reader with
testing performed on a development board.
Figure 10: Tablet interface reader. Messages are passed to data management system.
5. Testing
Once a sufficient number of seals have been fabricated, they will be tested throughout 2015 and 2016
for operational readiness. In 2015, the Ceramic Seal will undergo functional and performance testing
at SRNL, known as an “honest game assessment”. This assessment will be performed by
independent personnel, where they will analyze functionality and user-friendliness, as well as
estimating false positive and false negative errors.
The seal will also be attached to a variety of items in a bunker at SNL. Personnel will test ease of
attachment to items, ease of personality programming of the seal, ability of seal to accurately record
opening, ability of reader to make reliable contact with seal (under real-world conditions), receipt of
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state-of-health and messages on the data management system, battery life, and other suitable tests.
The seals will be physically inspected as well.
In 2016, seals will be deployed in a realistic field verification trial. Extensive testing will be performed,
including tests performed previously in 2015, and also physical inspection with a coatings reader. It is
expected that the tests in 2016 will be applied against a defined set of CONOPs, and the testing will
integrate technologies from both SNL and SRNL.
6. Next Steps
The next steps in the project are to test both the SRNL-developed handheld standalone reader and
the SNL-developed tablet interface reader with the complete Ceramic Seal prototype and make
adjustments as necessary. The team will complete fabrication of multiple Ceramic Seal prototypes
and begin both the honest game assessment at SRNL and the field testing at the SNL bunker.
Recommendations will be developed for any improvements or modifications to the seals or readers.
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Abstract:
The Active Container Tracking System (ACTS) vision is to provide a secure container tag that can be
used to optimize chain-of-custody monitoring for packaged nuclear materials as they are being stored,
processed, and transported. ACTS is an active device that utilizes an almost-universal core platform
that can be appropriately configured to provide the necessary data acquisition, data logging, and
communications functions needed for 21st century material accountancy, monitoring, and tracking 
applications.  The core design supports active monitoring of containment, movement and location and
provides secure data transmission via selectable communication methods that can be utilized
throughout the world.  This core architecture enables appropriately designed modules to be easily
interfaced to the basic system, thus providing an integration path for current and new technologies.
The ACTS contains a built-in set of sensors but also supports an expansion bus for up to 6 additional
communications, tracking, or sensing modules that may enhance monitoring and tracking of particular
containers for specific applications. ACTS stores events in memory, communicates activity to
Argonne’s ARG-US TransPort tracking and information server, and provides options for data
encryption and authentication.  Although the core design philosophy will be container agnostic, the
initial goal is to track and seal a 9980 packaging assembly.  Partners for this system are Oak Ridge
National laboratory (ORNL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Savannah River National Laboratory,
(SRNL), and commercialization partner The Aquila Group.
Keywords: tracking, authentication, sensing
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1. Introduction
There is a continuing need for secure container tracking/reporting systems that can report location,
intrusions, information on the status of contents, and any other anomalous data events.  In addition,
there is a need for long dwell time systems that require little or no battery maintenance.  We present a
new system under development that is designed to be a platform that can be configured for many
applications in the area of asset tracking, and whose configuration provides support for almost any
external device to be added to the system.
2. Architecture
The ACTS concept is being developed as a secure universal platform, compatible with ARG-US [1],
for active monitoring of device containment and device position that can report and record status of
user determined attributes via selectable communication methods.  In order to achieve this, we have
developed a general-purpose motherboard that contains captive sensors which will be used according
to the application, and high-current communications or sensing platforms which are determined by the
application, but are not currently an integral part of the ACTS platform.
The overall architecture and general use case is presented in Figure 1. The platform contains several
built-in sensors in its core, but can be expanded through the use of a Serial Peripheral interface SPI
bus for other type of communications, tracking, or sensing modules. This approach has several
advantages, most notably expandability for future applications and flexibility to support only the
functions dictated by the application.  There are two main batteries in operation.  One is sized for the
basic motherboard and its sensors, and does not supply power to any of the external (application-
required) peripherals.  This allows the motherboard to act almost independently of the peripherals
concerning power drain.  The second battery is sized for the peripherals and their use case. The
peripherals are expected to use the majority of the power in the module since they will typically be
high-current communications and location electronics.
The system block diagram is shown in Figure 2.  The motherboard consists of a core microcontroller
(Texas Instruments MSP430) and four sensor peripherals built in to the board which include an
ambient light sensor, temperature and humidity measurement, barometric pressure, and an inertial
Figure 1. System architecture and use case.
Fig. 1.  System architecture and use case.
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measurement/shock/magnetometer (IMU).  The integrated peripherals are configured through an I2C
bus interface by the MSP430.  The IMU and light sensor are also connected as interrupts to the
MSP430 allowing them to awaken the system by shock or ambient light change.  In addition, there is a
switch interface “farm” of connectors that allows the processor to read normally-open or normally-
closed switches commonly used for intrusion detection.  These are hardwired sensors that are
plugged into the motherboard and are usually mounted on the box in which the motherboard is placed.
A photograph of the system is shown in Fig. 3.
The SPI expansion bus uses the MSP430 in a master configuration with the expansion peripherals as
slaves.  Connectivity is provided by a 16-pin, 0.5-mm pitch ribbon connector that includes SPI signals
plus the peripheral battery leads.  We will be developing a standard interface architecture that can
assist a user in connecting their non-SPI peripheral to the system.  This will allow almost any 
































Figure 2. Motherboard block diagram.
Fig. 2.  Motherboard details.
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Figure 3. Motherboard photograph
Fig. 2.  Motherboard details.
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3. Requirements
Present system requirements cover the areas listed below.
Secure Communications – This system will be able to utilize modules on the SPI expansion bus which
include GPS tracking, Iridium communications, GSM communications, and any other type of low- or
high-power devices that can be added to the bus.  There also is capability to provide AES encryption
for communications.
Power – The system contains two different battery configurations.  One is a long-term battery that is
sized to power only the basic motherboard.  This is presently a lithium thionyl chloride battery which
can power the board for weeks or possibly up to months and is a C-sized cell.  The second battery is
intended to be sized to the specific application for the user’s required board configuration, and
operates only the peripherals on the SPI bus.  This partitioning of battery usage allows the user to size
the higher-power-drain peripheral battery for applications independent of the main controller battery.
Data Logging – Some data events will need to be stored until a clear communications channel is
available.  There is non-volatile storage set aside in the MSP430 for data logging.  Events will be
stored and delivered on a regular basis as communications channels allow.  Also, state-of-health,
system integrity, loss-of-power, and location will be logged.
Tamper Indicating Packaging – All pertinent electronics will be encapsulated into a tamper indicating
enclosure that provides both passive and active features of tamper detection.
These requirements will allow potential applications such as tagging and tracking containers over a
large area, such as those shown in Fig. 4. One or more appropriate communications links will be
needed for this application, as well as data and event storage on board the tag.
Figure 5.  Storage pad at URENCO USA.
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4. Server Interface
Through one of its communications modules, the ACTS can reach the inter-web to transmit activity to
the Argonne ARG-US TransPort tracking and information server, The Argonne ARG-US TransPort
software has a web-based user interface (shown in Fig. 5) which incorporates Geographical
Information System (GIS) elements with “trail-of-bread-crumbs” overlay as well as overview, summary,
and tag event history tables, a current tag status pane and a tag sensor report generator.  A database
exists behind the user interface to archive the messages sent by ACTS.  An ACTS message received
by the ARG-US TransPort server is parsed and inserted automatically into the database. The
message includes three fields, including the sensor values.
Figure 5. The Argonne ARG-US TransPort software has a web-based user
interface incorporating Geographical Information System (GIS) elements as
well as overview, summary, and tag event history tables, a current tag
status pane and a tag sensor report generator.
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5. Conclusion
We have presented a new system currently being developed for active container tracking.  This
system is configurable for a large number of secure asset-tracking applications, and contains
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Abstract:
It has been recognized by the IAEA and CNSC that safeguarding spent fuel in Canada continues to be
a resource challenge. While efficiencies have been increased through the implementation of
Integrated Safeguards in Canada, further improvements  are required in order to optimize the
application of safeguards to spent fuel. There are currently over 2000 Dry Storage Containers (DSCs)
containing discharged fuel bundles at Canadian spent fuel waste management facilities and more are
added weekly. The current IAEA containment measure requires two types of seals to be applied to all
DSCs in storage – metal seals and COBRA seals. The application and subsequent routine verification
of these seals consume a large amount of IAEA resources which will continue to increase, making this
approach unsustainable in the longer term.
In order to enhance safeguards efficiency for spent fuel in Canada, the CNSC has worked with the
IAEA and facility operators to develop new approaches. This paper will discuss the development and
implementation of these new approaches through trilateral cooperation between the IAEA, CNSC and
facility operators, including: the establishment of laydown areas to allow IAEA inspectors to seal more
DSCs per visit; and, the deployment of Laser Mapping for Containment Verification (LMCV) as a future
replacement for metal seals on DSCs.
Keywords: efficiency; spent fuel; cooperation; laydown area; LMCV
1. Introduction
Canada is one of the States with a large nuclear programme and a full natural uranium fuel cycle,
including mining, conversion, fuel fabrication, power reactor and spent fuel management.  In Canada, the
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is the federal agency mandated under the Nuclear Safety
and Control Act with regulating the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect health, safety, security
and the environment and to implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy; and to disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public.
In this capacity, the CNSC is the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material in
Canada.
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As the State authority for safeguards, the CNSC collaborates with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to implement and strengthen safeguards, develop safeguards concepts and approaches,
improve and optimize safeguards measures and approaches, and support the research and development
of safeguards equipment. Canada strongly supports the State-Level concept and  has implemented a
State-Level Integrated Safeguards Approach since first  obtaining the  broader safeguards conclusion in
2005. While efficiencies have been realized in Canada through the implementation of integrated
safeguards, it has been recognized by the CNSC and the IAEA that further improvements are required in
some areas, such as spent fuel. This paper will first describe spent fuel management in Canada, then
discuss the challenge of safeguarding the spent fuel at multi-unit stations. It will then turn to the
development of new approaches to optimize safeguards measures through trilateral cooperation between
the IAEA, CNSC and facility operators, specifically:  the establishment of laydown areas to allow IAEA
inspectors to seal more Dry Storage Containers (DSCs) per visit; and, the deployment of Laser Mapping
for Containment Verification (LMCV) as a potential future replacement for metal seals on DSCs.
2. Spent Fuel and its Storage in Canada
Canada's inventory of spent nuclear fuel comes mostly from the operation of nuclear power plants.
Currently there are four power stations in operation in Canada, including three multi-unit and one single-
unit CANDU nuclear generating stations:  Bruce Nuclear Generating Station,  Darlington Nuclear
Generating Station (DNGS), Pickering Nuclear Generating Station (PNGS) and the single unit Point
Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station (PLNGS), as listed in Table 1. DNGS, PNGS and the three waste
management facilities belong to Ontario Power Generation (OPG).































1 unit; the reactor has been
shut down  since 2014.
Table 1: Canadian nuclear generating stations and associated waste management facilities.
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It is estimated that about 5000 fuel bundles per power reactor are used and discharged to the storage
pools each year based on normal reactor operation. Since the 1960s, Canada's nuclear power reactors
have used over 2.5 million fuel bundles [1]. The remainder of the total used nuclear fuel – which accounts
for approximately 2% of the total – comes from prototype reactors (used to test full-power reactor
designs) and research reactors.
2.1 Wet storage
Spent nuclear fuel from the operation of nuclear power plants is kept onsite in the power station and in
associated waste management facilities. This onsite storage is interim storage which consists of two
phases: wet storage and dry storage. In the wet storage, the spent fuel bundles are stored for seven  to
ten  years in storage bays (pools of water) within the power station, which provide cooling and shielding
against radiation.
2.2 Dry storage
After seven to ten years in wet storage, the spent fuel will be transferred to medium term dry storage.
There are three main types of dry storage units used in Canada:
 Concrete canisters;
 Modular Air-cooled Storage (MACSTOR) units; and
 Dry storage containers.
Concrete canisters, or silos, were developed in the 1970s by the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
(AECL) at Whiteshell Laboratories, to demonstrate that dry storage for spent reactor fuel was a feasible
alternative to underwater storage.  Silos are now used to store the spent fuel from PLNGS , as shown in
Figure 1, as well as from the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories' prototype reactors, including those at Chalk
River Laboratories, Whiteshell Laboratories, Gentilly-1 and Douglas Point.  Each silo can hold between
325 and 600 bundles, and is built on reinforced concrete foundations.
The MACSTOR units, as shown in Figure 2, also developed by AECL, are similar to silos, but much
larger. Each MACSTOR unit can store more than 10,000 bundles of spent fuel. MACSTOR units are
currently installed at the Gentilly-2 Nuclear Generating Station.
Fig. 1:  Concrete silos at the Point Lepreau Generating Station, left [1].
Fig. 2: MACSTOR units at the Gentilly-2 Nuclear Generating Station, right [1].
The dry storage container was developed by OPG and is made of reinforced concrete encased in
interior and exterior shells made of carbon steel. The DSCs are currently used to store the spent nuclear
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fuel from the Darlington, Pickering and Bruce nuclear power plants at their associated waste
management facilities.
The DSC, as shown in Figure 3, is a rectangular cylindrical container made of a double carbon steel shell
filled with reinforced concrete.  Each container unit is designed to hold about 400 fuel bundles and weighs
approximately 60 tonnes when empty and 70 tonnes when loaded [1]. The DSC stores irradiated fuel
containing plutonium (Pu) and depleted uranium (DU) in CANDU fuel bundles. It is estimated that each
DSC contains thousands of kilogram of DU and more than one significant quantity of Pu.
Fig. 3:  OPG dry storage containers [1]
The DSC canister closure system consists of a lid, guide pins and a closure weld around the perimeter of
the canister. The DSC lid is welded to the top flange of the DSC body by an automatic process.
3. Safeguards approach for DSC of spent fuel and its challenges
As described above, Canada's inventory of spent nuclear fuel comes mostly from the operation of nuclear
power plants. As multi-unit power reactors are dominant in terms of spent fuel production, therefore, the
CNSC focuses on the improvement of safeguarding the spent fuel from multi-unit reactors. Under the
current State-level integrated safeguards approach, spent fuel is always under IAEA safeguards
measures, both at the power station and associated waste management facility. Details of these
measures include the following:
Power Station
 Twenty-four hour surveillance with the IAEA unattended monitoring system to monitor the bundle
discharging from a reactor core;
 Spent fuel bundle counter to verify the discharged bundle transfer to wet storage;
 Surveillance of wet storage and physical inventory verification (PIV);
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 Provision of facility’s advance spent fuel transfer activities, including: operational plan, location,
time, status of loading the DSC; update whenever the plans change;
 Near-real time inventory change reporting to the CNSC and IAEA; and
 Surveillance of spent fuel transfer and Unannounced Inspection (UI) (since March 1, 2007).
Waste Management Facility (WMF)
The DSC is transferred into the processing workshop at the WMF where the lid is welded to the top flange
of the DSC body by an automatic process. The weld is a full ring of the DSC body upper plate.
Safeguards measures of the spent fuel at WMF include:
 Provision of the facility’s advance (annually, weekly) spent fuel transfer operational activities,
including: operational plan, location,  time, status of loading; update whenever the plans change;
 Near-real time inventory change reporting to the CNSC and IAEA, and PIV;
 Surveillance of the DSC processing in the workshop;
 A radiation profile as  the signature of the spent fuel in the DSC; and
 Containment (i.e., seals) of the DSC with spent fuel in storage buildings.
Further, safeguards measures require that a radiation profiling must be taken and containment (sealing)
must be applied before the DSC can be moved out of the processing workshop, which is under  IAEA
surveillance, for storage.
It can be seen that the current safeguards measures for spent fuel are sufficient at power plants and
WMFs, with high confidence. However, challenges have also been recognized by the CNSC, the IAEA
and facility operators. The first challenge comes from the limited space of the workshop which only holds
up to about ten (e.g., nine at PWMF; eleven at DWMF) loaded DSCs for processing and limited IAEA
resources. WMF operation requires that the DSC should be moved out of the workshop once the lid
welding and painting are completed to free the space for receiving other DSCs. As a consequence, the
IAEA inspector is required to travel frequently to the three WMFs to seal DSCs. Due to the fact that the
number of DSCs that are ready to be sealed  is small per each visit, this results in an insufficient use of
IAEA resources.
The second challenge comes from the containment measure of the DSCs in storage. There are currently
over 2000 DSCs containing discharged fuel bundles at WMFs and more are added weekly. The current
IAEA containment measure requires two types of seals to be applied to all DSCs in storage – metal seals
and optical fibre seals. The application and subsequent routine verification of these seals consume a
large amount of IAEA resources, which will continue to increase, making this approach unsustainable in
the longer term. As a result of these two challenges, the CNSC started consultations with the IAEA and
facility operators to improve safeguards measures and approaches for spent fuel.
4. Improvement of safeguards efficiency at dry storage
Canada has a long history of collaborating with the IAEA on the development and implementation of
safeguards measures. Existing mechanisms for discussing safeguards matters include the bi-annual
Canada-Agency Safeguards Implementation Consultation (CASIC), Working Level Meetings (WLMs),
trilateral meetings between the CNSC, IAEA and operators, and bilateral meetings between the CNSC
and the IAEA or facility operators, in addition to routine communication via letter, email or by telephone.
Depending on the nature and impact of the matter, the appropriate mechanism will be used to facilitate
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the resolving of safeguards issues, improving safeguards measures, and developing new approaches. It
can be seen from the following sections that all mechanisms have been used in the potential deployment
of LMCV equipment while less tools in the establishment of the laydown areas at WMFs.
4.1 Laydown area
In order to resolve the inefficiency associated with sealing processed DSCs, the CNSC started discussion
with the IAEA and Western WMF operators associated with Bruce Power in April 2010, followed by a
bilateral WLM between the IAEA and the CNSC in May 2010.
The Western operator proposed to move partially processed DSCs to a “laydown area” in their storage
building on an as-needed basis in the event of high DSC congestion in its processing workshop. The
laydown area would be built with IAEA surveillance and allows the IAEA inspector to perform sealing and
gamma profiling of more DSCs in each trip, thus avoiding a possible interruption in processing or transfer
of DSCs and enhancing safeguards efficiency.
The laydown area approach was further discussed at an IAEA-CNSC-CANDU facilities trilateral meeting
in   2012. Considering the benefit of the laydown area at WWMF that reduces DSC congestion in the
processing area and allows more DSCs to be sealed at one time, both DWMF and PWMF expressed
interest in establishing such a laydown area. The cost of the laydown area setting would be shared
between the IAEA and Canadian facilities: the operator will provide support for installing the surveillance
camera cable and the mounts in its storage building while the IAEA will supply the  cable and the camera
mounts, as well as install the cameras on the mounts and make the connections at the camera and
surveillance  cabinet ends. In collaborating with the IAEA and the CNSC, PWMF established its laydown
area in October 2013 while DWMF will be establishing such an area in 2015.
4.2 LMCV – a longer term approach
As discussed in Section 3, applying and maintaining seals is identified as a challenge for the DSCs in dry
storage buildings over the longer term. The CNSC raised this issue at CASIC in 2010 and consulted with
the IAEA on the review of the application of Containment/Surveillance measures to material in DSCs at
Canadian waste management facilities. In response to this consultation, the IAEA proposed the use of a
LMCV on DSC welds as a potential replacement for the optical fibre and metal seals that are currently
applied, as a longer term approach.
As shown in Figure 4, the LMCV system developed by JRC Italy, uses a laser triangulation technique to
perform an accurate mapping of closure welds on containers of nuclear materials [2]. According to the
IAEA proposed draft procedure [2], the application of LMCV is that once a container has been loaded with
nuclear material, its lid closed and welded, a LMCV scan of the closure weld would be performed.  The
weld scan is used to derive a unique signature for a specific container, which remains valid as long as the
weld has not been modified, i.e., the container has not been opened. For verification purposes, the same
weld needs to be scanned by the LMCV equipment again. The reference and verification scans are then
automatically compared by the LMCV software and the comparison result, “Match” or “Match failed”, is 
displayed on the LCD screen of the LMCV scanner. “Match failed” indicates significant differences 
between reference and verification scans and may indicate a tampering attempt. The detailed technical
description will not be given here; instead, this paper will focus on the proposed application of LMCV at
Canadian facilities.
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Fig. 4:  the LMCV unit and its main components [2].
It was agreed by the CNSC and the IAEA that a field trial would be necessary to evaluate this technique.
With agreement by all parties and support by PWMF operators, the first field trial was performed at
PWMF in  December 2010 attended by JRC and IAEA representatives. Further field trials were performed
at PWMF, DWMF and WWMF during 2012 with support by these waste management facilities.
In addition to these field trials, extensive consultation has taken place between the CNSC, IAEA and
facility operators on the LMCV since 2010. A few highlights are the following:
Facility feedback from the field trials was positive and the operators indicated that the equipment
performed scans efficiently and that the equipment appeared easy to use. The IAEA has also indicated
that the field trials at all three dry storages were successful.
In 2013, the IAEA informed during a trilateral meeting that the use of the LMCV was approved by the
Agency in December 2012 and has been proposed as a replacement for one of the two components of
the current dual containment approach for DSCs, namely, metal seal. The IAEA also proposed that the
operators, under IAEA surveillance, could use the LMCV tool to take the initial reference signature.  The
potential joint use of the LMCV device with the operators or State authority was further discussed at
CASIC in 2013. The Agency noted that the first LMCV equipment should be ready by 2014 and all parties
agreed on implementation of the LMCV on a facility by facility basis. The IAEA proposal was discussed by
the three waste management facility operators; recognizing the potential benefit, they welcome and
support the application of the LMCV and are willing to learn and use the LMCV equipment to take the
initial reference scan on the DSCs, as proposed by the IAEA.
It is expected that the application of LMCV will be implemented at WWMF in 2015. The CNSC is working
closely with the IAEA and facility operators on the implementation of the LMCV and look forward to
increasing safeguards efficiency with this new approach at the three waste management facilities.
Further discussion between the CNSC, IAEA and facility operators will take place with the implementation
of the LMCV, to share operators’ operational experience, and optimize the application of  LMCV at
Canadian waste facilities.
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5. Conclusion
In summary, this paper describes the management of spent fuel in Canada and discusses safeguards
challenges for the spent fuel in dry storage and the improvement of safeguards efficiency. It can be
concluded that (1) the establishment of laydown areas at two WMFs so far has enhanced safeguards
efficiency; (2) extensive work has been done regarding the deployment of Laser Mapping for Containment
Verification equipment as a future replacement for metal seals on DSCs; (3) collaboration between the
CNSC, IAEA and facility operators is essential to develop new safeguards approaches, optimize
safeguards measures and enhance safeguards efficiency. The CNSC will continue to collaborate with the
IAEA and facility operators for the deployment of the LMCV tool at Canadian WMFs to improve
safeguards measures and approaches for spent fuel, and to ensure safeguards is implemented
sufficiently and effectively in Canada.
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Abstract: 
In order of ongoing joint R&D programme of TPU and “Mining and Chemical combine” on novel 
technologies, welds recognition system were proposed as improvement for account and control 
system. Spent nuclear fuel casks and containers with radioactive or nuclear materials were considered 
as possible objects for technology implementation. The objective of preliminary study was to find the 
most suitable characteristics for welds recognition system. 
Authors decided to choose have chosen biometrical recognition systems as parental technology for 
current research due to the fact that mentioned technology can easily identify or recognize patterns of 
one kind or another samples. The paper observes and theoretically justifies possibilities of relevant 
algorithms implementation in order to increase accounting units identification accuracy and 
effectiveness with automated technique for casks welds identification task. 
All major stages of iris recognition procedure were analyzed and transferred to weld recognition 
approach with the most appropriate technique: for the searching and selection of region of interest is 
linear Hough transform for detecting welds boundaries. Further to correct all uncertainties such as 
varying imaging distance, rotation of the camera, sample tilt the image registry method was chosen. 
Extraction template information and further encoding were performed by Log-Gabor filter,  as this filter 
could make functional dependence between image intensity and position and convert this data into 
binary code for the later data comparison with  application of weighted Euclidean distance technique. 
Performed research could help to release described methods and algorithms in developing an open-
source weld templates recognition system in the field of accounting and control of nuclear materials. In 
addition to that research contains proposed procedures and organizational issues for practical tests of 
intended technique. 
Keywords: biometry, iris recognition, nuclear materials, casks 
1. Introduction
Accounting and control system of nuclear materials, nuclear wastes and spent fuel requires 
implementation of safety measures through special organizational methods. One of the verification 
procedures is nuclear material localization during transporting and storage process. In order to 
maintain non-proliferation regime and prevent unauthorized access to nuclear materials, it is located in 
boxes, vaults, casks in material balance area. Identification of nuclear materials is essential part of 
accounting process in material balance area.  
Both object recognition and matching are vital for all operation processes including displacing and 
transport. Both visual and automatic verification procedures are used in accounting process. Visual 
methods based on observations of identification marks while automatic verification use technical 
instruments for searching and matching marks. Decreasing of human factor influence is one of the 
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main advantages of automated system that makes these systems significantly robust. On the other 
hand those marks could be either forged, defected or falsified that in its turn causes incorrect signal. 
2. Method selecting and substantiation
Identification means comparison of two samples – original stored in data base and identified one from 
input data – for decision making. Identifier could be either an assigned parameter or inherent one. For 
instance biometrical parameter is one of the most widespread examples of inherent properties used 
for identification. Biometry uses natural characteristics of human body when needed to recognize 
person identity. Nevertheless both types could represent statistical parameters which are the same in 
nature so this feature could be used in case of applying biometrical statistical algorithms not only for 
human marks identification. While identification samples have common visual data the result 
compared with original formula it could be assumed that there are the same or at least similar 
recognition and analysis approaches that do not pose restrictions on method choosing. 
This paper explicates using algorithms based on iris identification adapted for casks weld identification 
in order to increase accuracy and efficiency. Choice of biometric technique is determined by a range 
of different factors. Pattern in iris recognition methods is similar to weld in appearance unlike to other 
identification methods. Both patterns have fiber-like areas needed for comparison. 
Iris identification techniques are the leaders in biometric technique field. In comparison with fingerprint 
methods iris algorithms provides in 10 times more accuracy (1 from 1-2 bil. false iris matching as 
compared to 1 from 100 hund. fingerprints matching) [1]. 
As well eye cornea weld seam is naturally protected from harmful influence that leads to less noisy 
signal this fact is taken into account in identification algorithms development. Iris identification typically 
works with noncontact optical techniques  which is the best choice for metal surface identification. 
Identification process includes such steps as area of interest indention called Segmentation, process 
of Normalization so we can reduce noise or correct aberrations and feature Encoding and Matching. 
Segmentation is used for the area forming, the latter matched with the original pattern. In order to that 
iris segmentation means locating iris boundaries and choosing certain area with defined sizes for the 
weld. Iris sector could be identified by two circles known as pupil and sclera boundaries. For the weld 
type of pattern or other non-circular areas it is reasonable to use simpler techniques of segmentation 
which do not require any types of data approximation. Moreover those criteria algorithms of non-
circular segmentation are simplified with those types of noise like upper and lower lashes in iris 
method. 
Wildes et al. proposed to use an automatic segmentation algorithm based on the circular Hough 
transform for coordinate center and pupil radius and iris sector locating [2]. In addition to that Hough 
transform can be used for line and free shape search parametrically at black and white image. 
Assuming we have some data points in an image which is probably the result of an edge detection 
process, or boundary points of a binary blob. We need to recognize the points that form a straight line. 
If we divide parameter space into a number of discrete accumulator cells we can collect “votes” in 
(a b) space from each data point in (x y) space. Peaks in (a b) space will mark the equations of lines of 
co-linear points in (x y) space. Thus we can find points of interest [3]. 
In this way preliminary image transformation into black and white and optimization of segmented area 
size including points of interest and background may produce output image data in digital form. 
There was purposed Daugman’s Integro-differential Operator as alternative approach to iris and pupil 
circular area localization including upper and lower leads arches. The operator searches for the 
circular path where there is maximum change in pixel values, by varying the radius and center position 
of the circular contour [4]. The integro-differential can be seen as a variation of the Hough transform 
[5]. Since this operator is adapted for sector search technique it is not reasonable to use it in line 
search compared to Hough transform for line detection. 
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Matching of original and identified samples requires normalization step in case of different aberrations, 
such as mutual casks and equipment dislocation, tilt and rotation, distance shifts between inspected 
object and camera. 
Efficiency of both Daugman and Wilde approaches for weld-like patterns was compared in respect of 
shifts, scaling and rotation aberrations reduction. Daugman method provides use of radial scaling 
either to correct contraction of the pupil or pupillary dilatation and image sizes relatively to original 
image. The Process includes Cartesian to polar coordinates transfer with respect to angle of rotation 
(1) [4]. I x r, θ , y r, θ → I r, θ , x r, θ = 1 − r x! θ + rx!(θ)y r, θ = 1 − r y! θ + ry!(θ) (1) 
where I(x,y) is the iris region image, (x,y) are the original Cartesian coordinates, (r,θ) are the 
corresponding normalised polar coordinates, x!, y! and x!, y! are the coordinates of the pupil and iris 
boundaries along the θ direction.  
Wilde’s method uses image registration for normalization step both for rotation and scaling. This 
approach helps to transform disturbed image as original version with respect to scale and rotation 
parameters that is important within the work. 
In order to normalize iris biometric patterns with use of image registration method we choose as 
normalized parameters: scaling factor s and a matrix representing rotation ϕ which includes cask and 
camera aberrations within three main axes that influence considerable on applied algorithms (2). x′y′ = xy − sR ϕ xy , (2) 
where s is scaling factor; R(ϕ) is rotation matrix with angle of rotation ϕ. 
Sample selection should include marking procedure in order to avoid unacceptable aberration. Mark 
provides a reference zero point relatively to which matching procedure will be performed. It is 
important to accurately place cask in front of a camera that makes coding and matching stages more 
successful. Those would be better to use supportive techniques and instruments to correct distance 
and angle of rotation for accurate normalization. 
Characteristic point features contain graphic information that should be defined for further feature 
encoding. Those encode methods are based on integral transformation. 
Only the significant features of the sample must be encoded so that comparisons between patterns 
can be made. Gabor filters are able to provide optimum conjoint representation of a signal in space 
and spatial frequency. A Gabor filter is constructed by modulating a sine/cosine wave with a Gaussian 
(3). It is able to provide the optimum conjoint localization in both space and frequency, since a sine 
wave is perfectly localized in frequency, but not localized in space [1]. Gabor x!, y! = Gauss x!, y! ∗ cos 2πf!x! + φ , (3) 
where f! is spatial frequency; φ is phase. 
A Gabor filter modification is Log Gabor filter [6]. The Advantage of the Log Gabor filter is reduction of 
DC of Gabor filter for accurate pattern boundaries selection. This method is widely applied in different 
tasks and this is why it was chosen for this work. 
The pattern that is generated in the feature encoding process will also need a corresponding matching 
metric, which gives a measure of similarity between two patterns. Metric measure methods like 
Hamming distance (4) and Euclidean distance (5) have widespread use but Euclidean Distance has 
benefits with weight counting. 
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d!" = x!" − x!"!!!! , (4) 
where d!" – distance between ith и jth template; x!" – ith feature of the kth area; x!" – jth feature of the kth 
area. 
D = (f! − f!(!))!(δ!(!))!!!!! , (5) 
where f! – ith feature of the unknown pattern; f!(!) – ith feature of the original pattern; δ!(!) is the standard
aberration of the ith feature in template k. The ith unknown template is found to match template k, when 
D is a minimum at k. 
The encoding process produces a bitwise template containing bits of information. Matching will be 
provided with finding similarity between two digital codes with respect to weight in order to get the 
information about templates identity. 
3. Conclusion
The paper proposes biometric methods implementation to nuclear material cask welds identification. 
main stages for pattern identification and matching including algorithms and concluded appropriate 
ones for cask identification and analysis are described. The Work was realized in practice with 
development of cask identification program code. 
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Abstract: 
Development of a non-destructive analysis system using a pulsed neutron source is under discussion 
by researchers of the JAEA, and JRC-ITU and JRC-IRMM. The system will utilize a combination of 
neutron resonance transmission analysis and differential die-away and both prompt and delayed 
gamma-ray (DG) spectroscopy (DGS) techniques. The DGS technique can establish fissionable 
material ratios to relatively high precision since each isotope has a unique fission yield that generates 
specific gamma-ray spectra with energy extending well above the 3-MeV limit of passive gamma-ray 
emissions. This system will be applied toward safeguards applications by effectively determining 
nuclear material (NM) compositions within MOX fuel samples and NM samples with high neutron or 
passive gamma-ray emissions (including the melted fuel generated in severe reactor accidents). 
Additionally, this system can be applied toward nuclear security by detecting the high-energy DGs that 
can more efficiently pass through shielding materials. This presentation describes the initial status of 
the DG portion of this system and how it will be used in conjunction with the other techniques to 
provide both high accuracy and high precision of the composition of the NM of interest.   
Keywords: NDA; DGS; active; safeguards; security 
1. Introduction
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is developing multiple programs in order to improve state 
and international safeguards concepts and technologies. Included in these efforts are the 
technological aims of improving non-destructive analysis, detecting undeclared nuclear activity, and 
developing site-level safeguards-by-design. Particularly, there is increasing interest regarding how to 
effectively and efficiently determine the fissile and fissionable (FF) composition (FFC) of mixed nuclear 
materials (NM). Of significant interests are determining the Pu/U composition of purified NM (e.g. 
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel and plutonium nitrate solutions) and of non-purified NM (e.g. spent fuel, 
vitrified waste, melted fuel from reactor accidents, and next-generation fuel cycle) materials. For each 
of these material forms, destructive analysis has been deemed inappropriate due to the difficulty of 
acquiring reasonable sample material. 
To help fill this gap researchers of the JAEA and JRC (ITU, Ispra, and IRMM, Geel) are currently 
discussing the development of a non-destructive analysis (NDA) system and measurement campaign. 
The system will utilize a combination of neutron Differential Die-Away Analysis (DDA) [1], Neutron 
Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2], Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis (PGA) [3], and Delayed 
Gamma-ray Spectroscopy (DGS) techniques [4]. Interrogation with an external neutron source 
enables each of these techniques to provide a unique and complementary perspective of establishing 
reasonable confidence and precision of the FFC of any given NM sample [5]. 
The important aspect of the DGS technique is that after a few microseconds the induced fission 
products generate specific delayed gamma-ray (DG) energy spectra that extend well above 3 MeV. 
This is especially important for those NM samples that have high passive gamma-ray emissions below 
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this energy. Since each of these fission products has a unique decay half-life, the energy spectrum 
changes over time but in a predictable manner since the isotopes decay in well-established chains. 
Ratios of FFC isotopes can be ascertained based on the relative fission yield (FY) contributions to the 
integrated fission yield of the measured NM. 
Multiple presentations submitted will focus on various aspects of this new NDA project and the system 
being developed. This work describes initial studies from the JAEA regarding the DGS technique as 
an aspect of the overall project. Additionally, a description will be made of the necessary physics 
improvements required to enable this method to be more precise in determining the FFC.  
2. Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy
As mentioned above, the DGS technique has the potential to establish the fissile composition to high 
precision. The yield of fission products is unique to each fissile and fissionable isotope depending 
upon the energy of the fission-inducing neutron. Though many of the same fission products are 
produced between multiple isotopes, the relative proportions are different. The cross-section of the 
fissile isotopes are very similar above ~1-MeV, allowing the dominant isotope (e.g. 238U for spent fuel) 
to overwhelm the signature. It then becomes important to measure differences from neutrons of 
energies below ~40-eV where the cross sections for the isotopes of interest are highly separated. 
Mixed NM produces a unique combined FY dependent upon the relative quantity of each individual 
isotopic FF. As seen in Figure 1, the FY×σ contribution from equal amounts of 239Pu, 241Pu, and 235U 
have drastically different shapes and proportions for the same thermal irradiation neutron flux. Ignoring 
the relative intensities that indicate the probability to fission, the integrated FY is seen to have an 
entirely different shape assuming there are equal amounts of these three isotopes contained in the 
same target. The integrated FY×σ is also different from a target containing twice as much 235U as 
either Pu, indicating the capability for the DGS method to distinguish the unique ratio of the isotopes. 
Much work has already been performed to develop systems and analytic methods to apply the DGS 
technique toward spent nuclear fuel [4,6,7] and NM detection [8]. Results of these indicate that the  
Figure 1: The thermal fission yield of 241Pu, 239Pu, and 235U multiplied by the (n,fission) cross-section at 
a 25.3-meV irradiation neutron energy. Also shown are the FY×σ integrated values for a 1:1:1 and 
1:1:2 ratio of the list-ordered isotopes. 
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DGS technique is quite effective for detection and has the potential to establish irradiation history 
rather well, however, there is still much uncertainty in the accuracy of quantifying the absolute values 
[9]. The primary problem for this arises in the relatively poor precision of the FY of the short- and 
medium-lived (e.g. less than ~20-minute half-lives) isotopes that tend to be ideal for establishing 
relative FFC (see Figure 2). This JAEA-JRC collaboration intends to improve these efforts by not only 
developing a uniform system capable of site-level application at the many mixed-NM facilities, but to 
also measure DG signatures of isotopic material to improve the precision of the important FY. 
Figure 2: The relative yield error (σFY/FY) of 241Pu fission products (FP) compared to their half-life. Note 
that most of the FPs have relative errors greater than 20%, including many high FY isotopes. 
3. Multi-Technique NDA System
The active neutron-interrogation NDA system being developed by the JAEA, JRC-ITU, and JRC-IRMM 
is primarily intended to non-destructively assay multiple form factors of mixed NM. This system will 
consist of both neutron detection methods and gamma-ray detection methods to acquire as much 
detail of the fissile isotopic composition as possible. The intended targets will be from simple 
compounds (e.g. purified plutonium nitrate solution at a reprocessing facility) to highly active NM (e.g. 
spent nuclear fuel) that will require unique handling and system components. Each incorporated 
technique requires an external neutron source but provides complementary information based on the 
detection method for that technique. Table 1 describes different system elements that must be 
considered.  
The DDA neutron technique can provide estimations of the bulk fissile content by correlating the 
number of fission-produced delayed neutrons to an effective-239Pu mass [1]. The time frame for DDA 
is on the order of millisecond time windows requiring fast detectors. The PGA technique compliments 
DDA by covering the same time windows but observes gamma rays that can provide detail on which 
isotopes undergo (n,γ) reactions, including non-fissile materials [3]. NRTA is an auxiliary method that 
can provide a measure of isotopic composition observing suppressions of neutrons with energies that 
are more readily absorbed by the target material [2]. This technique requires a time-of-flight 
component but is the optimal method of determining irradiating-neutron energies. The DGS technique 
can provide isotopic fissile ratios by observing gamma rays from fission products that are 
proportionally unique to each induced isotopic fission yield [4]. 


















DDA Therm. High - Mod. Mod. - 
NRTA Wide High High High Mod. High 
PGA - Mod. Mod. High High High 
DGS Therm. High High High High High 
Table 1: System considerations of potential mixed nuclear materials. Dashes are unimportant aspects. 
The DGS technique of this system has the greatest potential to distinguish isotopic ratios and shielded 
NM, however it also requires the most development for NDA. Accordingly, much of the preliminary 
effort of this project will focus on improving the measurement capabilities of this technique. The DGS 
elements of the system will then be evaluated to determine the best way to incorporate it with the 
other techniques into an optimal system. Different elements will be required to optimize each 
technique as well as to address the large variety of environments and facilities in which this system 
can be used.  
3.1. Neutron Irradiation 
The required irradiation neutrons cover a wide range of energies, focusing on those below 40 eV. The 
DGS, PGA, and DDA techniques applied to the nuclear fuel cycle have mostly been studied using 
thermal energy (0.0253 eV) since there is a distinct separation in the neutron cross-sections for the 
various fissile isotopes with a minimum influence on the dominant 238U. Alternatively, NRTA requires 
neutrons that cover the 0.1-eV and 40-eV range of energies in order to respond to the various neutron 
resonances.  
However, there is no pure thermal or low-energy, broad-spectrum neutron source that can be easily 
transported to various facilities. This then necessitates the use of portable neutron sources of much 
higher energies: spontaneous-fission sources (e.g. 252Cf Watt spectrum peaking at 2.2-MeV), 
deuterium-deuterium (DD) neutron generators (2.4-MeV), or deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generators 
(14.1-MeV). Each of these must be moderated from the primary energy (or energy range) in order to 
be used effectively in this system.  
Another aspect of these source neutrons is that they are produced with an isotropic distribution, 
necessitating a reflector to increase the neutron flux through the target, especially from low-emissive 
sources. To detect illicit trafficking of NM, isotopic composition measurement is not as important as 
observing fission or unique neutron resonance signatures. Studies will be performed to evaluate these 
cases since, as long as the desired signature is observed, a neutron focuser may not be necessary.  
An element of the design is to establish which materials, as well as their thickness and shapes, are 
optimal for moderation and reflection of the irradiating neutrons. A difficulty arises due to the difference 
in requirements to moderate 14-MeV neutrons compared to moderate 2-MeV neutrons (e.g. neutron-
multiplication will be less effective in a lower-energy source). As such studies will be performed with a 
modular design in mind: a moderator-reflector optimized for one primary source can be replaced with 
one optimized for a different primary source depending upon the facility requirements and capabilities. 
Since improving the FY precision is one of the primary goals of this project, taking measurements at 
multiple facilities is also important, including neutron beam-lines from electron linear accelerators. 
These offer different capabilities based on the neutron source and possible target materials, but also 
require different methods of moderation. Studies will be performed to determine which elements of a 
modular system are important for these various sources. 
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3.2. System Detection Elements 
Separate from improving the rate of neutron irradiation of the target is the requirement to detect the 
appropriate particle signatures. The DDA technique generally uses gamma-negligent detectors 
located near the target to minimize the diffusion time of the secondary neutrons [10]. Since only 
neutron counts (not energy) is used in this technique, the system constraint is primarily dependent 
upon fast detectors with low dead-times.  
The NRTA technique uses a time-of-flight (TOF) configuration to measure the energy of the neutrons 
[2]. As such, not only is a fast neutron detector required, but also a collimating drift tube and a neutron 
filter to absorb neutrons below ~0.1 eV (for improved integration timing). These elements are not 
required for any of the other techniques and the filter will actually remove the important thermal 
neutrons optimal to fission the target for the DGS and DDA techniques. Allowing these components to 
be removed supports a modular system design. 
Due to the nature of the high-energy neutron source, the gamma-ray detectors would need to be 
protected to prevent drastic degradation of their resolution (HPGe) [11,12] or to minimize signal 
interference (scintillator). However, as a compromise to enhanced protection, using detectors that can 
be replaced frequently to increase detection capability may be allowable. This aspect will be studied 
over the course of the design.  
Additionally, the gamma-ray detectors will experience different rates of gamma rays for the PGA and 
DGS techniques over different time ranges. A preliminary model shows particles produced from 14-
MeV neutrons can last for several milliseconds concurrently with the gamma rays from the target and 
surrounding materials (see Figure 3). A PGA detector must therefore 1) be extremely neutron 
resistant, 2) be able to distinguish the neutrons from gamma rays, 3) be able to handle input rates of 
~105 s-1, and 4) have the resolution to distinguish the multiple neutron-activation gamma rays. 
Figure 3: The time difference of a preliminary MCNP6 model distribution of particles passing through 
a detector after the generation of 14-MeV neutrons. In this model, the peaks around 100-µs are from 
neutron activation providing the DDA and PGA signatures. The gamma rays beyond 10-ms are the 
delayed signature from the fission products with overlapping delayed neutrons. The gap may be a 
potential problem in the MCNP6 model and will be analyzed. 
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The prominent DGS signature in this MCNP6 model, on the other hand, starts beyond 10 ms for a 
single primary neutron. Though the gap in the timing may indicate a problem in the MCNP6 modelling, 
it still represents a requirement for accurate timing control of the detector with minimal measurement 
lethargy. This can be performed using many different methods including shutters to block the neutrons 
from irradiating the target (i.e. thermal-neutron experimental reactors [13]), shuttling the target to a 
separate location (i.e. for beam-line experiments), shuttling the source to a separate location (i.e. for 
252Cf button sources), or precision time-analysis of the signal [7]. What is most practical may be 
different for each facility and will be studied over the course of the project design.  
For the DGS, DDA, and PGA techniques, multiple detectors arrayed around the target can also 
improve the observed signature. Depending upon the facility, multiple detectors may not be feasible, 
so studies will be performed based on a single detector basis but additional models will be generated 
to study the systematic and statistical effects (including coincidence) of multiple detectors. 
4. Summary
Researchers at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and the European Joint Research Centers in Geel 
and Ispra are currently discussing the development of an active-interrogation, non-destructive analysis 
system and measurement campaign. This system will incorporate four different techniques (DGS, 
DDA, PGA, and NRTA) in order to quantify the fissile and fissionable content of multiple nuclear form 
factors from purified MOX fuel to high-activity spent nuclear fuel. As the DGS technique has the most 
restrictions of those being incorporated, primary efforts will be applied towards enabling this method, 
including optimizing the system’s initial design and improving fission yield measurements. 
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R&D Status of Nondestructive Assay System Based on Nuclear
Resonance Fluorescence
Toshiyuki Shizuma, Ryoichi Hajima, Takehito Hayakawa, Christopher T. Angell,
and Michio Seya




Nondestructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials is an important technology for nuclear security and
safeguard applications. We have proposed an NDA system based on nuclear resonance fluorescence
(NRF), which enables isotopic identification of materials in a nondestructive way. In the proposed
detection system, an energy-tunable and mono-energetic photon source generated by Compton
scattering of laser light (laser Compton scattering; LCS) with high-energy electrons is used. The NRF
measurement can be more efficient by using such a mono-energetic photon beam. We have started
the research and development program of LCS -ray NDA, which includes demonstration of LCS
photon generation from an energy recovery linac (ERL), establishment of detection system, and
benchmark of Monte Carlo simulation. The R&D status including recent results on the demonstrations
of the LCS photon generation as well as the measurement principles will be reported.
Keywords: Nondestructive assay; Nuclear resonance fluorescence; laser Compton scattering
1. Introduction
Nondestructive assay (NDA) methods using a mono-energetic photon beam based on nuclear
resonance fluorescence (NRF) can be used for assaying nuclear materials [1]. In the NRF-based NDA
method (scattering method), isotope-specific analysis can be made by direct measurement of
characteristic NRF signals emitted from the isotope of interest. An efficient NRF measurement is
possible when we use a mono-energetic photon beam which can be generated by Compton scattering
of laser photons with high energy electrons, i.e., laser Compton scattering (LCS) [1,2]. Transmission or
self-interrogation technique is also useful for NDA of spent fuel. In the transmission method, nuclear
resonance absorption is used to remove resonant photons from the incident beam. The selective
isotope detection can be made by measuring the decrease of photon beam intensity at resonance
energies [3]. This method can be improved by integrating the signal over multiple resonances in the
energy region of a photon beam, termed the Integral Resonance Transmission (IRT) method [4].
Both the scattering and transmission methods need a mono-energetic photon beam. An intense mono-
energetic LCS photon beam can be generated by combining two advanced technologies of the
electron superconducting accelerator (energy recovery linac, ERL) and the laser enhancement cavity
(or supercavity) to increase the collision density of both the electron and laser beams. In order to
demonstrate the generation of a high-flux mono-energetic photon beam, we have constructed an LCS
photon beam line at the Compact ERL (cERL) facility [5] at High Energy Accelerator Research
Organization (KEK).
In this paper, we will show the R&D status of the LCS -ray NDA program which includes results of the
demonstrations of the LCS photon generation as well as the measurement principle for the scattering
and transmission methods.
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2. R&D status of the NRF-based NDA
2.1. LCS photon generation based on the cERL
Major components of the cERL-LCS photon source, such as an electron superconducting linac (cERL)
and laser enhancement cavity, have been developed in collaboration with KEK, JAEA, and several
universities and institutes in Japan. The cERL consists of an electron gun, an injector linac, a main
linac, and recirculation loop as shown in Fig. 1. Accelerated electrons collide with laser photons inside
the enhancement cavity which is used to increase the density of the laser photons. The collision
between the electrons and laser photons results in production of a LCS photon beam which is
transported to the experimental hatch through the LCS beam line.
The commissioning of the injector linac started in April, 2013. We confirmed the generation of 5.5-MeV
electron beam at the injector. The recirculation loop was constructed during a summer shutdown
period in 2013. The commissioning of recirculation loop was done from December 2013 to March 2014.
In the commissioning, an electron beam of 20 MeV was accelerated and then decelerated after
recirculation. Further beam tuning was carried out from May 2014 for performance upgrade of the
recirculating electron beam. From June to December 2014, a mode-locked fiber laser, a solid-state
laser, an enhancement cavity, and a LCS beam line were installed. An experimental hatch and a
measurement room were also constructed next to the accelerator room. During this period, tuning of
the lasers and the enhancement cavity was carried out. From February 2015, the commissioning and
tuning were restarted to increase the electron beam current and the demonstration experiment of the
LCS photon generation has been carried out.
Figure 1; Schematic view of the Compact ERL and LCS beam line, and experimental hatch.
For demonstration of the LCS photon generation, an electron beam with bunch charge of 0.5 pC and
length of 3 ps generated by the electron gun was accelerated up to 20 MeV at repetition rate of 162.5
MHz. The repetition rate of the electron beam pulse in the cERL is originally 1300 MHz, but it was
modified to 162.5 MHz same as the laser repetition rate to enhance the signal to noise ratio of LCS
photons by decreasing bremsstrahlung radiation backgrounds from accelerated electrons. The
electron beam was transported to the collision point inside the enhancement cavity and was focused
to spot size of 30 m in root mean square (rms) and bunched to rms length of 2 ps at the collision
point. After the collision with a laser beam, the electron beam was injected again to the main linac with
deceleration RF phase before transferred to the beam dump.
We used two types of lasers, i.e., a commercial diode-pumped solid-state (DPSS) laser (Time-
Bandwidth Products AG, ARGOS) and a high-power mode-locked fiber laser developed at Kansai
Photon Science Institute, JAEA [6]. The DPSS laser with the maximum average power of 45 W was
installed on a movable optical bench together with the enhancement cavity for precise adjustment of
the laser and electron beam position [7]. The laser beam power was enhanced up to 10.4 kW
corresponding to the pulse energy of 64 J. On the other hand, the fiber laser with the maximum
average power of 100 W was placed outside the accelerator room. Since the laser beam needed to be
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transported approximately 20 m to the enhancement cavity, the position at the collision point became
unstable. Therefore, we show the experimental data taken with the DPSS laser.
The electron beam collides with the laser beam inside the enhancement cavity at a crossing angle of
18 degrees. The maximum energy of the LCS photons is expected to be about 7 keV. Figure 2 shows
an energy spectrum obtained by using the CAIN simulation code [8]. The total flux of the LCS photon




Bunch charge 0.36 pC
Bunch length 2 ps (rms)
Spot size 30 m (rms)
Emittance 0.4 mm mrad (rms)
Repetition rate 162.5 MHz
Laser
Wave length 1064 nm
Pulse energy 64 J
Pulse length 5.65 (rms)
Spot size 30 m (rms)
Collision angle 18 deg.
Repetition rate 162.5 MHz
Table 1: Parameters of the electron and laser beams at the collision point.
The LCS photon beam was transported to the experimental hatch through the LCS beam line in
vacuum. Two beryllium foils with thickness of 250 and 300 m was used at both the ends of the LCS
beam line. The LCS photons were measured by a silicon drift detector (SDD) with effective area of 17
mm2 in the experimental hatch. The LCS photons travelled 12 cm in the air from the end of the 
beryllium window to the SDD. The total distance between the collision point and the SDD was 16.6 m.
We calculated an energy profile of the LCS photon beam at the SDD position with the Monte Carlo
simulation code EGS5 [9]. The photon histories from the CAIN simulation were used as the input
photon parameters in the EGS5 estimation.  As a result of the EGS5 simulation, the flux, the peak
energy, and the energy width of the LCS photons at the SDD position were obtained as 2940 /sec,
6.96 keV, and  32 eV in full width of half maximum (FWHM), respectively. The expected properties of
the LCS photon beam are shown in Table 2.
Maximum energy 6.98 keV
Total flux 1.04×108 /sec 
Flux at SDD 2.94×103 /sec 
Peak energy, width at SDD 6.96 keV, 32 eV (FWHM)
Table 2: Expected properties of the cERL-LCS photon beam.
We measured an energy spectrum of the LCS photons by using the SDD placed in the experimental
hatch as shown in Fig. 3. The count rate, peak energy, and energy width were obtained as 1200 cps,
6.96 keV, and 173 eV in FWHM, respectively. The photon flux is about 40 % of the expectation. The
energy width of the SDD was measured to be 153 eV in FWHM for 5.9-keV X-rays from 55Fe.
Assuming quadratic nature for convolution of Gaussian width, the energy width of the LCS photon
beam is estimated as 81 eV. The total photon flux at the collision point is also estimated with the aid of
the EGS5 simulation to be 4.3×107 /sec at the average electron beam current of 57.7 A. Further 
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upgrade and tuning of the cERL as well as the laser enhancement cavity are planned to increase the
photon flux.















Figure 2; Energy spectrum of the LCS photons calculated by using the CAIN simulation code.










Figure 3; Energy spectrum of the LCS photons measured by a SDD detector which was placed 16.6 m from the
collision point.
As an application of the ERL-based LCS photon beam, we have proposed an advanced hybrid K-
edge/X-ray fluorescence densitometry (HKED) [10]. The HKED is a nondestructive assay technique
used for the determination of U and Pu concentrations in solutions [11]. In the conventional HKED
system, an X-ray tube is used to produce bremsstrahlung radiation as an incident photon source. The
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distribution causes background counts due to inelastic photon scattering which affect the counting
precision. From the Monte Carlo simulation study, we found that high precision HKED measurement is
possible by using a mono-energetic photon source with the ERL and the enhancement cavity [10]. We
have carried out a XRF test measurement with mono-energetic X-rays the cERL LCS photon beam. A
stainless (SUS304) sheet with thickness of 100 m was bombarded by the LCS photon beam. Emitted
X-rays were measured by two low-energy HPGe detectors. As shown in Fig. 4, K and K X-rays of
chromium which is one of the main compositions in SUS304 are clearly observed. Analysis of the data
is in progress.



















Figure 4; Energy spectrum of the emitted X-rays from a stainless (SUS304) target measured by two HPGe
detectors placed at scattering angles of ±135 degrees. 
2.2. NRF-based NDA measurement technique
NRF is a process of resonant excitation of nuclear levels by absorption of photons and subsequent de-
excitation to lower-lying levels by photo-emission. It occurs if the energy of the incident photon is
identical to the resonance energy of the nucleus. We have proposed two types of the NRF-based NDA,
i.e., scattering and transmission methods. Schematic views of these NDA methods are shown in Figs.
5 and 6. In the scattering method, the amount of isotopes can be quantified by measuring the intensity
of NRF -rays by using high resolution -ray detectors such as high-purity germanium (HPGe)
detectors (see Fig. 5). In order to design an optimum NDA detection system and to evaluate its
performance, we have developed a Geant4-based NRF simulation code, NRFGeant4 [12] and
improved by adding several new functions including Doppler broadening, nuclear recoil, angular
distribution, and so on [13]. The NRFGeant4 has been tested with experimental data as well as
another NRF code, MCNP-X in collaboration with US-DOE.
For the scattering method, the performance of measurement system, such as statistical uncertainties,
is affected by radiation background from spent fuel as well as background due to coherent scattering
such as Rayleigh, nuclear Thomson, and Delbruck scattering. We investigated these effects and found
that the radiation background can be reduced by using higher energy resonances at 3-5 MeV [14]. In
addition, the contribution from the coherent scattering background can be eliminated by measuring the
NRF transition to the first excited state instead of the transition to the ground state [14]. For actinide
nuclei, the typical excitation energy of the first excited state is 10 to 50 keV and thus the transition
energy to the first excited state is 10 to 50 keV lower than the coherent scattering peak which is almost
identical to the energy profile of the incident photon beam. This type of measurement is only possible if
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we use a mono-energetic photon beam with energy width less than 0.1% which can be achieved by
our ERL-LCS technology.
Figure 5; Schematic of the scattering measurement. NRF signals are measured by -ray detectors. The intensity
of the NRF signal is proportional to the amount of material of interest.
Figure 6; Schematic of the transmission measurement. The first sample resonantly removes photons. A decrease
of the intensity of NRF signals from the scattering target is proportional to the amount of material of interest.
A transmission or a self-interrogation method uses nuclear resonance absorption which removes
resonant photons from the incident beam. The selective absorption can be detected by measuring the
scattered NRF signal in a second target placed after the sample. The second target is referred to as
the witness plate, which consists of the isotope of interest. The self-interrogation measurement can be
improved by integrating the signal over multiple resonances in the energy region of an incident photon
beam which is termed the integral resonance transmission (IRT) method [4]. As shown in Fig. 6, the
beam traverses the sample target where resonance states selectively absorb photons. The transmitted
beam intersects with the scattering target in a shielded measurement location where the emitted NRF
-rays are measured using -ray detectors. The total flux is measured to normalize for attenuation from
non-resonant processes, particularly atomic scattering. The NRF -ray intensity drops proportionally to
the amount of material of interest. We have carried out several measurements of the IRT method
using 27Al [15], 181Ta, and 239Pu [16] samples for practical NDA demonstration for spent or melted fuel. 
Nuclear resonant properties of 27Al and 181Ta are similar to those of 239Pu. These measurements were 
made at the High Intensity -ray Source (HIS) facility, Duke University. The scattered radiation from
the witness target was measured using HPGe and LaBr detectors. Figure 7 is a NRF spectrum
obtained for the Al target measurement for practical demonstration showing that a NRF transmission
measurement is feasible through a TMI-2 container. Further analysis of the data sets is in progress.
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Figure 7; Energy spectra using an Al target for a simulant TMI-2 container. The spectra have been normalized for
same flux on target, demonstrating resonant absorption of photons by the Al target.
3. Summary
We have proposed a nondestructive assay (NDA) system based on nuclear resonance fluorescence
(NRF) for nuclear security and safeguard applications. The NRF-based NDA becomes more efficient if
we use an intense mono-energetic photon beam. Such a photon beam can be generated by laser
Compton scattering (LCS) together with advanced technology of an energy recovery linac (ERL) and a
laser enhancement cavity. The research and development program of the LCS -ray NDA has been
started. So far, the demonstration of the LCS photon generation from the Compact ERL has been
carried out. We confirmed the generation of the LCS photon beam with intensity close to the
expectation. Further upgrade of the cERL as well as the laser enhancement cavity are planned to
increase the photon flux. We have also developed the measurement methods, scattering and
transmission, of the NRF-based NDA which can be applied to spent or melted fuel.
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Abstract: 
Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) is a Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) 
technique that relies on the use of resonance structures in neutron induced reaction cross 
sections. An active NDA system based on NRTA is under development to identify and 
quantify Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and Minor Actinides (MA) in a wide variety of 
nuclear materials, including next generation fuel and highly radioactive materials. The 
development profits from the knowledge and experience gained in the development of 
Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) as a NDA method to characterize particle-like 
debris from melted fuel. In this presentation, the basic principle of NRTA is explained. 
Results obtained for a NRD prototype device are used to estimate typical counting statistics 
uncertainties. In addition, the impact of the width of the pulsed charged particle beam on the 
experimental transmission is verified by measurements at the KURRI time-of-flight facility. 
Keywords: neutron resonance transmission analysis; neutron time-of-flight 
1. Introduction
Quantification of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) (i.e. 235U and Pu) is important for nuclear 
safeguards, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. In addition, an accurate 
determination of the amount of Minor Actinides (MA) in next generation nuclear fuel material 
is important for nuclear transmutation applications. Hence, the development of a Non-
Destructive Analysis (NDA) technique that is capable to quantify both SNM and MA in a 
wide variety of nuclear material is important for various nuclear technology applications.  
A possible technique that can be applied for such a wide variety of materials is Neutron 
Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [1]. The potential of NRTA to quantify SNM in 
commercial fresh and spent fuel pins was tested experimentally at a pulsed reactor beam in 
Ref. [2] and a pulsed linear accelerator in Refs [3,4]. It was demonstrated that the areal 
densities of SNM determined by NRTA agreed within 4% with the reference values. Noguere 
et al. [5] applied NRTA to characterize a PbI2 sample that was produced from a solution of 
radioactive waste originating from waste of a reprocessing facility. 
Recently, NRTA was applied to determine the amount of 235U and 238U in an U3O8 reference 
sample that was enriched to 4.5 at% in 235U [1]. The measurements were performed at the 
GELINA time-of-flight (TOF) facility of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Geel (BE) [6]. 
The difference between the experimentally determined areal densities of 235U and 238U and the 
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reference values was less than 1%. This agreement is remarkable since the attenuation of the 
neutron beam due to the presence of matrix material was about 99% [1]. These measurements 
were part of a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and JRC. The 
objective of this collaboration was to develop a NDA method, referred to as Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry (NRD), for the determination of the amount of SNM in particle-like 
debris generated in a severe nuclear accident [7,8,9]. The method strongly relies on NRTA to 
quantify the amount of SNM in the melted fuel. Within this project systematic effects that 
have a strong impact on the accuracy of the results, such as the variety in shape and size of the 
particle like debris samples [10], irregular shapes of samples [11] and the presence of neutron 
absorbing impurities [1], were investigated. The results obtained within this collaboration 
suggest that NRTA is a suitable technique to determine with a high accuracy the areal density 
of SNM in fresh and spent fuel and debris of melted fuel. 
For further feasibility studies with the objective to develop an industrial system, we plan to 
develop a prototype NRTA facility using a DT pulsed neutron generator. This facility is part 
of a large NDA system which combines different neutron active interrogation techniques. 
More details about this system will be given in the contribution of Kureta et al. [12] at this 
symposium. The neutron intensity of a typical DT generator is about 2 to 5 orders of 
magnitude lower compared to the intensity of a neutron source produced by a pulsed linear 
electron accelerator (LINAC) like GELINA [6]. This difference in intensity can be 
compensated by reducing the flight path distance. However, a decrease in flight path length 
will affect the time-of-flight resolution. In addition, the pulse width of a DT generator, which 
is mostly ≥ 1µs, is substantially longer than the one of a pulsed LINAC, which is mostly ≤ 0.1 
µs. In this contribution, a compact NRTA system based on a DT generator is presented and 
the impact of the width of the beam pulses is verified. 
2. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis
2.1. Basic of NRTA 
NRTA uses a pulsed white neutron source as a diagnostic beam. Since SNM and MA possess 
one or more strong resonances in the low energy region (see Figure 1), neutrons in the thermal 
and epithermal energy region are preferred to quantify SNM and MA. The quantity of interest 
for NRTA is the transmission, i.e. the probability that a neutron passes the sample without 
interaction. This transmission is experimentally determined from the ratio of a sample-in and 
sample-out measurement. To study the resonance structures the transmission is measured as a 
function of neutron energy. The neutron energy is obtained by the time-of-flight (TOF) 
technique. The TOF is measured by the time difference between a start signal and a stop 
signal, provided by the pulsed beam and neutron detector, respectively.  
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Figure 1: Total cross section of individual isotopes of SNMs (solid lines) and MAs (dashed ones). The cross 
section data are based on ENDF/B VII.1.  
The characteristic dips in the experimental transmission as a function of TOF are due to 
resonance structures in neutron-induced reaction cross sections. These dips can be used to 
derive the areal number density of the nuclides present in the sample by a fit to the 
experimental data. In an ideal transmission experiment, i.e. with a homogeneous sample, 
measurements in a good transmission geometry and neglecting broadening due to the TOF-
response, the theoretical estimate T of the transmission is: 
 
where is total cross section and nk is the number of atoms per unit area (or areal number
density) of nuclide k. Hence knowing the total cross sections the areal densities can be 
derived. The total cross sections and corresponding resonance parameters are available from 
the major evaluated nuclear data libraries such as ENDF/B, JENDL and JEFF. The total cross 
sections are derived from transmission measurements which are the most accurate cross 
section measurements. Since NRTA is based on the same procedures it can be considered as 
one of the most accurate NDA techniques to quantify the areal density of SNM and MA. 
2.2 NRTA for new NDA 
Figure 2 shows a conceptual design of a NRTA system as part of the NDA system presented 
by Kureta et al. [11]. The pulsed neutron source is a commercially available GENIE 35 
neutron generator produced by SODERN. Its minimum pulse width is 10 µs and the repetition 
rate can be varied with a maximum of 5 kHz. Its average total neutron emission rate is 
between 108 and 109 s-1 for a repetition rate of 100 Hz and 1 kHz, respectively. The generator 
is surrounded by neutron moderating material to slow down the 14 MeV neutrons, emitted 
from the neutron generator, to the thermal and epithermal energy region. The neutrons 
scattered from the moderator are collimated into a flight path through an evacuated beam tube. 
The neutron beam traverses the sample which is placed half-way between the neutron 
production target and the neutron detector. Neutrons traversing the sample without any 
interaction are detected by a neutron detector. The latter will be based on a scintillator 
material containing 6Li coupled to a photomultiplier (PMT). The time of flight of the detected 
neutron is obtained from the time difference between the stop signal derived from the neutron 
detector and the start pulse from the pulsed neutron generator. From a measurement with and 
without sample in the beam, the experimental transmission is derived as a function of time-of-
flight. This transmission can be used to quantify SNM and MA in the sample. 
The objective is the development of a compact NDA system to be used as a prototype for an 
industrial system used for routine applications. Therefore, the flight path length of the NRTA 
facility will be ≤ 10 m. The short flight path length together with the 10 µs pulse width has a 
strong impact on the TOF resolution. The impact is discussed in section 3.2.  
T = exp(− nk ⋅σ tot , k∑ ),
σ tot , k
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Figure 2: Schematic design of a NRTA facility 
3. Feasibility study of NRTA with a short flight path
3. 1. Achievable statistical uncertainty on SNM quantification 
Kitatani et al. [13] studied the performance of a NRTA system for the characterization of 
debris of melted fuel considering a facility with a 5 m flight path. They considered a sample 
using the composition of a typical spent fuel pin from a light water reactor and added 10 wt% 
of natB and 10 wt% of 56Fe as matrix material. They estimated the uncertainty on the areal 
number density of 235,238U and the main Pu isotopes due to counting statistics for a neutron 
intensity between 108 and 1011 s-1. From the results in Table 2 in Kitatani et al. [13], one can 
conclude that for a 24 h measurement the uncertainty ranges from 0.19% (0.06%) to 18% 
(5.3%) for a neutron emission rate of 108 s-1 (109 s-1). Given the assumptions made by Kitatani 
et al [13], similar uncertainties can be expected for the system described in section 2.2.  
3. 2. Pulse width effect on a TOF spectrum 
One of the main drawbacks for NRTA applications of the DT generator, as described in 
section 2.2, is the 10 µs pulse width. To study the impact of such a pulse width, experiments 
have been carried out at the electron LINAC of the Kyoto University Research Reactor 
Institute (KURRI). Detailed information on the KURRI-LINAC is available from Ref. [14] 
and references therein. It offers a pulsed white neutron source covering a region from thermal 
energy up to a few MeV. 
TOF transmission spectra were taken using a pulsed electron beam with a varying width of 
0.1, 1, 2 and 4 µs. The transmission sample was a 0.15-mm thick natU metallic foil with an 
effective area of 4 cm x 2 cm. To estimate the background a 0.02-cm thick In and 0.025-cm 
thick Ag filter were placed in the beam. A 1-cm thick Pb filter was used to reduce the 
background due to both the γ-ray flash and 2.2 MeV γ-rays from the neutron moderation 
process. The sample and the filters were located half-way between the neutron source and the 
neutron detector. The neutrons transmitted through the sample and the filters were detected by 
a Li-glass scintillation detector (GS-20; 95% enriched in 6Li). The Li-glass scintillator has a 
volume of cm3. The detector was installed 7.3 m away from the neutron source.  10×10×1
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Figure 3: Comparison of TOF spectra with a neutron pulse width of 1 µs (red) and 4 µs (blue). Horizontal and 
vertical axes show TOF in µs and counts per µs TOF respectively. The counts were normalized by total neutron 
counts detected in each experiment by a BF3 monitor located at the measurement hall. 
Figure 3 compares the TOF spectra with a pulse width of 1 µs (red) and 4 µs (blue). 
Resonance dips due to the presence of the U sample and filters can be observed in the two 
spectra. The saturated dips around 450 µs and 240 µs in TOF were caused by the In and Ag 
black resonance filters, respectively. 
For a TOF > 180 µs, i.e. neutron energies < 8 eV, no clear differences between the spectra 
taken with a different pulse width are observed. For TOF < 180 µs the influence of the 
increasing pulse width is obvious. To quantify the impact of the pulse width the transmission 
dips were fitted using the sum of a Gaussian distribution and a linear function. The parameters 
of the analytical expression were adjusted in a fit to the experimental data. The results of this 
fit, i.e. the amplitude (dip) and width (FWHM), are summarized in Table 1. The results in 
Table 1 are the values of the dips (D) and width (W) relative to those obtained from the 
measurements with a 0.1-µs pulse width. Evidently the observed width increases and the dip 
decreases with increasing pulse width and the effect is more pronounced at higher energies.  
238U (6.67 eV) 115In (9.07 eV) 107Ag (16.3 eV) 238U (20.9 eV) 
Pulse W D W D W D W D 
1 µs       
2 µs        
4 µs         
Table 1: The width (W) and depth (D) of the observed resonance profiles for the resonances at 6.67 eV, 9.07 eV, 
16.3 eV and 20.9 eV. The values for a pulse width of 1 µs, 2 µs and 4 µs are given relative to those for a pulse 
width of 0.1 µs. 
4. Summary
To determine the amount of SNM and MA in a variety of nuclear materials, including those 
from the next generation fuel cycles such as fuel from nuclear transmutation, a new NDA 
system will be developed that includes a compact NRTA facility. Expected uncertainties due 
to counting statistics were estimated based on a system with a 5 m flight path length. In 
addition, the influence of the width of the pulsed charged particle beam was studied using 
TOF-spectra obtained from measurements with a width of 0.1 µs, 1 µs, 2 µs and 4 µs. These 
0.99±0.01 0.95±0.07 1.07±0.02 0.93±0.05 1.04±0.01 0.96±0.05 1.06±0.02 0.84±0.03
1.00±0.01 0.77±0.05 1.11±0.02 0.77±0.04 1.09±0.01 0.83±0.04 1.16±0.02 0.69±0.03
1.10±0.02 0.83±0.05 1.50±0.03 0.72±0.03 1.46±0.01 0.71±0.03 1.82±0.03 0.57±0.02
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results can be used to verify the performance of a compact NRTA facility using a DT neutron 
generator. 
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Abstract: 
Active non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques utilizes elementary particles (such as photons and 
neutrons) to induce nuclear reactions in sample objects. Materials in an object are deduced from 
measured particles coming out of them. Techniques of neutron resonance capture analysis (NRCA) 
and/or prompt gamma-ray analysis (PGA) are methods of measurement of neutron induced gamma 
rays from sample objects. These techniques are useful to identify elements (interacting nuclides) in an 
object without opening it. That would be potentially useful to investigate some suspicious objects 
relevant to CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) materials as well as explosives. In 
this paper, we review NRCA and PGA for identification of materials in objects. 
Keywords: Non-destructive assay (NDA); neutron resonance capture analysis (NRCA); prompt 
gamma-ray analysis (PGA); neutron resonance densitometry (NRD) 
1. Introduction
Active non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques utilizes elementary particles (such as photons and 
neutrons) to induce nuclear reactions in sample objects. Materials in an object are deduced from 
measured particles coming out of them. As an active NDA, some of the authors have developed a 
method called neutron resonance densitometry (NRD) [1-6] for quantification of special nuclear 
materials (SNMs) in particle like debris with a pulsed neutron beam in a collaboration between the 
JAEA and the JRC-IRMM. This method is a combination of neutron resonance transmission analysis 
(NRTA) [7-9], and neutron resonance capture analysis (NRCA) [7-9] or prompt gamma-ray analysis 
(PGA).  
In NRTA, neutron transmission is measured as a function of neutron energy with a time-of-flight (TOF) 
technique. Characteristic neutron absorption dips of Pu and U isotopes are observed at the neutron 
energy range of 1-50 eV [10, 11], which is achievable with a short-flight-path TOF system. Strong 
gamma-ray radiation from debris samples does not interfere in measurements. Instead, containing 
materials may absorb neutrons and distort NRTA spectra. Those containments, however, could not be 
identified because they do not resonantly absorb neutrons in the energy range of the spectra. Thus, 
techniques of NRCA/PGA were introduced to identify containing isotopes in the samples from gamma 
ray emission induced by neutron capture reactions.  
In this paper, we review the methods and techniques on NRCA and PGA showing some experimental 
results obtained in a collaboration of the JAEA and JRC-IRMM [1-6]. These techniques are useful to 
identify elements in an object without opening it. An idea of investigation method with NRCA/PGA for 
suspicious objects relevant to CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) materials and 
explosives is mentioned. 
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2. Techniques of NRCA and PGA
2.1 General description 
Observation of capture/prompt gamma-ray is complicated as Fig. 1 shows. A certain portion of the 
incident neutrons passes through the materials without any reaction. The other portion of them causes 
nuclear reactions: elastic/inelastic scattering, fission, capture, and the other nuclear reactions. Gamma 
rays emitted in nuclear reactions are called prompt gamma rays. The nuclear reactions are caused by 
the incident neutrons as well as by the secondary neutrons coming after scattering and the other 














Figure 1: A conceptual view of prompt gamma-ray measurement. 
Capture gamma rays from a nuclide is characterized by their energies and intensities, which are 
determined by its nuclear structure. In PGA measurement, a high energy resolution detector, such as 
a Ge detector, is used to obtain a gamma-ray energy spectrum. The energies of the observed peaks 
are clues for identification and quantification of the interacting nuclei.  
The strength of gamma rays also depends on neutron capture gamma interaction cross section, which 
varies as the neutron kinetic energy. The resonance structures of cross section differ for each nuclide. 
Therefore, a TOF technique can be applied to measure the nuclear interaction profiles of materials 
from the resonance structure, and to determine the composing nuclides. In NRCA experiments, pulsed 
neutrons produced at a neutron source travel in a flight path to reach an experimental apparatus as 
schematically shown in Fig. 1, where capture gamma rays are measured with a fast response detector, 
such as a C6D6 liquid scintillator, to make a TOF spectrum. The kinetic energy of a neutron is deduced 
from the flight length and the flight time, i.e., the time difference between the pulsed neutron 
production and the gamma-ray detections.  
The energies and intensities of capture gamma rays and neutron capture gamma reaction cross 
sections are found in tables for each nuclide, e.g. Ref. [12] and [13], respectively.  
Simultaneous measurement of gamma-ray energy and detection time enables us to combine PGA and 
NRCA, TOF-PGA [14]. The resolving power can be improved by a multiple-dimension spectrum 
obtained by the event-by-event analysis of simultaneously recorded gamma-ray energies and a 
detection time, i.e., TOF.  
A characteristic capture gamma-ray emission yield   , (  )  of a nuclide   is expressed as a sum of 
the yield of primary and secondary neutrons,   , (  ) and  ′ , (  ), respectively [7-9]. The secondary 
component is due to a capture reaction after at least one neutron scattering event, and neutron-
emission reactions.  
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
853
  , (  ,  ) =   , (  ,  ) +  ′ , (  ,  ),
where    is an energy of neutrons. The primary capture gamma-ray emission yield   (  ,  ) at the 
position r is given by: 
  , (  ,  ) =   ( )   ∙   ( ) ∙    , (  ), 
where	   is the emission probability of the gamma-ray  ,   ( ) the density of a nuclide k, and    , (  )
Doppler broadened capture cross section, and   ( ) the neutron flux at the position r. 
The total gamma-ray detection efficiency is also an important factor in experiments: that is determined 
by the solid angle, gamma-ray attenuation in the sample materials, and the efficiency of the detector. 
Figure 2 shows attenuation coefficients  of photons in elements [15]. The incident photon intensity Io 
with an energy E is attenuated in a material following the exponential law:  ( ) =   ( ) exp[−( ( )/
 ) ], where t and ρ are the thickness and density of a layer of the material. Because the attenuation 
coefficients decreases with the photon energy, gamma-rays are easily penetrates materials in 
comparison with low energy gamma rays and x-rays. At the photon energy around 1.5 MeV, the 
attenuation coefficients become approximately 0.05 cm
2
/g. The thicknesses of some materials are 
given in Table 1. For example, a 4-cm Pb plate attenuates the intensity of 1.5-MeV gamma ray to be 
1/10.  
2.2 Measurement of a thin uniform samples 
For a parallel uniform neutron beam penetrating a homogeneous sample material, the primary capture 
gamma-ray emission yield   (  ) is given by: 





where    ,   (  ) the Doppler broadened total cross section of nuclides j. In case of very thin samples
and/or small total cross sections, the capture gamma emission is approximated to a proportional 
function to the capture cross section    , (  )  and the areal density n 	 = ρ  ∙ t , where t is the
thickness of the sample. For relatively thick samples, secondary neutrons contribute to the yield 
  , (  ) and complicate the analysis [7, 8]. If the gamma-ray attenuation effect in the sample is
negligible small, the experimentally observed gamma-ray yield can be described by     , , (  ) =
 	(1 − exp	(−  ∙ 	n 	)). Once the relation of the curve is determined, the areal density of a sample can 
be deduced from a measured gamma-ray yield.  
Figure 2: Attenuation coefficients of photons 










































carbon 2.26 8.8 cm
Al 2.70 7.4 cm
Fe 7.87 2.5 cm
Pb 11.34 1.8 cm
Table1: Densities of various materials. 
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A black box experiment was carried out with an apparatus placed in an experimental hall at the 13-m 
flight path of GELINA, a pulsed neutron TOF facility of JRC-IRMM [16]. Figure 3 (a) shows a 
schematic drawing of the experimental setup. An LaBr3 scintillation detector was introduced for the 
gamma-ray measurements, because of its better energy resolution and fast decay time [17]. An about 
10-cm cubic aluminum box was prepared as a black box, in which eight sample plates can be stored. 
Gamma-ray yields induced by 
10
B(n, ) reaction were measured. Thin aluminum containers are used 
to store B4C powder. The 478-keV gamma-ray peaks from 
10
B were clearly observed. Figure 3(b) 
shows the result of the measurements. The peak yields were normalized with the counts of a neutron 
flux monitor. The abscissa is the total areal density of 
nat
B in the black box. The data points are fitted 
with a function of     , ( ) =  	(1 − exp	(−  ∙ 	x)). The areal density of 
nat
B of an unknown B4C sample 
plates, thus, can be deduced with the curve.  
A demonstration experiment with the black box was performed in a workshop on neutron resonance 
densitometry (NRD) [18]. Some participants secretly chose sample plates to make a black box; the 
available choices were Fe, Ni, Cr, B, Gd, and Hf. The box was then sealed and brought to the 
measurement position. Figure 4 (a) and (b) are the spectra obtained. Identification of Ni, Hf, and Gd 
samples were successfully done, proving the ability of elemental identification in unknown objects.    
Quantification of nuclides in a complex sample is, however, difficult. Figure 5(a) shows an 
experimentally determined function of  the 478-keV gamma-ray yields to the areal density of 
nat
B; the 
curve is the same as that of Fig. 3(b). From a gamma-ray count, for example, we can deduce the areal 
density as shown by the red pint in Fig 5(a). However, the value is the lower limit because unknown 
attenuation materials can be in front of the boron sample as shown in Fig. 3(a). To determine the 
upper limit, transmission measurement should be coupled.  
Figure 5(b) shows calculated transmission spectra of a spent fuel sample plus boron with different 
areal density: 0 cm, 1 cm, and 2 cm. The isotopic composition is taken from a UO2 fuel (3.9 wt% 
235
U) 
after a burn-up of 40 GWd/Mt [19]. In the spectra, resonant boron absorption does not appear. 
             (a) setup                (b) gamma-ray yield       
Figure 3: (a) Schematic drawing of the experimental setup of a black box measurement. (b) A 






















(a)            (b) 
Figure 4: (a) A gamma-ray spectrum. (b) A TOF spectrum. Identification of some peaks is given in 
the spectra.  
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Analyzing the existing dips, we can determine the areal densities of Uranium and Plutonium isotopes. 
Transmission of a sample containing only those isotopes can be reproduced as given by the black line 
of Fig. 5(b). The additional attenuation effect due to 
10
B and the other matrix material is calculated by 
the comparison of the calculated and the measured spectra. The maximum limit of the areal density of 
boron is deduced from the base line decrease by an assumption that the additional attenuation effect 
is only due to boron. The upper limit of the areal density is in this way calculated: the green dashed 
line in Fig. 5(a) show the upper limit obtained.   
(a)  (b) 
Figure 5: (a) Experimentally determined relation between 
nat
B areal density and 478-keV gamma-ray 
counts. (b) Calculated transmission spectra of a 1-cm-thick spent fuel sample plus boron plate with 
different thicknesses.  
3. Nuclear Security Applications of NRCA/PGA
Detection of CBRN materials and explosives are one of the topics of security guard. X-ray inspection 
stems are installed in any airport. Conventional X-ray techniques are useful for investigation of shapes 
of the contained objects quickly. The contrast of the images depends on the elements mass 
attenuation coefficients as shown in Fig. 2. However, the techniques could not distinguish nearby 
elements because of their similar attenuation coefficients. Element specific techniques must be 
introduced to inspect the objects. Accordingly, it is desirable to introduce an NDA technique to 
investigate the materials in a suspicious object.  
Neutron interrogation techniques are, therefore, worth to be applied. As discussed above, a neutron 
penetrates materials, cause nuclear characteristic reaction, and then induce gamma-ray emissions. 
Figure 6 is a conceptual drawing of an inspection system of a doubtful object. A collimated neutron 
beam is installed. Prompt gamma rays and transmission neutrons are measured separately. The 
collimator of the gamma-ray detector eliminates the inspecting position. Figure 7 schematically shows 
positional dependence of elementally characteristic gamma-ray yields. Since incident neutron beam 
comes from the left side of the plot, the neutron attenuation effect causes the reduction of the gamma-
ray yields. The gamma rays from 
14
N are due to the explosive materials. Generally, most commercial 
products do not contain little nitrogen, and only explosive materials and fertilizers do. Although the 
spatial resolution of this method is low, combining other imaging techniques, the details of the 
unknown object would be revealed.  
One disadvantage of this method is the strong nuclear-depend sensitivity. In case of boron, only 1-cm 
plates reduce the neutron flux 1/10 -1/100 at the neutron energy below 30 eV as shown in Fig. 5(b), 
while the main attenuation effect is due to 
10
B, of which abundance is 19.9%. Oppositely, some 
material is rather transparent to neutrons.  
When neutron attenuation is too large to investigate unknown objects, fast neutron beam would be 
useful to penetrate and probe the objects. It also opens the other reaction channels such as (n, n’), (n, 
p), etc. [20]. While this method may reduce the signal intensity, background reduction techniques 
with TOF and/or multiple gamma-ray coincidence techniques [14] would improve the elemental 
identification ability.   
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4. Summary
In this reports, we reviewed the techniques of NRCA/PGA showing some experimental results 
obtained in a collaboration of the JAEA and JRC-IRMM. These techniques are useful to identify 
elements in an object without opening it. That would be potentially useful to investigate some 
suspicious objects relevant to CBRN materials as well as explosives. A new program of active neutron 
NDA techniques [21] will start for nuclear security and non-proliferation under the collaboration 
between the JAEA and JRC. Methods of NRCA/PGA are considered as one category of the 
techniques to be considered in the project.  
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Abstract: 
Neutrons can be used as a tool to study materials and objects. Cross sections of neutron induced 
reactions show characteristic resonance structures which can be used as fingerprints to determine the 
elemental and isotopic composition of materials and objects. They are the basis of two analytical 
methods which have been developed at the European Commission's Joint Research Centre in Geel 
(BE): Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis (NRCA) and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis 
(NRTA). The first technique is based on the detection of gamma rays emitted during a neutron capture 
reaction in the sample being studied; the latter determines the fraction of neutrons transmitted through 
a sample positioned in a neutron beam. They rely on well-established methodologies in neutron 
resonance spectroscopy.  
It has been shown that NRCA is a useful technique to determine the composition of archaeological 
objects. In contributions to a previous ESARDA symposium in Bruges the use of NRTA to characterize 
particle-like debris of melted fuel that is formed in severe nuclear accidents has been presented. 
However, the discussion was primarily based on theoretical studies. In this contribution the 
performance of NRTA as a non-destructive method to determine the amount of fissile material is 
discussed based on measurements carried out at the time-of-flight facility GELINA using reference 
materials containing uranium and plutonium. The results of these experiments demonstrate that the 
relative amount of special nuclear material in particle like debris can be derived absolutely without the 
need of calibration materials with an uncertainty less than 2%, even in the presence of strong neutron 
absorbing matrix materials. 
Keywords: non-destructive assay; time-of-flight; resonance analysis; melted fuel; severe accidents; 
nuclear safeguards; transmission; neutron resonance transmission analysis; GELINA 
1. Introduction
Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis 
(NRTA) and Neutron Resonance Capture 
Analysis (NRCA are based on the presence of 
resonance structures in the cross sections of 
neutron induced reactions [1]. Since 
resonances are observed at energies which are 
specific for each nuclide, they can be used as 
fingerprints to determine the elemental and 
isotopic composition. Both NRCA and NRTA 
are non-destructive methods, which determine 
the bulk elemental composition, do not require 
any sample preparation and result in a 
negligible residual activation. They are 
applicable to almost all medium-weight and 
heavy elements. 
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At the previous ESARDA Symposium Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry (NRD) has been 
introduced as a non-destructive analysis (NDA) 
method to characterize particle-like debris of 
melted fuel resulting from severe accident, such 
as happened in the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear 
power plants [2,3]. NRD relies on a combination 
of NRTA and NRCA. In this contribution, we 
focus on the principles of NRTA and on the 
progress that has been made to apply NRTA as 
an absolute method to determine the amount of 
fissile and fertile materials in debris of melted 
fuel. The use of NRCA combined with Prompt 
Gamma-ray Analysis (PGA) for the 
characterization of melted fuel debris is 
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Figure 1:Total cross section as a function of neutron 
energy for neutron induced reactions in 1H, 6Li, 10B, 
60Co, 131Xe, 208Pb, 235U and 239Pu. 
2. Basic principles of NRTA
NRTA is a NDA method based on the time-of-
flight (TOF) measurement technique. It relies on 
well-established principles and methods for 
nuclear cross section measurement, which 
have been reviewed in Ref. [5]. NRTA is based 
on the analysis of characteristic dips in a 
transmission spectrum that can be obtained 
from a measurement of the attenuation of the 
neutron beam by a sample. These dips are 
observed at TOF values corresponding to 
resonance energies in the total cross sections 
which are shown in Fig.1.  
2.1. Time-of-flight measurements 
An accurate knowledge of the energy of the 
neutron inducing a reaction in the sample is 
required to make use of the resonance 
structures in neutron induced reaction cross 
sections for material analysis. For a quantitative 
analysis covering a wide range of elements, 
TOF measurements at an accelerator-based 
pulsed white neutron source are preferred [1].  
Experimentally, the time-of-flight tm is derived 
from the difference between a stop (Ts) and a 
start signal (T0).  The start signal is produced by 
the pulsed charged particle beam. The stop 
signal in a transmission experiment (NRTA) is 
provided by the neutron detector. The time-of-
flight t that a neutron needs to travel a distance 
L can be related to the velocity v of the neutron 
at the moment it leaves the neutron producing 
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where tt is the time the neutron spends in the 
neutron producing target and td the time it 
spends in the neutron detector. For low-
energies, the non-relativistic expression suffices 
to relate the neutron energy E to the time t and 



























= , (2) 
where m is the rest mass of the neutron. 
For the analysis of TOF data the response 
function of the TOF-spectrometer is required. 
The response function R(tm,E) expresses the 
probability that a neutron with energy E 
produces a measured TOF tm. This response is 
a convolution of different components due to 
the parameters L, tm, tt and td in Eq. 2. The 
distance L can be determined by metric 
measurements with an uncertainty smaller than 
1 mm. The contribution due to the TOF 
depends on the broadening of T0,Ts, tt and td. In 
case of a moderated neutron beam, the 
broadening in time is dominated by the neutron 
transport in the target-moderator assembly, i.e. 
the component tt. This component is mostly 
represented by introducing an equivalent 
distance Lt which is in first approximation 
independent of the neutron energy [1,5]. In 
case of transmission measurements the 
transport time in the detector is also 
represented by an equivalent distance Ld [1,5]. 
In first approximation the energy resolution ∆E 
can be described by the broadening due to the 












E ∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ , (3) 
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where the  broadening due to the parameters 
L, T0, Ts, tt and td are denoted by ∆L, ∆T0, ∆Ts, 
∆Lt and ∆Ld, respectively. Eq. 3 shows that the 
broadening decreases with increasing distance. 
Since the neutron beam intensity decreases 
quadratically with increasing distance a 
compromise between resolution and intensity 
has to be made. 
2.2. Transmission experiment 
In a NRTA experiment the observed quantity is 
the fraction of the neutron beam traversing the 
sample without any interaction. For a parallel 
neutron beam which is perpendicular to a slab 







e)E(T , (4) 
where k,totσ  is the Doppler broadened total 
cross section and nk is the number of atoms per 
unit area (or areal number density) for nuclide 
k. Hence, knowing the cross sections, one can
derive the areal number density from the 
transmission. 
Experimentally the transmission Texp is obtained 
from the ratio of the counts of a sample-in 
measurement Cin and a sample-out 
measurement Cout, after subtraction of the 










= . (5) 
The spectra in Eq. 5 are corrected for losses 
due to the dead time of the detector and 
electronics chain. All spectra are normalized to 
the same intensity of the neutron beam and 
TOF bin width. The background is determined 
by an analytical expression applying the black 
resonance technique. A detailed discussion on 
the background determination can be found in 
Ref. [5].  
Eq. 5 shows that the experimental transmission 
is independent of both the detector efficiency 
and incoming neutron flux. Therefore, a 
transmission measurement is an absolute 
measurement which does not require additional 
calibration experiments using representative 
samples or any reference to a standard cross 
section. In addition, the experimental 
observable Texp (Eq. 5) is a direct measure of 
the theoretical transmission (Eq. 4) if the 
measurements are performed in a good 
transmission geometry, which implies that: 
• the sample is perpendicular with respect
to a parallel incoming neutron beam;
• all neutrons that are detected have
passed through the sample;
• neutrons scattered by the sample are not
detected.
The conditions of an ideal or good transmission 
geometry can be achieved by a proper 
collimation of the neutron beam at the sample 
and detector position. However, it also requires 
a homogeneous sample.  
2.4. Data analysis 
The areal number densities n1,…,p of the 
nuclides present in the sample can be derived 
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where TM is a model describing the 
experimental observable. The theoretical 
estimate TM is the result of a folding to account 



















The theoretical model depends on resonance 
parameters and experimental parameters. The 
resonance parameters are used to 
parameterize the cross sections by the R-matrix 
theory. The experimental parameters include 
e.g. the detector and sample characteristics 
including sample temperature and the areal 
number densities n1,…,p of the nuclides present 
in the sample.  
The least squares fit can be performed by a 
resonance shape analysis (RSA) code, such as 
REFIT [6]. This code, which has been 
developed to parameterize cross section data in 
terms of resonance parameters, is based on the 
Reich-Moore approximation [7] of the R-Matrix 
formalism [8]. It accounts for various 
experimental effects such as Doppler 
broadening and the response of the TOF 
spectrometer and detectors. Examples of the 
use of REFIT for NRTA are given in Refs. 
[1,9,10,11,12].  
3. Challenges to characterize
particle-like debris of melted fuel 
Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) has 
been proposed as a method to quantify special 
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nuclear material (SNM) in particle-like debris of 
melted fuel formed in severe nuclear reactor 
accidents [2,3]. The quantification of the fissile 
material is based on NRTA. The potential of 
NRTA as a NDA method for the 
characterization of fresh and spent fuel has 
already been demonstrated by Priesmeyer and 
Harz [13] and Behrens et al. [14]. Noguere et al. 
[11] applied NRTA to characterize a PbI2 
sample that was produced from a solution of 
radioactive waste originating from waste of a 
reprocessing facility.  
The samples analysed in Refs. [11,13,14] were 
homogeneous samples with a regular shape. 
The analysis of particle like debris samples of 
melted fuel is far more complex and challenging 
due to their characteristics, in particular: 
1. the diversity in shape and size of
particle like debris samples;
2. the presence of neutron absorbing
impurities ( e.g. 10B);
3. the overlapping of resonances;
4. the sample temperature;
5. the radioactivity of the sample.
To study and solve these problems the Japan 
Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Joint 
Research Centre of the European Commission 
(JRC) started a collaboration in 2012. The 
progress made on points 1-3 within this 
collaboration is summarized in this paper. This 
progress strongly relies on theoretical studies 
which were validated by experiments at 
GELINA. A detailed description of this facility is 
given in Ref. [15].  
Studies for a better understanding of the impact 
of the sample temperature and radioactivity of 
the sample are part of a next collaborative effort 
that is also discussed in a contribution to this 
workshop [16]. 
4. Results of the JAEA/JRC
collaboration 
4.1. Diversity in shape and size of 
particle like debris samples 
Analytical expressions for homogeneous 
samples with irregular shapes have been 
proposed by Harada et al. [17]. A main difficulty 
for an unbiased analysis of transmission data of 
particle like debris samples is to account for 
their heterogeneous character. For such 
samples Eq. 7 is not valid. Algorithms that can 
be applied to characterize heterogeneous 
samples, have been extensively studied by 
Becker et al. [18,19].  
In Ref. [18] several numerical benchmarks were 
produced by creating stochastic geometries 
using Monte Carlo methods. The transmission 
through these geometries was then calculated 
assuming that the particle consisted of a 
mixture of uranium and plutonium oxide. Six 
different analytical models were applied when 
adjusting the areal density. Using the model 
proposed by Kopecky et al. [20] or the LP 
model of Ref. [21] the quality of the fit 
significantly improved compared to the 
assumption of a homogeneous sample.  
To validate the analytical models 
experimentally, transmission measurements 
were performed on a sample consisting of a 
mixture of tungsten and powder sample. The 
measurements were performed at a 25 m 
transmission station of GELINA. Details on this 
measurement station are given in Ref. [22]. 
The results of the measurements on the mixed 
powder sample reveal that by applying the LP 
model bias effects due to the variety in shape 
and size of the samples can be reduced to less 
than 2% [19]. Supposing a homogeneous 
model, i.e. neglecting the particle size 
distribution, the areal density was 
underestimated by 15%.  
4.2. Presence of strong neutron 
absorbing matrix material 
It is expected that the analysis of the amount of 
SNM in the melted fuel debris samples will be 
complicated due to the presence of water, 
boron, concrete, structural materials and in 
particular boron. Some of them are important 
neutron absorbers and their content is not well 
established. Therefore, the transmission will be 
strongly influenced by the attenuation of the 
neutron beam by the presence of these 
elements as illustrated in Fig. 2.  
Unfortunately, light elements such as 10B do not 
have resonances in the low energy region. To 
account for the contribution of such strong 
absorbing matrix material a method has been 
proposed and validated in Ref. [1]. The 
influence of these materials can be taken into 
account by lumping their contribution to the 
transmission introducing a single cross section 
of a dummy element X. The energy 






XtotX +=σ . (8) 
with aX and bX parameters which can be 
adjusted in a fit to the experimental data.  
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Figure 2: Transmission through a 2.5 cm thick 
sample with a composition similar to that of spent 
fuel and with different amounts of 10B (0, 0.1, 1 and 
10 at %). 
This procedure was validated by transmission 
measurements using a U3O8 reference sample 
with reference CBNM446 [23]. The sample was 
enriched to 4.515 at% in 235U. The areal density 
of 235U and 238U and corresponding 235U/238U 
ratio was determined by an analysis of 






















Figure 3: TOF-spectra measured at GELINA of the 
reference sample (Cin) and of an aluminum dummy 
sample (Cout). 
The sample contains a substantial amount of 
EPOXY that led to a strong attenuation of the 
incident neutron beam, i.e. to an extreme low 
transmission baseline of about 0.0085. Figure 3 
shows the strong attenuation due to the EPOXY 
matrix. Obviously it is not an ideal sample to 
determine the amount of 235U and 238U by 
NRTA. On the other hand, it is ideal to validate 
the procedure to account for the presence of 
matrix material that cannot be identified and 
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Figure 4: Experimental transmission (top) through 
the reference sample CBNM466 together with the 
result of the resonance analysis with REFIT (red 
curve). The fit residual is shown at bottom. 
The transmission in Fig. 4, derived from the 
data in Fig. 3, reveals that transmission dips 
due to 235U and 238U resonances can be clearly 
resolved and analysed.  
The areal densities of 235U and 238U resulting 
from a least squares fit with REFIT to this 
transmission are reported in Table 1. In the fit 
the parameters aX and bX, which account for the 
matrix material, were also adjusted. The results 
in Table 1 reveal that the NRTA results are in 
agreement with the reference values within the 
quoted uncertainties. The resulting isotopic ratio 
235U/238U = 0.0475±0.0008 is in very good 
agreement with the certified value 0.04729 ± 
0.000003. The quoted uncertainties are only 
due to counting statistics. 
U3O8 Reference samples 
EC NRM 171 
Declaration NRTA 
235U (5.0326±0.0080) 10-4 at/b 
(5.06±0.09) 10-4 
at/b 
238U (1.0628±0.0015) 10-2 at/b 
(1.06±0.01) 10-2 
at/b 
Table 1: Areal densities of 235U and 238U resulting 
from the fit to the experimental transmission, 
compared to the reference values. 
4.3. Overlapping of resonance dips 
A final industrial NRTA system will be based on 
a relatively short flight path (≤ 10m ), which 
limits the resolution of the TOF-spectrometer. 
Therefore, the analysis of the experimental 
transmission will be complicated due to 
overlapping resonance dips resulting from 
elements with a high level density in the low 
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energy region, i.e. uranium, plutonium, minor 
actinides and fission products. 
To verify the performance of NRTA under such 
conditions, a demonstration experiment was 
organized at the 10 m transmission station of 
GELINA. This demonstration experiment was 
organized as part of a Workshop on Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry that was organized at 
the JRC Geel site in the framework of the 
JAEA/JRC collaboration. 
Figure 5: Photo of the sample changer and detector 
of the 10 m transmission station at GELINA. 
The samples are placed in an automatic sample 
changer, which is positioned at 7.7 m from the 
target. This sample changer can also be used 
to mount background filters. Neutrons passing 
through the sample and filters are detected by a 
Li-glass scintillator, placed at 11 m distance 
from the neutron producing target. The detector 
is a 6.35 mm x 76 mm x 76 mm Li-glass 
scintillator, which is enriched to 95 % in 6Li and 
directly viewed by one photomultiplier tube. To 
minimize the background from neighbouring 
beam lines, the detector was placed inside a 
shielding structure composed of lead and 
borated polyethylene. A photo of the sample 
changer and detector is shown in Fig. 5. 
Mostly measurements are performed with the 
accelerator operated at 800 Hz and either a 10B 
or 4 mm thick Cd overlap filter is used to 
eliminate slow neutrons from the previous burst. 
The use of 10B filters reduces significantly the 
beam intensity at low neutron energies. 
Therefore a Cd filter is used to study the energy 
region between 1 eV and 60 eV. For energies 
above 60 eV, however, it is better to use a 10B 
filter due to the presence of strong cadmium 
resonances. Therefore, the transmission station 
is equipped with a double overlap filter which 
can be exchanged to cover the whole energy 
range of interest. Moreover, measurements with 
a low operating frequency (50 Hz) can be 
carried out to investigate materials in the 
thermal regions.  
During the Workshop on Neutron Resonance 
Densitometry a "blind" experiment was carried 
out. Three participants (from DOE, IAEA and 
DG-ENER respectively) were asked to 
assemble a test sample. To do this an inventory 
of 18 different samples in the form of metallic 
discs was available. Because the use of 
radioactive fuel components was not feasible 
due to radioprotection, different samples of 
medium-weight elements (Cu, Co, Mn, Nb and 
Rh) and heavy elements (W and Au) with 
different thicknesses were made available. 
These elements were chosen based on their 
characteristic resonances in the eV range in 
order to mimic the resonance structure of the 
fuel components. In addition, one of the cobalt 
samples was drilled to artificially reproduce the 
effect of inhomogeneities present in the melted 
fuel debris. Finally, two strong neutron 
absorbing B4C samples where also made 
available.  
To perform these measurements a special 
aluminum sample box has been designed that 
could contain up to 8 samples. The selected 
samples were placed in the box, which was 
completely closed and sealed by the DG-ENER 
representative. 
After a 14-hours transmission measurement the 
transmission data were analysed by using the 
AGS data analysis [24] and REFIT resonance 
analysis codes [6], together with the up-to-date 
total cross sections in the nuclear data libraries. 
The resonance analysis method consists on 
partial fits on the most significant resonances of 
the transmission spectrum. The final 
composition of the sample was obtained 
following an iterative procedure that determines 
the areal density of each component. The 
results of the analysis were presented during 
the workshop and compared to the expected 
composition, which was kept hidden in a sealed 
envelope. The results obtained by NRTA were 
compatible to the nominal sample composition 
within 2% for all the components. 
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Figure 6: REFIT result for the “blind” measurement performed during the Workshop on Neutron Resonance 
Densitometry. The red curve shows the total fit; the green curve accounts for the B4C presence in the sample and 
the resonance structure in this energy range is due to the rhodium (blue) and tungsten (magenta) contributions.  
5. Summary and conclusions
A method, referred to as Neutron Resonance 
Transmission Analysis (NRTA), has been 
described. The method, which relies on the 
appearance of resonance structures in neutron 
induced reaction total cross section, has been 
applied for the characterization of melted fuel 
that is formed after a severe nuclear accident. 
The basic principles have been explained and 
special challenges related to measurements of 
particle-like debris have been presented.  
The experimental programme developed at 
JRC Geel to validate the NRTA capabilities has 
been described and the main results 
concerning the resonance analysis in the 
presence of multiple isotopic contributions and 
of strongly absorbent matrix materials have 
been shown. This R&D programme, which is 
part of a collaboration between JAEA and JRC, 
strongly relies on measurements at the time-of-
flight facility GELINA. 
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High accuracy is required for analysis of
nuclear safeguards and forensic samples. The
best precision can be obtained by use of the
Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry method.
Separation of actinides is performed on
chromatographic columns as sample
preparation step for mass spectrometry
measurements. The chromatographic
separation is a time consuming process which,
if performed manually, necessitates the
constant presence of an operator.
A semi - Automatic Separation Unit (ASU) was
developed by JRC-ITU in collaboration with the
IAEA as an alternative to manual separations
under the EC support task to the IEA EC A-
1391. It is already in use in the JRC-ITU and in
cold testing for the LSS, La Hague and at SAL,
IAEA. A fourth unit will be produced for the OSL
Sellafield.
The main features of ASU are its modular
construction for simple replacement of
components, minimum need for operator
intervention, a light structure from materials
resistant to acid environment and a remote
control function over a LabView based
software. A detailed report of the experience
with ASU in JRC-ITU laboratories is presented.
Keywords: actinide separation, semi-
automated unit
1. Introduction
Proper safeguarding of nuclear material
depends on precise analyses of samples taken
in key points of processes at nuclear facilities.
One of the most accurate methods for analyses
of nuclear samples is the Isotope Dilution Mass
Spectrometry (IDMS) [1]. The technique uses
mass spectrometers like the Thermal Ionisation
Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) to determine the
content of plutonium and uranium in various
matrixes with uncertainties below 0.28%
expressed as relative combined standard
uncertainty as requested by the International
Target Values (ITV) of the ESARDA working
group [2].
The samples need several specific treatments
before the measurement by TIMS can be
performed. One of the steps is the chemical
separation of plutonium and uranium in
fractions from other trivalent actinides and/or
fission products using chromatographic
columns. This step is necessary for removing
the isotopes that could bias the results by
isobaric interferences like 241Am/241Pu or 
238Pu/238U and at the same time removing the 
high radiation doses from the samples. The
radiation doses released by samples taken from
the input tanks at reprocessing plants are
particularly high due to the highly energetic
gamma radiation of the fission products. Even
after dilution to reach the Pu and U
concentration levels typically used for mass
spectrometric analyses (ppm levels) the doses
of such an input sample can reach 300 – 400
µSv/h/mL. The separations are performed
simultaneously on several samples, grouped in
one “run”; it usually takes around ninety
minutes to complete a run. Even though the
operations are carried out in glove boxes
shielded with lead glass screens, the radiation
doses are elevated especially for the hands of
the operators. One possibility to reduce the
radiation dose intake by the operators and at
the same time increase efficiency of work is
replacing the manual work by an automated or
semi-automated device.
A semi-Automated Separation Unit (ASU) was
developed by the Joint Research Centre,
Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU)
in collaboration with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in an attempt to tackle
the challenges indicated above. The current
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paper describes the criteria used in the design
and the main features of the ASU.
2. Materials and design
After the past experience of JRC-ITU with more
elaborated commercial automated systems it
became clear that a right balance had to be
found for a system which could fulfil the
purposes without being too complicated and
sensitive to the harsh environment of the glove
boxes. Due to the inevitable extensive use of
HNO3 in the chemical preparation of the
samples for MS analyses the environment is
rather corrosive in the glove boxes. The space
is a further limitation in the glove boxes. Thus,
the following criteria were considered when
drafting the outlines for the automatic
separation unit. It had to be robust, easy to use,
resistant to acidic environment and within a
relatively low budget.
The concept was made such as to reduce as
much as possible the number of parts that have
to be introduced in the glove box. Plexiglas and
Teflon were found as the most suitable
materials for the construction of the unit body
that is introduced in the glove box. The power
transmission is ensured through commercially
available parts which are made out of
aluminium. The design was made modular such
that all critical parts can be easily replaced at a
turn of a few screws. This allows shortening the
downtime intervals to perform reparations when
necessary.
One further factor that was considered in the
design was the high costs of radioactive liquid
waste produced during the process. Therefore,
the volumes of solutions introduced in the glove
box are strictly those which are used in the
separation. A syringe pump is used to transfer
liquid in the glove box. The software reduces
the amount of liquid introduced in the glove box
by priming the external ducts and the syringe
and dispensing these “dead” volumes to a 
container outside the glove box. The diameters
of the tubes were also chosen such as to have
the minimum amount of “dead” volumes inside 
the glove boxes.
The production of the system consisted of two
parts: the hardware design and construction
and the writing of the software. The two parts
are described below.
2.1. Hardware
The parts of the system are:
2.1.1. The X/Y axis mobile unit
The unit was designed and constructed in JRC-
ITU mechanical workshop using Plexiglas and
Teflon for the waste collection tray as shown in
Fig. 1. Two stepper motors enable the X and Y
axis movement by means of toothed drive belt
axes (produced by Festo [3]). At the extremities
of the axes there are proximity switch sensors,
which prevent the motion beyond the axes
termination points.
Figure 1: The separation unit inside the glove box. The two stepper motors for the axis movement can be seen
on the left side, together with the electrical connections. The dispenser head is moving on top of the columns to
dispense the reagents
A waste tray is located between two collection
racks. The racks are manually fed with the
containers used for the collection of the
separated U and Pu fractions. The amount of
samples that can be processed simultaneously
varies between 12 and 20, depending on the
laboratory convenience i.e. the setup of the
samples flow, which is mostly imposed by the
capacity of the type of mass spectrometer used.
A further column is used as a "waste funnel"
while the system is filling the line with a new
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eluant. The liquid waste is gravimetrically
drained to a collection container.
2.1.2. The glove box adapter
The interface between the inside and outside of
the glove box is shown in Fig. 2. The control
cables for the stepper motors and for the
proximity switch sensors as well as the tube
used to transfer the reagents from the pump to
the dispenser head are fed through using this
system.
Figure 2: The glove box adapter
2.1.3. Liquid dispenser system
A Duratec PSD/3 [4] mini syringe pump
equipped with a Hamilton eight ports valve and
connected to a computer by means of a serial
cable provides for the liquid transfer to the main
unit in the glove box. The valve has ceramic
coating to avoid corrosion. The syringe is also
produced by Hamilton and has a volume of 1.25
mL.
The syringe pump picks up the required
reagents from side reservoirs and dispenses
the pre-set volumes on the columns during the
separation. A PTFE tube is used for the
dispensing of reagents. The PSD/3 mini
dispenser is configurable and different tubes
sizes, valves and syringes can be used if
necessary.
2.1.4. Motion controllers
National Instruments [4] electronic components
are used for the motion control. They consist of
a PCI board 7334 installed in the computer and
of a motion control interface UMI 7774
equipped with stepper motor and limit switch
controllers. A dedicated power supply is
required for the UMI and the connection
between the UMI and the PCI board inside the
PC requires specific National Instruments
cables. The UMI is fixed preferably under the
glove box.
2.1.5. Computer
A computer is required to manage the ASU.
The computer casing shall be large enough to
accommodate a PCI 7334 [5] board and a serial
port for the pump connection.
2.2. Software
The control software was written with the
LabView System Design Software [5]. The
control computer does not need the installation
of LabView program; merely the executable is
sufficient for the operation of the system.
Currently the computer runs using Windows 7
Professional and the control software was
developed by IAEA.
The software enables the configuration of the
hardware parameters, e.g. the tubes' lengths
and diameters, the position of the racks relative
to the "home" position, or the reagents
associated to the different valve ports. These
steps are necessary when setting up the
system or after changing components and
resetting is necessary. The software can be
used in a manual modus to command the
movement of the X and Y axes to predefined
positions.
Apart from the hardware setup, the software
controls the separation. Different programs like
plutonium-uranium either independent or
cumulated or rinsing of tubes are saved in the
library. The operation of the different programs
is described in Chapter 3. Further programs can
be easily created and saved.
3. Operating the ASU
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ASU is a semi-automatic setup thus, prior to
starting the chemical separations ran by the
software the following preliminary operations
need to be carried out by the analyst manually:
- reagents preparation and filling of the bottles.
The type of reagents and the required volumes
depend on the type of separation (e.g. Pu, U
only or U and Pu together) and on the number
of samples to be separated.
- priming the lines between the reagent bottles
and the pump. The control software on the
computer has a specific function for this task.
- collecting vials must be placed in the racks to
collect the separated Pu and/or U fractions.
Two collection racks are provided, one in the
front to collect Pu fractions and one in the back
to collect the U fractions. The waste tray lies
between the two collection racks.
- the columns need to be brought in the
dedicated positions
- with the columns rack positioned over the
waste tray the samples are  loaded on the
columns.
- while the samples flow through the columns,
the software can be set up for the separation,
by specifying the number of columns and the
required separation sequence. The chosen
program can be started by pressing the start
button on the interface when the entire volume
of the samples has passed through the
chromatographic columns.
The separation consists of several consecutive
rinsing sequences. The software dispenses
predefined volumes of liquid in the
chromatographic columns depending on the
chosen separation sequence. For the collection
of the different fractions, the columns are
positioned over the respective racks by the
controlling program.
The resin is placed manually into the columns
so it is reasonable to assume that the time
needed for the same volume of liquid to flow
gravimetrically varies strongly from column to
column. The software allows for this time to be
defined by the operator. It is usually set two
minutes longer than the values empirically
assessed for the “slowest” column of the series.
It is possible to check the progress of the
operations on the computer. If needed, the
program offers the possibility for the separation
to be paused, stopped or shortened by skipping
waiting times.
When the separation sequence is started by the
operator, the tube from the pump to the
dispenser head is filled with the first reagent
and then the dispenser moves along the X axis
to dispense the required amount of reagent on
each column. When it is time to dispense the
second reagent, the line is primed automatically
by the program with the new eluant.
The most common used programs are Pu or U
separation individually or both from the same
sample. They are described bellow.
3.1. Plutonium separation
- dispensing of 3 X 2 mL of 6M HNO3 on each
column containing the samples with the column
rack located over the waste tray; the dispensing
of a new liquid fraction will only be performed
after the complete dripping of the previous one
- dispensing of 250 µL of Pu eluant (“pre-strip”)
- after the dripping of 250 µL is completed the
racks are moved over the pots prepared for the
collection of Pu and 800 µL of Pu eluant is
dispensed. The Pu fraction is such collected.
3.2. Plutonium and uranium separation
The same sequence as previously described at
point 3.1. with the subsequent steps:
- dispensing of 3 X 2 mL of Pu eluant on each
column with the column rack located over the
waste tray
- dispensing of 250 µL of U eluant (“pre-strip”)
- after the dripping of 250 µL is completed the
racks are moved over the pots prepared for the
collection of U and 1 mL of U eluant is
dispensed on each column. The U fraction is
such collected.
3.3. Uranium separation
Although not very common this type of
separation can also be performed. The program
follows the same sequence as described at
point 3.2., but without collecting the Pu fraction.
4. Experience
The first ASU became operational in 2014 in
the laboratories of JRC-ITU. It has been used
since for routine separations. The first
separations were performed on well
characterised reference materials. These trials
were used for the validation of the proper
functioning of the system by comparing the
results with those from analyses for samples
that were prepared manually.
The unit runs smoothly and silently and once
started does not need the intervention or
supervision of any operator. The motion of the
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
871
mobile parts is at low speed and the power of
the step motors is limited so that no hazards
are induced by e.g. damaging of glove box
parts. The status of the separation is constantly
updated and displayed for the operator on the
computer screen.
After the demonstration of ASU’s capabilities a 
new unit was produced for the Euratom on-site
laboratory run by JRC-ITU in La Hague. The
unit is specifically designed to meet the
requirements of this site. For this, the maximum
amount of samples that can be processed
simultaneously is fourteen.  The unit has been
cold tested in JRC-ITU and is on the process of
implementation in La Hague. A further unit will
be produced for the Euratom on-site laboratory
at Sellafield. For this site, the racks are
designed to accommodate a maximum of
twenty samples simultaneously.
A further unit was built in Seibersdorf, Austria
by the IAEA. Due to logistic constrictions in
commissioning the new dedicated glove boxes
the ASU could not be yet tested for hot
operations. However, it has undergone
successfully the cold testing.
5. Conclusions
ASU is a compact, robust and reliable system.
It is produced and operates economically and
does not pose any hazards to the operators or
the operating environment. It reduces
considerably the radiation doses received by
the analysts. Furthermore, it facilitates the
management of the workload to be optimised in
order to increase the effective use of manpower
in time. This is a significant aspect especially
for the on-site laboratories where the manpower
is a limiting factor.
One of the critical point in the separation
process is the time required for the liquid to flow
through the chromatographic column.
Particularly when changing the positions of the
racks, it is essential to ensure that all the liquid
has drained from the top of the resin. The
current software uses pre-defined delay
intervals for the dispensing of the following
sequence. The delays have to be chosen using
a very conservative approach to ensure an
unproblematic progress of the operations. The
total duration of a separation run can therefore
be very long. It is foreseen to overcome this
problem by implementing an ultra-sonic fill
height sensor on the dispensing nozzle. The
sensor can provide the actual status of the
liquid level in the columns. This information can
be processed by the software to shorten
unnecessary waiting times automatically. A
prototype of this technique is already in the test
phase in the laboratories of IAEA. The
preliminary results look very promising.
6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the
contribution of Mrs. L. Duinslaeger and Dr. K.
Casteleyn who initiated the project, Dr. E.
Hrnecek and A. Mavroeidis for preparing the
initial version of the system. Furthermore, the
authors are very thankful for the support
received from the design office, the mechanical
and the electrical workshop of JRC-ITU and all
those who have reviewed this paper and
contributed to its completion.
7. References
[1] E. Zuleger, K. Mayer, L. Duinslaeger, K.
Casteleyn. Evaluation of Uncertainties for Pu
and U Measurements Achieved in the On-Site
Laboratory by Thermal Ionisation Mass
Spectrometry during Two Years of Operation,
Symposium of International Safeguards, IAEA- 
SM-367/5/03, Vienna 2001
[2] International Atomic Energy Agency;
International Target Values 2010 for
Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding





Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
872
Implementation of Large-Geometry SIMS for Safeguards:
4 years later
Laure Sangély, Jane Poths, Herbert Siegmund, Thippatai Tanpraphan, Olivier
Bildstein, Matvey Aleshin, Axel Schwanhäusser




Four years after its installation and validation for the purpose of uranium particle analysis of
Environmental Samples, the IAEA’s Large Geometry Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometer (LG-SIMS) is
regarded as a prominent asset within the Safeguards toolbox. Its improved performance has achieved
the goal of precise and accurate minor uranium isotopic results (234U and 236U) on a routine basis. In
addition to its excellent performance for destructive isotopic analysis, LG-SIMS advances the state of
the art for uranium particle detection and isotopic pre-characterisation capability. This particle
screening capability is critical with respect to characterising the entirety of the uranium isotopic
signatures captured by Environmental Sampling. Over the past years, a balance has been struck
between stability and high performance to allow the operation of LG-SIMS in a production mode. The
target of 100 samples analysed per year was reached in 2013 and 2014, with an average instrument
availability of >90%. Considerable effort was put into the characterisation and the prevention of
instrumental memory effects. Efficient measures were demonstrated and adopted, although a slight
reduction of the intrinsic quality of data was observed. A better fixation of particles during sample
preparation was identified as an area for future method improvement. An improved scheme for mass
bias and detector dead-time corrections would be a further step towards an overall reduction of
measurement uncertainties. However, this development is conditional upon the availability of an ad
hoc range of certified reference materials (CRMs) in the form of particles of diverse and well-
characterized size and chemical composition. Further improvement of data quality would require the
development of software tools for real-time, automated optimization of analytical parameters.
Keywords: Environmental Samples; particle analysis; Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry; minor
uranium isotopes
1. Introduction
Shortly after very promising tests were reported by Ranebo et al. in 2009 [1], the Safeguards
Analytical Services (SGAS) at the IAEA purchased a Large Geometry Secondary Ion Mass
Spectrometer (LG-SIMS instrument, model CAMECA IMS 1280) in replacement of its old conventional
instrument (CAMECA IMS 4f). Since then, this instrument has been dedicated to a single application:
the detection and the individual analysis for uranium isotopes of the micrometre-sized particles that
are collected by Environmental Sampling. This paper provides an overview of the 4 year experience of
SGAS with LG-SIMS operation. The initial approach for implementation is presented and put in
perspective with the current status of LG-SIMS operation at SGAS. The lessons learnt over the
successive development phases, the remaining challenges and ways for future improvement are also
discussed.
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2. Development of the LG-SIMS project at SGAS
2.1. Goals
The primary goal for SGAS’s LG-SIMS instrument was to establish an independent, in-house source
for the verification results that are evaluated by the Department of Safeguards in the process of
drawing conclusions regarding the completeness of declarations. As part of the initial requirements for
LG-SIMS, an emphasis was put on the determination of precise and accurate minor isotopes (234U
and 236U) and on the ability to confidently detect and measure the particles revealing the maximum
and minimum U-235 enrichment captured by the sample, regardless of the size and frequency of the
particles bearing the signature. The expectation is throughput of 100 samples analysed a year with a
target response time of 60 and 30 days for routine and high priority samples, respectively.
2.2. Approach
In 2009, most of the 17 LG-SIMS instruments already-installed worldwide were research instruments,
each of them performing multiple types of measurements (mainly stable and radiogenic isotopic
measurements) on diverse, well-characterized matrices (mainly minerals in the form of polished
sections). The overlap between the analytical protocols in use and Safeguards needs was fairly
limited. An original approach was followed to develop and validate an analytical method with an
emphasis on robustness, reliability, and timeliness with respect to the project schedule. Figure 1
provides a brief overview of the overall process in use at SGAS for particle analysis using LG-SIMS.
The transfer of particles from the samples (usually cotton swipes) to the analysis mounts (typically
glassy carbon planchets) is based on a fast and straightforward aerosol impaction technique. First, the
planchet is screened using an instrument-supplied piece of software (named APM for Automated
Particle Measurement) to generate an exhaustive map of the uranium particles deposited on the
planchet and an estimate of their respective isotopic abundances [2; 3].
Despite their low precision, screening isotopic results provide valuable insights to the analyst into a
range of particles that are critical in terms of Safeguards information and are targeted by subsequent
destructive micro-beam analysis for precise and accurate determination of uranium isotopes (so-called
microprobe analysis). Analytical conditions are detailed in [4]. In addition to common certified
reference materials, the validation plan emphasized the use of a large set of real inspection samples.
Moreover, considerable effort was put into the development of a comprehensive uncertainty budget
that was designed such as to accommodate the extreme variability of sample and particle
characteristics rather than to minimize the general level of final uncertainty. Details of uncertainty
calculation are given in [4].
2.3. Milestones
The milestones of the LG-SIMS project between 2009 and 2014 are summarized in table 1. The
commissioning of the LG-SIMS was made in two steps. After the factory acceptance tests, the LG-
SIMS instrument was operated at the manufacturer’s facilities (CAMECA, in Genneviliers, France) 
during 10 months until a purpose-built building was commissioned (the clean lab extension of the
IAEA’s laboratories in Seibersdorf). During the period of internal validation (August 2010 to July 2011), 
inspection samples were processed in parallel using both IAEA’s instruments (4f and LG-SIMS).
Following its installation in Seibersdorf in April 2011 and the on-site acceptance tests, the LG-SIMS
was revalidated so that it was fully operational when the 4f was shut-down on schedule in August
2011. External validation by our customer at the Department of Safeguards was mainly based on
comparisons of LG-SIMS with FT-TIMS (Fission Tracks-Thermo-Ionization Mass Spectrometry) results
acquired in parallel on sub-samples from identical source [5]. In addition, the participation of SGAS in
the NUSIMEP VII proficiency test (organized by the IRMM, Institute for Reference Materials and
Measurements, in September 2011) confirmed that the method developed was fit-for-purpose in terms
of accuracy, precision, and uncertainty budget [4; 6].
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Figure 1: Sample preparation and screening operations preparatory to microprobe analysis (1) Typical
environmental sample (here a cotton swipe), (2) Vacuum impactor head for sample preparation, (3) Particle
transfer from swipe to analysis mount via vacuum impaction, (4-a) Particles deposited on an analysis mount
(commonly a glassy carbon planchet), (4-b) Same as 4-a, observed under light microscope, (5-a) Uranium
distribution over a 2.5 cm diameter carbon planchet as revealed by APM screening. The map consists of
approximately 2400 fields of view of 350 µm ×350 µm each. The colour scale corresponds to the total uranium
counts integrated over each field and over time (here 20s per field), (5-b) Distribution of U-238 and U-235
isotopes over a single field of view of 350 µm ×350 µm (location on planchet displayed by the cross on 5-a). The
colour scale corresponds to the total number of counts integrated per pixel for each isotope over time (here 20 s).
The “hot spots” correspond to occurrences of uranium-bearing particles. The apparent size of particles reflects the
lateral resolution of scanning ion image under APM screening conditions and is approximately 25 µm, (5-c)
Outcome of APM algorithm for processing the images displayed in 5-b. Here 8 clusters of pixels were recognized
as particles and characterized in terms of isotopic composition. The values displayed in the table correspond to
the dark blue particle at the bottom of the field of view, (6) APM screening data obtained over the whole planchet
and displayed as U-235 enrichment vs total uranium counts. A range of particles is selected for micro-beam
analysis (pink circles) such as to characterize the full U-235 enrichment range. Error bars correspond to the
counting statistics (one sigma).
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Operated at the manufacturer’s (as of July)
Analyses duplicated using the IAEA’s 
conventional SIMS (IMS4f)
2011 59 54 73 n.a. On-site acceptance
tests
Re-validation study
Commissioning of the purpose-built facilities
(clean lab extension at the IAEA’s 
laboratories, March)
Reinstallation of the LG-SIMS (April-June)
Shutdown of the IAEA’s conventional SIMS 
(August)
2012 68 62 76 31 days Study of memory
effects
2013 103 101 3 28 days
2014 101 77 6 28 days
Table 1: Milestones of the LG-SIMS project
3. Lessons learnt along the way
3.1. Early compliance with initial requirement
The initial goals set by the Department of Safeguards regarding measurement precision and accuracy
were met during the early stage of LG-SIMS validation thanks to its excellent level of performance. On
a routine basis, U-235 and U-234 are reported with typical final uncertainty of 1-2% and 2-6% relative,
respectively, for small particles in the LEU range (U-236 detection limit being between 10-15 ppm). In
the most favourable cases, final uncertainties as low as 0.35% and 1% relative can be reported for U-
235 and U-234, respectively (and U-236 detection limit around 5 ppm).
LG-SIMS analysis and the related uncertainty budget proved robust over a large range in particle size
and analytical parameters. Figure 2 shows the outcome of a series of U-235 measurements performed
on 98 individual particles of Certified Reference Material (CRM) IRMM 9060-01-B chosen to cover our
usual working range in terms of particle size and analytical conditions. The range in total U counts
yielded during microprobe analysis (almost 3 orders of magnitude) reflects much of the variability in
particle size that is encountered in inspection samples. Individual measurements appeared statistically
consistent with the certified value within final uncertainties, ranging between 0.4% and 7% relative.
Figure 2: Test on measurement and uncertainty robustness using a series of 98 particles of CRM 9060-01-B
chosen selected as to reflect the variability in particle size and analytical conditions encountered when analysing
inspection samples.
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Agreement between the measured and certified values was met with a coverage factor of less than
one for 74 particles (out of 98 analysed), less than two for 95 particles, and less than three for one
particle. This highlights the fact that final U-235 uncertainties exactly reflect our level of confidence in
each individual measurement. Note the presence, when considering the entire population of particles,
of a systematic bias of approximately -0.5% relative in average. This reflects a particle size effect that
cannot be corrected for in our current calibration scheme but is conservatively accounted for in the
final uncertainty.
The IAEA’s LG-SIMS instrument was intended to be operated under optimized instrumental conditions
by multiple staff, 24 hours a day and 6 days a week, with minimum downtime. A quality chart approach
underpins this operation mode and allows evidence of LG-SIMS hardware and lab environment
stability over extended period of time. The routine quality checks include: i) daily series of
measurements made on a calibration plus an internal quality control CRM (NBS U010 and IRMM
9073-1-B, respectively), ii) calibration of the magnetic field (twice a day) with continuous regulation
using NRM control, iii) centering of the spot image relative to the optical axis at the entrance of the
analyser before each analysis. Tuning sessions are usually triggered by planned maintenance
services (every 3 months in average). On those occasions, an inter-calibration of the electron
multiplier is performed. Figure 3 shows the results obtained on the CRM use as internal quality control
(yellow cake IRMM 9073-1-B) over a period of 1.5 years. As a further quality measure, other CRMs
with U-235 enrichment between 0.5% and 93% are periodically measured.
Experience has shown that tuning for stability rather than maximum sensitivity is a necessary
compromise for consistent, high quality data and at high sample throughput. Operation at maximum
sensitivity level causes drifts in tuning and detector gains and results in higher overall uncertainties. A
throughput of 100 samples analysed a year (50 to 300 reported particles each) could be achieved in
2013 and 2014 (Table 1). Unplanned downtime was less than 10% with routine quarterly
maintenance.
LG-SIMS is now regarded as an established technique for particle analysis, however, due to the
extreme variability of particle characteristics, both within and between samples, it is not routine. To
address the fact that analyst judgement influences both particle detection and destructive analysis,
SGAS has been exploring the effect of measurement parameters on the instrument performance in
terms of inter alia particle detection sensitivity and accuracy of microprobe data. For instance, Figure 4
illustrates the dependence of screening sensitivity upon the parameters selected by the analyst for the
purpose of generating screening data through a built-in routine for image processing. When the
parameters are selected such as to sharpen the discrimination between particles and background
(and thus reduce the “noise” caused by erroneous particle detection), a compromise is made,
overlooking small particles. In the present case, this would have resulted in the non-detection of 2 of
the 3 particles depicting the weakest signature (here outliers with U-235 above 5% U-235).
3.2. Coming across unexpected successes and challenges
3.2.1. Insights from LG-SIMS screening data into minor isotopic signatures
As described in [4], one of the important yet unanticipated advantages of using LG-SIMS for particle
analysis of Environmental Samples results from the intrinsic quality of screening data generated for
uranium minor isotopes (U-234 and U-236). Unlike the other methods in use for particle screening that
exclusively provide information on U-235 distribution, LG-SIMS has a potential to estimate the tri-
dimensional distribution of U-235, U-236 and U-234 of a fraction of the particles detected. As a result,
LG-SIMS screening offers a much higher probability for detecting and selecting for subsequent
microprobe analysis, weak and rare minor isotopic signatures. Since screening datasets can range up
to 30000 particles, we find it necessary to use statistics-based software tools to assist the analyst in
selecting particles for destructive analysis, to ensure all significant minor isotopic variations are
captured [4].
Figure 5 shows two different samples for which screening results were used to select particles for
microprobe analysis using U-234 and U-236 screening data, respectively. In both cases, the various
minor isotopic signatures found in screening data could be confirmed and quantified by microprobe
measurements.
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Figure 3: Long-term reproducibility of U-234, U-235, and U-236 measurements performed on individual particles
of CRM IRMM 9073-01-B (yellow cake) as daily quality control
3.2.2. Memory effects dependant on the nature of the non-uranium particles present in samples
As part of the validation plan, experiments were carried out in order to explore instrumental memory
effects during particle analysis. One of the unexpected finding was the strong dependence of memory
effect upon the nature of the uncharacterized fraction of particles that are collected and deposited on
the planchets together with uranium particles (the so called matrix). An experiment using different
types of blanks could be designed after an increased uranium background was inadvertently
generated by sputtering a large amount of uranium, while a massive uranium sample was used for
tuning the instrument (Table 2). It appeared that APM screening was more affected for blanks loaded
with a matrix consisting of silica particles than for matrix-free blanks. A microscopy study of blanks
with matrix revealed a phenomenon of particle displacement and/or loss during the screening. It was
interpreted as the result of particle charging under instrumental conditions (positive high voltage and
progressive implantation of positive charges at the sample surface). The fraction of charged particles
that are not tightly bound to the sample surface is prone to travel back and forth between instrument
and planchet surfaces. The increase in uranium background may be explained by the potential for
those projectiles to erode the uranium coating in the instrument and to transport traces of uranium
back to the sample.
A preconditioning treatment was developed in order to minimize the potential of samples to collect
uranium material originating from the instrument. A pulsed nitrogen-stream is applied to the planchet
surface such as to blow off the loose particles that are prone to leave the surface due to uncontrolled
electrostatic phenomena under measuring conditions. The efficiency of this preconditioning is
demonstrated by the difference of uranium background observed during the screening of untreated
and treated blanks (Table 2). These results emphasize the need for performing “matrix-matched” 
blanks in order to assess the risk for memory effect during screening.
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Figure 4: Dependence of particle screening sensitivity upon the parametrization of the instrument-supplied
routine for image processing
Consequently, it was conservatively decided to use untreated blanks loaded with silica particles and to
systematically precondition samples. Although our long-term blank record indicates that memory
effects have been efficiently prevented, this method has drawbacks that are discussed below. Further
measures consisted in limiting the quantity of uranium at the surface of planchets (no massive
samples were allowed in the instrument from then on). Following this experiment, the increased
uranium background could be mitigated by a thorough cleaning of all instrument parts facing the
ionization area (Table 2).
4. Future areas of improvement
4.1. Sample preparation: prevention of memory effects without altering the size
distribution of uranium particles
Further experiments were carried out in order to investigate the impact of sample preconditioning on
the quality of data. Figure 6 illustrates the differences in microprobe results that can be observed
between two different planchets prepared from a same sample, one being preconditioned while the
other is not. For each planchet, more than 40 of the biggest particles detected by screening were
selected for microprobe analysis. The total uranium counts yielded during microprobe data can be
regarded as an indication for particle size. Those results suggest that the untreated planchet
contained significantly larger particles than the preconditioned one. This is likely due to the
fragmentation and/or the loss of the coarser fraction of particles during the step of preconditioning.
Under these circumstances, the ability of LG-SIMS to detect and resolve rare isotopic signatures might
be hampered.






Pre-conditioning Total U cts per field (×103), 




2nd April Yes No 2 8
3rd April 
(Tuning)
A mm sized U-ore mineral was sputtered for one
hour at very high sputtering rate (2-3 orders of
magnitude higher than for particle analysis)
8th April Yes No 40 2000
9th April No n.a. 5 70
10th April Yes Yes 8 200
12th April Cleaning of the analysis chamber and immersion
lens
17th April Yes No 10 30
Table 2: Investigation of instrumental memory effect using different types of blanks
For this reason, one clear way of data improvement would be to develop a method to strengthen the
adhesion of particles onto the sample surface without altering the size distribution of uranium particles.
Testing is underway to determine if reducing the nitrogen pressure for preconditioning the sample
provides a better balance between reduction of memory effect and preserving a better particle size
distribution. An alternative approach would be to selectively remove the non-uranium particles that are
prone to charge under instrumental conditions before the introduction of samples into the instrument.
4.2. From the percent to the permil uncertainty: a significant challenge
Our current state of the practice for uranium particles of 1 micron or larger generates a final
uncertainty for U-235 abundance of around 0.4% for an ideal run. The terms dominating the final
uncertainty for U-235 are related to the correction for mass bias, detector intercalibration and a larger
dead-time correction. Reducing the final uncertainty from 0.4% to 0.1% would require a considerable
effort that would need to be weighed against the benefit for safeguards interpretation. Effort would
have to be invested in, among other things, correcting the signal for deadtime on a pixel-by-pixel basis
instead of the current spatially integrated basis, better protocols for detector intercalibration and a
thoroughly understanding of the influence of particle size and composition on the mass bias
correction. An immediate challenge in this effort is the scarcity of adequate CRMs, in the form of
uranium particles of diverse and well-characterised sizes, densities and chemical compositions that
cover the characteristics of typical safeguards environmental samples.
In order to improve the reproducibility of isotopic measurements performed in multicollection mode to
an uncertainty of 0.1%, effort also would be required to understand the phenomenon of short-term drift
of the electron multiplier detectors. Recent experiments within the IAEA NWAL discovered a complex
but systematic pattern in the drift of detector gain when the detectors are exposed to a secondary ion
beam in the 105 cps range (Hedberg et al., in preparation). A preliminary study indicated that the 
optimization of the electron multiplier gain on a particle-by-particle basis substantially improved the
reproducibility of individual U-235 measurements for a series of large CRM particles. This method
improvement could be validated and applied to future analyses requiring the highest precision for
Safeguards purposes.
For smaller particles, the uncertainty budgets for U-235, U-234, and U-236 abundances are dominated
by the counting statistics. Therefore, improvement for these particles must await future method
developments aimed at enhancing efficiency of uranium ionization and transfer into the mass
spectrometer.
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Figure 5: Minor isotopic signatures as depicted by screening and microprobe analysis results. In A-1: closed
diamonds correspond to particles with more than 20 total screening U-234 counts and open circles correspond to
the particles that were selected for subsequent microprobe analysis. In B-1: closed diamonds correspond to the
particles having 2 sigma significant screening U-236 and more than 20 total U-235 counts and open square
correspond to the particles that were selected for subsequent microprobe analysis. A-2 and B-2 show the
outcome of microprobe analysis for both samples.
4.3. Development of an automated system for optimizing the analytical conditions
during screening and microprobe analysis
As mentioned above, in the current version of the LG-SIMS data acquisition software, the analyst must
manually optimize a number of parameters for an APM screening acquisition or microprobe analysis.
Since those parameters are then fixed over the course of the acquisition, they must be chosen as a
compromise between particle load and other characteristics varying across the 2400 fields examined
during an APM run. This compromise necessarily leads to low sensitivity in some fields or deadtime
issues and other artefacts in more heavily loaded parts of the planchet. For microprobe analyses, use
of automation to efficiently analyse a series of particles in unattended mode results in a reduction in
quality of the final particle data due to the large variability and unpredictability of particle response
under microprobe erosion.  SGAS has carried out a proof of principle investigation and demonstrated
that automation of the probe beam intensity and associated focus parameters is feasible. Under these
circumstances, SGAS has proposed the development of new acquisition modules for a real-time,
automated optimization of analytical parameters over the course of screening or microprobe analysis.
The expected gain would be the assurance that every particle in a sample could be targeted under
analytical conditions that would minimize the level of final uncertainty. As a result a larger number of
useful results could potentially be derived from each sample with no increase in response time.
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Figure 6: Comparison between unconditioned and preconditioned samples in term of particle size distribution
5. Conclusions
The LG-SIMS analysis of uranium particles at the IAEA has entered a phase of stable operation
producing high quality data. Due to the variable nature of the particles between and within samples,
some challenges have been overcome to produce data that are highly sensitive and accurate, in
addition to being robust. Other areas for improvement over the longer term have been identified.
However, progress for several of these areas is contingent upon the availability of a wider range of
certified reference materials in the form of particles than is currently available.
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Validation of a Cameca 1280 High-Resolution SIMS instrument for 
Analysis of Nuclear Safeguards Environmental Swipes 
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Abstract: 
We describe the validation of a Cameca IMS 1280HR large-geometry secondary ion mass 
spectrometry (SIMS) instrument, newly-installed at AWE, for the search, location and isotopic ratio 
measurement of uranium particles derived from environmental cotton swipe samples. The work 
involved measurement of five selected samples: (1) A uranium particle isotopic standard sample, to 
establish the instrument mass bias for uranium isotopes, as well as to assemble quality control data 
over an initial six month period of operation; (2) A blank carbon planchet, to check that measurable 
cross-contamination was absent; (3) A well-characterised sample prepared from a field swipe, 
providing a measurement difficulty representative of challenging samples; (4) A uranium isotopic 
standard comprising sub-micrometer-sized particles, to test particle isotopic measurement precision, 
accuracy and detection sensitivity, and (5) A second selected swipe sample previously measured 
using standard geometry SIMS and found to give a characteristic isotopic distribution.  
Sample preparation development work was also undertaken to examine methodologies for the 
removal of any loosely-adhered particles from substrates prior to SIMS, in order to minimise risks of 
particle cross-contamination.  
The qualitative and quantitative results obtained demonstrate that the validation was completed 
successfully, and that the capability is suitable for the analysis of environmental swipe samples. 
Keywords: SIMS; uranium; particle analysis; isotopic analysis; nuclear safeguards; 
1. Introduction
A large geometry (LG) Cameca 1280HR secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) instrument has 
been installed at AWE and was successfully commissioned in April 2014. This paper documents SIMS 
analysis results obtained in order to validate the performance of this instrument for the detection and 
isotopic measurement of uranium particles from environmental cotton swipe samples. AWE is an 
accredited member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Network of Analytical 
Laboratories (NWAL) for performing isotopic analysis of uranium-containing particles from 
environmental swipe samples using two different techniques: fission track thermal ionisation mass 
spectrometry (FT-TIMS), and secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS). This work supports the IAEA 
Department of Safeguards in their mission to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear activities by 
the analysis of cotton swipe samples collected by inspectors from nuclear facilities worldwide [1]. 
The overall criterion adopted for validation of the Cameca 1280HR has been to demonstrate data of 
equivalent or better quality to that obtained previously from standard-geometry (SG) SIMS 
measurements of the samples selected. This work closely follows the methodology previously used for 
the validation of a Cameca 4f SG SIMS instrument for this application [2] in 2012. 
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1.1. Need for SIMS high-mass-resolution 
In SIMS, a focussed high-energy O2+ primary ion beam is used to sputter and ionise surface layers. 
The ions formed are extracted by an electric field, mass analysed and collected, permitting 
measurements of isotope ratios as the sample material is eroded. For uranium, the ionisation 
efficiency under typical conditions is of the order of 1% which gives sufficient sensitivity for isotope 
ratio measurements of particles down into the micrometre diameter size range [3]. 
The specificity of the SIMS uranium particle searching step is particularly dependent on the mass 
resolving power of the spectrometer. This is because uranium elemental ions must be distinguished 
from molecular ions with the same nominal mass formed during the SIMS process. These mass 
interferences can be prevalent in field samples which can contain particles from many different 
chemical species. SG SIMS permits only near-unit-mass resolution over the uranium mass range 
without loss of ion transmission. Isobaric interferences can then result in false positive detection of 
candidate particles other than uranium, and/or in the reporting of perturbed isotope ratios, in particular 
elevated uranium minor isotope levels. Lead-containing compounds are the most common source of 
such mass interferences, although barium and bismuth compounds can also be problematic. A mass 
resolution of about 0.1 atomic mass unit (amu) is sufficient to negate mass interferences from most 
inorganic atomic combinations (a notable exception being actinide hydrides) in the uranium mass 
range. In M/∆M terminology, where ∆M is the peak-width (usually quoted at 10% peak height) at mass 
M, a mass spectrometer resolution of ≥2,400 is needed. Use of a scaled-up double-focussing mass 
spectrometer geometry can successfully achieve this without loss of instrument transmission and 
hence sensitivity [3]. Further, the larger instrument geometry gives sufficient space for inclusion of a 
multi-detector array enabling parallel collection of signals from the uranium isotopes (instead of mass-
peak-switching) and hence superior sensitivity.  
To emphasise this point, Figure 1 shows a high-resolution mass spectrum from an area of a 
conductive carbon substrate loaded with a deposited mixture of NBS U010 reference uranium 
particles and SRM2586 NIST dust. SRM 2586 contains many transition metals, which can form 
polyatomic ions, giving rise to multiple interference peaks occurring slightly below the uranium 
isotopes. Uranium isotope positions are marked by the vertical black lines in Figure 1. Relative 
intensity measurements fixed at these positions give the correct NBS U010 isotopic ratios, despite the 
presence of major levels of extraneous material. This clearly would not have been the case if 
measurement had been made under unit mass resolution conditions using a SG SIMS (uranium minor 





































Figure 1: Cameca 1280 limited-range mass spectrum from a mixed uranium particle (NBS U010) – standard dust 
(NIST 2856) specimen. 
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2. Experimental
2.1. SIMS instrument 
The LG-SIMS instrument installed at AWE is Cameca IMS 1280HR number 25 (Figure 2). The 
instrument was delivered in November 2013 and site acceptance tests were successfully completed in 
April 2014. Before delivery, the laboratory was refurbished to provide an environment that fully met 
Cameca specifications for thermal, acoustic and electromagnetic stability. A housing external to the 
laboratory was constructed to hold the electrical, compressed air and chilled water services. A nearby 
room has also been converted to allow remote operation of the instrument. 
Figure 2: Cameca 1280HR-25 after installation 
2.2. SIMS measurement conditions 
The instrument is first operated in ion imaging mode for uranium particle searching, and then in ion 
microprobe mode for individual particle assessment. A 15keV O2+ primary ion beam was used with a 
secondary ion extraction potential of 8keV, corresponding to a net ion impact energy of 7keV. The 
beam is focussed to spot size of typically less than10µm. The instrument secondary ion optics are set-
up under near-full ion transmission conditions so as to give the highest possible sensitivity. Using an 
exit slit width of 500µm a mass resolution, M/∆M of approximately 2,400 is obtained. Electron 
multiplier (EM) detectors capable of single ion counting are used, and the options of using either a 
single EM detector (mono-collector) or an array of up to five parallel EM detectors (multi-collector) are 
available. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the instrument conditions used.  
Parameter Ion Imaging 
(Particle Search) 
Ion Microprobe (Individual 
Particle Assessment) 
Primary beam species O2+ 
Primary beam ion energy 15keV 
Secondary voltage 8kV 
Mass resolution ~2,400 
Primary beam current ~10nA ~10pA 
Primary beam spot size Focussed spot (<10μm) 
Raster size 250μm 6 to 15μm 
Table 1: Typical 1280HR-25 SIMS instrument operating conditions 
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Ion Microprobe (Individual 
Particle Assessment) 
233 (Background) - 2 
234 / (234U) 80 6 
235 / (235U) 80 4 
236 / (236U) 80 8 
238 / (238U) 80 2 
239 (238U+1H) 80 4 
Detector Type Multi-collector (parallel) Mono-collector (serial) 
Table 2: Typical detector dwell times (seconds) used during analysis 
2.2.1. Uranium particle searching 
The aim of particle searching is to achieve a high sensitivity for the detection of any uranium present 
whilst consuming the minimum particle volume during sputtering, thus allowing subsequent more 
detailed microprobe measurements. Use of the multicollector detector gives the most efficient 
conditions for this.  
A short pre-sputter period was applied to each SIMS analysis field before image collection to remove 
surface contamination. Uranium particle searching and location was carried out by raster-scanning the 
focussed primary ion beam over 250µm areas whilst using the multicollector detector to 
simultaneously collect ion images corresponding to 234U+, 235U+, 236U+, 238U+ and 238UH+ signals.  
The Cameca Automated Particle Measurement (APM) software [4] steps the sample automatically 
under the beam so as to cover relatively large areas of the planchet during extended (for example 
overnight) operation. The APM software then processes the ion images, to identify uranium-containing 
particles, determine their locations and estimate the 235U/238U isotopic ratio for each particle. Minor 
isotopic ratios can also be estimated, albeit with very low precision due to the relatively weak signals. 
Figure 3 shows example ion images and the uranium particle map derived from them. 
The main validation criterion applied is a statistical cut-off to ensure that ion counts are adequate to 
allow major isotopic measurement with acceptable precision. The criterion used is that the relative 
standard deviation (RSD) contributed by ion counting statistics be less than 10%. For 235U/238U ratios 
of a few % or below this effectively amounts to a 235U minimum signal level of about 100 counts.  
Figure 3: APM software output showing 235U+ and 238U+ ion images from a 
single 250µm field, and the derived map of identified U particles 
235U+ 238U+ 61 particles identified 
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2.2.2. Ion microprobe analysis 
The aim of microprobe analysis is to obtain the highest quality measurements of uranium major and 
minor isotopic ratios possible within the constraint of individual particle size (and hence available 
sputtering time and total cumulative ion counts). Particles of most interest are selected for microprobe 
examination from the 235U/238U isotopic ratio distribution detected by APM. For this work mono-
collector detection was used, with magnetic field switching to cycle between the uranium isotope mass 
peaks. Data from typically 40-60 cycles were collected per measurement. This allows isotope ratio 
measurement with high precision and accuracy, and permits minor isotope ratios to be reliably 
determined. A fine-scale raster is used, and the particle may be completely consumed during analysis.  
Parameters adjusted in response to particle size, and hence signal strength, are primary ion beam 
current and raster area. As the particle erodes, signals may initially increase slowly before decaying 
more rapidly as the particle is consumed. All microprobe data collected is individually inspected to 
ensure that only good quality results are reported. Factors considered are (a) signal levels, which for 
the most intense isotope should ideally be in the range 1 x 104 to 2 x 105 counts per second, (b) total 
cumulative ion counts, and (c) changes in the isotope ratio or signal level, such as a rapid decay or 
spurious events, during sputtering. 
As-measured ratios are corrected for the instrument mass bias (see section 3.1) and reported 
uncertainties are calculated by combining uncertainties of the as-measured ratio and mass bias. The 
236U/238U ratio is calculated after subtracting the cycle-to-cycle 235UH isobaric interference from the as-
measured signal at m/z=236 (236U + 235UH). The 235UH signal is calculated from the 235UH/235U ratio, 
which is assumed to be equal to the observed 238UH (m/z=239) /238U signal ratio.  
2.3. Sample details 
Five different samples were measured, selected so as to allow basic instrument calibration, 
measurement stability and sensitivity to be evaluated, as well as to represent the range of 
measurement challenges typically encountered in this application:  
2.3.1. NBS U010 
The U010 particle isotopic reference material was used to determine the instrument mass bias (MB) 
factor (where MB is defined as measured / certified isotope ratio). Repeat MB measurements over an 
extended period of operation provide a test of instrument stability and sensitivity. Particles on this 
sample were relatively large (typically 1µm or greater), easily found, and were analysed solely in ion 
microprobe mode.  
2.3.2. NU7-064 
A NUSIMEP7 particle isotopic standard pre-prepared by the Institute for Reference Materials and 
Measurements (IRMM), Geel, Belgium, by the vapour phase pyrolysis of UF6 [5]. The sample was very 
heavily loaded with uranium particles. The analytical challenges in this case arise from the very small 
particle size (below 500nm diameter) and the presence of two particle isotopic ratios, providing direct 
tests of both the sensitivity and accuracy of uranium major and minor isotopic ratio measurements. 
2.3.3. Sample D 
This was selected as an example field swipe, previously identified as challenging in respect of particle 
size and reliable uranium minor isotope ratio measurement using SG SIMS [6]. Different areas of the 
planchet, which was fairly heavily loaded with uranium particles, have been used for previous 
characterisations using a Cameca IMS 1270 LG-SIMS instrument located at the Ion Microprobe 
Facility in the School of Geosciences at Edinburgh University, and a Cameca 4f SG-SIMS instrument 
at QinetiQ (Malvern) and later relocated to AWE. The results expected from this sample were 
therefore felt to have been well-established. The planchet had additionally been examined by 
scanning electron microscopy (SEM) with energy-dispersive X-ray fluorescence (EDX) microanalysis 
[6]. As common for field swipes, uranium particles were shown to be only a small minority (ca. 1%) of 
the total number of particles present, with a consequential high risk of SIMS isobaric mass 
interferences. 
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2.3.4. Sample S 
Sample S was from a field swipe recently measured by SIMS using a Cameca 4f instrument at AWE. 
This was selected for Cameca 1280HR analysis on the basis of a characteristic distribution of major 
isotope ratios found in the presence of mass interferences. 
2.3.5. IMS-BLANK1 
A blank planchet stored in the instrument during the validation measurement series. 
2.4. Sample preparation 
The particle samples were prepared onto carbon planchets to provide flat conductive substrates for 
SIMS analysis. The field samples derived from environmental cotton swipes had been prepared using 
vacuum impactor deposition.  
Steps were taken to minimise the potential for particle cross-contamination within the SIMS 
instrument. This work followed two approaches:  
(1) Control of the coverage level of deposited particles to avoid build up of multiple layers, with 
assessment by optical microscopy prior to loading into the SIMS  
(2) Integration of a simple means for the removal of loosely-adhered particles (by application of air-
pulses after deposition) into the vacuum impactor deposition method.  
Figure 4 highlights the optical microscopy methodology, comparing an approximately 500 µm field-of-
view area of a deliberately heavily-loaded test planchet before and after air-pulsing. The circular rings 
are centred on particles evidently removed by this step. 
Figure 4: Comparison optical micrographs from a test planchet (a) before and (b) after air-pulsing.  
SEM images of example uranium particles from some of the samples measured are shown in Figure 
5. 
NBS U010 Sample D NU7-064
Figure 5: Example SEM images of uranium particles. 
(a) (b) 
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3. Results
3.1. NBSU010: Mass bias factor (MB) measurements 
Microprobe measurements of 235U/238U ion signal ratios from a NBSU010 uranium particle standard 
were used to determine the instrument MB factor. Measurements made from 95 randomly-selected 
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Figure 6: Mass bias derived from NBSU010 microprobe measurements. 
The mean mass bias was 1.00866 (solid blue line) which corresponds to a bias of 0.289% per mass 
unit over the uranium isotopic range. The standard deviation (SD) was 0.0030 (0.30% relative SD). 
Error bars plotted in Figure 6 are standard error (SE) values derived from cycle-to-cycle variation of 
the ratios during each individual particle measurement. Only one data point was excluded, on the 
basis of a narrow spike seen in the ratio during mass cycling. It is clear that particle-to-particle and 
measurement-to-measurement effects dominate the variation, rather than cycle-to-cycle effects. This 
is unsurprising as the data includes measurements from 3 operators using a realistic range of set-up 
and measurement conditions with particles selected from the full planchet area. The period also 
included one instrument restart following a power outage, one adjustment to the EM detector 
operating voltage, and an extended shutdown for replacement of a failed turbomolecular pump.  
Assuming that the same overall measurement variation could be expected from unknown particles, 
this result would be consistent with measurement of an unknown 235U/238U isotopic ratio with a 
combined relative uncertainty of about 0.85% (~2SD or 95% confidence level). 
Cumulative results also provide quality control (QC) data from which long term instrument behaviour 
can be monitored. Visual inspection suggests a possible change in mass bias near run 54 which 
correlates with the instrument restart after power outage. The first half of data points exhibits a 
possible trend for mass bias to increase (by about 1% over the period) as would be consistent with 
slow detector aging during usage. However no such trend is evident in the second half of data points.  
3.2. NBSU010: Minor isotope measurements 
Averaged minor isotope ratio measurements obtained during the above series of NBSU010 
measurements, after mass bias correction, are compared with certified ratio values [7] in Table 3.  
Isotope m/z 233 / 238U 234U / 238U 236U / 238U 
Certified ratio - 0.0000547 0.0000688 
Measured ratio 0.00000004 0.0000543 0.0000696 
2 SD 0.00000008 0.0000022 0.0000027 
Table 3: Averaged NBSU010 minor isotope ratios after mass bias correction 
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Agreement with the certified values is very good, deviations from reference values being -0.6% and 
+1.2% for 234U/238U and 236U/238U respectively, well within the measured relative standard deviations of 
±2% in both cases. Signals measured at m/z 233 are recorded as a background indicator (there being 
no 233U in NBSU010). All measured 233/238U ratios were at or below 0.2ppm, with an average value of 
0.04ppm, as consistent with the typical level of detector dark noise. 
3.3. NU7-064: NUSIMEP7 dual U ratio standard 
A grid of 25x25, 250µm diameter fields examined by APM yielded 5,342 valid particles. The 
distribution of 235U/238U particle isotopic ratios is shown in Figure 7. This is dominated by two clear 
peaks centred close to the certified NUSIMEP7 235U/238U ratios of 0.00907 and 0.03415. A small 
number of particles with intermediate ratios were located. These are a probable result of the extremely 
high particle loading of the NU7-064 planchet, resulting in some particles which are too closely spaced 
to be spatially resolved in the ion images. The number of such occurrences is many times less than 
observed in previous 4f SIMS results, which correlates with the smaller diameter primary ion beam 
spot achieved using the 1280HR instrument.  
Figure 7: APM results from sample NU7-064. Left axis: Particle 235U signal versus as-measured 
235U/238U ratio. Right axis: Particle 235U/238U histogram. 
A few particles from each of the two enrichment populations were selected for measurement by ion 
microprobe. Tables 4 and 5 compare the measured and certified [8] major and minor isotope ratios 
respectively. Good agreement is apparent in all cases. 
Isotope Enrichment 1 Enrichment 2 
Certified 235U/238U ratio 0.0090726 ± 0.0000045 0.034148 ± 0.000017 
Particles measured 4 7 
Average measured ratio 0.009056 0.03395 
SD 0.000034 0.00020 
Deviation (Meas-Cert (%)) -0.19% -0.59% 
RSD (%) 0.38% 0.58% 
Table 4: Averaged NU7-064 235U/238U ratio after mass bias correction 
Isotope ratio 234U/238U 236U/238U 
235U/238U ratio 0.0090726 0.034148 0.0090726 0.034148 
Particles measured 4 7 4 7 
Mean measured ratio 7.475E-05 3.443E-04 8.34E-06 1.055E-04 
RSD (%) 4.5% 2.3% 3.6% 4.5% 
Certified ratio 7.437E-05 3.451E-04 8.02E-06 1.033E-04 
Deviation (Meas-Cert (%)) 0.51% -2.3% 4.0% 2.1% 
Table 5: Averaged NU7-064 minor isotope ratios after mass bias correction 
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3.4 Sample D: Well characterised field swipe 
A grid of 25x25, 250µm diameter fields were examined by APM. 3,387 candidate uranium particles 
were found of which 724 passed the validation criteria. The distribution of uranium particle 
enrichments measured is shown in two formats in Figure 8. Ion microprobe isotope ratio 
measurements were made on 35 particles, selected so as to sample over the observed enrichment 
range, and the results are shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 8: APM results from sample D. Left axis: Particle 235U signal versus as-measured 235U/238U ratio. 
Right axis: Particle 235U/238U histogram. 
Figure 9: Ion microprobe results from Swipe D. Left axis: 234U/238U ratio versus 235U/238U ratio. Right axis: 
236U/238U ratio versus 235U/238U ratio. Error bars shown are combined standard errors. 
The distribution of 235U/238U ratios in Figure 8 shows maxima near 0.007 and 0.041. This is in good 
agreement with that obtained previously using a 4f SIMS [2,6] as are the number densities of uranium 
particles detected. The trends of 234U/238U and 236U/238U minor isotope ratios in Figure 9 are also the 
same as measured previously using 4f and 1270 SIMS instruments [6].  
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3.5. Sample S: Swipe sample recently characterised on 4f SIMS instrument 
A total of 765, 250µm diameter fields, were examined by APM. 2,010 candidate uranium particles 
were found of which 599 passed the validation criteria. The distribution of uranium particle 235U/238U 
isotopic ratios obtained is shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: APM results from sample S. Left axis: Particle 235U signal versus as-measured 
235U/238U ratio. Right axis: Particle 235U/238U histogram. 
Previous 4f SIMS results [2,6] showed 3 well-defined populations associated with 235U/238U ratios of 
about 0.007, 0.03 and 0.045. The same distribution characteristics are clearly seen in Figure 10. 4f ion 
microprobe results showed consistent measurements of particles having 235U/238U ratios of 0.029 and 
0.045. 1280HR microprobe results are shown in Figure 11 and clearly reproduce this behaviour. Also 
measured are a depleted particle and a cluster of particles near 0.007, the approximate natural 
uranium (NU) isotopic abundance. 
4f SIMS minor isotope ratio values showed (where measurable) a linear dependence of 234U/238U on 
235U/238U ratio, as would be expected for enrichment from NU feedstock, and this trend is also clear in 
Figure 11. In the 4f results, 236U/238U ratios measured for the enriched populations were all in the 
range 85-120ppm, and the 1280HR results in Figure 11 are very similar. Overall, the 1280HR-25 
results show good agreement with the 4f measurements.  
Figure 11: Ion microprobe results from sample S. Left axis: 234U/238U ratio versus 235U/238U ratio. Right axis: 
236U/238U ratio versus 235U/238U ratio. Error bars shown are combined standard errors. 
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3.6 Sample IMS1-BLANK: Blank planchet 
A grid of 48x43, 250µm diameter fields were examined by APM under the same conditions as used for 
all other samples. No uranium particles were detected. 
4. Conclusions
Measurements of NBSU010 uranium isotopic reference particles were used to determine the mass 
bias factor of the 1280HR-25 SIMS instrument. Measurements made over a 6 month period were used 
to establish quality control information. These showed variations of the 235U/238U ratio within 0.3% 
relative SD. Good agreement between measured and certified minor isotope ratios (in the 50-70 ppm 
range) was found. 
Measurements were also made of a NUSIMEP7 standard planchet having two certified uranium 
particle isotopic populations. APM search results showed a clear separation of the two major isotope 
ratios present. The proportion of particles measured with intermediate values was significantly lower 
than previously observed using a 4f SIMS instrument. This is probably due to the smaller diameter 
primary ion beam spot achieved with the 1280HR instrument, which allows better spatial resolution of 
closely neighbouring particles with different enrichments. There was good agreement of both major 
and minor isotope ratios measured by ion microprobe with the certified values (which spanned the 
range 8-350ppm). Measurement of the lowest 236U/238U ratio of 8ppm with acceptable agreement was 
particularly encouraging given the additional SIMS uncertainty resulting from the 235UH hydride 
correction and the very small (ca. 500nm diameter) uranium particle size present on this sample.  
The results from particle isotopic standards are compared in Table 6 and show that consistently better 
measurement precision and accuracy is achieved using the 1280HR instrument.  
4f results [2] 1280HR results Reference 
sample Measurand 
Certified 
value Dev (%) RSD (%) Dev (%) RSD (%) 
235U/238U MB N/A +2.09 0.95 +0.866 0.30 
234U/238U 5.47 x 10-5 -0.2 8.7 -0.6 2.0 NBSU010 
236U/238U 6.88 x 10-5 +4.0 8.2 +1.2 2.0 
235U/238U 9.073 x 10-3 +0.23 2.8 -0.19 0.38 
234U/238U 7.44 x 10-5 -2.8 10.7 +0.51 4.5 
NUSIMEP 
NU7-064 
Enrichment 1 236U/238U 8.0 x 10-6 +19.1 28.5 +4.0 3.6 
235U/238U 3.4148 x 10-2 -0.40 0.58 -0.59 0.58 
234U/238U 3.45 x 10-4 -2.9 6.4 -2.3 2.3 
NUSIMEP 
NU7-064 
Enrichment 2 236U/238U 1.03 x 10-4 +3.4 5.3 +2.1 4.5 
Table 6: Comparison of 4f SIMS and 1280HR SIMS ion microprobe 
measurements (after mass bias correction) from reference particles 
As a cross-contamination check, a blank (new) carbon planchet was stored in the instrument during 
validation. APM SIMS searching detected no uranium particles. 
A field swipe sample, D, previously well-characterised by SIMS and SEM techniques, was measured 
to verify that previous results could be replicated. As is common with field swipe samples, uranium 
particles were only a small fraction of the total particles present. Consequently, there is a risk that 
uranium isotope measurements might be affected by mass interferences. Hence this sample provides 
a good test of the instrument performance with field swipe samples. The number density of uranium 
particles detected during the searching step using the 1280HR SIMS with APM software was similar to 
that detected previously using the 4f SIMS, and the major isotope ratio distributions obtained using the 
two instruments showed the same form. The minor isotope ratios measured by ion microprobe showed 
the same quantitative trends with 235U enrichment in both cases. 
Sample S provided a second comparison of a previously measured sample. The results again 
demonstrated a good correspondence in the number densities and 235U/238U ratio distributions of 
uranium particles detected using a 1280HR instrument with those detected using a 4f SIMS 
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instrument. Ion microprobe measurements from selected particles were also in good agreement 
between the two instruments. 
The conclusion from this work is that the Cameca 1280HR-25 instrument at AWE provides at least 
equivalent performance in terms of uranium particle detection and location, as well as improved 
isotope ratio measurement precision and accuracy, in comparison with that achieved previously using 
a 4f SIMS instrument, and hence that validation of this instrument for analysis of environmental swipe 
samples has been successfully completed.  
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Abstract: 
This study presents analytical advances in multi-collector thermal ionization mass spectrometry (MC-
TIMS) that allow for improved uranium isotope ratio analysis, and introduces the newly designed 1E13 
Ohm resistor current amplifiers. Accurate and precise uranium isotopic analysis is challenging 
because of the extreme range of the relative abundances of the U isotopes, peak tailing effects onto 
the minor isotopes and the requirement for certified isotopic reference materials. This study focuses 
on the conventional analysis at constant ion beam intensity of U isotope ratios down to the 1E-5 range 
on microgram-size sample loads. The samples were certified reference standards run in multiple static 
multicollection mode, combining 1E11 Ohm amplifiers for the major U ion beams with a 1E13 Ohm 
amplifier on the 236U ion beam and a 1E12 Ohm amplifier or a secondary electron multiplier on the 
234U ion beam. Repeatability for static multicollection analysis of the NBS-U010 certified standard 
using a SEM and a 1E13 Ohm amplifier were compared. Repeatability for ion beams ≥ 60 kcps is 
twice as good with a 1E13 Ohm amplifier (RSD = 0.27%, k = 2.13, 90% confidence level) as with a 
secondary electron multiplier (RSD = 0.49%, k = 2.13, 90% confidence level), reflecting the superior 
stability of high-ohmic current amplifiers. External reproducibility for static multicollection analysis of 
the IRMM-187 certified standard was assessed. 234U and 236U ion beams were amplified by 1E13 Ohm 
resistor current amplifiers and peak tailing from the major isotopes was corrected using an off-line 
correction, based on the repeated estimates of peak tailing effects at masses 234U and 236U from other 
campaigns of analyses and the in-run analysis of the peak tailing at mass 237.05. This study shows 
that Faraday cups using high gain amplifiers provide precise (down to the subpermil range) and 
accurate analyses (down to the permil range) for uranium isotopic ratios in the 1E-5 range, with ion 
beams down to the 10 kcps range. 
Keywords: 1E13 Ohm amplifiers; uranium; peak tailing; repeatability; accuracy 
1. Introduction
The determination of uranium isotope ratios is required at various stages in the nuclear power fuel 
cycle, in nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics and environmental monitoring. Thermal ionization 
mass spectrometry is the technique of choice for precise and accurate measurements of uranium 
isotope ratios. Due to the large range of uranium isotope ratios, different types of detection systems 
are typically used for detection of major and minor isotopes. The objective of this study was to 
investigate the potential of 1E13 Ohm resistor amplifiers for uranium isotope ratio measurements 
involving minor isotopes. The analyses originally focused on investigating and comparing the 
repeatability of isotope ratio determination, for ion beams in the 10 kcps range measured in a Faraday 
cup connected to a 1E13 Ohm resistor amplifier (for convenience, this detection system is thereafter 
referred as FC-1E13) and a Secondary Electron Multiplier (SEM) detector. In a second step, 
measurement accuracy was improved by a peak tailing correction scheme. There are different 
strategies to correct for peak-tailing. One such strategy, which involves measuring half-masses of the 
minor isotopes during the analysis and performing a cycle-by-cycle subtraction to the minor isotopes, 
is expected to be the most accurate, and is used in the Modified Total Evaporation routine developed 
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by NBL, IAEA-SGAS, ITE and IRMM1. In this study, the aim was to design an analytical protocol with 
one line of analysis only, resulting in half-masses of the minor isotopes not being measured. Instead, 
the approach was taken to apply an off-line peak tailing correction. The certified standards NBL CRM 
U010 and IRMM-187 analyzed in this study are characterized by similar 236U relative abundances 
(Table 1). 
n(234U)/n(238U) n(235U)/n(238U) n(236U)/n(238U) 
NBL CRM U010 0.000054484 (77) 0.010140 (10) 0.000069242 (57) 
IRMM-187 0.00038700 (16) 0.047325 (14) 0.000071965 (39) 
Table 1: Certified reference materials used in this study1. 
2. 1E13 Ohm resistor current amplifiers
The 1E13 Ohm resistor current amplifiers have been developed to improve the Johnson noise to 
signal ratio at low ion beam intensity (<50 fA) with respect to 1E11 Ohm and 1E12 Ohm resistor 
current amplifiers. The gain calibration of 1E13 Ohm resistor current amplifiers was performed using a 
neodymium reference standard2. Typical external reproducibility on the gains of 1E13 Ohm resistor 
current amplifiers over a year was less than or equal to 100 ppm (RSD, k=2, 95% confidence level).  
3. Conventional analysis combining Faraday Cup and SEM detection
3.1. Ion beam setting and detection systems 
SEM equipped with an 
energy filter 
Faraday cup - 1E11 
Ohm amplifier 
Faraday cup – 1E13 
Ohm amplifier 
Faraday cup – 1E11 
Ohm amplifier 
234U 235U 236U 238U 
Table 2: Detector configuration. 
3.2. NBL CRM U010 analytical protocol 
The certified standard NBL CRM U010 was measured on 5 different loads of 4 µg U each. The 
standard was scanned for interferences on the SEM detector. No interferences were found. Uranium 
isotope ratios were measured in multiple collection static mode for total integration times ranging from 
900 to 1680 s. The signal was kept stable over the analysis with an average 236U ion beam intensity 
between 10 and 30 fA, corresponding to ion beam signals between 100 and 300 mV on 1E13 Ohms 
resistor current amplifier, or 1 to 3 mV on 1E11 Ohm resistor current amplifier. This is also equivalent 
to 62 to 187 kcps detected on a SEM.  
The SEM yield was assessed by the sequential analysis of a stable ion beam of Re on a Faraday Cup 
and on the SEM. The uncertainty associated with the SEM-Faraday cup inter-calibration, expressed 
as the standard error of the mean of 9 yield replicates, was propagated into the reported overall 
uncertainty uy of the 234U/238U ratio (Table 4).  
3.3. Results 
The results are reported in Tables 3 to 5. 2RSE corresponds to the relative standard error, RD 
represents the relative deviation to certified ratios, and Uc represents the combined uncertainty 
comprising the absolute uncertainty associated to the analyses (2RSE) and the deviation (RD) to 
certified ratios. It can be noted that the relative deviation (RD) from the measured n(235U)/n(238U) ratios 
to the certified n(235U)/n(238U) ratio (Table 3) is less than the uncertainty on the certified n(235U)/n(238U) 
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ratio (0.1%, k=2, Table 1). Consequently, the n(234U)/n(238U), n(235U)/n(238U), and n(236U)/n(238U) ratios 
were not corrected for instrumental mass bias.  
Analysis I 236U (fA) 235U/238U 2RSE % RD (%) Uc (%) 
U010#1 30 0.010137 0.003 -0.028 0.028 
U010#2 10 0.010136 0.002 -0.042 0.042 
U010#3 12 0.010135 0.003 -0.050 0.050 
U010#4 24 0.010136 0.003 -0.038 0.038 
U010#5 26 0.010138 0.003 -0.021 0.021 
Mean 0.010136 
RSD % (k=2.13) 0.025 
Table 3: 235U/238U ratios for NBL CRM UO10 using the Conventional protocol. 
Analysis I 236U (fA) 234U/238U 2RSE (%) uy % (k=2) RD (%) Uc (%) 
U010#1 30 0.0000555 0.02 0.28 1.91 1.93 
U010#2 10 0.0000552 0.02 0.38 1.28 1.34 
U010#3 12 0.0000553 0.03 0.38 1.47 1.52 
U010#4 24 0.0000553 0.02 0.38 1.52 1.57 
U010#5 26 0.0000553 0.02 0.28 1.42 1.45 
Mean 0.000055 
RSD % (k=2.13) 0.491 
Table 4: 234U/238U ratios for NBL CRM UO10 using the Conventional protocol. 
Analysis I 236U (fA) 236U/238U 2RSE % RD (%) Uc (%) 
U010#1 30 0.0000713 0.03 2.95 2.95 
U010#2 10 0.0000712 0.06 2.81 2.82 
U010#3 12 0.0000712 0.06 2.77 2.77 
U010#4 24 0.0000713 0.04 3.02 3.02 
U010#5 26 0.0000714 0.03 3.08 3.08 
Mean 0.000071 
RSD % (k=2.13) 0.272 
Table 5: 236U/238U ratios for NBL CRM UO10 using the Conventional protocol. 
No peak tailing correction was performed on the minor isotopes, resulting in a significant deviation in 
the % range to certified values (Tables 4 and 5). Due to peak tailing variability over the course of an 
analysis and from run to run, peak tailing significantly contributes to analytical precision and 
repeatability.  
As expected, for 234U and 236U, the combined uncertainty Uc is dominated by the deviation to certified 
values, thus calling for a peak tailing correction protocol.  
Equivalent ion beams of 234U measured on the SEM and 236U measured with FC-1E13 show similar 
repeatability. For ion beam intensities > 30 fA and integration times > 1000 s, SEM and FC-1E13 
provide similar analytical uncertainty (Tables 4 and 5). For ion beam intensities < 10 fA, the analytical 
uncertainty on the SEM is twice as good as on FC-1E13. However, for all ion beams investigated in 
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this study (>10 fA), the repeatability (RSD, k=2.13, 90% confidence level) was twice as good with FC-
1E13 as with the SEM, thus validating high stability of the 1E13 Ohm resistor current amplifiers.  
As expected, both accuracy and repeatability on minor isotopes would improve by applying a peak 
tailing correction, as exemplified in section 4. 
4. Conventional analysis on Faraday cups with off-line peak-tailing correction
4.1. Ion beam setting and detection systems 
Faraday cup -1012Ω 
amplifier 
Faraday cup -1011Ω 
amplifier 
Faraday cup -1013Ω 
amplifier 
Faraday cup -1011Ω 
amplifier 
234U 235U 236U 238U 
Table 6: Detector configuration. 
4.2. IRMM 187 analytical protocol 
The certified standard IRMM-187 was measured on 4 different loads of 5.5 µg each. Uranium isotope 
ratios were measured in multiple collection static mode for total integration times ranging from 1380 to 
1920s. The signal was kept stable over the course of the analysis with an average 236U intensity 
between 29 and 33 fA, corresponding to between 290 and 330 mV on 1E13 Ohm resistor current 
amplifier, or 2.9 to 3.3 mV on 1E11 Ohm resistor current amplifier, also equivalent to 181-206 kcps on 
a SEM detector. 
4.3. Peak tailing assessment and correction study 
A protocol to correct for peak tailing on minor isotopes was designed, using the following approach. 
Peak tailing at mass 237.05 was measured simultaneously with U masses. Independently, the ratios 
A236/A237.05 and A234/A237.05 where A236 is the peak tailing at mass 236U, A234 is the peak tailing at mass 
234U and A237.05 is the peak tailing at mass 237.05 were assessed during several campaigns of analysis 
of IRMM-187 by MTE. In these campaigns, mass 237.05 and half-masses for the minor isotopes were 
measured, over the course of a multiple collection peak-jumping routine. The corresponding 
reproducibility was 23 % for A234/A237.05 and 26 % for A236/A237.05 (RSD, k = 2, 95% confidence level).  
4.4. Results 
The results are reported in Tables 7 to 10. It can be noted that the mean of the relative deviations 
(RD) from the measured n(235U)/n(238U) ratios to the certified n(235U)/n(238U) ratio (Table 7) is less than 
the uncertainty on the certified n(235U)/n(238U) ratio (0.030%, k=2, Table 1). Consequently, the 
n(234U)/n(238U), n(235U)/n(238U), and n(236U)/n(238U) ratios were not corrected for instrumental mass 
bias. 
For IRMM-187, A236/A237.05 = 0.321 (73) and A234/A237.05 = 0.174 (45) (k=2, 95% confidence level). 
These ratios determined by MTE and A237.05 measured simultaneously with U masses provide an 
estimate of A234 and A236 for the present study (Table 8). The reported uncertainty uA on A236 and A234 
combines the analytical uncertainty on A237.05 and the propagated uncertainty of A236/A237.05 and 
A234/A237.05 ratios (Table 8). In turn, the reported uncertainty u on the minor isotope ratios combines the 
analytical uncertainty and the propagated peak tailing correction uncertainty (Tables 9 and 10). 
Though the combined uncertainty Uc (combining 2RSE and RD) is dominated by the relative deviation 
(RD), the obtained minor ratios corrected for peak tailing are accurate within the permil range, which 
represents one order of magnitude improvement compared to analyses without peak tailing correction, 
as demonstrated in section 3.  
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Analysis I 236U (fA) 235U/238U 2RSE (%) RD (%) Uc (%) 
IRMM 187#1 33 4.7348E-02 0.008 0.050 0.050 
IRMM 187#2 30 4.7320E-02 0.003 -0.010 0.010 
IRMM 187#3 29 4.7346E-02 0.002 0.045 0.045 
IRMM 187#4 29 4.7332E-02 0.004 0.016 0.016 
Mean 4.734E-02 
RSD % (k=2.35) 0.065 
Table 7: 235U/238U ratios for IRMM-187 using the Conventional protocol. 
Analysis A237.05  2RSE (%) A236 uA (%) (k=2) A234 uA (%) (k=2) 
IRMM-187#1 5.55E-06 0.81 1.78E-06 7.31 9.66E-07 4.49 
IRMM-187#2 6.00E-06 0.65 1.93E-06 7.31 1.04E-06 4.49 
IRMM-187#3 5.19E-06 0.96 1.67E-06 7.31 9.05E-07 4.49 
IRMM-187#4 5.41E-06 0.69 1.74E-06 7.31 9.41E-07 4.49 
Table 8: Peak tailing on masses 237.05, 236U and 234U. 
Analysis I 236U (fA) 234U/238U 2RSE (%) 234U/238U corrected u % (k=2) RD (%) Uc (%) 
IRMM 187#1 33 3.884E-04 0.013 3.8747E-04 0.017 0.120 0.121 
IRMM 187#2 30 3.882E-04 0.009 3.8720E-04 0.015 0.052 0.054 
IRMM 187#3 29 3.884E-04 0.009 3.8745E-04 0.014 0.117 0.118 
IRMM 187#4 29 3.882E-04 0.008 3.8729E-04 0.014 0.076 0.077 
Mean 3.883E-04 3.874E-04 
RSD % (k=2.35) 0.057 0.078 
Table 9: 234U/238U ratios for IRMM-187 using the Conventional protocol and peak tailing correction. 
Analysis I 236U (fA) 236U/238U 2RSE (%) 236U/238U corrected u % (k=2) RD (%) Uc (%) 
IRMM 187#1 33 7.4105E-05 0.025 7.2321E-05 0.182 0.494 0.527 
IRMM 187#2 30 7.4151E-05 0.023 7.2223E-05 0.197 0.359 0.409 
IRMM 187#3 29 7.3917E-05 0.025 7.2248E-05 0.171 0.393 0.428 
IRMM 187#4 29 7.3980E-05 0.021 7.2242E-05 0.177 0.385 0.424 
Mean 7.404E-05 7.226E-05 
RSD % (k=2.35) 0.344 0.139 
Table 10: 236U/238U ratios for IRMM-187 using the Conventional protocol and peak tailing correction. 
The repeatability degrades marginally by 0.021% on the 234U/238U ratios corrected for peak tailing 
(RSD, k=2.35, 90% confidence level) but the accuracy improves by 0.25% (Table 9). The propagated 
uncertainty from the off-line peak tailing correction is significant and dominates the uncertainty u on 
the n(236U)/n(238U) ratios (Table 10). However, the repeatability and accuracy improve by a factor of 
2.5 on the 236U/238U ratios corrected for peak tailing (RSD, k=2.35, 90% confidence level).  
It should be noted that this off-line correction scheme must be considered with some caution. The ca 
25% uncertainty (RSD, k=2) on A236/A237.05 and A234/A237.05 ratios on the certified standard IRMM-187 
reflects variability with analytical conditions. Some added variability would result from mismatch in 
matrices and isotopic compositions. As such, this approach is sample-dependent and A236/A237.05 and 
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A234/A237.05 ratios determined on a certified standard cannot readily be applied to unknown samples. 
For users performing uranium isotope ratio determinations on a body of samples with identical, or 
near-identical, sample matrices and highly similar isotope ratios, application of this procedure using a 
generic or "standard" sample holds potential for a simplified, yet robust method of enhancing overall 
precision in uranium isotopic ratio analysis by TIMS.  
5. Conclusion
This study demonstrates the potential of Faraday cups using 1E13 Ohm current amplifiers for precise 
and accurate analysis of uranium isotopic ratios in the 1E-5 range, down to ion beams in the 10 kcps 
range. Using 1E13 Ohm current amplifiers, accuracy and repeatability are not limited by ion counting 
statistics but are primarily governed by sample running conditions and data processing, such as peak 
tailing corrections, calling for a rigorous assessment of the validity of selected peak tailing correction 
schemes and associated uncertainties. 
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CIGEO : The French Industrial Project of Deep Geological Repository 
Developed by Andra - Future Safeguards Considerations
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Abstract: 
This paper will start by an overview of ANDRA, the French public body in charge of waste management, 
and IRSN, the French public body in charge of the scientific assessment of nuclear and radiation risks. 
The future French deep geological repository for High Level Waste and Intermediate Level Waste (Long 
Lived), called Cigéo, will be described.  
Finally this paper will focus on safeguards consideration for Cigéo, in a Safegards by Design prospect.  
Keywords: repository; safeguards; France; ANDRA; IRSN 
1. ANDRA
Andra is a publicly owned industrial and commercial body, set up by the French radioactive waste 
management and research Act of 1991. It is responsible for identifying, implementing and guaranteeing 
safe management solutions for all French radioactive waste, in order to protect present and future 
generations from the risks inherent in such substances.  
Andra is independent of the producers of radioactive waste. 
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Figure 1: ANDRA’s sites 
 
 
90% (in volume) of the radioactive waste produced every year is disposed of in existing repositories in 
France (VLLW & L/ILW-SL). Andra is currently looking into solutions for dealing with other types of waste. 




Figure 2 : the French waste classification 
 
 
Andra is responsible for the study and the design of Cigéo, the future industrial deep geological repository 
devoted to the French high and intermediate level waste. It will also be the future operator of the 
repository. 
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IRSN is a publicly owned industrial and commercial body, in charge of the scientific assessment of 
nuclear and radiation risks. 
It is the French technical expert for safeguards, safety, security and radioprotection. 
 
The SACI department is the technical support of the French Authorities for International Safeguards and 
CWC Implementation. Its four main activities consist in advising the French Authorities (CTE) and 
assisting the operators, producing national declarations, escorting international inspections, assessing 
documentation. As a result, SACI will be involved in the discussion about Cigéo’s future safeguards.  
 
SACI’s website is http://non-proli feration.irsn.fr. 
 
 
3. Technical description of CIGEO  
 
In 2006, the French Parliament opted for deep reversible disposal as the solution for the long -term 
management of HLW and ILW-LL radioactive waste. Cigéo will be the French deep geological repository 
project for this waste. 
The license application of Cigéo is currently being prepared and the first operations should start in 2025.  
 
The inventory of Cigéo covers conditioned waste originating from the activities and the dismantling of 50 
years of operations of the French nuclear installations licensed to date. In agreement to French policy, 
irradiated fuel is being reprocessed. As a result, the license application of Cigéo will not include the 





Figure 3 : the planned lay-out of the deep geological disposal facility 
 
 
4. Safeguards considerations 
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Some of the waste disposed of in Cigéo contains nuclear material (U, Pu…) which will be entirely placed 
under Euratom safeguards (design information verification, control of accounting reports, inspections…).  
Safeguards have been integrated as an early stage in the industrial project according to safeguards by 
design approach: 
- Participation to international working groups : ESARDA (IRSN) & ASTOR (Andra & IRSN) ;  
- First official contact with Euratom in 2014 in order to launch a regular technical exchange 
process.  
The idea is to identify potential difficulties and introduce specific control needs as soon as possible in the 
project. 
The technical important specificities to take into account are : 
- The mass of nuclear material in the packages are declared to Andra by waste producers  ; 
- The conditioned waste disposed of are equivalent to safeguards-terminated material ; 
- Cigéo does not extract any nuclear material from the waste ; 
- Once a waste package has been emplaced in the underground disposal facility, it cannot be 
retrieved without being detected ; 
- The exact location and movement of all waste packages are permanently known ; 
Information on the inventory disposed of is kept with no duration limit (at least several centuries).  
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Safeguards instrumentation to the final disposal facility in Finland 
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Abstract:
In the disposal process, the spent fuel assemblies will be encapsulated in the disposal canister which
will be the new item for accountancy and control. The spent fuel will not be available for re-verification
and thus the containment and surveillance (C/S) measures will be essential to confirm the integrity of
the disposal canisters during the storage, transfer to underground repository and to final emplacement
position. The non-verifiability and non-accessibility of the disposed fuel create a challenge in creating
and preserving reliable knowledge about the nuclear material and its location over centuries.
The national safeguards system has been effective from the beginning of the site investigation and the
excavation phase in order to enable continuous design information verification and assurance on the
absence of undeclared safeguards relevant activities and to facilitate possible future safeguards
activities by the IAEA and the European Commission. The instrumentation of the facility is currently at
a crucial moment, while all these needs are to be incorporated in the national licensing and further
development of the disposal facility.
Keywords: final disposal of spent fuel, containment and surveillance, continuity of knowledge
1. Introduction
The direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel became an option already in the early 1980’s and geological 
investigations to locate a suitable site for a deep repository begun in several countries. The
safeguards concerns were addressed and the main issues were raised to be agreed upon with
international consensus. The spent fuel assemblies will be encapsulated in welded disposal canisters
which will be the new subject for accountancy and control. The spent fuel will not be available for re-
verification and thus the containment and surveillance (C/S) measures will be essential, to confirm the
integrity of the disposal canisters during storage and transfer to the underground repository, as well as
to verify that they remain there until the drifts are closed and the repository is closed [1]. The continuity
of knowledge must not be lost after the canisters have been disposed of in the geological formation
because the repository shall not be reopened due to failure of safeguards. Therefore, robust and
reliable C/S is required to confirm continuously that no nuclear material is retrieved from the
underground premises. The up-to-date techniques to verify the nuclear material content to be
disposed of and to confirm the integrity of the canisters during the transfer also in the underground
were addressed by Fritzell et al. [2]. This paper focuses on the C/S techniques to safeguard spent
nuclear fuel during the disposal process.
2. Review of the licence application for the disposal facility
The Finnish operator Posiva submitted an application to construct the final disposal facility at Olkiluoto
to the Finnish government at the end of 2012. In addition to this, the applicant submitted to the Finnish
regulator, STUK, a plan for arranging the nuclear materials safeguards which are necessary to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, among other documents required in the national legislation. The
safeguards plan describes the means and methods that will be applied by the future operator to fulfil
the safeguards requirements laid down in the national legislation that includes also the international
safeguards requirements. The current issues are the provision of design information, annual activity
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plan and site declaration. A preliminary description of the applicant’s internal control and reporting
system for the nuclear materials is also included in the safeguards plan. According to the plan, the
spent fuel will be under the operator’s continuous surveillance during the encapsulation and disposal
processes when the facility is constructed and commissioned, approximately by 2022. The whole
application was reviewed by STUK during 2012 – 2015 and the plan for safeguards arrangements was
separately approved by STUK. A similar procedure was used for the preliminary plan for security
arrangements, preliminary safety assessment report and all other documents required by the national
nuclear energy legislation. The licensing body is the Ministry for Employment and the Economy that
will asses all the stakeholder’s and public opinions, and will process the licence conditions
accordingly.
In order to facilitate international safeguards the design information questionnaire documents are
prepared separately for the encapsulation plant and the geological repository. The preliminary
versions were reviewed in advance by the European Commission (EC) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). After a few consultative negotiations between IAEA, EC, STUK and Posiva in
2013 and 2014, the need for safeguards instruments for the encapsulation process were specified
according to the current integrated safeguards approach [3], and a requirement document was
prepared by the EC and IAEA and submitted to STUK and the operator. The spent fuel shall be
verified at the current location at the power plants and kept under IAEA/EC C/S through the whole
encapsulation process [4]. The adaption of the surveillance methods requires some additional rooms
and spaces that the operator will incorporate in the facility design updates. The needs were indicated
to the operator during the review process. In case of changes in the detailed plans of the plant, the
safeguards plan will also be reviewed and updated if necessary in the “Safeguards-by-Design” (SbD)
process that is expected to continue during the planning and construction of the encapsulation facility.
The C/S equipment to be introduced in the geological repository can be adjusted later with the
progress of facility construction and development, but the same SbD process shall be carried out for
the whole disposal facility during its whole lifetime. The shape and volume of the accessible part of the
repository will evolve during its lifetime, thus safeguards instrumentation will be adjusted continuously
during the disposal process. The tunnels will be designed only for the intended use, thus equipment,
e.g. portal monitors may need some additional spaces. Thus, the communication between the
inspectorates and the operator will be essential during the development and in particular the
excavation work, in case any additional spaces are needed for the instruments, e.g. for portal
monitors.
2. New challenges for the C/S system
The need to know the exact location of the spent fuel canister in the repository is not considered
relevant in the generic safeguards approaches for geological repositories as the fuel becomes
inaccessible in the geological medium. Therefore, the safeguards conclusions can be based solely on
the effective containment and surveillance measures in stead of traditional item counting and re-
verification [5]. In the generic safeguards approach [6] the access points to the repository shall be
safeguarded for transfers of nuclear material. The continuity of knowledge is extremely important to
provide credible assurance about inventories and to avoid any re-verification in the repository.  In the
current integrated safeguards approach [7] highly reliable redundant C/S systems are suggested to be
applied during the transfer to the repository, but no C/S is considered in the repository itself. Remote
data transmission should be used to give immediate responses on possible equipment failure.
The assurance of the integrity of the disposal canister during the transfers in the repository is essential
for safety, security and safeguards.  Fritzell et al. [2] suggested that the emplacement vehicle could be
equipped with positioning and radiation monitoring systems to detect any replacement activities as the
circumstances in the Swedish and Finnish repositories are suitable for this kind of devices. As the first
prototype vehicle is constructed, the planning of the installation of the IAEA/EC C/S equipment on the
vehicle should be a rather straightforward procedure before the operations start. In the safeguards
plan, the operator has indicated that the spent fuel movements will be recorded and documented to
assure the safe transfer of the disposal canisters to their final position. It is important to have also
international confidence in the integrity of the disposed canisters to avoid all possible confrontations
and discussions about unsafeguarded transfers of spent fuel in the underground.
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
908
3. Possible joint use of equipment
For safety reasons, the operator must have an environmental, and in particular a radiation monitoring
programme in the facility, thus the movement of radioactive materials is followed by radiation detectors
trough the encapsulation and disposal process. It is essential to have security measures applied on
the fuel transfers also in the underground. Therefore both understanding the tunnel systems and
having surveillance and navigation systems in place are necessary. All these data contribute to
confidence building measures for safety, security and safeguards. However, the need to have
independent or authenticated records to be used by the IAEA, has shown to be one of the obstacles
for the efficient use of original data collected by the stakeholders, e.g., operator’s staff, contracted 
companies, science community etc.. In particular as the positioning of the sensors and also scheduling
of maintenance breaks are decided by the operator, there is a reason for the IAEA and the EC to have
their own C/S devices in place when considered necessary. However, the interaction between the
parties and also 3 S’s is to be encouraged to support the state findings and consequent safeguards
conclusions.
4. Continuity of knowledge
During the underground construction of the geological repository, the main focus in safeguards is on
the generation of credible safeguards-relevant documents on the underground premises and
geoscientific monitoring records during the over 100-year long disposal project [8]. The documentation
of the planned and, in particular, the excavated, and later back-filled rock volumes is intended to
generate the design information declarations to be verified as safeguards measures during the
operational time of the repository. The current integrated safeguards approaches [3 and 7] indicate
that the DIV/PIV inspection will take place once a year, most likely also the C/S will be analysed on an
annual base and safeguards conclusions will be drawn accordingly for the encapsulation plant and for
the geological repository. After the closure of the repository these documents will also serve as
assurance for non-diversion and as inventory maps providing the Continuity of Knowledge, CoK, for
future generations. The repository site may be inspected as long as there is societal control over the
land-use. The methods in archiving these data will evolve during the years to come. Therefore, the
information and data need to be maintained over centuries with appropriate methods.
5. Summary
The generic concepts to safeguard spent fuel in a geological repository were developed 25 years ago
when it became obvious that several countries were aiming at geological disposal of spent nuclear
fuel.  After that, the safeguards approaches have been slightly modified, e.g. owing to the introduction
of the Additional Protocol, but the main principles are still valid. Most important is that during the
disposal process continuous IAEA/EC surveillance is in place to confirm that no diversion of nuclear
material occurs. As long as there is societal control over the disposal site, other IAEA safeguards
measures can be reduced to a minimum according to the state-level approach.
The safe and secure disposal of spent nuclear fuel is a societal prerequisite for the use of nuclear
power. In Finland, the operating company Posiva has submitted the construction licence application
for the planned final disposal facility. A plan to conduct safeguards arrangements, including nuclear
material accountancy and control, at the future facility is included in the application. The practical
requirements for IAEA/EC safeguards instrumentation at the encapsulation plant, e.g. spaces
requirements, cabling, office rooms are specified and will be fitted in the design and construction of the
new building. The design and installation of the safeguards equipment will be carried out during the
design, construction and operation of the whole disposal facility.
Up-to-date technology will be used in the safeguards of the disposal process. The material flow to the
underground has to be controlled with reliable dual containment and surveillance techniques. It is
recommended that existing C/S methods are to be applied to the canisters, all the way to the final
disposal position, to confirm the integrity of the disposal canister. The conclusions about non-diversion
as well as records about the location and the nuclear content of disposed canisters shall be
maintained under institutional control for as long as possible.
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Abstract:
The potential of seismic detection for detecting undeclared activities in/near an underground repository
is an area of high interest for the German Support Programme to the IAEA. An experimental and
theoretical focus is on salt since this is the best-investigated potential repository medium in Germany.
After measurements of seismic and acoustic signals from various mining activities in a salt dome 2010
- 2012 the follow-on project is dealing with modelling of the propagation of seismic signals from
relevant sources to potential sensor positions.
Model structures resembling a part of the salt dome and meshes covering it were constructed using
the Trelis/Cubit program, by “sweeping” a two-dimensional cross section through the third dimension.
For the seismic parameters of the various strata typical values were used; attenuation was modelled
by quality factors constant with frequency. The three-dimensional propagation was computed by the
program SpecFEM3D. Computation was done on the LiDO computer cluster of TU Dortmund. The
source was put close to the potential repository. To simulate blasts a seismic-moment step function
was used, picking and other sources were modelled by force impulses. Seismic signals were gained at
many positions, underground and at the surface. For repetitive sources the single-pulse signals were
superposed with appropriate delays. By fitting model amplitudes to measured ones preliminary
assessments of source strengths can be done.
Keywords: final repository, salt, seismic monitoring, seismic modelling
1. Introduction
Without reprocessing spent nuclear fuel contains plutonium, thus such material should remain under
IAEA safeguards even after emplacement in an underground final repository. This presents a new
challenge for monitoring; geophysical techniques and methods have been proposed for this task.
During operation, the creation of undeclared cavities needs to be detected, and those parts of the
mine already filled with refuse have to be kept under surveillance for undeclared re-opening. After the
emplacement phase, when drifts and shafts will have been closed, and the above-ground parts of the
final repository will have been cleared for other uses, the IAEA needs the capability of long-term
monitoring for covert access to the mine.
One potential technique is seismic sensing. Mining and other underground operations produce
vibration directly as well as via acoustic noise. Seismic excitation propagates through the ambient
medium and can thus be used to detect activities at a distance. The main question with seismic
monitoring is whether signals from undeclared activities can be separated from signals from other
sources and from background noise. In the operational phase of the repository most noise stems from
the normal activity (mining, transport, filling, etc.), and sensors can be deployed at many sites in the
mine. After closure, no sensors and cables can remain in the mine; in this phase sensors need to be
located at some distance, but still underground in order to reduce seismic background, produced by
traffic, industry, agriculture and weather at the surface.
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Figure 1:  Notional possibilities for placement of seismic sensors after a possible emplacement phase in
Gorleben, avoiding the planned repository volume at around 900 m depth (brown quadrangles) in the salt-dome
centre. Blue: in the salt dome, red: surrounding it. Additional positions could be underground hundreds of metres
above the repository, and at the surface. (Based on BfS map)
The German Support Programme to the IAEA has since many years taken an interest in seismic
monitoring for final-repository safeguards. One potential repository site in Germany is the Gorleben
salt dome (Figure 1); it was explored for its usability since 1986 under contract to the Federal Office
for Radiation Protection (BfS). Following the new German Site Selection Act (Standortauswahlgesetz)
of 2013, exploration has been stopped, but in the new search for an optimum repository medium and
site, Gorleben remains an option.
Should this site be selected, the repository would be built at around 900 m depth in the centre of the
salt dome (Figure 2). To detect undeclared activities in the vicinity, mainly new excavation, a
monitoring system would use a sensor “fence” around the repository (Figure 1), with sensors and
cables at safe distances from the backfilled and sealed shafts and tunnels. While sensors at the
surface could contribute, they would suffer from relatively strong background noise from natural as
well as artificial sources. For higher detection sensitivity most sensors would be deployed under-
ground, at several hundred metres depth, laterally around the repository, outside and inside of the salt
dome. In addition, underground positions above the repository could be used.
In order to gain information on the properties of seismic signals from mining activities, a dedicated
measurement project had been carried out 2010-2012 at Gorleben, tasked by the German Support
Programme to the IAEA [1, 2]. Many sources were measured with seismic and acoustic sensors
deployed at various positions in the exploratory mine and at the surface. However, underground
positions outside of the mine or even outside of the salt dome, as they would be used for seismic
monitoring, could not be covered.
To find out the actual strengths and other properties of the signals from mining activities at such
positions, measurements are needed, but these require expensive drilling that could be done only at
very few test sites. As a prior step, a modelling project was done, again tasked by the German
Support Programme to the IAEA.
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Figure 2:  Simplified geological cross section in NW-SE direction through the salt dome. A possible repository
level at about 930 m depth is indicated. The x and z axes of the chosen co-ordinate system are shown, the y axis
points into the section plane. The section measures 5.52 km in the x and 3.57 km in the z direction, respectively. x
is roughly south-east. In the model runs the source was put at 900 m depth (X). Red dots denote the sensor
Positions 1 to 56 that lie in the centre plane at y = -500 m, corresponding sets of 56 sensors each are located in
the planes at y = -900 m, -700 m, -300 m and -100 m. 32 additional positions at y = -600 m and -400 m, in x and z
closer to the source, shift the total to 312. (Based on Figure 36 in [8])
2. Modelling programs
Since August 2012 a modelling project has been done, the final report is due at the end of June 2015.
Because the salt dome and its surroundings have a complicated structure, numerical computations
are needed. For this the spectral-finite-element code called SPECFEM was used, it has been
developed for numerical simulation of seismic-wave propagation in heterogeneous and anisotropic
media [e.g. 3, 4]. This open-source program [5] is widely used in the seismological community. It is
very efficient, with boundary conditions included. Attenuation can be incorporated by quality factors
constant with frequency.
After a two- or three-dimensional structure was set up e.g. in AutoCAD, it was transferred as an ACIS
file to the commercial program Trelis (formerly CUBIT) [6] which was then used to produce a mesh of
quadrilaterals or hexahedra, respectively, assign seismic properties to the partial volumes and
combine those belonging to the same geological stratum to blocks. Several programs, part of the
SpecFEM2D or SpecFEM3D packages, then separated the geometry into parts, one for each
processing node to be used, and built the respective data-base files of mesh nodes and the
associated seismic properties.
While two-dimensional propagation was run on a single Linux PC with a 4-core CPU, three-
dimensional computations were done on mostly 340, sometimes 256 or fewer processors of the LiDO
computing cluster of Technische Universität Dortmund [8]. The processing time depended on the
number of mesh elements and the modelling duration, of course. Running the model for 2 seconds on
340 processors for 100,000 time steps of 0.02 ms required around 1 hour in case of about 420,000
x
z
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elements (intended mesh-element size 40 m) and around 40 hours (close to the limit of 48 h with such
a number of processors) with 5.5 million elements (intended size 15 m) (see also Table 1 below).
3. Model structures, meshing
For realistic simulations of seismic propagation, in principle knowledge of the full three-dimensional
structure of the underground would be needed, at a resolution comparable to the size of the mesh
elements, on the order of 10 m. However, this information was not available throughout the salt dome
– the data that were provided by the Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR,
Hannover) comprise several horizontal and vertical planes only [see e.g. 9]. As a consequence it was
decided to proceed from the simplified geological cross section of the salt dome and its surroundings
shown in Figure 2, and extend it along the salt-dome axis (y) direction. The cross section was
converted to an AutoCAD file describing the boundaries of the 16 media involved. Because the z2SF
stratum (red/orange) is too thin and partly curled, it had to be removed to allow meshing with
acceptable, that is not too small, elements. For the same reason some narrow valleys of the salt-dome
cap (Hutgestein, grey) had to be flattened somewhat. A tedious process was needed to remove very
small gaps and lateral protrusions caused by non-coinciding vertices of adjacent regions.
A first three-dimensional structure was built by joining the 15 remaining media of the cleaned cross
section to four: base rock, salt, adjoining rock and overlying rock. This was then swept orthogonally, in
the -y direction, by 1.0 km (Figure 3). A better approximation to reality was to keep the 15 media and
sweep the full structure along the same orthogonal vector of the same length. This kept the different
structures in the salt as well as in the adjoining rock that – even though the differences in wave
speeds and densities are small – give rise to reflection. But this structure shows identical x-z cross
sections at all y co-ordinates, and the media boundary surfaces are flat in y direction. As a
consequence, specular reflection could occur over relatively large media-boundary areas.
Figure 3:  Three-dimensional underground model where the strata of Figure 2 have been united to form four
partial blocks and the result has been swept in -y direction by 1.0 km, here with a mesh of 40 m intended element
size.
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Figure 4:  Salt-dome hull and adjoining layers.
Top: View of the salt-dome hull, looking roughly north, and the outer layers in various sections.
Bottom: Vertical sections through the outer salt-dome surface, seen nearly from vertically above. The cross
section of Figure 2 is close to Section 5, the exploratory mine is between Sections 4 and 5. The extent of the salt-
dome bulge is marked, the red line connects the respective centre points.
(Produced from BGR data)
To achieve curved boundary surfaces that better represent the actual salt-dome shape, it was
intended to “sweep” the two-dimensional cross section through the third (y) dimension, while
“morphing” it according to the actual variations of the salt dome along its axis. For this purpose, data
describing the salt-dome hull and the layer boundaries outside of it in seven sections, provided by the
BGR, were used (Figure 4). The respective extent of the salt-dome bulge as well as the depth of the
salt-dome top were determined. The centre points were to be used for shifting the two-dimensional
cross section in the x and z directions. Unfortunately, neither morphing nor the simpler change of
scale in sweeping from one section to the next succeeded. Thus finally the two-dimensional cross
section was put at Section 5 and swept to Section 2 along a three-dimensional spline through the
centre points of sections 2 to 6, without scaling. To limit the number of mesh elements, the resulting
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Figure 5:  Result of sweeping the 15-media cross section of Figure 2 (with the modifications) along the three-
dimensional spline. The structure was then cut at y = -1000 m and only the part left of the cut plane retained.
Meshing by the Trelis program was done first in two dimensions, applied to the media surfaces at
Section 5. This was then extended towards the respective surfaces on the opposing margin of the
model. One has to define an intended mesh-element size; the program then adapts the shape and
size of the mesh elements so that the elements fit to the media boundaries. Table 1 shows the
resulting number of elements if the intended size is varied between 40 and 10 m, for the three
structures: 4- and 15-media models, swept along an orthogonal vector, and 15-media model, swept
along the spline. It is evident that the actual element size varies significantly as the mesh accom-
modates the shapes of the various media boundaries. Similarly the distances between the so-called
Gauss-Lobatto-Legendre (GLL) points (there are 53 GLL points in each mesh element), where the 
various properties are to be computed,[5] vary markedly.
Intended mesh-element size / m 40 20 15 10
No. elements with 4 media, vector sweep 0.320E6 2.39E6 5.50E6 16.5E6
No. elements with 15 media, vector sweep 0.415E6 2.40E6 5.49E6 18.2E6
No. elements with 15 media, spline sweep 0.419E6 2.39E6 5.47E6 18.4E6
Minimum element size / m, 15 media, vector sweep 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.6
Maximum element size / m, 15 media, vector sweep 84.3 52.4 38.1 30.1
Min. GLL point distance / m, 15 media, vector sweep 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.45
Max. GLL point distance / m, 15 media, vector sweep 27.6 17.2 12.5 9.8
Approximate run time per s / h 0.4 6 19 100
Table 1:  Properties of the meshes for the three models with various intended element sizes: numbers of mesh
elements (hexahedra), minimum and maximum element sizes, minimum and maximum distance between the
Gauss-Lobatto-Legendre (GLL) points in the elements (the latter two for the 15-media orthogonal-vector sweep,
the others are very similar), and approximate run time per second of model time using 340 processors with 0.02
ms time step.
After a mesh was built its quality was assessed, using the distribution of characteristics such as the
skew and aspect ratio. For an acceptable mesh, the former should be below 0.8, and the latter above
0.2 for (nearly) all mesh elements [5]. This was fulfilled strictly for 15 m intended size and below, but
for 20 m and 40 m the share of elements with worse characteristics was very low.
The last row of Table 1 gives the approximate run time for 1 second of model time using 340
processors and a 0.02 ms time step. Because about 2 s of model time are needed mostly, 10 m
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intended size with around 200 hours computation time, far above the maximum of 48 h with a few
hundred processors, is excluded. But 15 m fits, so this intended size was used mostly.
The time step was chosen as 0.02 ms for most runs. This is about half the threshold acceptable using
a stability criterion. As source time functions for a force pulse a quasi-Dirac function was used, and an
explosion was modelled by a quasi-Heaviside function for the seismic moment. The SpecFEM3D
program simulates the former by a Gaussian function for the time derivative of the force; the half
duration of a triangle function similar to the Gaussian is 1.63 * 5 times the time step, that is mostly
0.163 ms. The latter is approximated by the error function, the integral of a Gauss function similar to a
triangle function of half duration 5 times the time step, mostly 0.10 ms. This short excitation causes
spurious higher-frequency contributions in the seismic signals that were filtered out by convolution with
a Gaussian function of the much longer half duration of mostly 10 ms, equivalent to 500 time steps.
This number was found necessary for sufficient suppression of the higher frequencies. A doubled time
step, still allowed under stability considerations, would lead to worse separation of individual arrivals.
Constant-quality attenuation is implemented in SpecFEM3D by normally three standard linear solids.
The highest characteristic frequency is derived from the longest propagation time between
neighbouring GLL points. This was 32 Hz with 15 m intended mesh-element size, whereas the source
time function convolved with 10 ms half duration has a spectrum to above 100 Hz. Whether this
mismatch produces errors in the attenuation needs to be investigated. It will be attempted to modify
the meshing in order to reduce the maximum element size and GLL-point distance.
Because the seismic excitation is computed at all points for every time step, recording it at many
positions does not increase the computation time, only the memory and disk space for the result files.
Thus 56 sensors were put in five x-z planes each, at y = -500 m (the plane of the source), -900 m, -
700 m, -300 m and -100 m, as shown in Figure 2. In addition to these 280 sensors, 32 more were
placed at y = -600m and -400 m, relatively close to the source also in the x and z co-ordinates.
4. Results – two-dimensional propagation
For testing and better visualisation a few model runs were done in two dimensions with the program
SpecFEM2D, just using the modified cross section. Here the geometric expansion in a homogeneous
volume reduces the seismic amplitude with distance r in proportion to r -0.5 whereas in three
dimensions it is with r -1. Figure 6 shows snapshots of wave propagation every 0.1 s after an explosion 
was ignited at the usual source position. The same parameters were used for the 15 media as in the
three-dimensional case (Table 3), only here in addition to shear attenuation some bulk attenuation
was included, with Q = 2 Q for all media.
In Figure 6 the grey values indicate the P-wave velocities, the red colour in the wave fronts is linked to
the ground velocity. Various effects can be seen, most relevant are reflection and transmission at the
salt-dome boundaries with strong velocity contrast and at the free surface, but they occur also
between different salt layers with a small velocity difference. Also visible is conversion from P to S
waves and vice versa. Pictures such as these can be used to assign wave arrivals at a certain sensor
position to the respective propagation paths.
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Figure 6:  Snapshots of wave propagation every 0.1 s from an explosion (yellow dot) at 900 m depth, from 0.1 s
to 0.8 s. Shown is the absolute magnitude of the seismic velocity, indicated by red colour, with some logarithmic
distortion to make smaller values better visible. The grey value follows the P-wave velocity, from 1750 m/s at the
surface to 4850 m/s in the base rock at about 3,300 m depth. The green dots denote sensor positions.
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No. Medium  /(kg/m3) vP /(m/s) vS /(m/s) Q Q 
1 Rotliegendes 2,650 4,850 2,800 9,999 125
2 Surrounding rock 2,400 3,500 1,850 9,999 50
3 Overlying rock 2,000 1,750 1,000 9,999 20
4 Salt 2,200 4,400 2,600 9,999 50
Table 2:  Seismic properties of the underground model of four different media as shown in Figure 3. Given are the
density , the P-wave velocity vP, the S-wave velocity vS, the bulk quality Q (9,999 means no bulk attenuation)
and the shear quality Q.
No. Medium  /(kg/m3) vP /(m/s) vS /(m/s) Q Q 
1 z4 2,200 4,400 2,700 9,999 125
2 Oberer Bundsandstein/
Muschelkalk
2,600 4,350 2,500 9,999 50
3 Hutgestein 2,550 3,750 2,200 9,999 125
4 z3GT/HA 2,200 4,000 2,650 9,999 125
5 Unterkreide 2,350 3,000 1,400 9,999 50
6 z3 2,200 4,400 2,700 9,999 125
7 Tertiär 2,100 2,100 1,200 9,999 20
8 z2HS 2,200 4,400 2,600 9,999 125
9 Oberkreide 2,400 3,500 1,850 9,999 50
10 Keuper 2,500 3,300 1,700 9,999 50
11 Unterer/Mittlerer
Buntsandstein
2,650 4,300 2,500 9,999 50
12 Rotliegendes 2,650 4,850 2,800 9,999 125
13 z1 2,200 4,600 2,650 9,999 125
14 Quartär Elster 2,000 1,750 1,000 9,999 20
15 Quartär 2,000 1,750 1,000 9,999 20
Table 3:  Seismic properties in the 15-media model. For the media see Figure 2. Given are the density , the P-
wave velocity vP, the S-wave velocity vS, the bulk quality Q and the shear quality Q. In order to have only shear
attenuation, the Q values were set to fictitious 9,999.
5. Results – three-dimensional propagation
The results given here are still somewhat preliminary. The final findings will be presented in detail in a
JOPAG report.
5.1 Single and repetitive signals
Two types of repetitive signals were modelled: a sequence of blast shots and picking. The four-media
model was used here, with 40 m intended mesh-element size and a time step of 0.05 ms. In the
convolution a Gaussian function with an equivalent half duration of 5.0 ms was used. Many single-
pulse signals were superposed with time delays and in numbers similar to the ones observed in the
measurements. As examples the signals at Sensors 7 and 13 (at the source depth of 900 m, 144 m
and 2544 m, respectively, from the source in x direction), and at Sensors 21 and 49 (near-vertically
above the source at 500 m depth and the surface, respectively, the x co-ordinate of both is 144 m
higher than the one of the source) are shown.
Blast shots: When a tunnel was to be extended by five more metres, usually about 11 shots were
done with 0.25 s spacing, igniting groups of charges in the different drill holes. The shots were
modelled by a spherically symmetric point source, that is the seismic-moment tensor had equal values
in the three main-diagonal elements and zero in the other components. The value was chosen as 1
Nm. Figure 7 shows the single-shot signals at the left and the 11 superposed ones with 0.25 s spacing
at the right. Since an explosion excites nearly exclusively P waves, for the sensors lying in horizontal
direction from the source the x component of ground velocity is shown, for the ones near vertically
above the source the z component is presented. The z component at Sensors 7 and 13 as well as the
x component at Sensors 21 and 49 are very small.  The y component is essentially zero for sensors in
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Figure 7:  (Previous page)  Model signals (ground velocity) at various sensor positions from a single explosion
(left) and an 11-shot blast with 0.25 s spacing (right) in the main salt at 900 m depth.
a) x component at Sensor 7 (900 m depth, 144 m from the source in x direction);
b) x component at Sensor 13 (900 m depth, 2544 m from the source in x direction, just outside the salt);
c) z component at Sensor 21 (500 m depth, x co-ordinate 144 m higher than the source);
d) z component at Sensor 49 (at the surface, x co-ordinate 144 m higher than the source).
Figure 8:  Peak-to-peak value of vertical seismic velocity versus distance. Red squares: measured from blast
shots at 840 m depth; blue diamonds: model computation from an 11-shot blast at 900 m depth, multiplied by
61010 to fit to the measured data at several 100 m distance. Measured values and trend as in [1]: Fig. 67; 
distances excluded from trend: 44 m (the sensor is in the seismic shadow of a drift), 5-6 km (much lower
recording bandwidth). Power-law exponents are -2.2 for the measured data and -1.3 for the model ones.
the y = -500 m plane of the source, but it gets significant in the other planes where the P wave has a
slant projection in the x-y plane. At many positions the duration of the one-shot signals is shorter than
the repetition period, thus not much mutual overlap exists and the superposed signals look similar to
simple repetitions, with similar amplitudes and spectra.
To compare the absolute amplitudes with the measured ones, Figure 8 shows the peak-to-peak
values of seismic velocity of the model signals at all 56 sensor positions shown in Figure 2 (the y =
-500 m plane of the source) versus geometric distance, in double-logarithmic scale. The best-fit
power-law trend line has an exponent of -1.3. In order to fit the model values to the measured ones at
several 100 m distance, the former had to be multiplied by 61010. This means that – with the chosen 
moment-step equivalent-triangle half duration of 0.25 ms and the convolution half duration of 5.0 ms –
the seismic moment is around 1011 Nm. Whether this is the correct order of magnitude for a 
momentary release of the mechanical energy of several kilograms of explosive, that is several
megajoules, needs to be investigated.
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Figure 9:  (Previous page)  Model signals (ground velocity) at various sensor positions from a single force pulse
in -z direction (left) and a sequence of 100 such picking blows with 23 ms spacing (right) in the main salt at 900 m
depth.
a) z component at Sensor 7 (900 m depth, 144 m from the source in x direction);
b) z component at Sensor 13 (900 m depth, 2544 m from the source in x direction, just outside the salt);
c) z component at Sensor 21 (500 m depth, x co-ordinate 144 m higher than the source);
d) z component at Sensor 49 (at the surface, x co-ordinate 144 m higher than the source);
Figure 10:  Measured peak-to-peak values for picking (red squares) with power-law trend line (solid), and model
results from 100 blows with 23 ms spacing, multiplied by 700 (blue diamonds). Power-law exponents are -1.3 for
the measured data and -1.6 for the model data using all positions (dashed) and -1.1 for the positions in the salt
dome only (dotted).
Picking: The hand-held electrohydraulic pick hammer is used for a few seconds at a time. To model a
single chisel blow a Gaussian force pulse of 1 N with equivalent half duration of 0.163 ms, applied in
the -z direction, was assumed. The measurements had shown that the repetition frequency of the
pick-hammer chisel is 44 Hz. Thus 100 single-pulse signals were superposed with 23 ms spacing.
Here the single-signal duration is shorter than the repetition period, thus considerable overlap and
significant variation of the envelope shape results. Figure 9 shows the single signals at the selected
sensor positions at the left, and the superposed ones at the right. Because the force was vertical, the z
component is shown for all four sensors; it has to be noted that in the horizontal direction (to Sensors
7 and 13) the main excitation travels as an S (transversal) wave whereas in the (near-)vertical
direction (to Sensors 21 and 49) the seismic motion is mainly vertical, that is in the form of a P
(longitudinal) wave. The x and y components are markedly smaller. Because the next single-blow
signal is added to the preceding one when the latter still has significant amplitude, the superposed
signal was found to be stronger than the single one by up to a factor 3.
Figure 10 shows the peak-to-peak values of vertical ground velocity from the model (all 5*14 sensors
at the source depth in the planes at y = -900 m, -700 m, -500 m, -300 m and -100 m) and from the
measurements versus geometric distance, again in double-logarithmic scale. Depending on whether
the positions outside of the salt dome are included or not, the power-law trend line has an exponent of
-1.6 or -1.1, the exponent for the measured data is -1.3. To fit the model values to the measured ones
at several 100 m distance, the former had to be multiplied by 7102, corresponding to an integrated 
model force of around 700 N with the source half duration of 0.163 ms and the convolution one of 5.0
ms. Whether this is plausible for a picking chisel releasing about 25 J energy needs to be investigated.
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5.2 Comparison of the three underground models
Runs using a force pulse in –z direction were done with the three model structures produced from the
two-dimensional cross section: the four-media, orthogonal-vector sweep, the 15-media orthogonal
vector sweep, and the 15-media spline sweep.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the vertical component of ground velocity for several sensors at the
depth of the source, 900 m, in the y = -500 m plane of the source. Proceeding from the closest Sensor
7 at 144 m from the source to the farthest Sensor 14 at the model margin one can follow the dominant
S-wave excitation as it arrives with increasing delay. The expected arrival times from the partial
distances and corresponding S-wave speeds are marked “S” in the salt and “SS” after transmission to 
the adjoining rock, they fit very well.
Figure 13 presents the vertical ground velocity at the sensors near-vertically above the source, from
500 m depth via 150 m depth to the surface. Due to the vertical excitation here the P wave is
dominant; its expected arrivals are marked “P”, and “PP” after transmission to the overlying rock.
The major difference between the three structures is that at some sensors at the source depth the
four-media arrivals are somewhat later. This can be understood because the S-wave speed in the
united salt body is the one of the main salt z2HS whereas in the 15-media model the wave additionally
propagates through layers z2GT/HA, z3 and z4 with slightly higher S-wave velocities. But the general
appearance and amplitudes are similar for all three models. Concerning the 15-media structures, the
differences between the orthogonal-vector sweep and the spline sweep are relatively small.
Similar behaviour was observed at the other sensor positions analysed.
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Figure 11  Vertical component of ground velocity at various x co-ordinates in the source plane (y = -500 m) at the
source depth (900 m) after a force pulse in -z (down) direction. Sensors and source distances in x direction, from
the top: 7, 144 m; 9, 944 m; 11, 1744 m. Black: 4 media, orthogonal sweep; blue: 15 media, orthogonal sweep;
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Figure 12  Vertical component of ground velocity at various x co-ordinates in the source plane (y = -500 m) at the
source depth (900 m) after a force pulse in -z (down) direction. Sensors and source distances in x direction, from
the top: 12, 2144 m; 13, 2544 m; 14, 2944 m. Black: 4 media, orthogonal sweep; blue: 15 media, orthogonal
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Figure 13  Vertical component of ground velocity at various x co-ordinates in the source plane (y = -500 m), near-
vertically above the source (at depth 900 m) after a force pulse in -z (down) direction. Sensors and source depths,
from the top: 21, 500 m; 35, 150 m; 49, 0 m. Black: 4 media, orthogonal sweep; blue: 15 media, orthogonal
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Figure 14  Peak-to-peak value of the x component of seismic velocity versus distance along the horizontal line
from the source in x direction (Sensors 7 to 14). Signals were computed with the 15-media structure, spline
sweep, with 0.02 ms time step, and then convolved with a Gauss function of 10 ms half duration. Black: force of 1
N in x direction, red: explosion with 1 Nm seismic moment. Power-law trend lines are indicated, their exponent
(slope in double-logarithmic scale) is -1.1 for both sets.
5.3 Additional observations
Assignment of events: Many signals contain several smaller events. They come about by reflection
and transmission at media boundaries. When the wave does not impinge orthogonally, continuity
conditions effect conversion from P to S waves and vice versa. In case of a second boundary – for
instance the salt-dome top and the surface – various waves with mixed histories can occur, for
example PPP, PPS, PSP etc. If the partial path lengths in the different media are known well, the
expected arrival times can be found precisely, allowing unique assignment at least for the simpler
events, but for some mixed histories the arrival times are too similar for differentiation.
Comparison of excitation by directed force and by explosion: In test runs of an explosion and a
horizontal force pulse – for propagation in x direction both produce mainly P waves – the x compo-
nents of seismic velocity at the corresponding Sensors 7 to 14 were very similar, except for much
lower amplitudes in the case of the explosion. Figure 14 shows the peak-to-peak values, determined
as the difference between the maximum and the minimum values over the full time for each signal;
these extreme values occur at the respective main events. The ratio between the values from the
force pulse of 1 N and an explosion of 1 Nm seismic moment (half durations by convolution in both
cases 10 ms) has a mean of 4400. Also this issue needs some further investigation.
Transmission from salt to surrounding media: Whereas reflection and transmission at a media
boundary are normally very complex, in case of orthogonal incidence of a plane wave on a plane
boundary the respective coefficients can be described simply in terms of the impedances Zi = vi i,
where vi is the relevant (P- or S-)wave speed and i, is the density in medium i. The reflection and
transmission coefficients are
, .
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For monitoring a final repository in a salt dome most sensors would be positioned outside of the salt
(Figure 1). Thus the transmission from the salt to the adjoining and overlying layers is relevant. For a
rough check of this transmission results from the 15-media orthogonal-vector sweep were used. The
signal strength at a position just inside the salt was compared with the one at the neighbouring
position just outside it, corrected for distance r assuming an r -1 dependence. For P waves propagating 
in x direction the peak-to-peak values of the x components of ground velocity at Sensors 12 and 13
are used, for vertical propagation this concerns the z components at Sensors 21 and 35. The resulting
ratios of peak-to-peak velocities are compared with the expected transmission ratios in Table 4, the
impedances were gained by multiplying the P-wave speed and density entries of the respective media
in Table 3. There is good agreement, the fact that the incidence is not exactly perpendicular and that
the wave fronts and boundaries are curved does not seem to produce a strong deviation. This means
that sensors outside of the salt dome should have generally similar detection capabilities as ones
inside the salt dome. Only when attenuation becomes stronger, such as with the low quality values in
the overlying sediment at higher frequencies, detectability is expected to deteriorate.
Sensor Medium Z / kg/(m2 s) R T vPP ratio Distance-corrected
S12 z2HS 5.72E6
S13 Oberkreide 4.44E6 -0.071 1.071 0.81 0.96
S21 z2HS 5.72E6
S35 Quartär/Elster 2.00E6 -0.469 1.469 0.83 1.50
Table 4:  Impedances Z for P waves at sensors on both sides of a media boundary, ensuing (amplitude) reflection
(R) and transmission (T) coefficients, and ratio of the peak-to-peak velocities vPP in x (S12, S13) and z (S21, S35)
directions, respectively, plus this ratio corrected for source-sensor distance.
6. Conclusion and Outlook
Lacking full three-dimensional data of the salt dome and its surroundings, considerable effort was
spent to achieve a model structure that resembles the reality to some extent, from a simplified two-
dimensional section. The three structures investigated showed some differences in the seismic
signals, but these seem small enough to not be relevant from the perspective of monitoring and
detecting activities where the exact time of arrival or small-scale events are of little importance. But
since the 15-media spline-sweep model is closer to reality, it should be used in future investigations,
as long as additional methods of improving the fidelity of the model, such as scaling and morphing
while sweeping, are not available.
One should keep in mind that the complex inner structure of the salt dome, with for example inner
boundaries intersecting the axis direction, is not represented in the model. Also, broken-up and mixed
layers at the salt-dome margins could give rise to multiple scattering, reducing the transmission from
salt to the surrounding rock.
A few issues remain to be investigated. This concerns above all the question of absolute amplitudes,
since it is the ratio of signal to background that defines detectability in the simplest scheme. Some
calibration was possible by comparison with measured data, but this needs to be looked at further, for
example with respect to the frequency content. The frequency range in the model is a few hundred
hertz whereas the measurements contain frequencies up to a few kilohertz.
While the final quantitative evaluation of signal strength versus background noise for relevant activities
still needs to be done, it seems that, given the relatively strong transmission through the salt-dome
boundaries, the outlook for the utility of seismic monitoring for safeguarding an underground final
repository in salt is generally good.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank the Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR, Hannover) for
providing figures and for allowing the use of their data of the salt-dome surroundings, and the firm
bicad (Hannover) for actually providing them, including reactions to several requests. Thanks go to
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
929
Wolfgang Friederich who heads the Chair of Geophysics, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, and to Andreas
Schuck of GGL Geophysik und Geotechnik Leipzig, for valuable advice. I am grateful to Marcel
Paffrath, student at the Chair of Geophysics, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, for his work in producing
three-dimensional structures from the two-dimensional section. Further I thank Lasse Lambrecht, PhD
student at the Chair of Geophysics, for tips in case of program problems. Particular thanks go to the
LiDO team at Technische Universität Dortmund; these colleagues gave invaluable advice on the use
of the computer cluster, including providing scripts.
This work was funded under task JNT C1611 of the German Support Programme to the IAEA.
References
[1] Altmann, J., Kühnicke, H.; Acoustic and Seismic Measurements for the Detection of Undeclared
Activities at Geological Repositories – Results from the Gorleben Exploratory Mine, JOPAG/11.13-
PRG-404; Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA
Safeguards between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Nov. 2013.
[2] Altmann, J.; Seismic Monitoring of an Underground Repository in Salt – Results of the
Measurements at the Gorleben Exploratory Mine; ESARDA Bulletin no. 50, 61-78, Dec. 2013.
[3] Komatitsch, D., Vilotte, J.P.; The spectral-element method: an efficient tool to simulate the seismic
response of two-dimensional and three-dimensional geological structures; Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 88
(2), 368-392, 1998.
[4] Komatitsch. D., Tromp, J.; Introduction to the spectral-element method for three-dimensional
seismic wave propagation; Geophys. J. Int., 139, 806-822, 1999.
[5] Computational Infrastructure for Geodynamics (CIG), Princeton University (USA), CNRS and
University of Marseille (France), ETH Zürich (Switzerland); SPECFEM 3D Cartesian User Manual,
Version 2.1; Sept. 30, 2013, via https://geodynamics.org/cig/software/specfem3d (20 Jan. 2014).
[6] csimsoft; Trelis — Advanced Meshing Software; http://www.csimsoft.com/ (29 April 2015).
[7] O. Bornemann et al.; Standortbeschreibung Gorleben Teil 3 – Ergebnisse der über- und
untertägigen Erkundung des Salinars; Geologisches Jahrbuch C73; Hannover/Stuttgart:
BGR/Schweizerbart, 2008 (English version via http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/
Endlagerung/Aktuelles/2011_04_20_aktuelles_gorleben_engl_Part1bis3.html (29 April 2015)).
[8] LiDO – Der Linux-HPC-Cluster an der Technischen Universität Dortmund; http://www.itmc.tu-
dortmund.de/dienste/hochleistungsrechnen/lido.html (29 April 2015).
[9] Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR); Erkundung des Salzstockes
Gorleben; http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Endlagerung/Projekte/Endlagerstandorte/laufend/
Erkundung_Salzstock_Gorleben.html?nn=1550704 (29 April 2015).
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
930
Application of safeguards in the geological disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel: safeguards data requirements and contribution to very 
long lasting records and knowledge retention 
Mentor Murtezi1, Christos Koutsoyannopoulos1, Peter Schwalbach1, Ali Zein1, 
Wolfgang Kahnmeyer1, Valenti Canadell Bofarull1, Peter Turzak1, Andreas 
Smejkal1, Vitor Sequeira2, Erik Wolfart2
1European Commission – Directorate-General for Energy 
Direction E – Nuclear Safeguards, L-2530 Luxembourg 
E-mail: Mentor.Murtezi@ec.europa.eu 
2Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
Via E. Fermi, Ispra 21027 (VA) Italy 
Abstract: 
One distinctive feature of the geological disposal process for spent nuclear fuel is its timescale. Any of 
the proposed safeguards-related measures and solutions must adhere to this very long time 
perspective. The applicable safeguards-related infrastructure may be upgraded and even completely 
exchanged along with the technological progress and changes in the disposal project advancement as 
decades will go by. However, there is one element that from the very beginning should withstand the 
test of time, spanning over the entire timescale of the final disposal projects; this is the data and 
knowledge retention system. 
The EC and the IAEA safeguards services have the unique possibility and responsibility of acquiring, 
processing and storing the safeguards-relevant data according to the provisions of the applicable 
safeguards obligations. Furthermore, also information related to the development of safeguards 
approaches and evaluation methods needs to be maintained. The related knowledge retention 
arrangements have an important role not only in safeguards but can also contribute to the wider scope 
of knowledge retention contributing to the information-based decision making in the future. 
In this paper, based on considerations on the necessary safeguards equipment infrastructure and the 
proposed safeguards measures, we describe the necessary data feeds from the operators of the 
geological disposal systems, as well as the data to be collected by the safeguards inspectorates 
themselves. We discuss the plausible arrangements for accessing the relevant data and the very long 
lasting records and knowledge keeping as well as their multi-purpose safeguards and knowledge-
retention use. 
Keywords: geological disposal; spent fuel; safeguards data needs; knowledge retention 
1. Introduction
The geological disposal (GD) of spent nuclear fuel (SF) is becoming reality in Europe; the first two GD 
systems are to become operational within a decade. The first is scheduled to be launched in 2022 in 
Finland, the second one should be commissioned a few years later in Sweden. The GD projects in 
Finland and Sweden are implemented with "safeguards in mind". This safeguards-by-design (SBD) 
approach facilitates the application of safeguards and integration of its systems with the physical 
system components but also with the safety and security arrangements. SBD is aiming at effective and 
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efficient verification of the SF to be encapsulated and deposited and 100% assurance of continuity of 
knowledge (CoK) between the encapsulation and the deposition of the SF. 
EURATOM Safeguards has valuable past experience with preparations of a conditioning facility, as 
intensive discussions were held and agreements made during the preparation and construction phase 
of the German pilot conditioning facility. The principles and concepts developed then [1], [2] are mainly 
still applicable. The plant did not become operational following a political decision but also Germany 
will come back to this question in time. 
For a number of decades the EU safeguards inspectorate is putting a lot of effort in assuring a tight 
control of the nuclear material within the nuclear fuel cycle. The GD concept adds additional stages to 
this cycle: encapsulation of spent fuel and its transfer to the underground location and emplacement in 
its defined position. The overall goal of the EU's nuclear safeguards system is stated in chapter VII of 
the Euratom Treaty. Obligations on operators of nuclear installations are outlined in the Commission 
Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. The major goal of safeguards measures is to know and verify 
who, where, what and how much of nuclear material is used for what purpose and to verify if the reality 
on-site is correctly reflected in the operators' declarations. All civil nuclear material in the European 
Union is subject to Euratom safeguards and must be strictly accounted for. The accountancy 
declarations are verified via on-site inspection activities, aided by remote monitoring techniques. All 
these activities are currently routinely implemented. The addition of the GD as a new very long lasting 
stage in the nuclear fuel cycle is calling for rethinking and possibly revision of our data requirements. 
When launched, a GD system will operate continuously over decades. More than a century can pass 
from the day of disposal of the first canister with SF to the moment when the underground repository 
will reach its capacity. During all this time, the necessary safeguards related information must be 
collected, classified, and archived. The information provided by the GD system operators must satisfy 
the legal safeguards requirements and be sufficient to satisfy the data requirements of the 
implemented safeguards approach. As it is very difficult to define a safeguards approach that would 
last for a century, the collection of data should take into account evolution in approaches. For 
example, currently available verification techniques may not need very detailed records characterising 
the spent fuel to be placed underground, however, future development of new measurement 
techniques and possible changes in safeguards approach may require more detailed records on the 
SNF to be disposed of. Thus future requirements need to be considered now as far as feasible. 
The timescale of the GD process and non-excludable possibility of retrieval of the previously deposited 
SF requires adequate measures and techniques for data transfers, data management and archiving of 
the collected records. The information to be collected should be classified according to its relevance 
and purpose. The directly safeguards-related dataset should be a subset of a broader knowledge-
retention oriented dataset. The latter dataset can act as a repository from which data, originally not 
directly intended for safeguards purposes, could be retrieved and re-analysed. 
2. Safeguards approach to geological disposal system: safeguards
infrastructure and data needs
The GD system has two main components: the encapsulation plant (EP) and the geological repository 
(GR). Each of these components will have its safeguards infrastructure and, being separate material 
balance areas (MBA), will have separate sets of nuclear accountancy and operating records, as well 
as tailor-made, facility-specific, continuity of knowledge arrangements. 
2.1. The encapsulation plant: safeguards infrastructure and facility and process 
specific flexible approach for final verification of SF 
Responding to the need of establishing the appropriate safeguards approach and its implementation 
measures and techniques and following the safeguards-by-design concept, the EC and the IAEA 
jointly proposed in 2014 to the operator the Equipment Infrastructure Requirements Specification for 
the Spent Fuel EP in Finland. The Finnish GD system, as the first one to be launched after the 
blockage of the German development, is treated as a model for a modern baseline safeguards 
approach for GD of SF [3]. 
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The possible safeguards measures have been identified with the aim to have the least possible impact 
on the spent nuclear fuel geological disposal process, while allowing each safeguards authority to 
effectively fulfil their mandate and draw independent conclusions.  The technical measures have been 
specified wide enough to cover the expected scope of the final safeguards approach, also allowing for 
a degree of flexibility for possible future changes in safeguards strategies. 
One of the key points in the elaboration of the safeguards approach for GD of SNF was the definition 
of the location in the process where the final verification measurement of SF will be made. The two 
following options have been examined: 
• The flexible option: Verification at the SF shipping facility (= the nuclear power plant (NPP)
interim spent fuel storage), while keeping re-verification capabilities at the EP;
• The EP option: Final verification only at the SF receiving facility (= the EP).
The at-EP option would pose strict time constraints on the availability of reliable and approved 
equipment, which is still under development, and also on verification and approval actions. 
Instruments would have to be highly automated and rely on Remote Data Transmission (RDT), leaving 
very small margins for dealing with anomalous situations. On these grounds, (mainly anomaly 
resolution concerns leading to the need for immediate remedial actions in case of equipment failures 
and RDT interruptions), a flexible verification option is proposed locating the final verification of the SF 
assemblies at the interim stores of the NPPs while preserving the measurement capability at the EP.  
The chosen verification option is based on approved and tested equipment and procedures, leaving 
the possibility to move the verification to the EP at a later stage, when adequate SF measurement 
devices will be available. 
Compared to the scenario with final verification at the EP, the chosen flexible option poses stricter 
continuity of knowledge (CoK) requirements. The flexibility of this option is based on preserving the full 
capability for performing the final verification of the SF to be encapsulated in the EP. This would act as 
a back-up scenario in case of loss of CoK between the interim store of the NPP and the EP.  
The proposed equipment infrastructure for the EP has been designed to ensure complete verification 
possibility at the EP and to assure CoK inside the EP: from the arrival of the transport casks containing 
SF assemblies through to encapsulation of the SF assemblies and transfer of the loaded and welded 
disposal canisters to the underground disposal. 
The high throughput of the EP and its operational timescale require efficient unattended material flow 
monitoring (visual and radiation-based), identity reading, fingerprinting and verification measurements' 
data transfer. The proposed equipment infrastructure requirements assume upgradability and 
adaptability of the planned system components. The space reserved for the safeguards equipment in 
the EP assumes the possibility of adding in the future novel equipment, such as an unattended 
gamma emission tomography device (see e.g. [4] and references therein).. 
2.2. Geological repository: black box margins and assurance of retention  
In the proposed safeguards approach the geological repository (GR) is seen as a "black box". This 
means that all the nuclear material deposited underground must be accounted for and characterised, 
enabling its future re-verification in the event of retrieval at least until the final back-filling stage. 
However, the disposed SF will not be subject to any re-verification as long as it is staying in the black 
box. According to the currently adopted safeguards model, the black-box GR as a whole will neither be 
monitored internally nor externally for safeguards purposes (e.g. using seismic, acoustic or thermal 
sensing techniques). Following evolution of safeguards needs, mandates ad approaches the black box 
monitoring can be introduced in the future. Following the current safeguards model, portal radiation 
monitoring, possibly complemented by surveillance, will be applied to all penetrations leading to the 
disposal area. Periodical reviews of the technical characteristics of the GR (including underground) will 
be conducted. This containment-like black-box option is in agreement with the rationale of the GR 
concept and its wider context of safeguards, safety and security (the so-called 3S approach). 
A very important decision to be taken in respect to black box boundaries is exactly where to put these 
boundaries. One option is to treat the entire underground as a black box, i.e. as soon as a DC 
disappears from the surface it is already considered as transferred to the black box. Alternatively, the 
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black box boundaries could be limited to the underground disposal level itself. In the second case the 
material flow monitoring would have to be designed in a way allowing to follow the disposal canisters 
down to their disposal area hundreds of meters underground. 
By defining the black-box boundaries at the surface: 
• It would be easier to install and operate the required safeguards infrastructure (no equipment
underground) 
• The necessary safeguards infrastructure would cost less (less cables, less equipment, less
maintenance, less inspection effort) 
On the other hand, having such a large black box would mean that: 
• Arrival of the DC to the deposition level could not be traced and confirmed independently
• An undeclared activity warning would be delayed: SF could potentially be kept between the
deposition depth and the surface
Limiting the black box to the disposal level and treating the overlaying rock masses as a confinement 
(with almost 450 meters thickness in case of the Finnish GD) would enable: 
• Tighter control on a smaller black box confirming transfers of the DCs to the disposal level
• Earlier warning in case of undeclared activities
On the downside, narrowing the black box would make safeguards more costly and would require 
inspectors' presence underground (which might be necessary anyway for the basic technical 
characteristic verification). 
Currently, the two options for black box boundaries are being analysed comparing the necessary 
safeguards equipment infrastructure and the assurance levels provided. 
3. Discussion on data needs and knowledge retention
The above described model safeguards approach, based on the currently available SF verification and 
CoK assuring techniques, requires extensive data feeds from the operator of a GD system. Any 
safeguards approach formulated for a particular GD systems will have to evolve along with the 
advancement of the consecutive GD process stages (preparation, operation, partial and final 
backfilling and also, with non-excludable retrieval events). Taking into account that more sophisticated 
and data-hungry measurement techniques may, and certainly will, appear, the safeguards 
inspectorates should have access to the most detailed and accurate information on the SF to be 
disposed of. Apart from the routine information on the initial enrichment and burn-up values, the 
irradiation and cooling history of each SF assembly should be made available to the inspectorates. 
Moreover, whenever possible, detailed information characterising the SF design and even particular 
fuel rods should also be provided (data such as nodal burn-up, number and location of removed fuel 
rods, number and location of partial length fuel rods, burn up at a pin level etc). 
Part of the information on the SFA to be encapsulated can be obtained from the currently used 
inventory change reports (ICR) submitted by the operator. Some other characteristic details of the SFA 
can be obtained from the basic technical characteristics of the NPP. It will be necessary to merge the 
two data sources and create a comprehensive and detailed database. Other data are part of operating 
and accounting records which currently are not submitted to the inspectorates but kept available to the 
inspectorates by the NPP operators. 
All the above described data would have to be made available to the inspectorates in advance, so that 
they could be analysed in preparation for the final verification of the SNF using the agreed non-
destructive analysis technique. To avoid delaying the encapsulation and disposal process, it is also 
very important to agree on the declaration acceptance criteria. As the operator will be submitting very 
detailed information, it should be made clear which parameters will be primarily used for confirmation 
of the operator's declaration. The set of these parameters may vary depending on the agreed non-
destructive analysis technique to be used as a final verification tool. As these may evolve significantly 
over the long period of operation, a wider dataset will be envisaged by the safeguards authorities. This 
needs to be specified in thorough discussions with the concerned operators. It is clear that if only such 
information will be provided as currently required under Euratom Regulation 302/2005, it will be 
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insufficient to fully exploit the capability of even the currently envisaged NDA techniques. Novel data 
needs introduced by the launch of the GD processes could be regulated via revision of the applicable 
legal acts and by creation of adequate legal arrangements such as Particular Safeguards Provisions 
under Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 and could be reflected in the related Facility 
Attachments. 
Another very important set of data is required for the underground GR. The inspectorates' must have 
access to very detailed design characteristics of the underground GR in order to be able to understand 
and control the black box. Safeguards services must be sure that the GR is built as designed. For 
future reference it is also very important to understand the 3D layout of the GR enabling precise 
localisation of the disposed spent fuel. 
To be sure that the black box meets safeguards requirements (such as the indicated disposal depth 
and area) it must be very precisely characterised spatially. This characterisation and its periodic 
updating will allow for understanding its state and evolution. Currently the best available and fit for 
purpose technique is the 3D Laser scanning. It acts as a general independent verification technique 
for built as designed and declared confirmation, providing in addition an independent orientation for 
inspectors. 
The above described data needs and verification techniques are primarily safeguards-related. Their 
main goal is to help the safeguards inspectorates, Euratom and IAEA, in fulfilling their mandates. 
However, the collected data and experience have also a broader scope and can be used in the overall 
context of knowledge retention. The safeguards-related data is actually a subset of this wider 
databank. The preservation of detailed records and general knowledge will be more certain if they are 
shared and kept in redundant databanks. The safeguards inspectorates have a unique position on the 
international arena, as organisations designated for and capable of processing and keeping sensitive 
information for a very long time. In relation to the extremely long operational time of the GD systems, 
current record keeping solutions may not be sufficient. Actually any of the currently proposed or 
envisaged data retention techniques and measures will not be sufficient facing the GD timescale. 
Therefore, it seems that before revising the current data retention and record management solutions, 
we should define our role in knowledge retention and decide on knowledge transfer and handover 
approach. 
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Abstract: 
A design of a universal gamma-ray emission tomography (UGET) device has been defined 
within the IAEA MSSP project JNT1955 in order to evaluate partial defect detection 
capabilities when using tomography on used nuclear fuel assemblies. The design is 
intended to allow for fuel assembly verification using single photon emission tomography 
on a broad range of fuel assembly types and fuel parameters. 
In this paper, results from a set of Monte Carlo radiation transport simulations for the UGET 
design are presented. In these simulations, two cases are studied, each of them with a 
PWR fuel, in one case the complete fuel assembly and in the other with 11 missing rods. 
The characteristic features of the design are presented including expected performance 
requirements on the gamma-ray collimator and detector system, supported by the 
simulation results. In addition, the agreement between the two simulation tools used, 
Geant4 and MCNP, indicate that any of the two can give satisfactory accuracy for this 
purpose. 
Keywords: nuclear fuel assemblies; partial defect verification; gamma-ray emission 
tomography; Monte Carlo 
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1. The IAEA MSSP project 1955: UGET
The IAEA has identified a need to re-assess the viability of using gamma emission 
tomography (GET) for verification of used nuclear fuel to be transferred to difficult-to-
access storage. The joint task JNT A 1955, “Unattended Gamma Emission Tomography 
(UGET) for Partial Defect Detection”, has been set up within the support programmes of 
Sweden, USA, Finland and the European Commission. In the first phase of the project, the 
purpose is to provide an assessment of the viability of the technique for safeguards 
applications. Two verification objectives have been defined [1]; 1) pin counting for routine 
verification of item integrity and 2) quantitative determination of pin-by-pin properties such 
as burnup and cooling time for detection of anomalies.  
For the first objective, no operator-provided information is assumed to be known to the 
inspecting party and verification should be fully independent. For the second objective, 
operator-declared information may be used to detect anomalies in comparisons between 
measured data and operator-declared data. However, it is not completely required since by 
using results from the tomographic technique (i.e. pin-by-pin isotopic concentrations of 
studied isotopes), anomalies may also be detected in inter-comparisons between pins in 
the population itself. E.g., by using an assumption of similar cooling time between pins, the 
pin-by-pin burnup distribution may deduced from tomographic measurements of two 
isotopes [2].   
2. Tomography system design
Informed by prior work [3,4,5] and a simulation study of the capability of an existing 
tomography system to detect missing pins, a preliminary design of a universal gamma-
emission tomography (GET) has been developed. Design considerations included energy 
and spatial resolution as well as the ability to manage total count rate for short cooling time 
scenarios while maintaining adequate photopeak count rates for isotopes of interest across 
scenarios. In order to estimate pin-to-pin burnup variations, it will be necessary to separate 
the gamma response from different isotopes, primarily 137Cs (662keV) and 154Eu (5 lines 
between 723 and 1264keV). In addition, for very short cooling times, it would be desirable 
to separate the response of 134Cs (605 and 796keV) from the 137Cs lines. These objectives 
drive the system design toward high energy resolution scintillators as the detection 
material; LaBr3(Ce) was chosen for both its speed and energy resolution.  
In order to manage count rates for shorter cooling times and to achieve the spatial 
resolution necessary to image pins in the center of an assembly, a collimator with long, 
narrow, open slits was designed for imaging. This collimator closely resemble that in [6], 
although for the present case the thickness of the collimator depth can be less. To achieve 
high count rates for lower-activity fuel (long cooling times), the collimator had to be opened 
up slightly. In order to manage the count rate for higher-activity fuel, a provision to include 
lead filtration in the collimator was included.  
To collect tomography data, the imaging head consisting of the collimator and scintillator is 
to be used in a translate-rotate geometry in which projection data is collected by translating 
the detector along a linear track, and angular data is collected by rotating the head with 
respect to the fuel assembly. In this geometry, there is a trade-off between the number of 
detectors in the head and the number of steps required to collect a projection. This trade-
off is further complicated by the detector photopeak efficiency (a function of scintillator size) 
and total data collection time. While it might seem that many small detectors would be the 
appropriate design choice, calculations demonstrated that scintillators on the order of 38-
50 mm diameter provided an optimal count rate and imaging time. This results in a head 
with 6-10 detectors, depending on the overall field of view of the system. 
A drawing of the proposed geometry of a single detector head is shown in figure 1 and a 
table of design parameters are shown in table 1. Additional shielding is included in the 
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design to protect the detectors in the high radiation fields and to manage count rates. In a 
full system, the head would sit on a rotating platform in a “donut” that would surround the 
fuel assembly at some vertical offset from the bottom of the assembly. Multiple heads could 
be included on the ring to decrease total data-collection time. For simulation purposes, only 
a single head is included. 
Figure 1: Drawing of the proposed UGET design. 
Object and Scanner Parameters 
Maximum object diameter 375 mm 
Scanner radius (object center to collimator face) 225 mm 
Scintillator Parameters (Right Circular Cylinder) 
Diameter 38.1 mm 
Height 38.1 mm 
Collimator Parameters 
Material: Triamet-S18 (95% W, 3.5% Ni, 1.5% Cu)  18.0 g/cm3 
Length 20.0 cm 
Width 1.5 mm 
Height 10.0 mm 
Detector Head and Scan Parameters 
Number of detectors 8 
Collimator pitch 46.0 mm 
Inter-scintillator gap 4.0 mm 
Number of steps per projection for 2 mm sampling 23 
Number of angles 128 
Table 1: Parameters of the proposed UGET design. 
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3. Results from Monte Carlo simulations
Two Monte Carlo frameworks were used in this work: MCNP [7] and Geant4 [8]. The 
design of the UGET device was modelled in both frameworks but the Geant4 model was 
used in this work to validate the MCNP model. In Geant4, no techniques for variance 
reduction were used which limited the amount of cases to that could be simulated in the 
available time frame. Therefore, only a few selected cases for a PWR 17x17 fuel assembly 
were simulated, as summarized by table 2. 
Case 
# 
Lateral positions of the device 
[mm] 
Pattern of removed rods 
1 -23 None (complete assembly) 
2 -23, -21, -19, …, 17, 19, 21 
(one projection) 
[-7,0], [-4,-4], [-4,3], [-4,8], [0,-8], 
[0,5], [1,-1], [2,2], [4,-2], [5,6], [8,-3] 
Table 2: Summary of selected cases for simulation of a PWR 17x17 fuel 
assembly. In all cases, two source energies (661657 and 1274436 eV) and 
two rotations of the device (0 and 45 degrees) were used. 
3.1 MCNP simulations 
Two sets of MCNP simulations have been performed. First, a using model to specifically 
compare case 1 (with a complete fuel assembly) presented in this paper. Second, using a 
model capable of calculating all combinations of device positions (lateral positions and 
rotations) and source energies in a reasonable time to specifically compare case 2 (with 
missing pins). The second model, described in more detail in [9], is using a virtual 
geometry setup with a simultaneous calculation in all possible lateral positions at each 
rotation. The first model is described below. 
In the second MCNP model, MCNPX 2.5.0 has been used to model the 1274 keV gamma 
transport in case 1 of table 2. The MCNPX cell geometry used for the simulations is shown 
in figure 2 below. It includes the fuel assembly with fuel rods and guide tubes, contained in 
a steel cylinder and a collimator with eight slits to the detector locations corresponding to 
the UGET design, as shown in figures 2 and 4. It can be noted, that the physical detectors 
have not been modelled. Instead, the photon current integrated over the detector end 
surface is estimated using the F1:P tally of MCNPX.  Variance reduction has been 
introduced by truncation of the axial source distribution and the angular emission 
distribution, where the axial emission is limited to 42.5 mm height and the angular emission 
is limited to a 5° cone centred on phi. 1010 photons were started from the fuel rod in each 
simulation. 
In each calculation, the contribution of each rod to each of the eight detector positions has 
been investigated. Figure 3 shows the accumulated contribution of each rod in the two 
cases (i.e. the summed contribution of each rod to all detector positions.) 
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Figure 2: MCNPX geometry used the 45° rotation (and -23 mm 
lateral position) in case 1. Black lines representing cell borders. 
The red marking at the back of the detector space shows an 
example of a surface used for photon current tally in MCNPX 
(i.e. the F1 tally). 
Figure 3: Left: The investigated rod positions. Centre: The contribution of 
each rod to all detector positions in the 0° rotation of case 1. Right: The 
corresponding contributions in the 45° rotation of case 1.  
3.2 Geant4 simulations 
Geant4 simulations of the UGET design were performed in order to validate the MCNP 
models. A screen dump of the Geant4 model of the UGET design is displayed in figure 4. 
The coordinate system used, that defines the lateral position and the rotation of the device, 
is also shown in figure 4. The reference physics list FTFP_BERT was used in Geant4, 
implying that all standard electromagnetic interactions were modelled.  
For each case, the spectrum of energy depositions in the eight detectors of the collimator 
head was calculated for each pin in the fuel assembly. I.e. the response in each detector to 
gamma rays emitted isotropic and homogenous in a 42.5 mm high cylinder in each fuel pin, 
centred in front of the collimator opening. Due to large attenuation of gamma rays 
originating from fuel pins on the opposite side of the assembly, as seen from the detectors, 
the contribution to the response for these pins is relatively small. Figures 5 and 6 shows 
the response per fuel pin for case 1. 
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Figure 4: Schematics showing the Geant4 model of the UGET device (left and upper right). The 
upper right image indicates a view from above for case 2 with 0° rotation and -23 mm lateral position 
(i.e. with detector number 5 pointing towards the central rod in the assembly). The bottom right part 
illustrates the used coordinate system that defines the lateral position and rotation of the device 
relative to a fuel assembly indicated by the blue square in the centre. The rotation is given by angle 
phi. The lateral position is given by the y’ position of the collimator head, i.e. the distance between the 
centre of the head and the x’ axis. 
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Figure 5: The number of counts in the full energy peak, per emitted source 
photon for the energies 662 keV (left column) and 1274 keV (right column), for 
detector numbers 3 (bottom) through 7 (top) in the 0° rotation of case 1. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
943
Figure 6: The number of counts in the full energy peak, per emitted source 
photon for the energies 662 keV (left column) and 1274 keV (right column), for 
detector numbers 3 (bottom) through 7 (top) in the 45° rotation of case 1. 
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4. Comparison between simulation results
Variations of case 1 were used to compare calculated contributions to the full energy 
detector response for each fuel pin. Variations of case 2 were used to compare calculated 
projections. 
4.1 Comparison of pin contributions, case 1 
The results of the Geant4 and the MCNP modelling of case 1, with a complete 17x17 PWR 
fuel assembly, were used to compare calculated full energy response for each fuel pin. The 
results are shown in figure 7. The MCNP and Geant4 models are clearly linearly dependent 
on each other, indicating that either of the two models can be used to predict the 
contribution to the detector count, per fuel pin. 
Figure 7: Comparison between Geant4 and MCNP calculations of the 1274 keV source in case 1. 
Top part shows the 0° rotation and the bottom part shows the 45° rotation. About 1012 source 
particles were emitted in each Geant4 run. The correlation coefficient when for a linear model is 
indicated by the parameter r. 
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4.2 Comparison of calculated projections 
The results of the Geant4 and the MCNP modelling of case 2, with a 17x17 PWR fuel 
assembly with 11 missing pins, were used to compare calculated projections. Figure 8 
shows this comparison, specifically with a 1274 keV source distributed homogenously over 
the rods in the fuel assembly. 
Due to high computational demands for the Geant4 model, the variation due to statistics in 
the calculated projections, as seen in figure 8, is relatively large compared to the projection 
calculated with MCNP. The correspondence between the projections from the two models 
is expected to be improved as the calculations progress. 
Figure 8: The projections for 0° (top) and 45° (bottom) rotation using a 1274 keV source 
distributed homogenously over the fuel rods, calculated with the MCNP and Geant4 models. 
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5. Conclusions
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the effect of different attenuation for 662 and 1274 keV 
gamma-rays, respectively. About an order of magnitude less full energy counts are 
expected in the Cs-137 peak at 662 keV compared to Eu-154 peak at 1274 keV for a 
central rod in the PWR 17x17 fuel assembly (assuming the nuclide activities are equal). 
Comparing the pin-by-pin detector responses, in case 1, the results indicate that the 
Geant4 and MCNP models are linearly dependent which implies that either of the two 
models can be used to predict detector responses. 
Comparing the calculated projections, in case 2, is more difficult due to low statistics in the 
Geant4 modelling. However, the general shape of the projections from MCNP and Geant4 
seem to agree relatively well. The results from case 1 indicate that the shape of the 
calculated projection in Geant4 might converge to the projection calculated in MCNP. 
In conclusion, the Geant4 and MCNP calculations are comparable for the cases simulated 
in this paper, thereby increasing confidence in the models used in the UGET project to 
establish the design of a universal gamma-ray emission tomography device as presented 
in [10]. 
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Abstract: 
The potential for gamma emission tomography (GET) to detect partial defects within a spent nuclear 
fuel assembly is being assessed through a collaboration of Support Programs to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  In the first phase of this study, two safeguards verification objectives 
have been identified. The first is the independent determination of the number of active pins that are 
present in the assembly, in the absence of a priori information. The second objective is to provide 
quantitative measures of pin-by-pin properties, e.g. activity of key isotopes or pin attributes such as 
cooling time and relative burnup, for the detection of anomalies and/or verification of operator-declared 
data. The efficacy of GET to meet these two verification objectives will be evaluated across a range of 
fuel types, burnups, and cooling times, and with a target interrogation time of less than 60 minutes. 
The evaluation of GET viability for safeguards applications is founded on a modelling and analysis 
framework applied to existing and emerging GET instrument designs. Monte Carlo models of different 
fuel types are used to produce simulated tomographer responses to large populations of “virtual” fuel 
assemblies.  Instrument response data are processed by a variety of tomographic-reconstruction and 
image-processing methods, and scoring metrics specific to each of the verification objectives are 
defined and used to evaluate the performance of the methods.  This paper will provide a description of 
the analysis framework and evaluation metrics, example performance-prediction results, and describe 
the design of a “universal” GET instrument intended to support the full range of verification scenarios 
envisioned by the IAEA.  
Keywords: spent nuclear fuel assemblies, partial defect verification, gamma-ray emission tomography 
1. Introduction
Spent fuel verification measurements are central to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 
safeguards approaches at facilities handling and storing irradiated fuel. Generally speaking, IAEA 
safeguards approaches call for verification of spent fuel using a partial defect or ‘best-available’ 
method, for fuels that are being transferred to difficult-to-access storage and that have a design 
allowing disassembly [1-2]. At present, IAEA’s authorized instruments for partial defect detection have 
limitations in terms of independence, defect sensitivity, and implementation flexibility. The IAEA has 
documented the need for new fuel verification tools as Capabilities 5.5 and 5.7 in the Department of 
Safeguards Long-Term R&D plan [3].  
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Passive gamma-ray emission tomography is attractive for addressing partial defect detection and 
verifying the “completeness” of the fuel assembly because it has the potential to directly image the 
spatial distribution of the active fuel material in the fuel pins and the relative locations of the pins in the 
assembly structure, without the need for any operator-declared information. The gamma-ray 
signatures, particularly in younger fuels, can be strongly correlated to irradiation parameters such as 
final (integral) burnup and cooling time, thereby achieving more specificity than other methods. 
Further, tomography has the potential to directly image the interior of the assembly, at multiple axial 
locations along the assembly length so that pin-level assay (as opposed to volume-integrating assay) 
can be achieved. Finally, gamma tomography is viable in both wet and dry measurement 
environments, and in either unattended or attended modes, characteristics that afford significant 
operational flexibility. 
A substantial body of knowledge has been assembled, both through modelling and measurements, 
regarding the viability of gamma-ray tomography. An overview of these techniques is discussed in 
section 2. While the prior emission tomography work has been informative and encouraging, a number 
of technical and viability questions need to be addressed in the context of IAEA’s evolving fuel 
verification needs. Addressing these questions is the primary motivation for the viability study 
described in this paper, a study performed under the auspices of several Support Programs to the 
IAEA: United States, Sweden, Finland and the European Commission. Feasibility is quantified relative 
to the ability to perform specific verification objectives, described in the following sections. Expected 
performance of existing tomography capabilities will be used as a benchmark for design of a 
“universal” gamma-emission tomographer capable of examination of a wider variety of fuel types, 
burnups, and cooling times.  
In this paper, we review the verification objectives and implementation scenarios defined by the IAEA, 
describe the modeling and analysis framework, provide example performance-prediction results for an 
existing fuel tomographer developed at the request of the IAEA, and describe the design of a 
“universal” GET design intended to support the full range of use cases envisioned by the IAEA.  
2. Verification Objectives and Implementation Scenarios
Verification objectives and representative implementation scenarios were defined in order to focus the 
scope of the viability study and ensure that the study’s results are immediately relevant to IAEA’s 
decisions about viability. The guiding parameters for the study, as defined by the IAEA and the GET 
study team, are summarized below.  
Verification Objective 1: Independent pin counting for routine verification of item integrity 
In this case, verification of the spent fuel assembly integrity is performed in a manner completely 
independent of operator-declared information (e.g., fuel assembly type, initial enrichment, burnup, and 
cooling time). The assembly is treated as an unknown sample and emitted gamma rays at one or 
more energies are used to directly calculate the spatial distribution of the emitting material. This spatial 
distribution is then used to determine the geometric pattern of the pins (e.g., sparse and rectangular 
for BWR, dense and hexagonal for VVER) and to count the number of pins composing that array. Two 
types of partial defects are considered: 1) diverted pins that are not replaced with any material, leaving 
an empty water or air channel, and 2) diverted pins that are substituted with depleted uranium oxide 
pins. Pins are removed/substituted in various locations of the simulated assemblies to provide insight 
into the impact of partial-defect location. The evaluation metrics for Objective 1 should recognize the 
inherent tradeoffs between the probability of detection (PD) and false alarm rate (FAR). 
Verification Objective 2: Quantitative pin-by-pin burnup determination 
Gamma emission tomography may also be used to quantify the burnup of each pin in an assembly. 
Characterizing the magnitudes and gradient of pin-by-pin burnup could help reveal, for example, 
diversion scenarios where one or a few pins are replaced between reactor cycles. Such pin-level 
burnup data could also be useful for indirect calculation of fissile material content (e.g., total Pu) at the 
head end of reprocessing facilities, particularly where direct measurement of fissile material may not 
be viable by conventional means. Verification of the contents of atypical items, for example canisters 
containing fuel pins extracted from other assemblies or unirradiated dummy fuel assemblies used by 
the operator for legitimate purposes, are other potential uses of a tomography device. For this 
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verification objective, operator-declared information could be incorporated (e.g., fuel assembly type 
and geometry in order to correct for self-attenuation), but it should not be required. 
The implementation scenarios to be considered, for all three major fuel types (i.e., BWR, PWR and 
VVER), are summarized below. 






Routine verification of old fuel being 
transferred to a geologic repository 40 
Attended or 
unattended; 
dry or water 
30 
Routine verification of fuel being 
transferred to dry storage 5 
Attended or 
unattended; water 30 
Random verification of in-pool 
inventory 1 Attended; water 30 
Anomaly resolution of specific 
assemblies 1 to 40 Attended; water 60 
Table 1 Description of scenarios to be considered in this study. 
3. Modeling and Analysis Framework
The GET viability study described in this paper is based entirely on simulated instrument responses. 
An overview of the modeling and analysis approach is given in Figure 1. Note that the approach allows 
for the simultaneous evaluation of candidate approaches in each step, which will support comparative 
evaluations of different instrument designs, analysis algorithms, and performance metrics under the 
different verification objectives discussed above. A more complete description of each step in the 
framework is given in [4]. Benchmarking with relevant field data is used to build confidence in the 
accuracy of the results and ultimately, the study’s findings (see [5-7]). 
Figure 1 Flow chart illustrating the analysis framework that is used in the GET feasibility studies. 
A novel and particularly important aspect of the GET modelling and analysis framework depicted in 
Figure 1 is the concept of the single-pin sinogram. The single-pin sinogram is the detector response 
for a virtual assembly in which all of the pins are inert (they attenuate but do not emit radiation) except 
for one pin. The summation of the set of single-pin sinograms in the assembly is equivalent to the 
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sinogram from the full assembly. This single-pin sinogram modelling approach allows the 
characteristics of each emitting pin to be varied, while the attenuation characteristics of the 
surrounding pins are unchanged. The net result is that a large population of simulated spent fuel 
assemblies (SFAs), each with a distinctive and inhomogeneous pin-to-pin burnup, can be created from 
a single transport calculation. The large populations of virtual fuel assemblies then allow concepts 
from statistical decision theory, in particular the receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve, to be 
used to measure task performance. Note that a virtual assembly in which a pin has been substituted 
with a depleted uranium oxide pin can be simulated by omitting that pin when creating the assembly 
from the single-pin sinograms, but simulation of a missing pin requires that the pin be missing in the 
initial photon-transport used to calculate the sinograms.    
It is recognized that task performance will be significantly impacted by the fidelity of the reconstruction 
algorithm. For instance, attenuation correction may impact the ability to detect the absence of inner 
pins in the assembly. The flexibility of the framework allows testing different reconstruction and 
analysis approaches on the same ensemble of simulated data and quantitative performance 
comparisons to be made on changes of any of the steps in the process. Both verification objectives 
can be tested in this framework. More discussion on reconstruction algorithms and data analysis can 
be found in [8]. 
4. Performance Prediction: Example Results
The modelling and analysis framework described above can be used to analyse many combinations of 
tomographer design, and reconstruction and analysis algorithms. A current tomographer, developed 
under direction of the IAEA and currently undergoing modification by the Finnish Support Program, 
provides a convenient and relevant system design for illustrating the value of the evaluation 
framework. The “Passive Gamma Emission Tomographer” (PGET) is a portable instrument for 
underwater fuel measurements, designed primarily for the verification of longer-cooled (i.e., >5 years 
cooling) fuels. The availability of measured data from PGET campaigns on BWR and VVER fuels in 
Finland has proven invaluable to the benchmarking of the modelling methods, and for comparison of 
image-reconstruction and analysis results from both simulated and measured PGET data. The PGET 
design and field-trial results are more fully described in [9-10]. 
The example case study presented here considers two burnup and cooling time combinations for 
PWR fuels: 10 GWd/MTU and 40 years; 20 GWd/MTU and 5 years. Cooling times shorter than ~5 
years for even modest-burnup assemblies will produce count rates in the PGET instrument that would 
paralyze the pulse processing electronics—such fuels are not considered here.  
Gamma emission from 40-year-old fuel is dominated by activity from 137Cs while the activity at 5 years 
is a combination of 137Cs, 154Eu and 134Cs. Single-pin sinogram data were calculated for the two former 
isotopes independently and a model of the solid-state CdTe detectors was used to develop a detector 
response function to convert sinogram data to counts in the detector. For this system, the energy-
dependent detector-response data is divided into three bins:  400-700 keV, 700-1100 keV, and greater 
than 1100 keV, consistent with the field settings of the PGET instrument. For the longer-cooled fuel, 
only Cs contributes significantly to the lowest energy bin, and only that isotopic response is used in 
subsequent image reconstruction and performance analysis. For the shorter cooling time, the low 
energy bin includes significant downscatter from the Eu lines—therefore only the middle bin is used for 
performance. Both approaches are consistent with how the PGET has been applied in field trials. A 
sinogram and an example of a reconstructed image from the middle energy bin, 700-1100 keV, for a 
simulated PWR fuel assembly with burnup of 20 GWd/MTu and cooling time of 5 years is shown in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Sinogram and reconstructed image for the PGET instrument assaying a PWR assembly (20 
GWd/MTU, 5 years cooling), using simulated data from the 700-1100 keV energy window. There are 
11 missing pins scattered through the assembly. 
In the example case shown in Figure 2, photon transport from a 17x17 PWR assembly with 11 missing 
pins was simulated to create 253 single-pin sinograms. The single-pin sinogram data were scaled 
independently and used to create a simulated fuel bundle with pin-to-pin variations in burnup. For this 
study, we assumed a uniform pin-to-pin variation of ±20%, a number at the extreme end of likely 
burnup variations even for BWR fuels (less variation is expected for PWR fuels), but within bounds 
indicated by discussions with operators. Note that any other patterns of burnup variation are possible 
by proper scaling of the single-pin sinograms as discussed earlier. The data were reconstructed on a 
regular pixel grid and the aggregated intensity of multiple pixels in a “neighbourhood” centred on each 
pin location was calculated. These aggregated pin-region intensity values are referred to as the “pin 
scores.” This process was repeated for each simulated fuel assembly, approximately 10,000 for each 
fuel type (PWR and BWR). This produces a large population of virtual fuel assemblies that have the 
same average burnup, but different pin-to-pin variations and statistical noise realizations. (For more 
discussion, see [4].) 
The pin-score summary for 100 PWR assemblies are shown in Figure 3. In this plot, the pins are 
indexed by their distance from the centre of the assembly (abscissa) and the score is plotted on the 
ordinate. Pins that are present in the assembly are shown in green, and pins that are missing are 
shown in red (the scores for water channels are shown in blue). It is clear that the scores for missing 
pins near the periphery of the assembly (right side of the plot) are well-separated from scores of pins 
that are present, and that toward the centre of the assembly the distribution of scores of missing and 
present pins overlap.  
The ability to distinguish present from missing pins – the probability of detection – as a function of the 
misclassification of pin – the false-alarm rate – can be quantified by the receiver-operator 
characteristic (ROC) curve as shown in Figure 4. ROC analysis is used in many fields; an example 
from imaging sciences relevant to this work can be found in [11]. For this simulated PWR assembly 
population (average burnup of 20 GWd/MTU and 5 years cooling) and the device simulated and the 
reconstruction methods used here, missing pins can be detected with high probability and a low false 
alarm rate. Some acceptance of false alarms (~1%) must be made in order to achieve high detection 
rates greater than 90% for missing pins in the center of the assembly. Important to note is that these 
performance-prediction curves in Figure 4 should be considered to be upper bounds on realistic PGET 
performance, since real-world instrumentation and processing effects (e.g., pixel to pixel variations in 
detector sensitivity) that can degrade image quality have not been included in the simulations. 
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Figure 3 Pin scores from an ensemble of 100 assemblies for a simulation of PWR with a burnup of 20 
GWd/MTU and a cooling time of 5 years. These data represent variation in inhomogeneous burnup 
and counting statistics from the data in Figure 2.  
Figure 4 ROC curves as a function of pin location in the assembly for the study described in Figure 3. 
The scoring is aggregated into “rings” of pins. Ring 1 is composed of the 8 pins that form a square 
closest to the centre of the assembly, Ring 2 is formed from the pins in the next square region, and the 
rest of the rings are aggregated similarly. Scores from the water channels are not included in the ROC 
analysis. Rings 6-8 have identical performance; only Ring 6 is shown. 
5. Design of a “Universal” Tomographer for Safeguards
Examination of prior tomographic applications to spent nuclear fuel is informative for the development 
of a “universal” tomographer design for safeguards that can cover both verification objectives and all 
expected implementation scenarios. Two prior and/or ongoing projects are highlighted here because 
in many ways they represent the extremes of the design space.  
The first design is the PGET instrument described earlier. This portable, underwater device was 
designed to assay relatively long-cooled fuels (>5 years) where the intensity of emissions, and the 
proportion of those emissions that are at energies greater than 1500 keV, are relatively low. PGET 
was specifically designed to deliver on Objective 1 (pin counting) but not necessarily Objective 2 (pin-
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by-pin burnup quantification) Each PGET detector head has  a dense array of CdTe detectors with 
very limited spectroscopic capability (i.e., broad ROIs) and relatively “light” collimation. The detector 
array collects projection data, and rotates through 360-degrees to collect a full sinogram. (Two 
detector heads are used in order to provide more inter-detector collimation.) This approach can offer 
rapid data collection in a rotate-only geometry. This system has been field-tested and has shown 
promise for detecting missing pins with various fuel types and characteristics [10]. 
The second example design was a tomographer built by Uppsala University in Sweden for the 
purpose of validating the burnup codes of reactor operators. This large, underwater device was 
designed to measure commercial BWR fuel shortly after removal from the reactor (few weeks) where 
the total emission intensity is high and the proportion of high-energy emissions is high compared to 
longer-cooled fuels [7]. Because individual isotopes were to be assayed, spectroscopic detectors (i.e., 
BGO scintillators) were required. This system used a sparsely populated detector array with very 
heavy collimation. The detector head required a translation step to adequately sample the projection 
data as well as rotate to collect complete sinogram data. This system was developed for and 
demonstrated on BWR fuel at a nuclear power plant in Sweden [12]. 
These two approaches can be considered bounding cases for the detector-head design of a universal 
GET for safeguards. In one case, there are sufficient detector pixels in the detector head to sample a 
single projection and thus the only motion necessary to collect sinogram data is rotation of the 
detector head around the fuel assembly. Addition of the second detector head enables both reduced 
sampling time and finer sampling along a projection (because the detector arrays are offset by half of 
the detector pitch relative to each other). This approach is possible in part because the detector 
elements (2mm wide by 5mm tall by 10mm deep CdTe crystals) are small enough to allow the fine 
pitch. Some problems with this geometry are (1) the potential for crosstalk between collimator 
openings (septal penetration), which reduces the fidelity of the line integrals and thus the resolution of 
the reconstruction, and (2) the low full-energy detection efficiency of these small detectors, which 
implies that spectroscopic peak analysis with background subtraction would result in low counting 
rates and thus discriminated (binned) counting is used instead, which introduces some level of 
scattered gamma rays in the recorded data.  
The other approach is to have a sparser detector array (larger pixel pitch) and fewer total pixels in a 
detector array. The detector must be translated laterally in order to “fill in the gaps” between the widely 
spaced pixels. This design is required if the detector (scintillator) is larger than the pixel pitch, and has 
the advantage of not being a susceptible to septal penetration as a finer-pitch design (this may be an 
especially important feature for scenarios is which higher energy photons must be detected). 
Furthermore, since the detector (scintillator) is larger, it allows for efficient full-energy detection and 
thus spectroscopic peak analysis with background subtraction applied in order to efficiently select the 
radiation of interest for the analysis. This is the design to be adopted in the present work. 
In general, the design parameter space reduces to spatial resolution (Can individual pins be 
distinguished?), energy resolution (How well can isotopic lines be distinguished?), and collection 
efficiency (Are total count rates manageable? Is there sufficient collection of key emission lines to 
ensure reasonable total assay times?). The collimator parameters (bore length, width and height) are 
the principle determinants of the spatial resolution and collection efficiency, and also define the data-
collection geometry (number of samples per projection and angular sampling)1. Energy resolution and 
to a lesser extent the collection efficiency, are coupled through the choice of detector material. Total 
data-collection time will depend on each of these parameters, as well as other engineering and cost 
considerations (e.g., acquisition time could be decreased by the use of multiple detector assemblies, 
increasing cost and mechanical complexity).   
Informed by prior work and simulations of the existing tomography instrument, it was determined that a 
collimator with a length-to-width aspect ratio of between 100:1.5 and 300:1 will be sufficient to meet 
spatial-resolution requirements for all three fuel types considered in this study. In order to meet 
Verification Objective 2 and identify gamma-ray signatures from specific isotopes, it will be necessary 
to have a detector with a spectroscopy capability, see ref. [13]. For calculating pin-wise burnup values, 
1 Only parallel-beam CT geometries are considered in this work. Other data-collection geometries may 
be considered after a performance baseline has been established for benchmarking performance and 
cost. 
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it will be necessary to resolve emission lines from key isotopes, primarily 137Cs (662 keV) and 154Eu (5 
principal lines between 723 and 1264 keV). In addition, for very short cooling times, it would be 
desirable to separate the response of 134Cs (605 and 796 keV) from the 137Cs lines. These objectives 
drive the system design toward high energy resolution scintillators as the detection material. A 
comparison of detector responses to simulated projection data for a single pixel for both NaI(Tl) and 
LaBr3(Ce) are shown in Figure 5. Lanthanum bromide was chosen as the scintillator for both its speed 
and energy resolution. On-going work [14], outside of the scope for the UGET project, will provide 
information about potential neutron activation interference with the peak evaluation capability of the 
LaBr3(Ce) detector. 
Figure 5 Detector response functions for NaI and LaBr3 for simulated projection data. 
Once the spatial resolution has been set by the collimator field of view, and the energy resolution 
requirement defined by the detector material, the design challenge reduces to striking a balance 
between managing count rates across all implementation scenarios while ensuring sufficient imaging 
efficiency for challenging cases: 
- High-count rate: For high burnup, short cooling time fuels, the total count rate at the detector 
needs to be less than ~106 counts/second in order to prevent excessive pileup in scintillators 
(e.g., LaBr3(Ce)). An example scenario for this case would be PWR, 40GWd/MTU, 1-year 
cooling time. 
- Sufficient efficiency: For medium-length cooling times (5-10 years), the system design must be 
efficient to the 1274keV line from 154Eu (for PWR), and for longer cooling times, efficient to the 
662keV line from 137Cs. 
To achieve this balance, the detector-head design strategy is to choose a collimator geometry that is 
consistent with spatial-resolution requirement and efficient for the longer-cooling time, lower activity 
fuel, and use in-collimator filtration to address the higher count rates at short cooling times. Detector-
head design is explored for two parallel-bore and one diverging-bore collimator, see Figure 6., 
assuming a 5.08 cm diameter right circular cylinder (RCC)  LaBr3 scintillator. This plot shows that a 
collimator with bores having dimensions 1.5 mm wide by 10 mm tall by 200 mm long is sufficient to 
keep the count rate below 106 cps for the shortest cooling times. Note that the total count rate would 
be reduced if a less efficient (smaller) detector was used, thereby increasing the integration time 
needed to achieve sufficient counts rates in the photopeak but allowing more detector elements to fit 
in the detector head (decreasing the pixel pitch). This poses an interesting optimization study 
investigating the tradeoff between the number of pixels in the detector and the total collection time for 
a projection, a function of the efficiency and the number of steps. This tradeoff is summarized in 
Figures 7 and 8. 
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Figure 6 Total count rate for simulated PWR fuel as a function of the collimator bore size assuming a 
5.08 cm diameter LaBr3 scintillator for three different collimator designs.  
Figure 7 Peak count rate as a function of collimator and scintillator size. The efficiency of larger 
detectors allows shorter integration times, but requires more steps per projection. These data simulate 
a PWR assembly with a 20GWd/MTU burnup and 5 year cooling time. 
The optimization of scintillator size with respect to total data-collection time is driven mainly by the 
scintillator efficiency. The knee in the efficiency curve for a right-circular cylinder (RCC) LaBr3(Ce) 
scintillator is in the neighbourhood of a diameter of 2.5-5.1cm. Smaller detectors allow fewer steps to 
collect a projection, but result in longer total integration times with respect to larger detectors that take 
require more steps per projection. An alternative to the RCC is a slab detector that is thick in the 
direction parallel to the collimator bore and narrow in the transverse direction. This allows a higher 
packing fraction (higher pixel pitch), fewer steps, and shorter overall data-collection time. However, 
this design would drive up cost considerably – these are custom detector geometries and the required 
number of detectors is higher – for a decrease in imaging time of only a factor of 4. 
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Figure 8 Total data collection time as a function of collimator and scintillator size. This demonstrates 
the trade-off between integration time and number of steps in a translate-rotate geometry. These data 
simulate a PWR assembly with a 20GWd/MTU burnup and 5 year cooling time. 
These considerations drive toward a detector design with 8, 3.8cm diameter scintillators behind a 
collimator with dimensions 1.5mm wide by 10mm tall by 200mm long. While only a single detector 
head is required for full data collection, multiple heads will speed up the total collection time. To collect 
projection data, each head would have to scan laterally. This could be done in discrete steps, or the 
motion could be continuous and the data collected in list mode (and sorted out later). A drawing of a 
single detector head and a schematic drawing of the multi-head assembly demonstrating the translate-
rotate scanning protocol are shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 Diagram of a single detector head of a “universal” GET design for safeguards applications. In 
the proposed system design, four heads would be arranged around the object to minimize data-
collection time, as shown in a top-view diagram on the right. To collect tomographic data with the 
sparse detector array, a translate-rotate geometry will be necessary. 
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6. Summary and Next Steps
A modeling and analysis framework has been developed to examine the feasibility of gamma-ray 
tomography instruments for safeguards verification of spent nuclear fuel. The framework is an end-to-
end evaluation process consisting of: detailed modeling of different tomographer designs; conversion 
of MCNP-generated transport data to energy-dependent flux sinograms; compilation of pin-wise flux 
sinograms into full fuel assembly with missing or substituted pins; calculation of the corresponding 
detector response sinogram for each virtual assembly; and energy-windowing analysis on the detector 
response sinograms. The generated sinograms may then be used in various analyses for each virtual 
assembly. For example, for Verification Objective 1, one may consider image reconstruction using 
filtered back projection or algebraic methods, pin scoring based on pin-region grey level or image 
analysis [15], and application of ROC-curve analysis to the pin-scoring histogram data. For Verification 
Objective 2 on the other hand, reconstructions using detailed algebraic models to extract quantitative 
pin-wise data may be required along with other quantitative measures of the capability to reconstruct 
the original simulated distribution.  
Using the modeling and analysis framework, experience gained from prior work utilizing tomography 
for spent-fuel interrogation, and the commercial availability of key hardware components, a “universal” 
GET design for safeguards applications has been defined. Such an instrument could be used for 
assaying high-burnup fuel with cooling times as short as 1 year, but also has sufficient collection 
efficiency to achieve reasonable assay times for lower-burnup fuels with long cooling times (e.g., 40 
years). This tomographer would support not only the detection of missing pins, but also the 
quantitative determination of pin-wise burnup.  
Continuing work will progressively improve the fidelity of the radiation transport and other analysis 
steps in ways that can support realistic performance predictions. For example, in the image 
reconstruction and analysis steps presented here, only very simple reconstruction methods and 
image-processing tools have been exercised. In the near future, the GET team will explore alternative 
reconstruction approaches that incorporate different flavors of attenuation correction and models of 
the imaging geometry, as well as different approaches to analysis of the reconstructed pin activities, 
see e.g. refs. [8] and [15]. These candidate analysis modules can be “dropped in” to the modular 
analysis framework and exercised to generate comparative ROC curves. Once the modeling and 
analysis framework is extended to address both verification objectives, the team will complete the 
systematic walk through each of the implementation scenarios and fuel types prescribed for the study. 
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Tomographic determination of spent fuel assembly pin-wise burnup 
and cooling time for detection of anomalies 
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Abstract: 
The IAEA has initiated Member States’ Support Program project JNT A 1955 to assess the partial 
defect detection capabilities of gamma emission tomography (GET) for spent nuclear fuel assembly 
verification. The GET technique is based on measurements of the gamma-ray flux distribution around 
a spent fuel assembly using dedicated, tomographic equipment and subsequent reconstruction of the 
internal source distribution using tomographic algorithms applied on the recorded data. One of the 
verification objectives identified for the project is the quantitative measurement of pin-by-pin 
properties, e.g. burnup and/or cooling time, for the detection of anomalies and/or verification of 
operator-declared data. For this objective, reconstruction algorithms that return quantitative, isotopic 
pin-by-pin data are applied. 
Previously, GET measurements performed on commercial nuclear fuel assemblies in Sweden have 
proven capable of determining the relative pin-by-pin power distribution with high precision in BWR 
fuel with short cooling time, based on the measured distribution of the gamma-ray emitting fission 
product 140Ba/La in the fuel. In the current project, the capabilities of GET to determine additional pin-
wise fuel parameters in additional fuel types are being assessed. The evaluations are based on Monte 
Carlo simulations of the emission of gamma-rays from the fuel and their detection in a tomographic 
measurement device. 
This paper describes the algorithms used for reconstructing quantitative pin-wise data and the results 
that are anticipated with this technique. It is argued that detailed modelling of the gamma-ray 
attenuation through the highly inhomogeneous mix of strongly-attenuating fuel rods and less-
attenuating surrounding water (wet storage) or air (dry storage) is required to yield high precision in 
the reconstructed data. The burnup distribution assessment would be based on the recording of 662-
keV gamma radiation from 137Cs, whereas the assessment of both burnup and cooling time 
simultaneously requires the GET measurement and pin-wise reconstruction of at least two isotopes, 
which puts constraints on the measurement equipment used. 
Keywords: Nuclear fuel assemblies; Partial defect verification; Gamma emission tomography; 
Burnup; Cooling time 
Introduction1.
Verification of spent nuclear fuel assemblies is an important constituent of the IAEA’s measures at fuel 
handling and storage facilities, and recently, a general request has been posed for verification using a 
partial-defect method for spent fuel having designs that allow disassembly before these are transferred 
to “difficult to access” storage [1],[2]. One promising candidate method for such verification is gamma-
ray emission tomography (GET), for which both experimental and simulation studies have indicated 
that even removal or replacement of individual fuel rods from an assembly may be detected. 
GET on spent nuclear fuel assemblies is performed in two steps; (1) the gamma-ray flux emitted from 
an assembly at one axial level is recorded in a large number of positions (typically 1,000 to 10,000) 
using well shielded and collimated detectors, and (2) the internal gamma-ray source distribution at the 
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measured axial level is reconstructed using tomographic algorithms. As a result, a qualitative cross-
sectional image of the internal source distribution and/or quantitative pin-wise source contents of the 
fuel may be obtained. The method is attractive in that it yields pin-wise information without requiring 
the fuel assembly to be dismantled. 
The previous work on tomography includes the design, fabrication and field-testing of a portable, 
underwater device within the IAEA JNT1510 project [3],[4]. Additional experience has been gained on 
equipment design, tomographic reconstruction techniques and analysis methods in Swedish projects, 
including the construction of a laboratory mockup and a heavy, stationary type of underwater 
tomograph, which was used in measurements at a commercial BWR reactor [5],[6]. In addition, a 
collaborative Swedish-Norwegian project has resulted in an operational tomography device for 
measuring power, burnup and fission gas distributions in research reactor fuel at the OECD Halden 
reactor [7]. 
In order to bring together previous experiences and assess the viability of GET for verification of used 
nuclear fuel to be transferred to difficult-to-access storage, the joint task JNT A 1955, ”Unattended 
Gamma Emission Tomography (UGET) for Partial Defect Detection", has been set up within the 
support programmes of Sweden, USA, Finland and the European Commission. In the first phase of 
the project, the purpose is to provide an assessment of the viability of the technique for safeguards 
applications. Two verification objectives have been defined; 1) pin counting for routine verification of 
item integrity and 2) quantitative determination of pin-by-pin properties such as burnup and cooling 
time for detection of anomalies. For the first objective, no operator-provided information is assumed to 
be known to the inspecting party and verification should be fully independent. For the second 
objective, operator-declared information may be used. In the latter case, the anomaly detection may 
either be based on comparisons between operator-declared pin-wise BU and CT and measured 
values of these properties, or more independently by inter-comparing measured pin-by-pin contents of 
studied isotopes. 
This paper accounts for the current status of the work performed on verification objective 2. 
Verifying spent fuel parameters2.
As a result of a fuel assembly’s irradiation history in a reactor core, the isotopic inventory of the fuel 
changes, and during the time period after irradiation, further changes occur due to isotopic decay. One 
way of keeping track of the isotopic inventory is to save information on the fuel’s initial enrichment and 
its detailed irradiation history. However, most often the history is summarized in two parameters; 
burnup (BU) and cooling time (CT), the former giving a measure of the total number of fissions that 
have occurred in the fuel during irradiation, and the latter describing the time period that has passed 
since final discharge from the reactor core. 
Both BU and CT of spent fuel can be measured and compared to operator declarations, thus enabling 
a verification of the fuel properties and a confirmation that the irradiation corresponds to a civil fuel 
cycle. As described below, spectroscopic measurements of the gamma radiation field around a 
nuclear fuel assembly may be performed (gamma scanning) to assess the content of gamma-ray 
emitters in the fuel, and estimations of BU and CT can be inferred based on these data [8], [9]. This 
type of measurement is typically performed on a complete assembly, and accordingly, gamma 
scanning may be used in safeguards for item verification, where the item is an assembly. 
When employing emission tomography, isotopic contents, and thus also BU and CT, may be obtained 
on the individual fuel pin level, potentially enabling the capability to detect anomalies not only in terms 
of presence of fuel pins but also in terms of pin-wise fuel properties. 
2.1. Gamma-ray spectroscopy to determine burnup and cooling time 
Gamma spectroscopy is an established method for non-destructive assay of irradiated nuclear fuel. 
The availability of different characteristic gamma rays for measurement depends on the emitting 
isotope’s production modes (fission, neutron absorption and/or nuclear decay) and half-lives, and the 
gamma ray’s branching ratio and energy. In particular, the latter has to be high enough to escape the 
assembly. Some of the most commonly measured gamma rays for fuel with CT ≥ 1 year are 137Cs 
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(T½ = 30.1 years), 134Cs (T½ = 2.1 years) and 154Eu (T½ = 8.6 years). Examples of experimentally 
recorded gamma-ray spectra from PWR fuel assemblies with CTs ranging from 5 to 28 years are 
presented in Figure 1, identifying the strongest characteristic peaks from these isotopes. 
Figure 1: Measured gamma-ray spectra (logarithmic scales) from three PWR fuel assemblies with CT ranging 
from 5 to 28 years. The spectra were recorded using a 44% efficiency HPGe, a cylindrical 25.4 x 50.8 mm LaBr, a 
cylindrical 50.8 x 50.8 mm NaI and a rectangular 20 x 30 x 50 mm BGO detector. Peak positions for Cs-134 (605 
and 796 keV), Cs-137 (662 keV) and Eu-154 (1274 keV) are marked 34, 37 and 54, respectively. Data from [10]. 
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It has long been established that the produced amount of 137Cs in the fuel is nearly proportional to its 
BU and so is the ratio of the production of 134Cs and 137Cs, see e.g. ref [11]. Accordingly, the BU of the 
fuel may be assessed by measuring the gamma radiation emitted in the decay of these isotopes. In 
addition, the measurement of this intensity ratio is approximately independent of, e.g., detection 
efficiency. However, directly using these proportionalities requires knowledge of the CT of the used 
fuel. On the other hand, reference [9] shows that BU can be determined independently of CT using 
gamma-scanning measurements of the intensities1 from two isotopes, see equation (1). 
(1) 
where: 
I1 and I2 are two measured intensities of, e.g., 137Cs and either of 134Cs or 154Eu. 
ki and κi are fitting parameters for a calibration curve on the form I = k∙BUκ∙e-λ∙CT for each isotope i. 
(For 137Cs, 134Cs and 154Eu, κi are about 1.0, 2.0 and 1.6, respectively, see ref [9].) 
λi is the decay constant of isotope i. 
Neglecting uncertainties in the calibration curves and correlations between the two measured 
intensities, the relative uncertainty of BU can be written as in equation (2). 
(2) 
Reference [9] also elaborates on how CT can be determined, independently of BU, using measured 
intensities of, e.g., 137Cs and either of 134Cs or 154Eu. In this case, equation (3) is used. 
(3) 
Assuming again independent intensity measurements and neglecting calibration uncertainties, we can 
write the uncertainty of CT as in equation (4). 
(4) 
For fuel assemblies with long cooling time, 137Cs with its long half-life of 30 years is most widely used 
for passive gamma measurements. Provided that all fuel rods have the same CT, the distribution of 
137Cs in the fuel gives a direct measure of the BU distribution. For younger fuel assemblies, with CT up 
to about 10 years, 134Cs is still available for assay (having a half-life of 2.1 years), enabling the 
independent assessment of both BU and CT in combination with 137Cs. The half-life of 154Eu (being 
8.6 years) enables similar assay using 154Eu and 137Cs for yet some decades. 
2.2. Tomographic assessment of pin-level burnup and cooling time 
The discussion in section 2.1, regarding the ability to estimate BU and/or CT from peaks available in 
the energy spectrum, is directly transferrable to an evaluation of a tomographic measurement, where 
the gamma-ray intensity is measured in a large number of positions and the activity distribution is 
reconstructed using tomographic algorithms. For tomographic evaluation, there are thus two 
possibilities, depending on the number of gamma peaks available in the measured energy spectrum: 
1 Analogously, activity contents of two isotopes may be used, which may be measured by means of tomography. 
Exchanging intensities with activities in equations (1)-(4) only affects the calibration constants ki. 
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1. In cases where peaks of two different isotopes are available in the spectrum, e.g. from 137Cs
and 154Eu, a tomographic reconstruction of pin-by-pin activities of these two isotopes may be
performed. Subsequently, equations (1) and (3) can be used to estimate the BU and CT pin by
pin with a precision governed by how accurately the tomographic technique can assess the
isotopic contents of individual pins, in combination with equations (2) and (4).
2. In cases where only the 137Cs peak is analysable in the energy spectrum, i.e. for long-cooled
fuel, the relative pin-by-pin BU distribution can be estimated with a precision of the same order
of magnitude as that by which the tomographic technique can assess the pin-by-pin 137Cs
content. However, one should note that this analysis builds on an implicit assumption that all
fuel rods in the assembly have the same cooling time.
In both cases, the direct analysis of the pin-wise contents of measured isotopes is also useful to 
identify anomalies, because large deviations in pin contents are generally not expected under normal 
irradiation conditions. 
 Tomographic algorithms for deducing quantitative pin-by-pin data 3.
Once data on the gamma-ray flux distribution around a fuel assembly has been recorded, a variety of 
algorithms may be applied to reconstruct the assembly’s internal source distribution. The applicability 
of some algorithms for quantitative measurements on nuclear fuel assemblies has been discussed in 
ref. [12], covering two general classes of reconstructions: analytic and algebraic. Analytic 
reconstructions, e.g., filtered backprojection, require no a priori information about the object and 
assume an idealized imaging geometry. These algorithms may be well suited for Verification 
Objective 1, in which little or no information about the fuel assembly is provided by the operator. As a 
result, qualitative images of the internal source distribution are produced, which may be analysed 
further to additionally give rough estimates of the quantitative pin-wise source contents. 
The other class, model-based or algebraic reconstructions, allows more information about the imaging 
system and object to be incorporated. In particular, gamma-ray attenuation through the highly 
inhomogeneous mix of strongly attenuating fuel rods and less attenuating surrounding water (in case 
of wet measurement conditions) or air (in the case of dry conditions) affects the recorded intensities 
significantly. Furthermore, the finite width of the collimator slits attached to each detector element and 
the transmission of gamma rays through the corners of even the strongest attenuating collimator 
material will cause large deviations from an idealised measurement geometry. As shown in [12], taking 
the detailed attenuation conditions and measurement geometry into account in algebraic 
reconstructions allows for conclusive quantitative pin-wise data to be obtained. Such algorithms are 
thus well suited to address Verification Objective 2, and they are further elaborated upon below. 
3.1. The algebraic approach 
In this approach, the sought-after activity distribution is represented by the activities in N picture 
elements (pixels) in an axial cross-section of the fuel assembly. Using this representation, the gamma-
ray intensity Im measured in each detector position m can be mathematically defined as a sum of the 





















 or equivalently    AWI •= (5) 
where ωmn is the probability that gamma radiation emitted from pixel n will be detected in detector 
position m. ωmn are here called contribution coefficients, and the performance of the reconstruction, to 
a large degree, depends on the accuracy of these values, which form what is also called the system 
matrix, W . The system matrix is generally obtained by means of calculations, in which various levels 
of detail may be introduced. This is further discussed in section 3.2 below. 
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Accordingly, after calculating the contribution coefficients and measuring the gamma-ray intensities, 
the source distribution can be reconstructed by solving the equation system (5). In this work, an 
iterative solution technique called ASIRT (Additive Simultaneous Iterative Reconstruction Technique) 
has been applied to solve the system for A , which updates the activities from one iterative step, k, to 













































ASIRT is considered to be appropriate for the purpose considered here, but several other solution 
techniques may also be used [13]. However, the application of a relevant system matrix is considered 
to be more important to the quality of the reconstruction than the solution technique selected. 
3.2. Calculating the system matrix 
The calculations of the contribution coefficients ωmn in eq. (5) can be performed with various levels of 
complexity, ranging from idealised instrument response functions, which neither consider the finite 
width of the collimator slits nor take gamma-ray attenuation into account, to very complex models that 
include detailed properties of the instrument and object as well as all physics processes that influence 
the recorded intensities. The more accurate model that is used, the more accurate reconstructions can 
be expected, and consequently, detailed models can be expected to return more accurate estimations 
of pin-wise isotopic contents and thus of BU and CT according to equations (1)-(4). 
In this work, the instrument response function is modelled in detail, including not only the finite width 
and height of the collimator slits but also gamma-ray transmission through the corners of the collimator 
material adjacent to the slits. Furthermore, the transport of gamma rays through the fuel matrix is 
considered in detail. (See the most detailed models applied in ref. [12].) An example of the intrinsic 
instrument response function is presented in Figure 2, for the device design suggested in the 
framework of this project, JNT A 1955, see ref. [14]. This device design comprises a tungsten-alloy 
collimator, where the slits attached to each detector element have a length of 200 mm, a height of 
10 mm and a width of 1.5 mm. 
Figure 2: The intrinsic response function of the device design suggested in the JNT A 1955 project [14] for 
1274 keV gamma-rays (154Eu) emitted at various distances x from one collimator slit opening and distances y 
from the slit axis. The response is presented in relative units on the z axis. The plateau at small y for each x value 
corresponds to the region directly in front of the slit, while the sensitivity decrease for larger y values when 
entering the penumbra and finally the umbra regions. Left: The response when only taking geometric effects into 
account. Right: The response when considering also gamma-ray transmission through the collimator material, 
showing that in the order of 15% of the radiation reaching the detectors has passed the collimator material. 
Intrinsic response function of the 
suggested JNT A 1955 device design [a.u.] 
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As shown in Figure 2, gamma-ray transmission through corners of the collimator material adjacent to 
the slits will contribute notably to the gamma-ray intensity that reaches the detector. In total, in the 
order of 15% of the 1274 keV signal (154Eu) can be expected to come from radiation that has passed 
the collimator material in the suggested JNT A 1955 device design. Consequently, to reach the 
percent-level accuracy in measured pin-wise isotopic contents, these contributions should be taken 
into account, which is possible using algebraic reconstruction methods modelling the setup. 
With respect to the gamma-ray transport through the fuel matrix, one should note that only full-energy 
transport of mono-energetic gamma rays is considered in this work, and elastic scattering is also 
neglected. To justify these assumptions, measuring equipment that is conforming to these 
assumptions must be used, i.e. having spectroscopic capabilities so that a full-energy peak can be 
selected and analysed. The devices employed in refs. [5] and [7] fulfil these criteria, as well as the 
device design suggested in the framework of this project, see ref. [14].  
For a more detailed description of the methods to calculate the system matrix, we refer to [12]. 
Examples of their application on tomographic data are presented below.  
 Viability study of tomography for assessing pin-by-pin fuel properties in 4.
BWR fuel 
As described in section 1, the purpose of these investigations is to study the performance of GET for 
Verification Objective 2: quantitative determination of pin-by-pin properties such as burnup and cooling 
time for detection of anomalies, for which operator-declared information may be used. In this section, 
the application of quantitative algebraic reconstruction methods on experimental and simulated data 
from BWR fuel is demonstrated. 
4.1. Using a priori information to calculate the system matrix 
One piece of a priori information, which is particularly useful for accurately calculating the system 
matrix in eq. (2), is the nominal geometry of the fuel. However, nuclear fuel assemblies are exposed to 
harsh conditions in the reactor core, and geometric changes often occur during irradiation, such as 
assembly bow, torsion and/or single-pin displacements. Accordingly, we propose that image analysis 
methods are applied to basic reconstructed images before detailed reconstruction of pin-wise 
properties are performed, see ref. [15]. As demonstrated in [15], image analysis allows the position of 
the assembly in the measurement device to be deduced and possible dislocations of individual fuel 
rods to be detected and corrected for. One should note that all analyses are performed using the 
same measured data set, and accordingly such a procedure requires no additional measurements to 
be performed. 
Once the current fuel geometry is established, one can model the gamma-ray transport through the 
fuel in detail. One can also make use of the a priori knowledge to assign pixels only to regions in the 
fuel that may contain gamma-ray emitting materials. (If a full-energy gamma peak from a solid fission 
product is analysed, and the fuel is intact, only the fuel rods may contain the measured activity.) This 
assignment is equivalent to forcing the background in the image to be zero, which is justified if the 
background in measured data is negligible, a prerequisite that is considered valid for the devices in 
refs. [5] and [7] as well as for the planned JNT A 1955 device [14]. However, in cases where the 
background is found to be significant, pixels may also be assigned to regions outside the fuel rods. 
In this work, a pixel pattern with five pixels covering each fuel pin has been used, as illustrated in 
Figure 3 for in a SVEA-96 BWR assembly. Pixels are only assigned to regions that contain fuel, and 
no pixels cover both active and non-active materials, which would adversely affect the quality of the 
reconstructions. Furthermore, the selection of one central and four peripheral pixels per pin has 
proven useful in making the reconstructions less sensitive to possible dislocations of individual fuel 
rods as compared to defining only one pixel per pin. 
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Figure 3: For fuel assemblies with well-known geometry, one may use a priori information to improve the 
algebraic reconstructions, enabling the measurement of highly accurate, quantitative pin-by-pin data. Left: The 
nominal geometry of a SVEA-96 BWR assembly. Knowing the fuel geometry, the gamma ray attenuation in the 
fuel can be taken into account in detail when calculating the system matrix, by introducing exact estimates of the 
gamma-ray travel distances through different materials in the fuel. Right: The pixel pattern can be adapted to fit 
the regions containing gamma-ray emitting materials, thus avoiding pixels that cover both active and non-active 
materials, which would adversely affect the quality of the reconstructions. Here, each of the 96 fuel rods in the 
SVEA-96 assembly is covered by 5 pixels and no pixels are assigned to other regions in the assembly.  
4.2. Measurement geometry under study 
The demonstrations of the performance of algebraic tomographic reconstruction algorithms for 
deducing quantitative pin-by-pin isotopic contents presented below are based on the measurement 
geometry of the PLUTO device, used in [5], which is schematically presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: The geometry of the PLUTO measurement device used in the experiments in ref. [5], here 
schematically illustrated from above with a BWR 8x8 fuel assembly in the centre of the device. Four BGO 
detectors in a heavy tungsten-alloy collimator could be rotated (R) and translated (T) to record gamma-ray 
intensities in various positions relative to the measured assembly. 
Section 4.3.1 describes the results of analyses of experimental data from a 4-week-cooled SVEA-96 
BWR assembly, as presented in [5], collected on the 1596 keV gamma radiation from 140Ba/La in 
10 200 data points, covering 120 angular and 85 lateral positions relative to the assembly. In order to 
assess the possibilities to analyse pin-wise BU and CT based on equations (1)-(4), section 4.3.2 
additionally describes the results of analyses of simulated data for the 662 keV radiation from 137Cs in 
the same measurement geometry. 
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Analysis of experimental 140Ba/La data 
The experimental data from ref. [5] have been analysed in tomographic reconstructions, both in terms 
of quadratic-pixel-based image reconstructions of the 140Ba distribution and in terms of pin-wise 
source-content reconstructions. One should note that the actual distribution of 140Ba was not known, 
but the reactor operator’s core simulator provided calculations of the pin-wise 140Ba content with a 
stated precision of 4% (1 σ), which could be used for comparison of relative pin-wise data. According 
to the core simulator data, the pin-wise 140Ba contents varied significantly; between -27% and +20% 
from the average content. The results of the tomographic reconstructions are presented in Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Results obtained in tomographic reconstructions of experimental 140Ba/La data from a SVEA-96 fuel 
assembly measured in the PLUTO device. (Data from [5].) Left: A grey-scale 55x55-pixel image of the 140Ba 
distribution in the assembly cross section, obtained in a tomographic image reconstruction. This image has been 
used for deducing the assembly’s position in the device and identifying possible dislocations of individual fuel 
pins; see ref. [15]. Right: The pin-wise agreement between the relative pin-by-pin contents of 140Ba from the 
operator’s core simulator and those obtained in an algebraic reconstruction, where the instrument response and 
gamma-ray transport through the fuel matrix were taken into account when calculating the system matrix. 
According to the operator’s core simulator, the pin-wise contents of 140Ba ranged between -27% and +20% from 
average, and the agreement between calculated and measured relative pin-wise contents was 3.1% (1 σ). 
As accounted for in Figure 5, the relative pin-wise contents of 140Ba obtained in the algebraic pin-
activity reconstruction exhibited an agreement with the data from the operator’s core simulator of 3.1% 
(1 σ), which was well within the claimed accuracy of the core simulator of 4% (1 σ). However, no 
benchmarking data on the actual rod-by-rod content of 140Ba at higher precision was available, and 
accordingly, the precision obtained in the tomographic measurements is unknown, albeit the high level 
of agreement indicates a high level of precision in the tomographic data, demonstrating that relative 
pin-wise isotopic contents may be measured with high precision for this fuel type. 
In conclusion, the tomographic experimental data from ref. [5] show that high-precision relative pin-by-
pin isotopic contents may be obtained by means of algebraic reconstructions, where the system matrix 
is modelled with a high level of detail with respect to the instrument response function and the gamma-
ray transmission through the fuel matrix. The results in Figure 5 were based on data collected serially, 
which required 10 hours of measurements in the PLUTO device. With the JNT A 1955 device design 
[14], comprising 32 detector elements collecting data in parallel, a similar data set may be collected in 
about 20 minutes. 
4.3.2. Analysis of simulated 137Cs data 
In order to further investigate the performance of the algebraic reconstruction methods for tomographic 
measurement of pin-wise fuel properties, simulations have recently been performed also for 662 keV 
gamma rays from 137Cs [12]. The simulations were performed using the Monte Carlo simulation code 
MCNP, modelling a SVEA-96 fuel assembly in the PLUTO equipment and a similar measurement 
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scheme as for the experimental data presented above. These simulations provide a means to 
investigate whether the lower gamma-ray energy of 137Cs may be used with similar precision as that of 
140Ba, which was experimentally demonstrated above. As described in section 2, the pin-wise isotopic 
contents of 137Cs can provide a means to assess pin-wise BU, and, in combination with measured 
134Cs and/or 154Eu contents also pin-wise CT. 
To facilitate the analysis, all rods were simulated with equal 137Cs content. The results of the 
tomographic reconstructions are presented in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Results obtained in tomographic reconstructions of simulated 137Cs data from a SVEA-96 fuel assembly 
in the PLUTO device. (Data from [12].) All rods were assigned equal 137Cs contents in the simulations. Left: A 
grey-scale 55x55-pixel image of the 137Cs distribution in the assembly cross section obtained in a tomographic 
image reconstruction. Right: Relative pin-by-pin contents of 137Cs obtained in an algebraic reconstruction, where 
the instrument response and gamma-ray transport through the fuel matrix have been taken into account when 
calculating the system matrix. The precision obtained was 0.87% (1 σ), indicating that relative pin-by-pin 137Cs 
contents may be measured at the 1% level for this fuel type. 
According to the results in Figure 6, the tomographic technique comprising a PLUTO-like design and 
an algebraic reconstruction methodology involving detailed modelling can produce relative pin-by-pin 
contents of 137Cs with a precision at or even below 1% (1 σ). However, one should note that the 
precision obtained for each individual fuel rod depends on rod position in the assembly; the precision 
is higher for peripheral rods than for central fuel rods depending on the amount of gamma rays 
escaping the fuel from the different regions. For the 36 peripheral fuel rods, the precision was about 
0.5% (1 σ), while for the innermost 32 rods, the precision was about 1.1% (1 σ) and the 28 rods in 
between were reconstructed with a precision of 0.7% (1 σ). Extrapolating this to fuel types with more 
fuel rods in larger and denser configurations, even larger uncertainties must be expected, which will be 
subject for further studies. 
The level of precision that was demonstrated in the simulations and that was indicated in the 
measurements corresponds well to the precision of measured gamma-ray intensities previously 
reported in gamma scanning of complete fuel assemblies, see ref. [16], which could be used to 
deduce assembly burnup and cooling time with a precision in the order of 2%. Accordingly, similar 
precision may be expected for individual fuel rods in tomographic measurements on SVEA-96 
assemblies, provided that data of the above quality can be recorded. The obtainable precision for 
larger and/or denser assembly geometries like PWR or VVER fuel has so far not been investigated. 
Discussion and outlook5.
5.1. Applicable detector types for tomographic assessment of pin-wise fuel properties 
The HPGe detector is currently the best available detector type for high-resolution spectroscopic 
measurements, and it would allow for several well-resolved gamma-ray peaks to be used in 
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tomographic measurement and evaluation. However, the detector size, measurement time constraints 
and practicalities, such as the need for cooling of this detector type, limit its applicability in a 
tomographic inspection device. Other semiconductor detectors of relevance are CdTe and CdZnTe, of 
which the latter has been used in refs. [3] and [4]. However, the analysis of full-energy peaks for 
deduction of pin-wise isotopic contents requires detectors with relatively high full-energy detection 
efficiencies - a constraint which excludes these detectors for this application. 
In the current project (JNT A 1955), scintillator detectors have been considered to be the best choice 
due to their ruggedness, reliability and high full-energy detection efficiency, including in relatively small 
crystals. In particular, the latter property enables the analysis of full-energy peaks, which is required 
for deducing information on BU and CT according to section 2. Furthermore, the instrument may 
contain multiple scintillator detectors, each connected to an individual collimator slit, in a relatively 
small total collimator volume, which is important to limit the required time for measurement. However, 
as compared to HPGe, the use of scintillator detectors will increase the uncertainty in determined peak 
intensities because the larger peak width, making subtraction of background under the peak less 
accurate. For the same reason, one may expect higher resolution scintillators (such as LaBr) to 
perform better in the determination of BU and CT than lower resolution alternatives (such as NaI and 
BGO). 
Here, the data from [10], with gamma-ray spectra displayed in Figure 1, has been used to draw the 
following conclusions on the applicability of NaI, BGO and LaBr detectors: 
LaBr: Its energy resolution of about 3% is high enough to resolve the most dominant 
gamma peaks in the energy spectrum, even for relatively short-cooled fuel 
(demonstrated in Figure 1 for a PWR assembly with a CT of 5 years). Accordingly, it 
may be used to determine the pin-by-pin BU and CT independently in tomographic 
measurements by studying a combination of either 134Cs and 137Cs, or 154Eu and 
137Cs. 
NaI: At relatively short cooling times (see the spectrum for CT=5 years in Figure 1), the 
interference of the134Cs peak with the 137Cs peak makes the applicability of NaI 
doubtful. At longer cooling times (for the measured PWR assemblies with a CT of 18 
and 25 years, respectively), it can be readily used to resolve the 137Cs peak, and it is 
also applicable for measuring the count rate in the 154Eu peak, albeit this peak may 
become too weak to be practically useful after a few decades cooling time. 
Accordingly, NaI may be useful for assessing pin-wise BU and CT in tomographic 
measurements of fuel cooled for a decade or two, until 154Eu is no longer available. 
BGO: For long-cooled fuel, BGO detectors can also be used to evaluate the intensity of the 
dominant 137Cs peak. According to the spectra presented in Figure 1, they are 
applicable for cooling times at 18 years and beyond. However, these data do not 
support its use for measuring the 154Eu peak, hindering assay of both BU and CT 
using BGO detectors. 
In conclusion, all scintillation detectors mentioned above may be used to measure the intensity in the 
137Cs peak for long-cooled fuel (demonstrated in Figure 1 for PWR assemblies with CT of 18 and 25 
years, respectively). According to the discussion in section 2.2, the pin-wise 137Cs content would give 
a direct measure of the pin-wise BU under the assumption of equal CT. For measurements on short-
cooled fuel (CT ≤ 5 years), LaBr is most likely required, and it may resolve multiple peaks in the 
gamma-ray spectrum for short- as well as medium-cooled fuel, enabling the determination pin-wise 
contents of several isotopes and thus both BU and CT according to equations (1)-(4). For fuel cooled 
longer than a few decades, count rate limitations will most likely limit the measurements to 137Cs. 
5.2. Results obtained until date and further studies 
The applicability of detailed algebraic tomographic reconstruction algorithms for assessing relative pin-
wise isotopic contents in BWR fuel with accuracy in the order of a few percent has been demonstrated 
using experimental 140Ba/La data as well as using simulated 137Cs data, indicating that even the 1% 
level is achievable for this fuel type. One may note that these studies are based on the PLUTO device 
design [5], whereas a somewhat different design is planned for within the JNT A 1955 project [14]. 
Still, these device designs also involve several similarities, such as the use of scintillator detectors and 
spectroscopic peak evaluation, making the demonstrations above relevant also for JNT A 1955. 
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However, the studies presented here have been limited to BWR fuel, and the actual performance of 
the JNT A 1955 tomographic instrument for measuring pin-wise fuel properties will depend on several 
factors, such as fuel dimensions and cooling times, assessment time constraints, detailed instrument 
design, detector dimensions, etc. Accordingly, additional studies are currently underway in order to 
assess more specifically the JNT A 1955 device’s performance for a range of fuel with different 
properties and for various levels of statistics, corresponding to variations in the assessment time. In 
particular, the possibilities for tomographic assessment of the most central fuel rods in larger fuel 
arrays, such as PWR, will be covered.  
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Abstract:
Using the decades of experience of developing concepts and technologies for verifying bilateral and
multilateral arms control agreements, a broad conceptual systems approach is being developed that
takes into account varying levels of information and risk. The IAEA has already demonstrated the
applicability of a systems approach by implementing safeguards at the State level, with acquisition
path analysis as the key element. In order to test whether such an approach could also be
implemented for arms control verification, an exercise was conducted in November 2014 at the JRC
ITU Ispra. Based on the scenario of a hypothetical treaty between two model nuclear weapons states
aimed at capping their nuclear arsenals at existing levels, the goal of this exercise was to explore how
to use acquisition path analysis in an arms control context. Our contribution will present the scenario,
objectives and results of this exercise, and attempt to define future workshops aimed at further
developing verification measures that will deter or detect treaty violations.
Keywords: arms control verification; systems approach
1. Introduction
The reduction or elimination of nuclear arms is not likely to occur absent a lower perceived need for
nuclear weapons and high confidence that commitments are being honoured.  Over more than 50
years of IAEA verification has taught us that achieving confidence requires a coherent and
comprehensive picture of the State’s compliance with its obligations.  
The traditional IAEA verification approach was based solely on the type and quantity of nuclear
materials present in a state, without regard to other factors that correlate with proliferation risk.  The
State-Level Concept (SLC) was recently proposed as a way to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of safeguards.  The SLC consists of the development of state-level safeguards
approaches (SLAs) to identify areas of higher proliferation risk and the collection and evaluation of
multi-source information, including safeguards information, to optimize future safeguards activities.  By
piecing together a broad range of information encompassing declared, undeclared, international
technical monitoring data, information from national technical means, open source, state-level, and
international trade controls, it may be possible to provide state-level confidence that commitments are
being upheld.   It takes into account broader State-specific factors, potentially allowing greater focus
on areas of higher risk of non-compliance.  This approach could be extended to all types of treaty
verification, including nuclear arms control and disarmament.  So, in addition to verifying compliance
for a particular treaty or agreement, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, it could be used to
identify areas where effective verification could provide the greatest confidence that a State is
complying with its commitments, and therefore help inform the most fruitful avenues for future arms
reductions or disarmament efforts.
2. State-level analytical approach in development of future arms reductions
initiatives
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The IAEA SLC methodology consists of three processes which help to develop SLAs (for more details
see Cooley 2011):
1. Identification of plausible acquisition paths.
2. Specification and prioritization of State-specific technical objectives (TO).
3. Identification of safeguards measures to address the technical objectives.
Listner et al. (2012, 2013, 214) demonstrated how acquisition path analysis can be carried out using a
formal methodology which is yet compatible with the principles defined by Cooley (2011). The
acquisition path analysis method uses a three-step approach: First, the potential acquisition network is
modelled based on the IAEA's physical model and experts' evaluations. Second, using this model all
plausible acquisition paths are extracted automatically. Third, the State's and the inspectorate's
options are assessed strategically. Moreover, Listner et al. (2015) proposed and evaluated also two
possibilities for determining technical objectives.
Applied to verifying arms control reductions, the development of a SLA could include the following
three steps:
1. Modelling of a cheating network and identifying cheating pathways.  This is a purely technical
assessment of attractiveness including technical difficulty, timing and costs;
2. Determination of technical objectives, including identifying limits for detection probabilities for
each area of a potential cheating network.  It is assumed that requirements for high
confidence verification result in the need for high detection probabilities for areas of highest
risk; and
3. Identification of the technical and administrative measures that would provide the required
detection probabilities. This would be expanded beyond classical inspections and could
include all types of measures related to the field of interest (e.g. information barrier
approaches could be useful).
When an existing treaty or agreement is in effect, the legal commitments set out the context under
which non-compliant behaviour needs to be detected by the monitoring regime.  Ultimately, pathways
identified in this context should be developed to better understand how to verify compliance with a
specific set of treaty objectives and commitments.  However, the methodology could be applied to a
full range of assumed conditions, and therefore allow for a more general analysis.  Following this
approach, cheating pathways (CP) could be mapped out to produce a state-specific inter-connecting
network of nodes and processes/flows for nuclear materials and weapons – beginning with more
generic models to protect sensitive information.  The “relative attractiveness” or usefulness in a 
particular nuclear weapons program CP could then be considered.  It is recognized that expert
judgment will be required where no data is available.
To achieve a state-level approach for arms control or disarmament, the methodology will need to take
into account materials, weapons and the links between the two.  Being that the IAEA SLC has been
designed for implementation in Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) for verifying peaceful uses of
nuclear materials, it may not be much of a stretch to expand to verification of nuclear material cycles to
states possessing nuclear weapons.  However, significant work will be needed to expand the model to
nuclear weapons, because national security requirements and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Articles 1 and 2 commitments will impede the ability to provide many details.  To-date, considerations
regarding verification of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons disarmament verification have usually
been addressed separately but the importance of these linkages have been recently presented (NTI
2014).
3. Applying the material pathway analysis to nuclear weapons-possessing
states
For the purposes of developing the methodology, we will consider the verification of nuclear materials
in a state possessing nuclear weapons that is subject to international commitments.  It is assumed that
an international inspectorate exists.  It is important to remember that non-compliant behaviour is
defined as the violation of commitments so the legal situation or the assumptions must be taken into
account. Two examples that we considered are:
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• Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) within NPT and Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA).  A State
having signed a VOA must not use the facilities under this agreement to produce material that
will be used in a weapon.
• State outside NPT and INFCIRC/66 in-force. A State outside the NPT but with facility or item-
specific commitments (INFCIRC/66 type agreements) must not use these facilities or items for
military purposes.
Possible non-compliant behaviour (edge types), in addition to clandestine processing, misuse of
existing facilities, undeclared import and diversion from existing facilities considered for NNWS would
be included to account for the possible additional commitments beyond the NPT and IAEA
safeguards.  Depending on the commitments, clandestine processing (i.e. production in undeclared
facilities) would not be part of the model because without a comprehensive agreement like in
INFCIRC/153, states producing fissionable material in undeclared facilities would not be violating a
commitment.
In states possessing nuclear weapons, two additional edge types could be considered: diversion from
the military fuel cycle and military processing.  These are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Example for a Cheating Path. Grey arrows represent misuse and diversion in the civil nuclear fuel
cycle. Additional edge types consider the military fuel cycle: Diversion from the military fuel cycle is represented
by the red arrow from “origin“ to “source material“ and military processing is represented by all the remaining red 
arrows).
So, depending on the type of commitment, these processes could be carried out by the state without
violating international law (e.g. in a INFCIRC/66 case but not if a multilateral treaty was in-force).
When an activity is allowed, it would be represented in the model but the detection probability would
be set at 0% because an allowed activity will not need to be monitored.
The methodology could be applied to three example scenarios:
1. A state with a complete military fuel cycle without safeguards but with the civilian facilities
under safeguards.  This could be under INFCIRC/66 or a VOA.  In this case, where a military
fuel cycle is allowed, the military pathways will remain the most attractive pathway for
producing materials for weapons and therefore it is assumed that there will be no need for
misuse or diversion from the declared civil fuel cycle.  The risk of sanctions, if non-compliant
behaviour (such as pursuing a pathway that using civil installations under international
surveillance) is detected would also deter misuse and possibly eliminate the need for an
inspection effort at this pathway.
2. A case where some gaps in military fuel cycle exist, where those gaps would be represented
by missing diversion edges or reduced processing attractiveness values in the acquisition path
model.  Effective verification, possibly including increased monitoring, could deter non-
compliant behaviour so that if State finds these pathways attractive, appropriate monitoring
measures in particular facilities would increase the risk to the State of detection, should they
attempt to exploit the pathway.  If the risk (and costs) of detection are high, the State should
be deterred from non-compliant actions.
3. Military facilities & materials put under fissile material control regime.  If military facilities and
materials are put under a multilateral treaty, these installations may be under the same
restrictions as civil facilities under the NPT. Therefore there could be increased attractiveness
to use these facilities for the production materials for nuclear weapons.  To deter the use of
these paths in violation of the commitments, the model would recommend a significant
increased monitoring/inspection effort.  The ability to verify a baseline declaration and
knowledge of past production will be a key factor.
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4. Applying the nuclear weapons pathway analysis to weapons-possessing
states
To-date, consideration of monitoring and verification of weapons or weapons components has been in
the context of specific treaties or during negotiations of possible new regimes. In applying a state-level
methodology to weapons, and developing the appropriate CPs, it will be important to consider the
strategic objectives of a state.  The CPs could be different if the objective is to expand the size of the
national stockpile or to increase the degree of technical sophistication of their stockpile.  Some
potential cheating pathways include warheads or weapons that were not included in baseline
declarations, diversion of materials or components from dismantlement, and undeclared production of
warheads.  Ways to link monitored nuclear material and facilities with warhead production &
dismantlement will need to be considered to achieve confidence that new production is not occurring.
NTI (2014) has worked to advance methods to verify material and warhead baseline declarations in
states possessing nuclear weapons.  The confidence in these declarations will be key to modelling an
effective monitoring/verification regime that could detect clandestine activities.
One option to begin modelling the weapons complex would be to use IAEA Physical Models and
indicators and modify them as appropriate.  There will also be a need to consider weaponization
indicators, to take into account possible reconstruction of existing warhead designs without use of
development/testing facilities as well as acquisition of a weapon or development of more sophisticated
weapons.  A challenge to the successful modelling of the weapons complex arises from the fact that
many of the processes, actions and infrastructure that might constitute an indicator of non-compliance
in a proliferant state may exist or take place as a matter of course in a weapons state.
5. Workshops
A workshop held at the European Joint Research Center in Ispra, in conjunction with the 2014 Fall
Meeting of the ESARDA Verification Methods and Technologies (VTM) Working Group (WG), began
to explore this systems concept by studying the possible parallels with the IAEA’s State Level
Approach (SLA), currently used to develop effective safeguards for nuclear materials.
An exercise scenario was presented to the working group that bridged the gap between safeguarding
of materials and NEW START style verification of nuclear weapon delivery systems.  Under this
scenario, a treaty was signed by two states that required each state to cap the total number of
warheads in its nuclear arsenal and to cap the number warheads it deployed to no more than 500.
Each state maintained a full nuclear weapons enterprise from material production and weapons
design, through manufacture and deployment on multiple delivery systems.  Members of the VTM WG
were asked to consider the potential pathways one of the states could take to cheat on its treaty
commitments, and discuss the possible application of acquisition pathway analysis and a state level
approach for identifying verification requirements for the treaty.  Figure 2, below, illustrates a simple
example pathway (highlighted in red) that could be taken by the state.
The workshop resulted in a number of lessons that will require further consideration as the application
of systematic level analysis to arms control verification is refined.  They are introduced below:
6. Verification Objectives
Verification objectives need to be specifically identified for arms control treaties, in order for the
systems approach to be applied correctly. The IAEA has a well defined “significant quantity” concept 
around which an APA can be organized; safeguards measures are designed to be capable of
detecting the diversion of one significant quantity of material within four weeks of diversion.
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Figure 2: An example pathway used during the workshop, visualising the weapons enterprise as a linear flow
from weapons useable material to deployed weapons. Declared facilities are coloured yellow, undeclared facilities
are coloured grey. In this example, the pathway exploited is to deploy additional warheads from the total declared
stockpile onto reserved aeroplanes, increasing the total number of deployed warheads from 500 to 660,
significantly breeching treaty limits. Neither the declared reserve aeroplanes, nor the declared reserved
warheads, would breech the treaty so long as they remain in reserve. More complex pathways exist which may
involve combinations of declared and undeclared materials, components, weapons, facilities, process, stockpiles
and delivery vehicles.
In contrast, verification objectives are not yet defined for future warhead treaties and may well be
treaty dependent.  For example, under the exercise scenario, the definition of a significant quantity of
weapons as agreed by the states might be tolerant of small discrepancies since each state is allowed
to deploy 500 weapons and small fluctuations around this limit may not pose threat to either state.
Small fluctuations may not threaten strategic security or stability and so may not be strategically
significant.  Nevertheless, the discovery of even one extra deployed weapon might be indicative of
larger scale cheating that could threaten the security of one or the other state.  Overall perceptions of
what constitutes a threat may well differ between treaty parties.  It may be useful to separately
consider a significant quantity for detection purposes and a strategically significant quantity for stability
considerations and the purpose of identifying detections timeliness requirements.  Lastly, it might be
that a suitable definition of a significant quantity during treaties where large numbers of warheads
remain deployed is not suitable when deployed numbers are considerably reduced.  It is therefore
important to develop a mechanism for achieving consensus on these verification objectives.
It is also important to define a significant quantity of the controlled item in such a way that declarations
made about it in relation to the treaty can be verified effectively.  Because of the secrecy surrounding
weapons systems, verifying that an item declared to be a weapon is a weapon (and that it is in the
declared status of deployment) could be challenging. Therefore definitions of category of weapon by
deployment status (e.g. deployed or non-deployed, in reserve, inactive, disassembled, or weapon
component) should be framed in a verifiable way, which also allows items that are declared as none of
those categories to be verified as ‘none of the above’.  Significant detail concerning the activities of the
nuclear enterprise and locations of declared weapons may need to be shared, and updates
exchanged regularly, to facilitate verification of deployment status.
To be effective, any verification system must be capable of detecting the diversion (or clandestine
production and deployment) of the significant quantity (of weapons) in a timescale that ensures that
the strategic security of treaty signatories or the security of the wider international community is not
undermined by the actions of a state that cheats.
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An extension of the Acquisition Path Analysis approach to monitoring weapons as well as materials
could include additional terms.  See Table 1 for a suggested extension.
Graph Theory Route Planning Acquisition Path Analysis Weapons Verification
Node Location Material form Weapon status/form
Edge Street Process / path segment Deployment process/path
segment
Path Route Acquisition Path Deployment Path
Edge Weight Distance Attractiveness Attractiveness
Table 1: An example extension of the acquisition path model to include nuclear weapon verification by
deployment status
7. Measures of Attractiveness
The working group discussed suitable measures of attractiveness for identifying the cheating
pathways most likely to be exploited under this scenario.  Comparison was made with the proliferation
resistance metrics defined in the Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance &Physical
Protection of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems (2011).  Broadly, the metrics were considered to
be suitable.  The metrics are titled below as per the Gen IV definitions for simplicity and are
accompanied by a summary of the discussion of each:
 Proliferation Technical Difficulty – Since weapons states already maintain the full weapons
enterprise, the ability to deploy existing weapons, build additional weapons or modify
stockpiles is not considered to be beyond the state’s capability.  Furthermore, such actions
could be masked to a large extent by allowed processes.  Nevertheless, some pathways may
require mobilisation and coordination of greater resources than other pathways (e.g.
deployment of reserve warheads onto reserve bombers may be accomplished more simply
than building a clandestine stockpile of new weapons and secretly loading them onto a
submarine).  Proliferation Difficulty and Detection Probability were discussed in terms of the
stealth required to successfully exploit a CP.
 Proliferation Cost – The cost of certain pathways relative to others is evident (see example in
previous bullet point).  Nevertheless, capital and operational costs of pathways may already
be accounted for in national budgets.  Only pathways requiring significant capital investment
may be deemed less attractive to a state wishing to cheat.  Overall, cost may not be a primary
factor in the decision to exploit a CP.
 Proliferation Time – The minimum time required to deploy a strategically significant quantity of
additional weapons.  The significance of the proliferation time is closely tied to the strategic
goals of the state.  For example, a short proliferation time allowing the deployment of large
numbers of weapons very quickly might be considered strategically advantageous in some
situations by a cheating state.  Equally, a long proliferation time associated with a very
stealthy build up of a clandestine stockpile might be considered attractive in other
circumstances.  Since both routes could be attractive, each should be appropriately weighted
in a state level model.
 Fissile Material Type – Not discussed in great detail since stockpiles of material were declared
under the treaty.
 Detection Probability – With no standard set of verification measures assumed to have been
agreed or allowed under this treaty, cumulative detection probabilities cannot be determined in
advance.  This reflects well the situation for future nuclear warhead arms control verification
where no specific verification technologies or methods have been agreed.  However,
Acquisition Path Analysis can be used to identify where specific verification measures might
be of most benefit.  Design requirements for technologies can then be stipulated based upon
the identified verification requirement.  This systems level analysis can therefore help identify
technology requirements for future treaties.  Weapons or weapons components require
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sufficiently robust monitoring to ensure that their location remains known to the inspectorate to
a high level of confidence, thus ensuring that they are not deployed in breach of treaty
commitments.  High confidence might also be required in ensuring that only declared items
can interact with declared delivery systems.  Detection probabilities for undeclared items at
declared deployment sites must therefore be sufficiently high.  Linked to this, the detection
times in such instances should also be very rapid.
 Detection Resource Efficiency – The efficiency in the use of staffing, equipment, and funding
to apply verification measures across different parts of the weapons enterprise.  There may be
points in the nuclear weapons enterprise where the ability to verify declarations with high
confidence would be particularly beneficial.  In the case of the exercise scenario, the
monitoring to ensure delivery systems only carried the declared number of warheads was
identified to be important.  Nonetheless, the verification focal point could shift depending upon
the aims and objectives of the treaty.
8. System Level Analysis Benefits
A systematic or state level analysis is likely already performed by states (such as US and Russia) that
have extensive experience in arms control agreements.  In the context of bilateral arms control
agreements, Weapons States have a basic understanding of a nuclear weapons complex, in particular
the competing needs for effective verification, protection of national security information, and
upholding NPT Article VI commitments. In this case, the system level analysis can help identify
specific verification requirements based upon a state’s own strategic concerns. It can help identify
useful ways of framing and defining verifiable objects and timescales and identify the types of
technologies needed to provide monitoring capabilities in specific locations.  While a formal approach
may add value to a Weapons State’s analysis, its primary benefit may be the common framework it 
can provide to states without the capacity for or experience with analysing arms control verification
regimes. In this case, the state level approach can promote understanding about the strategic and
technical challenges associated with arms control verification.
9. Further considerations
The development of a state-level approach to modelling material CPs is more advanced than for
weapons, but work can be done to further expand the models and make the linkages between material
and weapons cycles.  As mentioned earlier, a challenge to the successful modelling of the weapons
complex arises from the fact that many of the processes, actions and infrastructure that might
constitute an indicator of non-compliance in a proliferant state many exist or take place as a matter of
course in a weapons state. True indicators of non-compliance with agreements may therefore be
much more subtle in nuclear weapons states, requiring detailed information of the level of expected
activity in the state with regards to the weapons enterprise.  Verification methods need to be fine tuned
such that allowed activities do not mask cheating. Furthermore, non-compliant actions with potentially
significant consequences could take place of very short time scales, and so detection times must be
commensurately short.  Therefore the level of intrusiveness required to effectively monitor allowed
activities may be considerably greater than for current or historical agreements.  All of these factors
can be incorporated into suitable systems level models to improve the links between materials and
weapons.
The challenges associated with the protection of national security and non-proliferation information
must be taken into account as a realistic physical model is developed that incorporates further
intrusiveness.  Existing ideas for managing access for routine and challenge inspections or new ideas
will need to be considered.  Verification that declared items are situated in their declared location may
prove to be a relatively traditional matter of accounting, assuming suitable managed access
procedures can be developed. In contrast, verifying the absence of undeclared items, either in
declared facilities or undeclared facilities, could be perceived to be an onerous task.  Nevertheless, as
suggested by the results of the workshop, early priorities in this area could focus of ensuring
undeclared items cannot successfully be mated with delivery systems and there are parallels following
this approach to verifying the absence of warheads on delivery systems as accomplished under NEW
START at present.
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Systems level analysis, including acquisition path analysis can therefore provide clear verification
objectives for site visits based upon information already provided by the inspected state.  Clear
verification objectives may enable managed access procedures to be defined that met those
objectives whilst protecting sensitive information.
Any advancement in arms reductions and disarmament is likely to proceed in a step-by-step way.
Bilateral agreements are likely to provide the steps that will pave the way for more multilateral
implementation.  For example, future US/Russia disarmament treaties limiting warhead numbers may
build the infrastructure for facility monitoring and inspection activities, and transparency and
confidence-building measures amongst the de-facto nuclear weapons states may provide capital for
more intrusive monitoring activities.  Such a state-level methodology could help inform the direction of
future negotiations, present day technology R&D, and assessment of possible effective verification
regimes.
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Abstract:
Neutron multiplicity counting is useful in warhead or warhead component authentication to determine if
an item declared to be a warhead fulfils an attribute related to its fissile mass. The inspector will not
know the configuration of the warhead or component, in particular the exact fissile material geometry
and the configuration of potential material between the plutonium and detector. Assay bias for highly
multiplicative samples has been studied only to a limited extent; corrections to the point model are
based on empirical data valid for only a small range of geometries. We systematically study the bias
and propose physics-based corrections for spherical shell geometries using MCNPX-PoliMi
simulations. As a result, the bias compared to the point model equations can be significantly reduced,
but an uncertainty remains which must be quantified.
Keywords: disarmament, verification, neutron multiplicity counting, point model
1. Disarmament Verification
As part of verified fissile warhead and warhead component inventory declarations and the verification
of warhead dismantlement, three elements will most likely be key to a sound verification regime. First,
warheads and warhead components must be uniquely identified so that warheads and components in
stock are not counted twice. Second, warheads and components must be authenticated.
Authentication in this context is the process during an on-site inspection by which it is assessed by
measurements whether a specific item is a nuclear warhead (or component). Third, a robust Continuity
of Knowledge could be defined as providing means to effectively demonstrate over a certain time or
process, e.g. during warhead dismantlement, the unchanged identity of the treaty-accountable item
and its integrity (i.e. that no undeclared changes to the item occurred).
Due to the classified nature of the items under investigation, direct measurements for authentication
purposes will most likely not be possible as they would reveal information that is considered sensitive
for nonproliferation, national security and possibly other reasons. The use of information barriers could
overcome this problem. An information barrier takes classified measurements but converts the results
to an unclassified output (such as a binary yes/no signal) while protecting the sensitive data from the
inspector’s view.
In the attribute approach, the inspecting and host parties agree on a set of attributes that the items
would be checked against and on an analysis algorithm. This set should be defined in a way that it
allows for an assessment whether a declared warhead (component) is genuine. One of the attributes
that could be considered is related to its fissile mass. This attribute could perhaps be assessed by
neutron multiplicity measurements using He-3 detectors.
A high reliability of attribute measurement techniques is required as inspectors cannot review and
analyze detailed measurement results, if they are in doubt for whatever reasons. In contrast to other
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situations where radioactive samples are characterized, the knowledge that exists prior to the
measurements, for example the sample's geometry, may be inadequate. Many measurement
techniques require certain information on a sample to function accurately. Inspectors must understand
how large deviations between real and measured values (bias) become as the properties of the item
and intervening materials vary in plausible manners. Besides the configuration of the fissile material
itself, bias may be the result of the potential presence of materials between warhead component and
detector. In the case of fully assembled warheads, materials such as a conventional explosive
surround the fissile component. Furthermore, most nuclear warheads and warhead components are
stored in containers for safety reasons [1, p. 33].
In this paper, the major source of neutron multiplicity counting bias with relevance to warhead
authentication is discussed which occurs for samples with high masses and neutron multiplication.
Furthermore, it is investigated how this bias depends on the sample configuration in order to assess
the reliability of neutron multiplicity counting when the configuration remains unknown.
2. Bias for highly multiplicative plutonium samples
Neutron multiplicity counting assesses the plutonium mass by counting the neutrons that are detected
within a defined gate length after a neutron trigger. The measured quantities are the Singles, Doubles
and Triples rates S, D and T. The theory behind neutron multiplicity counting that allows the deduction
of the fissile mass, the neutron multiplication and the quantification of (𝛼, 𝑛) reactions from S, D and T
is based on a derivation by Böhnel [2]. It inter alia makes the assumption that the amount of induced
fission started by the neutrons from a spontaneous fission is constant regardless of where an original
spontaneous fission event occurred (“point model”). While this assumption is unproblematic for gram
quantities of plutonium metal, it becomes a major source of bias with increasing sample size.
Indeed, leakage of neutrons from a spontaneous fission and secondary neutrons from induced fission
depends on the position of the initial spontaneous fission event [3]. For spherical configurations, this
dependence can be expressed by the function 𝑀(𝑟), where 𝑀 is the multiplication, i.e. the total
number of leaked neutrons per spontaneous fission neutron, and 𝑟 is the position of the spontaneous
fission event.
There has been some success in applying empirical correction factors that depend on the measured
multiplication: Krick et al. [3] determined separate S, D and T corrections based on MCNPX
simulations of plutonium cylinders to obtain the correct masses. These corrections remain, however,
geometry-dependent [3].
Croft et al. [4] proposed another model coupled with the desired physical understanding: In the
equations required to deduce the fissile mass, the multiplication 〈𝑀𝑛〉 appears up to the fifth order 
(n = 5) [5]. According to the “point model”, assuming constant multiplication at all spontaneous fission 




, n = 2 … 5





The corrected equations are then [4]
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𝑆 = 𝐹 ∙ 𝜖 ∙ 〈𝑀〉 ∙ 𝜈𝑠𝑓1(1 + 𝛼) 
𝐷 =
𝐹 ∙ 𝜖2 ∙ 𝑓𝑑 ∙ 〈𝑀
2〉
2





𝐹 ∙ 𝜖3 ∙ 𝑓𝑡 ∙ 〈𝑀
3〉
6




3(𝑔4 ∙ 〈𝑀〉 − 𝑔3)
𝜈𝑠𝑓2 ∙ 𝜈𝑖2
𝜈𝑖1 − 1
+ 3(𝑔5 ∙ 〈𝑀





where 𝜈𝑠𝑓𝑛 are the factorial moments of the spontaneous fission multiplicity distribution,  𝜈𝑖𝑛 are the 
factorial moments of the induced fission multiplicity distribution, 𝐹 is the spontaneous fission rate from
which the fissile mass 𝑚 can be deduced if the isotopic composition is known, 𝜖 is the detection
efficiency, 𝛼 is the ratio of (𝛼, 𝑛) to spontaneous fission reactions, 𝑓𝑑 and 𝑓𝑡 are the Doubles and 
Triples gate fractions. We have solved these equations for 〈𝑀〉, α and m.
3. Simulations
It has been shown that this approach indeed removes the bias [6]. This requires, however, full
knowledge of the sample configuration in order to obtain 𝑀𝑛(𝑟) and the 𝑔𝑛 from Monte Carlo 
simulations. In the following, parameter studies are presented with the aim of showing how the 𝑔𝑛 can 
be estimated when the sample configuration is not fully known.
MCNPX-PoliMi simulations [7] have been performed with plutonium metal samples (94% Pu-239 and
6% Pu-240, 𝜌 = 19.8 g cm3⁄  ) in spherical geometries, defined by their outer radius rout and in the case 
of hollow spheres their inner radius rin. A series of solid spheres and four series of hollow spheres 
(rin = 1.0 cm, 2.0 cm, 3.5 cm, 5.0 cm) were simulated with a variety of masses and accordingly rout. In 
the individual series, the thickness d = rout − rin  was increased up to 2.9 cm. 
𝑔𝑛estimate based on thickness 
The simulations show a strong dependence of the correction factors on the thickness 𝑑. Figure 1
shows 𝑔2(𝑑) for the configurations with different rin. The slopes of 𝑔3, 𝑔4 and 𝑔5 are similar, as can be 
seen from Figures 4, 5 and 6 in the Appendix. Most importantly, the figures show that the dependence
of the 𝑔𝑛 on 𝑟𝑖𝑛 is rather limited; the curves of all hollow spheres are very similar. 
Based on these results, the 𝑔𝑛 can be approximated as a function of 𝑑  if it is known whether the 
configuration is best resembled by a solid or hollow sphere, but without necessarily knowing 𝑟𝑖𝑛  or 
𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡. When for example choosing our results for 𝑟𝑖𝑛 = 2.0 𝑐𝑚  as reference curves to determine the 𝑔𝑛, 
the deviations of the plutonium mass obtained with the corrected analysis from the true values can be
expected to be small for hollow spheres with different 𝑟𝑖𝑛  but constant 𝑑. 
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𝑔𝑛estimate based on multiplication 
If 𝑑 is not available, an estimate of the 𝑔𝑛  can also be obtained as a function of the average 
multiplication, a direct output of the analysed multiplicity counting results. From Figure 2 and also
Figures 7, 8 and 9 in the Appendix, it can be seen that the slopes of 𝑔𝑛(< 𝑀 >) are steeper for smaller 
rin. Depending on the available information on the sample configuration, we suggest to choose a 
reference curve and an empirical fit function. Double exponential functions are suited to sufficiently
represent the data. Assuming a hollow sphere, a reasonable choice for a reference curve could for
example be the 𝑟𝑖𝑛 = 2.0 𝑐𝑚 data. In general, the magnitudes of the differences between the curves of 
the different 𝑟𝑖𝑛  are larger for 𝑔𝑛(< 𝑀 >) than for 𝑔𝑛(𝑑). As a result, the possible deviations of the 𝑔𝑛 
estimated from 𝑔𝑛(< 𝑀 >) are generally larger compared to 𝑔𝑛(𝑑). 
𝑔𝑛estimate based on fissile mass 
It has been proposed to estimate the 𝑔𝑛 as a function of fissile mass for solid sphere and cylinder 
configurations [4]. Figure 3  shows 𝑔2 of the solid and hollow sphere configurations. The results for 𝑔3, 
𝑔4 and 𝑔5 are shown in Figures 10, 11 and 12 in the Appendix. Determining the 𝑔𝑛 from a reference 
function of the fissile mass introduces large uncertainties, as their values strongly depend on the
actual configuration. Thus, a reliable reference function cannot be given without additional information
such as the radius or the multiplication.
Figure 1: g2 as a function of thickness 
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Figure 2: g2 as a function of multiplication
Figure 3: g2 as a function of fissile mass
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Influence of isotopic composition
Results of simulations with different plutonium isotopic compositions are shown in Table 1. The 𝑔𝑛 
increase slightly with Pu-239 content. Compared to the influence of geometries, the effect of the
isotopic composition is small. Knowledge of the isotopic composition is helpful to estimate the 𝑔𝑛, but 
𝑔𝑛 estimates without considering the isotopic composition can remain fairly accurate. 
Pu-239 Pu-240 𝑔2 𝑔3 𝑔4 𝑔5 
0.70 0.30 1.0040 1.0118 1.0233 1.0383
0.85 0.15 1.0045 1.0133 1.0263 1.0433
0.97 0.03 1.0049 1.0146 1.0288 1.0474
Table 1: g2 of a hollow sphere configuration (inner radius 3.5 cm, outer radius 4.9 cm) and different isotopic 
compositions 
Reflected solid sphere
𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 2.3 𝑐𝑚 
Reflected hollow sphere





Table 2: gn for reflected configurations 
Influence of neutron reflection
In order to study the influence of neutron reflection, simulations have been performed for two
plutonium configurations (a solid sphere, 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 2.3 𝑐𝑚 and a hollow sphere, 𝑟𝑖𝑛 = 3.5 𝑐𝑛, 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 4.9 𝑐𝑚) 
surrounded by a 3 cm thick layer of polyethylene (𝜌 = 0.955 𝑔 𝑐𝑚3⁄ ). The results for the 𝑔𝑛   are shown 
in Table 2. Compared to the unreflected configurations, they are somewhat smaller. Accordingly,
information of reflection is helpful to determine the 𝑔𝑛 with high accuracy. 
4. Conclusion
Without detailed knowledge of the sample configuration, the 𝑔𝑛 must be estimated. For hollow 
spheres, they can be approximated with high accuracy when the thickness 𝑑 is known. A less accurate
estimate is obtained when only the multiplication is known. Reflection decreases the 𝑔𝑛. As the 
available information on the sample configuration will be limited in the case of warhead authentication,
uncertainties in the mass assessments remain due to the uncertainties of the 𝑔𝑛. The more 
information is available, the more reliable will the assessment be. In any case, according to which
information is given, the remaining uncertainties should be quantified to understand the reliability of
the technique.
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Appendix
Figure 5: g4 as a function of thickness
Figure 4: g3 as a function of thickness
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Figure 6: g5 as a function of thickness
Figure 7: g3 as a function of multiplication
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Figure 9: g5 as a function of multiplication
Figure 8: g4 as a function of multiplication
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Figure 10: g3 as a function of fissile mass
Figure 11: g4 as a function of fissile mass
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Figure 12: g5 as a function of fissile mass
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Disposition of Certain U.S. Exports of High Enriched Uranium 
Santiago Aguilar, Danielle Emche, Brian Horn, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Washington, D.C. 
Santiago.Aguilar@nrc.gov, Danielle.Emche@nrc.gov, Brian.Horn@nrc.gov, 
Abstract: 
In 2012, the United States (U.S.) Congress, under provisions of the American Medical Isotopes Production 
Act, required the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) to submit a report 
detailing the current disposition of previous U.S. exports of highly enriched uranium (HEU) used as fuel or 
targets in a nuclear research or test reactor (RTR). In January 2014, the U.S. NRC submitted the requested 
report to Congress. In the preparation of the report, U.S. NRC staff reviewed nearly 1,700 HEU export 
transactions, 1,400 HEU import transactions, and compared the information to nearly 800 export licenses 
and license amendments. The report found that the bulk of the U.S. HEU exports and imports, 
approximately 95 and 80 percent respectively, occurred prior to 1990. The U.S. HEU exports peaked in the 
late 1960s and have since declined dramatically due to the shutdown of many foreign HEU-fueled RTR 
facilities and programs. The U.S. exported approximately 22,600 kilograms (kg) of HEU, of which 7,700 kg 
was imported back to the United States.  
The United States continues the effort to reduce and eliminate the use of HEU for use in RTRs and medical 
isotope production. Although the U.S. exported HEU to 35 countries, 20 countries still possess some U.S. 
HEU as RTR fuel or target material. Some of the outcomes from the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security 
Summits were statements on behalf of various countries, endorsing or committing to the minimization of 
HEU and potential replacement of HEU use in the future production of medical isotopes.  
Keywords: Highly Enriched Uranium; Export; Minimization; Safeguards; Security 
Introduction 
Acknowledging the comprehensive international framework and global partnerships that ensure nuclear 
material safeguards and security, there is likewise a high degree of United States (U.S.) domestic interest 
to identify and minimize risks associated with highly enriched uranium (HEU). In accordance with U.S. 
domestic legislation requirements,1 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) developed a 
report that assessed the current disposition of U.S. exported HEU, defined as uranium enriched to 20 
percent or more in the isotope uranium-235. In January 2014, the Chairman of the U.S. NRC submitted 
the, “Report to Congress on the Current Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Exports Used as Fuel or 
Targets in Nuclear Research or Test Reactors.”  For all previous U.S. exports of HEU used as fuel or 
targets in a research or test reactor (RTR), the U.S. NRC reported to Congress on: 
• the current location of the HEU;
• whether the HEU has been irradiated;
• whether the HEU has been used for the purpose stated in their export license;
• whether they have been used for an alternative purpose and, if so, whether such alternative
purpose has been explicitly approved by the Commission;
• the year of export, and re-importation, if applicable;
• the current physical and chemical forms of the HEU; and
• whether the HEU has been stored in a manner which adequately protects against theft
and unauthorized access.
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The U.S. NRC developed the report by examining information dating from 1950 through 2012. Data sources 
analyzed included export license records (over 800); reports by and technical discussions with staff from the 
National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI); records for 
tracking movements of nuclear materials from and to facilities within the United States known as the Nuclear 
Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) database (over 1,700 export transactions and 
1,400 transactions involving imports and receipts); and U.S. interagency bilateral physical protection visit 
report information. The report also built upon information that the U.S. NRC presented to Congress in a 
January 1993 report on the disposition of previous HEU exports.2 Additionally, the U.S. NRC staff consulted 
with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Department of State (DOS), and other relevant agencies. 
The report recognizes the significant duration of U.S. experience with exporting HEU and the changes that 
have occurred over the last 60 years. In order to accurately capture the complexity associated with the 
current disposition of U.S. exported HEU, the report provides an overview of the historical and legislative 
evolution of the U.S. experience with exporting HEU, and distinguishes particular policy and technological 
developments that have contributed to the current disposition of U.S. exported HEU.  
Summary of Report Findings 
The U.S. Government reviewed all of the available data and contacted the foreign governments relevant to 
the U.S. HEU that was exported since 1957, which totaled 22,600 kilograms (kg). This equates to 
approximately 896 significant quantities, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The 
U.S. NRC was able to identify the disposition or location of 93 percent of this previously exported HEU. This 
was a major accomplishment, considering the challenges that many historical records predate electronic 
recordkeeping (increasing the likelihood that records were incomplete); the agreements under which the 
United States exports HEU do not require the receiving country to report to the United States on the ultimate 
disposition of the HEU; and, there are inherent accounting uncertainties associated with HEU RTR fuel 
cycle and medical isotope processing operations.  
Of the 22,600 kg of previously exported HEU, the U.S. NRC determined that 7,700 kg was imported back 
to the United States, and 6,100 kg currently resides in 20 countries. Of the remaining 8,800 kg, 
information indicates that more than 4,300 kg of the U.S. HEU was eliminated by down-blending to LEU; 
approximately 500 kg of HEU was eliminated in highly-dilute processing waste; and at least 2,400 kg of 
HEU was burned up through irradiation in RTRs. There is a remaining seven percent, or 1,600 kg, of 
HEU that was not precisely reconciled by existing records.  This percentage will continue to decrease as 
the United States continues to work with foreign governments to reconcile information and import 
material back to the United States. 
U.S. History of Exports of Highly Enriched Uranium 
The United States has always recognized and continues to recognize the importance for preserving the 
security interests associated with nuclear materials in order to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
During the U.S. NRC’s work developing the report, it was useful to examine and assess the policy and 
historical factors that contributed to the creation of the U.S. and international nuclear materials export 
regime. Through a review of the U.S. history and experience with exporting HEU, the U.S. NRC was able to 
further contextualize its data findings, and identify enhancements that have developed over the years 
related to the U.S. and international nuclear export regime, and which contribute to the current disposition of 
U.S. exported HEU. 
The origin of the U.S. experience with exporting HEU began with President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
“Atoms for Peace” speech, given to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953. 
Following this speech, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 by replacing it with the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) to establish the legal framework for developing the U.S. civilian nuclear 
industry, promoting cooperation with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 
ensuring appropriate controls to protect public health, safety, and U.S. common defense and security. 
In tandem with the “Atoms for Peace” speech, the U.S. Government recognized the need for 
establishing an effective, independent safeguards verification system administered by an 
autonomous international organization of broad membership and strong collective purpose. The 
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U.S. Government strongly promoted the development and implementation of IAEA’s safeguards 
verification.  
U.S. Agreements and Requirements for Exports 
Starting in the 1950s, the United States established peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements, under 
Section 123 of the AEA, which became known as “123 Agreements,” with countries and organizations. 
These Agreements are a cornerstone of and precondition for U.S. export of nuclear materials. Presently, the 
United States maintains bilateral 123 Agreements with 20 individual countries, the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM),3 the IAEA,4 and Taiwan.5 The scope and content of 123 Agreements have 
evolved significantly since the 1950s, reflecting the progression of the international nuclear nonproliferation 
regime and its key policy instruments – IAEA safeguards agreements and the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Additionally, 123 Agreements evolved to reflect technological 
advancements in the nuclear field, and U.S. statutory requirements, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Act of 1978 (NNPA). 
Certain fundamental U.S. principles set forth in the 123 Agreements have not changed over the last 60 
years. The United States continues to obtain guarantees from the governing bodies of the cooperating 
nations and organizations stipulating that safeguards will be maintained, no material or equipment 
supplied by the United States under the agreements will be used for nuclear weapons or for research on 
or development of nuclear weapons or for any other military purpose, the appropriate physical protection 
measures will be maintained, and the United States will have certain prior consent rights (for example if 
the material or equipment supplied under an agreement may be transferred to a third party that had not 
been provided for in the agreement). 
Up until the 1970s, most of the 123 Agreements in force with countries interested in building and 
operating RTRs provided for the lease of HEU with explicit provisions for the return of the spent nuclear 
fuel to the United States. Following ratification of the NPT, the United States began relying on the IAEA to 
implement safeguards, and the United States stopped applying bilateral safeguards. From 1964 – 1988, 
the United States also began to operate under a policy known as the “Off-Site Fuels Policy,” and no 
longer required returns of spent fuel but continued to accept, store and process it for certain countries and 
in certain cases. During the 1990s, the Off-Site Fuels Policy and associated programs evolved into the 
present-day NNSA/GTRI managed Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, 
which is discussed further in this paper. 
The U.S. requirements and process for the licensing of HEU exports have evolved significantly since the 
1950s. Initially, all aspects of the U.S. reactor research, development, and demonstration programs, and 
associated international cooperation agreements were promoted, executed, and administered by the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In 1975, the responsibility for nuclear material export licensing was 
transferred to the U.S. NRC, as a result of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. The U.S. NRC licenses 
exports of nuclear material and equipment pursuant to the criteria set forth in the 1954 AEA, as amended. 
The existing U.S. NRC regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 110, set forth the 
criteria for licensing exports of nuclear materials and equipment as prescribed by the AEA.6 
U.S. NRC licensing criteria address the issues of nuclear non-proliferation, physical protection, and HEU 
minimization. Overall, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis that an approval of proposed 
exports of nuclear material or equipment will not be adverse to the common defense and security of the 
United States. In conducting nuclear material export licensing reviews, the U.S. NRC must seek the 
judgment of interested U.S. Government executive branch agencies (i.e., the U.S. Departments of 
Commerce, Energy, and Defense, as coordinated by DOS) as to whether approving a proposed export 
would be consistent with U.S. statutory and foreign policy requirements. The U.S. NRC cannot issue an 
export license if the Executive Branch recommends denying the license; however, if the Executive Branch 
recommends approval and the U.S. NRC disagrees, the license application must be referred to the 
President of the United States for action, which is subject to Congressional review. To date, every HEU 
export license issued by the AEC and the U.S. NRC has satisfied U.S. domestic law, internal AEC/NRC 
export licensing regulations, 123 Agreements, Project and Supply Agreements, the NPT as applicable, 
and IAEA agreements and protocols. 
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Significant Recent Policy Developments 
In recent years, the global community, including the U.S. Government, led by the National Security staff, 
DOE, and DOS, has intensified efforts and achieved significant successes to minimize the use of HEU 
for fuel or targets in RTRs. In this context and consistent with the provisions of U.S. domestic law 
concerning medical isotopes production,7 the U.S. Government continues to engage with foreign 
governments through DOE’s GTRI Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) and 
associated programs to convert existing facilities to LEU fuel and targets, prioritize returns of HEU to the 
United States, and reconcile record discrepancies. Concurrently, the GTRI/RERTR program is involved 
in converting existing U.S. research reactors to LEU fuel and targets to minimize all HEU in civilian use. 
The U.S. NRC strongly supports and recognizes the sensitive nature of these ongoing efforts. 
The importance of continuing these efforts is highlighted by the international commitments that have 
been made as a result of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS). In April 2010, President Obama hosted 
the first NSS in Washington, D.C. and met with 47 heads of state to discuss actions to increase security 
for nuclear materials and prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and trafficking. The summit reinforced the 
principle that all states are responsible for ensuring the best security of their materials, for seeking 
assistance if necessary, and for providing assistance if asked. It promoted the international treaties that 
address nuclear security and nuclear terrorism and led countries to commit to specific national actions to 
advance global security. One of the key items included in the Joint Communique issued by the Summit is 
that world leaders, “Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special 
precautions and agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as 
appropriate; and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel 
and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible.”8 
At the 2012 Seoul NSS, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United States issued a, “Joint Statement 
on Minimization of HEU and the Reliable Supply of Medical Radioisotopes.” That statement reaffirmed 
commitments on the part of those four countries to support conversion of European production industries to 
non-HEU based processes by 2015, subject to the regulatory approvals to reach a sustainable medical 
isotope production for the benefit of patients in need of vital medical isotope diagnostic treatments in 
Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. It was also agreed at the 2012 Summit that in the longer term, 
the use of HEU will be completely eliminated for production of medical isotopes. 
The most recent Nuclear Security Summit was held in 2014 at The Hague. In the significant final joint 
communique that was issued, participants affirmed the shared goal to, “…encourage States to minimize 
their stocks of HEU (…). Similarly, we will continue to encourage and support efforts to use non-HEU 
technologies for the production of radioisotopes (…).”9  Commitments resulting from the 2010, 2012, and 
2014 NSS underscore the importance for ensuring safety and security of HEU, with the goal of minimizing 
or eliminating its use. 
Detailed Analysis of the Disposition of U.S. Exported HEU 
Since 1957, the United States exported HEU for use as fuel or targets in RTRs to a total of 35 countries 
either directly (to 32 countries) or indirectly (to an additional three countries) as a result of re-transfers 
between those countries in Table 1, on the following page. Approximately 6,100 kg of U.S. supplied HEU 
presently remains in 20 countries, with 95 percent of that material located in Europe and Canada. Many 
of the 20 countries have converted their RTRs from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel or have 
committed to doing so in the future. The remaining 15 countries no longer possess any U.S. supplied 
HEU for these purposes and have either converted facilities to LEU or have shut down the facilities that 
required HEU. Approximately 7,700 kg of HEU has been returned to the United States primarily as 
irradiated fuel.  
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Table 1: Disposition of U.S. HEU Used as Fuel or Targets in a Nuclear Research or Test Reactor 
Countries that received 
HEU (Direct exports from 
the U.S.) 
Countries that no 
longer possess U.S. 
HEU 
for these purposes10 
Countries with 
less than 1 kg 




1 kg or more of U.S. 























Republic of Korea 
Romania  
Slovenia 























   Australia 
     Brazil 
  Jamaica 
 South Africa 
Turkey 
Argentina 
    Belgium 
    Canada 
 France 
  Germany 
 Indonesia 
       Iran 
     Israel 
       Italy 
      Japan 
       Netherlands 
       Norway 
     Pakistan 
           Switzerland 
        United Kingdom 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, the bulk of U.S. HEU exports occurred in the 1960s and 70s, with the 
peak occurring in the late 1960s. The dramatic decline of U.S. HEU exports is attributed to the shutdown 
of many foreign HEU-fueled RTR facilities and programs, additional export controls imposed under the 
NNPA in 1978, and the establishment of DOE’s GTRI/RERTR program to convert such facilities to LEU.  
Overall, the bulk of the U.S. HEU exports and imports (approximately 95 and 80 percent respectively) 
occurring prior to 1990, as displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Although there is no current requirement for 
U.S.-origin HEU to be returned to the United States, in August 1982, the U.S. NRC issued a “Statement 
of Policy on the Use of HEU in Research Reactors” (47 Fed. Reg. 37,007), expressing support for the 
RERTR program to convert facilities to LEU. The U.S. NRC also stated that it would perform more 
rigorous reviews related to U.S. supplied material used in foreign RTRs, with the intent of eliminating 
inventories of U.S. supplied HEU to the maximum degree possible. Furthermore, AEA Section 134 was 
amended in 1992 to add more stringent criteria for licensing U.S. exports of HEU to be used as fuel or 
targets in RTRs. In addition, NNSA/GTRI continues to work with foreign governments to return additional 
amounts of fresh and irradiated U.S. HEU to the United States. 
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Figure 2: Imports 
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In 2005, additional criteria were added to AEA Section 134 for licensing exports of HEU to certain 
countries11 for medical isotope production. Under these provisions, the U.S. NRC is required to review the 
adequacy of physical protection requirements that are applicable to the transportation and storage of the 
HEU for medical isotope production or control of residual material after irradiation and extraction of 
medical isotopes. If the U.S. NRC determines that additional physical protection requirements are 
necessary (including a limit on the quantity of HEU that may be contained in a single shipment), the U.S. 
NRC shall impose such requirements as licensing conditions or through other appropriate means. 
Presently, the United States continues to export HEU for use as RTR fuel or targets to a limited number 
of facilities in Canada and Europe.12 The primary purpose of these HEU exports is to support medical 
isotope production. 
Reconciling the Current Disposition of U.S. Exports of HEU 
The U.S. Government continues to work with certain partners to reconcile inventory records. These 
reconciliations are not facility specific, but at a State level. The U.S. NRC does not believe that adding 
new inventory reconciliation or other requirements to U.S. 123 Agreements or other international 
instruments would be an acceptable change to the status quo in the national interests of other countries. 
U.S. law has instead required the U.S. Government to obtain nonproliferation, peaceful use, and 
safeguards assurances from foreign government authorities on a case-by-case basis as a pre-condition 
for authorizing the export of any special nuclear materials, including HEU to foreign RTRs for use as fuel 
or targets. The U.S. Government has relied on these assurances among other factors in determining that 
the foreign recipient and the responsible government oversight authority will implement and maintain the 
controls to ensure that the nuclear materials are appropriately used, controlled and safeguarded. 
Additionally, the U.S. Government and the global community rely on the IAEA to conduct independent 
safeguards audits and inspections to verify that the records for and physical inventories of nuclear 
materials, whether supplied by the United States or another country, are consistent and provide no 
evidence of diversion. 
HEU Irradiation Status and Current Physical and Chemical Forms 
Approximately 60 percent of the U.S.-origin HEU remaining in foreign countries is irradiated and 40 
percent is un-irradiated. Most of the irradiated material is in the form of irradiated RTR fuel, targets, and 
medical isotope production residues. The un-irradiated U.S. HEU at foreign facilities exists primarily in the 
form of fabricated RTR fuel and medical targets, but some of the un-irradiated HEU is in the form of 
metal, compounds, scrap, and waste. 
Uses Stated in Export License, Alternative Uses, U.S. NRC-Approved Alternative Uses 
In most cases, U.S. supplied HEU was used for its stated uses as described in relevant U.S. export 
licenses. For the most part, U.S. export licenses have anticipated the need for transfers among certain 
countries and typically identified approved intermediate facilities (fuel and/or target fabrication facilities) 
and ultimate foreign consignees (RTRs and target processing facilities). In a number of instances, and to 
the extent that some countries subsequently transferred and/or received U.S. supplied HEU between 
themselves and other countries, they were required to obtain additional approval (prior consent) from the 
U.S. Government to do so. Requests for prior consent are processed as “subsequent arrangements” by 
NNSA in accordance with Section 131 of the AEA as amended. In a limited number of cases, based on 
international agreements and requirements for HEU exports in effect at that time, no additional 
U.S. approval was required. The U.S. NRC identified 13 requests to use U.S. supplied HEU for purposes 
other than what was originally authorized, as noted in Table 2 on the following page.  
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Table 2: Requests to Use U.S.-Supplied HEU for Purposes Other than Originally Authorized13 
Country       Original use         New use 








YAYOI Down blend 
Argentina RA-3 &RA-6 Down blend 
South Africa SAFARI Storage 
Canada Chalk River Dounreay 
Total U.S. HEU 112.5 kg 
KUHFR - Kyoto University high Flux research Reactor; KUR - Kyoto University Reactor; 
JMTR - Japan Material Test Reactor; JRR-4 - Japan Research Reactor #4; 
YAYOI - Research Reactor located in Japan; RA-3 - Argentina Research Reactor #3;  
RA-6 = Argentina Research Reactor #6; SAFARI - South African Research Reactor;  
Chalk River - Canadian nuclear site; Dounreay - United Kingdom nuclear site; Down blend - HEU into LEU 
Adequate Protection against Theft and Unauthorized Access 
Consistent with the current U.S. NRC export licensing criteria, physical protection measures at foreign 
facilities are assessed against recommendations in IAEA publication Information Circular 
(INFCIRC/225).14  To determine the adequacy of physical protection measures for high-risk nuclear 
materials at foreign facilities, the U.S. NRC primarily relies upon bilateral physical protection information 
exchange and assessment visits to the foreign country.15  These visits are conducted by a U.S. 
interagency team and involve exchanges of technical physical protection information as well as site-level 
security assessments. When appropriate, a determination is made on a country-wide basis as to whether 
the measures employed at a facility provide protection comparable to the INFCIRC/225 guidelines.16 
Returned U.S.-origin HEU is stored and processed at a small number of DOE facilities as well as at U.S. 
NRC licensed facilities. Most of the material returned to the U.S. has been irradiated HEU fuel, but has 
also included un-irradiated HEU – in addition to HEU that was down-blended to LEU. The physical 
protection measures at these U.S. facilities are maintained, as appropriate, in accordance with either 
DOE or NRC requirements and they provide adequate protection of the HEU against unauthorized 
access and theft. 
U.S. NRC has neither any evidence to suggest nor any reason to believe that any U.S. exported 
HEU has been stolen or diverted from a foreign facility. The U.S. NRC is confident of this 
assessment, based on the effectiveness of the aforementioned physical protection measures at 
foreign facilities to which U.S. materials have been licensed and exported. International safeguards 
containment, surveillance, and verification measures, and IAEA inspections provide further 
confidence that no U.S. HEU has been stolen or diverted. All recipient countries have provided 
nonproliferation and physical protection assurances and peaceful use guarantees as a precondition 
of supply, as required by U.S. law. Furthermore, HEU that has been transferred and/or retransferred 
to foreign countries has not been reported as missing or unaccounted for, nor has any country has 
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ever notified the U.S. Government that they lost or did not receive U.S. supplied HEU or that they 
relinquished control over the material.  
As reaffirmed by heads of state participating in the 2010 and 2012 NSS, recipient countries are 
responsible for maintaining safety and ensuring the adequacy of physical protection measures for nuclear 
materials they receive from the United States and other countries. As part of the U.S. export licensing 
process, the responsible foreign government authority in the recipient country must confirm on a case-by-
case basis that a facility is authorized to receive and possess the material and agree to maintain 
protection at least comparable to the recommendations in the current version of INFCIRC/225. The U.S. 
Government must receive these and other written assurances, including commitments to convert to LEU 
fuel or targets from the receiving country as part of the U.S. NRC export licensing process. 
Documentation and Data Gaps 
There are gaps and uncertainties in the historical records available to the U.S. NRC staff. The following 
reasons explain why the U.S. NRC was unable to fully document the status and location of all HEU 
exported by the United States: 
• HEU transfers between countries.
• Material losses and waste
• HEU consumption in reactors
• HEU down-blending
• Co-mingling of U.S. and non-U.S. HEU
• Co-mingling of RTR and non-RTR HEU
• National classification information laws
Observations and Conclusions 
The U.S. Government continues to work with its foreign partners to reconcile historical records for the 
disposition of the past U.S. HEU exports and to maintain an appropriate level of awareness regarding the 
disposition of the current and future U.S. HEU exports. 
The United States continues to be a leader in the effort to reduce and eliminate the use of HEU for use in 
RTRs and medical isotope production. Some of the outcomes of the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear 
Security Summits were statements endorsing the minimization of HEU and possible replacement of HEU 
use in future production of medical isotopes. The United States recognizes that the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology can only occur when it is pursued and fostered in a way that does not compromise 
global security. 
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Endnotes and References 
1 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA 2013), Title XXXI, Subtitle F, 
American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012, Section 3175, required the “Report on Disposition of 
Exports,” by the Chairman of the NRC, to be delivered to the U.S. Congress within one year after President 
Obama signed the NDAA 2013 into law on January 2, 2013. 
2 The NRC 1993 report was pursuant to section 903(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. 
3 The current U.S.-EURATOM 123 Agreement entered into force in March 1996 and meets the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The agreement encompasses U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation with all 28 
EURATOM members. It is in force through April 2026, with an option for rolling five-year extensions. 
4 The current U.S.-IAEA 123 Agreement entered into force June 2014 and meets the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978. It enables the U.S to supply power reactor fuel through the IAEA to Member 
States, under long-term Project and Supply Agreements, and remains in force until June 2054. 
5 This agreement is administered on a non-government basis by the American Institute in Taiwan. 
6 DOE has authority under section 54d. and 111b of the AEA to export up to 500 grams of HEU. 
7 NDAA 2013, Title XXXI, Subtitle F, American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012, Section 3175. 
8 “Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit,” (The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Washington, DC, April 13, 2010). 
9 “The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué,” (The Hague, March 25, 2014). 
10 Three countries – Chile, Jamaica, and Norway – received U.S. HEU from other countries, not directly 
exported from the United States. 
11 Those countries include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
12 In 2013, the appropriate HEU export licenses were amended to add RTRs in Poland and the Czech 
Republic as temporary intermediate consignees to receive and irradiate medical isotope targets. These 
reactors may receive HEU targets, containing gram-quantities of HEU each, for irradiation. Following 
irradiation, the targets are promptly shipped away to isotope production facilities in other countries. 
13 The NRC did not locate records indicating whether these 13 requests for alternative uses were 
approved by the U.S. Government or whether the HEU was used for the requested alternative use. 
14 Revision 4, June 1999, ‘‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities’’ 
15 High-risk materials include Category II and Category I quantities of nuclear materials. For HEU, these 
correspond to the material quantities containing greater than or equal to 1 kg but less than 5 kg uranium-
235 (Category II HEU), and greater than or equal to 5 kg uranium-235 (Category I HEU). For material 
irradiated to greater than 100 r/h at 1 m, the material category is reduced by one. 
16 Country-wide determinations are usually made for lower risk, Category III or less materials (less than 1 kg 
uranium-235); and for nuclear sites, which have not received a U.S. Government assessment team visit, but 
which are located in countries where such visits have occurred. In all cases, a country-wide determination 
involves consideration of available public and non-public sources. 
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Addressing Proliferation Concerns within the Existing 
NRC Regulatory Framework 
Thomas Grice, Brian Smith, and Brooke Smith 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Washington, DC 20555-0001 
Abstract: 
Interested persons may petition the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to issue, amend or 
rescind any regulation in accordance with 10 CFR § 2.206. As part of the established practice of 
reviewing requests for rulemaking, the NRC staff will evaluate the petition for rulemaking and any 
comments it received and will either consider the petition for rulemaking in the NRC’s rulemaking 
process or deny the petition for rulemaking. On November 10, 2010, the American Physical Society 
(APS) submitted such a petition for rulemaking to the NRC requesting the NRC amend 10 CFR Part 
70, “Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material,” to require each applicant for an enrichment or 
reprocessing (ENR) facility license in the United States to include an assessment of the proliferation 
risks as part of the application for an NRC license. The staff considered the petition, public comments, 
information related to the current threat environment, and the existing NRC licensing framework for 
ENR facilities and on October 25, 2012 recommended NRC denial of the petition for rulemaking to the 
NRC Commissioners. On May 22, 2013, the NRC Commissioners approved the staff’s 
recommendations to deny the APS petition for rulemaking and the final decision was published in the 
Federal Register on June 6, 2013. This paper provides an overview of the APS petition, a summary of 
the NRC staff evaluation of the APS petition, overview of how NRC’s existing comprehensive 
regulations for licensing, oversight and security of nuclear facilities protect classified information, 
nuclear materials and technology, and why a specific assessment of the proliferation risk by a license 
applicant is not warranted. 
Keywords: Nonproliferation; Security; Safeguards; Regulations 
1. Background
Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons and associated technology, information, 
materials and expertise. Nuclear nonproliferation refers to efforts to control or prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons and the means to make them. Nuclear nonproliferation efforts are focused on 
controlling three aspects: 
1) Physical access to special nuclear materials (SNM)1 (e.g., uranium and plutonium),
2) Physical access to specialized or sensitive nuclear related equipment, i.e., Nuclear Supplier’s
Group (NSG) Trigger List items, and
3) Access to sensitive nuclear related information, like design specifications or operating
parameters.
Although there are many possible acquisition pathways for a potential nuclear proliferator, uranium 
enrichment and the extraction of plutonium through reprocessing spent fuel or irradiated targets are 
the two primary paths for producing the nuclear material necessary for a nuclear weapon. 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the term special nuclear material can be considered interchangeable with special fissionable 
material, which is defined in the IAEA statute. 
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Nonproliferation is a crucial policy and technical focus of the U.S. Government and the international 
community. The NRC works closely with its U.S. interagency partners and supports U.S. 
nonproliferation policy by ensuring NRC-licensed facilities are constructed and operated safely and 
securely, international safeguards obligations are met, and that nuclear materials and classified 
information are properly protected. This is achieved through licensing nuclear facilities, licensing 
exports of nuclear materials and nuclear related equipment, and oversight of the NRC’s licensees’ 
implementation of NRC regulations (e.g., material control and accounting, physical protection, IAEA 
safeguards, personnel security, information protection, and export controls) and voluntary 
commitments incorporated into a facility’s license. 
On November 10, 2010, the NRC received a Petition for Rulemaking filed by Dr. Francis Slakey, 
Ph.D., on behalf of the American Physical Society requesting the NRC revise its regulations to require 
that each applicant for an enrichment or reprocessing facility license provide an assessment of the 
proliferation risks associated with the construction and operation of the proposed facility and assigned 
it Docket No. PRM-70-9. The NRC published a notice of receipt of the petition and request for public 
comment in the Federal Register (FR) on December 23, 2010 (75 FR 246). In accordance with 
established NRC practices, NRC staff evaluated the petition for rulemaking and corresponding 
comments, reviewed the NRC’s role within the overall U.S. nonproliferation program, and the 
adequacy of the requirements found in existing NRC regulations to meet these nonproliferation 
objectives and commitments. On October 25, 2012, the NRC issued SECY-12-0145, “Denial of 
Petition For Rulemaking (PRM-70-9) – American Physical Society,” which detailed staff’s analysis and 
recommendation to the NRC Commissioners to deny the petition for rulemaking. Upon review of 
staff’s completed analysis, the Commission voted to deny the petition for rulemaking in agreement 
with staff’s conclusion that the NRC’s comprehensive regulatory framework appropriately assesses 
proliferation risks and concerns associated with the licensing of an enrichment or reprocessing facility 
in the United States. This framework includes:  
1) Licensing and regulatory requirements;
2) Oversight and enforcement; and
3) Active interagency cooperation.
This position was subsequently published in the June 6, 2013, Federal Register notice “Nuclear 
Proliferation Assessment in Licensing Process for Enrichment or Reprocessing Facilities; Petition for 
Rulemaking; denial,” (78 FR 33,995; June 6, 2013). 
2. Existing NRC Regulations
Nonproliferation is addressed in several areas of the Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR). Licensees must demonstrate satisfactory programs, plans and procedures to comply with these 
requirements as part of the licensing process. In reviewing a license application, renewal application, 
or license amendment for a fuel cycle facility, the staff must determine whether there is reasonable 
assurance that the facility can and will be operated in a manner that will not be inimical to the 
common defense and security, and will adequately protect the health and safety of workers, the 
public, and the environment. Nonproliferation issues are addressed through three distinctive, yet inter-
related licensing mechanisms within existing NRC regulation. These are:  
1) Limiting the availability of special nuclear material (SNM) by controlling the creation of and
access to SNM, with specific consideration for uranium enrichment facilities;
2) Control of proliferation sensitive technologies, both information and equipment, through
physical protection, information protection, counterintelligence programs and export controls;
and
3) Participation in international activities to control nuclear materials, technology, facilities and
equipment.
While each area possesses unique attributes, the three areas are woven together through the NRC 
licensing process to provide a “defense-in-depth” approach to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons through the control of SNM, nuclear facilities, equipment and/or proliferation sensitive 
technologies. 
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In addition to the domestic requirements set forth to obtain a NRC license, 10 CFR also includes 
specific regulations to implement the requirements established by treaties between the United States 
and the IAEA. These specific requirements to allow the application of IAEA safeguards in accordance 
with the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and establish reporting requirements for licensees related 
to the U.S. Additional Protocol are codified in 10 CFR Part 75. If a particular NRC licensed facility is 
selected by the IAEA for the application of safeguards, the commitments negotiated in the facility 
attachment are incorporated into the facilities license. 
3. Physical Access to Special Nuclear Materials
Several areas of the NRC regulations address nonproliferation through the minimization of the use of 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the consideration of theft or diversion of SNM, and the 
detection of the production of unauthorized enriched uranium. These include 10 CFR Part 70, 
Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material; 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and 
Materials; and 10 CFR Part 74, Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material.  
Regulations under 10 CFR Part 70 are the foundation for the issuance of licenses to receive title to 
own, acquire, deliver, receive, possess, use, and transfer special nuclear material. While focused on 
the licensing process (i.e., content of applications, license modification and renewal) and safety 
(radiological health and safety, environmental protection, and accident analysis), the regulations also 
recognize that requirements should differ based on the type and amount of material possessed by 
licensees. For licensees possessing small quantities of SNM, 10 CFR 70.20a contains basic 
requirements that require general licensees to provide for the physical protection of such material 
against theft or sabotage. For licensees with larger, more significant quantities of SNM, 10 CFR Part 
70 refers to 10 CFR Parts 73 and 74 for additional requirements related to physical protection and 
material control and accounting requirements.  
Regulations under 10 CFR Part 73 prescribe the requirements for the establishment and maintenance 
of a physical protection system to protect SNM at fixed sites and in transit, and to protect plants where 
SNM is used. At Category I facilities, these regulations include requirements to protect against 
radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft and diversion of SNM through the establishment of 
physical protection requirements for facilities and materials including armed protective force 
personnel, physical barriers, access controls, intrusion detection and surveillance systems, criminal 
background checks, portal monitors and response procedures. For example, 10 CFR 73.67 and 73.71 
include physical protection requirements for SNM of moderate and low strategic significance and 
reporting requirements for safeguards events. In addition, 10 CFR 73.73 and 73.74 include 
requirements for advance notice and protection of export and import shipments of specified materials. 
Further, Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73 contains the Criteria for Security Personnel (training) for these 
types of facilities and Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73 includes detailed requirements for a safeguards 
contingency plan.  
Regulations under 10 CFR Part 74 include requirements for the control and accounting of SNM at 
facilities and for documenting the transfer of SNM. For example, general performance objectives in 10 
CFR 74.31, 74.41, and 74.51 address material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements for 
various levels of strategic significance. To meet these objectives, licensees must have a Fundamental 
Nuclear Material Control Plan that includes measures to ensure proper control of and accounting for 
the SNM possessed by the licensee. These MC&A programs are designed to track and account for 
SNM using accepted accounting practices, ensure the presence of SNM through physical inventory 
and inventory reconciliation programs, and maintain accurate values for SNM at the facility through 
measurement and measurement control programs. Through this combination of measures, licensees 
provide further assurance that SNM is properly controlled and maintained. These activities also 
provide a significant deterrent to potential theft or diversion scenarios through their ability to identify 
potential losses, and aid in or conduct investigations into SNM losses. Additionally, 10 CFR 74.33 
requires licensees authorized to possess equipment capable of enriching uranium or operating a 
uranium enrichment facility, and producing, or possessing a specified amount of SNM, to have an 
MC&A system that will protect against and detect unauthorized production of enriched uranium or 
enrichment to levels beyond 10 percent. Finally, 10 CFR 74.11 includes requirements for licensees 
that possess specified quantities to report loss, theft or attempted theft or unauthorized production of 
SNM to the NRC. By requiring capabilities to measure, control, detect, and report the loss, theft or 
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attempted theft or unauthorized production of SNM, a licensee’s compliance with 10 CFR 74 supports 
the overall objectives of the U.S. nonproliferation program. 
4. Access to Sensitive Nuclear Related Technology, Information and
Equipment
Controls of proliferation sensitive technology, information and equipment are addressed in a similar 
manner. The NRC regulations relevant to controlling access to sensitive nuclear related equipment 
include: 10 CFR Part 25, Access Authorization; 10 CFR Part 95, Facility Security Clearance and 
Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data; 10 CFR Part 110, Export and 
Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material. 
In addition to these NRC regulations, NRC licensees are also subject to the requirements established 
in 10 CFR Part 810, Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, which implements section 57 
b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulates civil nuclear trade to ensure that nuclear 
technologies and assistance exported from the United States will be used for peaceful purposes. 
Regulations under 10 CFR Part 25 establish the requirements and procedures for granting, 
reinstating, extending, transferring, and terminating access authorizations of licensee personnel, 
licensee contractors or agents, and other persons who may require access to classified information. 
Included in these requirements is submission of the following information: 
1) A completed Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86, Parts 1 and 2)
The SF-86 is the standard questionnaire used to obtain relevant information for a clearance
investigation
2) Two standard fingerprint cards (FD-258)
3) Security Acknowledgment (NRC Form 176)
The Security Acknowledgment form documents an individuals is knowledgeable and
understands the controls over access, handling, and dissemination of, classified information;
and
4) Other related forms where specified in accompanying instructions.
This information is used by the Office of Personnel Management to determine whether an individual 
should be granted the requested U.S. Government security clearance. NRC licensees and licensee 
contractors may be granted a "Q" access authorization or "L" access authorization, depending upon 
the level and category of classified information to be accessed. These access authorization 
requirements address an employee’s suitability, trustworthiness and reliability before and during the 
time an employee or contractor works at the facility. Additionally, periodic reviews of an individual’s 
background and trustworthiness continue during the individual’s employment. An important aspect of 
this program is informing the employees of their continuing responsibilities with respect to protection 
of classified information upon termination of their employment. 
Similar to the controls established in 10 CFR Part 73 for physical access to SNM, 10 CFR Part 95 
establishes requirements for access to and the physical protection of classified information, including 
classified documents, materials and equipment. 10 CFR 95.25 and 95.27, respectively, establish the 
requirements for licensees to maintain appropriate protection of National Security Information and 
Restricted Data while in storage and in use. These requirements address all of the areas routinely 
associated with a classified information protection program. 
It should also be recognized that NRC enrichment licensees and their contractors that possess 
classified material have voluntarily committed to adhere to additional information security measures 
not addressed in 10 CFR Part 95. These voluntary security enhancements are set forth in Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI) 08-11, “Information Security Program Guidelines for Protection of Classified 
Material at Uranium Enrichment Facilities,” and NEI 13-04, “Counterintelligence Program for Uranium 
Enrichment Facilities” published by the NEI. These documents provide guidance for the protection of 
classified information, equipment, and technology and recommend the development and 
implementation of several programs and additional requirements. The measures are contained in 
each licensee’s security plan, which is an integral component of their license and specifically 
approved by the NRC as part of the issuance of a facility security clearance prior to facility operation. 
This allows these requirements to be used as the basis for enforcement action if a licensee violates 
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the terms of the plan. The Information Security (INFOSEC) additional measure program requirements 
include: 
1) Operations Security (OPSEC) Program
2) Telecommunications Electronic Materials Protected from Emanating Spurious Transmissions
(TEMPEST) program
3) Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program
4) Counterintelligence (CI) Program
5) Information Technology (IT) Security requirements for classified networks
6) Classified Item Control and Inventory (CICI) requirements
7) Defensive Counterintelligence Program
In addition to these requirements, the NRC regulates the export and import of nuclear related 
materials and equipment under 10 CFR Part 110. Included in the appendices to Part 110 are 
illustrative lists of regulated equipment specific to various enrichment technologies and reprocessing 
plants. 10 CFR Part 110, “Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material,” includes 
requirements for controlling the export and import of nuclear materials and equipment by NRC or 
Agreement State licensees. Export license reviews address proliferation concerns by requiring the 
U.S. Government to obtain assurances from the recipient foreign government that, among other 
things, include: 1) IAEA safeguards will be applied as required by Article III (2) of the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 2) adequate physical security measures will be maintained; and 
3) the material being exported will not be transferred to another country without prior U.S.
Government approval. These export applications are reviewed by multiple offices within the NRC and 
also by other U.S. Government agencies (i.e., U.S. Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, 
Energy, and Homeland Security) to assess security concerns and proliferation risks. 10 CFR 110.27 
authorizes, by general license, the import of nuclear material if the U.S. consignee is authorized to 
receive and possess the material under the relevant NRC or Agreement State regulations. By 
controlling the export and import of nuclear materials and equipment, these requirements address 
proliferation risks and concerns. The additional voluntarily adopted security practices further enhance 
the protection of sensitive nuclear related technology, information and equipment. 
5. Control of Classified Data Systems
Based on past experience and anticipated activity, any NRC licensee that owns or operates a uranium 
enrichment facility will need to possess a classified information data system. The National Industrial 
Security Program (NISP), established by Executive Order (E.O.) 12829 for the protection of classified 
information classified under Executive Order 12958, as amended, or its successor or predecessor 
orders, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, requires that classified information can only 
be processed on secure information technology (IT) systems or networks that have been accredited 
by certain agencies of the Federal government. This includes both the NRC and the U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE). The NISP Operating Manual (NISTPOM) is set forth in Department of Defense 
(DoD) 5220.22-M, and requires that for a specific classified IT system a Federal government agency 
must agree to serve as the Designated Approval Authority (DAA). The DAA is responsible for 
inspecting the classified IT system to determine that it is installed and capable of operating in 
accordance with all applicable security requirements. After the DAA makes a favorable determination, 
an accreditation statement is issued that authorizes the system to be operated.  
As the licensing authority for commercial uranium enrichment facilities in the United States, the NRC 
is responsible for enforcing any violations of the licenses issued to these facilities, including any 
security violations. Therefore, in order to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, NRC entered 
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DOE to allow DOE to act as the DAA for NRC 
licensed uranium enrichment facilities. All classified cyber security plans and their corresponding 
computer systems will be assessed in accordance with this agreement between the NRC and the 
DOE. As such, DOE conducts site audits, with NRC presence, and reports the results to the NRC and 
the inspected NRC licensee. Based upon the results of these inspections, the NRC will authorize 
operation of the computer systems following approval and accreditation by the DAA. Each enrichment 
facility license includes a requirement for an accredited information technology (IT) plan in their 
Standard Practice Procedures Plan (SPPP). This IT plan is updated as the DAA requirements change 
and the licensee must obtain NRC approval of any substantive changes to the plan.  
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6. NRC Oversight Activities
Each of the preceding areas mentioned are not only licensed by the NRC, but also routinely inspected 
by the NRC and subject to the NRC Enforcement Program. Inspections are performed to verify a 
licensee’s compliance with all applicable regulations, and all commitments contained in the licensee’s 
plans and procedures which have been incorporated into the operating license. Any deficiencies that 
are identified are evaluated using a graded approach based upon actual consequences, potential 
consequences, potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, and any 
willful aspects of the violation. All cited violations require licensees to provide the NRC with a written 
response with details of the proposed corrective actions to correct the issue and prevent recurrence. 
Significant violations may result in civil penalties or the issuance of orders by the NRC. In addition to 
regular inspection oversight, each licensee’s performance is monitored on a routine basis. If a 
licensee’s performance warrants, the NRC may take such actions and increase oversight through 
special inspections, augmented inspections or increasing the frequency of routine core inspections. 
Through this oversight and enforcement process, the NRC ensures licensees are maintaining the 
proper controls to operate the licensed facilities in a safe and secure manner. 
7. Licensee Performance of a Proliferation Assessment
In addition to evaluating the adequacy of NRC’s regulatory framework, NRC staff also considered the 
potential benefit of licensees conducting proliferation assessments for their facilities. Staff concluded a 
commercial entity would not have access to the necessary intelligence resources, capabilities, and 
information essential to compiling a meaningful nuclear proliferation assessment.  
The task of assessing proliferation risks is best performed by the Federal Government. Other Federal 
agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, 
and the Department of Commerce along with the NRC, have primary responsibility for implementing 
national nonproliferation policies and goals and conducting proliferation assessments of sensitive 
technologies, including nuclear technologies. Staff in these agencies have access to the necessary 
classified information and are better informed concerning the motives and intent of potential 
proliferators. This information is closely held and would not be available to an NRC licensee or 
applicant for use in their evaluation. An assessment based solely on information available to a 
commercial entity would be of little value to the NRC in assessing the proliferation risks associated 
with licensing a particular facility.  
8. Conclusion
The mission of the NRC is to license and regulate the Nation’s civilian use of byproduct, source, and 
special nuclear materials to ensure the adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the 
common defense and security, and protect the environment. One of the NRC's primary concerns is to 
ensure that the facilities it regulates that manufacture or use enriched uranium and plutonium do so 
safely and securely. The NRC's regulations on physical security, information security, material control 
and accounting, IAEA safeguards, cyber security, and export control create a tapestry of protection for 
the material and technology at NRC-regulated fuel cycle facilities. These regulations, which focus on 
preventing, deterring, and detecting the theft or diversion of radioactive materials and classified 
technologies, ensure proliferation considerations are taken into account during the licensing and 
oversight activities of the NRC. Consistent with its statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA) of 1954, as amended, the Commission will not issue a license for an ENR facility if it 
determines that such a facility would constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the 
public or would be inimical to the common defense and security. 
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THE USE OF MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY
IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS ACCOUNTANCY AND VERIFICATION
O. Alique; S. Vaccaro; J. Svedkauskaite
Nuclear Safeguards Directorate E, DG Energy, European Commission,
L-2920 Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Abstract:
EURATOM nuclear safeguards are based on the nuclear operators’ accounting for and declaring of
the amounts of nuclear materials in their possession, as well as on the European Commission
verifying the correctness and completeness of such declarations by means of conformity assessment
practices. Both the accountancy and the verification processes comprise the measurements of
amounts and characteristics of nuclear materials. The uncertainties associated to these
measurements play an important role in the reliability of the results of nuclear material accountancy
and verification.
The document “JCGM 100:2008 Evaluation of measurement data – Guide to the expression of
uncertainty in measurement” - issued by the highest international instances in metrology,
standardisation, accreditation, physics and chemistry - describes a universal, internally consistent and
transferable method for the evaluation and expression of uncertainty in measurements.
This paper discusses different processes of nuclear materials accountancy and verification where
measurement uncertainty plays a significant role. It also suggests the way measurement uncertainty
could be used to enhance the reliability of the results of the nuclear materials accountancy and
verification processes.
Keywords: measurement uncertainty, conformity assessment, verification
1. Euratom Nuclear Safeguards operating principle
The holders of nuclear materials in the European Union are subject to Euratom nuclear safeguards.
The obligations for nuclear operators derived from nuclear safeguards include the implementation of a
Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control (NMAC) system and the declaration of nuclear materials
flows (monthly) and stocks (yearly). The European Commission verifies consequently the correctness
and completeness of the declarations produced for nuclear materials flows and stocks by means of
inspections. In a nutshell, Euratom nuclear safeguards are based on three sequential processes:
1. Accountancy and control of nuclear materials, performed by nuclear operators;
2. Declaration to the European Commission of flows and inventories of nuclear materials,
performed by nuclear operators; and
3. Verification of the correctness and completeness of these declarations by the European
Commission.
Measurements and measurement uncertainties play a crucial role in the first and third processes. The
role of measurement uncertainty and the way it is estimated and reported has been discussed on
several occasions without reaching a clear agreement amongst the nuclear safeguards community. A
deeper analysis can assist safeguards practitioners to understand the role of measurement
uncertainty.
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2. International standardisation of measurement uncertainties and
application to Nuclear Safeguards
The metrology community has discussed for long in its attempt to find a harmonised way of reporting
uncertainty. In 1977, recognizing the lack of international consensus on the expression of uncertainty
in measurement, the world's highest authority in metrology, the ‘Comité International des Poids et
Mesures’ (CIPM), requested the ‘Bureau International des Poids et Mesures’ (BIPM) to address the
problem in conjunction with the national standards laboratories and to make a recommendation.
The BIPM prepared a detailed questionnaire covering the issues involved and distributed it to 32
national metrology laboratories known to have an interest in the subject (and, for information, to five
international organizations). The BIPM then convened a meeting for the purpose of arriving at a
uniform and generally acceptable procedure for the specification of uncertainty; it was attended by
experts from 11 national standards laboratories. This Working Group on the Statement of
Uncertainties developed Recommendation INC-1 (1980), Expression of Experimental Uncertainties
[1]. The CIPM approved the Recommendation in 1981 and reaffirmed it in 1986.
The task of developing a detailed guide based on the Working Group Recommendation (which is a
brief outline rather than a detailed prescription) was referred by the CIPM to the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), since ISO could better reflect the needs arising from the broad
interests of industry and commerce.
In 1995, the JCGM (Joint Committee for Guides in Metrology) formed by the highest instances in
chemistry, physics, metrology and standardisation, issued the first version of the Guide to the
Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM). In 2008, a second version of the GUM [2] was
published. Together with its supplements, this is the most recent international standard in the matter
globally accepted.
It is important to note that not every actor of the nuclear safeguards community has incorporated to
their practices the use of measurement uncertainties calculated according to the GUM Guide [2]:
 Laboratories providing measurement results to the nuclear inspectorates and nuclear
operators laboratories provide uncertainties calculated according to the GUM Guide [2].
 Measurements performed at nuclear facilities by plant staff do not always carry uncertainties
calculated according to the GUM Guide [2]. Frequent examples are mass and volume
measurements performed in the operations areas.
 Traditionally nuclear inspectorates have been using the classical statistical model of error for
uncertainty calculation and for measurement data evaluation. The harmonized standard
method for estimation and use of measurement uncertainty is not used by nuclear
inspectorates 30 years after the first issue of this international standard.
3. Accountancy and control of nuclear materials
Nuclear operators account for and control all nuclear materials inside the Material Balance Areas
(MBA) for which they are responsible. This process includes accounting for every amount of nuclear
material entering or leaving the MBA and taking an inventory of the nuclear material held in the MBA
once per year. When the nuclear material is in loose form, at any stage of the processes which take
place in the MBA, measurements will play an important role in the accountancy process.
In this case the legislation in force, specifically Article 7 of the Commission Regulation (Euratom)
302/2005 of 8 February 2005, on the application of Euratom safeguards [3], obliges the measurement
system used for accountancy purposes to be conform or equivalent in quality to the latest international
standards. This legal requirement is often interpreted as the uncertainties of the nuclear operators'
measurements to be equal or less than those expressed in the International Target Values (ITV) [4]
issued by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). However, the ITVs are not standards with
requirements on the quality of measurement systems. They are reference values to be used by every
actor in nuclear safeguards in order to evaluate their measurement performance when validating their
measurement methods or assessing their fitness for purpose.
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There exist international standards that contain requirements about the quality of measurement
systems. The most widely recognised standards are:
 ISO 17025:2005. General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration
laboratories [5]
 ISO 10012:2003. Measurement management systems -- Requirements for measurement
processes and measuring equipment.[6]
Both standards require that measurement methods are validated, and that measurement results are
metrologically traceable. This condition requires the measurement results to be traceable to a unit of
the International System of Units by an unbroken chain of calibrations, each one contributing to the
final uncertainty of the result. It is therefore implicit as a requirement that every measurement
performed with nuclear materials accountancy purposes must be reported together with its associated
uncertainty.
Other than the quality of the measurement systems, the European Commission imposes to nuclear
operators the obligation of keeping operating records. Regulation 302/2005 [3] stipulates in its article 8
that:
"For each material balance area, the operating records shall include, where appropriate:
[…]
(c) the data, including derived estimates of random and systematic errors, obtained from the
calibration of tanks and instruments as well as from sampling and analysis;
(d) the data resulting from quality control measures applied to the nuclear material
accountancy system, including derived estimates of random and systematic errors;"
The expression 'estimates of random and systematic errors' must be understood here as the
combined standard uncertainty as defined in the GUM [2]. It is important to note that no requirement
exists for accompanying the declarations performed by the nuclear operators about nuclear materials
with the associated uncertainties that these data hold, when they are originated by measurements.
The same applies for the requirement of stating estimations of random and systematic errors as stated
in Annex I of the above mentioned Regulation 302/205 [3], with the purpose of declaring the Basic
Technical Characteristics of the installation. This declaration must respond to a typical uncertainty
obtained, so it must be interpreted as the maximum acceptable uncertainty for the nuclear operator.
The different measurements performed in nuclear materials accountancy can be grouped in two
categories with respect to the uncertainty calculations required:
1. Measurements performed in analytical laboratories, which are in most of the cases
metrologically traceable. These measurements are designed to obtain low uncertainties.
Typically individual uncertainties are calculated for every measurement result, according to the
GUM guide [2]. Titrations, mass spectrometry or calorimetry are good examples of this type of
measurements.
2. Measurements performed on industrial plants. These measurements can be grouped as:
a. Nuclear measurements. These measurements are designed to provide fast results
without generating any waste and not destroying the sample analysed. The
uncertainties obtained are normally bigger than those obtained in analytical
laboratories. Often the full metrological traceability of these measurements is not
ensured.
b. Mass and volume measurements. When mass and volume measurements are
performed in an industrial environment, an overall uncertainty associated with the
instrument can be attributed to every measurement performed by that instrument,
avoiding the necessity to perform uncertainty calculations for every measurement
performed. This practice is only acceptable when three conditions are fulfilled:
i. The overall uncertainty for the measurement instrument is recalculated after
calibration;
ii. Appropriate quality control is applied to the measurement device to ensure
that last calibration is still valid;
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iii. The environmental conditions influencing the measurement are monitored
and acceptance limits have been set-up in advance.
It happens more often than expected that mass and volume measurements in
industrial plants are not metrologically traceable, The most common reasons for this
are the use of inappropriate standards for calibration or the incorrect uncertainty
calculations.
Another important aspect of nuclear materials accountancy and control where measurement
uncertainty plays an important role is the Material Balance Evaluation (MBE). MBE performed by
nuclear operators consists in evaluating the difference between the results obtained in the
accountancy books and the physical reality. This difference is named MUF (Material Unaccounted
For). In installations that handle and measure materials in loose form (liquid, gas or powder), the MUF
figure stemming from a physical inventory taking will be different to zero. The potential causes of MUF
are:
 Clerical mistakes
 Hidden inventories non accounted for
 Hidden loses non accounted for
 Legitimate measurement errors.
From these potential causes, only the last one is acceptable. In order to assess whether the MUF can
be justified by legitimate measurement errors, it is compared with the parameter σMUF. σMUF is the 
result of properly propagating all the uncertainties associated to the measurements that could explain
the difference between accountancy books and physical reality. In order to perform a reliable
assessment of MUF, the uncertainties propagated into σMUF must all be comparable and realistic. The 
method described in the GUM [2] provides uncertainty values that take into account all relevant factors
and are comparable, transferrable and auditable. Moreover, the combined standard uncertainty
provided according to the GUM [2] has the mathematical form of a standard deviation. This allows for
statistical testing of MUF considering this parameter as a normally distributed variable.
4. Verification of the correctness and completeness of these declarations
by the European Commission
The European Commission verifies the correctness and completeness of nuclear materials
declarations provided by nuclear operators, following a series of conformity assessments. They are
grouped according to their objectives in three groups:
1. First layer assessments. This first group of conformity assessment activities serves as
preparation for the physical verification of the nuclear materials declarations. They include the
periodical verification of the Basic Technical Characteristics of the nuclear installations and the
assessment of the correspondence between the nuclear materials declarations, accountancy
records and operational records kept by nuclear operators. Further, the correctness in format
and consistency of declarations provided to the European Commission is also checked.
Finally, the quality of the measurement systems of the nuclear operators is evaluated.
One basic activity performed to evaluate the quality of the nuclear operators' measurement
systems is the performance of independent measurements and comparison of the results
obtained by the nuclear operators and the inspectorate. This assessment is performed
according to the definition of metrological compatibility from the International Vocabulary of
Metrology (VIM) [7]:
"Metrological compatibility of measurement results is a property of a set of
measurement results for a specified measurand, such that the absolute value of the
difference of any pair of measured quantity values from two different measurement
results is smaller than some chosen multiple of the standard measurement uncertainty
of that difference.
Metrological compatibility of measurement results replaces the traditional concept of
‘staying within the error’, as it represents the criterion for deciding whether two 
measurement results refer to the same measurand or not. If in a set of measurements
of a measurand, thought to be constant, a measurement result is not compatible with
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the others, either the measurement was not correct (e.g. its measurement uncertainty
was assessed as being too small) or the measured quantity changed between
measurements.
Correlation between the measurements influences metrological compatibility of
measurement results. If the measurements are completely uncorrelated, the standard
measurement uncertainty of their difference is equal to the root mean square sum of
their standard measurement uncertainties, while it is lower for positive covariance or
higher for negative covariance."
Hence, for fully independent measurements between the nuclear operator and nuclear
inspector, the assessment on the compatibility is done according to the following formula:
|𝑅𝑜𝑝 − 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑠| ≤ 𝑘 ∙ √𝑢𝑜𝑝2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑠
2  
Where:
Rop is the measured value obtained by the nuclear operator,
Rins is the measured value obtained by the inspectorate,
uop is the combined standard uncertainty of the nuclear operator result,
uins is the combined standard uncertainty of the inspectorate result.
k is a constant to be chosen in function of the risk of false alarm. Typically, in nuclear
safeguards assessments k equals three, which corresponds to a false alarm rate of 0.135 %
2. Physical verification of nuclear materials. This group includes physical verification techniques
as identification, item counting, qualitative testing, quantitative testing, as well as verification of
the results of containment and surveillance techniques.
Quantitative testing of nuclear materials with the purposes of physical verification implies the
conformity assessment of a declaration with the support of a measurement result. This
conformity assessment activity is different to the assessment of the nuclear operators'
measurement system in different aspects:
 The first difference originates from the property of nuclear material declarations not
holding an associated uncertainty, contrary to measurement results provided by
nuclear operators as operating records. Therefore, the conformity assessment for
nuclear materials declarations cannot be supported in the concept of metrological
compatibility.
 Another difference lies in the fact that nuclear materials declarations can refer to an
item, or a batch of items, or a bulk amount of nuclear materials, so to support the
conformity assessment in a measurement result often a sampling process takes
place. Therefore, occasionally the sampling uncertainty will have a crucial importance
in the conformity assessment of nuclear materials declarations.
 Another difference comes from declarations that could originate from estimations,
calculations, or measurements not performed directly on the referred item or batch,
but on the material while being in previous phases of the industrial process.
 Finally, there is a difference in the fact that often the inspectorate uses measurement
techniques of lower accuracy than the techniques used by nuclear operators to
produce their declarations, which influences strongly the conformity assessment
process.
Therefore, for quantitative testing of nuclear materials with the purpose of physical verification,
it is necessary to set a decision rule1 to document the judgement of conformity based on a 
measured value and its uncertainty.  There is extensive literature on how to set decision rules
when the conformity assessment is based on the measurement of a property of the item to
assess, and the conformity is conditioned by tolerance limits in the form of intervals or
thresholds. The decision rules are set in function of the risk that can be assumed of judging an
item as conform when this is not the case and the risk of rejecting a conforming item.
1 From JGCM 106:2012 [8]
"Decision rule”:
documented rule that describes how measurement uncertainty will be accounted for with regard to accepting or rejecting an
item, given a specified requirement and the result of a measurement.
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Unfortunately, there is limited literature that refers to the use of measurement uncertainty for
the assessment of nuclear materials declarations. There is a generally applied decision rule
used in nuclear safeguards based on the measurement uncertainty obtained by the
inspectorate. Acceptance is granted to the declaration if:
|𝐷 − 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑠| ≤ 𝑘 ∙ 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑠 
Where:
D is the declared value for the assessed property of an item or batch of nuclear materials,
Rins is the measured value by the nuclear inspectorate for the same property of the item/batch
uins is the combined standard uncertainty of the inspectorate result
k is a constant.
Typically, in nuclear safeguards assessments k has been assigned a fixed value equal to
three. However, the risk that the inspectorate and the nuclear operator can assume of
accepting a non-conform declaration or rejecting a conform declaration is not always the
same. It depends on the type and amount of nuclear material measured, on the measurement
method used, on the uncertainty obtained, on the possibilities to repeat the measurement and
the cost of it, etc…   
This is why, documented decision rules with clear risk assessments shall be performed by the
inspectorates instead of using a fixed value for the constant k.
A practical application can be explained with two examples. In cases a and b the declaration
by the nuclear operator refers to an item and it is based on indirect measurements, i.e. the
measurement of the amounts and characteristics of the nuclear material contained in the item
has not been performed on the item, but in previous stages of the industrial process having
the considered item as a product. In both cases, the inspectorate will perform direct
measurements on the considered item to assess the conformity of the nuclear operator’s
declaration:
a. The nuclear operator declares the mass of uranium contained in a fresh fuel element
prepared for shipment in a fuel fabrication plant. In this case, the operator will declare
the mass of uranium contained based on the measurements performed during the
fabrication process, whereas the inspectorate performs a non-destructive
measurement, by Active Neutron Coincidence Collar, directly on the fuel element with
uncertainties going up to 11% of the measured value.
b. The nuclear operator declares the mass of plutonium oxide contained in cans
produced in a reprocessing plant. The operator declares a mass value based on
analysis performed during the chemical reprocessing process and weighing, while the
inspectorate performs a non-destructive assay, by a combination of gamma
spectroscopy and passive neutron coincidence counting, with uncertainties going up
to 2%. Complementary to this, the nuclear inspectorate is branched to the weighing
device of the nuclear operator, obtaining the weighing results and assesses the
nuclear operator's measurement system quality by means of destructive assay.
The cases a and b are totally different from the safeguards risk point of view regarding the
amount and type of material, the cost of a second measurement or the consequences
regarding nuclear safeguards of a non-conform result. That is why the value of k should
be used to adjust the risk assumed by the inspectorate of declaring conform a non-
conform declaration and the risk assumed by the nuclear operator of getting non-
conformity over a conform declaration.
3. Material Balance Evaluation. This is a group of activities that have the objective of gaining
additional assurance on the correctness and completeness of the nuclear material
declarations. The accountancy and physical verification processes are strongly based on
measurements, therefore they are strongly influenced by measurement uncertainty. By
assessing the declared MUF by nuclear operators, the nuclear inspectorate mitigates the risk
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of the nuclear safeguards conclusions drawn being erroneous due to inaccuracies in
measurements.
In order to assess the declared MUF by the nuclear operators, the inspectorate has to obtain a
figure for σMUF. This can be properly done only by propagating the measurement uncertainties 
over the material balance period to evaluate. This information is not known to the inspectorate,
and a recurrent practice is to estimate a figure for σMUF from other data as uncertainties 
declared in the BTC (Basic Technical Characteristics) or using the ITVs (International Target
Values). An alternative technique used is to estimate the measurement uncertainties from the
statistical analysis of paired measurement results and induction of uncertainty values from a
set of estimators. Any of the above mentioned techniques draw an overestimation of the σMUF 
value, hence decreasing the added value of this assessment. We strongly argue that it would
be more reasonable to audit and validate all the components of the σMUF value performed by 
the nuclear operator and then use it in the consequent tests, which is why a realistic and
auditable way of estimating uncertainties becomes very important for the benefit of nuclear
safeguards conclusions.
Another important assessment that takes place in the phase of Material Balance Evaluation is
the assessment of shipper-receiver differences. When a shipper MBA declares a different
value for the transferred nuclear material than the receiver MBA, the inspectorate must assess
whether this difference is due only to legitimate measurement errors. To do that, the
inspectorate will again support its decision in the definition of metrological compatibility of
measurements, by applying the following formula:
|𝑅𝑠ℎ − 𝑅𝑟𝑒| ≤ 𝑘 ∙ √𝑢𝑠ℎ
2 + 𝑢𝑟𝑒2  
Where,
Rsh is the measured value obtained by the nuclear operator shipping the nuclear material,
Rre is the measured value obtained by the nuclear operator receiving the nuclear material,
ush is the combined standard uncertainty of the result obtained by the nuclear operator
shipping the nuclear material,
ure is the combined standard uncertainty of the result obtained by the nuclear operator
receiving the nuclear material.
k is a constant to be chosen in function of the risk of false alarm. Typically, in nuclear
safeguards assessments k equals three.
Again the use of the constant k shall be optimised by the inspectorate as a function of the
risks assumed by the nuclear operators and the inspectorate.
Conclusions
 Measurement uncertainties are an essential element in the nuclear material accountancy and
control processes.
 The use of measurement uncertainties calculated according to the GUM Guide should be
extended to all safeguards actors.
 Measurement uncertainties are involved in a number of conformity assessments leading to
drawing nuclear safeguards conclusion, so they play a very important role in nuclear
safeguards.
 Since these conformity assessments are based in the comparison of measurement results
and the respective uncertainties, it is crucial for the reliability of the assessments to ensure the
metrological traceability of the measurements and the compatibility of the measurement
uncertainty calculations. The use of the most widely accepted methodology to estimate
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measurement uncertainties by nuclear operators and inspectorates becomes crucial to the
reliability of the nuclear safeguards system.
 In order to optimize the use of measurement results and their associated uncertainties in
nuclear safeguards, the inspectorates shall introduce the concept of risk in their decision rules
for conformity assessment.
All the proposed improvements in the nuclear safeguards practices come at a cost. The benefit and
cost of improvements needs to be assessed beforehand, however, some of the requirements for
measurement systems have already been implemented in several disciplines running from nuclear
safety to industrial products trade showing an important rate of return. It is calculated that for an
industrialized country, measurements performed according to agreed metrology practices cost around
3% of GDP, returning around 9% of the GDP.
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Abstract: 
Licence holder of a nuclear power plant is responsible for his nuclear material management system as 
a part of the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). 
Fortum has developed a software tool to manage nuclear material in power plant environment. Tool 
includes nuclear material accountancy and reporting features as the heart and optional features for 
planning and management of nuclear material. 
Keywords: reporting; nuclear; material; accountancy; 
1. Introduction
Fortum Power and Heat Oy has operated Loviisa nuclear power plant as Licence holder since 1977 
and is responsible for the nuclear material management system (NMMS) as a part of the Finnish state 
system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). 
The NMMS system is described in Nuclear Material Handbook as a part of power plants management 
systems. Handbook (Figure 1) describes nuclear material management as well as management of 
export controlled items in detailed level and acts as a guide for personnel dealing with nuclear 
material. 
Figure 1: Nuclear Material Handbook. 
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Fortum uses software tool called PATI [1] for nuclear material management in Loviisa nuclear power 
plant to meet the requirements set by SSAC. This article describes the tool and its benefits for the 
plant Operator. 
2. PATI Users and Use Cases
PATI is used as a daily tool for managing tasks like nuclear material reception, planning of fuel 
transfers, planning for reloads, planning the use of spent fuel storage capacity and accountancy 
reporting to Authorities. Management of these tasks concerns many users at power plant. These users 
and their tasks may be following: 
• Nuclear Material Responsible Person: Authority reporting
• Reactor Engineer: Management of fuel stores, planning of transfers, reloads and reporting
• Reactor Physicist: Information for planning of reactor reloads
• Fuel Procurement: Fresh fuel stock
• Fuel Manufacturing Surveillance: Fuel information for reactor reload license
• Fuel examinations: Fuel history, fuel damage information
Concise and valid data is needed to meet user requirements in a format that is easy to use and 
maintain. Fortum uses PATI to meet the need by main functions like: 
• Centralized storage for fuel life time data
• Import and operation license information of fuel assemblies
• Usage and movement history of fuel assemblies
• Mass changes of fissile Uranium and Plutonium isotopes during plant operating cycles
• Graphical maps of internal rod burn-up of fuel assemblies after any given plant cycle
• Graphical maps of fuel assembly locations on any given date
• Residual thermal power of fuel assemblies at any given date
• Planning of reactor reloading and transfer operations
• Generation of instructions for the fuel handling machine (FHM) operators
• Generation of fuel movement files for the FHM automation system.
• Authority reporting (PIL, ICR, MBR)
Figure 2 shows general life cycle of a fuel assembly as nuclear material at power plant. 
Figure 2: PATI Use cases and benefits. 
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3. PATI User experience
PATI user interface is based on menus (Figure 3). The underlying database structure is not directly 
visible to the user, thus the use does not require special IT skills. 
Figure 3: User interface 
Figure 3 presents steps to generate a Mass Balance Report (MBR) with four selections. User selects 
"Reports" in main menu, "MBR-report" in the next dialog and this opens MBR generation dialog. Here 
user shall select Inventory Change Reports (ICR) that he wants to be included on the MBR and 
finalises the process by pressing "Make report" button. Now MBR report is generated, saved in PATI 
database and shown to the User for sending to the Authority. 
Same philosophy is used in all other tasks with PATI. The data to PATI is imported using file transfer 
dialogues that minimise the need for handwork. This enables the User to import data from fuel supplier 
systems or his own existing tools like core management systems to PATI. 
All data stored in PATI can be searched for using query dialogue. Figure 4 shows example of query 
dialogue. Query results are shown to User in separate text file for software independent post 
processing. Background of Figure 4 shows PATI graphics capabilities to generate maps of fuel 
storage locations. 
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Figure 4: Fuel storage location maps and assembly queries 
4. Conclusions
Fortum Power and Heat Oy has developed and uses PATI Nuclear material management system at its 
own Loviisa nuclear power plant to meet the challenges of nuclear material management, 
accountancy an reporting. 
We have found PATI tool very practical to support every day work of different Users dealing with 
nuclear fuel. Fortum is interested to share our experiences and software tools to nuclear material 
management community. 
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Implementing a Model for a Computerised Nuclear Materials 
Accounting System. 
 








The Computerised Nuclear Materials Accountancy System (CNMAS) project is a project to replace 
various nuclear materials accountancy and tracking systems used on the Sellafield Site with a single, 
up to date system.  During the design phase of the project, the project team developed a business 
model.  This was then implemented using an agile software development methodology (scrum) in a 
pilot, during which a system was developed to account for Uranium Oxide (UO3) being produced from 
Magnox Reprocessing Operations, its storage on site and its despatch off site.  This paper documents 
the model as originally conceived, the way the model was implemented in the pilot area, and learning 
from experience in the pilot area.  The model uses a system where the user enters records, which are 
filed.  Once filed records cannot be changed, but they can be withdrawn or superseded by later 
versions.  The records are used to calculate a view of the plants stock, and relevant accountancy 
reports.  Correcting data proved difficult, and the authors are aware that this has been the case in 
other accounting systems.  This is because of the bitemporal nature of the records, which all have 
both an event date (when the event being recorded happened) and a system date (when the event 
became known to the system).  The paper will highlight the approach now being taken to corrections 










The Computerised Nuclear Materials Accountancy System (CNMAS) project is a project to replace 
various nuclear materials accountancy and tracking systems used on the Sellafield site with a single, 
up to date system.  The system is being developed using an agile methodology. 
 
During the design phase of the project, the project team developed a business model.  This was then 
implemented in a pilot, which covered the production of UO3 arising from Magnox Reprocessing 
operations, its storage on site and despatch off site. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to document: 
• The model as originally conceived 
• The way the model was implemented in the pilot area 




2. The System Model 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the business model used.  It consists of five main areas.  This section of the paper 
gives a brief description of these areas.  
 
Records Management.  The purpose of this part of the model is to receive inputs to the system.  
These include records of what the user says has actually happened on plant, as well as records of 
what other systems say has happened. 
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 • All data should be provided to the system as “records”. 
• The records provided to the system cannot be amended.  Any corrections must be made by 
providing further records to withdraw, supplement or replace the originals, and withdrawn or 
replaced records must be available for inspection.   
• The record storage should be sufficiently robust so that the records can be used for evidential 
purposes if required. 
• Data should be captured once and only once.   
• Data should be subject to Quality Assurance(QA) checks by a person independent of the person 
who captured it. 
• The system needs to be simple and robust so that it minimises the chance of operator error.  
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• Where appropriate, to avoid manual re-entry of data, records should be received from other 
systems.  These records will be subject to automated QA checks.  Manual checks may also be 
required if the QA methods used by the system providing the data are not deemed to be sufficient. 
 
Consolidated Plant Inventory Tracking System (CPITS).  The purpose of this part of the model is to 
take the (often plant specific) records, translate them into discrete instructions and use them to update 
the model of what material is where. 
• This part of the system should be the definitive statement of the properties of nuclear material 
items and where they are.   
• To avoid duplication, this part of the system must hold all relevant data on items, not just nuclear 
data. 
• This part of the system will produce the List of Inventory Items and Physical Inventory Listings 
required for Euratom reporting. 
• This part of the system will produce the Consolidated Operating Records. 
 
Site Nuclear Materials Accountancy System (SNMAS).  The purpose of this part of the model is to 
receive data from CPITS and use it to provide material accounts and statutory reports to Euratom. 
• A few accountancy transactions do not arise from changes to the physical items on plant.  In these 
unusual cases, data will still be entered into records management but will bypass CPITS. 
 
Rulebook.  This is the part of the system that knows about what sort of thing can be where.  As far as 
possible, running of the system should be based on the rulebook rather than on hard coded rules. 
• Appropriate users should have the ability to update the rulebook by entering records into the 
records management system. 
• The rulebook will include a location hierarchy, splitting the site into Material Balance Areas 
(MBAs), Works Accountancy Areas, Locations and Sub-locations.  It will also know about off site 
locations and MBAs.  It will distinguish between “stock” locations where all material must be held 
in discrete items, and “process” locations where discrete items do not exist. 
• The rulebook will include details of what type of items exist, what the properties of the items can 
and should be, and how items can be containerised. 
• The rulebook will include flow information about which types of items can exist in which locations 
and can move between which locations. 
• The rulebook will include details about user roles, so that we can ensure that users can only enter 
or QA data where they are suitably qualified, experienced and authorised to do so. 
 
Anomalies and performance management.  As the system develops, it will be important to track 
information on anomalies and performance and make this information available to the right people.  
Examples might include: 
• Advising senior staff where “warnings” issued by the system have been acknowledged but not 
acted on. 
• Producing performance statistics on the number of errors being corrected and length of time taken 
to enter data. 
• Alerting staff to data inconsistencies arising and being resolved.  (An example of a data 
inconsistency would be the case where a user asserts in an operating record that an item has 
moved from B to C when the system thinks the item is in A.  This may be because the item is 
indeed in A, and the system should warn the user of that possibility.  However it may also be 
because another user has failed to record a movement from A to B.  The records management 
system should not prevent a user entering a record asserting something to be true, but must 
highlight such inconsistencies and allow for them to be resolved before updating CPITS.) 
 
 
3. The Pilot Plant 
 
The Pilot area plant was a UO3 drumming plant at the end of a spent fuel reprocessing facility.  Figure 
2 illustrates the normal flow of material in the plant.  Essentially, the plant works as follows: 
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Empty drums are lined with plastic and a tare mass taken (1), filled with UO3 (2) and lidded (3).  
During filling they are placed on a load cell which provides an indication of their gross mass after filling 
(3).  Due to the conditions it operates in, this gross mass is considered to be indicative rather than 
accurate.  The full drums are moved to a buffer store (4), accurately weighed (5), and placed in a 
Figure 2 - Pilot Area
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Sampled
3. Drum Lidded and
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storage grid location (6).  During filling a sample is taken from the material entering the drum (2).  The 
samples are aggregated into a daily bulk sample (7) which is analysed to find the % of 235U in U (8).  
They are then further aggregated into a weekly bulk sample (9) which is analysed to find the % of U in 
UO3 (10).  The materials accountants assign the drums an obligation code (11), based on the 
obligation codes of the material entering the reprocessing plant.  When the store’s supervisor is 
content that the drums are in a good condition, that the data on the drums is accurate, that the U and 
235U analytical results have been received, and that the obligation has been set, he will prepare a 
loading plan (12), identifying a set of drums to be despatched off site to the long term store.  The 
loading plan is executed, and the drums are placed into a container (13).  The container is moved to a 
transport area (14), and then shipped off site to the long term store (15).  Occasionally, drums have to 
be sent back from the buffer store to the plant (17).  This might be because there are quality issues 
associated with the drums, or because material is needed to prime the plant when operations are 
commencing after a shut-down.  The drums are emptied back into the production plant (18). In theory, 
the drums can be reused once the contents have been emptied into the plant, but in practice they are 
often scrapped (19). 
 
 
4. Scope of the Pilot Implementation 
 
Material tracking in the pilot plant was performed using an old computer system.  The computer 
system passed data to the site’s main accountancy system.  While the set-up was very advanced at 
the time it was installed in the early 1990’s, there were a number of reasons why it was no longer 
considered fit for purpose.  The scope of the pilot implementation was to replace the existing system, 
and to do it in a way that was consistent with the overall model.  
 
It was agreed that the pilot implementation should cover all required aspects of Records Management 
and CPITs (although it was known that the requirements for this plant were simpler than for some 
other plants that need to be dealt with later in the programme). 
 
A conscious decision was made to limit the amount of SNMAS included in the pilot.  The drumming 
plant and the buffer store are in separate MBAs.  The MBA containing the drumming plant contains 
other areas of the reprocessing plant.  The proposed system could not, therefore, account for all 
material in that MBA.  It would have to send data to the existing materials accountancy system.  
Because of this, the decision was made that SNMAS should simply collate a list of transactions, and 
that, for the pilot, all these transactions would be transferred to the existing system to produce the 
necessary reports.  Transferring the reporting to the new system would be done later in the project. 
 
The pilot implementation included the minimum required rule book.  Data was necessary on the 
location hierarchy and material types.  However, as there are, at this stage, very few material types 
and locations, and the plant functionality is stable, the decision was made not to include the 
functionality to enable the user to update the rulebook in the pilot. 
 
The pilot implementation did not include any anomaly and performance management tools.   
 
 
5. Implementation – Manual Data Entry Process. 
 
A number of plant specific data capture screens were designed to capture information on drum 
location and properties.  
 
For all manual data entry screens affecting the properties or location of the item, a QA system was 
implemented.  On entering the data, the user must save the data for QA.  A different user then 
confirms (or rejects) the data on a separate screen.  The data can also be saved as draft in case the 
original user realises that the data set is suspect or incomplete during data entry. 
 
For all screens, checks were built in to assist the user by trapping obvious errors.  Three types of 
obvious errors are looked for: 
• Data outside expected ranges (e.g. gross mass outside norms). 
• Impossible dates (e.g. dates in the future, process steps in wrong order) 
• Data conflicting with other records (e.g. item identity already used). 
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 The error trapping built into data entry screens results in warnings and errors.   
• Warnings indicate that the data is unusual but might be correct.  The person undertaking QA is 
asked to provide a specific comment to acknowledge the warning.  An example of a warning might 
be an unusually low gross mass.  This could indicate a data error (e.g. a decimal point in the 
wrong place) but might be genuine (e.g. drumming off the final material at the end of a production 
run.) 
• Errors indicate that data is clearly incorrect.  The user is not allowed to accept the data.   
• In this implementation, the restriction was added that any errors are assumed to be in the record 
being entered.  This simplification is discussed further in section 11. 
 
A system to allow users to withdraw the most recent record was put in place.  This system fell short of 
the final requirements but was sufficient to allow the project to proceed to the first release.  Again, for 
more discussion on this, see section 11. 
 
Security protocols were built into the system to ensure that only appropriate user groups could see 
and use data entry screens. 
 
One data entry screen (Create Loading Plan) does not actually change the status of a drum or its 
properties.  It simply prepares the system for the next step.  It was agreed that this step would not 
need independent QA. 
 
Manual data entry is provided to allow the users to link the drums to analytical data through the 
Laboratory Serial Number (LSN) uniquely assigned to each set of analysis.  However, the analytical 
data itself is provided automatically from a Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS).  The 
data provided from the LIMS is considered to be a record.  It is subjected to automated QA checks.  If 
these succeed (no warnings or errors) the data is allowed into the system.  If these fail, the data is 
held pending manual QA.  If the reason for the failure is a warning, the operations support or quality 
control groups may accept the results, providing the warning has been acknowledged. 
 
 
6. Implementation – Routine Reporting. 
 
All routine reports are generated from data in the CPITS area of the system.  The reports only reflect 
data that has been through QA.  Draft data and data pending QA is not included in CPITS.  
 
 
7. Implementation – Material Accounts and Inventory Change Reports 
 
In the initial deployment, the CPITS part of the system provides data for the SNMAS part of the 
system which then uses the data to create a transaction.  However, very limited functionality 
associated with the SNMAS system is included.  Instead, data will be transferred to the existing 
Nuclear Materials Accountancy System (NMAS) which will be used to provide accounting functionality 
and produce Inventory Change Reports. 
 
 
8. Learning about the Model – General Points 
 
The model was generally shown to be robust.   
 
The need for separation between different parts of the model was highlighted.  Rework was caused as 
the model was developed when insufficient separation was identified. 
 
Ensuring appropriate data security caused some issues.  This was because it was not considered right 
at the start of the project.  Although the project had only been going a few months when data security 
was added, there was already a significant amount of rework required.  Other projects should consider 
data security right at the start of product development. 
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9. Learning about the Model – Corrections. 
 
The biggest issue which slowed the project down was the failure to appreciate the complexity caused 
by bitemporal data. 
 
All records received into the database have two time stamps, the “event date” timestamp indicates 
when the thing referred to in the record actually happened, while the “system date” time stamp 
indicates when the record became known to the system.  These two timestamps have an effect on 
both data input and output. 
 
The effect on data input is that, when considering if the data being presented is consistent, the system 
must consider the event date not the system date.  When telling the system that item x moved from B 
to C at time t, the system needs to consider whether the item was at B at time t, not whether it is there 
now. 
 
To complicate this, data may be entered in the wrong order.  This is particularly likely if the data is 
being entered from two different sources.  A simple example of this is shown with the application of 
analytical results to the system.  The UO3 drums are placed into the drum store as soon as possible 
after production.  At that point, we have to report on the mass of UO3 leaving the production area and 
being placed in the store.  However, the chemical analysis of the UO3 to determine its assay will not 
have been completed.  Later, when the analytical results become available we have to correct the 
movement report with a more accurate figure.   
 
Data input is further complicated by corrections.  As a general principle, while the users are expected 
to ensure data is as correct as possible when it is originally entered, and the system should facilitate 
this, human performance is fallible.  The system has to assume that if there is any possibility of 
entering data which is in error, then sooner or later it will happen and corrections will be required.  
Where a series of corrections are input, it may be the case that none of the corrections are valid on 
their own, but the series is fine.   
 
For data output, the system needs to consider that the user may ask three similar but very different 
questions. 
• The question operations will normally ask is “What is the state of the system now?”  
• As part of historic investigations, we may need to ask “What do I now believe the state of the 
system was at time t?”. 
• When trying to get data to line up for purposes such as QA, we may need to ask “At time t1, what 
did I believe the state of the system was at time t0?”  This is a particularly important question 
when making sure that data held in different systems is aligned, as it avoids the need to suspend 
data entry in one system while a related system is being updated. 
 
The project concluded that the considerable problems raised by bitemporal data were too difficult to fix 
in the timeframe allowed for release 1.  As a fall back, QA constraints were imposed to ensure that the 
differences between system and event date could not result in the system getting into an invalid state.  
The biggest consequence of this is that the correction mechanism used is a “roll back” mechanism 
where only the most recent item can be rolled back and hence corrected.  While this was better than 
the system being replaced (which had no method for the user to make corrections) it was clearly going 
to be unsatisfactory in the long term leaving the need to address this issue in later releases. 
 
 
10. Changes Being Made To The Model To Cover Corrections 
 
In the light of the pilot experience the way the final system works has been changed significantly. 
 
In the pilot, data was received into the system in the form of records.  However, in common with most 
traditional system design, the records are used once to update a database which is then considered to 
be the source of truth on what items are where, etc. 
 
In the revised design, “event sourcing” is used.  The records provided to the system are considered to 
be the source of truth.  These are played into an object model which is used to answer the user’s 
questions about what is there.  If the user wants to know what was there at a given time, using the 
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records that were available at a different time, the system replays the relevant records through the 
system.  This is proving a much better way to answer the bitemporal questions and report on the 
effects of corrections or late data. 
 
 
11. Learning About The Agile Process 
 
We had spent longer than we should have done trying to initiate this project using a traditional 
waterfall technique.  The problem with that approach is that it requires a complete, clear and tightly 
defined and designed end product prior to the commencement of work.  On a site as complex as 
Sellafield, and for a large material tracking system, it would be very difficult to achieve this.  It would 
then be very difficult to get the customers to be able to understand the design documents in sufficient 
detail to confirm that the system is the one they need.  Even if you succeeded in doing that, the 
operations in the plant are changing, and an accurate design for a system now would need to be 
modified by the time the system is built. 
 
To avoid this problem, the project has used an agile methodology.  The particular methodology 
selected was scrum.  In this methodology, the problem is divided up into large chunks known as 
“epics” to get an idea of the amount of work involved.  As work proceeds, these epics are further 
broken down into small “stories”.  Work is divided into short “sprints” of one to four weeks (we have 
been using two week sprints).  Stories are refined prior to the start of the sprint to ensure that the 
developers have sufficient understanding of them. They are then designed, constructed, tested and 
accepted during the sprint.  The work is done in close co-operation with the customer. 
 
The project has found that this has been an extremely effective way of making sure that the product is 
what the customer needs. 
 
The main difficulty the project has experienced with this methodology is confusion when reporting 
back into an engineering environment where, for very good reasons, the waterfall approach is far more 
common. 
 
It is also vital to keep the real customer involved with the process.  How well the system meets the 
customer’s needs depends very largely on getting the right level of involvement. 
 
Scope creep is a potential problem.  The customer can easily ask questions along the lines of “can 
you just add a bit on to enable the system to …?”  To prevent this from happening, the customer and 
project team have to have a very clear idea of the objective and scope of the project, and the product 
owner has to challenge if additional work does not seem to contribute to meeting the objective.  It is 
also worth noting that this is a problem in “waterfall” projects as well.  However, in waterfall projects, it 
tends not to be changing scope because the customer sees the possibilities, but rather the customer 
asking for things at the start of the project to be done “just in case” or in a way that will not be efficient.  
As a result, waterfall projects can end up with very good functionality which is rarely if ever used, and 





Evaluation at the end of the pilot phase confirmed that the basic model in use by the project appeared 
to be sound.  
 
The need to consider data security right at the start of work of this type was highlighted. 
 
The issues arising from the bitemporal problem were highlighted and an alternative approach is now 
being used.  
 
The advantages of using an agile development method were highlighted. 
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ESARDA Symposium 2015 / 37th Annual Meeting, 18-21 May, Manchester, UK 
Closing Plenary 
Irmgard Niemeyer
ESARDA Vice President 
Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues, good afternoon and welcome to the closing session of 
the 37th ESARDA Annual Meeting in Manchester. 
The closing session of an event like this always offers an excellent opportunity to review the 
past days, to sort the many impressions and achievements, and probably also to realize what 
you may have missed. So I will try to give a brief overview of some Symposium highlights, 
noting that this summary may be subjective and to some extend different from what you have 
experienced. 
Summary 
Most of us this gathered already on Monday in course of the traditional working group (WG) 
and committee meetings before the official start of the ESARDA Symposium. Six WGs hold 
meetings with 20 to 30 participants each, covering organisational issues, the review of joint 
projects, such as the International WG on Gamma Spectroscopy Techniques (NDA WG), 
inter-laboratory comparison programs for quality control (DA WG), and presentations on a 
variety of topics, such as antineutrino detection (NA/NT WG) as well as satellite imagery and 
geoinformation technologies (VTM WG). The details of the meetings will be available soon 
via ESARDA’s information repository of CIRCABC. 
Approximately 30 participants attended the open meeting “Building Capability in Safeguards 
R&D – A Role for Universities” on Monday. The objectives of this event were 1) to provide 
some basic safeguards background for those new to ESARDA and the safeguards world, 
especially those from the UK nuclear research community, 2) to demonstrate university 
research projects that have developed to include support for the safeguards regime and 3) to 
describe training opportunities and existing networks for increasing safeguards awareness and 
understanding amongst university researchers and young nuclear professionals more generally 
(specifically the ESARDA and wider Europe Young Generation Networks). During the 
discussions, it turned out that there is a continuing demand for and benefits of short courses to 
increase safeguards awareness and basic understanding, also to help researchers to identify 
possible safeguards applications for otherwise non-safeguards projects. Though this demand 
for providing safeguards education, taught courses specific to safeguards remain limited, 
including because of the ‘niche’ nature of the subject. The participants identified means for 
more systematic higher-level safeguards engagement with the UK University nuclear research 
community. 
Also the Steering Committee (SC) discussed, among other topics, the importance of 
safeguards education and training. The chair of the TKM WG, Sophie Grape from Uppsala 
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University, presented a strategy paper entitled “Building a strategy for ESARDA – Education, 
Training and Knowledge Management”. The SC acknowledged this initiative, next to the 
ESARDA Young Generation initiative, in order to increase the awareness of nuclear 
safeguards by making educational and research material available. However, the success of 
this strategy requires support from all ESARDA WGs, and I call on all ESARDA WG 
members to contribute to the initiative. The strategy paper presented will also be available in 
the symposium proceedings.  
Moreover, SC was pleased to approve an application for membership from the Nuclear 
Research and Consultancy Group, NRG, the only provider of nuclear services in the 
Netherlands. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the first US National lab joining ESARDA 
activities in the very early 80’s, applied for associated membership, and the SC approved this 
application, too. Hence, the number of ESARDA parties and associated members is 
constantly increasing. 
In the evening, just before the reception, the INMM International Safeguards Division (ISD) 
met. This event attracted about 35 participants and included presentations on the 
quantification of detection probabilities, the forthcoming joint INMM/ESARDA Workshop: 
“Building International Capacity” and general background on the NPT Review Conferences.  
On Tuesday, the ESARDA president Jim Tushingham opened the ESARDA Symposium 
officially. The opening plenary included four invited speakers providing keynotes. 
First, Mr. Sallit, Deputy Chief Nuclear Inspector and Programme at the Office of Nuclear 
Regulation (ONR), introduced the safeguards obligations of the UK in fulfilment of the 
related treaties and safeguards agreements. As part of the Cross ONR Programme, safeguards 
tasks of ONR are to provide the UK Government with informed independent assessment of 
safeguards application and compliance in the UK, to meet the international and domestic 
safeguards-related reporting obligations, and to provide advice and support to the Department 
of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) and other Government Departments on safeguards 
implementation in the UK, the effectiveness of regulation and associated policy development.  
The second keynote was given by Prof. Sucha, Director General of the EC Joint Research 
Centres (JRC). He emphasised the importance of the many contributions of the JRC for 
nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards and security by referring, inter alia, to the 15 years 
anniversary of the on-site laboratories at the reprocessing plants located at Sellafield (UK) and 
La Hague (France), the development of verification technologies based on 3D laser scanning 
for Design Information/Basic Technical Characteristics Verification (DIV/BTC), and the 
provision of certified reference materials. Prof. Sucha recognized as one of the largest 
challenges that too much knowledge would be available and therefore called for further 
efforts on knowledge management, for example by means of a new knowledge centre on 
energy under the JRC as focal point. 
Third, Ms. Renis addressed the Symposium on behalf of IAEA DDG Mr. Vajoranta. In her 
keynote, she reported, inter alia, on the implementation of measures under the Framework for 
Cooperation and the Joint Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear programme, noting also the 
implications of the additional verification efforts on personnel and budget. She provided an 
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update on the safeguards implementation at the State level and the plans of the IAEA to 
update the existing State-level safeguards approaches (SLAs) under Integrated Safeguards and 
to develop SLAs for other States in future. With reference to the data on safeguards activities 
listed in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) 2014, Ms. Renis noted the challenge of 
doing more with less. She stated that enhancing the effectiveness and improving the 
efficiency of IAEA safeguards could only be achieved by improving the productivity of 
processes, including 1) optimization of internal processes, 2) enhanced cooperation by 
Member States and 3) better use of modern technologies. 
In the fourth keynote, Dr. Szymanski, Director EC ENER E, described developments within 
Euratom since the last ESARDA Annual Meeting with regard to 1) strengthening of 
communication with stakeholders, 2) completing the integrated management system, 3) 
improving effectiveness and efficiency of Euratom safeguards, and 4) improving relations 
with the IAEA. He also gave an update on the technical developments for the in-field 
inspection activities, including, inter alia, the progress on remote data transmission and 
equipment (DCVD, EOSS sealing interface for operators, NDA equipment in fuel 
fabrication). Dr. Szymanski recognized the important role of ESARDA in the development of 
new approaches, innovations and technological advances, noting that Euratom strongly relies 
on the support provided by ESARDA.  
All speakers emphasized the challenges of the today’s changing (nuclear) world given the 
shrinking financial resources and called for technical and scientific innovations and to work 
even more closely together.  
The Symposium continued with the technical plenary with contributions from the INMM 
President Mr. Satkowiak, Mr. Abousahl (EC DG JRC) on the nuclear safeguards and security 
activities under Euratom research and training programme, Ms. Mathews (IAEA) on recent 
developments in IAEA safeguards guidance and outreach, Mr. Seya (JAEA) on the JAEA-
ISCN’s NDA development programs, and Mr. Johnson (ONR) on the experience 
implementing the UK Additional Protocol. The papers of the technical plenary will be 
published soon via the ESARDA website. 
On Tuesday afternoon, the technical sessions started. 119 Papers were presented in 23 
sessions, including one poster session, and covered a large variety of topics:  




• Training and Knowledge Management
• Nuclear Material Accountancy
• Geological Repositories
• Containment and Surveillance
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• Integrated Measurement and Monitoring
• Spent Fuel Verification
• Inhomogeneous Material Verification
• Neutron Measurements
• Gamma Measurements
• Uncertainties in NDA Measurements
• He-3 Alternatives for Neutron Detection
• Destructive Analysis (Quality Control, Measurements)
• Combined Analytical Techniques
• Novel Technologies and Forensics
• Geospatial Information
• Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
All papers presented at the 37th ESARDA Annual Meeting will be made available via the 
ESARDA website, while a selection of “best papers” will also be published in the ESARDA 
Bulletin. In this context, I should like to point out, that the Editorial Committee would 
appreciate if more volunteers could assist with the peer review of these papers.  
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The closing session is also the place to say “Thank you” you to all people being involved in 
the Symposium. 
My first and sincere thanks go to Jim Tushingham, our ESARDA president and Chair of the 
ESARDA Symposium. Jim, my congratulations for successfully preparing, organising and 
holding the 37th ESARDA Annual Meeting in Manchester. While the City of Manchester 
alone was worth a visit, the organisational settings of the Symposium, including also the 
reception at the Midland Hotel, the Symposium dinner at Tatton Park, and the evening tours 
to the Cold War Nuclear Bunker at Hackgreen were outstanding. 
I am grateful to the National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) for hosting the Symposium and the 
ESARDA Event Management Team from Marick Communications for their professional 
support. 
Moreover, I would like to thank Filippo Sevini, our ESARDA secretary for his efforts, not 
only in the context of this Symposium. Filippo, please pass my thanks also to Andrea de Luca 
for his support with regard to ESARDA website, EasyChair and others. 
I should also like to thank our sponsors for their financial support, specifically the exhibition 
sponsors Baltic Scientific Instruments, Canberra, Hybrid Instruments, Kromek, Nu 
Instruments, and Thermo Fisher Scientific, the coffee sponsors Sellafield Ltd and Urenco, as 
well as the technical sponsors EC, JRC ITU and NNL. 
Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Manchester, UK, 19-21 May 2015
1044
I wish to thank the members of the Symposium Committee for their time and efforts to review 
almost 130 abstracts and to structure the programme of this symposium. On a related note, I 
also thank JRC ITU Ispra for hosting the 1.5 days Symposium Committee meeting in January. 
Last but not least, I would like to extend my thanks to all of you, the 218 participants of the 
37th ESARDA Annual Meeting, representing 73 institutions. We have had 22 participants 
from 10 universities, 36 participants from 17 institutions from outside Europe. Thank you 
very much for your interest, time and contributions. 
Outlook 
Lastly, this final session also offers a chance to announce future ESARDA meetings. 
True to the motto “After the Game is before the Game”, the organisation of the 2017 event 
has already started. I am pleased to announce that the ESARDA Symposium 2017 will be 
held in Germany and hosted by Forschungszentrum Jülich and is likely to take place in the 
vicinity of the research centre, with date and venue still to be decided. 
The next ESARDA Annual Meeting will take place in Luxembourg in May 2016 as internal 
meeting of all ESARDA WGs. Before, many of the WGs meet in Oct/Nov 2015 at JRC ITU 
Ispra.  
However, there are some possibilities to continue your ESARDA activities already tomorrow. 
You may attend the meeting of the IS WG or the joint meeting of the NDA and DA WGs. The 
WG Meetings are open to all interested participants. Moreover, Urenco has generously 
offered a site visit to their uranium enrichment facility at Capenhurst tomorrow.  
Finally, I wanted to point again to the 8th INMM/ESARDA Joint Workshop 2015, entitled 
“Building International Capacity. The workshop will be held from October 4 to 7, 2015, at the 
Jackson Lake Lodge just inside the Grand Teton National Park near Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 
During four concurrent working group sessions, a total of 12 topics related to non-
proliferation and nuclear security, arms control, international safeguards, and education and 
training will be discussed. Information about registration and the venue can be found at the 
workshop’s website at http://www.inmm.org/8th_INMM_ESARDA_Workshop.htm. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, now I have the honour to officially close the 37th ESARDA Annual 
Meeting. On behalf of the Symposium Programme Committee, I thank you all for your 
participation and for making this symposium a success. I hope you will take numerous 
impressions, new contacts and new ideas home with you. I wish you a very pleasant 
remaining stay in the city of Manchester and a safe travel home.  
Thank you very much. 
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